

ALSO BY NORMAN O. BROWN
Closing Time
Love's Body
Hesiod's Theogony
Hermes the Thief
Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis

LIFE AGAINST DEATH

The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History

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Instinctual Dualism and Instinctual Dialectics

THE THEORY of the instincts is psychoanalysis in its most opaque and most unsympathetic form. We are suspicious of the very word "instinct": it suggests an unalterable biological datum, and therefore seems to deny man the power to alter himself, and simultaneously to deny the environment the power to alter him, leaving him with a fixed nature irreconcilable with the actual variety in human character and conduct. Or, starting from the methodological principle that theories of human nature must be derived from the observation of human behavior, we fail to see how from the observation of human behavior we can derive anything except a classification of the varieties of human behavior; and we fail to see anything gained, except mystification, by calling such classifications instincts.

This initial lack of sympathy turns into outright rejection when we find that Freud steadily insists that the instincts are two and only two; at this point psychoanalysis seems quite arbitrary and therefore unscientific. Then finally we find that Freud changes his mind quite radically as to the nature of the two instincts in the middle of his psychoanalytical career. And his argumentation is a jungle of technical psychoanalytical considerations mixed with biological speculations. Having lost all sense of direction, we happily pounce on the passage where Freud says, "The instincts are mythical beings, superb in their indefiniteness,"¹ and interpret it as justification for forgetting the whole subject. But the next sentence in the same passage reads, "In our work we cannot for a moment overlook them,

and yet we are never certain that we are seeing them clearly."

First, therefore, we must clarify the scientific status of these instincts which are "mythical beings." Freud regards them as the basal concepts of psychoanalysis, having a status comparable to such concepts as matter and energy in physics. But, he says, in truly empirical sciences these basal concepts are not the foundation stone but the coping stone of the whole structure. And he argues that while a speculative theory must be based on sharply defined concepts, an empirical science will be "gladly content with nebulous, scarcely imaginable conceptions, which it hopes to apprehend more clearly in the course of its development, or which it is even prepared to replace by others."² (Freud said this long before he decided to abandon his earlier instinct theory.) In another passage Freud argues that such basal concepts, in the beginning stages of a science, must have some measure of uncertainty, and strictly speaking must be in the nature of conventions, "although everything depends on their being chosen in no arbitrary manner, but determined by important relations they have to the empirical material—relations that we seem to divine before we can clearly recognize and demonstrate them."³ To all but extreme positivists Freud's defense of the scientific status of the "mythical" instincts will, I think, be acceptable. Basal concepts such as instincts are groping attempts to answer the fundamental problem which any given science is trying to solve, and at the same time they must spring out of the empirical material which is the real foundation for the science.

The light which shows a path through the complications of the Freudian theory of instincts is a clear perception of the problem he is trying to answer and of the facts from which the answer is to be derived. We must return to the fundamental concept of psychoanalysis, the pillar on which the whole edifice rests—repression. The empirical material on which psychoanalysis rests is the observation of repression, resistance, and conflict in human life. And the goal of psychoanalysis is to create a theory of human nature which explains why there is repression.

This goal immediately explains two formal characteristics of the theory of instincts. The Freudian theory of the instincts

is persistently dualistic because it starts from the fact of conflict in mental life and aims at explaining that fact. Hence the Freudian critique of Jung's monistic theory of the libido centers on the argument that it undermines the theory of repression.⁴ Secondly, the Freudian "instinct" is a borderland concept between the mental and the biological, because Freud is seeking an explanation of man as neurotic or repressed in terms which would relate man's specifically human characteristic (repression) to his animal (bodily) nature. Hence he defines an instinct as "both the mental representative of the stimuli emanating from within the organism and penetrating to the mind, and at the same time a measure of the demand made upon the energy of the latter in consequence of its connection with the body."⁵

As a borderland concept between the human and the animal, the instinct theory inevitably takes Freud into biological as well as psychological considerations. Thus his general approach to the problem of repression gave his instincts two formal characteristics. On the one hand, they must be common to all animals, or even all life; on the other hand, they must be a mutually antagonistic pair. These formal characteristics hold true for both the earlier and the later theories of the instincts. For whether the antagonism, or as Freud calls it the ambivalence, is between sex and self-preservation, or between sex and aggression, or between life and death, in every case Freud postulates an ultimate duality grounded in the very nature of life itself.

Freud began by borrowing from the romantic poets the antithesis of hunger and love, which, translated into scientific terminology, gave him the antithesis of the sexual and self-preservation instincts. The antithesis of the sexual and self-preservation instincts corresponds to the antithesis of the pleasure-principle and the reality-principle, which is, in Freud's earlier theory, the cause of repression. At the same time they can plausibly be regarded as present in all organisms or at least all animals, the sexual instinct working to preserve the species and the self-preservation instinct working to preserve the individual member of the species. This first theory of repression was upset by developments in the exploration of the sexual instinct (libido). The antithesis of sex and self-preservation was undermined when empirical facts forced on psychoanalysis the

recognition of the narcissistic character of the sexual instinct; for narcissistic libido cathects the self, and there was no way of distinguishing narcissistic libido from the self-preservation instinct. The only duality which the narcissistic libido suggested was the duality of ego-libido and object-libido; but since the facts which forced on psychoanalysis the concept of the narcissistic libido showed the convertibility of ego-libido into object-libido and vice versa, this duality was not firm enough.

Hence, again looking for a dualism, Freud turned to the ambivalence of love and hate, an ambivalence prominent, like hunger and love, in romantic philosophy and poetry, and also prominent in the clinical picture of psychopathological case histories. He thus obtained a fresh start with the antithesis of the sexual and aggressive instincts. But again the empirical facts which suggested the antithesis showed that sexual and aggressive instincts were not an ultimate duality. No one has shown more clearly than Freud himself how love can turn into hate, and the fusion of both in the phenomenon of sadism. So, to obtain a firm enough duality, Freud turns for inspiration to the biological antithesis of life and death, and links the hypothesis of a universal biological death instinct with the psychological phenomenon of masochism.

Now he is able to postulate an irreconcilable conflict between Eros, seeking to preserve and enrich life, and the death instinct, seeking to return life to the peace of death. Now ambivalent fusions, such as that of sadism, no longer threaten to undermine the basic dualism. Such ambivalent fusions are secondary fusions, compromises generated in the eternal struggle of life and death. Sadism represents an extroversion of the innate death instinct, a transformation of the desire to die into the desire to kill, a transformation achieved by Eros so as to reduce the innate self-destructive tendency in the organism and turn it into a useful ally in the erotic task of maintaining and enriching life.⁶

If a psychoanalytic theory of the instincts must have the formal characteristics Freud demanded, if it is to trace the conflicts in mental life to basic conflicts in "the demands made upon the mind in consequence of its connection with the body," it is difficult to see any way of avoiding Freud's final duality of

the life and death instincts. Assuming we have to have a duality, the technical arguments which forced Freud from one duality to another till he reached this final hypothesis are both logically coherent and strongly based on empirical data. Psychoanalysts after Freud, who have not accepted the life-and-death duality, have not been able to produce any alternative. They content themselves with rejecting the death instinct, and thus drift into instinctual monism, as Jung did, or into that general theoretical skepticism or indifference which is so congenial to the practitioner-technician.

The psychoanalytical practitioners have good reason to draw back from Freud's final instinct theory. The theory, as he left it, results in complete therapeutic pessimism, and is therefore worse than useless for therapists. Freud himself was unable to use the death instinct in his own later clinical writings, with one significant exception, namely the essay "Analysis Terminable and Interminable." This essay analyzes the factors preventing complete cure. Freud's therapeutic pessimism is grounded in his hypothesis of the eternal and irreconcilable struggle of life and death in every organism, producing in every human being the "spontaneous tendency to conflict" and manifesting itself in neurotic patients as an unconscious resistance to cure, a kind of "psychical entropy."⁷

Quite apart from the specific character of the death instinct—the subject of the next chapter—Freud's system as a whole is given a metaphysical tendency toward pessimism by the formal prerequisite that conflicts in mental life are to be traced to instincts. The aim of the theory of instincts is to build a bridge between mental conflict (neurosis) and human biology, and, at least as Freud handled it, it ends by finding the causes of conflict in the biological domain. But if the causes are biological data, the hope of cure is groundless. It is true that Freud more than once disavows the propriety of giving a biological, as opposed to a psychological, explanation of repression.⁸ But when, for example in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, he invokes the "primal," "innate" conflict of ambivalence between Eros and Death as the ultimate explanation of the human neurosis, we must assume he means "innate," i.e., biologically given.⁹ And the vision of Life and Death in *Beyond the Pleasure*

Principle completes the picture by seeing all organic life caught in the conflict of ambivalence.

All organic life is then sick; we humans must abandon hope of cure, but we can take comfort in the conclusion that our sickness is part of some universal sickness in nature. The metaphysical courage, even grandeur, of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* should not blind us to the fact that it is metaphysics (Freud calls it speculation); it is true religion, in the Spinozistic sense; it is Freud's attempt to see all things in God and *sub specie aeternitatis*. To argue *ad hominem* against a metaphysical system is easy, and psychoanalysis equips us to do so. It is easy to argue that Freud has projected the neurosis of mankind onto the whole organic world, with the effect of exhibiting the inevitability and permanence of the human neurosis. It is easy to argue that this is a rationalization really expressing that unconscious resistance to cure which, according to Freud, makes patients cling tenaciously to illness and suffering and which is a manifestation of the wish to die.¹⁰ It is less easy to see how the psychoanalytical exploration of the human neurosis leads to any other theoretical conclusion or any other instinctual resolution.

A psychoanalysis which remains psychoanalysis must keep the theory of instincts. In it is contained the commitment to restore to man his animal nature and to eliminate the mystery of the soul. Hence the instincts must be universal biological principles. The question is: What had to happen to an animal in order to make him into a man-animal? And a psychoanalysis which remains psychoanalysis must keep the duality of instincts. The essence of the man-animal is neurosis, and the essence of neurosis is mental conflict. The human neurosis must be traced to an instinctual ambivalence, a conflict between forces inherent in all organic life, unless we are to return to the traditional and stale notion that the psychic conflict in man is due to the ambivalence between his superorganic soul and his animal body.

If, on the other hand, psychoanalysis is to retain hope and keep open the possibility of therapy, it must find a way to avoid Freud's metaphysical vision of all life sick with the struggle between Life and Death. It must hold fast to the vision that man is distinguished from other animals by the privilege of being

sick; that there is an essential connection between being sick and being civilized; in other words, that neurosis is the privilege of the uniquely social animal. It must therefore maintain that instinctual ambivalence is a human prerogative.

We need, in fine, a metaphysics which recognizes both the continuity between man and animals and also the discontinuity. We need, instead of an instinctual dualism, an instinctual dialectic. We shall have to say that whatever the basic polarity in human life may be—whether it is the polarity of hunger and love, or love and hate, or life and death—this polarity exists in animals but does not exist in a condition of ambivalence. Man is distinguished from animals by having separated, ultimately into a state of mutual conflict, aspects of life (instincts) which in animals exist in some condition of undifferentiated unity or harmony. Psychoanalysis must find the basis of human neurosis in the animal, and at the same time must recognize that the animal is not neurotic (except when it is brought into contagious contact with man). Since the basis of human neurosis is conflict, the polarities which develop into conflict at the human level must exist, but not as conflict, and therefore somehow undifferentiated, at the animal level.

This dialectical metaphysics is no less metaphysical than the metaphysics of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. The difference between the two can be best seen if we relate them to their proper models in pure philosophical speculation. Freud correctly found a model for his own view in the pre-Socratic philosopher Empedocles, who found the ultimate principle of the universe to be the eternal conflict between love and strife.¹¹ Our speculation has a similar analogy to the philosophy of Empedocles' predecessors—Anaximander, who said that the strife of opposites is produced by the separating of opposites out of a primal state of undifferentiated unity, and Heraclitus, who asserted the ultimate unity of opposites, including life and death.

The difference between a dualism of the instincts and a dialectical unity of the instincts is small and elusive; but slight shades of difference at this fundamental level can have large consequences. Freud's dualism undermines the distinction between different levels in what is nevertheless the continuous

hierarchy of organisms; the shift from the logic of Empedocles to the logic of Anaximander makes it possible to formulate both the continuity and the discontinuity between man and animals. Freud's dualism also leads to suicidal therapeutic pessimism, because it results in representing conflict not as a human aberration but as a universal biological necessity; our modification of Freud's ontology restores the possibility of salvation. It is the distinctive achievement of man to break apart the undifferentiated or dialectical unity of the instincts at the animal level. Man separates the opposites, turns them against each other, and, in Nietzsche's phrase, sets life cutting into life. It is the privilege of man to revolt against nature and make himself sick. But if man has revolted from nature, it is possible for him to return to nature and heal himself. Then man's sickness may be, again in Nietzsche's phrase, a sickness in the sense that pregnancy is a sickness, and it may end in a birth and a rebirth.¹² The Freudian dualism prevents us from positing any break with nature, and consequently precludes the notion of a return to nature; and since the failure to posit a break with nature entails the necessity of projecting man's sickness back into nature, a return to nature, even if it were possible, would not be a return to health.

Dialectics rather than dualism is the metaphysic of hope rather than despair. There is no way of eliminating questions of faith from human life as long as human life is subject to general conditions of repression. Or rather—since, as Freud said, faith is a derivative of love—dialectics is the metaphysic of Eros, hoping all things according to St. Paul and seeking reunification according to Freud.

Actually the dialectical metaphysic of hope does not lack empirical grounds, grounds established by psychoanalysis itself. The only grounds for hope for humanity are in the facts of human childhood; and psychoanalysis is nothing without the doctrine that mankind is that species of animal which has the immortal project of recovering its own childhood. But childhood is the state of nature. The notion of man's revolt from nature and return to nature, though incompatible with Freud's instinct ontology, is required by his theory of childhood. Quite specifically, Freud's ontological postulate of the

innate ambivalence of instincts, as we have seen, is contradicted by the empirical theorem of a first, pre-ambivalent stage in infancy. And the fixation to that first pre-ambivalent experience commits mankind to the unconscious project of overcoming the instinctual ambivalence which is his actual condition and of restoring the unity of opposites that existed in childhood and exists in animals.

