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Problems in General Linguistics

translated by Mary Elizabeth Meek



University of Miami Press
Coral Gables, Florida

1971

at Lemnos, where I brought you the price of a hundred oxen' *εκατόμβιον δέ τοι ἤλαρον* (*Il.* 21. 79). About a little slave who is offered for sale: 'he will bring you a thousand times his price' *ὁ δ' ἔμιν μυρίον ὄνον ἄλφοι* (*Od.* 4. 453). Melantheus threatens to sell Eumaeus far from Ithaca 'so that he will bring me a good living' *ἵνα μοι βίον πολόν ἄλφοι* (*Od.* 17. 250), and the suitors invite Telemachus to sell his guests at the market in Sicily 'where they will bring you a good price' *ὅθεν κέ τοι ἄξιον ἄλφοι* (*Od.* 20. 383). There is no variation in the meaning of the verb and the full force of it is found in the epithet that describes maidens: *παρθένοι ἀλφεισίβοιαι* they 'bring in oxen' for their father who gives them in marriage.

"Value" is characterized, in its ancient expression, as a "value of exchange" in the most material sense. It is the value of exchange that a human body possesses which is delivered up for a certain price. This "value" assumes its meaning for whoever disposes of a human body, whether it is a daughter to marry or a prisoner to sell. There we catch a glimpse, in at least one part of the Indo-European domain, of the very concrete origin of a notion connected to certain institutions in a society based on slavery.

From *L'Année sociologique*, 3rd series, 2 (1948-1949): 7-20

The Notion of "Rhythm" in its Linguistic Expression

IT MIGHT BE THE TASK of a psychology of movements and gestures to make a parallel study of the terms that denote them and the psychological phenomena that they express, the meaning inherent in the terms, and the often very different mental associations that they awaken. The notion of "rhythm" is one of the ideas that affect a large portion of human activities. Perhaps it even serves to distinguish types of human behaviour, individual and collective, inasmuch as we are aware of durations and the repetitions that govern them, and also when, beyond the human sphere, we project a rhythm into things and events. This vast unification of man and nature under time, with its intervals and repetitions, has had as a condition the use of the word itself, the generalization, in the vocabulary of modern Western thought, of the term *rhythm*, which comes to us through Latin from Greek.

In Greek itself, in which *ῥυθμός* does indeed designate rhythm, where does the notion come from and what does it properly mean? An identical answer is given by all the dictionaries: *ῥυθμός* is an abstract noun from *ῥεῖν* 'to flow,' the sense of the word, according to Boisacq, having been borrowed from the regular movements of the waves of the sea. This is what was taught more than a century ago, at the beginnings of comparative grammar, and it is what is still being repeated. And what, really, could be more simple and satisfying? Man has learned the principles of things from nature, and the movement of the waves has given rise in his mind to the idea of rhythm, and that primordial discovery is inscribed in the term itself.

There is no morphological difficulty in connecting *ῥυθμός* to *ῥέω* by means of a derivation which we shall have to consider in detail. But the semantic connection that has been established between "rhythm" and "to flow" by the intermediary of the "regular movement of the waves" turns out to be impossible as soon as it is examined. It suffices to observe that *ῥέω* and all its nominal derivatives (*ῥεῦμα*, *ῥοή*, *ῥόος*, *ῥυάς*, *ῥυτός*) are exclusively indicative of the notion of 'to flow,' but that the sea does not "flow." *ῤεῖν* is never said of the sea, and moreover, *ῥυθμός* is never used for the movement of the waves.

The terms which depict this movement are entirely different: ἄμπωτις, ῥαχία, πλημυρίς, σαλεύειν. Conversely, what flows, ῥεῖ, is the river or the stream, and a current of water does not have "rhythm." If ῥυθμός means 'flux, flowing,' it is hard to see how it could have taken on the value proper to the word "rhythm." There is a contradiction of meaning between ῥεῖν and ῥυθμός, and we cannot extricate ourselves from the difficulty by imagining—and this is a pure invention—that ῥυθμός could have described the movement of the waves. What is more, ῥυθμός in its most ancient uses never refers to flowing water, and it does not even mean "rhythm." This whole interpretation rests on the wrong premises.

