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Author Michel Foucault

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This is quite an exceptional book of very high calibre - brilliantly written, intellectually rigorous, and with a thesis that thoroughly shakes the assumptions of traditional psychiatry

Michel Foucault

History of Madness

Edited by Jean Khalfa

Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa

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acquisition of notions, but there was 'discovery', in that it was through a process of detachment, and thanks to the distance that was created, that its worrying presence was experienced once again. It was this 'detachment' which, a few years before the reforms of Tuke and Pinel, finally allowed it to stumble out into the light on its own, in the outrageous, ruined figure of unreason.

III

THE PROPER USE OF LIBERTY

We now find madness restored to a solitude of sorts. Not the noisy and in some respects glorious solitude that had been its lot until the Renaissance, but another, strangely silent; a solitude that slowly disengaged it from the confused community of the houses of confinement, and which came to form a neutral, empty zone around it.

What disappeared in the course of the eighteenth century was not the inhuman rigour with which the mad were treated, but the obviousness of confinement, the global unity into which the mad had been unquestioningly subsumed, and the countless threads that locked them into the unbroken weave of unreason. Madness was liberated long before Pinel, not from the material constraints that had kept it in prisons, but from a more decisive, more constricting form of servitude that had kept it under the control of that dark power. Even before the Revolution, madness had been set free. Free to a perception that individualised it, free in the recognition granted its individual faces, and the whole process that finally gave it the status of an object.

Left alone, and detached from its antique kinship, inside the tumbledown walls of confinement, madness became a problem, posing questions that it had never previously formulated.

Madness was an embarrassment above all for the legislators, who had little option but to sanction the end of confinement, and no longer knew

where in the social space madness should be placed – prison, hospital, or family assistance. The measures taken immediately before and after the Revolution reflect that indecision.

In his circular on *lettres de cachet*, Breteuil asked his superintendents to indicate the nature of the detention orders in the various houses of confinement, and explain the motivation behind them. His instructions were to free, after one or a maximum of two years' confinement, inmates who 'had done nothing that required that they be exposed to the full rigour of the law, and were guilty of libertine behaviour, debauchery or dissipation'. On the other hand, those who were to be kept in the houses of confinement were:

> prisoners whose alienated mind or imbecility means that they are incapable of behaving themselves in the world, or whose ravings would make them dangerous. The nature of their condition is to be ascertained, and if it is found to be unchanging, then unfortunately it is indispensable that their detention continue, for as long as it is clear that their liberty presents a danger to society, or a benefit that is of no use to them.[1]

This was the first step: reducing as far as possible the practice of confinement where it was simply a result of a moral fault, a family conflict, the more benign aspects of libertinage, but maintaining it in its principle, and with one of its major significances to the fore: the locking up of the mad. This was the moment when madness really did take possession of confinement, just as confinement divested itself of its other forms of utility.

The second step was the great enquiries prescribed by the National and Constitutional Assemblies in the immediate aftermath of the Declaration of Human Rights:

> No man may be arrested or detained other than in cases determined by the law, and according to the forms that it prescribes . . . The law should only admit of punishments that are strictly and obviously necessary, and no man shall be punished other than in virtue of a law that has been established and promulgated prior to the committing of the crime and legally applied.

The age of confinement was over. All that remained was imprisonment, where criminals convicted or awaiting trial and madmen were temporarily kept side by side. The Constituent Assembly Committee on Begging nominated five people to visit the houses of confinement in Paris.[2] The Duke La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt presented the report in December 1789. He was of the opinion that the presence of the mad gave the houses of confinement a degrading style, and risked reducing the inmates to a level that was demeaning to their humanity, and that the mix of people tolerated there showed a lack of seriousness on the part of both the authorities and the judges:

> This lack of concern is far distant from the enlightened and careful pity that palliates unhappiness, softening it and bringing all possible consolation . . . if the alleviation of misery is really the aim, how can we ever – and particularly when aiming to alleviate misery – consent to appear to degrade mankind?[3]

If the mad sullied those with whom they were imprudently mixed, then what was required for them was a special form of confinement. A confinement that was not medical by nature, but was the most effective and gentle form of assistance possible:

> Of all the misfortunes that afflict humanity, the state of madness is among those which in several ways command pity and respect the most; help should be given above all to all those in such a state, and even when there is no hope of a cure, there are still a myriad means by which their suffering may be alleviated, and good treatments that can restore these wretches to a life that is at least bearable.[4]

The status of madness appears in all its ambiguity in this text: the confined population was to be protected from its perils, and yet madness was also to be granted the advantages of a special assistance.

The third stage was the succession of decrees promulgated between 12 and 16 March 1790. The Declaration of Human Rights now found a concrete application:

> Within six weeks of the present decree, all persons detained in castles, religious houses, gaols, police houses or prisons of any other description on the strength of a *lettre de cachet* or by order of any agent of the executive power, unless they have also been sentenced or charged or

> are awaiting trial for a serious crime, have been stripped of their civil rights, or have been locked up on account of madness, are to be set free.

Confinement was thus reserved in a definitive manner for limited categories of people answerable to the law, and for the mad. But there was a special provision for the latter:

> For the three-month period that follows the publication of this decree, under the responsibility of our procurators, people detained for insanity will be questioned by our judges in the usual manner, and in accordance with their decisions, visited by physicians who, under the eye of district directors, will pronounce on the true state of these patients, so that sentence may be passed on them, and they will accordingly either be set free or treated in hospitals to be designated precisely for that purpose.[5]

The decision seems to have been made at this point. On 29 March 1790, Bailly, Duport-Dutertre and an administrator from the police made a visit to the Salpêtrière to determine how the decree could be applied in practice, and followed that with a visit to Bicêtre.[6] They faced numerous difficulties, not least of which was the simple fact that there were no hospitals intended or reserved for the mad.

In the face of these material difficulties, complicated by so many theoretical uncertainties, a long period of hesitation now began.[7] Requests poured in from all sides for the Assembly to draw up a text that would protect the public from the mad, even before the promised new hospitals came into existence. A step backwards, which was of great importance for the future, was the decision that the mad fell under the jurisdiction of measures taken with immediate effect and under no control to protect the public not against known criminals but against dangerous animals. The law of 16–24 August 1790

> [entrusts] to the vigilance and authority of municipal bodies . . . the task of obviating or remedying the unfortunate consequences that might result from the insane or the raving being set free, or from the actions of dangerous and ferocious animals.[8]

The law of 22 July 1791 reinforced that measure, making families

responsible for watching over the alienated, and allowing municipal authorities to take any measures necessary:

> The parents of insane people must guard them, and prevent them from wandering or committing any offences against public order. Municipal authorities are to act to prevent any problems that might result from the negligence of people involved.

This meandering on the path towards their liberation meant that once more, and this time as a result of a legal process, the mad were returned to the animal status into which confinement had alienated them. They were wild beasts once more, just as doctors were beginning to identify a benign animality in their nature.[9] Entrusting this legal disposition to the hands of the authorities did little to solve the problem. The fact was that hospitals for the alienated did not exist yet.

The Ministry of the Interior received numerous requests. De Lessart replied to one of them as follows:

> Like you, Sir, I feel that it would be most reassuring if we could immediately proceed to the creation of these establishments, designed to serve as a retreat for the unfortunate class that are the insane . . . Regarding the insane whom the lack of such establishments has by necessity placed in the various prisons of your department, I can at present see no means of extracting them from their predicament in these places so ill suited to their condition, other than their provisional transfer, if such a thing is possible, to Bicêtre. It would therefore be of assistance if the local Directoire were to write to the Paris Directoire and consult with them over the formalities of having them admitted to the establishment, where their upkeep would be paid for by your department or by their respective municipalities, if their families are not in a position to take charge of this expense.[10]

Bicêtre therefore became the main centre to which the insane were sent, particularly after the closure of Saint-Lazare. The Salpêtrière followed suit in 1792, taking in 200 mad women who had spent the previous five years living in a former noviciate of the Capucine nunnery in Rue Saint-Jacques.[11] But in the more distant provinces there was no question of sending the alienated to what had previously been the general hospitals. Most of

the time they were kept in prisons, including the Hâ Fort, the Château d'Angers, and in Bellevaux. The disorder of such places was unimaginable, and continued for a long time, up until the Empire period. Antoine Nodier gave the following details about Bellevaux:

> Every day the whole neighbourhood is forced to listen to the shouting and clamour of the inmates arguing and coming to blows. Then the guards rush in. Their current state makes them a laughing stock for the inmates, and the municipal administrators are called on to intervene; their authority is despised, and insults rain down upon them. This is no house of justice or detention.[12]

The disorder was similar, if not greater, at Bicêtre, which was now home to political prisoners. Hunted suspects were hidden there, and poverty and scarcity meant that many went hungry. The administration protested constantly, requesting that criminals be segregated from the rest. Importantly, some still suggested that the mad should be thrown in together with them. On 9 Brumaire year III, the Bicêtre bursar wrote to 'citizens Grandpré and Osmond, members of the Commission for Administrations and Tribunals', saying 'I can reveal that at a time when humanity is undoubtedly the order of the day, no one could fail to feel a moment of horror on seeing crime and indigence thrust together in the same asylum.' Not forgetting the September massacres, continual bids for freedom, and the manner in which many innocents were forced to watch garrotting and chain gangs leaving the asylum.[13] The poor and the old who could no longer help themselves

> have nothing but chains, bars and bolts before their eyes. Add to that the groans of other prisoners that sometimes reach their ears . . . It is against this background that I once again request that the prisoners be removed from Bicêtre, leaving only the poor, or indeed that the poor be sent elsewhere so that only the prisoners remain.

That letter was written in the midst of the Revolution, long after the reports drawn up by Cabanis, and several months after Pinel is traditionally credited with having 'liberated' the alienated at Bicêtre. Crucially, it continues:[14]

> If the latter is the preferred option, we could perhaps leave the mad where they are, as they are unfortunates of a different sort, who also bring horrible suffering to humanity . . . Hasten then, you citizens who cherish humanity, and turn this beautiful dream into reality – you can be sure in advance that you will be congratulated for it.[15]

These were years of considerable confusion, and at a time when 'humanity' was being re-evaluated it was difficult to determine the status of madness within it, and, in a social space undergoing a major restructuration, where to situate it.

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But already, in this simple chronology, we have passed the date traditionally recorded as being the start of the great reform. The measures taken between 1780 and 1793 situate the problem: the disappearance of confinement left madness without a precise point of insertion in the social space, and faced with this unchained danger, society reacted first of all with a series of measures planned for the long term, in keeping with an ideal that was coming into being – the creation of houses reserved specifically for the insane – and secondly with a series of immediate measures, which would allow madness to be mastered by force. These were regressive measures, if we wish to measure this history in terms of progress.

The situation was ambiguous, and that ambiguity reflected the difficulties that were beginning to appear, and the new forms of experience that were coming into being. To understand them, we need to liberate ourselves precisely from the idea of progress, and all the teleology and perspectival reading it implies. Only then can we discern the overall structures that carry the forms of experience in an indefinite movement, open only onto the continuity of its own prolongation, and which nothing, not even our age, can stop.

We must meticulously guard against looking for anything in the years that surround the reforms of Tuke and Pinel that looks like the beginnings of a major event, either in the positive recognition of madness or the more humane treatment of the alienated. We should give back to the events of these years, and the structures that made them possible, the liberty of their metamorphoses. Slightly below the level of the juridical measures, at the exact level of the institutions, and in the everyday debates where the mad and the non-mad were brought face to face, separating, compromising

and finally recognising each other, certain structural figures came into place over a number of years. They were obviously decisive in that they formed the basis of 'positive psychiatry', and it was out of them that the myths of a finally objective and medical recognition of madness were born, bringing justification after the act by consecrating them as the discovery and liberation of the truth.

In fact these figures cannot truly be described in terms of knowledge. They are situated on its near side, where knowledge is still close to its gestures, its familiarities, and its first formulation. Three of these structures were of particular importance.

1 In one, the old space of confinement, now limited and considerably reduced, was joined to a medical space that had taken shape elsewhere, and could only adjust to it by successive modifications and refinements.
2 Another structure established a new relation between madness and those who identified it, guarded and judged it, a neutralised relation, seemingly purified of any complicity, of the order of an objective gaze.
3 In the third, the madman found himself face to face with the criminal; but neither in a space of confusion nor as a variety of irresponsibility. This was a structure that would allow madness to haunt crime without ever completely reducing it, simultaneously authorising reasonable men to judge and divide up different kinds of madness according to the new forms of morality.

These are structures to be found behind the legislative chronicle sketched out so far, and we shall now look at them in detail.

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Medical thought and the practice of confinement had long remained strangers to each other. While a knowledge of diseases of the mind had slowly been taking shape, following its own laws, a concrete experience of madness was also being formed in the classical world, an experience that was symbolised and fixed by confinement. At the end of the eighteenth century these two figures began to come together, giving the first indication of a convergence. There was no moment of illumination, nor even a sudden realisation that revealed in a sort of conversion of knowledge that the confined were patients, but a far slower, more obscure process, in

which the old homogeneous, uniform, rigorously limited space of exclusion was brought together with the social space of assistance that the eighteenth century had recently fragmented and made polymorphous, restructuring it along the lines of psychological and moral forms of devotion.

But this new space was ill suited to the particular problems of madness. If the healthy poor could be put to work, and families obliged to look after their own sick members, there was no question of allowing the mad to blend into society. The most that could be hoped for was to integrate them into a family environment, while forbidding families with dangerous madmen in their entourage to allow them to circulate freely. But that way protection was only assured from one side, and in an extremely fragile way. Inasmuch as bourgeois society felt innocent when faced with poverty, it did recognise its responsibility before madness, and felt that it should protect private citizens from it. At a time when for the first time in the Christian world sickness and poverty were becoming *private affairs*, belonging only to the sphere of individuals and families, madness, by virtue of that fact, required a *public status*, and the definition of a space of isolation that would safeguard society from its dangers.

Nothing yet determined the nature of that isolation. No one knew whether it would be closer to corrective or hospital institutions. At that time, only one thing was certain: as the world of confinement collapsed, bringing liberty to inmates and restoring the poor to their families, the mad found themselves in the same position as prisoners who were condemned or awaiting trial, together with the poor and the sick who had no family to look after them. In his report, La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt stressed that help at home could equally apply to the great majority of people hospitalised in Paris. 'Of the more than 11,000 poor affected, this form of assistance could almost certainly be applied to 8,000, i.e. to children and people of both sexes who are neither *prisoners, insane, nor lacking family*.'[16] Were the mad then to be treated simply as prisoners, and placed in a prison environment, or should they be treated as invalids who had no relatives, and who therefore needed a quasi-family environment created around them? We shall see below precisely how Tuke and Pinel combined both these approaches in defining the archetypal modern asylum.

But the common function and mixed form of these two types of confinement had not yet been discovered. On the eve of the Revolution, two series of projects found themselves in opposition. The first aimed to

reinvent the old functions of confinement, with a sort of geometrical purity and almost delirious rationalism, to be used for both crime and madness; the second aimed to establish a more hospital-oriented status for madness, to take the place of the absent family. This was no struggle between philanthropy and barbarism, any more than it was a duel between tradition and the new humanism. They were rather the first stumbling steps towards a definition of madness that a whole society was once more eager to exorcise, at a time when its previous companions in misery – poverty, libertinage and sickness – had been returned to the private domain. In this entirely restructured social space, madness once more had to find a place.

There were many dreams, even as confinement was losing its meaning; ideal houses of correction, functioning unhindered with no disadvantages, in silent perfection, oneiric Bicêtres where all the mechanisms of correction operated in a pure state, where order and punishment and sentence were carefully measured, an organised pyramid of work and chastisement, the best possible of all worlds of evil. And in these ideal fortresses, the fantasy was that there would be no contact at all with the real world; they were to be entirely closed in on themselves, and would rely on the sole resources of sickness and evil, circumventing any risk of contagion and preventing terror. These independent microcosms would be an inverted mirror of society, where vice, constraint and punishment would take the place of virtue, liberty and the just rewards that made for the contentment of mankind.

Brissot for example drew up a plan for a perfect house of correction, according to the rigours of a geometry that was both architectural and moral. Every fragment of space took on the symbolic values of a meticulous social hell. Two sides of the building, which was to be square in shape, were reserved for less serious misdemeanours, with women and children on one side, and debtors on the other. They were to be given 'beds and passable food'. Their rooms would be exposed to sunlight and natural warmth. The cold and windy sides would house 'people accused of capital crimes', and they would be grouped together with libertines, the raving mad and all the insane who were 'disturbers of the public peace'. The first two classes of prisoners would do jobs that were of some use to society. The latter would carry out those indispensable tasks that were harmful to health, and which all too often honest people were forced to carry out:

> Work will be proportional to strength and the delicacy of their constitution, the nature of their crimes, and so forth. Vagabonds, libertines and villains will break stones, polish marble, grind up colours and do the sort of work with chemicals that ordinarily puts the life of honest citizens in danger.

In this marvellous economy, work is doubly effective: it produces and destroys, as work necessary to society is born out of the death of workers whose disappearance is desirable. The dangerous, restive lives of men passed into the docility of objects. The irregularities of these senseless existences were all ground and polished as smooth as marble. The classic themes of confinement here reach a paroxysm of perfection: the confined are excluded until their death, but each step taken towards this death is useful to the society from which they are banished.[17]

When the Revolution began, these dreams had not yet disappeared. Musquinet's project used a fairly similar form of geometry, although the meticulousness of the symbols was even richer. His fortress was to have four sides, with each of the buildings in turn having four storeys, forming a pyramid of work. It was an architectural pyramid, with carding and weaving at its base, and at the top there was 'a platform to serve as place for warp to be stretched before it was introduced to the loom'.[18] It was a social pyramid too, as the confined were to be grouped in battalions of twelve, under the direction of a foreman. Guards would watch over their work, and a director would oversee the whole establishment. A hierarchy of merit culminated in the promise of liberation, and each week the most zealous workers 'would receive a prize of an écu of six pounds from the president, and anyone winning the prize three times would also win their liberty'.[19] Work and personal interest were therefore combined, and a fair balance was struck: the prisoners' work was an economic good for the administration, and a step towards freedom for the inmate, so a single product brought gains of two types. But there was also the world of morality, symbolised by a chapel that was to be built in the middle of the square formed by the buildings. Men and women were to attend mass every Sunday, paying particular attention to a sermon:

> whose purpose will invariably be to instil feelings of repentance in the prisoners for their past life, making them understand how libertinage and idleness never bring happiness, even in this life . . . and forcing them to make a firm resolution to behave better in the future.[20]

If a prisoner who had won prizes, and was only a step or two away from gaining his freedom, caused a commotion in mass, or demonstrated himself to be 'disorderly in his morals', he would immediately lose the benefits he had gained. Freedom did not simply have a market value, it had a moral value too, and was also to be acquired through virtue. Prisoners were thus placed at the intersection of two different systems. The one was purely economic, consisting of work, its product and its reward; the other was exclusively moral, and consisted of virtue, vigilance and recompense. When the two coincided, in a perfect form of work that was also pure morality, the prisoner was free. This perfected vision of Bicêtre thereby found a double justification: for the outside world, it was pure profit, as it was unremunerated work, and Musquinet reckoned that for 400 workers, it was worth precisely 500,000 pounds per year. For the interior world that it enclosed it was a gigantic moral purification:

> No man is so corrupt that he can considered incorrigible: all that is necessary is for him to understand his true interests, and for him not to be abased with unbearable punishments that are always too much for human weakness.[21]

Here we touch some of the most extreme forms of the myth of confinement. Purified into a complex scheme, its intentions are immediately visible. It becomes, in all naivety, what it always was in some obscure fashion – the moral control of inmates, and economic profit for everyone else. The product of the work accomplished can be easily broken down into the profits that go to the administration, thereby indirectly benefiting society as a whole, and the gratification awarded to workers in the form of certificates of morality. A sort of caricatural truth that indicates not only what the asylum wished itself to be, but also the style in which a whole form of bourgeois consciousness set up the relations between work, profit and virtue. It is a point at which the history of madness slides into a mythology where reason and unreason found simultaneous expression.[22]

This dream of work carried out in a purely moral environment, and this other dream of work that attains its positivity with the death of the person accomplishing it, both demonstrate that confinement attained an excessive truth. Such projects were now only determined by an overflow of psychological and social meanings, or by a system of moral symbols where madness was somehow levelled out: madness was now only disorder,

irregularity and obscure faults – a disturbance in men that troubled the State and contradicted morality. Just as bourgeois society was beginning to understand the futility of confinement, and lose the unity of evidence that made unreason perceptible to the classical age, it found itself dreaming of a pure form of work – which was pure profit for this society, and death and moral submission for its outsiders – where all that was foreign in man would be snuffed out and reduced to silence.

