

*for*  
KAUSHALYA AND BHAVANESH KAUL  
*and for*  
PRIMLA LOOMBA

# *The Partitions of Memory*

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THE AFTERLIFE OF THE DIVISION  
OF INDIA

*Edited by*  
SUVIR KAUL

 INDIANA  
University Press  
Bloomington & Indianapolis

2001

## Partition and the North West Frontier: Memories of Some Khudai Khidmatgars

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THE NORTH WEST Frontier may seem an unlikely site in which to explore the legacy of Partition. For a ninety-six per cent Muslim majority province<sup>1</sup> which became a part of Pakistan in August 1947, it seems a less problematic issue compared to other provinces where the proportion of Muslims and Hindus was not this straightforward. Nor was it like East Pakistan which the Muslim League bargained for and made part of Pakistan despite it being separated from its western half by the expanse of India. The Frontier on the other hand, was conveniently positioned, lying adjacent to the provinces of Sind, Balochistan and the Punjab, which formed West Pakistan.

On second thoughts however, there emerge several reasons for the need to explore the legacy of Partition in the Frontier. It was, for example, the only Muslim majority province to have three Congress ministries between the years 1930 and 1947 and was the site of one of the most remarkable historical instances of the practice of non-violence. The practitioners were the famous Pathan Red Shirts, the Khudai Khidmatgars, led by their charismatic leader Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan who is known to most in the Indian sub-continent as Badshah Khan or Frontier Gandhi. The Pathans had been allied to the Indian National Congress since 1930, were political and ideological opponents

of the All India Muslim League throughout and had an elected ministry in place at the time of the Third June Plan. Unlike other provinces in British India, however, they were subjected to a referendum to decide whether they would join India or Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> Badshah Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgars (hereafter KKKs) found the referendum an unfair imposition and boycotted it; the result of the referendum was therefore unsurprisingly in favour of the NWFP joining Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> Making nonsense of their geographical contiguity with Pakistan but much of their ideological identification with the Congress, the KKKs often posed the rhetorical question in the 1990s that, 'If East and West Pakistan could be separated by India, why could not we form West India and be separated from the rest of India by Pakistan?' They repeated to me Badshah Khan's last words to the Congress, 'You have thrown us to the wolves.'

A second reason for considering the legacy of the Partition in the Frontier is to represent for the first time the point of view of the political actors in the Frontier which has been entirely ignored so far in the historiography of the Independence movement. The KKK movement has been written about by a few scholars, but mostly from historical records and literary sources and some interviews with political leaders of the movement.<sup>4</sup> In my interviews with KKKs in the early 1990s, I explored the praxis of the ideology of the movement and what the *bricolage* of Islam, Pukhtun custom and non-violence meant for ordinary Pukhtuns. This was essential for an understanding of the KKK movement through which a sense of pan-Pukhtun identity was forged for the first time.

Badshah Khan's appeals for non-violence were achieved through a cessation of intra-Pukhtun feuding and the adoption of new forms of loyalty and hierarchy that the structures of leadership and recruitment in the movement brought about. These changes in Pukhtun society were a revolution in themselves. What I hope to do in this article is to use the testimonies of the KKKs to focus particularly on their memories of Partition and the independence they had fought so hard for.<sup>5</sup> Nearly fifty years after the event, most of the KKKs I spoke to shared memories of betrayal, profound sadness, helplessness and bewilderment about

the way in which their struggle ended in 1947. Their betrayal was two-fold. They felt rejected by the Congress on the one hand for agreeing to the referendum on their behalf and by the Muslim League on the other, for they were never recognized as freedom-fighters in the new nation of Pakistan.

It is also interesting to explore whether the political machinations for negotiating the terms of Partition encoded assumptions and preconceptions about the Frontier on the part of all the major political players: the British, the Congress and the Muslim League. All the players had certain notions about the Frontier and its people and these were displayed in several statements they made about it. Fundamentally they, as most people in India today, worked with a stereotype of the Frontier which seems to be close to the image of the Pathan we get from reading stories such as Tagore's 'Kabuliwallah' or Kipling's *Kim*. This stereotype of the Pathan is of a hot-headed, fiercely loyal man with a fragile ego, prone to violent retaliation but also gentle, almost child-like, in his behaviour towards those he loves. C.F. Andrews described Badshah Khan thus: 'In the year 1936 I was privileged to spend many days at Mahatma Gandhi's village home in Central India, at a time when Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan was staying with him. He is one of the noblest Muslims I have ever met, as tender as a child and as brave as a lion.'<sup>6</sup> Nehru, in *Discovery of India*, observed, 'When it is remembered that a Pathan loves his gun more than his brother, is easily excited, and has long had a reputation for killing at the slightest provocation, this self-discipline [in the KKs] appears little short of miraculous.'<sup>7</sup> But he goes on, 'Changes of religion made a difference, but could not change entirely the mental backgrounds which the people of those areas developed.'<sup>8</sup> During the run-up to Partition, Gandhi warned, 'Any fight among the Pathans themselves, who were a martial people, would be most regrettable and they were endeavouring to find means to avoid the referendum and its consequences.'<sup>9</sup>

This conception of the Pathan may have had an important role to play when it came to deciding whether to bargain for the Frontier to remain in India or to allow it go to Pakistan. In the final instance, the

elected ministry led by Dr Khan Sahib in 1947 was not consulted when the decision to hold a referendum was taken and ratified by the AICC. It is worth speculating why this was allowed to happen.

'Frontier and Partition': this title, a pairing of contradictions, provides another entry point. Partition creates boundaries of the kind which exists today between India and Pakistan: a no-man's land flanked by barbed wires, severely protected, a hysterical political desire to keep two sides of the same community hermetically sealed off from each other.<sup>10</sup> A frontier on the other hand, is a region of exchange of cultures, goods, ideas and people. The North West Frontier of the Indian sub-continent has remained just such a place. Indeed, even today, the Durand Line demarcating Afghanistan from Pakistan, dividing the Pathans between two nation-states, is a porous zone through which refugees, trucks, drugs, guns and news of war flow easily. This has been the case always. As one of my informants from the Tribal Areas said, 'There used to be regular crossings across the Durand Line . . . British law was disregarded.' The Durand Line is thus the opposite of a boundary. This fact was beautifully demonstrated during the death and funeral of Badshah Khan in 1988, a recent memory for most of the sub-continent. The Frontier Gandhi died in Peshawar but was buried in Jalalabad, Afghanistan;<sup>11</sup> for his funeral a day's ceasefire was called in the Afghanistan war, thousands of his mourners from Pakistan were allowed to cross-over into Afghanistan without any formalities and political Premiers broke with protocol to attend. A frontier cannot be easily partitioned because its very nature as a region of exchange does not allow it.

Finally, I offer a personal example of what it is like for an ordinary Indian to live and work in Pakistan. I visited Pakistan over three trips between 1990 and 1993, staying for several months during the second. I lived in the house of Khan Abdul Wali Khan, the most politically active of Badshah Khan's sons, and a well-acknowledged friend of India.<sup>12</sup> I had gone to the Frontier with the express purpose of looking for surviving KKs in order to talk to them at some length about their perspective on non-violence, why they chose it, how difficult it

was and so on. I was lucky enough to find seventy of them after much searching and their stories form an important component of my research data.<sup>13</sup> I will draw on these testimonies in this article and would like to emphasize that these stories and opinions were shared with me not merely because I was a curious researcher but also because I am Indian. To them, I came from the country they had fought for: this they told me repeatedly, so I would understand. Being young, Hindu, Bengali, and a woman, made my situation curious to the authorities but unambiguous to my informants. This convinced them that I was there not with any political agenda or to search for my roots but because I really wanted to hear their stories. My Pathan and Pakistani colleagues and friends were suspicious of what these old men said to me, impatient at my interest in the opinions of a bunch of toothless, ordinary peasants ('they were just blind followers of Badshah Khan!'). Comparing notes with some of them who spoke to some of my informants as well, I found that the stories and opinions that I was privileged to hear were not repeated to them.<sup>14</sup> As an anthropologist and as an Indian I maintain that it is crucial to understand their point of view to accord them their place in history. The struggle of KKKs, their membership of the Congress, and their eventual inclusion in Pakistan at Independence turned them into 'traitors' in their new country. The Frontier was not partitioned, it is true, but it did isolate some freedom fighters forever, in their own country. KKKs and their leaders ironically spent more time in jail perhaps after Independence than before it. When I met these old men in the early 1990s, they were a marginalized and forgotten lot among their own people. Most of them were not alive to witness the jubilee celebrations of India and Pakistan and perhaps that is a good thing. For it would have resurrected for them, even more profoundly, the irony of their situation:

#### The Frontier and the Congress

The relationship between the Congress and the Frontier was always fraught with ambiguities and misunderstandings. The KKK movement was the culmination of nearly two decades of Congress and other political activity in the North West Frontier. Initially the Congress in the

NWFP was affiliated to the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee and came under its jurisdiction. But in 1928, the Frontier Congress decided to establish itself as an independent Provincial Congress Committee. The general secretary of the Frontier Congress accordingly wrote to Nehru, then secretary of the AICC:

I am directed to say that according to the original constitution of the Congress, the NWFP was separate from the Punjab. In 1923 at the Cocanada session of the Congress, it was however, at the insistence of the Frontier local workers, amalgamated with the Punjab. Since then, though it has been connected with the Punjab, the PPCC have not been able to devote any time or attention to our province with the result that there has been no Congress work here worth the name. Under the circumstances, the Frontier local workers had no option but to stand on their own legs and organize the work themselves . . . On the evening of the 17th Nov. after putting up a very successful demonstration of 'Black Flags' . . . Frontier Provincial workers met under the Presidentship of Mr Abdur Rahim Khan . . . and formed their own provisional PCC.<sup>15</sup>

This show of initiative on the part of the NWF Provincial Congress took the high command by surprise and Nehru was firm in his objection. He wrote back:

I am little surprised to learn that a separate Provincial Congress Committee has been established in Peshawar. Separate PC can only be established by a decision of the Congress in its annual sessions. No other organization has authority to do so. I have no doubt that the Congress in Calcutta will agree to your proposal but so long as this formal sanction is not obtained we cannot treat your committee as a PCC . . . I would therefore request you to continue to function for the moment as part of the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee . . .<sup>16</sup>

This exchange of letters provides some idea of the nature of relations between the AICC and the North West Frontier at the outset. Until 1928, the Congress organization in the Frontier was weak and quite unremarkable, with almost no mass support; it was regarded by Congress national HQ with a degree of suspicion and patronizing tolerance as representing what was, to Delhi and Calcutta, a little understood and rather enigmatic part of British India. Things were to change

rather dramatically with the events in Kissa Khani bazaar in April 1930, when the sacrifice and the courage of the Pukhtuns was lauded and recognized for the first time at an all-India level.