It is characteristic both of the complications in Freud's thought, and also of his capacity to surpass himself, that although his basic ontology should preclude the possibility of any reconciliation between the two antagonistic instincts, he nevertheless formulates such a goal when he speaks of their possible fusion. He furthermore assigns the task of working toward such a fusion to the ego, that is to say to the conscious self, attributing to it a tendency to "synthesize," "harmonize," "reconcile," "organize" the conflicts and divisions in mental life.¹³ From Freud's point of view this unifying tendency in the ego must be a manifestation of the erotic or life instinct, to which he attributed the function of seeking ever wider unification. This is a remarkably optimistic analysis of the ego, implying as it does a predominance of Eros in its instinctual constitution, and implying that the victory of the ego is a victory of Eros or Life over Death. One wonders how the ego escapes so lightly from the death instinct.

But if in man the instincts have departed from a primal state of undifferentiated unity, then, just as Freud said object-finding was re-finding, we may add that the fusion sought by the ego is refusion. If so, then we may question Freud's statement that the tendency to synthesis and unity is entirely absent from the id (the instinctual reservoir).¹⁴ Then his picture of the weak but coherent ego seeking to tame the strong chaos in the id has to be modified. Fusion may be a goal sought by the body and the unconscious instincts themselves as much as by the ego. If, therefore, Freud in these passages permits himself to be too optimistic about the ego, he is perhaps too pessimistic about the id.

If psychoanalysis must say that instincts, which at the level of animality are in a harmonious unity, are separated at the level of humanity and set into conflict with each other, and

that mankind will not rest content until it is able to abolish these conflicts and restore harmony, but at the higher level of consciousness, then once again it appears that psychoanalysis completes the romantic movement and is understood only if interpreted in that light. It is one of the great romantic visions, clearly formulated by Schiller and Herder as early as 1793 and still vital in the systems of Hegel and Marx, that the history of mankind consists in a departure from a condition of undifferentiated primal unity with himself and with nature, an intermediate period in which man's powers are developed through differentiation and antagonism (alienation) with himself and with nature, and a final return to a unity on a higher level or harmony.¹⁵ But these categories—primal unity, differentiation through antagonism, final harmony—remain in the romantics arbitrary and mystical because they lack a foundation in psychology. The psychoanalytical theory of childhood completes the romantic movement by filling this gap.

But at the same time, to make conscious the unconscious connection between psychoanalysis and the romantic movement is to give psychoanalysis a philosophy of history. Primal unity, differentiation through antagonism, and final harmony constitute for the romantics the historical path and destiny of the human species as a whole. The pessimism of Freud's final position and his failure to develop a philosophy of history are intimately connected. For the therapist and humanitarian, a philosophy of history has to take the form of an eschatology, declaring the conditions under which redemption from the human neurosis is possible.

The possibility of redemption lies in the reunification of the instinctual opposites. But Freud finally came to see the instinctual opposites as Life (Eros) and Death. How can Life and Death be unified? We must turn to an examination of the death instinct.

V I I I

Death, Time, and Eternity

THE PSYCHOANALYTICAL theory of neurosis requires us to postulate a real instinctual ambivalence in man. The possibility of therapy depends on recognizing that instinctual ambivalence is a human prerogative, absent at the animal level and correlative with repression at the human level, and therefore in principle surpassable, if repression can be surpassed. And Freud had good reasons for moving from his earlier formulations of the duality to his final formulation, Life and Death. But if the instinctual duality is Life and Death, our modification of Freud's ontology entails the hypothesis that Life and Death coexist in some undifferentiated unity at the animal level and that they could be reunified into some higher harmony in man. But in every human ideology, and in the experience of every human individual, Death is the great adversary. How can Death be unified with Life? If we want to cure, we had better follow Freud and study Death.

Under the general heading of the death instinct Freud groups three distinct sets of phenomena. First of all, biological and psychological considerations suggested that the activity of all organisms and also of the human mind was directed at getting rid of tensions and attaining inactivity. (I believe the term preferred in modern biological theory is "homeostasis.") In this light the pleasure-principle, which Freud from the first had seized upon as the guiding principle of mental life, appeared as a Nirvana-principle, aiming at inactivity, rest, or sleep, the twin brother of death. Second, Freud, assuming a connection between Eros and the pleasure-principle, contrasted with the pleasure-principle that compulsion to repeat which in many cases produces fixations to traumatic experiences in the past

and a daemonic compulsion to bring suffering on oneself. Freud therefore argued that the compulsion to repeat was a tendency independent of and more elemental than the pleasure-principle. He then brought the compulsion to repeat into relation with the conservative character of the instincts in all organic life, and put forward the idea that there was a general instinctual tendency to restore an earlier state of things, ultimately derived from a tendency in all organisms to return to the inorganic or dead level out of which life arose. And finally Freud referred to the psychoanalytic analysis of the sado-masochistic complex. He now modified his earlier view that masochism represented an introversion of what was originally a sadistic drive, and took the reverse position that there was a primary masochism directed against the self and that sadism was an extroversion of this primary masochism, which he identified with the death instinct.¹

Clarity requires that we distinguish these three elements in Freud's death instinct. Nirvana, the repetition-compulsion, and masochism may all represent death, but if they do, they represent different aspects of death. Freud's equivocation may contain a real truth; these three forms of "death" may turn out to be really three forms of one death; but first we must grasp them separately. And in our analysis, carrying forward our modification of Freud's ontology, we must press always for clarification of the relation between the biological and human levels—the crucial question of what happened when animals became men.

Assuming that the Nirvana-principle, or homeostasis, is a fundamental principle of organic life, how does it operate in the mental life of human beings? Freud in his earlier writings said that the pleasure-principle expressed the fundamental aim of human desire and had the negative goal of reduction of tension (unpleasure). He thus identified the pleasure-principle at the human level with homeostasis in all organic life, implicitly obliterating any distinction in this respect between the human and animal levels.

One of the advances opened up in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, but developed only later, was the discrimination between homeostasis and the pleasure-principle. Freud was forced

in this direction by his assimilation of homeostasis and the death instinct, since the connection between the pleasure-principle and the libido, that is to say the sexual or erotic or life instinct, seemed obvious. He therefore abandoned the notion that the goal of the pleasure-principle was a quantitative reduction of tension, and proposed that the essence of pleasure should be found in a certain quality rather than quantity, but he was unable to specify the nature of this quality.² Pursuing this new line of thought, Freud detected in the operations of the libido, in sexual relations, in social relations, and in the relations between the conflicting factors in the human psyche (the ego, the super-ego, and the id), a tendency to seek ever greater unification—a tendency, therefore, which went beyond the purely negative goal of release of tension.³ Consequently Eros, and by implication the pleasure-principle, appeared not to seek the negative goal of reducing unpleasure, but to represent a "deep-rooted, passionate striving for a positive fulfilment of happiness"⁴—a happiness which lay in some form of ever wider unification. Freud therefore withdrew the identification of the pleasure-principle and Nirvana (homeostasis) still assumed in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, and advanced the idea that "the Nirvana-principle expresses the tendency of the death-instincts, the pleasure-principle represents the claim of the libido."⁵

This new idea fits badly with all the previous arguments pointing toward a connection between the pleasure-principle and Nirvana, between the libido and the goal of reducing tension. Therefore Freud, not unaware of this other side of the picture, in the same passage postulates a transformation of the Nirvana-principle through which it became the pleasure-principle: "We must perceive that the Nirvana-principle, which belongs to the death-instincts, underwent a modification in the living organism through which it became the pleasure-principle, and henceforth we shall avoid regarding the two principles as one."⁶ But such a transformation implies in this context a transformation of the death instinct into the life instinct incompatible with the Freudian dualistic ontology.

Freud's dualistic ontology has confused an important issue. Let us postulate, as biology seems to do, that homeostasis expresses the tendency of all organic life to seek a state of equi-

librium. Let us accept from Freud's later writings the idea that the pleasure-principle at the human level is not reducible or equivalent to homeostasis. Then Freud's own analysis suggests that what at the biological level appears as the static Nirvana-principle, at the human level appears as a dynamic pleasure-principle.

This reformulation preserves the element of continuity between men and animals, but at the same time it recognizes the necessary element of discontinuity. To identify the pleasure-principle with man and the Nirvana-principle with life in general is only another way of saying that man, and only man, is the neurotic animal. The neurotic animal is the discontented animal; man's discontent implies the disruption of the balanced equilibrium between tension and release of tension which governs the activity of animals. Instinctual repression transforms the static homeostasis principle in animals into the dynamic pleasure-principle in man; homeostasis can exist only under conditions of instinctual satisfaction. It is the search for instinctual satisfaction under conditions of instinctual repression that produces in man the restless quest of the pleasure-principle for a quality of experience denied to it under conditions of repression. The restless pleasure-principle is the search for psychic health under conditions of psychic disease, and therefore is itself a symptom of the disease, just as Freud said the progress of psychic disease may also be regarded as an attempt to cure.⁷

By the same token, if man could put an end to repression and obtain instinctual satisfaction, the restless pleasure-principle would return to the Nirvana-principle, that is to say, a balanced equilibrium between tension and tension release. If therefore the Nirvana-principle "belongs to the death-instincts" and the pleasure-principle belongs to Eros, their reunification would be the condition of equilibrium or rest of life that is a full life, unrepressed, and therefore satisfied with itself and affirming itself rather than changing itself. Thus interpreted, psychoanalysis reaffirms ageless religious aspirations. For Nirvana, if it expresses the rhythm of the lowest form of organic life, also expresses the highest aspirations of Buddhism. And how Nirvana differs from that eternal rest not only of the spirit but also

of the body which St. Augustine promises as man's ultimate felicity,⁸ is a distinction which I leave to theologians.

The reunification of Life and Death—accepting for the moment Freud's equation of Death and Nirvana—can be envisioned only as the end of the historical process. Freud's pessimism, his preference for dualism rather than dialectics, and his failure to develop a historical eschatology are all of a piece. To see how man separated from nature, and separated out the instincts, is to see history as neurosis; and also to see history, as neurosis, pressing restlessly and unconsciously toward the abolition of history and the attainment of a state of rest which is also a reunification with nature. It comes to the same thing to say that the consequence of the disruption of the unity of Life and Death in man is to make man the historical animal. For the restless pleasure-principle—which is the morbid manifestation of the Nirvana-principle—is what makes man Faustian, and Faustian man is history-making man. If repression were overcome, the restless career of Faustian man would come to an end, because he would be satisfied and could say, "*Verweile doch, du bist so schön.*"⁹

Let us now turn to the repetition-compulsion and attempt in the same way to discriminate its mode of functioning at the animal level from its mode of functioning at the human level. The difficulty with Freud's notion of the repetition-compulsion as a factor in all organic life is that he sees a connection between two distinct phenomena—the fact that all organisms die, and the fact that biological instincts are fundamentally conservative (he instances the migration of birds and fishes and the laws of heredity and embryology).¹⁰ If we postpone till we come to the sado-masochistic complex consideration of Freud's notion of an internal drive to die, we are left with the repetition-compulsion as a principle of instinctual conservatism. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* Freud correctly saw that the problem was to relate the human phenomenon of "progress," "perfectionism," to the conservatism of instincts at the organic level, and (if we ignore some hesitations) he correctly saw that these apparent opposites are the same thing:

It may be difficult . . . to abandon the belief that there is an instinct toward perfection at work in human beings. . . .

I have no faith, however, in the existence of any such internal instinct and I cannot see how this benevolent illusion is to be preserved. The present development of human beings requires, as it seems to me, no different explanation from that of animals. What appears in a minority of human individuals as an untiring impulse to further perfection can easily be understood as a result of instinctual repression. The repressed instinct never ceases to strive for complete satisfaction, which would consist in the repetition of a primary experience of satisfaction. No substitute or reactive formations and no sublimations will suffice to remove the repressed instinct's persisting tension.¹¹

The difference between men and animals is repression. Under conditions of repression, the repetition-compulsion establishes a fixation to the past, which alienates the neurotic from the present and commits him to the unconscious quest for the past in the future. Thus neurosis exhibits the quest for novelty, but underlying it, at the level of the instincts, is the compulsion to repeat. In man, the neurotic animal, the instinctual compulsion to repeat turns into its opposite, the quest for novelty, and the unconscious aim of the quest for novelty is repetition.

Furthermore, it is repression which turns the repetition-compulsion into an antagonist of the pleasure-principle. Freud had to recognize that the repetition-compulsion could be a principle of pleasure as well as a principle of traumatic daemonic compulsion, thus running into the same confusion that made him formulate the Nirvana-principle first as Eros, then as Death. "Children," he observes, "cannot have their *pleasurable* experiences repeated often enough, and they are inexorable in their insistence that the repetition shall be an identical one"; in contrast, in the adult "novelty is always the condition of enjoyment."¹² Childhood is, psychologically speaking, the state of nature; at the animal level there is no antagonism between the pleasure-principle and the repetition-compulsion. The repetition-compulsion—the conservative tendency of instincts—seems to be a biological principle imposing the limitations of a species-essence on each individual member of a species and directing the individual to enjoy the life proper to his species. In the discontented animal, man, it is transformed into a regressive fixation to the past, with the effect of unconsciously compelling him

to change himself, to become, to find the life proper to his species. But if repression were overcome and man could enjoy the life proper to his species, the regressive fixation to the past would dissolve; the restless quest for novelty would be reabsorbed into the desire for pleasurable repetition; the desire to Become would be reabsorbed into the desire to Be.

Man, the discontented animal, unconsciously seeking the life proper to his species, is man in history: repression and the repetition-compulsion generate historical time. Repression transforms the timeless instinctual compulsion to repeat into the forward-moving dialectic of neurosis which is history; history is a forward-moving *recherche du temps perdu*, with the repetition-compulsion guaranteeing the historical law of the slow return of the repressed.¹³ And conversely, life not repressed—organic life below man and human life if repression were overcome—is not in historical time. If we connect—as Freud did not—the repetition-compulsion with Freud's reiterated theorem that the instinctual processes in the id are timeless,¹⁴ then only repressed life is in time, and unrepressed life would be timeless or in eternity. Thus again psychoanalysis, carried to its logical conclusion and transformed into a theory of history, gathers to itself ageless religious aspirations. The Sabbath of Eternity, that time when time no more shall be, is an image of that state which is the ultimate goal of the repetition-compulsion in the timeless id. The romantics inherited and secularized the mystic aspiration for Eternity: Hegel envisioned the end of the dialectic of history, and humanity's final entry into the eternal realm of "Absolute (perfected) Spirit" (*Absolute Geist*). Psychoanalysis comes to remind us that we are bodies, that repression is of the body, and that perfection would be the realm of Absolute Body; eternity is the mode of unrepressed bodies.