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In these dreams, confinement overreached itself. It became a pure form, finding its place in the network of social utilities, indefinitely fecund. These mythical elaborations were in vain, the fantastical geometry of a confinement that had already had its day. Yet purifying the space of confinement of its real contradictions, making it compatible, in the imaginary at least, with the requirements of society, it tended to give a positive significance to what had previously been pure exclusion. This region, akin to a negative zone at the limits of the State, sought to become a substantial milieu where society could recognise itself and put its own values into circulation. In that respect, the dreams of Brissot and Musquinet were complicitous with numerous other projects whose seriousness, philanthropic concerns and proto-medical preoccupations seemed to propose a meaning at the other extreme.

Although they were contemporaneous with them, these other projects were in a very different style. On the one hand was the abstraction of confinement taken in its most general terms, with no reference to the confined themselves – who were merely an opportunity and a raw material rather than the *raison d'être* of the project itself. On the other, the peculiarities of the confined, and above all the singular appearance that madness had taken on in the course of the eighteenth century as confinement lost its essential structure, were instead exalted. Alienation was treated on its own terms, not as one of the forms that necessitated confinement, but as a problem in and for itself, with confinement seen as nothing more than a solution. This was the first time that confined madness and medically treated madness were systematically brought face to face, when madness seen as unreason confronted madness seen as disease. It was, in short, the first moment of the confusion or synthesis (whichever label one prefers) that constituted mental alienation in the modern sense of the phrase.

In 1785, under the double signature of Doublet and Colombier, there appeared *Instructions Printed by Order and at the Expense of the Government on the Manner of Governing and Treating the Insane*. The madman here is located in an ambiguous manner, half-way between forms of assistance that are in the process of being reorganised, and confinement, which was in the process of disappearing. This text reflects neither a sudden discovery nor a conversion in the manner in which madness was to be treated. Rather, it points to compromises, the search for new measures, balanced positions. All the hesitations of the Revolutionary legislators are already there in embryo.

On the one hand assistance, as a manifestation of natural pity, is required by the mad, as it is for all those who are incapable of meeting their own needs: 'It is society's duty to shield the weakest and most miserable most carefully, and for that reason, children and the insane have always been the object of public concern.' But the compassion naturally felt towards children is a positive attraction, while the pity felt for the mad is quickly spent, and even replaced by a horror inspired by their foreign existence, given over to violence and fury:

> We tend to flee them, to avoid the heart-wrenching spectacle of the hideous marks on their faces and bodies and of the loss of their reason; in any case a fear of their violence is such that anyone who is not obliged to assist them remains at a distance.

What was therefore required was a middle way between the duty of assistance prescribed by an abstract pity and the legitimate fears that the real experience of this terror inspired; and the solution, naturally, was assistance *intra muros*, help that was supplied at the boundaries of the distance inspired by horror, and pity that operated inside the space prepared by more than a century of confinement, now left empty. One consequence was that the exclusion of the mad took on a whole new meaning: it no longer marked the great caesura between reason and unreason, at the furthest limits of society; but inside the group itself it drew a line of compromise between feelings and duty – between pity and horror, between assistance and security. Never again was it to have the sense of absolute limit that it had perhaps inherited from age-old terrors, and that it had confirmed in the obscure fears of men, by taking the place of leprosy in an almost geographical manner. Now it was a measure rather

than a limit, and it is the obviousness of that shift in significance that meant that the 'French asylums, inspired by Roman Law' were so roundly criticised. All they relieve are

> the fears of the public, and they are unable to satisfy pity which requires not simply security, but also the care and treatment that are often neglected, and without which the madness of some is perpetual, whereas it could be cured, and the condition of others worsens, whereas it could be improved.

But this new form of confinement should also be a measure of a different sort in that it needed to reconcile the possibilities of riches and the demands of poverty; for the rich – and this was the ideal of assistance for Turgot's disciples – 'make it their duty to look after relatives stricken with madness in their own homes', and if their efforts were in vain, they had them 'looked after by trustworthy individuals'. But the poor had 'neither the necessary resources to contain the insane, nor the ability to have them looked after and treated as sick people'. What was therefore necessary was a form of treatment for the poor that resembled that of the rich – they should be watched over and guarded as carefully as the madmen of rich families were, but at no cost to the beneficiary. To that end, Colombier recommended the creation 'of a department solely destined for the poor insane in each begging centre, where madness should be treated in all its forms'.

In any case, the most significant aspect of the text was the still-hesitant search for a form of equilibrium between the exclusion of the mad pure and simple, and the medical care that was provided for them on the grounds that they were considered to be sick. To lock up the mad was in essence to protect society against the danger that they represented:

> A thousand examples have proven this danger, and the newspapers recently reaffirmed it by reporting the story of a maniac who slit the throats of his wife and children, before calmly lying down to sleep beside the bloody victims of his frenzy.

It was therefore of primary importance to lock up the mad whose needy families did not have the means to guard them at home. But they were also to benefit from the treatment they would receive either at the hands of

doctors, if they were more fortunate, or in hospitals if they were not immediately confined. Doublet detailed the cures that were to be applied to different diseases of the mind – precepts that exactly summarize the treatment traditionally handed out in the eighteenth century.[23]

Despite that, the connection between confinement and medical treatment here is only of a temporal order. They did not exactly coincide, but succeeded each other: treatment was given during the short period when the disease was considered to be curable, but immediately afterwards confinement resumed its sole function of exclusion. In one sense, the 1785 *Instructions* did little more than take up and systematise what was already customary in hospitality and confinement; but what was essential was the manner in which it brought them together in the same institutional form, and that the treatment was to be applied in the same place as the exclusion. Previously, treatment was carried out at the Hôtel-Dieu, and confinement occurred at Bicêtre. What was now projected was a form of confinement in which the medical function and the exclusive function would alternate, but inside a single structure. Society was to be protected against the mad through a form of banishment that designated madness as irreversible alienation, and protected against disease in a recuperative space where madness, in principle at least, was considered transitory. These two types of measures, which covered two different experiences that until this point had been considered to be heterogeneous, were now superimposed, although they did not yet blend into one another.

There have been attempts to see Doublet and Colombier's text as the first great stride towards the creation of the modern asylum.[24] But however close their *Instructions* come to bringing medical and pharmaceutical techniques into the world of confinement, the essential step had not yet been taken. That would only happen when the space of confinement, adapted and reserved for madness, revealed values of its own, capable, with no external addition of curing madness, i.e. the day when confinement itself became the essential medication, and when the negative gesture of exclusion, by its own meaning and its intrinsic virtues, became an opening onto the positive world of the cure. Confinement was not to be supplemented by practices that were external to it, but reorganised, so that the truth that it concealed was revealed, and the loose threads that ran through it tightened at last. It would thus take on a medical value in the movement that brought madness back to reason. The space that was exclusively the domain of social division was to become a dialectical

domain where the mad and the non-mad came to exchange their secret truths.

That step was taken by Tenon and Cabanis. In the work of Tenon, one can still discern the old idea that the confinement of the mad should only be decreed in a definitive manner once medical treatment had failed: 'Only after using up all possible resources is it permissible to consent to the unfortunate necessity of depriving a citizen of his liberty.'[25] But already confinement was no longer, in a rigorously negative manner, the total and absolute abolition of liberty. It was more a restrained and organised form of freedom. If the idea was to avoid all contact with the reasonable world – and in that sense it remained a form of closure – confinement was also to open, on the inside, onto an empty space where madness was free to express itself, not so that it might be abandoned to its blind rage, but so that it had the possibility of satisfaction, an opportunity for appeasement that could never result from uninterrupted constraints: 'the first remedy should be to offer the madman a certain amount of freedom, so that he can allow himself to express in some measure the desires that nature instils in him'.[26] Rather than seeking to control it entirely, confinement functioned as though it had to leave madness a certain leeway, a space in which it could be itself, a form of liberty stripped of secondary components like violence, rage, frenzy or despair, whose appearance was invariably provoked by constant oppression. The classical age, in some of its myths at least, associated the liberty of madness with the most aggressive forms of animality, and considered that predation was the basis of the resemblance between the demented and the animal. What now appeared was the idea that there could be in a madman a more gentle form of animality, which did not destroy its human truth in violence, but allowed instead one of nature's secrets to emerge: the rediscovery of the familiar but forgotten resemblance with tame animals and children. Madness was no longer an absolute perversion that went against nature, but an invasion by a neighbouring nature. To Tenon's way of thinking, the ideal form of confinement was the one practised at Saint Luke's, where a madman:

> is left to his own devices, and leaves his cell if he wishes, and roams through the gallery, or wanders off to a sandy open-air path. As he is restless, he requires covered and open walkways, so that he can yield in any weather to the impulses that overtake him.[27]

Confinement was thus to be a space of truth as much as a space of restraint, and had to be the latter only to be the former. For the first time, an idea was formulated that was to weigh heavily on the history of psychiatry up until the psychoanalytic liberation: that in these constraints, this closed-off vacuum, this 'milieu', confined madness found a privileged element in which the essential forms of its truth could surface.

Relatively free and abandoned to the paroxysms of its truth, was there not then a risk that madness might thereby gain strength and follow a sort of constant intensification? Neither Tenon nor Cabanis thought so. They thought that on the contrary, this semi-liberty, this caged freedom would be of therapeutic value. This was because for them, as for all physicians of the eighteenth century, the imagination was always responsible for all the sicknesses of the mind, because it partook of both the body and the soul and was the birthplace of error. The more men were constrained, the more their imagination tended to wander, and the stricter the rules restraining their bodies, the greater the disorder in images and dreams. So much so that freedom was therefore more effective than chains when it came to binding the imagination, as it constantly forced the imagination to confront reality, burying strange dreams under familiar gestures. Imagination was silenced by this vagabondage of liberty. Tenon praised the foresight of the administrators at Saint Luke's, where 'a madman, in general, is let loose for most of the day: that freedom, in people unaccustomed to the rule of reason, is already a remedy that brings calm to the wandering or lost imagination'.[28] In itself, without being anything other than this secluded form of liberty, confinement was thus an agent of cure: it was medical, not so much in terms of the care that it provided as in the play of imagination, liberty, silence and limits, and the movement that spontaneously organised them and brought error back to truth and madness back to reason. Confined freedom cured of its own accord, just as liberated language was soon to do for psychoanalysis, but in a movement that was its exact opposite: not by allowing fantasy to take shape in language and use it as a medium of exchange, but by forcing it instead to disappear when confronted with the insistent and heavily real silence of things.

An essential step had been taken, and confinement had at last gained a form of medical acceptability. It had become the place of cure, no longer the place in which madness kept watch and ruled until its death, but the place in which, by a sort of indigenous mechanism, it was supposed to suppress itself of its own accord.

The key fact is that this transformation of the centres of confinement into asylums was not the result of a progressive introduction of medicine – a sort of invasion coming from the outside – but was the result of an internal restructuring of a space that the classical age had designated as a place of exclusion and correction. The progressive alteration of its social significance, the political criticism of repression and the economic critique of assistance, the appropriation of the whole field of confinement by madness, at a time when all the other figures of unreason were slowly being liberated, all resulted in confinement being a doubly privileged place for madness, the place both of its truth and of its abolition. To that extent, it really did become its destiny, and the link between them became a necessary one. The twin functions that might appear quite contradictory – protection against perils that the insane represented, and the curing of sickness – were suddenly harmonised at last, as it was in the closed but empty space of confinement that madness formulated its truth and liberated its nature, and by this single operation, the danger to the public was averted and the signs of sickness removed.

Once the space of confinement was invested by these new values, and by the whole new movement that they brought, then and only then could the world of medicine take control of the asylum, bringing all the experiences of madness into its own remit at last. It was not medical thought that forced open the doors of the asylum, and if today doctors now reign in such places, it is not through any right of conquest resulting from the vital force of their philanthropy or their concern with scientific objectivity. It is because confinement itself slowly took on a therapeutic value, bringing a realignment of all the political and social gestures, and the moral and imaginary rituals that for more than a century had been used to ward off madness and unreason.

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The appearance of confinement therefore changed. But in the complex unity between confinement and madness, where a clear division was never entirely possible, madness too underwent an alteration. It struck up new relations with the semi-liberty that it was offered, however parsimoniously, with the time within which it unfolded, with the gaze that watched over it and controlled it. Madness was at one with this closed world, a body which was by the same token its *truth* and its *home*. Through

a recurrence, which is only strange if one believes that madness pre-exists the practices that designate and concern it, its situation became its nature; the constraints upon it took on the meaning of a determinism, and the language that determined it assumed the voice of a truth that spoke of itself.

The genius of Cabanis, and of the texts that he wrote in 1791, coincided with this decisive, equivocal moment, where perspectives suddenly began to lose their clarity: what had originated as a social reform of confinement became a fidelity to the deep truths of madness, and *the manner in which the mad were alienated* was forgotten, only to reappear as the *nature of their alienation*.[29] Confinement was beginning to order itself in relation to the forms to which it had given birth.

The problem of madness was no longer envisaged from the point of view of reason or order, but from the point of view of the rights of the free individual, which no coercion nor even charity could infringe. 'The liberty and safety of individuals must be protected above all other things. The rules of justice should never be violated, not even when doing good.' Liberty and reason had the same limits. Whenever reason was affected, liberty too could be constrained, but only if the attacks on reason threatened the existence of the subject or the freedom of others:

> When men enjoy the full power of their rational faculties, i.e. whenever these powers are not so altered as to compromise the safety and tranquillity of others, or expose men to genuine danger, no one, not even society as a whole, has the right to raise a hand against their independence.[30]

The ground was being prepared for a definition of madness based on the relation that freedom might have with itself. The old judicial conceptions that delivered the mad from responsibility for their actions before the law, at the cost of their civil rights, did not constitute a psychology of madness; that suspension of liberty was a purely legal consequence. But with Cabanis, freedom became man's nature, and any legitimate restriction on its exercise must necessarily have also altered the natural forms that it took in man. Locking up a madman had now to be the sanctioning of a matter of fact, a translation into juridical terms of an abolition of liberty that had already taken place on a psychological level. And in this recurrence or retroaction of law upon nature, we find the basis for the great ambiguity that causes contemporary thinking to hesitate so much when considering

madness: if irresponsibility is an absence of liberty, then any form of psychological determinism is a proof of innocence. This is tantamount to saying that there is no truth in psychology that is not also a form of alienation for man.

The disappearance of liberty, once a consequence of madness, now became its foundation, secret and essence. And it was this essence that was to dictate the degree of restrictions that were to be imposed on the material liberty of the insane. A control was necessary and it had to interrogate madness about its own being, which given the still-ambiguous nature of this disappearance of liberty, involved a confused variety of figures, such as magistrates, jurists, doctors, and simply men of experience: 'For these reasons, the places where the mad are to be detained must be constantly inspected by the various magistrates, and carefully examined by the police.' Whenever a madman is taken to a detention centre, 'he is to be examined forthwith from all points of view. He is to be watched by health officers, and guarded by the most intelligent personnel, who are most accustomed to observing madness in all its forms.'[31] Confinement was to operate like a permanent measuring of madness, a constant series of readjustments in response to the changeable nature of its truth, restraining only inside the limits within which freedom alienated itself: 'Humanity, justice and good medicine dictate that only the mad who risk genuinely harming others should be locked up; the only patients who should be restrained are those who otherwise risk harming themselves.' The justice that was to reign inside asylums would no longer be that of punishment, but that of truth: there was to be an exact measurement of the exercise of liberty and of its restrictions, and as rigorous a conformity as possible between constraints and the alienation of liberty. And the most concrete form of this justice, its most visible symbol, was no longer to be the chain – an absolute, punitive restriction that 'invariably wounds the flesh it rubs against' – but the new, soon-to-be-famous straitjacket, 'a close-fitting canvas shirt, which constrains and contains the arms', designed to progressively hinder movements as their violence increased.[32] The straitjacket should not be seen as the humanisation of chains, or as progress towards 'self-restraint'. A process of conceptual deduction leads to the straitjacket, showing that in madness, the experience was no longer of an absolute conflict between reason and unreason, but rather of a play – always relative, always mobile – between freedom and its limits.[33]

The draft regulations that followed the *Rapport adressé au Département de Paris* proposed that the main ideas developed in Cabanis' text be applied in detail:

> The mad or the insane will be admitted to the different establishments that are or will be allotted to them throughout the Department of Paris on the basis of reports from legally recognised doctors and surgeons, signed by two witnesses, parents, friends or neighbours, and certified by a justice of the peace from the section or canton.

But the report gave a far wider interpretation to the regulations: even the pre-eminence of the doctor in the determination of madness was carefully controlled, precisely in the name of an experience of the asylums that was considered to be closer to the truth as it was based on a greater variety of cases, but also because it somehow allowed madness to speak more freely for itself.

> Imagine a madman being taken to hospital . . . the patient arrives, led by his family, neighbours, friends or charitable strangers. Everyone certifies that he is indeed mad; they either *are* or *are not* in possession of doctors' certificates. Appearances confirm or appear to contradict what they say. Whatever opinion one might have of the state of the patient, if, in addition, the proofs of poverty are authentic, he must be taken in provisionally.

What should then follow is a long process of observation carried out by the 'staff of the institution' and 'health officers'. And there, in the privileged environment of confinement, and under its purified gaze, the division is made: if the subject manifested obvious signs of madness,

> all doubt should disappear. He can be retained without scruples, and he should be looked after and protected from his own errors, and the use of the indicated medication should be courageously continued. But if, on the other hand, after a reasonable amount of time, no sign of madness is found, and painstaking investigations reveal nothing to arouse the suspicion that the calm is merely a lucid interval, and if the patient requests that he be allowed to leave the hospital, then it would be a crime to retain him there by force. He should immediately be returned to himself and to society.

The medical certificate issued on entry to the asylum was thus only a guarantee of doubtful value. The definitive criterion, which could not be put in doubt, was to be provided by confinement instead. Inside, madness appeared filtered of anything that might have provided an illusion, offered to an absolutely neutral gaze; for it was no longer the interest of a family that was speaking, nor power and its arbitrary nature, nor the prejudices of medicine. Confinement pronounced of its own accord, in a vocabulary that was its own, i.e. in terms of liberty and constraints that penetrated deep into the essence of madness. The guardians who watched over the limits of confinement were now the sole persons who had the possibility of a positive knowledge of madness.

By that means, Cabanis arrived at the curious idea (probably the most novel among his innovations) of an 'asylum journal'. In the classical forms of confinement, unreason was, in the strictest sense of the word, reduced to silence. We know nothing of what it was for a considerable period of time, give or take a few enigmatic inscriptions on registers of the houses of confinement: its concrete figures, its language, and its teeming, delirious existences are probably lost to us now. Madness was then without memory, and confinement was the seal on that forgetting. But from this point confinement was the space within which madness formulated its own truth; it was to mark its measure moment by moment. Within it madness would come to completion up to the point of decision:

> A journal shall be kept where a picture of each form of madness, the effects of remedies, and autopsies, are to be recorded with scrupulous exactitude. The names of all individuals in the section are to be recorded, enabling the administration to draw up a nominative report on their condition week by week, or even day by day, if that is what is judged necessary.

Madness therefore came to regions of truth that unreason had never attained: it was inserted into time, escaping the random, the purely accidental that had previously been used to mark its various episodes, and it took on an autonomous form in history. Its past and evolution became part of its truth, and what revealed madness was no longer the always-instantaneous rupture with truth that had previously been the hallmark of unreason. Madness too has a time that coincides with the calendar, not the

rhythmic calendar of the seasons that would link it to the dark forces within the world, but the daily time of men, the time within which history is accounted for.