It is clearly necessary, in order to reconstruct a history which was less simple but which is also more instructive, to begin by establishing the authentic meaning of the word ῥυθμός and by describing its use at its origins, which go very far back. It is absent from the Homeric poems. It is especially to be found in the Ionian authors and in lyric and tragic poetry, then in Attic prose, especially in the philosophers.¹

It is in the vocabulary of the ancient Ionian philosophy that we may apprehend the specific value of ῥυθμός, and most particularly among the creators of atomism, Leucippus and Democritus. These philosophers made ῥυθμός (ῥυσμός)² into a technical term, one of the key words of their teaching, and Aristotle, thanks to whom several citations from Democritus have come down to us, transmitted its exact meaning to us. According to him, the fundamental relationships among bodies are established by their mutual differences, and these differences come down to three: ῥυσμός, διαθιγή, τροπή, which Aristotle interprets thus: διαφέρειν γὰρ φασὶ τὸ ὄν ῥυσμῶν καὶ διαθιγῆ καὶ τροπῆ: τούτων δ' ὁ μὲν ῥυσμὸς σχῆμά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ διαθιγὴ τάξις, ἡ δὲ τροπή θέσις. "Things are differentiated by ῥυσμός, by διαθιγή, and by τροπή; the ῥυσμός is the σχῆμα ('form'), the διαθιγὴ ('contact') is the τάξις ('order'), and the τροπή ('turn') is the θέσις ('position') (*Metaph.* 985b 4). It is clear from this important passage that ῥυσμός means ὄχημα ('form'), which is confirmed by Aristotle by what follows in the passage, in an example borrowed from Leucippus. He illustrates these three notions by applying them respectively to the "form," "order," and "position" of the letters of the alphabet.³ A differs from N by the σχῆμα (or ῥυσμός), AN differs from NA by the τάξις, and I differs from H by the θέσις.

Let us hold on to the idea suggested by this passage that ῥυσμός is the equivalent of σχῆμα. Between A and N, the actual difference is one of "form" or "configuration": two of the strokes are identical—A—and only the third is different, being interior in A and exterior in N. And it is indeed in the sense of "form" that Democritus always uses ῥυθμός.⁴ He wrote a treatise *Περὶ τῶν διαφερόντων ῥυσμῶν*, which means 'on the variety of form (of

atoms).' His doctrine taught that water and air, ῥυθμῶ διαφέρειν, differ from each other in the form that their constituent atoms take. Another citation from Democritus shows that he also applied ῥυθμός to the form of institutions: οὐδεμία μηχανὴ τῶ νῦν καθεστῶτι ῥυθμῶ μὴ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν τοὺς ἀρχοντας 'there is no way, in the present form (of the constitution) to prevent rulers from committing injustice.' The verbs ῥυσμῶ, μεταρρυσμῶ, μεταρρυσμῶ 'to form' or 'to transform' proceed from this same meaning, in the physical or moral sense: ἀνοήμονες ῥυσοῦνται τοῖς τῆς τύχης κέρδεσιν, οἱ δὲ τῶν τοιῶνδε δαήμονες τοῖς τῆς σοφίης 'fools are formed by the acquisitions of chance; but men who know [what] these acquisitions [are worth], by those of wisdom'; ἡ διδαχὴ μεταρρυσμοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον 'instruction transforms man'; ἀνάγκη . . . τὰ σχήματα μεταρρυσμῶσθαι 'it is indeed necessary that the σχήματα change in form (in order to pass from angular to round).' Democritus also uses the adjective ἐπιρρυσμιος, whose meaning can now be corrected; it is not "courant, qui se répand" (Bailly) or "adventitious" (Liddell-Scott), but 'possessing a form': ἐτεῆ οὐδὲν ἴσμεν περὶ οὐδενός, ἀλλ' ἐπιρρυσμῆ ἐκάστοισιν ἢ δόξῃς 'we have no genuine knowledge of anything, but everyone gives a form to his belief' (= lacking knowledge of anything, everyone makes up his own opinion about everything).