The repetition-compulsion, willy-nilly, involves us in the theory of time; and here, as elsewhere, psychoanalysis is, or ought to be, paradox. The notion of the abolition of time will seem to many, including the orthodox psychoanalysts, not paradox but nonsense. Is not time of the essence of things, and are we gods so that we can abolish it? But time is not of the essence of things. The psychoanalytical theory of time, as Freud saw,¹⁵ must take as its point of departure Kant's doctrine that

time does not pertain to things in themselves out there but is a form of perception of the human mind. This Copernican revolution makes time a psychological, not an ontological, problem, and therefore a problem for psychoanalysis. It also, as Schopenhauer saw,¹⁶ opens up the possibility of man's emancipation from the tyranny of time. It suggests that if the human mind were to break through the veil of phenomena and reach "noumenal" reality, it would find no time. It is true that Kant himself firmly shut the door on any such possibility, not only by denying the possibility of reaching "noumenal" reality, but also by asserting the immutability of the forms (including time) through which the human mind perceives reality, and by equating these immutable forms with rationality.

Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, claims to be a break through phenomena to the hidden "noumenal" reality, at least with regard to knowledge of ourselves. And if, as I think we can, we equate Freud's Unconscious with the "noumenal" reality of ourselves, we find Freud positively asserting the discovery that at least in that "noumenal" reality there is no time: "Unconscious mental processes are in themselves timeless"; "In the id there is nothing corresponding to the idea of time."¹⁷ If, therefore, we go beyond Freud, and speculate seriously on the possibility of a consciousness not based on repression but conscious of what is now unconscious, then it follows a priori that such a consciousness would be not in time but in eternity. And in fact eternity seems to be the time in which childhood lives. The poets have said so, and the psychoanalyst Marie Bonaparte expresses it this way:

The days of the child seem to unfold in some sense outside of our time. These days of childhood—let us each recall them—seem to the child as if they were eternal. . . . Of course the important persons who bring up the child strictly impose the scheme of their time on him . . . but he feels the imposition of adult time by adults as an alien intrusion into his own time, which is essentially in some sense infinite.¹⁸

Not only does Freud represent a breakthrough to the "noumenal" self, but he also lays the basis for an attack on the Kantian equation of the time-schema with rationality. There are psychoanalytical theorems, which we can discuss only in a

later chapter, anatomizing time-consciousness as a diseased consciousness and tending toward the conclusion that what Kant took to be the schemata of rationality are really the schemata of repression.¹⁹ It is true that Freud fails to gather the insights of psychoanalysis together to make a frontal assault on the concept of time: in fact, he recognizes his failure when toward the end of his life he writes, "It is constantly being borne in upon us that we have made far too little use for our theory of the indubitable fact that the repressed remains unaltered by time. This seems to offer us the possibility of an approach to some really profound truths. But I myself have made no further progress here."²⁰ In particular, Freud does not seem to have envisaged the mutability of the time-schema, much less its abolition (along with the abolition of repression).

On the other hand, recent developments in physics, biology, and anthropology are tending to establish the relativity of time-schemata to variable biological and cultural needs.²¹ In other words, the twentieth century has seen the disintegration of the universality and, with the universality, the rationality also, of the time-schema. Postponing further discussion of the problem until we are in a position to exploit the psychoanalytical theory of the mechanisms of repression ("defense mechanisms"), we may, I think, envisage the Sabbath of Eternity, without being mystical except in the sense in which all hope of better things is mystical.

And yet would perfection and happiness be in eternity? Does not such a notion face emotional objections over and above the theoretical objections? Faustian characters as we are, we cannot imagine "rest," "Nirvana," "eternity" except as a cessation of all activity—in other words, as death. What our argument is reaching for is not death rather than life but a reconciliation of life and death. We have therefore to sustain the possibility of activity (life) which is also at rest.

The notion of activity or life which is also at rest is plainly contained in the Christian notion of heaven; and I suspect that the Buddhist Nirvana is not as inert and negative as Christian polemics make it out to be. But the Christian heaven exists to solve problems not soluble on earth; and, since it postulates immortality in heaven, its hidden psychological premise is the im-

possibility of reconciling life and death, either on earth or in heaven. We can find, as F. C. S. Schiller has shown,²² a more satisfactory model of perfection conceived as activity without motion in Aristotle.

Aristotle's fundamental notion is activity (*energeia*). Motion (*kinesis*) is a special kind of activity, namely imperfect activity; it is the movement of the imperfect toward perfection. Perfect activity is activity without motion or change or passivity, and therefore, since time is correlative with motion, an activity not in time. And Aristotle recognizes pleasurable activity of the bodily senses, provided there is no "impediment" (in Freudian terms, frustration), as an activity without motion or change, and therefore not in time: "Seeing seems to be at any moment complete, for it does not lack anything which coming into being later will complete its form; and pleasure also seems to be of this nature. For it is a whole, and at no time can one find a pleasure whose form will be completed if the pleasure lasts longer. For this reason too, it is not a movement."²³ Pleasure is the measure of perfection in activity. Hence Aristotle's model of perfect activity: "God always enjoys a single and simple pleasure; for there is not only an activity of motion, but also one of motionlessness, and pleasure is rather in rest than in motion."²⁴ We can add that activity not generated by want or defect is purposeless, and therefore play; hence Boehme conceived of God's life as it is in itself as play. Eternity is the mode of play.

Thus Aristotle succeeds in formulating philosophically the notion which also underlies the Christian theology of time—that time is relative to Becoming rather than Being, and Becoming is relative to imperfection or evil. In F. C. S. Schiller's formula, unsatisfactoriness is the cause of impermanence, not vice versa. We do not have to accept Aristotle's ideas on the nature of human perfection and imperfection (he has no notion of repression); his notion of activity that is motionless and in eternity may nevertheless formulate the abstract formal characteristics of perfection, and therefore may be, in F. C. S. Schiller's words, "a *scientific* formulation of the popular theological conceptions of Heaven and Eternity." As to whether perfection is attain-

able, or worth discussing, I can do no better than quote the final words of F. C. S. Schiller's discussion:

Whether of course there is any possibility of actually realizing any such ideal is quite another question, and no one could be more keenly conscious than myself of the bitter contrast between such dreams of metaphysics and the stern facts of our daily life. But once upon a time our fairest facts, our most uncontroverted truths, were but the visions of a dream, divined by a prescience that slowly hardened into science; and so perchance even dreams like these may come true, or rather be made to come true, if we try. It is, moreover, certain that if we dismiss such thoughts as idle dreams, dreams they will remain, and no end will ever come to the conflict and the friction that wear out our world; whereas, if we consent to look for possibilities of harmony, our willingness may be the first condition of success. And even for the proximate purposes of ordinary life, there is perhaps some practical value in the contemplation of a metaphysical ideal which can stimulate us to be active, while at the same time warning us that such self-realization must assume the form, not of a hideous, barbarous, and neurotic restlessness, nor of an infinite (and therefore futile) struggle, but of an activity which, transcending change and time, preserves itself in an harmonious equipoise.²⁵

It is now evident that Freud's equivocation with different forms of "death" was meaningful equivocation. The repetition-compulsion and the Nirvana-principle appear to be two interconnected aspects of the instinctual demand for complete satisfaction and the abolition of repression. The abolition of history, or the Sabbath of Eternity, which is the ultimate aim of the repetition-compulsion, is also the attainment of Nirvana, which is the ultimate aim of the pleasure-principle. But we still see no reason why Freud insists on the term "death." We see no connection between the Nirvana-principle, or the repetition-compulsion, and the state of being dead. Unless there is some real connection, Freud's death instinct is not only a mere metaphor but also a confusing metaphor. It is only the third element in Freud's death instinct, the sado-masochistic complex, which introduces death in the real and literal sense into the death instinct.

The theory of the sado-masochistic complex starts from the

observation of man's peculiar ambivalent capacity for love and hate, his capacity to love and to destroy others, his capacity to love and to destroy himself. In traditional ethical terms, identifying love with good and hate with evil, Freud's fundamental perspective is that the evil in man is not to be explained away as a superficial excrescence on a basically good human nature, but is rooted in a deep conflict in human nature itself. Although his first instinct theory does suggest that man is basically a loving animal, forced by the reality-principle to unloving behavior, Freud finally rejects the liberal optimist position—tacitly held by most social scientists and by psychoanalysts of the neo-Freudian type—that man is inherently good and peaceful and that his aggressive behavior is simply the result of environmental frustrations or ignorance and poor education. Freud recognized the factor of environmental frustration (in fact he gave us the concept), but he insists the trouble goes deeper.

For Freud as for St. Augustine, mankind's destiny is a departure from, and an effort to regain, paradise; but in between these two terms man is at war with himself—driven, says St. Augustine, by two loves, true love on the one hand and the lust for power (*libido dominandi*) on the other.²⁶ In psychoanalytical terms, the conflict inside human nature is at the instinctual level; hence Freud's dualism of Eros and the aggressive instinct. As the neo-Freudians have pointed out, Freud has so formulated the conflict between Eros and the aggressive instinct as to preclude the possibility of salvation or cure. Freud speaks emphatically of the innate tendency to aggression; with an innate tendency to aggression mankind's only alternative is to turn it outward and destroy others or turn it inward and destroy himself.

This unpleasant picture of the human situation is developed by Freud to all its logical consequences in *Civilization and Its Discontents*. It takes only the capacity to endure unpleasant truth to prefer the bleak pessimism of *Civilization and Its Discontents* to the lullabies of sweetness and light which the neo-Freudians serve up as psychoanalysis. It still remains true that if aggressiveness is innate and accumulates with the growth of civilization, then psychoanalysis may, like Freud, hope for a rebirth of Eros, but rationally it can only predict the self-de-

struction of the human race. It is one of the sad ironies of contemporary intellectual life that Freud's hypothesis of an innate death instinct, which has been received with horror as the acme of pessimism, actually offers the only way out of the really pessimistic hypothesis of an innate aggressive instinct.

Freud arrived at the hypothesis of a death instinct when, having in mind the instinctual ambivalence between Eros and aggression at the human level, he pressed, as the psychoanalytical theory of instincts must, the question of what corresponds to it at the level of all organic life. The evolution of his libido theory had already destroyed his earlier distinction between the sexual and self-preservation instincts, transforming the human libido into a general life instinct, seeking to preserve and enrich life. The evolution of the libido theory therefore suggested that the fundamental polarity was life and death. Thus equipped with the hypothesis of a psychological life instinct and death instinct, Freud went on to consider the relation of life and death in biology.

His idea—which, he argues, is not contradicted by biological theory—is that organisms die for internal reasons; death is no external accident; death is an intrinsic part of life. In Freud's words, "The goal of all life is death."²⁷ Now Freud returns to the sado-masochistic complex. Psychoanalysis had already shown the interchangeability of aggression turned outward and aggression turned inward (masochism), and raised the question as to which of these two is the original form. But aggression turned inward on the self in the form of self-destruction would be a death instinct. Freud therefore supplied his life instinct with its logical opposite by making the assumption that extroverted aggression (sadism) in human beings is derived from a "primary masochism," and by identifying this primary masochism with a death instinct.²⁸

Freud never saw that the hypothesis that aggression is extroverted death opened up the possibility of a solution to the problem of aggression. To the end of his life he continued to speak of innate aggressiveness and the destructive instinct as if these were the same as a death instinct. Everything depends on establishing the difference, as well as the continuity, between man and the rest of organic life. Freud's static dualistic ontology

made him interpret the unity of life and death in all organisms as an eternal conflict of two distinct and completely opposed forces, one seeking to preserve and extend life, the other seeking to reduce life to the inorganic state out of which it arose. But Freud's own interpretation of the psychoanalytical data suggests that extroversion outward of the death instinct in the form of a drive to mastery or a will to power is a distinctively human phenomenon. And conversely Freud's own formula—"The goal of all life is death"—suggests that at the biological level life and death are not in conflict, but are somehow the same. That is to say, they are some sort of dialectical unity, as Heraclitus said they were: "It is the same thing in us that is alive and dead, awake and asleep, young and old: by a reversal the former are the latter and the latter in turn are the former." We thus arrive at the idea that life and death are in some sort of unity at the organic level, that at the human level they are separated into conflicting opposites, and that at the human level the extroversion of the death instinct is the mode of resolving a conflict that does not exist at the organic level. Then neurosis remains, as it should be, a human privilege; life-and-death does not make nature sick.

If death is a part of life, there is a peculiar morbidity in the human attitude toward death—a morbidity which Freud recognized²⁹ but did not connect with his theory of the death instinct. "What distinguishes man from other animals," says Unamuno, "is that in one form or another, he guards his dead. And from what does he so futilely protect them? The wretched consciousness shrinks from its own annihilation. . . . The gorilla, the chimpanzee, the orang-outang, and their kind, must look upon man as a feeble and infirm animal, whose strange custom it is to store up his dead."³⁰ It is not the consciousness of death but the flight from death that distinguishes men from animals. From the times of the earliest cave men, who kept their dead alive by dyeing the bones red and burying them near the family hearth, down to the Hollywood funeral cult, the flight from death has been, as Unamuno said, the heart of all religion. Pyramids and skyscrapers—monuments more lasting than bronze—suggest how much of the world's "economic" activity also is really a flight from death. If death is a part of

life, if there is a death instinct as well as a life (or sexual) instinct, man is in flight from his own death just as he is in flight from his own sexuality. If death is a part of life, man represses his own death just as he represses his own life.

According to Freud, aggressiveness represents a fusion of the life instinct with the death instinct, a fusion which saves the organism from the innate self-destructive tendency of the death instinct by extroverting it, a desire to kill replacing the desire to die.³¹ As against Freud, we suggest that this extroversion of the death instinct is the peculiar human solution to a peculiar human problem. It is the flight from death that leaves mankind with the problem of what to do with its own innate biological dying, what to do with its own repressed death. Animals let death be a part of life, and use the death instinct to die: man aggressively builds immortal cultures and makes history in order to fight death. Thus Freud's death instinct, if we interpret it dialectically and keep the distinction between men and animals, like the Nirvana-principle and the repetition-compulsion, becomes crucial in the psychology of history, and in fact establishes another crucial link between Freud and the philosopher of history, Hegel.

Existentialist scholarship is discovering a more human Hegel, Hegel the psychologist, Hegel trying to transcend the traditional paranoia of philosophers and find the essence of man not in thinking but in human desires and human suffering. Of Hegel's two systematic attempts to grasp the essence of man, the first identified man with love, and the second identified man with death. Hegel's thought thus passed from Eros to Death, the pair which together form the essence of human nature according to Freud's latest instinct theory. And it was only in his second attempt, through his identification of man with death, that Hegel was able to grasp man as essentially a history-making creature.