Its truth revealed by confinement, firmly installed in the time of chronicles and history, stripped of all the elements that would have made the deep presence of unreason irreducible, madness, disarmed in this fashion, could now safely enter the world of exchange. It became communicable, but in the neutralised form of offered objectivity. It could take on a public existence once more – not in the form that had once caused such scandal, when it suddenly and irrevocably called into question all that was most essential in man, and all that was most true in his truth – but as a calm object, kept at a safe distance, and yet totally visible, fully open to reveal its secrets, now no longer a cause of discomfort, but a means of instruction.

> No doubt the administration will consider the contents of the journal and its precious details to be the property of the public who provided such deplorable material. There is no doubt that it will have the results printed, and if the editor is a man of some learning and medical experience, such a compendium, providing new information year upon year, new observations, new facts, and the latest results of new and true experiments, will become an immense source of riches for all students of the physical and moral science of man.[34]

Here was madness offered up to the gaze. This had also been its position in classical confinement, when it presented the spectacle of its own animality; but the gaze that had then been cast upon it was one of fascination, in that man contemplated in that figure so foreign an animality that was his own, which he recognised in a confused manner as being indefinably close yet indefinably distant; this existence that a delirious monstrosity made inhuman and placed as far from the world as possible, he secretly felt it inside himself. The new gaze that was trained on madness was not charged with so much complicity. It was directed towards an object, which it attained by the sole intermediary of a discursive truth that had already been formulated: the madman now appeared in a purified state, madness in an abstract form. If there was anything in its spectacle that concerned reasonable individuals, it was not the extent to which madness could challenge humanity as a whole, but rather the extent to which

it could bring something new to what was known about man. Madness was no longer to be inscribed in the negativity of existence, as one of its most brutal figures, but now progressively took its place in the positivity of known things.

In this new gaze, where compromises disappeared, barriers like grilles were also abolished. The mad and the non-mad were to meet face to face. The only distance between them was the one immediately measured by the gaze. It may have been almost imperceptible, but it was no less unbridgeable for that; the freedom acquired in confinement, the possibility of finding there a truth and a language were for madness no more than the other side of a movement that gave it a place as an object of knowledge. Under the gaze that now enveloped it, madness shed all the prestige that had made it until recently a figure banished on sight; it became an object of investigation, a thing invested with language, a known reality: it became, in short, an object. And if the new space of confinement brought madness and reason into closer proximity, within a mixed home it also marked off an even greater distance between them, an imbalance that could never be reversed. However free madness became in the world that reasonable men had created for it, however close it came to their spirit and their hearts, it could never be anything other than an object for them. No longer the ever-imminent converse of their existence, but a possible eventuality in the concatenation of things. This fall into objectivity was a far more effective means of mastering madness than its previous enslavement to the forms of unreason. Confinement, in the light of these developments, could offer madness the luxury of liberty – as it was now enslaved, and stripped of its deepest powers.

If this evolution was to be summed up in one sentence, we might say that the kernel of the experience of Unreason was that madness was there its own subject, but that in the experience that came into being in the late eighteenth century, madness was alienated from itself through its promotion to a new status as object.

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What Cabanis dreamt of for madness was that half-sleep to which the asylum would consign it, and he sought to exhaust it in that problematic serenity. But strangely, at that very moment, it sprang back to life elsewhere, taking on a whole new concrete content. While it became purified

for knowledge, and was freed of its ancient complicities, it also found itself engaged in a series of questions that morality began to ask itself: it penetrated everyday life, affecting everyday choices and elementary decisions, provoking archaic reactions and forcing public opinion to revise its system of values concerning madness. The clarification and purification that was operated in the work of Colombier, Tenon and Cabanis as part of a continual series of reflections was immediately counteracted and compromised by this more spontaneous labour carried out on the margins of consciousness everyday. Nonetheless, it was there, in the barely perceptible weave of daily experience, that madness was soon to take on the moral form that was so instantly recognisable to Pinel and Tuke.

For as confinement disappeared, madness once again entered the public domain. It reappeared as though carried by a slow, silent invasion, affecting judges, families, and everyone responsible for law and order. While a status was sought for it, it posed some urgent questions: the age-old concept of the unreasonable man, in the family, society and police sense, was now beginning to disintegrate, leaving the judicial notion of irresponsibility face to face with the immediate experience of madness, with no intermediary. A whole labour now began, in which the negative concept of alienation as defined by law was slowly permeated and altered by the moral meanings that ordinary people lent to madness.

'A distinction should be made in the Lieutenant of Police between the Magistrate and the Administrator. The first is a man of the law; the latter is a man of the government.'[35] Five years later, Des Essarts had this to say about his own earlier definition:

> Re-reading, in April 1789, the article that I wrote in 1784, I must add that the nation ardently desires to diminish the influence of the administrator's part, or at least modify it, so that liberty of citizens should be guaranteed in the most inviolable manner.

The reorganisation of the police in the early days of the Revolution caused that power, which was both independent and mixed, to disappear, granting its privileges to citizens instead, conceived of as both private individuals and the collective will of society. The electoral districts created by the decree of 28 March 1789 served as a framework for the reorganisation of the police. In each district of Paris, five companies were set up, only one of which was paid (this was usually the previous police force),

with the four others staffed by volunteer citizens.[36] From one day to the next, private individuals found themselves entrusted with the task of carrying out a fundamental social division that precedes the act of justice and is the work of all police. Private individuals now had to deal directly, with no intermediaries and no controls, with all the human material that was previously consigned to the houses of confinement: vagabondage, prostitution, the debauchery and immorality, and of course all the confused forms that went from violence to frenzy, from weak-mindedness to dementia. Man, as a citizen, was now called upon to exercise within the group the provisionally absolute power of police. His task was to accomplish the obscure and sovereign gesture that designates an individual as an undesirable element, a stranger to the unity that society forms; and it fell to the common citizen to judge the boundaries of order and disorder, liberty and scandal, morality and immorality. The immediate power of decision regarding the division of reason and madness was now to operate inside the citizen, and inside his conscience, before any liberation.

The citizen was universal reason, and doubly so: he was the immediate truth of human nature, the touchstone of all legislation. But he was also the person for whom unreason departed from reason: he was, in the most spontaneous forms of his consciousness, in the most immediate decisions that he took, before any theoretical or judicial elaboration, the place, the instrument and the judge of that division. Men of the classical age, as we have seen, also immediately recognised madness, without any recourse to reflection, in an immediate apprehension; but they made spontaneous use of their good sense, not of their political rights. That was man judging as man, perceiving without commentary a difference of fact. But now, when faced with madness, a citizen had a fundamental power that made him both a 'man of the law' and a 'man of the government'. As the sole sovereign of the bourgeois state, the free man became the first judge of madness. The man in the street renewed the contact with madness that had been interrupted by the classical age; but contact was renewed, without dialogue or confrontation, in the pre-existing form of sovereignty, in the absolute and silent exercise of his rights. The fundamental principles of bourgeois society allowed this private yet universal consciousness to reign over madness, before any possible contestation. And when judicial or medical experience was allowed to express an opinion on it, at trial or inside the asylums, it had already been secretly mastered.

This new reign had its primary (and highly transitory) form in what were known as the 'family tribunals'. These were an old idea, which easily predated the Revolution, and which the customs of the Ancien Régime seemed to have sketched in advance. Regarding the petitions used by families requesting *lettres de cachet*, Bertin, the Lieutenant of Police, wrote to his superintendents as follows on 1 June 1764:

> Take extreme care with the following two points: first of all, be certain that the requests are signed by the closest relatives on both the paternal and maternal sides of the family, and secondly take careful note of any signatures that are missing, and find out why they did not sign.[37]

Breteuil later considered constituting in law a special familial jurisdiction, but it was the Constituent Assembly that eventually set up family tribunals in May 1790. They were to form the most elementary cell of the civil jurisdiction, but their decisions only took on an executive force once they had been ratified by special orders from the district courts. These tribunals were to relieve the state of its duties in the innumerable procedures concerning conflicting family interests, inheritances, co-ownership and so forth. But they were also entrusted with a separate task, and were to give a proper status and juridical form to measures that courts previously asked directly of the royal authorities: spendthrift and debauched fathers, prodigal sons, inheritors who were incapable of managing their share, and all the various forms of deficiency, disorder and misdemeanour that were previously sanctioned with *lettres de cachet*, in the absence of the complete legal procedure of interdiction, all now fell into the jurisdiction of these family tribunals.

In one sense the Constituent Assembly had completed a process of evolution that had continued throughout the eighteenth century, conferring an institutional status on what was a spontaneous practice. But in fact the arbitrary power of families and their relative interests were hardly checked at all by such measures. Under the Ancien Régime, requests from families for *lettres de cachet* were followed with enquiries by the police so that the allegations might be verified,[38] whereas under the new scheme, one merely had the right to appeal against the family tribunal's decisions by going to a higher court. It is quite unlikely that these courts functioned in an effective manner, and they did not survive subsequent reorganisations of the justice system.[39] But it is quite significant that for a certain time, the family itself was elected to the status of judicial body, and that it had the prerogatives of a tribunal regarding cases of misbehaviour, disordered lifestyles and the different forms incapacity or madness could take. For this brief moment, it openly was what it was long to remain in more covert form – the most immediate instance of division between reason and madness, an archaic and simple form of justice that likened the rules of life, economics and family obligation to the norms of good health, reason and freedom. In the family, taken as an institution and defined as a court, unwritten laws took on a natural significance, and at the same time private individuals became judges, bringing their daily dialogue with unreason into the public domain. From this point onwards, there was a public and institutional grasp of private consciousness upon madness.

Numerous other transformations also bore witness to this new grasp, and foremost among them were changes in the nature of the punishments meted out. As was noted above, confinement on occasion constituted an attenuation of the punishment;[40] more often still it was used to cover up the monstrous nature of a crime, if it was the result of some form of excess, or a form of violence that seemed to reveal inhuman powers.[41] Confinement marked out a limit beyond which scandal was deemed unacceptable. For the bourgeois consciousness, on the other hand, scandal became an instrument for the exercise of its sovereignty. Its absolute power was such that this consciousness was not merely judgement, but also a punishment in and of itself. 'To know of a case' did not simply mean to instruct and to judge, but also to make public, and to make manifest in such a manner that the glaring spotlight of its own judgement was itself a punishment. In this consciousness, judgement and the execution of the sentence were unified through the ideal, instantaneous act of the gaze. Knowledge, in the organised game of scandal, was the totality of the judgement.

In his *Theory of Criminal Laws*, Brissot showed that scandal was the ideal punishment, always proportional to the crime, free of any physical stigma, and instantly adequate to the demands of moral consciousness. He took up again the old distinction between sin, which was an offence against the divine order, only punishable by God, crime, which was an act committed against one's fellow man, to be rewarded with punishment, and vice, 'a disorder that relates only to the self', which was to be punished with

shame.[42] Because it was more interior, vice was also more primitive: it was crime itself, but before its accomplishment, at its roots in the human heart. Before they broke the law, criminals always infringed the silent rules present in the conscience of a man:

> Vices are to morality as crime is to law, and vice is invariably the father of crime: it is a race of monsters which, like the terrifying genealogy of sins described by Milton, seem to infinitely reproduce each other. I see a poor unfortunate on the scaffold, about to pass over to the other side ... why is he there? Go back up the chain of his actions, and you will invariably discover that the first link was a violation of the sacred limit of morality.[43]

If crime was to be avoided, it was not through a reinforcement of the law or by the introduction of stiffer sentences, but rather by making morality more imperious, and enforcing its rules with greater force, so that scandal was the natural effect of the denunciation of vice. Such punishments seem ineffective, and were truly such in tyrannical states, where the vigilance of consciences and scandal produced nothing but hypocrisy, 'because the sinew of public opinion in such places has lost its mettle, and because, crucially, good morality is not as essential and integral a part of monarchy as it is in a republic'.[44] But when morality formed the substance of the State, and public opinion was the most solid link in the chain that held society together, then scandal became the most redoubtable form of alienation. Through it, men irreparably became outsiders to all that was most essential in society, and punishment, rather than keeping the particular character of a reparation, became a universal, present in the conscience of each man and carried out by the will of all:

> Legislators who desire to stamp out crime, take note: look at the road taken by criminals, mark the first wrong turn they take, and you shall see that it is the infringement of good morals. Block off that turning, and you will have to resort to punishment far less often.[45]

Scandal thus becomes a form of punishment that is doubly ideal, in that it is immediately fitting to the offence, and also a means of preventing it from taking a criminal form.

What confinement deliberately locked away in the shadows, the revolutionary consciousness was eager to offer to the public gaze, as manifestation became the essence of punishment. All the values relative to secrets and scandal were therefore reversed: the obscure depths of punishment that enveloped any fault were replaced with an immediately perceptible public admonition, sanctioning actions that lurked deep in the hearts of men, to prevent similar actions from rising to the surface. In a strange manner, the revolutionary consciousness rediscovered the ancient value of public punishments, which were akin to an exaltation of the dark power of unreason.[46] In appearance only: the idea was no longer to show senselessness to the world, but simply to place immorality before a scandalised public conscience.

Here a new psychology was being born, which changed the essential meaning of madness, and proposed a new description of the relations between man and the hidden forms of unreason. It is strange that the psychology of crime, in its most rudimentary aspects – or at least the desire to go back to its origins in the hearts of men – was not born of any humanisation of justice, but out of a supplementary requirement of morality, a sort of moral conversion by the state itself, and a refinement of various forms of indignation. Above all, this new psychology was a sort of reverse image of classical justice. All that was previously concealed was now converted into a manifest truth. Justice was to bear witness to those elements which, until now, had previously never had witnesses at all. As a consequence, psychology and the knowledge of all that was most interior to men were born from the fact that public conscience had been elected to the status of universal judge, as an immediately valid form of reason and morality for judging men. Psychological interiority was constituted on the basis of the exteriority of scandalised conscience. All that which had previously made up the content of the old classical unreason could now be taken up in these new forms of psychological knowledge. That world, which had been kept at an inviolable distance, suddenly became familiar to everyday conscience, since it was to be its judge; and it spread itself across the surface of a psychology that was entirely the product of the least examined and most immediate forms of morality.

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These changes were institutionalised in the great reform of criminal justice. The jury was to represent the public conscience, and its ideal reign over all

of man's secret, inhuman powers. The rule of public debate gave the sovereignty which jurors were momentarily delegated to hold an almost infinite extension: the whole body of the nation judged through them, and found itself involved in a debate with the different forms of violence, profanation and unreason that confinement had long kept out of sight. And by a paradoxical movement, ongoing even today, as the judging institution claimed greater universality for the foundation of its justice, and substituted the general norm of human rights and obligations for the particular rules of case law, and as the truth of its judgements found confirmation in a certain public consciousness, crime became interiorised, and its meaning became ever more private. Criminality lost the absolute meaning and unity that it had previously possessed in its finished gestures, in the offences that were committed, and was divided according to two measurements that were to become ever more irreducible with the passing of time: the idea of a punishment adjusted to fit the crime – a measurement borrowed from the norms of the public conscience, the requirements of scandal and the rules of the judicial attitude that assimilated punishments and manifestation; and that which defined the link between a fault and its origins – a measurement that was of the order of knowledge, and of secret, individual assignations. This dissociation suffices to prove, if proof were needed, that psychology, as knowledge of the individual, should historically be considered in a fundamental relationship with the forms of judgement that were proffered by the public conscience. The psychology of individuals would not have been possible without this entire reorganisation of scandal in the social conscience. Knowledge about the concatenations of heredity, the past and motivations only became possible when fault and crime ceased having intrinsic value and were no longer seen purely in relation to themselves, but took their meaning instead from the universal gaze of the bourgeois conscience. In this schism between scandal and secret, crime lost its real density, and took its place in a world that was half-public, half-private. To the extent that it belonged to a private world, it was error, delirium, pure imagination and therefore inexistence; and to the extent that it belonged to a public world, it manifested inhumanity and insanity, that in which the consciousness of the public was unable to recognise itself, that which was not founded in it, and which therefore had no right to exist. In both cases, crime became unreal, and in the non-being that it manifested, it discovered its own profound connection to madness.

Perhaps classical confinement had already been the sign that this relation was sealed long before. Had it also not turned any weakness of the mind and errant behaviour, any violence of word and gesture into the same monotony, enveloping them in the massive apprehension of unreason? But it was not to give them a common psychology that would denounce the same mechanism of madness in both. Neutralisation was there sought as an effect. Non-existence was now determined as an origin. And through a phenomenon of recurrence, what was obtained in confinement as a consequence was rediscovered as a principle of assimilation between madness and crime. The geographical proximity to which they were constrained in order to reduce them became a genealogical proximity in non-being.

This change is already perceptible in the first case of a crime of passion to be heard in France before a jury in a public sitting. Historians of psychology usually pay relatively little attention to this type of event, but anyone who wishes to grasp the meaning of the world of psychology that opened up to man at the end of the eighteenth century, where men have subsequently sought in ever greater depth their own truths, to the point of now trying to decipher there everything down to the last word, and anyone who wishes to know what psychology is, not as a body of knowledge but as fact and cultural expression unique to the modern world, does well to examine this trial and the manner in which it was conducted, as it is as important as the measurement of thresholds or theories of memory. A whole new relationship between man and his truth was beginning to be formulated here.

To situate it exactly, it can be compared to any other case of crime and madness that had been judged in the preceding years. The Bourgeois case, from the time during which Joly de Fleury was Minister of Justice, is typical. Bourgeois had attempted to kill a woman who refused to give him some money.[47] He was arrested, and his family immediately requested that 'it be authorised to instigate an inquiry, to prove that he had constantly shown signs of madness and dissipation, in the hope that as a consequence he would either be locked up or sent to the colonies'. Witnesses were ready to confirm that on various occasions the accused had had 'the wild look and bearing of a madman', and that he had often been 'excessively garrulous', generally giving the impression of a man who was 'losing his wits'. The procurator fiscal was inclined to grant the family's request, not out of consideration for the state of the accused, but out of respect for the honour and misery of the family:

'It is at the request of this much wronged honest family', he wrote to Joly de Fleury,

> who have only slender means, and who have six children of tender age left by Bourgeois who is now reduced to a state of atrocious poverty, that I have the honour to send your Highness the enclosed copy, so that under your protection the family might be authorised to have this man locked up, an individual who could bring dishonour upon them through the mad conduct that he has all too often demonstrated for some years now.

Joly de Fleury replied that the trial should be carried out in full, in compliance with the procedure, and that even if the madness was self-evident, confinement should never impede justice from following its course, nor prevent a sentence from being pronounced; but that part of the procedure should be an inquiry into the madness, and the accused should be 'heard and interrogated in the presence of the reporting counsel, that he should be heard and visited by the physician and surgeon of the court, in the presence of one of his deputies'. The trial took place, and on 1 March 1783 the Tournelle criminal court decreed that 'Bourgeois should be taken away to the gaol in Bicêtre, to be detained there, and to be fed, treated and given the same medication as the other insane.' After a short stay amongst the alienated, it was noted that he showed few signs of insanity, and as some form of simulation was then suspected, he was moved to a cell. Some time later he asked to return among the insane, and as he showed no signs of violence the request was granted. He was then employed to do tasks that 'brought him a minimum of comfort'. He petitioned the governor to be allowed to leave. 'The president of the courts replied that his detention was a favour, and that in any case his sentence was *ad omnia citra mortem* – for the rest of his days.'