Accordingly, there is no variation, no ambiguity in the meaning that Democritus assigns to ῥυθμός, and this is always 'form,' understood as the distinctive form, the characteristic arrangement of the parts in a whole. This point being established, there is no difficulty in confirming it by the total number of ancient examples. Let us first consider the word in Ionian prose. It is found once in Herodotus (5. 58), along with the verb μεταρρυσμῶ, in a passage which is particularly interesting because it deals with the "form" of the letters of the alphabet: ("The Greeks borrowed the letters of their writing from the Phoenicians"; μετὰ δὲ χρόνον προβαίνοντος ἅμα τῆ φωνῆ μετέβαλον καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν τῶν γραμμάτων 'as time passed, at the same time that they changed their language, the Cadmeans also changed the form (ῥυθμός) of the characters'; οἱ παραλαβόντες ("Ιωνες) διδαχὴ παρὰ τῶν Φοινίκων τὰ γράμματα, μεταρρυσμῶσαντες σφραγν δλίγα ἐχρέωντο 'the Ionians borrowed letters from the Phoenicians through instruction, and used them after having transformed (μεταρρυσμῶσαντες) them a little.' It is not chance that Herodotus used ῥυθμός for the 'form' of letters at almost the same period that Leucippus, as we have just seen, was defining this word by using the very same example. This is proof of an even more ancient tradition that applied ῥυθμός to the configuration of the signs of writing. The word remained in use among the authors of the *Corpus Hippocraticum*, and with the same sense. One of them prescribes, for the treatment of clubfoot, the use of a small leaden boot, 'in the form of the ancient sandals of Chios' (οἶον αἱ

χῆται κρηπίδες ῥυθμὸν εἶχον).⁵ From ῥυθμός, come the compounds δμορροσμος, δμοιόρροσμος 'of the same form,' δμορροσμή 'resemblance' (Hip. 915h, 916b), εἰδρροσμός 'of a beautiful form, elegant,' etc.

If we now turn to the lyric poets, it is even earlier, as early as the seventh century, that we see the appearance of ῥυσμός. It is taken, like σχῆμα or τρόπος, as defining the individual and distinctive 'form' of the human character. Archilochus counsels, "do not boast of your victories in public and do not collapse at home in order to weep over your defeats; rejoice at reasons for joy and do not exacerbate yourself unduly over evils; γίγνωσκε δ' ὁλός ῥυσμός ἀνθρώπων ἔχει 'learn to know the dispositions which men have' " (2. 400. Bergk). In Anacreon, the ῥυσμοί are also particular 'forms' of mood or character: ἐγὼ δὲ μισέω πάντας ὄσοι σκολιὸν ἔχουσι ῥυσμούς καὶ χαλεπούς (fr. 74. 2), and Theognis counts ῥυθμός among man's distinctive traits: μή ποτ' ἐπαινήσης πρὶν ἂν εἰδῆς ἄνδρα σαφηνῶς δογῆν καὶ ῥυθμὸν καὶ τρόπον ὄντων ἔχει 'never praise a man before knowing clearly his feelings, his disposition (ῥυσμός), his character' (964). Let us add here Theocritus: Ἀυτονόας ῥοθμός ὠτός 'the attitude of Autoñoē was the same' (26. 23).

Among the tragedians, ῥυθμός and the verbs derived from it invariably maintain the same sense as in all the texts cited: ἐν τριγώνοις ῥυθμοῖς 'in a triangular form,' in a fragment of Aeschylus (fr. 78 N²); νηλεῶς δὲ εἰδρῶσιμα 'a pitiless fate has made my present form (= condition)' (Prom. 243); πόρον μετερρῶθμιζε '(Xerxes, in his madness,) wanted to transform a strait' (Pers. 747); μονορρῶθμοι δόμοι 'a dwelling arranged for one person' (Suppl. 961).⁶ The use of ῥυθμιζω in Sophocles is very instructive (Antig. 318): to the guard whom Creon has commanded to be quiet because his voice makes him suffer and who asks him, "Is it in your ears or in your soul that my voice makes you suffer?" Creon replies, τί δὲ ῥυθμιζεις τήν ἐμήν λύπην ὅπου 'why do you picture the location of my grief?' Here is the exact sense of ῥυθμιζω 'to give a form,' and the scholiast correctly renders ῥυθμιζω by σχηματίζειν, διατοποῦν 'to picture, to localize.' Euripides speaks of the ῥυθμός of a garment, of its distinctive 'form' (ῥυθμός πέπλων, Heracl. 130); of the 'modality' of a murder (τρόπος καὶ ῥυθμός φόνου, El. 772); of the 'distinctive mark' of mourning (ῥυθμός κακῶν, Suppl. 94); he uses εἰδρῶθμιζω 'in a suitable fashion,' for the arrangement of a bed (Cycl. 563) and ἄρρῶθμιζω for a 'disproportionate' passion (Hipp. 529).