It is alleged that British troops fired at a crowd of unarmed demonstrators at Kissa Khani bazaar. The news of this incident took some time to filter out of the Frontier and when it did, the AICC immediately sent Sardar Patel to carry out an investigation.<sup>17</sup> It also said in its monthly report of April 1930:

News of the Peshawar incidents was withheld by the Government and only garbled versions were given to the public. Part of the truth leaked out, however, which electrified the whole country. The courage, the patriotism, the non-violent spirit of the war-like Peshawaris<sup>18</sup> became famous and earned for the whole province a unique place in the history of the struggle. Peshawar day was celebrated all over the country to commemorate the heroic deeds of that city.

It was after this event that the emerging KK movement was faced with a ban. Only an affiliation with an established, respectable, national political party could ensure its survival and prevent its being labelled 'Bolshevik', implying a violent and subversive revolutionary faction: 'We could do this only by joining the Muslim League or the Congress' [Haji Sarfaraz Nazim].\* Badshah Khan, despite his personal links with the Congress, felt that as Muslims, the KK ought naturally to affiliate with the Muslim League. Though in jail at the time, he allowed two KK leaders to approach the Muslim League about affiliation: their request was rebuffed. They then turned to the Congress, who made no effort to conceal their scepticism at the idea of a non-violent Pukhtun movement. Sarfaraz Nazim narrated to me the incident when Mian Jaffar Shah and Mian Akbar Khan approached the AICC for permission to affiliate:

Tyabji, the Secretary of the Congress at the time, wondered how non-violence and the Frontier were ever going to be compatible. Our leaders then convinced him that NWFP had more non-violence than the rest of India. Fazle Rahim Saqi remembered Mahatma Gandhi asking the

\*The names in square brackets at the end of quotes refer to the informant I am quoting.

Pathans 'What do you want and how?' (And Mahatma Gandhi sent Patel to the Frontier later to check out what we said). Our representative said that we wanted the British out of our country and with non-violence. Only then did Gandhi agree to the affiliation.

This was the first of many occasions on which the KKs had to prove their worth to the Congress, as being capable of 'civil' resistance, not merely of unruly fighting.<sup>19</sup>

In 1930 when Abdul Gaffar Khan was appointed by the AICC to coordinate the all India civil resistance programme in the NWFP, it was not without some apprehension:

The local Khilafat Committee has received a letter from Nehru asking for their proposals for carrying out the programme of civil disobedience. The letter laid stress on the importance of observing non-violence *in view of the traditional reputation of the people of the Frontier for the opposite characteristic*. The local committee has referred to Abdul Gaffar Khan, who has been in consultation with the Congress and Khilafat Committee of Peshawar. The only concrete proposal so far has been picketing of liquor shops. . . .<sup>20</sup>

The Government probably expected unruly mobs and noisy demonstrations and this early encounter with civil disobedience (picketing) must have seemed an anti-climax.

While affiliation to the Congress provided much needed official credentials for the KKs at the time, it carried with it a tension that was to last through its entire existence. The source of the tension was twofold. First, the KK movement was primarily a movement of rural Pukhtuns, who were effectively cut off from the rest of the Indian sub-continent, where the Congress had its mass base. There was thus little interaction between the activists of the two sides. Also, the Frontier was (and continues to be) a subject of curiosity for Indians who lived beyond the Indus, an enigma with strange customs of blood-feuds and tribal loyalty, and their view of the 'violent Pathans' was every bit as stereotypical as that of the British. My informants recalled several of their visits to India which they remembered with affection. They also remember being taunted by other Muslims in India for not being 'real' Pathans who fought with arms; they bore these taunts with irritation

but great wit. The KKs were aware that 'incidents of firing by the police and their atrocities occurred with far more frequency and closer to each other in the Frontier than anywhere else in the Indian sub-continent.' For many reasons therefore, the KK movement always remained exclusively a Pukhtun movement.

Further, Badshah Khan himself desired that the KKs remain discrete from Congress organization in the Frontier. It was his novel ideology, combining aspects of Islam and non-violence while keeping in mind traditional Pukhtun codes of behaviour, which had attracted a large majority of believing Muslim Pukhtun peasants. The organization had its civil and military wings; the latter consisted of the mass rural base who wore red uniforms and had all the trappings of an army, save the arms. The 'civil' or *jirga* wing mostly had older and literate people in it. While Badshah Khan admitted to being Gandhi's disciple, he was well aware that popular response in the frontier was to *him* personally and to his own non-Hindu articulation of non-violence. He thus needed to maintain the clarity of his leadership, without confusing it with that of the Congress. As Mohammed Gul put it, 'Badshah Khan . . . was to the Frontier what Mahatma Gandhi was to the rest of India.'

This was one of the reasons behind having two separate wings in the KK movement. The military wing was more populist, explicitly Pukhtun, and largely autonomous. The civil *jirga* wing kept far closer coordinating ties with the Congress Committee. The Governor, George Cunningham, accurately reported Badshah Khan's policy.

Abdul Gaffar Khan insists on absolute independence for the Red Shirts; and maintains that any support or allegiance accorded to the Congress party by Red Shirts will be given under his orders and that the Red Shirts will take orders from nobody else. To ensure that this procedure is followed in practice he has appointed his nephew, Rab Nawaz, as commander-in-chief of the Red Shirts—thereby providing a further insulator against Congress interference. In this connection a general tendency in Ministerial circles is noticeable to avoid interference by the Congress Executive in Provincial administrative affairs . . . Abdul Gaffar Khan . . . has not attended recent AICC meetings, and has of late become more parochial in his

activities. These . . . go to show that the Red Shirts are determined to maintain their own independence as an organization . . . A corollary to this view is that the Congress executive will go a long way to retain the allegiance of the Red Shirts and that Dr Khan Sahib will be given a long rein in implementing his policy.<sup>21</sup>

The last sentence indicates the leverage that the KKs (or the Red Shirts, as the British and Indians preferred to call them) had with the Congress. They provided the mass Pukhtun following from which the Congress ministries derived their legitimacy in NWFP. That the Congress was governing there was a vital vindication of its claim to represent both Muslim and Hindu populations throughout India. Several of my informants could vividly remember visits by Congress leaders to the Frontier Province. For instance, Gul Rahman, who used to be the General Secretary of Pdang, recalled that several Indian leaders were at the camps which used to be held at least once in three or four months. Likewise, Waris Khan remembered that Vijaylakshmi Pandit laid the foundation for the Khudai Khidmatgar Centre in Sardaryab and Gul Samand Khan remembered Devdas Gandhi's visit to the Frontier.<sup>22</sup> However, if the Congress gained kudos, the KK movement itself tended to suffer from the Congress ministries' weak performance in Provincial government. Its inability to deliver radical land reform tended to demoralize the peasantry and weaken KK activism.

The decision about keeping the two wings separate was Badshah Khan's idea, but there was always ambiguity surrounding this decision. He needed to keep the KKs away from the Congress to avoid the effect of *realpolitik* on party discipline but also the Congress away from the KKs because he was aware that the KKs' first allegiance was to him as a Pukhtun leader. Badshah Khan appears to have used the confusion with skill. He was rarely blamed in the several tensions and disagreements between the Congress and himself, and even when criticized, neither his credibility and following among the Pukhtuns nor his allegiance to the Congress and Gandhi were ever in serious doubt. If Badshah Khan had definite reasons for keeping the two organizations separate, he did not state them. The rumours and the uncertainty surrounding the autonomy of the KKs kept the speculations going and Badshah Khan

did not need to commit himself by admitting that his loyalties were divided, if indeed they were. Both wings had their uses in the political life of the Frontier and he seemed to have worked out a division of labour both with his brother and within the organization to keep the Congress and the KK functioning independently and parallel to each other.

When Gandhi visited the Frontier it was reported thus:

Mr Gandhi's visit . . . not a great success . . . his object in coming here not very clear . . . he no doubt, feels great anxiety regarding the relation between the Congress and the Red Shirt Party. Abdul Gaffar Khan's attitude towards Mr Gandhi is curious. He persists in refusing to allow the Red Shirts to become a part and parcel of the Congress, and shows no sign of changing his tactics in this respect, indeed by doing so he would surrender his independent position as a leader. At the same time he continues to sit at Mr Gandhi's feet as a veritable 'chela'.<sup>23</sup>

Clearly, the 'success', or lack of it, of Gandhi's visit was measured by the colonial government in terms of resolving the perceived tension between the KK organization and the PCC. The real object of his visit seems to have eluded British officials: it was to ascertain how well civil disobedience and non-violence were working in the Frontier. In this respect the trip was successful, inasmuch as Gandhi returned from it greatly reassured of the adherence of the Pukhtuns in the KK to non-violence. Fazle Rahimi Saqi's memory of Gandhi's visit is invaluable to gain an insight into what the visit achieved:

Gandhi was very close to Badshah Khan. He came to the Frontier to meet this army that Badshah Khan had. He said that he wanted to meet the Generals of this army. So the Generals were summoned and 12 of them were introduced to Gandhi in the Khudai Khidmatgar office. Gandhi asked them, 'Do you follow Badshah Khan as your leader? Do you obey him totally?' And they all said a prompt and vehement 'Yes!' Then Gandhi asked them, 'What will your reaction be if Badshah Khan one day decides to change and start to believe in violence?' The Generals tried to tell Gandhi that he was making a mistake and that there was no way in which

Badshah Khan would ever change his ideology. When Gandhi still insisted, a General called Anwar, my father's brother's son, replied, 'We can leave Badshah Khan but we cannot leave non-violence.'