At the beginning of his career Hegel shared the sentimental romanticism of the *Sturm und Drang* period, and found the reality of human desire and human action in the microcosm of love. Later, evolving in the same direction as Goethe when he added *Faust* Part II to *Faust* Part I, he found the reality of human action in the macrocosm of human history: man is that

unique species of animal which has a history, that is to say, that animal whose essence is not united with his existence as with other animals, but is developed in the dialectic of historical time. In developing his philosophy of man as the animal with a history, Hegel found that his former identification of man with love was inadequate. Love is a little moment in the life of lovers; and love remains an inner subjective experience leaving the macrocosm of history untouched. Human history cannot be grasped as the unfolding of human love.

Hegel was able to develop a philosophy of history only by making a fresh start and identifying man with death. And he develops the paradox that history is what man does with death, along lines almost identical with Freud's. Freud suggests that the aggression in human nature—the drive to master nature as well as the drive to master man—is the result of an extroversion of the death instinct, the desire to die being transformed into the desire to kill, destroy, or dominate. Hegel postulates a transformation of the consciousness of death into a struggle to appropriate the life of another human being at the risk of one's own life: history as class struggle (the dialectic of Master and Slave, in Hegel's terminology) is based on an extroversion of death. And similarly Hegel's other fundamental category of history, human work or labor, is a transformation of the negativity or nothingness of death into the extroverted action of negating or changing nature. More generally, according to Hegel, time is what man makes out of death: the dialectic of history is the dialectic of time, and "time is the negative element in the sensuous world"; time is negativity, and negativity is extroverted death.³²

Freud does not have that concept of historicity which is Hegel's strength: Hegel, although trying to grasp the psychological premises of man's historicity, has only an intuitive psychology. And yet Hegel may help us understand death. Hegel needs reformulation in the light of the psychoanalytical doctrine of repression and the unconscious. It is not the consciousness of death that is transformed into aggression, but the unconscious death instinct; the unconscious death instinct is that negativity or nothingness which is extroverted into the action of negating nature and other men. Freud himself, in his most

important addition to the theory of the death instinct after *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, derived affirmation from Eros and negation from its instinctual opposite.³³ On the other hand, Hegel's doctrine of the connection between negation and time is essential if psychoanalysis is to make the breakthrough, which Freud did not make, to a psychoanalytical theory of time.

The relation of the pleasure-principle to the Nirvana-principle suggests that man has a history because the balanced equilibrium between tension and release of tension at the animal level has been disrupted and replaced by a dynamic restless striving. The study of the repetition-compulsion suggests that repression generates historical time by generating an instinct-determined fixation to the repressed past, and thus setting in motion a forward-moving dialectic which is at the same time an effort to recover the past. In that perspective on man's historicity the crucial psychoanalytical concept is fixation to the past. In our new perspective the crucial psychoanalytical concept is the repression of death.

What is the relation between fixation to the past and repression of death? The intermediate term is obvious—the refusal to grow old. At the biological level, organisms live their lives and have no history because living and dying, that is to say growing older, is in them an inseparable unity. With them, in Shakespeare's beautiful phrase, ripeness is all. At the human level, repression produces the unconscious fixation to the infantile past, the instinctual unity of living and dying is disrupted, and both the life instinct and the death instinct are forced into repression. At the biological level, the death instinct, in affirming the road to death, affirms at the same time the road of life: ripeness is all. At the human level, the repressed death instinct cannot affirm life by affirming death; life, being repressed, cannot affirm death and therefore must fly from death; death can only affirm itself (and life) by transforming itself into the force which always denies life, the spirit of Goethe's Mephistopheles.

Then Freud's equivocation with three forms of death—the Nirvana-principle, the repetition-compulsion, and the sado-masochistic complex—turns out to be profoundly suggestive.

Man is the animal which has separated into conflicting opposites the biological unity of life and death, and has then subjected the conflicting opposites to repression. The destruction of the biological unity of life and death transforms the Nirvana-principle into the pleasure-principle, transforms the repetition-compulsion into a fixation to the infantile past, and transforms the death instinct into an aggressive principle of negativity. And all three of these specifically human characteristics—the pleasure-principle, the fixation to the past, and the aggressive negativism—are aspects of the characteristically human mode of being, historical time.

The elucidation of Freud's vision of organic life as a dialectical unity of life and death is hampered by the inadequacies in the current philosophy of organism. Psychoanalysis would like to start with a clear idea of the role of death at the organic level. But the great philosopher of organism, Whitehead, has no chapter on death or on the relation between life and death; it seems as if even he bears unconscious witness to the repression of death in the human consciousness. Psychoanalysis therefore cannot proceed without going beyond Whitehead. Not Whitehead but Hegel puts forward the idea that there is an intrinsic connection between death and that essence of true life, individuality: "The nature of finite things as such is to have the seed of passing away as their essential being: the hour of their birth is the hour of their death."³⁴ The precious ontological uniqueness which the human individual claims is conferred on him not by possession of an immortal soul but by possession of a mortal body. Without death, Hegel argues, individuals are reduced to the status of mere modes in the one infinite and eternal substance of Spinoza.³⁵ Whitehead's organisms also, without death, have no individuality: at the simplest organic level, any particular animal or plant has uniqueness and individuality because it lives its own life and no other—that is to say, because it dies.

The intrinsic connection between death and individuality is also suggested by hints contained in Freud's instinct theory. His identification of the life instinct with sexuality identifies it with the force that preserves the immortality of the species. By implication, therefore, it is the death instinct which constitutes

the mortal individuality of the particular member of the species. Furthermore, Freud's theorem that Eros or the life instinct, as it operates in the human libido and in the lowest cells, aims to preserve and enrich life by seeking unification implicitly contains the theorem that the aim of the death instinct is separation; and explicitly Freud's theory of anxiety brings birth and death together as separation crises.³⁶ Freud is thus moving toward a structural analysis of organic life as being constituted by a dialectic between unification or interdependence and separation or independence. The principle of unification or interdependence sustains the immortal life of the species and the mortal life of the individual; the principle of separation or independence gives the individual his individuality and ensures his death.

If death gives life individuality and if man is the organism which represses death, then man is the organism which represses his own individuality. Then our proud views of humanity as a species endowed with an individuality denied to lower animals turns out to be wrong. The lilies of the field have it because they take no thought of the morrow, and we do not. Lower organisms live the life proper to their species; their individuality consists in their being concrete embodiments of the essence of their species in a particular life which ends in death.

But if the psychoanalytical doctrine of repression means anything, man never unfolds the mode of being which is proper to his species and given in his body. Repression generates the instinctual compulsion to change the internal nature of man and the external world in which he lives, thus giving man a history and subordinating the life of the individual to the historical quest of the species. History is made not by individuals but by groups; and the cliché-mongers repeat *ad nauseam* that man is by nature a social animal. It is intrinsic to the psychoanalytical point of view to assert the morbidity of human sociability, not just "civilized" as opposed to "primitive" sociability or "class society" as opposed to "primitive communism," but all of human sociability as we have known it. Freud's formulations of the Primal Father and the Primal Horde (in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*) may or may not be adequate explanations of the morbidity in group-formation.

What is essential is the clinical pronouncement that sociability is a sickness.

The essential point in the Freudian diagnosis of human sociability was seen by Róheim: men huddle into hordes as a substitute for parents, to save themselves from independence, from "being left alone in the dark."³⁷ Society was not constructed, as Aristotle says, for the sake of life and more life, but from defect, from death and the flight from death, from fear of separation and fear of individuality. Thus Freud derives fear of "separation and expulsion from the horde" from castration anxiety, and castration anxiety from the fear of separation from the mother and the fear of death.³⁸ Hence there are no social groups without a religion of their own immortality, and history-making is always the quest for group-immortality. Only an unrepressed humanity, strong enough to live-and-die, could let Eros seek union and let death keep separateness.

The unrepressed animal carries no instinctual project to change his own nature; mankind must pass beyond repression if it is to find a life not governed by the unconscious project of finding another kind of life, one not governed by unconscious negativity. After man's unconscious search for his proper mode of being has ended—after history has ended—particular members of the human species can lead a life which, like the lives of lower organisms, individually embodies the nature of the species. But only an individual life in this sense can be satisfactory to the individual who lives it. The attainment of individuality by the human species would therefore mean the return of the restless pleasure-principle to the peace of the Nirvana-principle. The Nirvana-principle regulates an individual life which enjoys full satisfaction and concretely embodies the full essence of the species, and in which life and death are simultaneously affirmed, because life and death together constitute individuality, and ripeness is all. An individual life so regulated is possessed by all organisms below man. Because he too has a body, is an organism, must die, man has also instincts which will not let him rest till he attains individuality.

It is hard, under conditions of general repression, to affirm the death instinct without becoming an enemy of life. For under conditions of general repression the death instinct oper-

ates malignantly. In dialectical fusion with the life instinct it is a principle of restless negativity (like Goethe's Mephistophiles); but given the basic unsatisfactoriness of life under conditions of general repression, a defusion into a simple wish to die is always lurking in the background. Thus Schopenhauer seems to affirm death and Nirvana, but because he cannot affirm life, his affirmation of death is spurious. Schopenhauer's hostility to the *principium individuationis* is a hostility to death as well as to life; only he who can affirm birth can affirm death, since birth and death are one. Under conditions of general repression, as long as life is unsatisfactory, death can be affirmed only by those whose life instinct is strong enough to envisage the reconciliation of life and death as a future state of perfection toward which the life instinct strives. Schopenhauer's incapacity to affirm life or death turns on his conviction that "men are so constituted that they could not be happy in whatever kind of world they might be placed"; hence all he can say to the dying individual is, "Thou ceasest to be something which thou hadst done better never to become."³⁹

In contrast with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, because he envisages the possibility of Superman, can affirm life and therefore death: "What has become perfect, all that is ripe—wants to die." Nietzsche's explanation shows how instinctual repression generates the flight from death, how the flight from death underlies both the religion of immortality and the economic institution of hereditary property: "All that is unripe wants to live. All that suffers wants to live, that it may become ripe and joyous and longing—longing for what is farther, higher, brighter. 'I want heirs'—thus speaks all that suffers; 'I want children, I do not want *myself*.'"⁴⁰ Those prejudiced against Nietzsche might compare his concept of "wanting heirs" to John Maynard Keynes' critique of purposiveness:⁴¹

Purposiveness means that we are more concerned with the remote future results of our actions than with their own quality or their immediate effects on our own environment. The "purposive" man is always trying to secure a spurious and delusive immortality for his acts by pushing his interest in them forward into time. He does not love his cat, but his cat's kittens; nor, in truth, the kittens, but only the kittens' kittens, and so on for-

ward for ever to the end of cat-dom. For him jam is not jam unless it is a case of jam to-morrow and never jam to-day. Thus by pushing his jam always forward into the future, he strives to secure for his act of boiling it an immortality.

In contrast with the neurotic time obsession of repressed humanity, Nietzsche affirms the eternity of repetition: "Joy, however, does not want heirs, or children—joy wants itself, wants eternity, wants recurrence, wants everything eternally the same."

Nietzsche's perfection, which is unrepressed life (joy), wants eternity, but it also wants to die. Eternity is therefore a way of envisaging mankind's liberation from the neurotic obsession with the past and the future; it is a way of living in the present, but also a way of dying. Hence the ultimate defect of all heavens with immortality beyond the grave is that in them there is no death; by this token such visions betray their connection with repression of life. Anxiety about death does not have ontological status, as existentialist theologians claim. It has historical status only, and is relative to the repression of the human body; the horror of death is the horror of dying with what Rilke called un-lived lines in our bodies. That perfect, resurrected body which the Christian creed promises would want to die because it was perfect: "All that is perfect wants to die." It takes the greatest strength to accept death, says Hegel.⁴² Following Hegel, the existentialist philosophers have returned to the wisdom of Montaigne, that to learn philosophy is to learn how to die. Lacking Freud's concept of Eros, these philosophers may exhibit the unconscious wish to die, from which even Freud, with his concept of Eros, was not free. Nevertheless, in facing death they are serving the cause of life.

The construction of a human consciousness strong enough to accept death is a task in which philosophy and psychoanalysis can join hands—and also art. It was the poet Rilke who said it was the poet's mission to bind life and death together, and who said, "Whoever rightly understands and celebrates death, at the same time magnifies life."⁴³ But the hard truth which psychoanalysis must insist upon is that the acceptance of death, its reunification in consciousness with life, cannot be

accomplished by the discipline of philosophy or the seduction of art, but only by the abolition of repression. Man, who is born of woman and destined to die, is a body, with bodily instincts. Only if Eros—the life instinct—can affirm the life of the body can the death instinct affirm death, and in affirming death magnify life.

If the repression of death and the repression of individuality have this importance in human history, psychoanalysis ought to be able to detect their role in the formation of neurosis in individual lives. Freud, however, perhaps because he lacked the concept of the repression of death, did not make use of his hypothesis of a death instinct (as distinct from an aggressive instinct) in his clinical writings. But if death is the aspect of life which confers on life individuality, independence, and separateness, then a priori the repression of death should produce symptoms which exhibit on the one hand a flight from independence and separateness and on the other hand the compulsive return of the repressed instinct. But such an ambivalent attitude toward independence and separateness is at the heart of all neurosis, according to Freud's later clinical writings. The ultimate cause of repression and neurosis is anxiety, and anxiety is "the anxiety of separation from the protecting mother." One of the hallmarks of the neurotic personality is a lifelong fixation to the infantile pattern of dependence on other people.⁴⁴

Although Freud does not make the necessary theoretical links between anxiety and his death instinct, he does say that what the ego fears in anxiety "is in the nature of an overthrow or an extinction."⁴⁵ It looks therefore as if the specifically human capacity for anxiety does reflect a revolt against death and individuality, or at least some deep disturbance in the organic unity of life and death. And if there is a connection between the human sense of time and the human use of death, there is also good reason to suspect a connection between time and anxiety. Kierkegaard speaks like a psychoanalyst when he says, "Time does not really exist without unrest; it does not exist for dumb animals who are absolutely without anxiety."⁴⁶

Death and Childhood

ACCORDING to psychoanalytical theory, childhood bequeaths to mankind not only the project of transcending the human neurosis, but also the neurosis itself; not only the erotic possibilities of human nature, but also the self-defeating mechanisms which keep those erotic possibilities unfulfilled. Wisdom directs us to childhood—not only to the immortal wishes of childhood for the substance of things hoped for, but also to the failure of childhood for the cause of our disease.