This meaning of ῥυθμός persists in the Attic prose of the fifth century. Xenophon (Mem. 3. 10. 10) makes ῥυθμός ('proportion') the quality of a fine cuirass, which he qualifies by εἰδρῶθμιζω 'of a beautiful form.' In Plato one finds, among others, the ῥυθμός the 'balanced state' between opulence and poverty (Laws 728e), and expressions like ῥυθμιζω τὰ παιδικά 'to form a young favorite' (Phaedr. 253b), μεταρρῶθμιζεσθαι 'reproduce the form,'

in speaking of the images which mirrors reflect (Tim. 46a); this same verb μεταρρῶθμιζειν has the moral sense of 'to reform (the character)' in Xenophon (Econ. 11. 2. 3). And Aristotle himself invented ἀρρῶθμιζω 'not reduced to a form, amorphous' (Metaph. 1014b, 27).

We must limit ourselves here to this almost exhaustive list of examples. The citations suffice amply to establish: (1) that ῥυθμός never meant 'rhythm' from the earliest use down to the Attic period; (2) that it was never applied to the regular movement of the waves; (3) that its constant meaning is 'distinctive form, proportioned figure, arrangement, disposition' in conditions of use which are otherwise extremely varied. Similarly the derivatives or compounds, nominal or verbal, of ῥυθμός never refer to anything but the notion of "form." Such was the exclusive meaning of ῥυθμός in all types of writings down to the period at which we halted our citations.

Having established this meaning, we can and must determine it precisely. There are other expressions in Greek for 'form': σχῆμα, μορφή, εἶδος, etc., among which ῥυθμός should be distinguished in some way, better than our translation can indicate. The very structure of the word ῥυθμός should be investigated. We can now profitably return to etymology. The primary sense, the one which we have just deduced, seems unquestionably to take us far away from "to flow," by which others have explained it. And nevertheless, we shall not lightly abandon a comparison which is morphologically satisfying; the relation of ῥυθμός to ῥέω does not in itself give rise to any objection. It is not this derivation itself that we have criticized, but the wrong sense of ῥυθμός that was deduced from it. Now we can take up the analysis again, basing it on the corrected meaning. The formation in -(θ)μός⁷ deserves attention for the special sense it confers upon "abstract" words. It indicates, not the accomplishment of the notion, but the particular modality of its accomplishment as it is presented to the eyes. For example ὄρχησις is the act of dancing, ὄρχηθμός, the particular dance seen as it takes place; χοῦσις is the act of consulting an oracle, χοῦσμός the particular response obtained from the god; θέσις is the act of placing, θεσμός the particular disposition; στάσις is the state of being in some position (Fr. se tenir), σταθμός the position assumed, whence the balancing of a scale, a stance, etc. This function of the suffix emphasizes the originality of ῥυθμός. But it is especially the meaning of the radical which must be considered. When Greek authors render ῥυθμός by σχῆμα, and when we ourselves translate it by 'form,' in both cases it is only an approximation. There is a difference between σχῆμα and ῥυθμός; σχῆμα in contrast to ἔχω 'je (me) tiens' (cf. the relation of Lat. habitus to habeo) is defined as a fixed 'form,' realized and viewed in some way as an object. On the other hand, ῥυθμός, according to the contexts in which it is given, designates the form in the instant that it is assumed by what is moving,