This is believed to have impressed Gandhi very much. The visit also achieved some familiarization on the part of the KKs about leaders of the Congress. Gurfaraz Khan said about this or other visits:

Gandhi came, Nehru came . . . Gandhi was a Hindu, he was in charge of the movement in other parts of India . . . he was a frail man and had a goat with him. Badshah Khan and Dr Khan Sahib accompanied him everywhere; I personally saw him in Peshawar Cantt . . . he had come here because we had invited him . . . without an invitation nobody comes to visit us . . .

Also note here (and in Mohammed Gul's statement that follows at the end of this paragraph) the candid ease with which people in the Frontier spoke of Gandhi. Never was he referred to as 'Gandhiji', the more honorific term of reference in India, neither as 'the Mahatma' or 'Bapu'. Here he was another Congress leader whom they had seen and formed their own opinions about. 'Gandhi was an intelligent politician because he managed to bring the whole of India together . . . that was not an easy task to have accomplished.'

What the Governor did not realize was that his earlier remark about Badshah Khan being a 'veritable chela of Gandhi' was indeed true. Badshah Khan's first allegiance was to Gandhi personally and only secondarily to the All India Congress Committee. Dr Waris told me that 'Badshah Khan used to say that he was Gandhi's soldier . . . he even refused the title of 'Frontier Gandhi' because he felt it created a sense of competitiveness.' On several occasions, he took Gandhi's side against other Congress leaders. The resignation of all Congress Provincial Ministries in 1939 was one such example, where he agreed with Gandhi that resignation was an important act of non-cooperation, even though many of their colleagues were keen on retaining power. In many ways Badshah Khan's role in the Frontier was similar to that of Gandhi's in the subcontinent. They were both ideologues with great

crowd appeal. They both shunned office and left such tasks to Nehru and Dr Khan Sahib respectively, men who were themselves in fact similar (and good friends) and suited to executive duties. This is perhaps the reason why Mohammed Gul said, 'Badshah Khan will never be born again. He was to the Frontier what Mahatma Gandhi was to India . . . There was Dr Khan Sahib and Badshah Khan in the Frontier and Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi in India.' It is interesting to note that Maulana Hamdullah Jan clarified that Badshah Khan was more akin to Gandhi than other Muslim leaders in the Congress, for example, Maulana Azad. When I pressed him to clarify why, he explained, 'The difference between Maulana Azad and Badshah Khan was that the former did not lead a simple life. He wore Turkish clothes, travelled First Class and lived in the best hotels.' Sarfaraz Nazim may have echoed the opinion of his comrades when he said, 'Badshah Khan and Gandhi were reformers born to this world which needed them. They were men who were unshakeable in their beliefs. Mountains would move but their beliefs would not. The Congress Working Committee had some of the best minds. The British were continually creating problems and these leaders always showed the way out of them.' The feeling among all my informants was that Badshah Khan and Gandhi occupied a status which was very special compared to the other leaders around them. This is certainly the feeling today in India too. The Government of India made this clear when it offered a final resting place for Badshah Khan beside Gandhi in Raj Ghat, Delhi, when his death was imminent in 1988.

Most rank and file KKs were aware of the tensions between the Congress organization and their movement and the repercussions these had for the success of their movement. But there was also among the KKs a great sense of pride in the impact they made on outsiders, particularly the Congress. When Nehru arrived in the Province on 26 May 1940 for a short visit, he said nothing sinister but they thought it evident he wanted all the credit for their actions to go to the Congress.<sup>24</sup> Akram Khan remembered one visit by Nehru:

Nehru came to the Frontier in 1938. He went to Hazara and then came to Swabi. We received him by lining the streets, waving flags . . . we were

wearing our uniforms. Nasveen Kaka and me were told to remove the seats in the bus that Nehru was travelling in and make up a bed for him for the night. We greeted him next morning along with Salar Munir Khan and others. Nehru crossed the river in a boat that was decorated in red with a band on board and lots of photographers . . . You see, Hindus also followed Badshah Khan. When Nehru made his speech, he said, 'Thank you for the warm reception, which was not for me but for the President of the Congress.'

Shah Jahan Khan and Gul Rahman told me:

When Gandhi visited the Frontier KKs lined the streets from Utmanzai to Charsadda. At the meeting that was held, Gandhi said: 'I congratulate you that you have the privilege of being led by Badshah Khan. I have been to several public meetings all over the country but the level of organization in today's meeting surpasses all of them. There is so much discipline . . . everybody is so quiet that one can hear the birds!'

The KKs appeared to be well aware of the image that outsiders, not least the leaders of the Congress, had of them as supposedly unruly Pathans. They told me about Gandhi's statement as a way of reassuring me that all they had been telling me about the organization and the peaceful activities of the movement was really true: it had happened, and *even Gandhi had acknowledged it*. Muffariq Shah, a *khan* involved in the movement, reiterated this: 'Our organization consisted of hundreds and hundreds of workers, totally disciplined and ready to carry out any orders given to them by their leaders. Gandhi and Nehru used to be amazed and scared of this army!' This amazement is evident in the following passage from *Discovery of India*:

Of all the remarkable happenings in India in recent times, nothing is more astonishing than the way in which Abdul Gaffar Khan made his turbulent and quarrelsome people accept peaceful methods of political action; involving enormous suffering. That suffering was indeed terrible and has left a trail of bitter memories; and yet their discipline and self-control were such that no act of violence was committed by the Pathans against the Government forces or others opposed to them [in the Frontier, during the 1942 agitations]. There was firing on the demonstrators and the usual methods of suppressing popular activities were adopted. Several thousands of



people were arrested, and even the great Pathan leader, Badshah Khan was seriously injured by police blows. *This was extreme provocation and yet, surprisingly enough, the excellent discipline, which Abdul Gaffar Khan has established among his people, held, and there were no violent disturbances there of the kind that occurred in many parts of the country.*<sup>25</sup>

The alliance with the Congress was a process of reciprocity between the KK and the larger nationalist movement. As one of my informants, Haji Sarfaraz Nazim saw it, there was a clear symbiosis between the KK and the Congress. The Congress claimed to represent all communities and religions and the NWFP ministry made a crucial contribution to this claim as the province had a ninety-six per cent Muslim majority. In return, the KK was able to share in the Congress's respectability in British eyes and avoid the 'Bolshevik' label which had been used against it in the past. But as we have seen in this section, the alliance was not without ambiguities and as the principal leader commanding both the provincial Congress and the KK, Badshah Khan had continuously to strike a balance between the approaches and claims of the two.

#### Memories of Allegations

One crucial theme in the narratives of the Khudai Khidmatgars was memories of the political opponents of the KKs who used the alliance with the Congress as an excuse to discredit the KKs as 'Hindus' thereby also implying their lack of martial valour or incapacity for 'taking an eye for an eye'. Non-violent civil disobedience was as new a method of protest to the Pukhtuns as to the rest of India and was clearly associated with Gandhi and the Congress. However, KKs in jail were repeatedly made to wear orange clothes to mark them as Hindu and worse still there were numerous mentions by my informants of their 'manhood being compromised in various ways for involvement with the movement.' Sarfaraz Nazim remembered a striking comment made by one of their opponents that 'Badshah Khan had turned Pukhtuns into eunuchs and lions into sheep.' The 'feminization' of politics and suffering through civil disobedience is a separate and well-known

discussion; here it is important to note that this idea was repeatedly inscribed on the bodies of the men with some violence. Various organizations tried repeatedly to brand the KKs as *kafirs* for their so-called non-Islamic ways and Haji Sarfaraz Nazim Saheb remembered how during the '1946 elections . . . the British had a new plan for anti-propaganda. They created *Anjuman Asfiya* (consisting of religious elders) and declared Manki Sharif, a Muslim Leaguer, its head. A lot of elders of the sub-continent joined the organization. They held a conference in which they passed a resolution declaring that Badshah Khan and all Khudai Khidmatgaran were *kafirs*.'

Badshah Khan on that occasion called a KK meeting and clarified their position. 'He said that we were Khidmatgars of the people and not kafirs. As the elections were very close, Badshah Khan travelled through every zilla personally clarifying his position. But he never asked for votes.' Badshah Khan himself seems to have been the butt of accusation often. When he started a *gur mandī* to encourage enterprise, self-reliance and freedom from money-lenders, he was branded a Hindu by other khans, because thus far such trade had been the forte of Hindus. Badshah Khan had to come up with ingenious solutions to respond to these accusations peacefully. According to Haji Chairman Meherban Shah:

There was a lot of propaganda against Badshah Khan saying that he was a Hindu. Badshah Khan had changed Pukhrun people you see. Earlier people used to stay and interact within the confines of their tribes. But Badshah Khan changed all that. The British and the mullahs opposed this and started a lot of propaganda against him. They used to say that he was a Hindu and that *halal* from his hands was not valid. He finally decided one day to take off his turban to prove that he was not a Sikh and never covered his head again.<sup>26</sup>

In another story, Jarnail Hazrat Gul recalled how:

we were constantly told that we were Hindu supporters and therefore kafirs. Badshah Khan was constantly bothered with questions about his faith in Islam. He was once asked why he did not slaughter cows (because you know that Hindus don't) and he replied, 'I am not a butcher that's why.' However the man persisted in asking him the same question and after the

third time Badshah Khan said, 'Why don't you bring me one of the bulls from the pair that pull your plough and I will certainly slaughter him!'