Here we come to an essential point: being sentenced to stay with the insane was not a sign that the innocence of the criminal was recognised, but remained, simply, a favour. Which is to say that the recognition of madness, even if it was established in the course of a trial, did not form an integral part of the judgement: it was superimposed upon it, modifying the consequences, but not affecting its essential nature. The meaning of the crime, its gravity, and its absolute value as an act all remained intact; madness, even when recognised by doctors, did not penetrate to the heart of the act, making it 'any less real'; the crime

remained what it was, but madness allowed the perpetrator to benefit from an attenuated form of punishment. What then came into being, in punishment, was a complex, reversible structure, a sort of oscillating sentence: if a criminal showed no obvious signs of madness, he went from the insane to the common prisoners; but if, in the cells, he showed himself to be reasonable, gave no sign that he was violent, and if his good behaviour seemed to be a step towards a pardon for his crime, then he was placed among the insane, whose regime was less harsh. Violence at the heart of the act was in turn that which indicated madness and that which justified a rigorous punishment. Alienation and crime both revolved around that unstable theme, in a confused mixture of complementarity, proximity and exclusion. But in any case the relation remained of an external nature. What was yet to be discovered, and would be formulated precisely in 1792 for the first time, was by contrast an interior relation where all the different meanings of crime began to change, becoming caught up in a system of interrogation which still has no clear answers even today.

In an appeal court in 1792, a lawyer named Bellart was called upon to defend a 52-year-old labourer named Gras who had been sentenced to death for murdering his mistress, whom he had discovered in *flagrante delicto*. For the first time, a crime of passion was to be heard at public trial before a jury, and for the first time the great debate between crime and alienation came out into the full light of day, as the public consciousness sought to establish a limit between the assignation of psychological determination and criminal responsibility. Bellart's defence brought no new knowledge to the domain of the sciences of the soul and the heart, but did more – it delineated a whole new space in which that knowledge might take meaning, and discovered one of the operations by means of which psychology in Western culture became the truth about man.

The first thing to be noted about Bellart's text is the disentanglement of psychology from the literary and moral mythology of passion, which had served it both as norm and truth throughout the eighteenth century. For the first time, the truth of passion ceased to coincide with the ethic of true passions. It was known that love had a certain moral truth, made up of verisimilitude, spontaneity and naturalness, which confusingly made up the psychological law of its genesis and the form of its validity. In the eighteenth century, no sensitive soul could fail to understand or acquit des Grieux:[48] if, instead of a 52-year-old man accused of killing a mistress of

doubtful trustworthiness in a fit of jealousy, one pictured 'a young man in the full force of his age, a shining example in his beauty and his passions, then most people would be on his side . . . love belongs to the young'.[49] But beyond that form of love, which was immediately recognised by moral sensibility, there was another form, which independently of beauty and youth, could spring into being and live long in people's hearts. Its truth was to be without verisimilitude, its nature to be against nature; unlike the first form, it was not linked to man's seasons, and it was not 'the handmaid of nature, created to serve her ends and to give existence'. While the harmony of the first meant that it was promised happiness, the latter only thrived on suffering: one was 'the delights of youth, and the consolation of later years', the other was too often 'the torment of old age'.[50] The text of the passions, which the eighteenth century had indiscriminately deciphered in terms of psychology and morality, was now dissociated, and shared between two different forms of truth, revealing two different systems of natural belonging. A psychology emerged whose concern was no longer sensibility but knowledge alone, a psychology that spoke of a human nature where the figures of truth were no longer forms of moral validity.

This love no longer held in check by the wisdom of nature is entirely in thrall to its own excess: it is the rage of an empty heart, the absolute game of a passion without object; its attachment is indifferent to the truth of the love object, so violently is it controlled by the movements of its own imagination. 'It lives above all in the human breast, jealous and furious like the human heart.' This self-absorbed rage is both love as a form of naked truth, and madness in the solitude of its illusions. There comes a time when passion becomes unhinged by this excessive conformity to its mechanical truth, so much so that its momentum drags it into a state of delirium. And consequently, by the equating of a violent gesture and the violence of passion, and by the identification of some psychological truth in a pure state, it is placed in a world of blindness, illusion and insanity, which all serve to bypass its criminal reality. What Bellart unveiled for the first time in his pleading was the now fundamental relationship that establishes in any human gesture an inverse proportion between its truth and its reality. The truth of any form of behaviour necessarily makes it unreal, and has an obscure tendency to suggest that its ultimate, most secret form lies beyond any possible analysis, in the realm of madness. In the end, all that remains of Gras' murderous act is an empty gesture, accomplished

'by a hand which alone was guilty', and 'an unfortunately fatal chain of events' that took place 'in the absence of reason, in the torment of an irresistible passion'.[51] When man is liberated from all the moral myths that tended to hold his truth, what becomes apparent is that the truth of this unalienated truth is nothing other than alienation itself.

From this point onwards, what was understood by phrases like 'the psychological truth of man' took over the function and meanings that had long been the domain of unreason; and man discovered within himself, at the furthest point of his solitude, where happiness, verisimilitude and morality never reached, the age-old powers that had been banished by the classical age, and exiled on the most distant margins of society. Unreason was turned into an object by force, in what was most interior, most subjective and deepest in man. That which had so long been a manifestation of guilt now became innocence and secrecy. Unreason, which had so long exalted the forms of error where men abolished their truth, became, beyond appearances and beyond reality itself, the purest form of truth. Captured in the human heart, buried deep within it, madness could formulate all that which was most originally true in man. What then began was a slow process that has resulted today in one of the major contradictions in our moral life: anything that can be formulated as a truth about man is considered to be a form of irresponsibility, and of that innocence that has always been, in Western law, proper to madness in its ultimate degree:

> If, at the moment during which Gras killed the widow Lefèvre, he was so totally under the influence of some absorbing passion that he no longer knew what he was doing, and was therefore incapable of allowing himself to be guided by reason, then it is impossible to condemn him to death.[52]

The whole process of the calling into question of punishment, judgement, and the meaning of crime by a psychology that secretly places the innocence of madness at the heart of any form of truth that can be formulated about man was already present in a virtual form in Bellart's defence.

The word 'innocence' should not be understood here in the absolute sense. What is at stake is not a liberation of the psychological from the moral, but rather a readjustment in their equilibrium. Psychological truth only brought innocence in a sense that was extremely precise. However

much it is irresponsible, this 'love that lived principally in the heart' had to be more than simply a psychological mechanism – it also had to be an indication of a different morality, a more rarefied form of morality itself. When good-looking young men in the prime of life are deceived by their mistresses, they go off and find a new one. Another man in Gras' position 'might have laughed off her infidelity by repaying the compliment'. But the passion of the accused lived only for itself – it could accept no infidelity, and the idea of change was impossible. 'Despairingly, Gras saw the last heart over which he could hope to reign disappear, and all his actions carried the imprint of that despair.'[53] He was absolutely faithful, and the blind nature of his love led him to a rare, imperious and tyrannical form of virtue that it was not possible to condemn. Must one be severe with fidelity when one is indulgent with inconstancy? When Bellart asked that his client be spared capital punishment, it was in the name of a virtue that was perhaps not so highly regarded in the eighteenth century, but had to be honoured now if people wanted to return to the virtues of earlier times.

This region of madness and frenzy where the criminal act came into being only rendered it innocent to the extent that it was not rigorously neutral morally, but rather played a role that was precise: it exalted a value that society recognised, while being unable to give it any currency. Marriage was prescribed, but society was obliged to turn a blind eye to infidelity. Madness could have the power of an excuse if it was a manifestation of jealousy, obstinacy or fidelity – even when it resulted in vengeance. Psychology was to be instilled inside guilty consciences, in the play between the values that society recognised and those it demanded. It was then and only then that the reality of a crime could be dissolved, and rendered innocent through a Quixotic valorisation of impracticable virtues.

Crime could very well be determined by the laws of psychology and the mechanisms of the heart, but if there was no indication of these inaccessible values, it warranted no indulgence, and revealed nothing but vice, perversion and wickedness. Bellart was careful to establish 'a clear distinction between crimes: some are vile, the work of a soul made of mud, like theft', and bourgeois society would obviously never find any value in such crimes, not even in an idealised form. They were to be linked to other forms of behaviour, more atrocious still, which announced 'a soul with a canker of wickedness, like assassination or premeditated murder'. But other crimes by contrast revealed 'a passionate, fiery soul,

the sort to be easily carried away, like the act carried out by Gras'.[54] The degree of determination that lay behind an act did not thus fix the responsibility of the person who carried it out; on the contrary, the more distant the origins of the act, the more deeply rooted it appeared to be in 'a soul made of mud', the more guilty it became, but if it was spontaneous, carried out as though by surprise, by a pure movement of the heart towards a solitary, absurd form of heroism, then it deserved a lighter sanction. One could be guilty of having been given a perverse nature or a vicious education, but one was innocent in that immediate, violent passage from one form of morality to the other, i.e. from a common form of morality that was rarely acknowledged to an exalted form of morality that most refuse, for the greater good of others.

> Anyone who had a healthy education in his youth, and has had the good fortune to preserve those principles into a later age, should be able to tell himself that no crime like those of the first group [the cankerous, those with 'a soul of mud'] will ever be a stain on his life. But what man would be foolhardy enough to dare to claim that he would never act in the second sense, in the explosion of a great passion? Who can be certain that he will never, in the exaltation of fury or despair, soil his hands with blood, and perhaps spill the blood he considers most precious?[55]

What now came into being was a new division of madness. On the one hand was madness abandoned to the madness of its perversion, which no determinism could ever hope to excuse; on the other was a form of madness that was heroic in nature, the inverse yet complementary image of bourgeois values. That one, and that one alone, would slowly be allowed the right to belong to reason, or rather to the intermittences of reason; it was in that form of reason that responsibility could be diminished, and crime became more human and less punishable. If it was capable of being explained, that was because it was found to be secretly penetrated by moral impulses in which people recognised themselves. But there was also the other side of alienation, to which Royer-Collard was doubtless referring in his famous letter to Fouché, when he mentioned 'the madness of vice'. That madness was less than madness, as it was a total stranger to the world of morality, and its delirium spoke of nothing but evil. And while the first form of madness approached reason, mingled with it, and could be understood on its basis, the other was cast out into

the external darkness; and it was there that the strange notions that succeeded one another in the course of the nineteenth century had their origins – the idea of moral madness, of degeneracy, of natural born criminals and perversion. These were the 'bad madnesses' that the modern consciousness could not assimilate, and which formed the irreducible residue of unreason, against which the only defence was an entirely negative one, in the form of refusal and absolute condemnation.

In the first great criminal trials that were held in public during the Revolutionary period, the whole ancient world of madness was once again brought out into the open on an almost daily basis. But the norms of that experience did not allow it to bear its full weight, and all that the sixteenth century had accepted into the prolix totality of an imaginary world, the nineteenth century was to divide according to the rules of moral perception: it was to recognise two forms of madness, good and bad – one whose confused presence was accepted on the margins of reason, in the play between morality and bad conscience, and responsibility and innocence, and the other that bore the full weight of the ancient anathema, and of irreparable offence.

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The destruction of confinement was more brutal in France than anywhere else. For the few short years that preceded Pinel's reforms, the places to which madness was banished and the process of elaboration that transformed them were all out in the open. A complex work is then visible, whose different aspects we are attempting to describe here.

At first sight, the process seems to be a sort of 'realisation' [*prise de conscience*], as if madness was at last designated within a problematic proper to it. But this new realisation must be perceived in the totality of its meaning: it was less a sudden discovery than a long investment, as though in this 'realisation' the *capture* was more important than the novelty of the *illumination*. One particular historically situated form of consciousness took hold of madness, and mastered its meaning. If that new consciousness seemed to restore madness both to its liberty and to a positive truth, that was not simply owing to the disappearance of the ancient constraints, but also thanks to the equilibrium that was established between two series of positive processes. The first was of uncovering, separation, and in a sense, liberation; the second was the hasty construction of new structures

of protection that allowed reason to free itself and become self-reliant, just as it was discovering madness in an immediate proximity. These two sets were not opposed, and were more than complementary; they were the same thing – the coherent unity of a gesture through which *madness was offered to knowledge in a structure that was alienating from the very first.*

And it was here that the conditions of the classical experience of madness changed definitively. The table below summarises these concrete categories, in the play of their apparent opposition:

Forms of liberation	Structures of protection
1 The suppression of a form of confinement that confused madness with all the other forms of unreason.	1 The designating for madness of a form of confinement that was no longer a place of exclusion but the privileged place where it was to regain its own truth.
2 The constitution of an asylum whose sole purpose was medical in nature.	2 The capture of madness by an inviolable space that was to be a place of manifestation and a space of cure.
3 The acquisition by madness of the right of expression, to be heard and to speak in its own name.	3 The elaboration around and above madness of a sort of absolute subject who was a pure gaze, conferring on madness the status of pure object.
4 The introduction of madness into the psychological subject as the everyday truth of passion, violence and crime.	4 The insertion of madness into a non-coherent world of values, and into the games of bad conscience.
5 The recognition of madness in its role as psychological truth, as a determinism beyond responsibility.	5 The dividing up of the different forms of madness according to the dichotomous requirements of moral judgement.

This double movement of liberation and enslavement forms the secret foundations of the modern experience of madness.

We easily believe that the objectivity we recognise in different forms of mental illness is freely offered to our knowledge as a truth that has been liberated at last. In fact, this truth is only ever available to those who are protected from it. The knowledge of madness supposes in the person who holds it an ability to distance the self from it, and to remain aloof from its dangers and its charms, a certain manner of not being mad. The historical arrival of psychiatric positivism is only linked to the promotion of knowledge in a secondary manner: at its origin, it is the fixing of a particular mode of being outside madness, a certain consciousness of non-madness that becomes a concrete situation for the subject of knowledge, the solid basis from which it is possible to know madness.

If we wish to know what happened in the course of this rapid mutation which, in the space of a few years, brought to the surface of the European world a new knowledge and new treatments for madness, there is little point in wondering what was added to the sum of previous knowledge. Tuke was not a doctor, Pinel was not a psychiatrist, and they both probably knew little more than Tissot or Cullen. What had changed, and changed quite suddenly, was the consciousness of not being mad – a consciousness which since the middle of the eighteenth century had found itself confronted once again with madness in its most vigorous forms, caught in their slow ascent, soon to be jostled with the collapse of confinement. What happened during the years that preceded and immediately followed the Revolution was a new, sudden emergence of that consciousness.

It might be imagined that this was a purely negative phenomenon, but looked at close up it reveals itself to be quite different. It could even be described as the first and the only *positive* phenomenon that accompanied the arrival of *positivism*. The disengagement was only made possible by the erection of structures of protection, designed and built successively by Colombier, Tenon, Cabanis and Bellart. And the solidity of their structures was such that they survive more or less unchanged today, even despite all the efforts of Freudian research. In the classical age, the manner of not being mad was double: it was divided between an immediate, daily apprehension of difference, and a system of exclusion that mixed madness with a whole range of other perils. That classic consciousness of unreason was therefore entirely occupied by a tension between this inner evidence that was never contested, and a more contentious arbitrary

division in the social fabric. But when these two forms of experience finally joined together, and the system of social protection found itself interiorised into the forms of consciousness, and when the madness was recognised through the movement of separating from it, and measuring this distance from it in the concrete reality of institutions, the eighteenth-century tension suddenly vanished. Forms of recognition and structures of protection found themselves superimposed in a consciousness of not being mad that was henceforth sovereign. This possibility of grasping madness as something both known and mastered at a stroke, in one single act of consciousness, was at the heart of the positivist experience of mental illness. And until that possibility becomes impossible once more in a new liberation of knowledge, madness will remain for us what it was already becoming for Pinel and Tuke, and will remain mired in its age of positivity.

From this point onwards, madness was something other than an object to be feared, or an indefinitely renewed theme for scepticism. It became an object. But one with a quite singular status. In the very movement that objectified it, it became the first objectifying form, and the means by which man could have an objective hold on himself. In earlier times, madness had signified a vertiginous moment of dazzlement, the instant in which, being too bright, a light began to darken. Now that it was a thing exposed to knowledge – that which was most interior to man, but also that which was most exposed to the gaze of others – it operated as a great structure of transparency. This is not to say that knowledge entirely clarified it, but that starting from madness, and the status of object that had been conferred upon it, in theory at least, man could become entirely transparent to scientific investigation. It was no accident, nor the effect of a simple historical slippage, that the nineteenth century began by investigating the pathology of memory, of the will and of personality, to find out the truth of memories, volition and the individual. The order of that research remains profoundly faithful to the structures that had been elaborated at the end of the eighteenth century, which had made madness the first great figure of the objectification of man.

In the great theme of a positive knowledge of human beings, madness always occupied an uncomfortable position: it was at once objectified and objectifying, offered and held back, content and condition. For the thought of the nineteenth century, and indeed to us today, it has the status of an enigmatic thing: it may for the moment in fact be inaccessible in the

totality of its truth, yet we do not doubt that one day it will split open and deliver up its secrets to our knowledge. Yet this is merely an assumption and a neglect of essential truths. This reticence that we believe to be transitory in fact camouflages the fundamental retreat of madness to a region that extends beyond the frontiers of what man can possibly know. The possibility of a positive science of man requires that somewhere, in a far distant corner, there is a space reserved for madness, in which and from which all of human existence can fall into objectivity. In its essential enigma, madness watches, always promised to a form of knowledge that will enclose it in its entirety, but always just out of reach, as it was madness that first offered objective knowledge a grasp of man. For man, the eventuality of being mad and the possibility of being an object came together in the late eighteenth century, and that meeting led directly and unambiguously (there is no chance coincidence in the dates here) to the postulates of positive psychiatry and the themes of an objective science of man.

In the work of Tenon, Cabanis, and Bellart, that conjunction, which is so essential for modern culture, only operated in the order of thought. It only became a concrete situation through Pinel and Tuke: in the asylums that they founded, which took up where the great projects for reform had left off, the danger of being mad was identified forcibly in every man, in the smallest gestures of their daily life, with the necessity to be an object. Positivism then was no longer a merely theoretical project, but the stigmata of alienated existence.

The status of object was now to be imposed immediately on any individual recognised as alienated: alienation was suddenly deposited as a secret truth at the heart of all objective knowledge of man.

IV

BIRTH OF THE ASYLUM

We know the images. They are familiar from all histories of psychiatry, where their function is to illustrate that happy age when madness was at last recognised and treated according to a truth to which everyone had been blind for too long.

> The Respectable Society of Quakers . . . has been desirous of securing to those of its members, who should have the unhappiness to lose their reason, without possessing a fortune adequate to have recourse to expensive establishments, all the resources of art, and all the comforts of life, compatible with their situation. A voluntary subscription furnished the funds; and, about two years since, an establishment, which appears to unite many advantages, with all possible economy, was founded near the city of York.
>
> If the mind shrinks for a moment at the aspect of this terrible disease, which seems calculated to humble the reason of man; it must afterwards feel pleasing emotions, in considering all that an ingenious benevolence has been able to invent, to cure and comfort the patients afflicted with this malady.
>
> This house is situated a mile from York, in the midst of a fertile and cheerful country; it presents not the idea of a prison, but rather that of a

> large rural farm. It is surrounded by a garden. There is no bar or grating to the windows.[1]

The story of the deliverance of the alienated of Bicêtre is famous, with the decision taken to remove the chains from the prisoners in the cells, Couthon visiting the hospital to check that it was harbouring no suspects, and Pinel bravely going out to meet him, while everyone trembled at the sight of this 'invalid carried in men's arms'.[2] The confrontation between the wise, firm philanthropist and the paralytic monster:

> Pinel immediately led him to the section for the raving, where the view of the cells disturbed him considerably. He desired to question all the patients, but received nothing but abuse and expletives from the majority of them. There was no point in pursuing the enquiry any further. He turned to Pinel: 'So, citizen, are you not mad too, wishing to unchain such animals?' Pinel answered calmly: 'Citizen, I am convinced that these alienated are only so intractable because they are deprived of air and liberty.' 'Then do as you will, although I fear that you may become a victim of your own presumption.' And with that, Couthon was carried back to his carriage. His departure was a great relief, and everyone breathed again. The great philanthropist set to work at once.[3]

These are images, at least in so far as each of these stories takes the essential element of its power from imaginary forms: the patriarchal calm of Tuke's domain, where the passions of the heart and the disorders of the spirit are slowly appeased, and the lucid firmness of Pinel, who masters with a single word and a single gesture the twin animal furies that roar and watch him warily, and the wisdom that allowed him to recognise which was the greater danger between the raving mad and the bloodthirsty deputy of the Convention. Such images echo down the ages, carrying the full weight of legend.

