This table will be revised continuously. Suggestions for
revision are welcome. It is intended as an aid to thinking about
the material in Psychology 153/600, which is most of the field of
judgment and decision making. Perhaps the categories run into
each other. But this may still help.
| Bias
| Normative model
| Explanation |
| I. ATTENTION |
| I. A. Availability, attention to here and now, easy, and compatible |
| errors in syllogisms
| logic
| limited search |
| four-card problem
| logic
| limited search |
| anchoring and underadjustment
| right answer to the question asked
| underadjustment |
| availability in causes of death
| right answer
| availability |
| fault tree effect
| probability additivity
| availability |
| asymmetric dominance
| independence of irrelevant alternatives
| neglect of difficult judgment |
| evaluability effect
| invariance principle
| neglect of difficult |
| dynamic inconsistency
| consistent discounting
| attention to short-term |
| preference reversal for gambles
| invariance principle
| response mode compatibility |
| identifiable victim
| utilitarianism
| proportionality |
| planning fallacy
| regression to the mean
| individuating information |
| I. B. Heuristics based on imperfect correlations |
| gambler's fallacy
| independence of events
| representativeness |
| hindsight bias
| right answer
| availability |
| outcome bias
| right answer
| availability |
| information bias
| value of information
| information heuristic |
| congruence bias
| value of information
| congruence heuristic |
| status-quo bias
| invariance principle
| status-quo heuristic |
| ambiguity effect
| EU (expected-utility) theory (sure-thing principle)
| missing information heuristic |
| omission bias
| EU or utilitarianism
| do-no-harm heuristic |
| punishment without deterrence
| utilitarianism
| reciprocity heuristic |
| natural bias
| utility theory
| naturalness heuristic |
| proportionality bias
| EU theory (linear in p)
| proportionality heuristic |
| zero-risk bias
| EU theory
| proportionality heuristic |
| extra cost effect
| utility theory (only future consequences matter)
| confusion of total and marginal cost |
| sunk cost effect (only future consequences matter)
| utility theory
| no-waste heuristic |
| ex-ante equality
| utilitarianism
| equality heuristic |
| voter's illusion
| cause-effect
| cause-correlation confusion |
| diversification
| utility theory
| adaptation heuristic |
| I. C. Focus on one attribute with unawareness of others |
| neglect of priors
| Bayes's theorem
| representativeness |
| nonregressiveness in prediction
| regression to the mean
| representativeness |
| conjunction effect
| logic and probability
| representativeness |
| illusion of control
| contingency
| attention to outcome |
| prominence effect
| invariance
| importance heuristic |
| neglect of ranges
| multi-attribute utility theory
| importance heuristic |
| single mindedness
| multi-attribute utility theory
| limited attention |
| failure to integrate
| utility maximization
| isolation |
| fixed-pie assumption
| multi-attribute utility theory
| failure to see trade-offs |
| parochialism effect
| utilitarianism
| self-interest illusion |
| II. MOTIVATED BIAS - MYSIDE BIAS AND WISHFUL THINKING |
| inappropriate extreme confidence
| calibration
| myside bias in search, regression to the mean |
| wishful thinking
| independence of belief and value
| effect of desire on belief |
| selective exposure
| fairness toward evidence
| selective exposure |
| biased assimilation
| neutral evidence principle
| biased assimilation |
| polarization
| neutral evidence principle
| biased assimilation |
| belief overkill
| uncorrelated beliefs
| myside bias |
| illusory correlation
| correlation
| biased assimilation |
| primacy effect
| order principle
| biased assimilation |
| distortion of fairness by self-interest
| universalizability of morality
| wishful thinking |
| morality as self-interest illusion
| self-other distinction
| belief overkill |
| III. PSYCHOPHYSICAL DISTORTIONS |
| certainty effect
| EU theory (linear probability)
| diminishing sensitivity |
| overweighting low probabilities
| EU theory (linear probability)
| diminishing sensitivity |
| declining marginal disutility
| increasing marginal disutility
| diminishing sensitivity |
| framing effect for gains and losses
| invariance principle
| diminishing sensitivity |
| dynamic inconsistency
| consistent discounting
| diminishing sensitivity to time |