Such repartee was not only the forte of Badshah Khan. When Jarnail Hazrat Gul was taunted by a bystander for being seen to be carrying a charkha, his quick retort was 'that it was not a charkha I was carrying but a cannon . . . I said it was a cannon that would exterminate London.' Interestingly, this was a metaphor used often by many of my informants. The metaphor encoded the militancy of civil disobedience and self-reliance that was vivid in the minds of their interlocutors. Despite all the allegations, the KKs remained defiant in their identification with the Congress. As Fazle Karim, who came from Pabbi, recalled with pride, because of its huge number of volunteers, 'Pabbi was nicknamed "Wardha" after Gandhiji's ashram.'

Thus we see that the KKs had to constantly prove to the rest of the Frontier that their political ideology was in fact wholly compatible with Islam. Their interrogators were not always fellow Muslims though. C.F. Andrews, a devout Christian, learnt in his discussions with Badshah Khan about

the higher bravery of suffering as an essential feature of Islam, because the Prophet in his days of rejection and persecution had placed his faith in God and God alone. All the saints and prophets, he [Badshah Khan] said to me, had been persecuted. It was the way in which God purified them in the fire of suffering until the dross was burnt away and they came out at last pure gold. 'Look at your Prophet', he said to me, 'how He was persecuted to the very end.'<sup>27</sup>

The alchemy of ideas that the KK produced made it a unique achievement of the nationalist movement in British India. When I asked Gul Samand Khan whether he still believed that non-violence was the best way despite all the stigma attached to it, he said rather simply, 'We believed in non-violence, we asked for our freedom with folded hands . . . with violence we could not have won.' When I asked him why, he surprised me by saying, 'Subhas Bose and Gandhi had disagreed on precisely this . . . we did not want violence because we were

ready to die but we could not assume the responsibility of the sacrifice of the lives of others.' Thus the KKs were aware that Hindus too could be divided in their opinion about the efficacy of non-violence. Their belief was a self-conscious choice of a particular ideology which happened to be espoused by a Hindu, Gandhi.

A further reason why the KKs felt favourably disposed towards Hindus was because a number of Hindus were fellow revolutionaries. Gul Samand Khan who came from Bannu (which had a large population of Hindus) provided the following picture, 'The Hindus were also involved . . . they wore uniforms, went to jail . . . In jail when we prayed, they waved flies away and kept us cool with a hand-held fan and we did the same for them.' Fazle Rahim Saqi too remembered that, 'There were a lot of Hindus and Sikhs with us as well . . . we were all together in Haripur jail. I remember an old Hindu man in jail who hung a portrait of George VI upside down as an act of defiance. When we had been arrested he had started a "vow of silence" . . . he was released after six months but died at the door of the jail. . . .' It was touching that Colonel Mohammed Sayid remembered the names of dozens of his Hindu compatriots from among the hundred and seventy KKs who were with him in 1942 for two years. When I remarked that it was amazing he should still remember their names after all these years, he replied, 'They were my friends from our days in the jail! I cannot forget them!' The KKs seemed to convey this feeling of solidarity with Hindus and Sikhs in various ways. Ninety-year-old Haji Zamir Gul of Charsadda recounted how they were spared a punishing workload and poor diet in Haripur jail by the intervention of the Sikh jailer's wife. He said, 'The wife asked her husband to stop his boorish behaviour and give the inmates proper food and to buy a buffalo for them and so on. She was a Congressite, you see.' As one of the KKs put it, 'We used to go to jails illiterate but came out of them educated.'

The reason for this sense of solidarity was also strategic; Badshah Khan appears to have repeatedly emphasized to his followers the reasons why they should forge such alliances. Mukarram Khan said rather candidly:

The British said that on winning the war they would set our country free . . . in those days India was undivided and united . . . Badshah Khan used to explain by saying that after independence we will have to live with them [Hindus] and they are three times the population of Muslims so we should make friends with them.

Muffariq Shah remembered Badshah Khan explaining to them that 'in independent India there will be one army for the whole of the country. It will not be like it is now . . . the Muslim League beat the Hindus here and the Hindus beat the Muslims in India.' Colonel Mohammed Sayid recalled that Badshah Khan had told them that 'in an independent undivided India, in Hindu majority areas Hindu law would prevail and in Muslim-dominated areas Muslim law would be introduced.'<sup>28</sup>

The Partition then came as a betrayal of everything that they had been told and what they expected from the future. Nehru was always concerned about raids from the tribal areas on Hindus in the NWFP and so I asked several KKs about this. Could this have been a reason why the Hindus left? When I asked Mohammed Yakub Khan, a Waziri from the tribal areas<sup>29</sup> this, he said shortly, 'This is the one from 1938 I suppose . . . in your notes? There were large concentrations of Hindus and raids meant a means of making money. But in the raid of 1938, nobody was killed or robbed . . . definitely no looting . . . these raids were directed not at Hindus but at the homes of the British and the British loyalists.' This may or may not have been true of numerous other raids, but he wanted me to know that the Faqir of Ipi, the anti-colonial revolutionary leader of the Waziris 'told his people not to harm Hindus and that their battle was only against the British.' He insisted that British 'agents' in the tribal *lashkars* always spoiled things and gave the wrong impression. Nehru was right in stating that Muslims of the Frontier, unlike other Muslims who were in the minority in other provinces, were 'brave and self-reliant and have no fear complex . . . for they can stand on their own feet and have no reason to fear other groups.'<sup>30</sup> But Mohammed Yakub Khan, like so many of his comrades, seemed to convey a sense of embarrassment and regret that people in India or elsewhere should believe that the Pukhtuns had treated Hindus and Sikhs badly. In the end while they lost the right to

be a part of the India they had fought so hard for, they felt vindicated that it was because of them that the Congress was not known to be an anti-Muslim group even if it was known as a 'Hindu Jumma'.

### Memories of India

The KKs were very aware of the politics of the rest of India and had several stories about their visits outside the Frontier. They treasured memories of times spent there and had hung on to old photographs and letters of their political comrades in India. I felt that these were also produced for my benefit as if to welcome me from a place they, unlike younger Pakistanis, knew about. They had things to say about the Congress, political developments, and details of Congress intrigue. Several of them had visited India in the 1930s and '40s and were eager to tell me about these visits. Ghazi Khan from Pabbi recalled going to Lahore for picketing activities; Fazle Karim remembered a trip to Meerut where he met Charan Singh and was aware that Singh had later become Prime Minister of India; Sayyid Mohammed Fasi Badshah remembered meeting Devdas Gandhi in Multan Central Jail and even brought along a letter he had from him, to show me; Haji Saifur Khan had been to Meerut and had been sent to Ahmedabad by Badshah Khan with a message for Patel; Gul Samand Khan told me about his visit to India in great detail when I asked him if he was aware that their movement was part of a larger nationalist struggle. He told me how on one occasion:

Badshah Khan took with him to Allahabad twenty men from every district. I went with one from Kakki. The meeting there had been called for two reasons:

- i. To decide who would form the Government once the British had gone.
- ii. To promise the public that the movement would end once the British left.

. . . The first day we ate at a *langar*. We managed to hoist our flag again in Meerut. Maulana Azad came to Badshah Khan and asked for some soldiers to guard the flag. But Badshah Khan said that he could not promise to 'give' anyone without consulting his Khudai Khidmatgaran. . . . Yes, we

knew that our movement was an all-India movement. We knew that everyone, Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, were asking for independence. I know that Tilak was Gandhi's uncle. The resolution for independence had been passed in Deoband.

The above anecdote demonstrates a number of things. First, that KKs were much sought after for their discipline to serve the purposes of soldiers in civil actions. Hama Gul Pdang explained that their 'job was to keep order at polling booths. The police used to try and stop us but we would protest by throwing our canes away and surrendering ourselves for arrest. Our job was to collect the ballot papers from the people and put them in the right boxes in an honest fashion. We were asked to do this and people realized how Badshah Khan's army functioned.' Wazir Mohammed remembered campaigning for Hafiz Ibrahim, who was against Jinnah.

Second, while Gul Samand may have got the relationship between Gandhi and Tilak wrong, he was aware of them as political leaders, just as he was also aware of major political events like the signing of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, and the rift between Gandhi and Bose; furthermore, most of the KKs felt that they had never had any trouble dealing with the people in India. In fact, Hama Gul remembered that, 'The people there were crying when we were to leave.' The instances of hostility that my informants cared to mention to me were ones which involved other Muslims and Pukhtuns in India:

Some Pukhtun students came from Aligarh Muslim University to the camp and started to jeer at us saying that we were the 'non-violent types'. We got angry and said that 'We come from the Frontier and are always ready to fight.' We were asked how much we were paid to be with Badshah Khan. We were asked how many of us were in 'army'. We replied 'as many Muslims there are.'

#### Memories of Muslim League

Another important theme that emerges from the testimonies of the KKs is their attitude to the formation of Pakistan and the Muslim League. As I have mentioned before in this article, after Independence,

the new government penalized the KKs very heavily for their opposition to the Referendum. Eighty-year-old Mohammed Yakub Khan from Bannu was unequivocal in his opinion: 'No Badshah Khan supporters participated in the referendum for Pakistan, it was the Muslim League who did.' Raghibullah Khan stated clearly, they 'had believed in and fought for an undivided India'.

It is important to recognize that the reasons behind the KKs' boycott of the referendum lay in the history of their confrontation with the Muslim League over the past several years. Most KKs, like Dr Waris from Gallader, thought that 'The Muslim League, as far as we were concerned, were agents of the British. We had nicknamed the Muslim League, "Motor League" because of all the cars that they owned! We used to recite a *tappa* which said 'the stick that used to beat us now has a flag on it.' There were instances in the past when they had been let down by supporters of the League as is illustrated in an incident narrated by Gul Samand Khan:

One day the Assistant Commissioner came for an inquiry at one of our court meetings in the mosque. The ulema-in-charge was not present. There was only Hazrat Maulana Mir Sahib Shah present. The A.C. asked him on what basis was the law in our courts to be considered valid. Maulana Sahib said that it was based on the Koran and the A.C. looked shocked and said, 'But that is in Arabic!' Because of this incident the village of Kalkki was surrounded by British troops and all the people of the village gathered together. One Khudai Khidmatgar stood on a string cot and asked the gathering, 'Who among the people present here wants independence?' Forty-eight people came forward. Nineteen maliks from our village went with the British. The British asked them if they thought that the British were likely to go away. They replied that they did not think that at all. The maliks added, 'We cannot do anything about them (pointing to us). Why don't you drown the lot of them in the river Sind?'