mobile and fluid, the form of that which does not have organic consistency; it fits the pattern of a fluid element, of a letter arbitrarily shaped, of a robe which one arranges at one's will, of a particular state of character or mood. It is the form as improvised, momentary, changeable. Now, *ῥεῖν* is the essential predication of nature and things in the Ionian philosophy since Heraclitus, and Democritus thought that, since everything was produced from atoms, only a different arrangement of them produced the difference of forms and objects. We can now understand how *ῥυθμός*, meaning literally 'the particular manner of flowing,' could have been the most proper term for describing "dispositions" or "configurations" without fixity or natural necessity and arising from an arrangement which is always subject to change. The choice of a derivative of *ῥεῖν* for explaining this specific modality of the "form" of things is characteristic of the philosophy which inspired it; it is a representation of the universe in which the particular configurations of moving are defined as "fluctuations." There is a deep-lying connection between the proper meaning of the term *ῥυθμός* and the doctrine of which it discloses one of its most original notions.

How then, into this coherent and unvarying semantics of "form" did the notion of "rhythm" thrust itself? Where is its connection with the original concept of *ῥυθμός*? The problem is to understand the conditions that made *ῥυθμός* the word suited to express what we understand by "rhythm." These conditions are partially implied in advance by the definition posited above. The modern sense of "rhythm," which indeed existed in Greek itself, came about a priori from a secondary specialization, that of "form" being the only one attested until the middle of the fifth century. This development is really a creation to which we can assign, if not a date, at least a circumstance. It is Plato who determined precisely the notion of "rhythm," by delimiting the traditional value of *ῥυθμός* in a new acceptation. The principal texts in which the notion became fixed must be cited. In the *Phileb.* (17d), Socrates insists on the importance of intervals (*διαστήματα*), whose characteristics, distinctions, and combinations must be known if one wishes to study music seriously. He says, "Our predecessors taught us to call these combinations 'harmonies'—(*ἁρμονίας*); ἔν τε ταῖς κινήσεων αὐ τοῦ σώματος ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα πάθη γιγνώμενα, ἀ δὴ δι' ἁριθμῶν μεταρθέοντα δεῖν αὐ φασὶ ῥυθμὸς καὶ μέτρα ἐπινομάζειν." They also taught us that there occur other analogous qualities, inherent this time in the movements of the body, which are numerically regulated and which must be called *rhythms* and *measures* (*ῥυθμὸς καὶ μέτρα*)." In the *Symposium* (187b): "Ἡ γὰρ ἁρμονία συμφωνία ἐστίν, συμφωνία δὲ ὁμολογία τις . . . ὥσπερ γε καὶ ὁ ῥυθμὸς ἐκ τοῦ ταχέος καὶ βραδέος, ἐκ διετηρηγμένων πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ ὁμολογη-

σάντων, γέγονε 'Harmony is a consonance, and consonance an accord. . . . It is in the same way that *rhythm* results from the rapid and the slow, at first contrasted, then in accord.' Finally, in the *Laus* (665a), he teaches that young people are impetuous and turbulent, but that a certain order (*τάξις*), a privilege exclusively human, appears in their movements: *τῇ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἶη, τῇ δ' αὖ τῆς φωνῆς, τοῦ τ' ἀξέος ἅμα καὶ βραδέος συγκειρανημένων, ἁρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο, χορεία δὲ τὸ ξυναμφοτέρον κληθεῖη* 'This order in the movement has been given the name *rhythm*, while the order in the voice in which high and low combine is called *harmony*, and the union of the two is called the *choral art*.'

It can be seen how this definition developed from the traditional meaning and also how that meaning was modified by it. Plato still uses *ῥυθμός* in the sense of 'distinctive form, disposition, proportion.' His innovation was in applying it to the *form of movement* which the human body makes in dancing, and the arrangement of figures into which this movement is resolved. The decisive circumstance is there, in the notion of a corporal *ῥυθμός* associated with *μέτρον* and bound by the law of numbers: that "form" is from then on determined by a "measure" and numerically regulated. Here is the new sense of *ῥυθμός*: in Plato, 'arrangement' (the original sense of the word) is constituted by an ordered sequence of slow and rapid movements, just as "harmony" results from the alternation of high and low. And it is the order in movement, the entire process of the harmonious arrangement of bodily attitudes combined with meter, which has since been called *ῥυθμός*. We may then speak of the "rhythm" of a dance, of a step, of a song, of a speech, of work, of everything which presupposes a continuous activity broken by meter into alternating intervals. The notion of rhythm is established. Starting from *ῥυθμός*, a spatial configuration defined by the distinctive arrangement and proportion of the elements, we arrive at "rhythm," a configuration of movements organized in time: *πᾶς ῥυθμὸς ὠρισμένη μετρεῖται κινήσει* 'all rhythm is tempered by a definite movement' (Arist. *Probl.* 882b. 2).