It would serve little purpose to dispute them, as we have too few documents that are more trustworthy at our disposal. And then they are too dense in their naivety not to reveal much of what they do not say. In their surprising depth, one would need to identify the concrete situation that they conceal, the mythical values that they pass off as the truth, and finally the real process that took place, of which they only provide a symbolic translation.

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First of all, Tuke was a Quaker, an active member of one of the innumerable 'Societies of Friends' that sprang up in England during the late seventeenth century.

English legislation, as we saw, increasingly favoured private initiatives in the domain of assistance in the latter half of the eighteenth century.[4] Mutual associations appeared, and friendly societies prospered. For reasons that were both economic and religious, the Quakers had played this role for a century and half, initially against the government's will. 'We don't give money to men dressed in black to help our poor, bury our dead, or to preach to the faithful. These holy duties are too precious to be shifted onto others', wrote Voltaire in his *Lettres Philosophiques*.[5] In the new conditions that prevailed in the late eighteenth century, a law was put through Parliament in 1793 'For the Encouragement and Relief of Friendly Societies'.[6] The societies in question were associations, whose model and often inspiration were those of the Quakers, based on a system of contributions and donations collected together in a mutual fund and used for members who fell into need, sickness or infirmity. The text of the law recognised that 'it is likely to be attended with very beneficial effects, by providing the happiness of individuals, and at the same time diminishing the public burthens'. Importantly, members of such societies were immune to 'Removal', the process by which a parish could and should get rid of any indigent or sick pauper who was not native to the area, sending them back to their parish of origin. It should be noted that Removal, which was the result of a clause in the Settlement Act, was abolished a few years later, in 1795, after which date parishes were obliged to take care of any sick pauper found in the region, if there was a risk that removal might present a further danger to his health.[7] Such was the juridical framework of the singular conflict that resulted in the creation of the Retreat.

It may be surmised that Quakers had long been particularly vigilant about care and assistance to the insane. From the very beginning, they had had dealings with houses of confinement. In 1649, George Fox and another of his companions had been sent, by order of a judge, to Darby prison, to be whipped and locked up for six months as blasphemers.[8] In Holland, Quakers were locked up in the Rotterdam hospital on several occasions.[9] And perhaps because he had noted down something that he had heard in their company, or because he ascribed to them a commonly held opinion concerning their beliefs, Voltaire has his Quaker say in the

Lettres Philosophiques that the breath that inspired them was not always the Word of God, but sometimes the senseless verbiage of unreason: 'We cannot tell whether a man who rises to speak will be inspired by the Spirit or by folly.'[10] In any case, the Quakers, like many religious sects in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, found themselves caught up in the great debate between religious experience and unreason.[11] To outsiders, and perhaps even in their own eyes, some forms of that experience were situated in the grey area that lay between sense and madness, and decisions were constantly required about which was which, while they were continually forced to confront the constant accusations of insanity that were made against them. This led quite understandably to the slightly guarded interest that the Societies of Friends took in the treatment of the mad in the houses of confinement.

In 1791, 'a female of the Society of Friends was placed at an establishment for insane persons in the vicinity of the City of York'. Her family, who lived far away, asked the Friends to look after her fate. But the administration of the asylum refused any visiting rights, on the pretext that the patient's condition would not permit it. The woman died a few weeks later.

> The circumstance was affecting, and naturally excited reflections on the situation of insane persons, and on the probable improvements which might be adopted in establishments of this nature. In particular, it was conceived that peculiar advantage would be derived to the Society of Friends, by having an Institution of this kind under their own care, in which a milder and more appropriate system of treatment, than usually practised, might be adopted.[12]

That was how Samuel Tuke presented the story, twenty years after the events took place.

It is quite possible that this was merely one of numerous incidents provoked by the Settlement Act. If a person without means fell ill far from home, the law required that the person be sent home. But their condition, and perhaps the cost of transportation often meant that they were forced to stay. This partly illegal situation could only be justified by the immediate danger to health, and in this particular case it must have been resolved by a confinement order signed by a Justice of the Peace. But besides the asylum to which the patient was sentenced, no charitable

organisation other than one in the patient's parish of origin had the right to intervene. In other words, the poor who fell seriously ill outside their parish found themselves at the mercy of the arbitrariness of a confinement that nothing could control. It was this situation that the friendly societies were protesting against when they demanded the right to care for any of their brethren who fell sick when away from home, regardless of the parish of origin, a right they obtained with the 1793 law, two years after the events described by Samuel Tuke. This project for a private, collective house destined for the insane should thus be understood as one of the extremely numerous protests against the old legislation regarding the poor and the sick. The chronology makes that clear, even if Tuke is careful not to stress it, in his concern to lay all the merits of the enterprise at the door of private generosity. In 1791, the York Quakers came up with their project, and in early 1793 a law came into force encouraging the growth of friendly societies, which exempted them from Removal. The responsibility for assistance thus moved from the parish to private enterprise. Also in 1793, the York Quakers launched the subscription, and voted in the regulations of the society. Land was acquired the following year. The Settlement Act was repealed in 1795, and work began on the construction of the Retreat, which opened in 1796. Tuke's enterprise fits neatly into the great legal reorganisation of assistance in the late eighteenth century, a series of measures that allowed the bourgeois State to invent, for its own requirements, private welfare.

The event in France that sparked the liberation of those 'in chains at Bicêtre' is of a different nature, and the historical circumstances are considerably more difficult to determine. The law of 1790 had planned the creation of large hospitals for the insane, but by 1793 none had yet materialised. Bicêtre had been converted into a '*Maison des pauvres*' and, as had been the case before the Revolution, contained a confused mixture of the poor, the old, the criminal and the mad. That traditional population was supplemented by all those placed there by the Revolution. First of all there were the political prisoners. On 28 Brumaire Year III, i.e. during Pinel's time there, Piersin, who had charge of the mad at Bicêtre, wrote to the Civil Administration Commission, saying: 'I still have in my employ here even people who are detained for the Revolutionary Tribunal'.[13] There were also suspects who were in hiding. Like the Belhomme pension, and the Douai and Vernet houses, Bicêtre too was used as a refuge for suspects.[14] Under the Restoration, when it became

important to forget the fact that Pinel had been the physician at Bicêtre under the Terror, he was credited with having protected aristocrats and priests:

> Pinel was the physician at Bicêtre during those dark days when men came asking for its tribute to death. The Terror had filled the house with priests and émigrés who had returned. Mr Pinel opposed the extradition of a great number of them, claiming that they had lost their wits. The requests were repeated, and he redoubled his opposition; his will was soon of such strength that it impressed the executioners, and the energy of this normally quiet, even-tempered man saved the life of many victims, including a prelate who currently occupies one of the highest positions in France.[15]

But another factor should also be borne in mind: during the Revolution, Bicêtre did become the main centre for the hospitalisation of the insane. From the earliest attempts to apply the 1790 law, the mad who had been freed from the gaols were sent there, as were the alienated patients who were too numerous at the Hôtel-Dieu.[16] So much so that by force of circumstance rather than as part of any great scheme Bicêtre inherited the medical function that had subsisted through the classical age, without ever being confused with confinement, and had made the Hôtel-Dieu the only Parisian hospital where any systematic attempts were made to cure the mad. What the Hôtel-Dieu had done uninterruptedly since the Middle Ages, Bicêtre was now ordered to do, in the framework of a form of confinement that was more confused than ever, and for the first time it became a hospital where the alienated received treatment until they were cured:

> Since the Revolution, the administration of public establishments only confines the mad in free hospices for the period during which they are judged to be harmful and a menace to society, so they only stay so long as they are ill, and as soon as it becomes apparent that a cure has been effected, they are sent back to the bosom of their families or friends. The proof of this is the large number who have left after recovering their wits, even including some who had been confined for life by the previous Parliament. The current administration considers it its duty to lock up only the mad who are unable to enjoy their liberty.[17]

The medical function was clearly introduced to Bicêtre, and a general revision of all the confinements for madness that had been decreed in the past was now begun.[18] And for the first time in the history of the General Hospital, in the infirmaries of Bicêtre, a man who already had a certain reputation for being well versed in the sicknesses of the mind was appointed head physician.[19] Pinel's appointment in itself is proof that the presence of the mad in Bicêtre had *already* become a medical problem.

But there is no doubt that it was also something of a political problem. The certainty that there were innocents confined together with the guilty, and that there were men of reason locked up among the insane, had long been part of the mythology of the Revolution:

> Bicêtre is sure to contain criminals, brigands, and ferocious men . . . but it is doubtless also home to a host of victims of arbitrary power, of the tyranny of families and of paternal despotism . . . the cells conceal men, our brothers and equals, to whom the air is refused, and who see no light other than through narrow skylights.[20]

Bicêtre, the prison of innocence, came to haunt the public imagination as the Bastille had done before:

> During the massacre of the prisons, brigands broke into the hospice at Bicêtre, on the pretext of delivering some of the innocent victims of the ancient tyranny that had sought to mix them with the insane. Armed, they went from cell to cell, interrogating the inmates and leaving them there if their alienation was plain. But one of the detainees in chains caught their attention on account of the clarity of his reasoning and the bitterness of his complaints. Was it not odious that he had been bound in chains, and locked up with the other inmates? The brigands became quite incensed, and they started threatening the hospital controller, who was forced to account for his actions.[21]

Under the Convention, a new fear emerged. Bicêtre was still an immense reservoir of fears, but now it was seen as the haunt of suspects – aristocrats dressed as paupers who had taken refuge there, and scheming agents from abroad who merely simulated insanity. The concern was still with denouncing madness so that innocence appeared, but now also while unmasking duplicity. In the great fear associated with Bicêtre

throughout the Revolutionary period, which turned it into a dark, menacing force on the outskirts of the city where the Enemy was inextricably mixed with unreason, madness had two alienating roles to play. It alienated anyone who had been wrongly adjudged to be mad, but it could also alienate those who thought they were protected against its grip. It tyrannised or it deceived, and was a perilous intermediary between men of reason and the mad, threatening to alienate them both and deprive them of their liberty. In any case, it needed to be *foiled*, so that truth and reason might be restored to their natural relation.

In this slightly confused situation – a tight network of real conditions and imaginary forces – it is difficult to be sure about the exact role played by Pinel. He took up his duties on 25 August 1793. It is to be supposed, given that his reputation as a doctor was already considerable, that he had been chosen precisely in the hope that he would 'foil' madness, determining its exact medical form, and that he would then free victims and denounce suspects, and finally provide a rigorous justification for the confinement of the mad, the necessity of which was recognised, but whose perils were also feared. In addition, Pinel had republican feelings and would not allow the prisoners of the Ancien Régime to remain confined there, or show any favouritism towards those hunted by the new regime. In a sense, Pinel found himself invested with an extraordinary moral power. In classical unreason, there was no incompatibility between madness and simulation, nor between madness recognised from without and madness objectively assigned; it was rather the case that there was something of an essential link from madness to the illusory forms and the guilt hidden beneath it. Pinel's political task was to unravel the knot, and operate a division so that a single rigorous unity emerged for discursive knowledge: madness, its objective truth and its innocence. It was to be shorn of all the fringes of non-being where the games of unreason unfolded, and where it was accepted both as persecuted non-madness and as hidden non-madness, without ever ceasing to be madness on that account.

What then was the exact meaning of freeing 'the enchained'? Was it the pure and simple application of ideas that had been formulated several years previously, which were part of the reorganisation process of which Cabanis was the best example, one year before Pinel's arrival at Bicêtre? Removing the fetters of the madmen in the cells meant opening for them

a domain of liberty that was also the domain of verification, allowing them to appear in an objectivity that was no longer veiled by persecution or the frenzy that it provoked in return; it was the invention of the asylum in its pure state, just as Cabanis had defined it, and which the Convention wanted to see established for political reasons. But there are perhaps also grounds for believing that in doing what he did, Pinel was dissimulating a political operation of the opposite tenure: when he liberated the mad, they blended in with the whole population of Bicêtre, engendering further, inextricable confusion, abolishing the criteria that might have permitted a division. Was it not the constant concern of the Bicêtre administration at this time to prevent the separation that the political authorities were demanding?[22] Whatever the truth, Pinel was moved to la Salpêtrière on 13 May 1795, several months after Thermidor, as the political climate was relaxing.[23]

It is probably impossible to know exactly what Pinel was intending to do when he decided to free the alienated. It matters little – for the key point is precisely that ambiguity that was to mark the rest of his work, and the meaning it was to take on for the modern world: the constitution of a domain in which madness appears in its pure truth, both objective and innocent, but a constitution indefinitely delayed, each of the figures of madness blending in with non-madness in an inextricable proximity. What madness gained in precision through its scientific outline, it lost in the vigour of concrete perception; the asylum, where it was to rejoin its truth, was not a place from which it could be distinguished from that which was not its truth. The more objective it became, the less certain it was. The gesture that set it free in order to investigate it was also the operation that disseminated it, and hid it in all the concrete forms of reason.

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Tuke's work was carried along by the readjustment of English social welfare legislation that took place at the end of the eighteenth century; Pinel's by the ambiguity of the situation of the mad at the moment of the Revolution. But that in no way diminishes their originality. There was a decisiveness in their work that cannot be reduced, and which comes through quite clearly – barely transposed – in the myths that have transmitted its sense.

It was important that Tuke was a Quaker. Just as important was the fact that the Retreat was a country house. 'The air also is healthy, and much more free from smoke than situations near manufacturing towns.'[24] The house opened through unbarred windows onto a garden:

> The Retreat is situate on an eminence, at the distance of about half a mile from the eastern gate of the city of York. It commands a very delightful prospect, extending, on the south, as far as the eye can reach, over a wooded, fertile plain.

The neighbouring land was given over to livestock and arable farming, and the garden 'furnishes abundance of fruit and vegetables. It also affords an agreeable place for recreation and employment, to many of the patients.'[25] Exercise in the open air, regular walks and work in the garden were thought to be of great benefit:

> the general effects of fine air upon the animal spirits, would induce us to expect especial benefit from it, in cases of mental depression . . . Several instances have occurred, in which melancholy patients have been much improved by their journey to the Retreat.[26]

All the imaginary powers of the simple life, the happiness of the countryside and the return of the seasons were called together here to preside over the curing of different forms of madness. Madness, in the view of the eighteenth century, was a disease, not of nature nor of man himself, but of society. Emotions, uncertainties, agitation and artificial food were all causes of madness for Tuke, and his contemporaries shared those beliefs. Madness was only ever of the order of a consequence, the product of a life that had strayed from the path of nature; it never called into question what was fundamental in man, his immediate belonging to nature. It left intact man's nature, which was also his reason, like a secret that had been forgotten. That secret could reappear under strange conditions, just as it could reappear by ruse or fraud, the result of a chance disturbance. Tuke quotes the case of a young woman in a state of 'perfect idiocy'; she remained in the state for many years, with no alteration in her condition, until one day she was attacked by a typhus fever. As the fever mounted, her mind



4. William Hogarth (1697–1764), *Scene in a Madhouse*, from *A Rake's Progress*, 1735



5. Francisco Jose de Goya y Lucientes (1746–1828), *The Madhouse*, 1812–1815 (oil on canvas). Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando, Madrid

6. Tony Robert-Fleury (1837–1912), *Philippe Pinel Freeing the Insane from their Chains at the Salpêtrière in Paris in 1795* (colour lithograph [or oil painting]), Bibliothèque des Arts Décoratifs, Paris, France

became clearer, more limpid and lively. Throughout the acute period during which patients normally suffer from delirium, the patient was entirely reasonable, recognising her entourage and recalling events to which she had seemed to pay no attention at the time. 'But, alas! it was only the gleam of reason; as the fever abated, clouds again enveloped the mind; she sunk into her former deplorable state, and remained in it until her death, which happened a few years afterwards.'[27]

What we have here is a whole mechanism of compensation. In madness, nature is forgotten, not abolished, or rather it migrates from the mind to the body, in such manner that dementia is in some sense a guarantee of solid health; but if illness strikes, nature is shaken from the body and returns to the spirit, purer and clearer than it has ever been. So much proof that one should not consider 'the mad as absolutely deprived of reason', but rather evoke in them, through the play of resemblances and proximities, that part of nature that invariably slept beneath the agitation of their madness. The seasons and the days, the great plain of York and the wisdom of gardens, where nature coincides with the order of men, were to recall reason and awaken it from its momentary slumber. Inside this life of tending the vegetable patch that was imposed on patients at the Retreat, under the sole guidance of an unshakeable confidence, a magical operation was concealed, where nature helped nature triumph by a process of resemblance, *rapprochement* and mysterious penetration, while the anti-nature that society had infused into man was simultaneously exorcised. Behind such images a new myth was beginning to take shape, which was to become one of the great organising forms of the psychiatry of the nineteenth century – the myth of the three natures: Nature as Truth, Nature as Reason, and Nature as Health. It was in this space that the movement of alienation and its cure were developed: if Nature as Health could be abolished, Nature as Reason could only ever be obscured, while Nature as the Truth of the world always remained adequate to itself, and it was from the last that Nature as Reason could be woken and restored; and the exercise of reason, when it coincided with truth, permitted the restoration of Nature as Health. And it was in that sense that Tuke preferred the French term 'mental alienation' to the English word 'insane': 'I adopt this term from an opinion, that the *aliéné*, of the French, conveys a more just idea of this disorder, than those expressions which imply, in any degree, the "abolition of the thinking capacity".'[28]

The Retreat placed patients in a simple dialectic with nature, but it also

built up a social group at the same time. It did that by strangely contradictory means. It was founded by subscription, and it had to function as an insurance system like the many friendly societies that came into being at that time; each subscriber could designate a patient whom he would follow and who would pay a reduced rate, while other patients paid the amount in full. The Retreat was a contractual coalition, a convergence of interests organised along the lines of a simple society.[29] But at the same time it took its place in the myth of the patriarchal family: it aimed to be a great fraternal community of patients and helpers, under the authority of the directors and the administration. It was a rigorous family, without weakness or complacency, but fair, in accordance with the great image of the biblical family. 'The study of the superintendents to promote [the comfort of the patients] with all the assiduity of parental, but judicious attention, has been, in numerous instances, rewarded by an almost filial attachment.'[30] And in this common affection, without indulgence but without injustice, patients were reunited once more with the calm happiness and security of a family in its pure state; they were the children of the family in its primitive ideality.

With its contracts and families, its unstated interests and its natural affection, the Retreat combined the two great myths through which the eighteenth century had sought to define the origin of societies and the truth about man in the state of society. It was both individual interest renouncing itself in order to regain itself and the spontaneous affection that nature creates among the members of a family, thereby proposing a sort of immediate and affective model to all possible society. At the Retreat, the human group was brought back to its original, purest form; men were put back into elementary social relations, which conformed absolutely to their origins, which was to say that they had to be both rigorously founded and rigorously moral. Patients were taken back to the point at which society had freshly emerged from nature, where it accomplished itself with an immediacy that the whole history of mankind had subsequently clouded. The idea was that here all the artifice, the vain worries, the unnatural links and obligations that society had instilled in man would be effaced from the alienated mind of the patient.

Such were the mythical powers of the Retreat: powers that mastered time, contested history, led men back to their essential truths, and identified them to the First Natural Man and the First Social Man in an immemorial space. The distance that separated them from this primitive

being was abolished, and the thick layers of society cut away, and at the end of their 'retreat', the inalienable beneath the alienation at last appeared – nature, truth, reason and pure social morality. Tuke's work seemed to be carried, as well as explained, by a long process of reforms that had preceded it. It actually was, but what made it both a rupture and an initiation was the mythical landscape in which it was set from its inception, and which it managed to inject into the old world of madness and confinement. In place of the simple linear division that confinement had operated between reason and unreason, it brought a dialectic, whose movement could only originate in the mythic space that had been constituted. In this dialectic, madness became alienation, and its cure was the return to the inalienable; but at its core was a new power that was invested in confinement for the first time, at least in the manner in which it was dreamt of by the founders of the Retreat. Thanks to that power, at the very moment when madness revealed itself to be alienation, and as a result of that discovery, men were brought back to the inalienable. The myth of the Retreat makes it possible to establish both the imaginary procedure of the cure as it was then obscurely conceived, and the essence of madness, such as it was to be implicitly transmitted in the nineteenth century:

1 The role of confinement is to reduce madness to its truth.
2 The truth of madness is what it is, minus the world, minus society, and minus the anti-natural.
3 This truth of madness is man himself, in all that can be most primitively inalienable in him.
4 All that is most inalienable in man is a blend of Nature, Truth and Morality: i.e. Reason itself.
5 The Retreat has the power to heal because it brings madness back to a truth that is both the truth of madness and the truth of man, and to a nature that is both the nature of sickness and the serene nature of the world.