After this incident Special Courts were set up here and there was a new law by which any revolutionary was to be arrested and shot. Records were made and kept of these forty-eight people. This area was divided into six divisions and for each there was a malik and a British officer and a Dogra regiment assigned on duty.

The increased repression by the colonial regime here is directly linked to the attitude of the *maliks* (who were supporters of the League). They displayed a clear loyalty to the government rather than the KKs, as is expressed in their exasperated and cavalier comment about drowning the KKs in the Indus. These instances of betrayal and enmity formed vivid memories in the minds of the KKs even fifty or more years after the events.

In my long chat with Jarnail Hazrat Gul and Sadar Musa Khan someone mentioned an incident of poisoned tea at a KK camp. I was astonished that between them they reconstructed the entire sequence of events, the politicians involved and their future careers in Pakistan; they implicated people of no less stature than Sikander Khan, who they remembered was, 'the District Commissioner at the time and later went on to become the Governor General of Pakistan. Ibrahim Khan mixed poison in the tea that all the six hundred Khudai Khidmatgars drank. In return, we learnt, Sikander Khan managed to procure 4,000 *bighas* of land for Ibrahim Khan from the Sikhs.'

While Hazrat Gul was telling me this, Sadar Musa Khan intervened to add, 'Ibrahim Khan was in league with Dwarka Nath, a policeman. He had got Sarvar Khan, a Khudai Khidmatgar, arrested. There were several such incidents . . . therefore it was hard to tell whether Ibrahim Khan was a Khudai Khidmatgar or a stooge. When the poisoning incident took place naturally everybody suspected him.'

Hazrat Gul then continued, 'Sikander Mirza himself confessed that Ibrahim Khan was an informer for them. He said this to Ali Gul and to Yahya Jan.'

They may have misremembered some of the details but the memory of the betrayal was as fresh as events one week old. Like the incident in Aligarh recounted in the section above, KKs had constantly to distance themselves from co-religionists whose politics they did not share. Thus, Maulana Hamdullah Jan, a trained scholar, said to me with great pride, 'I am a political disciple of Maulana Azad and a disciple of Hazrat Maulana Syed Hussain Madani at Deoband. That is the radical school you know, involved in the Satsa agitation. This is not Aligarh which was full of British puppets. All of us used to spin the

charkha.' He is thereby distancing himself from other non-Congress Muslim politics in the sub-continent. He obviously identified with Badshah Khan in this and quoted to me Badshah Khan's speech at the Congress centenary celebrations in 1985 when he had stated, 'My political life began here in Deoband.'

The KKs felt that they were different from other political supporters because they 'fully felt a part of the Congress', while the poorer supporters of the League were only part of it because 'the big khans forced their tenants to join the Muslim League.' However, the KKs also acknowledged the reasons why people succumbed to force. As Fazle Rahim Saqi said, 'The reason these people gave was that they had to tolerate a lot of beatings and torture from the British for being Khudai Khidmatgaran.' They also brought to life what happened when Congress supporters defected to the League. When their President in Bannu, Yakoub Khan, was convinced to join the Muslim League, 'his daughter and sister cried so much at this news that the whole village was at their door to find out the cause of the grief!' When such incidents took place, Fazle Rahim Saqi remembered trying 'to convince a lot of people not to join the Muslim League.' And when these prodigal revolutionaries changed their minds again, 'Badshah Khan had an amazing capacity of welcoming back defectors.'

From accounts such as these, we get a much better sense of the flux in the loyalty of Pukhtuns in the years of the struggle. People had various motivations for fighting for independence and tried to make the best choice of political party possible to them at any given time. This may explain to some extent why people did vote for Pakistan during the referendum in 1947 when rallies raised the slogan 'Islam in danger'.

When the details of the Third June Plan came to be known, Badshah Khan could only poignantly comment, 'The sacrifices the Pathans have made in the course of their struggle for liberty have borne fruit and we are on the threshold of freedom today. Now is the time to enjoy the blessings of freedom, but when I look at the prevailing conditions I fear that we may not probably be able to derive the full benefit from this golden opportunity.'<sup>31</sup> Despite their boycott, however:

During the polls for the Referendum in 1947 about the partitioning of the sub-continent, Khudai Khidmatgaran helped in maintaining discipline at polling booths in spite of the fact that they had agreed to boycott the Referendum. They did this to avoid bogus votes being cast; they did not want the foundations of the new country to be laid with cheating.

In this they seemed to have lived up to Gandhi's hope 'that the referendum in the Frontier was to be without violence. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Khudai Khidmatgars were pledged to non-violence. They were to show that they lived up to their beliefs.'<sup>32</sup>

The feelings of the KKs about Pakistan are therefore a result of both a sense of betrayal by the Congress for agreeing to a referendum in the Frontier as well as a deep sense of disappointment about the way their futures turned out after Independence. They repeatedly drew parallels between the colonial regime and the one after it. For instance, Gul Rahman, who is now confined to a wheelchair, said, 'We used to be amazed that the British did not in fact fire upon us when we stood up to them and were ready to face their bullets . . . that was certainly different from Abdul Qayyum's policy after 1947!' Haji Sarfaraz Nazim Sahib told me with regret that he could not show me the Khudai Khidmatgar Centre because, 'After 1947 the Chief Minister Abdul Qayyum auctioned off the building and it was later reduced to rubble by being blown up by dynamite.' Secretary Amir Nawaz Khan, whom I found after much searching, told me that as a 'secretary' in the movement his job was to keep minutes but I could not have them for my book because, 'All records of our movement have been destroyed . . . I have myself either buried or destroyed most of them.' Dr Khan Sahib's son by his first wife, Hidayatullah Khan, told me about the various publications of the movement, 'There used to be a magazine called *Abbasin*. And there was the *Chattan* in the 1930s. But I am afraid that you cannot read these magazines any more. They were searched out and destroyed after 1947 by the Pakistani police.' There are several other instances of peoples' land being confiscated, their being reduced to poverty, and their children denied an education for their fathers were in jail most of the time after Independence. Mohammed Gulab felt that 'it has only been a change of uniform after Pakistan was formed.'

When Wali Khan was put in jail by the PPP, a frustrated Hama Gul was moved to exclaim to Badshah Khan: 'I know it says in the Koran that if anyone wrongs you, forgive him, but is anyone going to forgive us or are we expected to do the forgiving all the time?' He says Badshah Khan's response was 'Violence will get us nowhere.' The greatest solace for the KKs therefore has been the knowledge that they fought a fair battle against the British and that they achieved Independence. Thus when I asked Mukarram Khan whether he thought that Badshah Khan managed to achieve his objective during his lifetime, he replied, 'Badshah Khan accomplished his mission . . . it was the liberation of his country.' Sarfaraz Nazim seemed to think though that the achievement was short-lived. He felt that, 'Badshah Khan wanted to humanize Pukhtuns. But later the influence of the Muslim League on the people ruined it all and ruined the values of the region. The Hindus were driven out.'

The formation of Pakistan therefore was a great disappointment for most KKs. The causes lay not only in their personal losses: they had believed that after the British, the law of *sharia* would prevail, but it didn't happen; women stopped participating in politics—they could come out of purdah with the British but with the Muslim Government after 1947 it was not possible; Pakistan standardized dress so much that Yusufzais don't wear their traditional *khaliqs* any more; the name of the province was never changed from the British NWFP to one that reflected the people who lived in it; the Awami National Party led by Badshah Khan's son, Wali Khan, still has to demand the rights of Pukhtuns as the KKs did and finally, 'Partition itself is a lasting problem.'

To some extent we may be forgiven for thinking that their disgruntlement with the present is the same as that of eighty-year-olds in any society; things for them were always better in the past. But few remarks were made about rising prices, the morality of the new generations or the state of the country in general as elderly people everywhere tend to make. Their disappointment was always linked to the complete *volte face* that Independence brought. Their sentiments are beautifully captured in an anecdote that eighty-year-old Sher Khan recounted to me when I asked him whether looking back, he felt that they had

achieved what they had been fighting for. He replied, "There was an evening when I remember sitting with Badshah Khan by the Sindh river at dusk, talking . . . I remember telling him that I did not and could not accept Pakistan. I said that I wanted to kill off the "brown sahibs" . . . There was a man called Nawab who jumped into the Sindh saying, "O river! Carry me away to a place where they do not know the name of Pakistan." "

### Memories and Narratives

In the testimonies as a whole we can see the influence both of older pre-KK narrative forms and of new post-Partition developments in a nascent KK oral tradition. Recall, for example, Rahim Saqi's story of the old Hindu man in jail who hung a portrait of George VI upside down as an act of defiance, and died at the threshold of the jail. Here we have a very vivid and amusing image of subversion, followed by a denouement of great pathos, whose combination of silence, martyrdom and thresholds again seems to resonate with older mythemes. As with this brief fragment, most of my interviews contained episodes varying in their content and mood and shedding light on each other. As Mills writes for the Afghans, it is 'part of the aesthetic of . . . traditional story telling . . . that stories of differing genres, scales of complexity and construction, as well as other kinds of discourse (proverbs, conversational remarks) are juxtaposed and caused to reflect on one another in a full-blown oral performance of varying verbal texture.'<sup>33</sup>

An obvious point noted by sceptics of oral material is that the greater the length of time between event and narrative, the more events and new people/generations will intervene to provoke alterations in peoples' perceptions and evaluations of the original event about which we want them to report. Analogous influences can be seen at work in my own fieldwork: We can point to two pivotal points in the pattern of memories of the KK. The first, a pivot explicitly identified by the KKs themselves, is their introduction to the work of Badshah Khan. Their testimonies repeatedly stress that before him the Pathans were unruly

and divided, after him, disciplined and unified; before, they were ignorant and knew nothing; after, they knew more about the sins of the British and what is morally good behaviour.