The neurotic element in infantile sexuality is centered in the so-called infantile organizations of the libido (oral, anal, phallic). In our earlier chapter on infantile sexuality we drew out of Freud the theorem that the final adult disposition of sexual energy (genital organization, or concentration of libido in the genital) is a tyranny at war with the natural tendency of the human body, which is anarchistic and polymorphously perverse. We left hanging in the air the question of how the tyranny of genital organization is established. Genital organization is not the result of puberty but is the outcome of developments in infantile sexuality, specifically the Oedipus complex and castration complex (normally occurring about the age of five); and the Oedipal phase of infantile sexuality, which presupposes a concentration of libido in the genital organs, was preceded by earlier phases in which libido was concentrated in the anal and oral zones. Hence the ideal of polymorphous perversity (or play), rooted in our childhood fixation, has to be measured against a countertendency also rooted in childhood. According to psychoanalysis, it is this countertendency in infancy which establishes the pattern of the human neurosis. Neuroses are classified by their “predispositional point” in infancy, by

whether the adult neurotic is unconsciously striving to achieve infantile oral, anal, or genital (Oedipal) ambitions. Character types are similarly classified; and all cultural achievements, viewed as sublimations, are sublimations of infantile sexuality, not adult sexuality, and of infantile sexuality as concentrated in the infantile organizations, not as polymorphously perverse.

The infantile organizations of the libido, pregenital and genital, sustain the human neurosis; they are the bodily counterpart of the disorder in the human mind. It is part of Freud's pessimism that he accepts them as immutable data and can envision their abolition as little as he could the abolition of repression. Optimism, of course, can be recovered cheaply if, with the neo-Freudians, we drop the whole theory of infantile sexuality.¹ We propose to explore another way. Freud's theory of the stages of infantile sexuality (oral, anal, phallic) was formulated very early in his career, and not reformulated in terms of his later theory; but developments in his later theory materially alter the picture.

In the early *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex* Freud treated the stages of infantile sexuality simply as stages in the maturation of the sexual instinct, and therefore as stages in a biological process, having as its natural goal the Oedipal project. This natural efflorescence of infantile sexuality was viewed as being subjected to disturbance from the outside when the Oedipal project succumbs to the castration complex. The confrontation of the Oedipal project with the threat of castration was represented as the fateful collision between the demands of infantile sexuality and the reality-principle and as the cause of repression.

In Freud's later discussions, however, infantile sexuality is seen as disturbed from a very early stage by the relations between the child and the mother on whom he depends. Freud had regarded the threat of castration as issuing from the father figure; he now discovers that the complicated ambivalences of love and hate which he had envisaged as corrupting the erotic relation between child and father are anticipated in the relations of the child to what he called the pre-Oedipal mother, even as early as the so-called oral stage.² But then it follows that infantile sexuality is disturbed by instinctual ambivalence from a very early stage, and therefore its characteristic manifestations (oral,

anal, phallic) must be regarded not as creations of Eros alone, but also of Eros' instinctual antagonist. Freud in his later writings introduces a second new perspective on the disturbance of infantile sexuality, without coherently unifying it with the analysis of instinctual ambivalence, in his concept of anxiety. Just as he now sees the castration complex as the climax in a history of an instinctual ambivalence which goes back to a very early stage, so he also sees the castration complex as the climax in the history of infantile anxiety, going back to the birth-trauma.

The effect of Freud's new formulations about instinctual ambivalence and anxiety, as he himself saw—without, I think, drawing the full consequences—is to alter decisively the theory of repression. In Freud's words, "It was anxiety which produces repression and not, as I formerly believed, repression which produces anxiety";³ similarly he invokes instinctual ambivalence as the cause of repression.⁴ The old formula postulates as the cause of repression the ill-defined "reality-principle." The new formula shifts the cause of repression from the external world to the internal world, and puts the cause of repression inside the child himself, making repression essentially self-repression.

Freud never rewrote the theory of the infantile organizations of the libido in the light of his later formulations about instinctual ambivalence and anxiety. But if, as he said, the theory of repression is the foundation stone of all psychoanalysis,⁵ then the new notion of self-repression must be explored. Anxiety and instinctual ambivalence must be explored as the cause of repression. And, in the light of our preceding chapter, anxiety and instinctual ambivalence must be related to the death instinct. If anxiety and instinctual ambivalence run throughout the entirety of infantile sexuality, then the infantile organizations of the libido must be seen as infantile sexuality disturbed by the morbidity of the human death instinct. And since, in Freud's words, "the ego is the only seat of anxiety,"⁶ and likewise of instinctual ambivalence, the infantile organizations of the libido are ego organizations and not just libidinal organizations. Perhaps then we should regard the sexual organizations as the effect on the body of anxiety in the ego. Then, since, as we saw in the last chapter, anxiety is the ego's incapacity to accept death, the sexual organizations were perhaps

constructed by the ego in its flight from death, and could be abolished by an ego strong enough to die.

When Freud speaks of instinctual ambivalence in the infant, he has in mind love and hate; but, as we have seen, his death instinct must be taken more seriously than he took it, and systematically applied to the analysis of infancy. In man the dialectical unity between union and separateness, between interdependence and independence, between species and individual—in short, between life and death—is broken. The break occurs in infancy, and it is the consequence of the institution of the human family. The institution of the family means the prolonged maintenance of human children in a condition of helpless dependence. Parental care makes childhood a period of privileged freedom from the domination of the reality-principle, thus permitting and promoting the early blossoming, in an unreal atmosphere, of infantile sexuality and the pleasure-principle. Thus sheltered from reality by parental care, infantile sexuality—Eros or the life instinct—conceives the dream of narcissistic omnipotence in a world of love and pleasure.

But if the institution of the family gives the human infant a subjective experience of freedom unknown to any other species of animal, it does so by holding the human infant in condition of objective dependence on parental care to a degree unknown to any other species of animal. Objective dependence on parental care creates in the child a passive, dependent need to be loved, which is just the opposite of his dream of narcissistic omnipotence. Thus the institution of the family shapes human desire in two contradictory directions, and it is the dialectic generated by this contradiction which produces what Freud calls the conflict of ambivalence.

But the contradiction in the human psyche established by the family is the contradiction between the life and death instincts as previously defined. The contradiction between the subjective dream of loving union with the world and the objective fact of dependence, with its libidinal correlate the passive need to be loved, means antagonism in the dialectic of union and separateness, independence and dependence, species and individual—the dialectic of life and death. The antagonism is generated not by the intrusion of some new factor, but, as it were, by a hyper-

trophy of the same instincts which are harmoniously unified at the biological level. The same instincts which constitute all life generate also the human family. The parent-child relation, which is the nucleus of the family, constitutes a new mode of that interdependent union which is the essence of life, and at the same time it generates a new mode of individual independence which is the essence of death. The human family is created by an intenser mode of love and creates an intenser mode of death.

The reaction of the human child to the contradictions in his own psyche developed by his position in the family is anxiety; and anxiety is both a flight from death and a death experience. Infantile anxiety has, according to psychoanalysis, a long history reaching as far back as the act of birth. The anxiety of the infant at birth, when life and death are struggling with each other, is the model for the syndrome of physical sensations and innervations which accompany later outbreaks of anxiety. Otto Rank went so far as to claim that the traumatic experience of birth is the cause of neurosis. Freud attributed the peculiar human capacity for anxiety and neurosis not to the birth trauma, but to the fact that the child nurtured in the human family suffers psychic traumas which are for him as traumatic as the trauma of birth and which therefore re-create the anxiety syndrome in situations where it is not biologically functional as it is at birth.⁷

The purely biological act of birth, which not only destines the organism to death but is in itself the death of a fetus as well as the birth of a baby, is also a biological separation from the mother conferring biological individuality on the child. The prototype of psychic traumas, the experience of wanting but not being able to find the mother, is an experience of psychic separation, and its anxiety is, in Freud's own words, "the anxiety of separation from the protecting mother."⁸ And the climactic psychic trauma, castration anxiety, is, according to Freud, also a fear of separation from the mother, or rather a fear of losing the instrument for reuniting with a mother-substitute in the act of copulation.⁹ Furthermore all these separations are experienced as a threat of death: again in Freud's own words,

what the ego fears in anxiety "is in the nature of an overthrow or extinction."¹⁰

Thus Freud's own analysis of anxiety shows, although Freud himself never said so, that there is a close and deep connection between anxiety and the death instinct. Anxiety is a response to experiences of separateness, individuality, and death. The human child, which at the mother's breast experiences a new and intense mode of union, of living, and of loving, must also experience a new and intenser mode of separation, individuality, and death; in the dry language of Freud, a trauma is constituted when the ego comes into contact with an excessive demand of its own libido.¹¹ In the human family the expansion of Eros onto a new and higher level entails the expansion of death onto a new and higher level. It is because the child loves the mother so much that it feels separation from the mother as death. As a result, birth and death, which at the biological level are experienced once only, are at the human psychic level experienced constantly; the child can say with St. Paul, "I die daily."

One effect of the incapacity to accept separation, individuality, and death is to eroticize death—to activate a morbid wish to die, a wish to regress to the prenatal state before life (and separation) began, to the mother's womb. Freud analyzed the castration complex as the fear of losing the instrument for reuniting with (a substitute for) the mother's womb. The implication is not only that the morbid or regressive death wish underlies the Oedipal project in infancy, but also that it underlies the adult genital arrangements which fall heir to the destruction of the Oedipus complex—the human family and the genital organization of the human body. Hence, as Freud so often said, in choosing a wife we still seek our mother, and in the genital act "the vagina comes into the inheritance of the mother's womb."¹²

Ferenczi, in *Thalassa*, has amply developed the analysis of sexual intercourse as an aiming at "the genital re-establishment of the intra-uterine situation," without, however, being clear on the morbidity of this "regressive uterine tendency," and therefore, in my opinion, illegitimately projecting the same tendency onto all organic life, just as Freud did.¹³ In human beings at any rate, the special concentration of libido in the

genital region, in the infantile phallic phase and in the adult genital organization, is engineered by the regressive death instinct, and represents the residue of the human incapacity to accept death, separation, and individuality. And in the same essay Ferenczi, going beyond Freud, showed how the earlier phases of infantile sexuality, the oral and anal, are also dominated by the same regressive trend.¹⁴ The special concentration of libido in the mouth in earliest infancy, the hypercathexis of the act of suckling, results from the inability to accept separation from the mother and is sustained by fantasies of uterine regression. The anal stage (the most fantastic psychoanalytical paradox, of which more later) involves symbolic manipulation of feces as a magic instrument for restoring communion with the mother. Altogether, therefore, the sexual organizations, pregenital as well as genital, appear to be constructed by anxiety, by the flight from death and the wish to die; the distribution of libido in a life not at war with death is polymorphous perversity.

Not only does the incapacity to accept death activate a regressive death wish; it also contaminates Eros and burdens the projects of infantile narcissism with the flight from death. As a result of instinctual ambivalence, the history of childhood is the history of an organism caught in an ever widening sequence of dualisms which it vainly seeks to overcome, till in the end, after a final climactic struggle, it acknowledges defeat and acquiesces in its own permanent impairment. In this sequence of dualisms we can trace the steps by which the death instinct is transformed into a principle of active negativity.

The first stage, the oral stage, is not simply the stage at which erotic activity of the mouth at the mother's breast is the most important activity; it is also the stage which discovers the anxiety of wanting, but not being able to find, the mother's breast. Therefore, says Freud, it is the stage which discovers the dualism of subject and object.¹⁵ It is the stage at which the child formulates the grandiose project of the pure pleasure-ego, the dream of union with the world in love and pleasure. But the construction of the pure pleasure-ego is achieved by inaugurating the first repression, which takes the form of repudiating the external world and projecting out into the repudiated ex-

ternal world anything painful—that is to say, denying its existence.¹⁶ Thus the first affirmation (the pure pleasure-ego project) is accompanied by the first negation. This negation is a prototype of repression; but negation is also, according to Freud (and Hegel), a manifestation of the death instinct.¹⁷ At this stage, then, the incapacity of the ego to accept separation results in a transformation of the instinctual force working for separation and individual life into a mental force which separates the ego from reality, denies reality, represses reality. And the effect is to burden the narcissistic project of loving union with the world with the unreal project of becoming oneself one's whole world (the solipsism to which the philosophers regress).

In Freud's second stage, the anal stage, the dualism of subject and object is transformed into that of activity and passivity. Infantile narcissism carries on from the previous stage the project of denying its own dependence, but now experiences its dependence on the plane of action, as passivity, and therefore asserts its independence by rebellious action, by seeking to transform passivity into activity, as in the game, "Now let's play that I am the mother and you are the child."¹⁸

But this obsessional commitment to transform passivity into activity is aggressiveness. Freud always recognized that aggressiveness originated at this stage (hence the label, anal-sadistic). He comes close to recognizing that it is at this stage, by the transformation of passivity into activity, that the fateful extroversion of the death instinct outward onto the world in the form of aggression takes place.¹⁹ At this point Eros, through the project of becoming both mother and child, in flight from death transforms death, already transformed into a principle of negation, into a principle of negative activity or aggression. (This stage in the development of the infantile ego is attached to the anal region, because, as we shall see later, the project of becoming both mother and child is carried out not in reality, but in fantasy: the fantasies must have some bodily base, and attach themselves to a part of the body which can be magically, fantastically, manipulated as a fantastic double of the self.)

In the final phallic or Oedipal phase, the polarity of activity and passivity is transformed into the polarity of masculinity and

its opposite, castration.²⁰ Here infantile narcissism carries over from the preceding stage the rebellion against passivity, but it experiences that passivity on the plane of biological reproduction, as the fact of having been born from the mother. Hence it seeks to transform passivity into activity with the Oedipal project of having a child by the mother; that is to say, by becoming father of oneself. Since Freud himself did not always stick to this interpretation of the Oedipus complex, we quote Freud: "All the instincts, the loving, the grateful, the sensual, the defiant, the self-assertive and independent—all are gratified in the wish to be the *father of himself*."²¹

The Oedipal project is not, as Freud's earlier formulations suggest, a natural love of the mother, but as his later writings recognize, a product of the conflict of ambivalence and an attempt to overcome that conflict by narcissistic inflation.²² The essence of the Oedipal complex is the project of becoming God—in Spinoza's formula, *causa sui*; in Sartre's, *être-en-soi-pour-soi*. By the same token, it plainly exhibits infantile narcissism perverted by the flight from death. At this stage (and in adult genital organization) masculinity is equated with activity; the fantasy of becoming father of oneself is attached to the penis, thus establishing a concentration of narcissistic libido in the genital.²³ There it remains, even after the destruction of the Oedipus complex, burdening with fantasies of possession not only the sexual relations of men to women, but also the relations of fathers to sons: sons, as the father's heirs, perpetuate the father. To quote Freud, "At the weakest point of all in the narcissistic position, the immortality of the ego, security is achieved by fleeing to the child. Parental love is nothing but parental narcissism born again."²⁴ Thus again it appears that the sexual organizations, pregenital and genital, do not correspond to the natural distribution of Eros in the human body: they represent a hypercathexis, a supercharge, of particular bodily functions and zones, a hypercathexis induced by the fantasies of human narcissism in flight from death.