The history sketched here will assist in the appreciation of the complexity of the linguistic conditions from which the notion of "rhythm" was disengaged. We are far indeed from the simplistic picture that a superficial etymology used to suggest, and it was not in contemplating the play of waves on the shore that the primitive Hellene discovered "rhythm"; it is, on the contrary, we who are making metaphors today when we speak of the rhythm of the waves. It required a long consideration of the structure of things, then a theory of measure applied to the figures of dance and to the modulations of song, in order for the principle of cadenced movement to be recognized and given a name. Nothing is less "natural" than this slow working out, by

the efforts of philosophers, of a notion which seems to us so necessarily inherent in the articulated forms of movement that we have difficulty in believing that people were not aware of it from the very beginning.

From *Journal de Psychologie* 44 (1951): 401-410

Civilization: A Contribution to the History of the Word

THE WHOLE HISTORY of modern thought and the principal intellectual achievements in the western world are connected with the creation and handling of a few dozen essential words which are all the common possession of the western European languages. We are just beginning to perceive how desirable it would be to describe with precision the genesis of this vocabulary of modern culture. Such a description could only be the sum of many detailed investigations of each of these words in each language. These works are still rare, and those who undertake them feel keenly the scarcity of the most necessary lexical documentation, especially in French.

In a well-known study,¹ Lucien Febvre gave a brilliant sketch of the history of one of the most important terms of our modern lexicon, the word *civilisation*, and the development of the very productive notions attached to it between the end of the eighteenth and the middle of the nineteenth century. He also deplored the difficulties encountered in dating exactly the appearance of the word in French. Precisely because *civilisation* is one of those words which show a new vision of the world, it is important to describe as specifically as possible the conditions under which it was created. The present article, which has as its particular purpose the broadening of the problem and the enrichment of the documentation, will be limited to that early phase of the first uses of the word.

Febvre did not encounter any reliable example of *civilisation* before 1766. A little after the publication of his study, new specific details and earlier examples were contributed on the one hand by Ferdinand Brunot, in a succinct note in his *Histoire de la langue française*,² and on the other by Joachim Moras, who devoted a detailed treatise to the notion of civilization in France.³ To this we can now add still other data encountered in our own reading.

It now appears quite likely that the earliest examples of the word are to be found in the writings of the Marquis de Mirabeau. Today it is hard to imagine the fame and influence of the author of *L'Ami des hommes*, not only in the circle of the physiocrats, but in the entire intellectual world and for many

7. This meaning of *δωτήνη*, once fixed, helps to settle a philological problem. We read in Herodotus 6. 89 that the Corinthians, by way of friendship, ceded to the Athenians some ships with the "symbolic" price of five drachmas, 'because their law forbade a completely free gift' *δωτήνην* (var. *δωρήνην*) γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὅμῳ νοθεύειν *δοῦναι*. The sense of a 'free gift,' which is that of *δωρήνη*, not of *δωτήνη*, should cause the adoption of the reading *δωρήνην* of ABCP, in opposition to the editors (Kallenberg, Hude, Legrand) who admit *δωτήνην*, following DRSV.
8. Cf. Mauss, *L'Année sociologique*, new series, 1 (1923-1924):38, n. 1.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