The second pivot, more pertinent to the present argument, is Partition. The KKs as we have seen, had very strong links with the Indian National Congress. They were thus strong opponents of the Muslim League and of their programme for the creation of Pakistan; they opposed the partition of India. Thus, when the Pakistan movement was successful, the Pukhtuns and particularly KKs were regarded with a great deal of suspicion by the newly-formed Muslim government of Pakistan. The result was brutal repression of the Pukhtuns; KKs found their movement banned, their lands taken away, their leader Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan in jail, and they themselves placed under arrest on various contrived charges. The experience of Independence for KKs was thus far from their expectations as freedom-fighters. They experienced denunciation, suppression and imprisonment, and a far longer period of continued criticism and marginalization.

By the time of my visits, these intervening events seemed to have temporarily robbed the KK of their confidence in their actions and memories, after so many years of having been told they were mistaken and unpatriotic, of having been denied the support of memorials or memoirs or approbation. We may note here in passing the relevance and validity of the French sociologist Halbwachs's argument that individual recollections only survive by linking up with the memory of others: "The individual's remembrance is the meeting point of a manifold network of solidarity of which he is part."<sup>34</sup> My presence as an Oxford academic, and perhaps particularly as an Indian, seemed to galvanize their memories and convictions, and several explicitly said that my interest had reawakened both their recollections and their faith in the rightness of their actions; in some cases the effect seemed actually to bring about a brief improvement in their physical health. One can also see however, how Partition influenced their testimonies. The KK always viewed their pre-Partition activities in the light of their post-Partition disappointments and sufferings; their heroic tales are

frequently followed by the wistful comment, 'But that was another time.' Since that time was clearly good for them, this comment in itself constitutes a veiled expression of their disappointments and critical attitude toward the post-Partition state. By their positive evaluation of 'before', the KKs reveal their distaste for the post-Partition chain of events, lamenting, if not actually re-inventing it. The KKs obtain a great part of their dignity and sense of self-respect from how they shape memories of their earlier political exploits. If they had said that the KK's aim had been an unpartitioned India or an independent pan-Pukhtun state they would have been conceding their ultimate failure. Accordingly, their aims and estimations of their achievements are framed predominantly in terms of the more narrow 'getting rid of the British', while most also stress their moral education under Badshah Khan, their cultivation of an ethic of non-violence, humility and service, as a great achievement in its own right. Thus there is a strong consensus among the old men about their aims and achievements: the removal of the British and the achievement of a non-violent ethic. To some extent therefore, some of the original means have been slightly re-emphasized, the original ends somewhat de-emphasized.

In the examples cited in this paper, we again see that processes of self-justification and self-presentation are not antithetical to the historical 'reality' but an intimate part of it, and we see how large scale political events influence more individual and personal memories, and how such events can act as defining points or pivots in the map of peoples' memories.

But if the passing years bring new events for comparison, each encouraging reconstrual and revaluation of older events, it should be remembered that the intervening years also bring age, and new domestic experiences and responsibilities, such that in a very real sense, the person recalling distant events is rather different from the person who participated in them. It seems reasonable to suggest that the stress upon the moral improvement and spiritual development which the KKs achieved under Badshah Khan is not simply a reaction to political disappointment. By the time of my interviews, these men had moved through fatherhood, grand-fatherhood and great-grand-fatherhood.

They had seen a half century of life, with all its pettiness, problems and little conflicts, and had had much opportunity for reflection upon it. Thoughts of specific political issues and enemies must have quickly faded in the grind of making a living. And now they were drawing ever closer to the brink of eternity, which must put politics in a certain perspective. It is not so surprising therefore that they should choose to emphasize the moral guidance which they had received from Badshah Khan, a guidance which seems to have influenced their approach to everyday life long after the British left, and the significance of which outlived the nationalist question. I felt also that they were clearly addressing themselves to contemporary life, what was surrounding them, many elements of which they find disturbing. An old man's impassioned defence of non-violence becomes highly resonant and understandable when one leaves his hut and encounters his grandchildren casually playing with Kalashnikovs, the availability of which has intensified feuding. Similarly, their emphasis on the KK's frugality seems to be directed both at venal and corrupt politicians and at a younger generation apparently seduced by foreign goods and a nascent consumerism. Recollections of the past are influenced by the changing responses of an individual over time. That is one reason why the elicitation of life histories can be so illuminating and intriguing.

As a general conclusion therefore, we can say that one of the reasons why the interpretation of oral sources about events gets more difficult over time is that there is more scope for other and disruptive events to intrude upon the memories, events which can range in scale from a civil war to the birth of one's child. However, the way in which recollections are influenced by these events is clearly itself of great potential value in shedding light on the social and political relations which have surrounded and are surrounding one's informants.

John Davis utilizes the Marxian phraseology of the social relations of production to signal his claim that historical statements are a type of commodity, a commodity moreover, that some people, due to their wealth or power, are far more able to produce and distribute than others. Accordingly, as with money and commodities, the pattern of distribution of particular historical assertions, including memories,



will be greatly influenced by the structure and inequalities of the society in which they are produced. Davis argues through his discussion of Libyan history that, 'history is a social and cultural product, consisting of events plus the structure of relations among those who construe events.'<sup>35</sup> In particular, he contrasts the tribal history of the Zuwaya, which assimilates new events to a genealogy-based account of age-old triumph and glory, with a generational history which arose in post-Civil War Spain; one generation, raised in the war, turned their back on their parents' highly politicized view of events, only to see their own children reject the peaceful apolitical environment which they had tried to create after the war. Thus Davis contrasts 'the "never again" of Belmonte to the "always so" of the Zuwaya.'<sup>36</sup> The Libyan state, in contrast to the Zuwaya's small scale and lineage-oriented accounts, purveys a state-oriented nationalist account of the fighting against the Italians, stressing a trans-tribal unity of will and purpose, directed toward building a Libyan nation. In short, Davis's argument is that 'the social relations of the people who make history determine in some part the meanings that they attach to events: the typical products (texts) of villagers and tribesmen are different in specifiable ways, and these produce different actions (events).'<sup>37</sup> More particularly, control over access to historical sources and resources and the distribution of specific statements about the past are typically used to reinforce the authority of elders or the primacy of the state.

These phenomena are clearly present in the NWFP and its relationships with the Pakistan state. Initially, given the segmentary social structure of the area, one might expect something of a lineage-based set of memories of the KK and its activities. There is indeed something of this. The old men themselves often frame their recollections in terms of their uncles and cousins and their own feud-resolutions, celebrating particularly the defiant non-violent feats of other members of their clan, or suggesting that their clan or lineage had always been especially active and effective in struggling against oppressors. The young are more tolerant of their own KK relative than they are of his merely tiresome and senile comrades.

Nonetheless, in general, the pattern of recollections is more akin to

a generational rather than a lineal one. The old men, describing what it was like to be swept up in the revolutionary and anti-British fervour, following an utterly charismatic leader, convey the exhilaration of self-sacrifice. But the children of the KKs, already themselves well into late middle age, were more eager to talk of the KK struggle which occupied their childhood in terms of hardship and deprivation, of absent fathers and uncles and the smell of prison visits. My informants seemed even more distant from their grandchildren and great grandchildren. They seem unable to communicate with the fast-changing younger generation who are swept up by the rhetoric of Islamic fundamentalism, entrepreneurship and 'foreign goods'. It is not easy to explain non-violence to youth surrounded by cheap weapons, and who witness nearby both ruthless military governments and heroic Afghan freedom fighters. Although most of the young have a vague respect for the old KKs as people who fought for the independence of the country, this respect is not a well-informed one—it is little more than a tacit and taken for granted social acceptance of their importance. Few under the age of thirty-five have any idea at all about the political life of the old men, about the exact role they played in the liberation struggle.

It is important to stress however that these differences are not the inevitable or 'natural' result of the age differences, of the fact that the KKs are now very old and speak slowly and quietly, their thoughts occasionally wandering. In fact there is a great and inherent respect for anybody of such advanced age. The problem rather is that the Pakistani state has systematically intervened, promoting its own vision of the nationalist struggle, a vision which criticizes and marginalizes the KK. The state's ability to do this has cut the younger generations adrift from their activist forbears. This is seen most clearly in the fact that the KK movement receives no mention in school history text books. There, the emphasis is very much upon Pakistan as a Muslim state, whose precursors run directly from Mohammed to Jinnah, a portrayal which leaves no place for the KK's sympathetic links to the mostly Hindu Congress or its opposition to Partition. Similarly, the emphasis on the unity both of the struggle for a free Pakistan (as led by the Muslim League) and of the contemporary nation, leaves no room for the

KK's opposition to the League and their calls for a free pan-Pukhtun homeland. Censorship has been very extensive. I was sternly questioned at Lahore customs about my illicitly acquired copy of Badshah Khan's autobiography, which had been published in Kabul (Afghanistan) and I had to feign indifference to it, saying it was a casual acquisition in a bazaar to help me learn Urdu.