All the problems of infantile sexuality come to a head in the castration complex, which is the link between infantile sexuality and adult behavior. According to the Freudian formula, the Oedipus complex, and with it the whole of infantile sexual-

ity, succumbs to the castration complex. Through the castration complex infantile sexuality becomes transformed into normal adult sexuality; it is therefore the key to the psychology of adult genital sexuality and more generally the psychology of the two sexes. At the same time the castration complex establishes that reservoir of sexual energy which cannot achieve expression in normal adult sexual activity, and which, through sublimation, creates culture. And finally, it is the mechanism which transforms the infant's dependent love of his parents into the adult's dependent love of social, religious, and moral authority. In general, inasmuch as neurosis is caused by the repression of infantile sexuality, the castration complex is the key to the human neurosis.

How far psychoanalysis is from being a finished system is nowhere better illustrated than in the theory of the castration complex. Freud moved ever forward, introducing modifications in line with his later discoveries of anxiety, instinctual ambivalence, and the pre-Oedipal mother, without, however, reconsidering the whole, and without abandoning earlier formulations inconsistent with the later; but Freud at least knew he had not found an adequate solution. The Epigoni, when they do not abandon the problem altogether, attempt to combine Freud, early and late, into a closed system, with results which the public has rightly chosen to ignore. A reformulation is needed, a reformulation which takes account of the forward movement in Freud's thought.

One of the relics of Freud's earlier theories, not consistently abandoned in his later formulations and still littering the textbook expositions of psychoanalysis, is the notion that the essence of the phallic stage of infantile sexuality is masturbation, and the essence of the castration complex is the repression of masturbation by the parental (usually paternal) threat to punish by castration. Also connected here is the explanation of penis-envy in women (a theorem inseparable from the castration complex) as due to the little girl's apprehension that the female clitoris is inferior to the male penis for purposes of masturbation.

In so far as psychoanalysts talk this way, they justify the quite widespread illusion that if parents would only abstain from repressing masturbation, at least by threats of castration,

the children would grow up unscathed by the castration complex. There is similarly a search, involving also the psycho-analytically minded anthropologists, for the right kind of toilet training, as if parental behavior were the cause of anal traumata and subsequent anal character. This whole notion is structured along the lines of Freud's early theory. Its fundamental assumptions are, first, that what is repressed is autoerotic bodily organ pleasure; and second, that repression intervenes from outside. But the concentration of libido in the genital is not a simple manifestation of organ pleasure, but is constructed by the regressive fantasies of infantile narcissism distorted by the flight from death—that is to say, the Oedipal project.

The whole notion is overthrown by Freud's own formula that "masturbation is only the discharge in the genital of the excitation belonging to the [Oedipus] complex."²⁵ The Oedipal project, as we saw, is the quest to conquer death by becoming father of oneself. It never made sense to suppose that the abandonment of a piece of organ pleasure should be such a trauma and lead to such far-reaching consequences as postulated by the castration complex; but what the castration complex shatters is the infantile solution to the problem of death. Since, as we have seen, the human family must produce a human child incapable of accepting death, it follows that the Oedipal project is inevitably self-generated in the child and is directed against the parents, irrespective of how the parents behave. Hence Freud recognized that there is no way for parents, either lenient or strict, to avoid provoking infantile aggressiveness. Hence in a sublime formula he says, "It is not really a decisive matter whether one has killed one's father or abstained from the deed; one must feel guilty in either case, for guilt is the expression of the conflict of ambivalence, the eternal struggle between Eros and the destructive or death instinct."²⁶

The same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the anal phase; to state it paradoxically, children toilet train themselves. Psychoanalysis must always take the position that the Child is Father to the Man. Freud said, but did not always abide by his dictum, that "analytic experience has convinced us of the complete truth of the common assertion that the child is psychologically father of the man."²⁷ The origin of the adult promotion of

toilet training lies in an infantile predisposition. Infantile anality is not anal erotism or "playing with feces"; it is not a simple manifestation of the erotic search for organ pleasure and play, rudely repressed by parental toilet training from the outside. It is an ambivalent mixture of Eros and death, involving attachment to the anal zone of regressive fantasies of union with the mother and narcissistic fantasies of being both Self and Other; hence the "playing with feces" contains its own internal drive to master and control them.

Not only does Freud's early theory assume that what is repressed is simply Eros (or play); it also assumes that repression comes from the outside—from the threatening father in the castration complex, from the toilet-training parents in the analogous anal trauma. But the tendency of Freud's later theory is toward a conception of repression as essentially self-repression, the inevitable result of the anxiety and instinctual ambivalence inside the child himself. In the new perspective, the castration complex is the climax in the long history of ambivalence in the relations between the child and the mother, and it represents a definitive victory for the aggressive component over the love component. This perspective is tentatively reached by Freud himself in one of his later writings:

One might even believe that this first love relation of the child is doomed to extinction for the very reason that it is the first, for these early object-cathexes are always ambivalent to a very high degree; alongside of the child's intense love there is always a strong aggressive tendency present, and the more passionately a child loves an object, the more sensitive it will be to disappointments and frustrations. In the end, the love is bound to capitulate to the accumulated hostility.²⁸

Similarly, in the toilet-training analogy, as Abraham pointed out,²⁹ the disgust at feces emerges in the child not because he assimilates parental indoctrination, but for internal reasons. Before going on to the narcissistic project of the anal phase (symbolic retention, mastery, possession of the world), the infantile ego turns against the narcissistic project of the oral phase (symbolic incorporation, swallowing of the world).

But if the castration complex is the climax to the long his-

tory of instinctual ambivalence, it must be the climax to the long history of the child's relation to his mother; and then the role of the father must be quite secondary. In the later phase of his theory, and in the study of the psychology of women, Freud uncovered a deeper layer underlying the Oedipus and castration complexes, the core of which consists in the attachment to what Freud calls the pre-Oedipal mother. It came to him as a surprise, he says, comparable to the effect in another field of the discovery of Minoan-Mycenaean civilization behind that of Greece.³⁰ The pre-Oedipal mother is the mother who, in consequence of the biological basis of the family, must become the whole world of the child.

In this general sense, of course, Freud knew all about the primal or pre-Oedipal mother from the very start of his career. What he discovered only late in his career was the necessity of linking his analysis of the Oedipus and castration complexes to the notion of the primal mother—that is to say, the necessity of apprehending the Oedipal relation to the father as a superstructure on top of a substructure of Oedipal relations to the mother. The new point of view revealed that the Oedipus and castration complexes can be generated in principle without any reference to the father-figure. The analysis of the little girl showed that her relations with her mother, by the principle of transforming passivity into activity, generated the desire to get the mother with child.³¹ Freud calls this project of having a child by the mother pre-Oedipal; but the Oedipal intent is plain: what Freud means by calling it pre-Oedipal is that the project dates to the period before the girl turns to her father.

It is therefore an integral part of Freud's psychology of women to suppose that the girl conceives the Oedipal project without reference to the father-figure. And in the same context, Freud describes the castration complex in girls as a revulsion against the mother induced by the discovery of sexual differentiation, a revulsion against the fact that she is born a woman, i.e., of the same sex as her mother.³² Thus, at least for the girl, the castration complex revolves around the relation to the mother, and needs no father; in the Freudian psychology of women the girl turns to the father only after and as a result of the castration complex. And furthermore it becomes clear

that the preformed preference for masculinity which the whole theory of the castration complex (and penis-envy in women) assumes represents a continuance of the Oedipal *causa sui* project. The revolt against biological dependence on the mother is transposed, by collision with the fact of sexual differentiation, into the desire to be of the opposite sex to the mother.

And what about the boy? Contrary to the usual opinion, Freud's psychology of women is more mature than his psychology of men, because it belongs entirely to his later phase. He himself recognized the need for a comprehensive re-examination of the male castration complex in the light of the pre-Oedipus phase.³³ Actually, however, Freud's revisions of his own formulations show him steadily moving toward the position that the male castration complex can be generated in principle without reference to a father-figure. The first step in this direction was made when Freud saw that the motive power which generated the castration complex was not the father's threat to castrate but the discovery of the sexual organs of the female sex (as in the case of the girl, the castration complex is the reaction to the recognition of the fact of sexual differentiation). He took the next step when he recognized that the discovery of sexual differentiation becomes a traumatic crisis only when the mother is seen in this light. In earlier writings he had spoken of the castration complex being activated by the apprehension of sexual differentiation in relation to a brother or sister. The final step was to see that the essence of the castration complex was to perceive, not the image of the castrating father, but the image of the castrated mother: in Freud's blunt style, the perception of the mother's genitals as devoid of a penis.³⁴

Confrontation with the fact of sexual differentiation, for boys as well as girls, transposes the opposition to the mother into a preference for the sex opposite to the mother's, a preference for masculinity in terms of which the opposite of masculinity is castration. Thus the apprehension of the mother in terms of sexual differentiation, as castrated, automatically and without any reference to a father-figure, turns both boy and girl away from the mother and generates horror, terror, contempt.³⁵ Freud explicitly derives from this horror not only the

male contempt for women as the inferior sex and the penis-envy of women, but also the horror of incest which Freud always regarded as the primal taboo, the fundamental moral law, and which he always connected with the first formation of the conscience or super-ego.

A transitional stage in Freud's evolution in this direction is his theory in *The Ego and the Id* (1923) of the twofold nature of the Oedipus complex, in which he recognizes that all the ambivalent relations toward the father, which he had postulated to be the origin of the super-ego, can also develop in relation to the mother.³⁶ We may therefore conclude that in principle the castration complex and all the far-reaching consequences attributed to it by psychoanalysis rest ultimately on the child's relation to the mother. And, of course, the child's peculiar reaction to the fact of sexual differentiation from the mother—"horror at the mutilated creature"—which is the castration complex, is his own invention; it is a tissue of fantasy inseparable from his own fantastic project of becoming father of himself (and, as fantasy, only remotely connected with actual sight of the female genitalia). Hence, just as you are bound to feel guilty whether you have killed your father or not, so Freud says that it is not primarily a question of whether castration is really performed; what is important is that the boy believes in it.³⁷

In spite of his discovery of the pre-Oedipal or primal mother, Freud returns in *Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego* (1921), and in *Moses and Monotheism* (1937), to what he calls his scientific myth of the Primal Father who castrated his sons; and since in these same writings he stresses the importance of the phylogenetic or archaic heritage in the formation of the individual neurosis, he is, I think, involved in formal self-contradiction, the explanation of which may lie in his own Oedipus complex. What the myth of the Primal Father amounts to is a postulation of male superiority and aggressiveness as an immutable fact of nature (the Primal Father, while the cause of culture, is in the state of nature) and the use of this assumption to explain the psychology of the human family.

But even granting that male superiority and aggressiveness are universal facts, the question is: Why are they facts? Since the Freudian anthropology is basically a deduction from psy-

choanalysis, it cannot legitimately be invoked to cover a gap in psychoanalysis itself. If the burden of proof rests on the Freudian anthropology, then the whole notion of the castration complex is open to all the attacks which have been directed against the Freudian anthropology. We are left free to argue, for example, that the castration complex is not a universal phenomenon but exists only in patriarchal cultures. If the invocation of anthropology is not allowed, Freud fails to give an explanation of what has to be explained.

To explain the child's equation of active aggressiveness with the male sex by reference to the brute external fact that the father is the aggressively dominant factor in the family is to assume as given precisely what has to be explained. Psychoanalysis must derive adult male aggression from childhood. Here, and everywhere, psychoanalysis must take the paradoxical position that the Child is Father to the Man; that Primal Father was once a boy, and, if there is anything to psychoanalysis, owes his disposition to his boyhood. A crucial issue in methodology is involved. In the myth of the Primal Father Freud abandons psychological explanation and invokes the category of brute natural force to cover the gap. In the state of nature, force is supreme, and the human family is constituted by the monopoly of force in the hands of the Primal Father, who monopolizes the women and castrates the sons when they threaten his monopoly.

Freud thus is pushed back to the position of Hegel and Nietzsche. Hegel assumed the antinomy of Master and Slave as given by nature; and Nietzsche, offering, like Freud, an explanation of guilt as internalized aggression, invoked the sudden appearance of a "master race" to establish repression and the state, and thus cause the internalization of aggressiveness.³⁸ It is true that Freud goes beyond Nietzsche and Hegel by attributing the internalization of aggressiveness, and indeed the whole human propensity to aggression, to the institution of the human family; for whereas neither the state nor the antinomy of Master and Slave can be granted to be given by nature, the institution of the family can. Freud reaches down to the level where social and natural institutions are truly joined, and opens up the question of how the psychic dynamism inherent in the human fam-

ily might, in the fullness of time, produce the antinomy between Master and Slave and the institution of the state. On the other hand, Freud carried into his analysis of the family the presupposition that the antinomy of Master and Slave is given by nature. Freud's primal despotic father simply transposes into the family, and assumes as given the domination which Hegel and Nietzsche conceived in terms of the state.

The proper starting point for a Freudian anthropology is the pre-Oedipal mother. What is given by nature, in the family, is the dependence of the child on the mother. Male domination must be grasped as a secondary formation, the product of the child's revolt against the primal mother, bequeathed to adulthood and culture by the castration complex. Freudian anthropology must therefore turn from Freud's preoccupation with patriarchal monotheism; it must take out of the hands of Jungian *Schwärmerei* the exploitation of Bachofen's great discovery of the religion of the Great Mother, a substratum underlying the religion of the Father—the anthropological analogue to Freud's discovery of the Oedipal mother underlying the Oedipal father, and comparable, like Freud's, to the discovery of Minoan-Mycenaean civilization underlying Greek civilization.

Starting from this basis, a Freudian anthropology would have to work out a theory of the dynamic interrelations between family structure, religion, and material culture (sublimation)—a theory which would have to solve a number of still unsolved problems. It is, for example, by no means obvious that, as assumed by Bachofen (and following Bachofen, such unlikely bedfellows as the Marxists and Robert Graves), a matriarchal religion presupposes a matriarchal family. According to psychoanalytical theory, fantasy is not so crassly tied to reality. What does seem certain is that, as Freud divined and the anthropologists are coming to see, the incest taboo is the mainspring of the dynamic in archaic kinship systems; that the incest taboo is directed against the mother; and that the incest taboo is not to be explained sociologically, by the abstract need for social organization, but by the psychology of guilt and the castration complex. It is not sufficient to say (as anthropologists are now willing to say) that the incest taboo is the foundation of familial organization. We must return to Freud and say that

incest guilt (the Oedipal project) created the incest taboo. And if the incest taboo involves a preference for masculinity so strong as to see femininity as castration, it would seem likely that a tendency toward patriarchy is intrinsic to the human family.