We can now see how positivism was able to take root in this dialectic, despite the fact that nothing seemed to herald its coming, as the talk was all of moral experiences, philosophical themes and dream-like images of man. But positivism was really the contraction of this movement, the reduction of this mythical space. From the outset, it took for granted, as objectively obvious, that the truth of madness was man's reason, entirely

reversing the classical scheme where the experience of unreason in madness called into question the possibility that man might bear any kind of truth. Henceforth, any objective grasp of madness, all knowledge and all truth formulated about it was to be reason itself, reason restored and triumphant, the undoing of alienation.

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In the traditional telling of the liberation of the prisoners in chains at Bicêtre, one point has never been established with any certainty – the presence of Couthon. Some have claimed that his visit could not have taken place, and that there must have been confusion with a member of the Paris Commune who was also paralysed, and his infirmity coupled with Couthon's sinister reputation meant that the one was taken for the other.[31] Leaving that aside, what is more important is that the confusion happened and has been passed on, and the fact that the image that came to dominate with such force was that of an invalid retreating in horror before the mad, abandoning 'such animals' to their fate. At the heart of the scene is a paralytic carried by other men; and it was preferable that this paralytic was a fearsome figure of the Convention, known for his cruelty and infamous for condemning so many to their death. Consequently it was Couthon who visited Bicêtre, and who for a moment was the master of the fate of the mad. The imaginary force of history wills it so.

What this strange tale hides is a decisive chiasm in the mythology of madness. Couthon visited Bicêtre to see if the mad that Pinel wished to liberate were in fact suspects. He hoped to find reason in hiding, but what he found was animality, which displayed the full force of its violence. He gave up looking for signs of intelligence and simulation there, and decided to leave the mad to their own devices, and allow madness to resolve itself in its essential savagery. It was precisely here that the metamorphosis was operated: Couthon, the paralytic Revolutionary, the sick man who cut off heads, just as he was treating the mad as animals, through the double stigmata of his sickness and his crimes, unknowingly became the incarnation of all that was most monstrous in humanity. For that reason, it was his presence that the myth required, and not the presence of someone less infirm or less cruel, so that he could pronounce the last words which, for the last time in the Western world, consigned

madness to its own animality. When he left Bicêtre, carried by his helpers, he thought that he had consigned the insane to their bestial nature, but in fact he was the one who carried the charge of animality, while the freedom that the mad were offered allowed them to demonstrate that they had lost nothing of all that was essential in man. When he had formulated the animality of the mad, and given them the freedom to move around in it, he liberated them from it but revealed his own, and enclosed himself within it. His rage was more insane, more inhuman than the madness of the demented. Madness had thus emigrated to the side of its keepers; those who locked up the mad like animals were now possessed by the animal brutality of insanity, and it was in them that the beast raged, while the beast that showed its face in the demented was no more than a cloudy reflection of that rage. A secret was revealed: animality was not to be found in the animal, but in its taming; the latter, by its rigour alone, was enough to bring it into being. The mad were thus purified of their animality, or at least of that part of animality which is violence, predation, anger and savagery; and what remained was a docile animality, which did not respond to constraints and attempts to tame it by violence. The legend of the meeting of Couthon and Pinel recounts this process of purification, or more exactly, demonstrates that the purification had already taken place when the legend was written.

Once Couthon had left, 'the philanthropist immediately set to work'. He decided to unchain twelve patients who were kept in irons. The first was an English captain who had been locked up in a Bicêtre dungeon for forty years: 'He was considered the most terrifying of all the alienated; . . . in a rush of frenzy, he had once hit an attendant on the head with one of his handcuffs, who had fallen down dead.' Pinel approached him, requested that 'he be reasonable, and harm no one'; if he complied, his chains would be removed and he would be granted the right to walk around the courtyard: 'Take my word. Be calm and confident, and I shall restore your liberty.' The captain listened to the speech, and remained calm when his irons were removed. As soon as he was free, he rushed out to admire the sunlight, crying out ecstatically, 'How beautiful! How beautiful!' Throughout this first day of recovered liberty, 'he constantly ran around, rushing up and down the stairs, exclaiming "How beautiful! How beautiful!" again and again.' That evening, he returned to his cell and slept peacefully:

During the two further years that he remained at Bicêtre, he never again suffered from frenzy, and even became useful around the house, exercising a certain degree of authority over the other inmates whom he controlled as he wished, almost taking on the status of a guard.

Another liberation, equally well known in the chronicles of medical hagiography, was that of the soldier Chevingé. He was a drunkard with delusions of grandeur, who took himself for a general, but Pinel had seen 'an excellent nature behind the irritation'. He undid his chains, declaring that he was taking him into his service, and that he would require of him all the fidelity that a 'good master' should expect from a grateful servant. The miracle happened, and the virtues of a faithful valet were awoken in that troubled soul: 'Never was a revolution operated more quickly nor more completely in a human intelligence . . . as soon as he was delivered, he was attentive to his every gesture.' Bad-tempered, but tamed by so much generosity, he took it upon himself to face and appease the fury of others for his new master; 'he spoke the language of reason and goodness to the alienated, he who had been on their level until so recently, but above whom he now felt elevated by the height of his liberty.'[32] In the legend that grew up around Pinel, this good servant was to play his role to the full; he devoted himself body and soul to his master, and he protected him when the people of Paris came to break down the doors of Bicêtre to mete out justice on the 'enemies of the nation: he shielded him with his body, exposing himself to the blows to save Pinel's life'.

So the chains came off and the mad were free. And at that moment, they recovered their reason. Or rather, they did not: it was not so much that reason reappeared in and for itself, but rather fully-fledged social species that had slept for so long in madness were suddenly awakened, and stood up straight, in perfect conformity with all that they represented, without alteration or grimaces. As though the madman, freed from the animality to which his chains confined him, could only rejoin humanity as a recognised *social type*. It would not have sufficed for the first man delivered to have become a normal healthy man; he had to become an officer, an English captain, loyal to the man who set him free, like a man kept in bondage to a conqueror by his word, a figure of authority for others on whom he exercised his prestige as an officer. His health was only restored in the social values that were both its sign and its concrete presence. His reason was not of the order of knowledge or happiness, nor of the good

functioning of his mind. Here, reason was honour. For the soldier, it was to be fidelity and sacrifice: Chevingé became not a reasonable man but a manservant. In his story, there are more or less the same mythical meanings as there are between Man Friday and Robinson Crusoe. The relationship that Defoe set up between the white man isolated in nature and the good savage is never a man-to-man relationship, totally comprised in its immediate reciprocity, but an instance of the master–servant relation, of intelligence versus devotion, of wise strength against brute force, of reflective courage versus heroic unconsciousness: a social relation, in short, with its literary status and all its ethical coefficients, is transposed to a natural state, and becomes an immediate truth in that two-man society. The same values are to be found in the story of the soldier Chevingé; his encounter with Pinel was less the meeting of two like forms of reason than of two clearly defined social characters who instantiate their type perfectly and strike up a rapport in accordance with pre-ordained social structures. It is quite clear here that the force of the myth is far more important than any psychological truth or rigorous medical observation; if the subjects freed by Pinel were really madmen, it is clear that they were not cured by the simple gesture of liberation – their conduct must have long been marked by traces of alienation. But that was unimportant to Pinel. What mattered to him was that reason be signified by crystallised social types very early on, from the very moment when the mad were no longer treated as Outsiders, Animals, figures that were absolutely foreign to men and the relations that existed between them. What constituted the curing of the mad for Pinel was their installation in a recognised social type that was morally recognised and approved.

What is most important then is not the fact that the chains were removed – that measure had been taken on many occasions in the eighteenth century, and particularly so at Saint Luke's – but the myth that gave meaning to this liberation, opening it onto a reason peopled by social and moral themes and figures long recognised in literature, thereby creating in the imaginary an idealised form of the asylum. An asylum that was no longer a cage for man abandoned to his savagery, but a dream republic where relations were only ever established in a virtuous transparency. Honour, fidelity, courage and sacrifice reign here in a pure state, and designate both the ideal forms of society and the criteria of reason. And the myth takes its strength from the fact that it is more or less explicitly opposed – and here again the presence of Couthon is indispensable – to

the myths of the Revolution, such as they were formulated after the Terror: the republic of the Convention is a republic of violence, passion and savagery – and it was that republic, without even being aware of it, that harboured the various forms of insanity and unreason. The republic that spontaneously came into being among the mad who were left to their own violence was pure of passion, and was the city of essential obedience. Couthon was the symbol of this 'bad liberty' that had unleashed passions in the people, bringing the tyranny of the Committee of Public Safety, a liberty in whose name the mad were left in chains; Pinel was the symbol of 'good liberty', which delivered the most insane and violent of men, taming their passions and introducing them to the calm world of traditional virtue. Between the people of Paris who came to Bicêtre on a hunt for the enemies of the nation, and Chevingé, the soldier who saved Pinel's life, the more insane and the less free was not the one who had been locked up for years for drunkenness, delirium and violence.

The myth of Pinel, like that of Tuke, hides a whole discursive movement that holds good both as a description of alienation and as an analysis of its suppression:

1 In the inhuman, animal relation that classical confinement imposed, madness did not reveal its moral truth.
2 That truth, when it was allowed to appear, revealed itself to be a human relation filled with virtuous idealism, such as heroism, fidelity, sacrifice, etc.
3 But madness was vice, violence and wickedness, as the rage of the revolutionaries made all too clear.
4 Liberation within confinement, to the extent that it is a reconstruction of society along the lines of conformity to types, could not fail to bring a cure.

The myth of the Retreat and that of the deliverance of men in chains correspond exactly to each other in an immediate opposition. The one brings out all the themes of primitivism, and the other puts transparent images of social virtues into circulation. One looks for the truth and the suppression of madness in a place where man is barely emerging from nature; the other requires a sort of social perfection, and an ideal functioning of human relations. But the two themes were still too close and had been too often blended together in the eighteenth century for

them to have radically different meanings for Pinel and Tuke. Here and there, traces of a single effort to integrate certain confinement practices into the great myth of alienation can be found, as in the work of Hegel writing a few years later, which rigorously filled out the conceptual lesson of all that had happened at the Retreat and at Bicêtre:

> The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that insanity is not an abstract *loss* of reason (neither in intelligence nor in will and responsibility), but a simple derangement, a contradiction in a reason that still survives – just as physical disease is not an abstract or total loss of health (that would be death), but a contradiction in it. The humane treatment, benevolent and reasonable in equal measure . . . [the services of Pinel here deserve the highest acknowledgement] presupposes the patient's rationality, and that assumption provides a sound basis for dealing with him on this side.[33]

Classical confinement had created a state of alienation, which only existed from the outside, for those who interned and only recognised the interned as an Outsider or an Animal; Pinel and Tuke, in those simple gestures that were to provide its paradoxical origin to positive psychiatry, interiorised alienation, and installed it inside confinement, delimiting it as the distance from a madman to himself, and thereby invented the myth of alienation. For it is indeed of myth that we must speak when attempts are made to pass off concepts as nature, the reconstitution of a whole moral system as the liberation of truth, and to present as a spontaneous cure for madness what is perhaps no more than its secret insertion into a deceitful reality.

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The legends of Tuke and Pinel transmit mythical values, which the psychiatry of the nineteenth century came to accept as natural truths. But beneath the myths themselves was an operation, or rather a whole series of operations that silently organized the world of the asylum, the methods of cure, and the concrete experience of madness.

First of all, Tuke's action. Because he was a contemporary of Pinel, and because he was known to be part of a 'philanthropic' movement, his gesture was always seen as a 'liberation' of the mad. In fact it was something quite different:

> there has also been particular occasion to observe the great loss, which individuals of our Society have sustained, by being put under the care of those, who are not only strangers to our principles; but by whom they are frequently mixed with other patients, who may indulge themselves in ill language, and other exceptionable practices. This often seems to leave an unprofitable effect upon the patients' minds, after they are restored to the use of their reason, alienating from those religious attachments which they had before experienced; and, sometimes, even corrupting them with vicious habits, to which they had been strangers.[34]

The Retreat was to act as an instrument of segregation: moral and religious segregation, which sought to rebuild around madness an atmosphere that resembled a Quaker community as closely as possible. And that for two reasons. First of all because the spectacle of evil was a source of suffering for any sensitive soul, and the origin of harmful passions like horror, hatred and spite, which engendered or perpetuated madness:

> It was thought, very justly, that the indiscriminate mixture, which must occur in large public establishments, of persons of opposite religious sentiments and practices; of the profligate and the virtuous; the profane and the serious; was calculated to check the progress of returning reason, and to fix, still deeper, the melancholy and misanthropic train of ideas.[35]

But the main reason was elsewhere: religion could play the double role of nature and rule, as it had taken on, in its ancestral habits, education and everyday exercise, the depth of nature, while remaining at the same time a constant principle of coercion. It was both spontaneity and constraint, and to that extent, it was the only means of counteracting the limitless violence of madness during the eclipse of reason:

> Where these [its precepts] have been strongly imbued in early life, they become little less than principles of our nature; and their restraining power is frequently felt, even under the delirious excitement of insanity. To encourage the influence of religious principles over the mind of the insane, is considered of great consequence, as a means of cure.[36]

In this dialectic of alienation, where reason hid without ever disappearing,

religion was the concrete form of that which cannot be alienated; it contained all that was invincible in reason, which subsisted beneath madness as a quasi-nature, and around it was a constant invitation from the milieu: 'During lucid intervals, or the state of convalescence, the patient might enjoy the society of those who were of similar habits and opinions.'[37] It assured the secret watch of reason over madness, making nearer and more immediate the constraints that had already been operative inside classical confinement. There, the religious and moral milieu was imposed from without, so that madness, without ever being cured, had a restraint placed upon it. At the Retreat, religion was part of the movement that indicated that despite appearances there was reason in madness, and it brought people back from alienation to health. Religious segregation had a quite precise meaning: it was not there to preserve the sick from the profane influence of non-Quakers, but placed the alienated in a moral environment where they entered into debate with themselves and their surroundings; the aim was to constitute a milieu in which, far from being protected, he was maintained in a state of perpetual unease, constantly threatened by Law and Guilt.

'The principle of fear, which is rarely decreased by insanity, is considered as of great importance in the management of the patients.'[38] Fear appears as an essential character of the asylum. It was probably a familiar figure already, if one considers the terrors of confinement. But confinement imposed fear on madness from without, marking the boundary between reason and unreason, and playing on a double power – on the violence of frenzy, in order to contain it, and on reason itself, in order to keep it outside. The result was a fear that was a surface phenomenon. Fear at the Retreat was a much deeper affair. It was a mediating link between reason and madness, the evocation of a nature that was still shared, which could be used to solder the connection between the two. The terror that reigned was the most visible sign of the alienation of madness in the classical world; fear now was granted the power of disalienation, restoring a sort of primitive complicity between the mad and men of reason. Fear was to renew the solidarity between the two. Madness was no longer to strike fear into people's hearts, nor would it be able to – it was itself to be *afraid*, helplessly, irrevocably afraid, entirely in thrall to the pedagogy of good sense, truth and morality.

Samuel Tuke recounts the arrival of a maniac at the Retreat, a young man of prodigious strength, whose attacks brought panic to his entourage

and even among his guards. He arrived at the Retreat handcuffed and in chains, with his clothes tied on with ropes. As soon as he entered, his fetters were removed, and he was allowed to eat with the superintendents, and his agitation disappeared immediately. 'His attention appeared to be arrested by his new situation.' He was led to his room, and the superintendent explained how the house was set up for the greater freedom and comfort of all, and that he would never be restrained unless he broke the rules of the house, or went against the general principles of human morality. The superintendent assured him that he had no desire ever to use the means of coercion that he had at his disposal. 'The maniac was sensible of the kindness of his treatment. *He promised to restrain himself.*' On occasion he still became agitated, raising his voice and frightening his companions. The superintendent then repeated the threats and promises of the first day, saying that unless he calmed down, they would be forced to return to older means of punishment. The patient's agitation would increase slightly, and then rapidly decline: 'he would listen with attention to the persuasions and arguments of his friendly visiter. After such conversations, the patient was generally better for some days or a week.' After four months, he was released from the Retreat, entirely cured.[39] Fear here was directed straight at the patient, not through any instrument but purely by means of discourse. There was no question of limiting a raging liberty, but of defining and exalting a region of simple responsibility, where any manifestation of madness would be linked to a punishment. The obscure guilt that in the past had linked transgression and unreason was thus displaced, and the madman, as a human being originally blessed with the faculty of reason, was no longer guilty of being mad; but the madman, as an insane person, and within the sickness for which he was no longer to feel guilty, was forced to feel responsible for all within it that could trouble morality and good society, and only blame himself for any punishment that he received. The assignation of guilt was no longer the mode of relation between the mad and the man of reason in purely general terms: it became instead at the same time the form of the concrete coexistence of each madman and his guardian, and the form of consciousness that an alienated man was to have of his own madness.

A re-evaluation of the significance usually attributed to Tuke's work is therefore necessary. The liberation of the alienated, the abolition of constraints, and the constitution of a human milieu were mere justifications. The real operations were quite different. In fact, Tuke created an asylum

where he substituted the stifling responsibility of anguish for the free terror of madness; the fear was no longer of what lay on the other side of the prison door, but what raged instead beneath the seals of conscience. The secular terrors in which the alienated found themselves caught up were transferred by Tuke to the heart of madness. True, the asylum no longer sanctioned the guilt of the madman, but it did more: it organised it. It organised it for the madman as self-consciousness, in a non-reciprocal relation with his keeper, and it organised it for men of reason as a consciousness of the other, and a therapeutic intervention into the madman's existence. Through this guilt, the madman became an object of punishment always offered to himself and the other; and from that recognition of his status as object, and his consciousness of his own guilt, the madman was to return to his consciousness as a free, responsible subject, thereby regaining reason. This movement where, by becoming an object for an other, the alienated person returned to his own freedom, was a process to be found in Work as well as in the Gaze.

It must be remembered that this was a Quaker universe, where God blessed men with the signs of their prosperity. Work was of primary importance in the 'moral treatment' that was practised at the Retreat. In itself, work has a power to constrain which was superior to all other forms of physical coercion, as the regularity of the hours, the demands it made on attention, and the obligation to achieve a result removed what would otherwise have been a harmful liberty of thought, fixing patients in a system of responsibility:

> Of all the modes by which the patients may be induced to restrain themselves, regular employment is perhaps the most generally efficacious; and those kinds of employment are doubtless to be preferred, both on a moral and physical account, which are accompanied by considerable bodily action; that are most agreeable to the patient, and which are most opposite to the illusions of his disease.[40]

By such means man entered once more the order of God's commandments; he submitted his liberty to laws that were both those of reality and those of morality. For the same reasons mental work was not discouraged, although all exercise of the imagination was to be banned, as it always involved complicity with passion, desire, and all forms of delirious illusion. On the other hand, the study of all that is eternal in nature, and

conforms most closely to the wisdom and bounty of Providence, was tremendously efficacious when it came to limiting the excessive freedom of the mad and helping them to discover the different forms of their responsibility. 'The various branches of the mathematics and natural science, furnish the most useful class of subjects on which to employ the minds of the insane.'[41] In the asylum, work was stripped of any production value; it was only imposed as a moral rule. It was a limitation of liberty, submission to order, an engagement to responsibility, of which the only goal was the tethering of a spirit that roamed too freely in the excess of a liberty which physical constraints only limited in appearance.