After Partition, nearly all KK activists had their homes raided, and all personal papers were removed and burnt, including those of Badshah Khan. This was a clear attempt to destroy any source which might provide an alternative conception of events. Most other artifacts pertaining to the KK were also destroyed in this way; thus the Red Shirts and pictures of Badshah Khan which I occasionally encountered in peoples' homes had typically been preserved in great secrecy and at some peril, or been acquired very recently as posters of the ANP. The KK's central buildings were bombed in 1948, destroying the records there, along with the building and Badshah Khan's vegetable gardens. Speeches of Badshah Khan have been entirely memorized by some as I discovered in my meeting with Nabad Khan of Swabi. In India, though Gandhi remains pre-eminent, other nationalist leaders are also represented in the state history, especially where they had a regional following, such as Bose in Bengal. In Pakistan in contrast, all still remains focused on Jinnah, and in this minor cult of personality, his image continues to be omnipresent, and prefaces the nightly news programme. There have hitherto been no memorials to Badshah Khan, and no museums.<sup>38</sup>

In all these ways therefore, the State has denied younger generations access to the historical truth of the KK movement, and has presented a very critical and partial picture of it. In Davis's terms, we clearly see how state history has forcefully intervened in order to create a disjunction in the next generation's views of the past, in order to purvey a particular view of state and nation. It thereby prevents a lineal or tribal view of the nationalist struggle, which it fears would glorify KK ancestors and be too emotively connected to feelings of Pukhtun pride and autonomy.

However, the picture is not entirely gloomy. The course of events

demonstrates the continued potency of historical images and their use in a counter-hegemonic vein. In recent years, the position of the long-dominant Muslim League ruling party had been weakened, firstly by the military rule of General Zia al-Haq, then by the rise of the Bhuttoist Pakistan People's Party (PPP). As part of this, the ANP, led by Badshah Khan's son Wali Khan, has significantly improved its political position both nationally and provincially, not least as third party power brokers. The first thing they did on assuming provincial office in NWFP was to begin changing the names of streets and buildings and to drastically increase the representation of Badshah Khan's image throughout the province with large and colourful posters and billboards. There are also plans afoot for a Badshah Khan memorial centre and archive. Much of the party's support stems from its claim to be the true heir of the KK movement, and the recent initiatives are clearly designed to re-emphasize and legitimate this claim. However, we should also note that the use of Badshah Khan's name is not monopolized by the ANP. Some of my informants invoked Badshah Khan and his moral standards specifically to draw a contrast with and make criticism of, the current generation of ANP politicians. As Mills remarks, 'didactic storytelling makes extensive use of oblique implications and implicit connections, especially from adult to adult, in communities where circumspection is a basic ingredient of polite conversation . . . Making points through narrative absolves the speaker of responsibility for direct confrontation. It is up to each listener to infer to what present persons or events the story might relate.'<sup>39</sup>

I have explored some ways in which social structure, high politics and struggles for power and authority intervene in the distribution of thoughts about the past. However, I want to re-emphasize the fact that such processes typically work through their penetration of even the most private and personal experiences and recollections, and this inevitably means that they also become connected to personal matters of prestige, personality, self-presentation and ageing.

It was very interesting to note that most of the seventy KKs whom I got to meet and talk with retained some symbol of their identities as Khudai Khidmatgars. For instance, several of them retained before

their names the rank that they had in the movement. So I spoke to 'Secretary' Amir Nawaz, 'Jarnail' (General) Abdul Rahim, 'Lieutenant' Mohammed Wali, 'Sardar' (President) Musa Khan and so on. Further, several of them carried on their persons an article in the colour red—red painted walking sticks, a red turban, a red kerchief (not the usual accessories of Pukhtun men, I may add!)—to remind them of their identity as 'Red Shirts'. The lives of the KKs were an enduring legacy of the political activism of the colonial period. Several of them still kept up with international news through the BBC, they knew exactly how to handle my being followed by the Intelligence and their being interrogated; their children have names like 'Siyasat' (Politics). Their self-identity is clear as in the case of Haji Zamir Gul who specified at the beginning of our interview that he was a revolutionary first and a haji only later.

To evaluate the oral testimonies I gathered, I have had to consider them in the light of Pukhtun culture, imperial power, Islam, Afghan story-telling and rhetoric, the Pakistan state, five decades of post-Partition history, the nature of Pukhtun ethical and emotion terms, the life courses of old men, the experience of subsequent generations, the psychology of self-presentation etc. etc. This requires an imaginative restructuring of wide sociological significance and is a far richer approach than that of simply discarding or ignoring 'inaccuracies'. Anthropological history is (or should be) in the former position, and it is exciting precisely because it is not simply backward-looking but concerned to carve out a dialectical synthesis of past and present.

#### My Memories of the Frontier

As the principal players in the KK movement were British officials and Pukhtuns, I decided to consult any information that either side had produced. On the one hand, I consulted archival material in the India Office Library, London and the National Archives and AICC papers in the Nehru Memorial Library in New Delhi. The first two holdings are comprised mainly of fortnightly reports sent by colonial officials to the central government in New Delhi, the capital of British India,

and to Whitehall. But report-writing and colonial administration have their own rules of facticity, not least the need to seem to have events under control, and as an anthropologist I was constantly aware of the dangers of taking the reports at face value. Ultimately, they provided not only a great deal of hard information, but also marginalia and parenthetical remarks that betrayed prejudice and occasional confusion, all of which helped in reconstructing the colonial government's perceptions of the civil disobedience movement and its methods of dealing with it.

Fieldwork in the NWFP on the other hand was a different experience. I talked to the old KKs usually in their own village, near the *hujra* (men's house). These conversations almost invariably attracted an audience of about twenty to fifty people. People came out of curiosity, to pass the time or to take a break between their tasks. Curiosity was sometimes shown in me—a young Hindu woman, an Indian travelling alone, who was interested in and wanted to write down their grandfathers' stories. At times I could sense the audience's incredulity or disbelief that I had gone through enormous logistical problems simply in order to have a chat with the oldest, most eccentric man in the village whom society took entirely for granted, or at best dimly respected for some now obscure sacrifice in the past. But interest in the content of the old men's testimonies usually superceded their initial curiosity about the anthropologist. Some seemed to be hearing them for the first time, while many more seemed to be listening with new ears, as the stories transformed from old men's ramblings to revolutionary history, a transformation largely caused by my presence and interest and specifically, by my writing down the tales. Very often the interview became something of a performance as I had to live up to the image the local people had of me, a young woman, an Indian, a Hindu, an educated scholar, someone who knew life in the land of the English colonialists. My 'identity' was rarely that of an anthropologist.

The setting of the interview was always interesting because of the problem of where we could sit to conduct the interview. I usually arrived in a village with Habibullah, a Pukhtun, whose father was a respected KK, and who had generously agreed to help me locate my

informants. Also present was the driver of my car, a young Pukhtun man. We could not sit in the hujra since respectable women were not allowed there. We could not sit in the jenana because men from outside the family were not allowed in. Most often therefore, a neutral space was found outdoors in the sun and a few string cots from the hujra were dragged out to serve as seating arrangements. I had to learn very quickly at which end of the cot I was expected to sit as the guest, because the less comfortable end would be occupied by the host. If I offered my seat to the old man as a mark of respect, I was blessed profusely but firmly overruled.

The difference in age between me and my informants was of course enormous. My knowledge of the KK movement was entirely second-hand and unlike older people in India I had not experienced undivided colonized India. I had not seen Badshah Khan except in pictures or in documentary films. Also because of the difference in our world views I could not immediately understand some of their ways of reckoning time. For instance, if I asked someone his age he might say, 'How old are you? . . . I had spun twenty set of clothes by the time you were born!' He expected me to know how long it takes to spin a set of clothes because I came from the land of Gandhi. In our conversations we had to zoom back over half a century, firstly, because that was the period I was trying to reconstruct, and secondly, because it was a genuine security risk to discuss the politics of post-Partition Pakistan, since I would probably face being deported for sedition. Of course, usually we had to go back much further than 1930, sometimes to the year when my informant was born, since most found it impossible to tell me about the KK movement and Badshah Khan without describing their own life histories along with it.

These conversations were in the nature of semi-structured interviews. I was looking for answers to some specific questions, but the chronology and format was guided entirely by the informant. Quite often, my informants did not even wait for me to ask them any questions; after the initial formalities, they started talking about the movement of their own accord, because by then word had spread about the reason I was there. The KKs usually drifted from one issue to another, guided by

their memory and recall. I did interrupt occasionally for clarifications or to ask another question, but my general attitude was to be respectful and supportive. They did not always respond to my interventions and if they did, it was often indirectly. Thus their narratives largely took on their own structures, and their frequent use of emblematic episodes and tropes seem to be the beginning of a new 'traditional' corpus of stories about the freedom movement, a corpus created out of their disparate personal reminiscences.

Yet though I have spoken of narrative in this last section, it is important to emphasize that my interviews were often far from being smoothly produced narratives. As I have already said, the KK had been long-marginalized and there had been little occasion, opportunity or demand for them to tell their stories. Rather than pre-packaged reminiscences therefore, stories and facts often emerged gradually. Portelli makes the point that 'rank and file' histories are usually unlike the 'affirmative discourse' of official history, which is readymade, articulated and available. Instead, a vernacular version 'must piece itself together from scratch every time, and is burdened by the fear of disapproval and isolation . . . it is distorted, buried, deviated, and allowed to emerge only in between the lines, as dream, metaphor, lapses, digression, error, denigration.'<sup>40</sup>

One method which I hit upon of helping such things to emerge was provoking accounts through anger. Most of my archival research in the India Office Library was completed before I visited the Frontier to look for any surviving KKs. I thus had a fair idea of the British perspective on the KK before I spoke to the Pukhtuns themselves. Often, I would tell my informants of certain British statements or views. These were sometimes so divergent from the views of the KKs themselves that they found it difficult to believe the truth of my attributions and in defence I had to produce my file of notes, read out the relevant passages and translate them, in order to convince. This in itself was an interesting exercise and I began to do it regularly, for in responding to the 'allegations' of the British, their manner of discussion often became different from that of their earlier answers to my questions. 'False' claims made about their organization still angered them and

provoked them to state their points of view, clarify incidents or concede lapses with the clarity resulting from anger and pride. I had therefore quite inadvertently set up a sort of dialogue between the colonial officials and the revolutionaries. This in retrospect has proved to be a useful methodological tool in writing colonial history.