According to basic psychoanalytic theory, the castration complex establishes the peculiar capacity of human bodies to devise nonbodily activities (sublimations) and the peculiar capacity of the human self for self-denial (the super-ego). We can begin, I think, to make sense of these paradoxes if we think of the Oedipal project as the *causa sui* (father-of-oneself) project, and therefore in essence a revolt against death generally, and specifically against the biological principle separating mother and child. The castration complex is the consequence of the collision between this project and the perception of the fact of sexual differentiation separating mother and son. The whole question is: What happens to the Oedipal project when it collides with the castration complex? There is a strange contradiction in Freud here. In spite of a lifetime of insisting that the Oedipus complex was the answer to the riddle of the Sphinx and the clue to all neurosis, in an essay entitled "The Passing of the Oedipus-Complex" (1924), he says that the effect of the castration complex on the Oedipus "is more than a repression; when carried out in the ideal way it is equivalent to a destruction and abrogation of the complex"; in the *New Introductory Lectures* he repeats that "in the most normal cases" the complex is "entirely destroyed."³⁹

Freud never elucidated these formulae, and he did not cease to describe the all-pervasive effects of the Oedipus complex, not only in neurotics but also in the normal psychology of the two sexes. Apparently his final position is that the Oedipus complex both is and is not retained. Let us attempt to elucidate. The adult flight from death—the immortality promised in all religions, the immortality of familial corporations, the immortality of cultural achievements—perpetuates the Oedipal project of becoming father of oneself: adult sublimation continues the Oedipal project. On the other hand, the confrontation with the fact of sexual differentiation from the mother destroys the bodily-sexual character of the infantile Oedipal project. Hence

the outcome is the etherealization—in Freud's terminology, desexualization—of the Oedipal project: all sublimations are desexualizations. Thus man acquires a soul distinct from his body, and a superorganic culture which perpetuates the revolt against organic dependence on the mother. The soul and the superorganic culture perpetuate both the Oedipal *causa sui* project and that horror of biological fact which is the essence of the castration complex.

Man acquires a soul, but remains only a body. What corresponds to the soul in the body is that concentration of libido in the genital which is genital organization. In the Oedipal or phallic phase the morbid death wish and the flight from death have fused with and distorted infantile narcissism so as to produce a concentration of libido in the genital, attaching to it fantasies of reunion with the mother. The castration complex puts an end to the possibility of bodily fulfillment but does not put an end to the fantasies. In the words of one of Freud's last formulations: "As a result of the threat he has given up masturbation, but not the activities of his imagination accompanying it. . . . Derivatives and modified products of these early masturbatory phantasies usually make their way into his later ego, and play a part in the formation of his character."⁴⁰

Thus the Oedipus complex both survives and is destroyed. The outcome is the desexualized penis, that is to say, a penis burdened by Oedipal fantasies denied bodily fulfillment. In the essay on "The Passing of the Oedipus-Complex" Freud has a formulation that can hardly be improved: "The libidinal trends belonging to the Oedipus-complex are in part desexualized and sublimated . . . in part they are inhibited in their aim and changed into affectionate feelings. The whole process, on the one hand, preserves the genital organ, wards off the danger of losing it; on the other hand, it paralyzes it, takes away its function from it."⁴¹ And just as the genital and pregenital organizations distort the body of infantile narcissism, so they represent distortions of the ego. The natural function of the ego, as Freud says in *The Ego and the Id*, is to be the sensitive surface of the entire body; but the survival of *causa sui* fantasies attached to the genital establishes in the unconscious, as Ferenczi said, the phallus as a miniature of the total ego.⁴²

The inevitable legacy of the Oedipal project is the radical deformation of the human ego and the human body. The castration complex finally enforces the separation of the child's body from the mother's body, but traumatically, so that individuality, a true synthesis of Eros and Death, is never attained. Human narcissism, still burdened with the *causa sui* project, still seeks an unreal independence and thus gets morbidly involuted. The castration complex establishes as absolute the dualism of the self and the other, the dualism which infantile narcissism had sought to overcome. The child has to make a choice between love of self and love of the other: according to Freud, the boy's self-love or narcissism turns him away from his mother.⁴³ But the self so loved is fraudulent: self-love replaces parental love, but, according to Freud, only at the cost of splitting the ego into parent and child.⁴⁴ Through the institution of the super-ego the parents are internalized and man finally succeeds in becoming father of himself, but at the cost of becoming his own child and keeping his ego infantile.

At the same time human aggression, inseparable from the *causa sui* project, is likewise internalized, not only in the mutual warfare between ego and super-ego, which must perpetuate the war between parent and child, but also in that general war between the ego and the body which is repression and which sustains the desexualization of the Oedipal project. The morbid death instinct, already transformed into a principle of denial, blossoms after the castration complex into a principle of self-denial and denial of one's own body. Involute Eros and involuted aggression constitute the "autonomous self" or what passes for individuality in the human species. "The process of individualization," says Róheim, "is naturally built up by or based on hostile trends directed against the mother. . . . However, just because of the dual-unity matrix from which the differentiation takes its starting point, these aggressions are followed by guilt, by reparations, or reidentification and then again by renewed aggression."⁴⁵

Once again it appears that psychoanalysis' closest allies are in the religious tradition. The same harsh judgment on human individuality is contained in the doctrine of original sin.

Boehme, the most psychoanalytical of theologians, develops the doctrine that the primal sin is selfishness, or a vain project of the part to become independent of the totality conceived as a mother-principle, in words which can stand beside Freud's:

Every will which enters into self-hood and seeks the ground of its life-form (sc. in itself) breaks itself off from the mystery and enters into a capriciousness. It cannot do otherwise for its fellow members stir up dying and death. It lies, and denies union with the Will of God and sets self-hood in its place, so that it goes out from unity into a desire for self. If it knew that all things have brought it forth and are its mothers, and if it did not hold its mother's substance for its own, but in common, then greed, envy, strife and a contrary will would not arise.⁴⁶

According to Boehme, this fall into selfhood, Adam's fall, is a fall from eternity into time, and therefore the beginning of human history; it is also the moment when Adam ceased to play and started to work. In Freudian terminology, the castration complex represses infantile sexuality and inaugurates sublimation.

The special contribution of psychoanalysis is to trace religious and philosophic problems to their roots in the concrete human body. The central paradox in the theory of the castration complex is that confrontation with the fact of sexual differentiation produces in the child and bequeaths to the unconscious of the adult the image of the female as the castrated sex. One of the advantages of eliminating the threatening father from the theoretical picture is that it makes clear that there is no way of keeping the castration complex for the psychology of males without admitting at the same time the theorem which appears to have raised much stiffer opposition, penis-envy in women. Critics have accused Freud of accepting as inevitable and natural nineteenth-century notions of male superiority, and are afraid of any implication that women are by nature and by biology the inferior sex. It is true that Freud confuses the issue by sometimes assuming male social domination as given eternally by nature, and by sometimes attempting to derive penis-envy from the organic biological inferiority of the clitoris to the penis. The assumption of male domination suggests that

penis-envy is not absolute or universal, and merely expresses female revolt against social domination by the male; the comparison of the clitoris with the penis on the other hand does make the inferiority of women absolute and biological.

Freud's unsatisfactory oscillation between a social and a biological determinism is transcended if we follow Freud (not the critics) to the concept of the primal mother and the inevitable and universal consequences of being a human child in the human family. The origin of the castration complex in men and penis-envy in women lies neither in society nor in biology but in the secret projects of infantile sexuality. The neo-Freudian critics say, on the one hand, that "Freud's basic attitude is patriarchal," and, on the other, that he "explains psychic differences between the two sexes as the result of anatomical differences."⁴⁷ But the real point of the Freudian paradox is that, despite the social order and despite anatomical fact, the immortal wish of both sexes is the same. Penis-envy in women is the residue of the *causa sui* project in women, corresponding to the phallic ego in men. As long as mankind and culture are in flight from death, so long will penis fantasies confuse the erotic, familial, and social life of women, as they do for men.

What underlies both penis-envy in women and the castration complex in men is the immortal allegiance in the unconscious of both sexes to that flagrant contradiction of both the social order and the anatomical facts—what Freud calls the bisexuality of childhood. Infantile sexuality (before the castration complex), just because it is infantile, must be sexually undifferentiated; and since the structure of infancy is the same for both sexes, the basic demands of the libido are the same for both sexes.⁴⁸ Hence it is part of Freud's later position to stress the bisexual character of the Oedipal project itself:

Closer study usually discloses the more complete Oedipus-complex, which is twofold, positive and negative, and is due to the bisexuality originally present in children: that is to say, a boy has not merely an ambivalent attitude toward his father and an affectionate object-relation toward his mother, but at the same time he also behaves like a girl and displays an affectionate feminine attitude to his father and a corresponding hostility and jealousy toward his mother.⁴⁹

Hence, measured by the standard of the unconscious and of childhood, the sexual differentiation of the adult libido, as presupposed in genital organization and the human family—masculine aggressiveness and feminine passivity—is a loss of sexual completeness; hence the fact of sexual differentiation is regarded with horror. In each sex, says Freud, it is the attitude belonging to the opposite sex which succumbs to repression. In each sex the unconscious does not accept the repression but wants to recover the bisexuality of childhood. Corresponding to penis-envy in women, there is in men “a struggle against their passive or feminine attitude toward other men.”⁵⁰ In his last clinical essay Freud pointed to this fundamental rejection of sexual differentiation as the deepest and most stubborn cause of the neurotic conflict between the libido and reality:⁵¹ and, with Freud’s view of genital organization as a biological datum, it follows that neurosis is incurable.

Even if we take the position that genital organization is a formation of the ego not yet strong enough to die, the conflict between the libido and all forms of culture recorded in history remains. For if mankind is unalterably, in the unconscious, in revolt against sexual differentiation and genital organization, genital organization and the castration complex have been the psychosomatic base for all known forms of the human family. In postulating a deep conflict between the erotic aspirations of mankind and the institution of the family, psychoanalysis connects again with the religious tradition. According to a Bible text which mystical theologians love to elaborate, and also according to the myths of very primitive peoples,⁵² in heaven none marry and none are given in marriage; and yet in heaven all for the first time truly love.

At the deepest level the androgynous or hermaphroditic ideal of the unconscious reflects the aspiration of the human body to overcome the dualisms which are its neurosis, ultimately to reunify Eros and the death instinct. The dualism of masculine-feminine is merely the transposition into genital terms of the dualism of activity and passivity; and activity and passivity represent unstable fusions of Eros and Death at war with each other. Thus Freud identifies masculinity with aggressiveness and femininity with masochism.⁵³ In Freud’s earlier writ-

ings, before he discovered the bisexual disposition in the Oedipus complex, and in line with his early notion that love is essentially possessive (“object-choice”), the libido is assumed to be essentially active and masculine. In his later writings the libido is viewed as essentially bisexual, “a single libido, though its aims, i.e., its modes of gratification, are both active and passive.”⁵⁴ But activity and passivity are also derivatives of the death instinct. Thus Eros contains in itself the possibility of reunification with its instinctual opposite, and it strives toward that goal. Freud, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, used the myth of the formation of mankind by bisection of an originally bisexual creature to suggest that Eros, in seeking ever wider unification, might be seeking to reinstate a lost condition of primal unity.⁵⁵ But with his view of the instincts as a radically discrete pair, he could envisage this primal unity only as a primal conglomerate of all life before it was shattered by the intrusion of some separating force. In a more dialectical view, the primal unity Eros seeks to reinstate is its unity with its own opposite, the death instinct.

As Freud’s exploitation of the myth of the primal hermaphrodite or androgyne shows, psychoanalysis, interpreted as a phenomenon in the history of human thought, is only an interpretation of the dreams of mysticism. In the West, cabalistic mysticism has interpreted Genesis 1:27—“God created man in his own image . . . male and female created he them”—as implying the androgynous nature of God and of human perfection before the Fall.⁵⁶ From cabalism this notion passed into the Christian mysticism of Boehme, where it is fused with the Pauline mysticism of Galatians 3:28—“There can be no male and female; for ye are all one man in Christ Jesus.”⁵⁷ In neglecting Boehme, or this side of Boehme, later Protestantism only keeps its head in the sand; for, as Berdyaev writes:

The great anthropological myth which alone can be the basis of an anthropological metaphysic is the myth about the androgyne. . . . According to his Idea, to God’s conception of him, man is a complete, masculinely feminine being, solar and telluric, logocic and cosmic at the same time. . . . Original sin is connected in the first instance with division into two sexes and the Fall of the androgyne, i.e., of man as a complete being.⁵⁸

In the East, Taoist mysticism, as Needham shows, seeks to recover the androgynous self: one of the famous texts of the Tao Te Ching says:

He who knows the male, yet cleaves to what is female
Becomes like a ravine, receiving all things under heaven
(Thence) the eternal virtue never leaks away.
This is returning to the state of infancy.⁵⁹

And since poetry, as well as psychoanalysis, is the modern heir of the mystical tradition, the hermaphroditic ideal is central, for example, in the message of Rilke. In *Letters to a Young Poet* he writes: "And perhaps the sexes are more related than we think, and the great renewal of the world will perhaps consist in this, that man and maid, freed from all false feeling and aversion, will seek each other not as opposites, but as brother and sister, as neighbours, and will come together as *human beings*." But deeper than the problem of the relation between the sexes is the problem of the reunification of the sexes in the self. In Rilke as artist, according to his friend Lou Andreas Salome, "both sexes unite into an entity." And Rilke, in his call to God to perfect him as an artist, calls on God to make him a hermaphrodite:

Mach Einen herrlich, Herr, mach Einen gross,
bau seinem Leben einen schönen Schooss,
und seine Scham errichte wie ein Tor
in einem blonden Wald von jungen Haaren.⁶⁰

Part Four

SUBLIMATION

The link between psychoanalysis and the science of human culture is the concept of sublimation. If psychoanalysis is right, virtually the totality of what anthropologists call culture consists of sublimations. Freud not only regards "higher mental operations, scientific, artistic, ideological activities" as sublimations of sexual energy, but also the less high but more fundamental cultural activity of work. The emotional ties which bind the individual members of a particular culture into a unity, as well as individual and social character structures, are also said to be effects of sublimation. And yet the theory of sublimation is far from clear. This strategic concept reflects all the ambiguities in the relation between psychoanalysis and society.