More useful still than work was the gaze of others, which Tuke termed the 'desire of esteem': 'This principle in the human mind, which doubtless influences, in a great degree, though often secretly, our general manners; and which operates with peculiar force on our introduction to a new circle of acquaintance.'[42] In classical confinement too the madman had been exposed to the gaze, but it had little power of penetration, going no deeper than the monstrous surface of his visible bestiality; and it had a degree of reciprocity, as healthy men could read there, as in a mirror, the imminent movement of their own fall. The gaze that Tuke instituted as one of the primary components of life in the asylums was at once more profound and less reciprocal. It was to track the least perceptible indications of madness in patients, hunting for the point where madness was secretly attached to reason, and barely began to drift apart from it; and it was a gaze that the madman could never return in any form, for he was only ever the observed; he was like a newcomer, the last settler in the world of reason. Tuke organised a whole ceremony articulated around the processes of the gaze. These were English-style evenings, where everyone was to observe the minutiae of social conduct in the strictest possible terms, and where the only object in circulation was an inquisitorial gaze on the lookout for any infringement of the codes, any disorder, incongruity or ineptness that betrayed a sign of madness. The directors and the keepers at the Retreat would thus regularly invite some of the patients to tea-parties:

> All who attend, dress in their best clothes, and vie with each other in politeness and propriety. The best fare is provided, and the visiters are treated with all the attention of strangers. The evening generally passes in the greatest harmony and enjoyment. It rarely happens that any unpleasant circumstance occurs; the patients control, in a wonderful degree, their different propensities; and the scene is at once curious, and affectingly gratifying.[43]

Curiously, this ritual is not one of intimacy, of dialogue or of mutual knowledge; it is the organisation around the madman of a whole world where everything seems similar and accessible, but to which he is a perpetual outsider, the Stranger *par excellence* judged not only on appearances, but on all that they might reveal and betray despite themselves. Constantly recalled to this empty role of the unknown visitor, and challenged in everything that can be known of him, attracted to his own surface by the social type whose form and mask are silently imposed upon him by the gaze, the madman was invited to turn himself into an object for the eyes of reasonable reason, as the perfect stranger, i.e. he whose foreignness is never perceptible. The city of reasonable men only welcomes him to the extent that he conforms to that anonymous type.

We can see that the partial suppression of physical constraint at the Retreat was part of a whole, of which the essential element was the constitution of 'self-restraint', where the freedom of the mad, checked by work and by the gaze of others, was constantly threatened by an acknowledgement of guilt.[44] What at first glance seemed to be a simple negative operation that loosened bonds and freed the profound nature of madness turned out to be a positive operation that enclosed madness in a system of rewards and punishments, including it into the movement of moral consciousness. It was the passage from a world of Censure to a universe of Judgement. But at the same time a psychology of madness became possible, for before the gaze, on its own surface, madness is constantly made to deny its own dissimulation. It is judged on its actions alone; its intentions are not put on trial, and no attempt is made to plumb its secret depths. It is only answerable for the part of itself that is visible. All the rest is reduced to silence. Madness no longer exists except as that which is seen. The proximity that comes into being in the asylum, in the absence of chains and bars, does not encourage reciprocal interaction. It is simply that of a piercing gaze, observing, scrutinizing, moving pitilessly close the better to see, while remaining sufficiently distant to avoid any contamination by the values of the Stranger. The science of mental illness, such as it was to develop in the asylums, was only ever of the order of observation and classification. It was never to be a dialogue. That could only begin

once psychoanalysis had exorcised the phenomenon of the gaze, so essential to the nineteenth-century asylum, substituting its silent magic with the powers of language. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that psychoanalysis doubled the absolute gaze of the watcher with the indefinite monologue of the surveyed – thus keeping in place the old asylum structure of a non-reciprocal gaze, but balancing it out, in a non-symmetrical reciprocity, with the new structure of a language without response.

Surveillance and Judgement: a new type of personage was coming into being, who would be essential for the functioning of the nineteenth-century asylum. Tuke himself outlined his profile, when he told the story of a maniac who was subject to fits of irrepressible violence. One day, when he was walking with the superintendent in one of the gardens of the house, the patient suddenly had an attack, and ran off to pick a large stone, which he 'held up as in the act of throwing it at his companion'. The superintendent stopped in his tracks, and stared the patient in the eye, advanced a few paces and, 'in a resolute tone of voice, commanded him to lay down the stone'. As he approached, the patient lowered his arm, and dropped the weapon. 'He then submitted to be quietly led to his apartment.'[45] Something was born here, which was not repression but authority. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the world of the mad had been peopled only by the abstract, faceless power that kept patients locked up. Inside these limits, it was a void, a world empty of anything that was not madness itself, where even the keepers were often recruited among the patients. What Tuke instituted was a mediating element between guardians and patients, between reason and madness. The space reserved by society for alienation was now haunted by figures 'from the other side', representing both the prestige of the authority that confined, and the rigours of the reason that judged. The superintendent intervened unarmed, with no instruments of constraint at his disposal other than the gaze and language. He advanced towards madness, stripped of anything that might protect him or turn him into a figure of menace, risking an immediate confrontation with no possible retreat. And yet it was not as a concrete person that he confronted madness, but rather as the incarnation of reason, bearing the full force of the authority invested in him by the fact of his not being mad. In previous times, the victory of reason over unreason was assured only by material force, in a combat of sorts that was quite genuine. But now the battle was always won in advance, and the

defeat of unreason was already inscribed in the concrete situation where the mad and the non-mad met. The absence of constraint in the asylums of the nineteenth century was not the liberation of unreason, but madness mastered in advance.

For this new reason that reigned in the asylums, madness was less an absolute form of contradiction than a minority status, an aspect of itself that had as yet no right to autonomy, which could only exist grafted onto the world of reason. Madness was childhood, and at the Retreat, everything was organised so that the alienated might be treated as minors. They were considered

> as children, who have too much strength, and who make a dangerous use of it. Their punishments and rewards must be immediate, since that which is distant has no effect on them. A new system of education must be adopted to give a fresh course to their ideas. Subject them at first; encourage them afterwards, employ them, and render their employment agreeable by attractive means.[46]

In the eyes of the law, the alienated had long been considered minors, but that was a legal situation, abstractly defined by interdiction and trusteeship; it was not a concrete means by which men related to each other. For Tuke, that minority status became a style of existence for the mad, and a mode of sovereignty for their guardians. Much was made of the 'big family' atmosphere formed by the community of the insane and their keepers at the Retreat. The belief was that the 'family' placed the patient in a milieu that was both normal and natural; the reality was that it alienated them still further. The mad were accorded the legal status of minors to protect them as subjects before the law; but when this ancient structure became a form of coexistence, it meant that they were entirely controlled, as psychological subjects, by men of reason, who became for them the incarnation of adulthood, i.e. both domination and destination.

In the great reorganisation of relations between madness and reason, the family, at the end of the eighteenth century, played a decisive role – it was both an imaginary landscape and a real social structure. The family was both the origin and the destination of Tuke's work. Lending it the prestige of primitive values not yet compromised in the social, Tuke had it play a role of disalienation: in its mythology, it was the antithesis of the 'milieu' in which the eighteenth century saw the origin of all

madness. But he also introduced it in a very real way to the world of the asylum, where it appeared as both truth and norm for all the relations that could be struck up between madmen and men of reason. Thus minority under family tutelage, a juridical status in which the civil rights of the mad were alienated, became a psychological situation where their concrete liberty was alienated. The whole existence of madness, in the world that was now being prepared for it, was enveloped in what we might describe by anticipation as a 'parental complex'. The privileges of patriarchy were revived once more around it in the bourgeois family unit. It was this historical sedimentation that psychoanalysis would later bring up to date, with the institution of a new myth that gave it the meaning of a destiny, traceable through the civilization of the West, and perhaps all civilization, whereas the process had in fact been much more gradual, and its bedrock had only recently solidified, during this *fin-de-siècle* period when madness found itself twice alienated inside the family – by the myth of a disalienation in the purity of patriarchy, and then again by a genuinely alienating situation in asylums closely modelled on the family unit. From this point onwards, and for a period whose end is still impossible to see, the discourses of unreason became inextricably linked to the half-real, half-imaginary dialectic of the Family. And in the place where, in their violence, we previously saw profanation and blasphemy, we must now decipher endless attacks against the Father. All of which means that in the modern world, what was once the great, irreparable confrontation between reason and unreason has become instead the dull thud of instincts repeatedly coming up against the solidity of the institution of the family and its most archaic symbols.

There is an astonishing convergence between the development of the basic institutions and this evolution of madness in the world of confinement. As we have seen, the liberal economy tended to place the onus on the family rather than the State when it came to assistance to the poor and the sick, so that the family became the place of social responsibility. But if a sick patient could be entrusted to a family, a madman could not, as he was too foreign and inhuman. Tuke's innovation was to create a simulacrum of the family around the mad, an institutional parody that was nonetheless a real psychological situation. Where family was lacking, he substituted a fictitious familial décor through signs and attitudes. But by a curious crossover, the day was to come when the family was discharged of its role in assisting the poor and alleviating the suffering of the sick, but

still kept its fictitious values regarding madness; and long after the sickness of the poor had again become an affair of the State, asylums maintained the insane in a fictional family imperative. The mad remained minors, and for a long while to come reason bore for them the attributes of a Father.

With these fictitious values locked up inside it, the asylum was sheltered from the forces of history and social change. Tuke's intention was to create a milieu that imitated the most ancient, pure, and natural forms of coexistence: the milieu was to be as human as possible, while remaining as un-social as possible. What he did in practice was to copy the structure of a bourgeois family, symbolically recreate it inside the asylum and set it adrift in history. Always oriented towards anachronistic symbols and structures, the asylum was outside time and ill adapted *par excellence*. And in this place where animality manifested a presence without history, constantly beginning anew, the immemorial signs of ancient hatreds and ancient familial profanations, the forgotten signs of punishment and incest, would slowly surface once more.

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There was no such religious segregation in the work of Pinel. Or rather, the segregation went in the opposite direction to everything practised by Tuke. The benefits of the new model asylums were open to all, or almost all, with the exception of fanatics 'who believe that they are inspired, and constantly search for new adherents to spread their gospel'. Bicêtre and the Salpêtrière, as Pinel saw them, formed a kind of complementary figure to the Retreat.

Religion was not to be a moral substratum of life in the asylum, but purely and simply an object of medicine:

> Religious opinions, in a hospital for the alienated, should only ever be examined from the point of view of medicine, so any considerations related to public cults or to politics should be swept aside, and all that should be considered is whether it is important to oppose the exalted ideas or feelings that derive from such sources, in order to help cure certain patients.[47]

Catholicism, a source of powerful emotions and haunting images born of the terrors of an afterlife, often provoked insanity, giving birth to delirious

beliefs and hallucinations, leading people into despair and melancholy. Pinel was not surprised that 'looking down the list of alienated patients at Bicêtre, we find the names of many priests and monks, as well as country folk frightened out of their wits by terrifying paintings of the future'.[48] And he was even less surprised to see how the figures for religious madness varied down the ages. Under the Ancien Régime and during the Revolution, the strength of superstitious beliefs and the violence of the struggles that pitted the Republic against the Catholic Church caused melancholia of religious origin to multiply. With the return of peace, the Concordat smoothed over the differences, and such forms of delirium disappeared: in Year X of the revolutionary calendar, 50 per cent of the melancholics at the Salpêtrière were still diagnosed as suffering from religious madness; the following year that number had fallen to 33 per cent, and by the year XII they were a mere 18 per cent.[49] The asylum was thus to be freed of religion and its imaginary correlates. Those who were 'melancholic by devotion' had their pious books removed, as experience had shown that allowing them 'was the surest way of perpetuating their alienation, and even rendering it incurable. The more such permission is granted, the less their worries and scruples can be calmed.'[50] Nothing could be further from Tuke and his dreams of a religious community that would also be a privileged place for the curing of the mind than this idea of a neutral asylum, purified of all the images and passions that Christianity had brought into existence, and which led the mind to error, delusion, and ultimately delirium and hallucinations.

But Pinel's aim was to reduce the imaginary forms, not the moral content of religion. For once such images had been filtered, religion had a power of 'disalienation', dissipating images, calming passions and restoring to man all that was immediate and essential in his being: it could help him approach his moral truth. And for that reason it was often capable of bringing about a cure. Pinel tells several stories that are reminiscent of Voltaire. He writes of one young 25-year-old woman, 'of a strong constitution, united in marriage to a man who was weak and delicate'. She suffered from 'violent crises of hysteria, and imagined that she was possessed by a demon which, she claimed, took on a variety of forms, sometimes imitating the singing of birds, or making low, lugubrious sounds, and sometimes uttering piercing cries'. Luckily, the local priest preferred natural religion to exorcism, and put his trust in the benevolence of nature to cure her:

> This enlightened man, of a calm, persuasive disposition, gained some sway over the mind of the patient, and managed to convince her to leave her bed, so that she returned once more to her domestic chores, and even to digging her garden . . . this was followed by even more successful results, and a cure that lasted three years.[51]

Brought back to the extreme simplicity of its moral content, religion invariably went hand in hand with philosophy, medicine, and all the forms of wisdom and knowledge that could restore reason to the wandering mind. There were even cases where religion could serve as a preliminary treatment and prepare what was to be done at the asylum. One example was a young girl 'of an ardent temperament, although well behaved and very pious', who was torn between 'the inclinations of her heart and the severe principles of her conduct'. Her confessor, after advising her in vain to attach herself to God, showed her cases of firm, measured saintliness, counselling her 'to trust in the traditional remedies to the great passions – patience and time'. Taken to the Salpêtrière, she was treated under Pinel's orders, using 'the same moral principles', and her sickness was 'of short duration'.[52] The asylum thus took on not the social theme of a religion where men felt like brothers in one communion and one community, but a moral power of consolation, confidence and docile faithfulness to nature. It was to do the moral work of religion, ignoring the fantastical text and concentrating on the levels of virtue, work and social life.

The asylum was thus a religious domain stripped of religion, a domain of pure morality and ethical uniformity. All that retained the imprint of the old differences was slowly effaced, and the last memories of the sacred were gradually extinguished. Previously, houses of confinement had inherited, in the social space, the almost absolute limits of the lazar houses, and had been foreign territory. The asylum was now to figure the great continuity of social morality, and was ruled by the values of family and work and all recognised virtues. And that in two ways. First, they reigned in fact, at the heart of madness itself: under the violence and disorder of alienation, the solid nature of essential virtues remained unbroken. A primitive form of morality remained, ordinarily untouched even by the most extreme forms of dementia, and it was this that both appeared and operated during the cure:

> I must state my unstinting admiration for the pure virtues and severe principles that invariably come to light in the course of the cure. Nowhere else, other than in novels, have I come across husbands more worthy of being cherished, fathers and mothers more tender, lovers more passionate, or people more attached to their duties than most of the alienated who are happily brought to the period of convalescence.[53]

This inalienable virtue is both the truth and the resolution of madness. For that reason, if it reigned in fact, it also *had to do so*. The asylum was to reduce difference, repress vice, and eliminate irregularity. It denounced anything that was opposed to the essential virtues of society, like celibacy:

> The number of young girls who fell into idiocy is seven times greater than the number of married women between year XI and year XIII; for dementia, the proportion is a factor of two or four times. It can therefore be presumed that for women, marriage offers considerable protection against the two most inveterate (and often incurable) forms of alienation.[54]

Debauchery, bad behaviour and 'extreme perversity of morals' got the same treatment: 'the habit of vice, like that of drunkenness, unrestrained and promiscuous lechery, bad behaviour and general apathetic insouciance can slowly chip away at reason, and often result in a clear case of alienation'.[55] Laziness was 'the most constant and unanimous result of the experience that in public asylums, as in prisons and hospices, the most certain and perhaps the sole guarantor of health, good morals and social order is the law of a mechanical work, rigorously executed'.[56] The asylum's aim was the homogeneous reign of morality, and its rigorous extension to all those who attempted to escape it.

But by that fact, it allowed difference to creep in: if the law did not reign universally, then that was because there were men who did not recognise it, a social class that lived in disorder, negligence, and something approaching illegality:

> If on the one hand we see families prospering for many years in peace and harmony, how many others do we also see, particularly in the lower strata of society, offending our sight with a repugnant vision of debauchery, dissent and shameful distress! Day after day, my notes indicate that this is the most common source of alienation that we are called upon to treat in the hospices.[57]

In a single movement, the asylum, in the hands of Pinel, becomes an instrument of moral uniformity and social denunciation. The intention was to erect one form of morality as universal, which was to be imposed from within on other forms of morality that were foreign to it, and which contained the alienation that would inevitably affect people in the end. In the first case, the asylum was to act as an awakening and a reminder, invoking a forgotten nature; in the second, it was to act as social displacement, to uproot individuals from their condition. The operation as practised at the Retreat was still simple: a religious segregation for the purposes of moral purification. What Pinel practised was relatively complex, as he tried to operate moral syntheses, assuring an ethical continuity between the worlds of madness and reason, but enacting a form of social segregation all the while that guaranteed bourgeois morality a *de facto* universality, enabling it to impose itself as a system of law over all forms of alienation.

In the classical age, poverty, laziness, vice and madness all blended into a single culpability inside unreason; the mad were locked up in the great confinement of poverty and unemployment, but all were promoted to the vicinity of sin, close to the essence of the Fall. But madness now became more of a social fall, confusedly perceived as its cause, model and limit. Within the space of half a century, mental illness would be treated as a form of degeneration. And from then on, the essential madness, and the real threat, was something that floated up from the lower depths of society.

Pinel's asylum was not to be a retreat from the world, a space of nature and immediate truth like that of Tuke, but a uniform domain of legislation, a place of moral syntheses where the nascent alienation that came into being on the fringes of society was to be eliminated.[58] The lives led by the internees, and their behaviour towards doctors and guards, were organised by Pinel in such manner that these moral syntheses should be carried out. This he did by three principal means.

1 *Silence.* The fifth chained prisoner freed by Pinel was a defrocked priest whose madness had caused him to be expelled from the church. He suffered delusions of grandeur, and imagined himself to be Jesus Christ: this was 'the sublime of human arrogance in delirium'. He had been

admitted to Bicêtre in 1782, and had been in chains for twelve years. His proud bearing and grandiloquent speeches meant that he was one of the best appreciated spectacles in the hospital, but as he knew that he was in the midst of reliving Christ's Passion, 'he patiently endured his martyrdom and the constant sarcasm, to which he was exposed'. Pinel chose him to be among the first dozen delivered from their chains, despite the fact that his delirium was as strong as ever. But he did not act with him in the same way as with the others: there were no exhortations, and no promises were extracted. He removed his chains without uttering a word, and

> expressly ordered that everyone imitate his reserve, so that not a word was said to this poor unfortunate. This rigorously observed prohibition had a more tangible effect on this man so imbued with himself than either the irons or his cell; he felt humiliated by the abandonment, and by this new form of isolation within his full liberty. Finally, after a long period of hesitation, he was seen of his own accord to mingle with the society of the other patients; and from that day on, he slowly returned to more reasonable and correct ideas.[59]

Deliverance here takes on a paradoxical meaning. In the patient's delirium, the cell, the chains, the continual spectacle and the sarcasm were the element of his liberty. Thus recognised, through his very bondage, and fascinated from without by so much complicity, he could not be dislodged from his immediate truth. But the removal of the chains, the indifference and the silence of all around him confined him in the limited use of an empty liberty; he was delivered in silence to a truth without recognition, which he would demonstrate in vain since he was no longer observed, and from which he could no longer extract any form of exaltation as his humiliation had come to an end. It was the man himself, and no longer his projection into delirium, who now found himself to be humiliated, and instead of physical constraints he now had a liberty that showed him the limits of his solitude every instant. Where there had previously been a dialogue between insult and delirium, there was now a monologue that exhausted itself in the silence of others, and his parade of presumption and outrage was met with indifference. From that moment on, more genuinely confined than he could be in a dungeon or in chains, a prisoner of nothing but himself, the patient was

trapped in a relation to the self that was of the order of guilt, and in a non-relation to others that was of the order of shame. The others were made innocent, and were no longer persecutors; guilt was displaced to within, demonstrating to the madman that he was fascinated by nothing other than his own presumption. The faces of the enemy disappeared, and he no longer experienced their presence as a gaze, but rather as a refusal to pay any attention to him, a gaze averted; for him others were now nothing but a limit that constantly retreated as he advanced. Freed from his chains, he was now truly a prisoner, by virtue of silence, in sin and shame. Before, he felt himself to be punished, and saw there the signs of his innocence; now, free of any physical punishment, he had no option but to consider himself guilty. His torture had been his glory: his deliverance was his humiliation.