KK narrations of their past were helped by other stimuli as well. For instance, when I posed my first question to Noor Akbar, instead of an answer, he gave me orders to wait till he returned as he had just thought of something. My two-hour wait was rewarded when he appeared again dragging a slightly battered black trunk. I watched with growing excitement as he slowly extracted his old uniform, his Sam Brown belt, an old poster of Badshah Khan and other items of memorabilia. I recognized what some of them were and my initial questions were linked to them. As the discussion slowly moved to more general issues, he repeatedly went back to the other obscure items whose significance resided in his mind. He did not always explain to me what they were and I did not always ask. They seemed to serve as mnemonic devices and helped him recall information; that was enough to satisfy me. While this was the most dramatic uncovering of the past, on other occasions too, old uniforms were produced from well-hidden crannies, and on one occasion I was even offered a uniform as a gift. When I was talking to Sarfaraz Khan about their civil disobedience activities he said: 'In 1942 we picketed the law courts. Thirty of us were arrested.' He then produced an old notebook in which he had made a note of the twelve 'generals' who were arrested along with him and imprisoned for a period of three years in Dera Ismail Khan jail, and read out the names to me. What till then had been a general and abstract conversation about civil disobedience was at once grounded in his experience. The writing in the notebook was his own and probably reminded him of the time he had written it down, soon after the event or more likely several years later when he felt that unless he wrote the names down he would one day forget. The names in his book not only yielded hard information; they also triggered his thoughts about other associates and other forgotten incidents.

On another occasion, I went to meet Gurfaraz Khan just outside

Peshawar city during the run-up to the general elections in Pakistan in 1993. On seeing my unfamiliar face, he assumed that I had come to solicit votes and began by apologizing for not helping with the elections. This was despite the fact that he was so ill that we had to conduct the entire conversation with him lying down. My informants often also felt the need to enact their activities as KKKs, sweeping, spinning and marching while they described them to me. Their evocative gestures were the reenactment of previous revolutionary activities, making the contrast between their present setting and their past ideals starker. Also, they felt that I ought to visualize them as young, enthusiastic workers rather than the bent and toothless men they now were. In this desire they were indeed transformed as they enthusiastically supplemented the ever-increasing amount of information with their miming, striving to make the picture clearer to me. Their charades were the embodied memory of past actions.<sup>41</sup>

The search for the KKKs was not an easy one either. There too I was repeatedly (and often pointedly) told that they were all dead. I nearly gave up on the project. No official lists of members of the nationalist movement exist and save for one district (Bannu) none of the local MPs seem to have any idea of the location of their 'political fathers'—further evidence of the KKKs' marginalization since 1947. It required persistent searching and a little luck to find a Khudai Khidmatgar. But when I did find one, it was not only a richly informative session but a profoundly moving experience. Secretary Amir Nawaz had been bed-ridden for six months when I went to see him. By the end of our long chat he was sitting up and even saw me to the door. He insisted that he had suddenly found the will to live. At least someone was interested in his stories of the freedom struggle, he said ecstatically to his astounded sons, as he patted me on the head with tears in his eyes.

I also encountered problems in the search for local archives. As already mentioned, most of the personal papers of Badshah Khan and his family have been destroyed over the years in various raids by the Pakistani police. I tried to enter the offices of the regional archives in Peshawar but I was consistently denied permission, principally because of my nationality: 'If only you weren't Indian' was the oft-repeated

apology. But I did consult the holdings of the National Archives and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in India, where the AICC papers yielded valuable information about the relations between the provincial and national organs of the nationalist movement.

Lastly, though I had begun my fieldwork as the interviewer, I ended as the interviewee. In the final month of my fieldwork, Pakistan security police came to one village and interrogated me about my excessively free-ranging movement in the province, clearly viewing me as employed in espionage (partly due to recent press reports that the latest wave of Indian spies were young women). After several hours they eventually accepted my oft-repeated account of my purely academic interests and my vow of not discussing post-1947 events; they even good-naturedly recommended that I read Macaulay on the Frontier. Upon returning to Delhi, the relief of being home was quickly dispelled by an 'invitation' from the head of the Pakistan desk of the Indian Civil Service to come for a 'chat' about my experiences in the Frontier, an invitation which, fearing a likely de-briefing, I nervously avoided. Thus I had come myself to be treated as an oral source on either side of the border, my interest in the old united sub-continent now caught up in post-Partition games of division and suspicion.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. 1921 Census.
2. Mountbatten's Third June Plan was for a partitioned sub-continent. Nehru agreed to Mountbatten's suggestion that two provinces be singled out for a referendum on the single question of whether they should join India or Pakistan upon Independence. Sylhet (Bengal) was the only other province forced to hold a referendum.
3. Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and other Frontier leaders were kept uninvolved in the decision to hold the referendum. As a consequence they argued for India, Pakistan, and an autonomous Pakhtunistan, which was rejected. Since the Frontier leaders were ignored by the AICC in this as well as in the initial decision-making and the acceptance of the plan for a referendum, the new demand for Pakhtunistan was easily discredited by Jinnah.
4. These include works by Amit Kumar Gupta, Eric Jansson, Steve Rittenberg and Waqar Ali Shah. The last is a young Pukhtun historian who has recently

submitted his thesis about the movement. Interestingly, he has much the same attitude to the Khudai Khidmatgar as did historians before him. In his work, as in that of the others, we get a rich and detailed account of the workings of *realpolitik* in the Frontier; what remains missing is any enquiry into the motivations and activities of the rank-and-file of this vast political movement.

5. See Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and Memory in the North West Frontier* (James Curry, 2000, forthcoming) in which I have written about the movement in some detail, with particular emphasis on explaining the transformation of a segmentary-feudal Pukhtun society which usually settled conflict through violence into one that practiced non-violent civil disobedience for seventeen years.
6. C.F. Andrews, *The True India: A Plea for Understanding*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938, p. 34.
7. J. Nehru, *Discovery of India*, p. 381.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
9. 19 June 1947, *Hindustan Times*, 'Conflict Among Pathans'.
10. See Richard Murphy's article in this volume about the everyday rituals at this border.
11. Badshah Khan had specifically asked to be buried in the garden of his home in Jalalabad, where he spent several years after 1947 in self-imposed exile. His supporters saw this as his final rejection of the partitioned sub-continent.
12. I first got to know Wali Khan when he was visiting India in November 1988. I had spoken to his cousin, Mohammed Yunus, about my interest in the Red Shirts and I met Wali Khan at Yunus's house in New Delhi. My fieldwork was entirely possible because of Wali Khan's generous invitation to live in his house in Charsadda, for which I am grateful. It would have been impossible for me to have lived in the Frontier for as long as I did without the hospitality of his family and his constant and sometimes fierce protection! This paper is as much a tribute to his continued friendship with India as it is to the memories of the Khudai Khidmatgars.
13. I must add that there exist no records at all of erstwhile members of the nationalist movement. Unlike in India, 'freedom fighters' are not recognized or given a pension and thus locating them was not an easy task. See section below in this paper for a more detailed account of my searches.
14. For instance, their repeated references to the 'prophet-like' stature of Badshah Khan were never to be repeated to a young Pukhtun man, who would certainly see this as heresy from a Sunni Muslim.
15. 18 November 1928, AICC Papers, NMML.
16. 24 November 1928, AICC Papers, NMML.

17. Patel's team was however not allowed entry into the Frontier by the government, and he had to base himself in Rawalpindi (in Punjab) to carry out his investigation. The report was proscribed by the government.
18. Note Congress stereotype here.
19. One should note here that my informants clearly collapsed their later years of non-violence with the mood in 1930. Non-violence was a new idea for them in 1930, by their own admission, and I discuss elsewhere the long process of the adoption of non-violence. However, what is important in the statements quoted here is that they do remember Congress scepticism and their own initial guarantees being vindicated in the years to follow.
20. Chief Secretary's Report, 1930, IOLR, L/P&J/12/9, emphasis added.
21. Governor's Report, June 1938, IOLR, L/P&J/5/214.
22. In fact his exact words were, 'Devdas Gandhi came here . . . he was very young . . . I taught him many things' [Gul Samand Khan].
23. Governor's Report, July 1939, IOLR, L/P&J/5/214.
24. Chief Secretary's Report, June 1940, IOLR, L/P&J/5/216.
25. Nehru, *Discovery*, p. 486.
26. This is a telling example of Badshah Khan's early association with Akali leaders in the 1920s. I have argued elsewhere that the KK and Akali movement are not instances of the practice of non-violence by so-called 'martial' races but that there was an extensive cross-fertilization of ideas between leaders of the two movements. It is my contention that many of the lessons learnt during the Akali struggle were used during the KK one.
27. C.F. Andrews, *The True India*, p. 24.
28. Unfortunately we don't know much more about Badshah Khan's blueprint for a free undivided India and he may have kept his ideas deliberately vague to allow for the new idea of India to develop after Independence.
29. My meeting with him was an unexpected treat as he came specially to visit me in Bannu because I did not have permission to enter the tribal areas where he lived.
30. Nehru, *Discovery*, p. 530.
31. *Hindustan Times*, 9 June 1947.
32. *Hindustan Times*, 7 July 1947.
33. Margaret Mills, *Rhetorics and Politics in Afghan Traditional Storytelling*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991, p. 21.
34. Quoted in Paul Thompson, *The Voice of the Past*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 214.
35. John Davis 'The Social Relations of the Production of History', in Tonkin *et al.* (eds), 1989 ASA 27. *History and Ethnicity*, London: Routledge, p. 116.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
38. This began to change in 1991 when the ANP formed a part of the Government at the Centre for the first time sharing power with PML (N).
39. Mills, *Rhetorics and Politics*, p. 121.
40. Alessandro Portelli, 'Uchronic Dreams: Working-class Memory and Possible Worlds', in R. Samuel and P. Thomspon (eds), *The Myths We Live By*, London: Routledge, p. 155.
41. See Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.