1. Most of the references used here are to be found in Lidell-Scott-Jones, *s.v.*, *ῥυθμός*. But the different acceptations of *ῥυθμός* in it are arranged almost at random, starting with the meaning of 'rhythm,' and without one's being able to discern the principle of the classification.
2. Between *ῥυθμός* and *ῥυσμός* the difference is only dialectal; *ῥυσμός* is the prevailing form in Ionian. There are many other examples of the coexistence of *-θμός* and *-σμός*: cf. Doric *τεθμός*, Homeric *θεσμός*; *βαθμός* and *βαδμός* etc.
3. These observations are valid for the form of the letters in the archaic alphabets, which we cannot reproduce here. An I is, in effect, a vertical H.
4. The citations from Democritus that follow may easily be found in H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, rev. W. Kranz (Berlin, 1951-1952), vol. 2.
5. E. Littré, ed., "Des Articulations," *Oeuvres complètes de Hippocrate* (Paris, 1844), 4:266.
6. Another example of *ῥυθμός* in Aeschylus, *Choeph.* 797, in a very emended text, was unusable.
7. For an analysis of the formations in *-θμός*, cf. J. Holt, *Glotta* 27 (1939):182ff; but he does not mention *ῥυθμός*.

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

1. L. Febvre, "Civilisation. Le mot et l'idée," Publications du Centre International de Synthèse (Paris, 1930), pp. 1-55. Paper read at the Centre de Synthèse in May, 1929.
2. F. Brunot, *Histoire de la langue française* (1930) 6, 1st part: 106. He gives as the first example of the word a passage from Turgot which L. Febvre ("Civilisation," pp. 4-5) eliminated as probably belonging to Dupont de Nemours.
3. J. Moras, *Ursprung und Entwicklung des Begriffs der Zivilisation in Frankreich (1756-1830)*, *Hamburger Studien zu Volkstum und Kultur der Romanen* 6 (Hamburg, 1930).
4. 1814 edition, p. 53, n. 1.
5. This was demonstrated by G. Weulersse, *Les Manuscrits économiques de François Quesnay et du marquis de Mirabeau aux Archives nationales* (Paris, 1910), pp. 19-20, which shows "that the work was composed entirely, and undoubtedly even printed, in 1756, but it did not appear until 1757."
6. It was not difficult to go back to Mirabeau. This passage is cited in the second edition of the *Dictionnaire de Trévoux*. The reference now appears in the new edition of O. Bloch and W. von Warburg, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française* (Paris, 1950), but with a wrong date (1755, instead of 1757) and an error in the title of the work (*L'Ami de l'homme* instead of *L'Ami des hommes*).

7. We do not think it would be of any use to take up again the examples given by J. Moras for Mirabeau or those of the Abbé Baudeau in the *Éphémérides du citoyen*, already cited by L. Febvre and J. Moras.
8. Dossier M. 780, no. 3. The manuscript was pointed out by G. Weulersse (*Les Manuscrits économiques*, p. 3). J. Moras did not make complete use of it.
9. The passages in italics are underlined in the original ms.
10. It is the only passage cited by Brunot (*Histoire*) with a different reference (p. 190) which either refers to another edition or is wrong.
11. F. Gohin, *Les Transformations de la langue française pendant la deuxième moitié du XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1902), pp. 266ff.
12. Brunot, *Histoire*, 6, 2nd part: 1320.
13. Gohin, *Les Transformations*, p. 271.
14. Febvre, "Civilisation" pp. 7ff.
15. Moras, *Ursprung*, pp. 34ff.
16. R. Price, *Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government and the Justice and Policy of the War with America* (Dublin, 1776), p. 100.
17. This translation was only mentioned by Febvre, "Civilisation," pp. 9, 22. In the French translation, it is always *civilisation* which translates the English word and which is sometimes even employed (p. 154) where the English text has "refinement."
18. A French translation, *Histoire de la société civile*, tr. Bergier, was published in 1783 (the publisher's note states that it was printed almost five years before that date). The translator uses *civilisation* everywhere. It is even less useful for listing the examples than the French version of Millar's work.
19. In any case it is now clear that Boswell, being himself a Scotsman and one who had studied at Edinburgh, had every reason for being familiar in 1772 with a term which Ferguson's courses must have made known.
20. Letter cited by Dugald-Stewart in his biography of Adam Smith, published at the beginning of the posthumous collection, *Essays on Philosophical Subjects* (1795) p. xlvi.