37. CP V, 81.
38. Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, XIV, 443, note; cf. *Civ.* 41.
39. Cf. Benz, *Der vollkommene Mensch nach Jacob Boehme*, pp. 9-11, 25-26, 31, 35.
40. Kaufmann, *The Portable Nietzsche*, pp. 128, 302.
41. BW (Sex) 614.
42. CP IV, 58.
43. GI 323.
44. Goethe, *Faust*, Part II, vs. 8479.
45. CP IV, 57.
46. CP IV, 44. Cf. BW (Sex) 587; GI 322-23, 434; GP 60-62.
47. BW (T & T) 854; GP 61; EI 61; NIL 159; CP V, 263.
48. NIL 129.
49. NIL 129.
50. Abraham, *Selected Papers*, p. 481.
51. CP II, 253, 395; ISA 33, 36, 61, 71; MM 125; CP V, 326, 337.
52. Abraham, *loc. cit.*; Ferenczi, *Further Contributions*, p. 372.

Chapter V: Art and Eros

1. Trilling, *The Liberal Imagination*, p. 61.
2. Trilling, *op. cit.*, pp. 57, 60.
3. Contrast GI 384-85 with L 120, CP V, 222 and Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, XIII, 265, note 1
4. CP IV, 14; GI 365.
5. Keats, *Endymion*, Book I, vss. 1-13.
6. Nietzsche, *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, p. 1088.
7. Rilke, "Ueber Kunst," pp. 41-49.
8. BW (History) 938.
9. Reich, *The Function of the Orgasm*, pp. 63-64.
10. BW (Wit) 692, 782, 791.
11. CP V, 215-21.
12. BW (Wit) 692.
13. BW (Wit) 803.
14. BW (Wit) 721, 794.
15. Poe, "The Poetic Principle," pp. 273-74.
16. Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, pp. 197-99.
17. BW (Wit) 754; cf. BW (Wit) 717, 721, 761.
18. Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, VI (*Der Witz . . .*), 204. (Author's trans.)
19. Trilling, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
20. BW (Wit) 730-31, 736-37, 740-42.
21. DD 117.
22. Trilling, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
23. BW (Wit) 722; cf. BW (Wit) 702.
24. Trilling, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

25. Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, VI (*Der Witz . . .*), 196-197. (Author's trans.)
26. BW (Wit) 697, 721.
27. BW (Wit) 712, 719.
28. BW (Wit) 730-31, 736-37, 766.
29. Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, VI (*Der Witz . . .*), 154. (Author's trans.)
30. BW (Wit) 801-802.
31. BW (Wit) 761.
32. *Civ.* 37.
33. BW (Wit) 761.
34. Rilke, "Ueber Kunst," pp. 41-49.
35. Freud, *The Origins of Psychoanalysis*, p. 244.
36. *Civ.* 122.

Chapter VI: Language and Eros

1. LaBarre, *The Human Animal*, pp. 163-207.
2. GI 175.
3. CP V, 181-85.
4. Engels, *The Part Played by Labor in the Transition from Ape to Man*, p. 8.
5. CP IV, 111, 126; CP V, 185.
6. Jespersen, *Language*, p. 436.
7. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, p. 96.
8. Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, p. 109; cf. J. Huizinga, *Homo Ludens*, p. 4.
9. Jespersen, *op. cit.*, p. 433.
10. Cassirer, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
11. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 47.
12. Wittgenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 133; Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, p. 189.
13. BW (T & T) 865-83.
14. BW (T & T) 872.
15. Boehme, *Mysterium Magnum*, chap. 35, secs. 59-60.
16. Hytier, *La poétique de Valéry*, p. 29.
17. Hytier, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
18. Hytier, *op. cit.*, pp. 57, 289.
19. Hartman, *The Unmediated Vision*, pp. 73-76.

PART THREE

Chapter VII: Dualism and Dialectics

1. NIL 124.
2. CP IV, 34.

3. CP IV, 60.
4. BPP 72; BW (History) 972-77.
5. CP IV, 64.
6. Cf. *Civ.* 94-98; NIL 124-39; BPP 83-84n.
7. CP V, 345, 347.
8. CP V, 355.
9. *Civ.* 120-21, 136, 144.
10. NIL 140-41; CP V, 345.
11. CP V, 348-50.
12. Nietzsche, *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, pp. 706, 745.
13. NIL 101; ISA 33, 61, 71; CP II, 253, 395; CP V, 326, 337.
14. NIL 101.
15. Cf. Popitz, *Der entfremdete Mensch*.

Chapter VIII: Death, Time, and Eternity

1. BPP, *passim*; CP II, 255-68; NIL 134-42.
2. Contrast BPP 76, 85-88 with CP II, 256.
3. BPP 57, 68; *Civ.* 97n.
4. *Civ.* 37.
5. CP II, 257.
6. CP II, 256.
7. CP IV, 136; CP V, 370-71; MM 125.
8. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book XXII, chap. XXX.
9. Cf. Popitz, *Der entfremdete Mensch*, pp. 151-52.
10. BPP 46-48.
11. BPP 55-56.
12. BPP 45.
13. Cf. above chap. II, note 2.
14. BPP 33; NIL 99.
15. BPP 33.
16. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, III, 283.
17. BPP 33; NIL 99.
18. Bonaparte, *Chronos, Eros, Thanatos*, pp. 11-12.
19. See below, chap. XV, sec. 5.
20. NIL 99.
21. Cf. von Bertalanffy, "An Essay on the Relativity of Categories," 243-63.
22. Schiller, *Humanism*, pp. 204-27; Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, pp. 255-58, 423-24.
23. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, Book X, chap. IV.
24. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, Book VII, chap. XIV.
25. Schiller, *Humanism*, pp. 217, 226-27.
26. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book XIV, chap. XXVIII.

27. BPP 50.
28. BPP 74-75; CP II, 261.
29. CP IV, 304-17; ISA 93.
30. Unamuno, *Tragic Sense of Life*, pp. 20, 41.
31. BPP 73; EI 56-57; CP II, 260.
32. Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, pp. 11-34, 364-80, 490-513, 527-73; Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, pp. 224, 240; Kroner, "Bemerkungen zur Dialektik der Zeit," pp. 153-61.
33. CP V, 185.
34. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, I, 142.
35. Cf. Kojève, *op. cit.*, pp. 517, 549.
36. ISA 91-95.
37. Róheim, *The Origin and Function of Culture*, pp. 77, 79, 98.
38. ISA 93-95, 104-12.
39. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, III, 286, 298, 308.
40. Kaufmann, *The Portable Nietzsche*, p. 434.
41. Keynes, *Essays in Persuasion*, p. 370.
42. Kojève, *op. cit.*, p. 546.
43. Cf. Rehm, *Orpheus: Der Dichter und die Toten*, p. 583.
44. EI 87. Cf. ISA 105-18; NIL 114-16.
45. EI 85.
46. Kierkegaard, *Works of Love*, p. 253.

Chapter IX: Death and Childhood

1. Cf. Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, pp. 47-78.
2. NIL 129, 153-59.
3. ISA 53. Cf. NIL 113.
4. NIL 159. Cf. *Civ.* 120-22.
5. BW (History) 939.
6. NIL 112.
7. ISA 103-16, 131-42, 151-53.
8. EI 87. Cf. ISA 105-18.
9. ISA 109-10.
10. EI 85. Cf. ISA 160; NIL 122.
11. NIL 123; MM 200.
12. CP II, 249. Cf. BW (Sex) 618; CP IV, 45; ISA 110.
13. Ferenczi, *Thalassa*, pp. 18, 26.
14. Ferenczi, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-24.
15. CP IV, 77-79.
16. CP IV, 14, 78, 82; CP V, 183.
17. CP IV, 119; CP V, 182, 185.
18. BW (Sex) 597-98; BPP 15; CP V, 119, 264-66; NIL 165.
19. CP II, 260; CP V, 266; BPP 74.

20. CP II, 248.
21. CP IV, 201. Cf. CP V, 265-66; NIL 154.
22. Contrast BW (Sex) 614-16 with CP V, 259-65, NIL 154-59, and MM 125-29.
23. CP II, 272; CP V, 188, 196, 199, 257.
24. CP IV, 48-49.
25. CP II, 272. Cf. CP II, 53, 190; CP V, 188-90, 267; NIL 154, 165.
26. *Civ.* 121; *Civ.* 117n. Cf. CP V, 262-63; NIL 156-59.
27. *Out.* 54.
28. NIL 159. Cf. *Civ.* 120-21.
29. Abraham, *Selected Papers*, p. 497.
30. CP V, 254.
31. CP V, 264-69; NIL 154.
32. CP V, 186-97, 262; NIL 162-63; CP II, 274.
33. CP V, 263.
34. GI 326; CP II, 246-47, 270-71; CP V, 105, 199, 256, 261; NIL 160; *Out.* 58.
35. CP V, 105-106, 191; NIL 37; CP II, 247, note 2. Cf. Pollack, *Les idées des enfants sur la différence des sexes*, p. 77.
36. EI 40-44.
37. NIL 114.
38. Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, pp. 14-34, 494; Nietzsche, *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, pp. 701-705. Cf. CP V, 275.
39. CP II, 273; NIL 166; CP V, 196.
40. *Out.* 59.
41. CP II, 273.
42. EI 19-31; Ferenczi, *op. cit.*, p. 16. Cf. Ferenczi, *Further Contributions*, p. 86.
43. CP II, 272; CP V, 188, 196, 199, 257.
44. EI 36-49; MM 184.
45. Róheim, *War, Crime and the Covenant*, p. 37. Cf. *Civ.* 105, 115, 120.
46. Cf. Brinton, *The Mystic Will*, pp. 214-15.
47. Fromm, "Sex and Character," pp. 21, 25; Horney, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
48. BW (Sex) 558, 612-13; CP II, 56-58, 246; CP V, 230, 251; NIL 146-49, 151.
49. EI 42-43. Cf. CP II, 198-201, 272; CP V, 230-32.
50. CP V, 354.
51. CP V, 356-57. Cf. *Out.* 63.
52. Cf. Lévi-Strauss, *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté*, p. 567.
53. CP V, 231; NIL 148. Cf. CP II, 248-49, 258.

54. CP V, 269. Cf. BW (Sex) 612; NIL 169.
55. BPP 79-80.
56. Baumann, *Das doppelte Geschlecht*, pp. 127-28, 171-72.
57. Cf. Benz, *Der vollkommene Mensch nach Jacob Boehme*, pp. 23, 38-43, 111, 121.
58. Berdyaev, *The Destiny of Man*, p. 64.
59. Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, II, 58.
60. Rilke, *Letters to a Young Poet*, p. 38; Rilke, *Sämtliche Werke*, I, 349. Cf. Simenauer, "Pregnancy Envy in Rainer Maria Rilke," pp. 240-42.

PART FOUR

Chapter X: The Ambiguities of Sublimation

1. GI 175, 321; *Civ.* 63; GP 57, 118-20; CP II, 50, 82-83; BW (Sex) 584, 625.
2. Kroeber, "The Superorganic," pp. 163-213. Cf. Valabrega, "L'anthropologie psychanalytique," pp. 221-45.
3. CP II, 48; *Civ.* 33, 63; MM 182-87.
4. CP V, 132-33. Cf. GI 354.
5. GI 27.
6. *Civ.* 76-77.
7. CP IV, 52. Cf. BW (Sex) 625; L 49.
8. *Civ.* 33.
9. FI 12. Cf. FI 16; GI 321.
10. GI 175; *Civ.* 34n.
11. L 49-50.
12. Reich, *The Function of the Orgasm*, pp. 77, 111, 141.
13. *Civ.* 77n.
14. CP V, 171. Cf. GI 441.
15. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pp. 35, 37.
16. Reich, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53, 92; Reich, *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, pp. 183, 244, 337-38.
17. GI 463.
18. GI 355; CP II, 83.
19. *Civ.* 33-34; GI 355.
20. GP 118-19.
21. EI 65, 80. Cf. below, chap. XII.
22. CP V, 126, 128, 329, 331; *Out.* 44; FI 68.
23. *Works* (T & T), XIII, 73. Cf. CP II, 25-35; CP V, 92-97.
24. CP V, 94.
25. BW (T & T) 864.

13. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 93-118.
14. Hartman, *The Unmediated Vision*.
15. Hartman, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28, 57, 64, 94, 96, 107, 109.
16. See above, chap. IX, notes 56-60.
17. NIL 106.
18. See above, chap. XV, note 9.
19. Cf. Gray, *Goethe the Alchemist*, pp. 98-99.
20. Needham, "Mechanistic Biology," in *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 257.
21. Ferenczi, *Thalassa*.
22. Ferenczi, *Further Contributions*, p. 373.
23. Ferenczi, *Further Contributions*, p. 256; *Thalassa*, p. 2.
24. Ferenczi, *Further Contributions*, p. 256.
25. Ferenczi, *Further Contributions*, p. 393.
26. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 69.
27. Bachelard, *La formation de l'esprit scientifique*, pp. 250-51.
28. Ferenczi, *Final Contributions*, p. 246.
29. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 69.
30. Marx, Engels, *Kleine ökonomische Schriften*, p. 131; cf. pp. 127-37.
31. Needham, "A Biologist's View of Whitehead's Philosophy," in Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, pp. 241-72; Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, II, 75-77, 291, 454, 467.
32. Eliade, *Le Yoga*, pp. 110, 258, 269; Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, p. 218.
33. Cf. the role of paradox in philosophy: Wisdom, *Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis*, pp. 169-81, 248-82.
34. CP V, 316-57.
35. CP V, 181-82.
36. For the positivist approach to psychoanalysis, see Kris, "The Nature of Psychoanalytical Propositions and Their Validation," pp. 239-59; Frenkel-Brunswik, "Psychoanalysis and the Unity of Science," pp. 273-347; Pumpian-Mindlin (ed.), *Psychoanalysis and Science*.
37. BW (Dreams) 345-46; NIL 99; CP III, 559n; CP IV, 119, 184; CP V, 185.
38. CP IV, 184; BW (Dreams) 346.
39. CP IV, 184-91. Cf. BW (Dreams) 346n.
40. CP V, 181-85.
41. CP V, 182. Cf. CP III, 559n; CP IV, 119.
42. See above, chap. VII, note 13.
43. CP V, 369-71.
44. See above, chap. XII, note 70.
45. *Civ.* 144.

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