In comparison to the incessant dialogue between reason and madness that had marked the Renaissance, classical confinement had been a silencing. But that silence was not total, and language was now engaged in things rather than totally suppressed. Confinement, prisons, dungeons, and even torture had set up a silent dialogue between reason and unreason, which was of the order of a struggle. That dialogue itself was now undone, and the silence was absolute; there was no longer any common language between madness and reason, and all that answered the language of delirium was an absence of language, for delirium was not a fragment of dialogue with reason, but no language at all; its only reference, in the consciousness finally silenced, was guilt. And it was only from that point on that a common language was once more possible, after guilt had been recognised and acknowledged. 'Finally, after a long period of hesitation, he was seen of his own accord to mingle with the society of the other patients . . .' The absence of language, as a fundamental structure of life in the asylums, had as its correlative the renewal of the act of confession. When Freud cautiously reinstituted the exchange in psychoanalysis, or rather began to listen once more to this language, now eroded into monologue, was it any wonder that the formulations he heard were always a reference to guilt? In this inveterate silence, guilt had taken over the very source of language.

2 *Recognition as mirror.* At the Retreat, the mad were observed, and made aware of it; but, for madness, that direct gaze was only a sideways glance and it had no immediate grasp on itself. With Pinel, by contrast, the gaze only worked inside the space defined by madness, without surface

or exterior limits. It saw itself and was seen by itself – as both pure object of spectacle and absolute subject.

> Three alienated men, who each believed themselves to be sovereigns, and had all taken the title of Louis XVI, were arguing one day about their rights to royalty, which they were seeking to assert with slightly excessive enthusiasm. The guard approached one of them and took him to one side: 'Why', she said, 'are you bothering to argue with those people, who are obviously mad? Doesn't everyone know that you should clearly be recognised as Louis XVI?' The patient was flattered by this treatment, and withdrew, looking down his nose at the other two with considerable disdain. The same tactic worked with the second patient. And from that point on there were no more arguments.[60]

This was the first moment, the period of exaltation. Madness is called upon to examine itself, but in others, and it appears in them as unfounded pretension, i.e. as derisory madness; and yet in this gaze that condemns others, the madman assures his own justification, and the certainty of being equal to his own delirium. The cleavage between presumption and reality can only be recognised in the object. It remains entirely veiled in the subject, who becomes immediate truth and absolute judge; an exalted sovereignty denounces the fake sovereignty of the others and dispossesses them, thereby confirming the unbroken surface of its own presumption. Madness, as simple delirium, is projected onto others, and as perfect unconsciousness is entirely accepted.

But at that moment the complicitous mirror becomes a means of demystification. Another Bicêtre patient still believed himself to be king, and still expressed himself 'with the commanding tone of supreme authority'. One day when he was less agitated, the guard approached him and asked him, if he was king, why he didn't bring his detention to an end, and how it was that he allowed himself to be kept together with the other inmates. Repeating this speech day after day,

> he gradually caused him to see the ridiculous nature of his exaggerated pretensions, showing him another alienated patient who had also long been convinced that he was invested with supreme power and yet had become an object of derision. The maniac felt shaken at first, and soon began to doubt his own title as sovereign, and finally managed to recognise the chimerical nature of his imaginings. This highly unexpected moral turnaround happened in about two weeks, and after a few months of tests, this dutiful father was returned to his family.[61]

This then was the stage of abasement; presumptuously identified with the object of his delirium, the madman recognised himself in the mirror of the madness whose ridiculous pretension he had already denounced; the solidity of his sovereign subjectivity crumbled in the object that he had demystified by taking it as his own identity. He found himself the unpitied object of his own gaze, and faced with the silence of those who represented reason and did nothing other than hold out a dangerous mirror, he recognised himself as objectively mad.

We have already seen the means – and the mystifications – employed in the therapeutic practices of the eighteenth century to persuade the mad of their insanity, the better to free them from it.[62] Here the movement is of a quite different nature. It is not that error is dissipated by the imposing spectacle of truth, or its counterfeit; the aim is to attack the arrogance of madness rather than its aberration. The classical mind condemned in madness a certain blindness to the truth; from Pinel onwards, it recognised in it an impulse from the depths which exceeded the juridical limits of the individual, ignoring fixed moral limits and tending towards an apotheosis of the self. For the nineteenth century, the initial model of madness was to believe oneself to be God, whereas for preceding centuries it had been to turn one's back on God. Madness was thus to find its salvation in the spectacle of itself as unreason humiliated, when, fascinated by the absolute subjectivity of its delirium, it glimpsed its derisory and objective image in an identical madman. The truth insinuated itself as though by surprise (not by violence, as had been the case during the eighteenth century) into this game of reciprocal glances, where it only ever saw itself. But the asylum, in this community of madmen, ensured that mirrors were positioned in such fashion that eventually the mad could not fail to see themselves for what they were. Freed from the chains that had ensured it was a pure object of the gaze, madness was paradoxically stripped of its essential liberty, which was that of solitary exaltation; it became responsible for what it knew of its truth, and was imprisoned in its own gaze, which was constantly turned back on itself, finally chained to the humiliation of being an object for itself. Realisation, or gaining consciousness was now linked to the shame of being identical to that

other, compromised in him and scorned by oneself even before reaching recognition and knowledge of oneself.

3 *Perpetual judgement.* In that mirror game, as with silence, madness was constantly called upon to become its own judge. But in addition, it was at each moment judged from without; judged not by a moral or scientific consciousness, but rather by a sort of invisible court that was permanently in session. The asylum Pinel dreamt of, and which he realised in part at Bicêtre, and even more so at the Salpêtrière, was a judicial microcosm. In order to be effective, this justice needed a fearsome aspect. All the imaginary paraphernalia of judge and executioner needed to be present in the mind of the alienated, so that they understood completely the universe of judgement in which they found themselves. The ceremony of justice, the full terror of its implacability, was therefore to be a part of the treatment. One of the inmates at Bicêtre suffered from a religious delirium that revolved around a panicked fear of Hell, and he believed that the only manner in which he would escape eternal damnation was by observing a rigorous abstinence. It was necessary for that fear of a distant justice to be compensated by the presence of an immediate form of justice that was more redoubtable still: 'Could the irresistible course of his sinister ideas be counterbalanced other than by an intense, deep-seated impression of fear?' One night, the director turned up at the patient's door:

> with an appearance designed to terrify him, his eyes aflame, and with a thundering tone of voice, surrounded by a group of men carrying heavy chains, which they shook loudly. They placed some soup in front of the alienated patient, and ordered him to eat it during the night, unless he wished to experience the most terrible treatment. Then they retreated, leaving the patient painfully oscillating between the fear of an immediate punishment and the terrifying prospect of eternal torment in the life to come. After an inner struggle that went on for several hours, the first idea carried the day, and he decided to eat the food.[63]

As a judicial instance, the asylum recognised no other. It judged immediately, and there was no appeal. It had its own instruments of punishment, and it used them as it saw fit. The old confinement, on the whole, had taken place outside of the normal juridical forms. But it imitated the punishments of those on whom sentence was passed, using

the same prisons and dungeons, the same physical punishments. The justice that reigned in Pinel's asylum owed nothing to other forms of repression, and invented its own instead. Or rather it employed the therapeutic means that had become more widespread during the eighteenth century, reinventing them as forms of punishment. This conversion of medicine into justice, and therapeutics into repression ranks not lowest among the paradoxes in the achievements of this 'liberator' and 'philanthropist'. In the medicine of the classical age, baths and showers were used as remedies, as a result of physicians' dreams about the nature of the nervous system. The idea had been to refresh the system, relaxing the burning, desiccated fibres;[64] and it was doubtless true that among the fortunate consequences of the cold shower there was also the psychological effect of a disagreeable surprise, which broke the chain of thoughts and changed the nature of feelings; but here we are still in the domain of medical dreams. With Pinel, the use of the cold shower became openly judicial, and a shower was the usual punishment meted out by the simple police tribunal that permanently sat in the asylums:

> Considered as a means of repression, they are often enough to force an alienated woman to submit to the general law of manual labour, and will also conquer refusals to take food, and calm alienated women who are carried away by a sort of turbulent and reasoned humour.[65]

Everything is organised so that the mad recognise themselves in the world of judgement that envelops them from all sides: they are to know that they are observed, judged and condemned. The link between the crime and its punishment was to be clear, and guilt was to be acknowledged by all:

> Advantage is taken of the circumstances surrounding the bath, and the fault that has been committed or the omission of the important duty is recalled, and with the help of a tap a quick burst of cold water is directed at the head, often disconcerting the alienated patient, or freeing her from a dominant idea with this strong and unexpected sensation. If she is obstinate, the cold shower is repeated, but care is taken to avoid a harsh tone or words that might shock or offend; she is made to understand that it is for her good and that recourse is regretfully made to measures of such violence; sometimes a joke is made of it, although care must be taken that it does not go too far.[66]

The almost arithmetical obviousness of the punishment, repeated as often as necessary, and the recognition of fault by the repression that was exerted were all intended to bring about an interiorisation of the judicial instance, leading to the beginnings of remorse in the patient's mind. Only then did the judges agree to bring the punishment to an end, as they were sure that it would continue indefinitely inside the patient's conscience. One maniac was in the habit of tearing at her clothes and breaking any object within her reach. She was given the cold water treatment, and then tied up in a straitjacket, and appeared at last 'humiliated and deeply concerned'; but fearing that her feelings of shame were merely transitory and her remorse too superficial, 'the director spoke to her in the strongest terms to ensure that she experienced a feeling of real terror; he did not show anger, but he informed her that henceforth she would always be treated as severely as possible'. The expected result was not long in coming: 'Her repentance began in a torrent of tears, which she shed for nearly two hours.'[67] The cycle was doubly complete: the fault was punished, and its author had acknowledged her guilt.

There were, however, alienated patients who escaped this movement and resisted the moral synthesis it operated. Such people were to be locked away inside the asylum, making a new confined population that was even out of the reach of justice. When people speak of Pinel and the liberation he initiated, this second form of incarceration is too often ignored. We have already seen him refusing the benefits of asylum reform to

> religious fanatics who believe themselves to be inspired, and who constantly seek to convert others to their cause, and take a perfidious pleasure in fomenting dissent amongst other alienated patients, on the pretext that they should obey God rather than man.

But reclusion and the dungeon were equally obligatory for those 'who refuse to cooperate with the general law of work and who, in malicious activity, enjoy tormenting the other inmates, provoking them and inciting them to revolt', and for women who 'during their attacks, have an irresistible propensity to steal anything that comes into their grasp'.[68] Disobedience on account of religious fanaticism, resistance to work, and theft, the three great sins against bourgeois society, three major attacks on its essential values, were all inexcusable, even in the mad. Such faults demanded imprisonment pure and simple, and exclusion in the most rigorous form possible, as all three crimes demonstrated the same resistance to moral and social uniformity, which were the *raison d'être* of the asylum such as it was conceived by Pinel.

In previous times, unreason was placed outside judgement, to be arbitrarily handed over to the powers of reason. Now, it was judged, and not just once, on entry to the asylum, to be recognised, classified and declared innocent forever; instead it was caught in a perpetual judgement, which never ceased to hound it and apply sanctions, proclaiming faults and demanding a frank admission of wrongdoing, banishing anyone whose errant ways risked compromising the social order for a long time. Madness escaped arbitrariness only to fall into a sort of endless trial, for which the asylum provided the police, the prosecutors, the judges and the executioners. This was a trial where any error in life, by a virtue proper to life in the asylum, became a social crime, observed, sentenced and punished; a trial that had no issue other than in a perpetual recommencement in the interiorised form of remorse. The mad who were 'delivered' by Pinel, and, in their wake the madmen of the modern confinement, are characters on trial; if they have the privilege of no longer being locked up or confused with other prisoners, they are still condemned at each instant to be the subject of a process of accusation which never takes place in public, for it is formulated by their whole asylum life. The asylum of the positivist age, which Pinel is credited with having founded, is not a free domain of observation, diagnosis and therapeutics: it is a judicial space where people are accused, judged, and sentenced, from which they can only be freed by a translation of this judicial process into the depths of psychology, i.e. through repentance. Madness was to be punished in asylums, even if its innocence was proclaimed outside. For a long time to come, and at least until today, it was imprisoned in a moral world.

*

A fourth structure, proper to the world of the asylum as it came into being at the close of the eighteenth century, should also be added to silence, the recognition in a mirror and perpetual judgement. This is the apotheosis of the medical character (*'personnage médical'*). This is perhaps the most important of all, as it was to authorise not only new contacts between doctors and patients, but also a new relation between alienation and medical thought, which was finally to take command of the whole modern

experience of madness. Until now, what had been found in the asylum was essentially a repetition of the structures of confinement, although displaced and deformed. With the new status of the medical character, it was the deepest meaning of confinement that was abolished; mental illness, with all the connotations that are familiar to us today, then became possible.

The works of Tuke and Pinel, which were so different in spirit and values, come together in this transformation of the medical character. As we saw above, physicians had no role to play in the life of confinement. But they became essential figures in the asylum. They presided over entry, as the rules of the Retreat made clear:

> On the admission of patients, the Committee should, in general, require a certificate signed by a medical person. It should also be stated, whether the patient is afflicted with any complaint independent of insanity. It is also desirable, that some account should be sent, how long the patient has been disordered; whether any, or what sort of medical means have been used.[69]

Since the end of the eighteenth century, a medical certificate had been more or less obligatory for the confinement of the mad.[70] But inside the asylum, the doctor took pride of place, since it was he who transformed the space into a medical institution. Despite that, and this was the key point, the intervention of the doctor was not done on the basis of some skill or medical power as such that he alone possessed, justified by a body of objective knowledge. It was not as a scientist that *homo medicus* gained authority in the asylum, but as a wise man. If medical practitioneers were required, then it was not for the knowledge that they brought, but rather as a moral and juridical guarantee of good faith.[71] Any man of good conscience and unquestionable virtue, providing he had a long experience of the asylum, could just as well take his place.[72] For medical duties were only one part of the immense moral task to be accomplished inside the asylum, and which alone could guarantee the insane a cure:

> Must it not be an inviolable law in the administration of any public or private establishment for the alienated that maniacs should be given the maximum of liberty that their safety and that of others permits, so that repression should be proportional to any danger that their behaviour might pose . . . and that any facts that might aid the doctor in his choice of treatment should be carefully recorded, and particular differences in behaviour or temperament studied precisely so that gentleness or firmness, conciliatory terms or an imposing, authoritative tone and inflexible severity should be used accordingly?[73]

According to Samuel Tuke, the first doctor who was assigned to the Retreat was to be commended on his 'indefatigable perseverance'; admittedly, he had no particular experience of mental illness when he arrived at the institution, but he 'entered on his office with the anxiety and ardour of a feeling mind, upon the exertion of whose skill, depended the dearest interests of many of his fellow-creatures'.[74] He tried the remedies that his good sense and the experience of his predecessors suggested. But he was quickly disappointed, although not because the results were bad or because the number of cures was minimal:

> [Although the proportion of cures, in the early part of the Institution, was respectable;] yet the medical means were so imperfectly connected with the progress of recovery, that he could not avoid suspecting them, to be rather concomitants than causes.

He then realised that the known medical methods of the time were of little use. A concern with humanity was of much greater importance, and he decided to forego any form of medicine that patients found disagreeable. But this was not to say that the doctor had only a minor role to play at the Retreat: the regular visits that he made to patients, the authority that he exercised in the house, which placed him above the guards, meant that 'The physician, from his office, sometimes possesses more influence over the patients' minds, than the other attendants.'[75]

It is generally believed that Tuke and Pinel opened up the asylum to medical knowledge. But it was not science that they introduced so much as a new character, who borrowed little more than the disguise offered by that knowledge, or at best used it as a justification. These powers, by their nature, were of an order that was moral and social. They had their roots in the status of the mad as minors, and in the alienation of their character rather than their minds. If the medical character could circumscribe madness, it was not because he knew it but because he mastered it; and what

positivism came to consider as objectivity was nothing but the converse, the effects of this domination:

> It should be the great object of the superintendent to gain the confidence of the patient, and to awaken in him respect and obedience; but it will readily be seen, that such confidence, obedience and respect can only be procured by superiority of talents, discipline of temper, and dignity of manners. Imbecility, misconduct and empty consequence, although enforced with the most tyrannical severity, may excite fear, but this will always be mingled with contempt.
>
> In speaking of the management of insane persons, it is to be understood that the superintendent must first obtain an ascendancy over them. When this is once effected, he will be enabled, on future occasions, to direct and regulate their conduct, according as his better judgement may suggest. He should possess firmness, and when occasion may require, should exercise his authority in peremptory manner. He should never threaten, but execute; and when the patient has misbehaved, should confine him immediately.[76]

The doctor could only exert his absolute authority over the world of the asylum in so far as he was, from the beginning, Father and Judge, Family and Law, and for a long time his medical practice did little more than offer a commentary on the ancient rites of Order, Authority and Punishment. Pinel recognised very well that doctors cure when, outside modern therapeutics, they bring these immemorial figures into play.

He quotes the case of a young 17-year-old girl who had been brought up by her parents in 'a most indulgent fashion'; she had fallen into a 'gay, dreamy delirium, for no reason that could be determined'. In hospital she had been treated with the utmost gentleness, but she had always had a slightly 'haughty air' that could not be tolerated inside the asylum, and she only ever spoke 'of her parents with bitterness'. It was decided that she should be submitted to a regime of strict authority:

> In order to break her inflexible character, the keeper chose his moment at bath time, and expressed himself quite forcibly about certain unnatural people who dared go against their parents and question their authority. He warned her that she was to be treated henceforth with all the severity that she deserved, since she had clearly set herself against a cure and was seeking to disguise the original cause of her malady with insurmountable obstinacy.

Faced with the rigours of this new threat, the patient felt herself to be

> deeply moved . . . and wound up admitting the error of her ways, and made a frank confession that she had fallen into her unreasoned state as a result of heartbreak, even naming the person who had been its object.

After that first confession, the cure became easy: 'A most favourable change came over her . . . and she was quite relieved, and filled with gratitude towards the keeper who had put a term to her suffering, restoring tranquillity and calm to her heart.' Every moment of this story could be readily transposed into a psychoanalytical narrative, so true is it that the medical character in Pinel's definition was to act not in accordance with an objective definition of the sickness or a diagnosis based on a classification, but rather by using the sort of prestige that envelopes the secrets of Family, Authority, Punishments and Love. By bringing these powers into play, and taking on the mantle of the Father and Lord of Justice, the doctor, by one of those sudden short-cuts that bypass medical competence, became the almost magical practitioner of the cure, taking on the appearance of a worker of miracles. It was enough for him to look and talk for secret faults to appear, insane presumptions to vanish, so that madness would finally tow the line of reason. His presence and his language possessed that power of disalienation, which at a stroke revealed faults and restored the moral order.

It is a curious paradox to see medical practice enter the uncertain domain of the quasi-miraculous just as the science of mental illness was trying to assume a sense of positivity. On the one hand madness is placed at a distance in an objective field where the threats of unreason disappear; but at the same moment the madman and the doctor begin to form a strange sort of couple, an undivided unity where complicity is forged along very ancient lines. Life in the asylums, such as it was constituted by Tuke and Pinel, enabled the growth of this subtle structure that was like the root cell of madness – a structure forming a microcosm where all the great, massive structures of bourgeois society and its values had their own symbol: the relationship between Family and Children structured around the theme of paternal authority; the relationship between Fault

and Punishment around the theme of immediate justice; and the links between Madness and Disorder around the theme of social and moral order. It was here that the origins of the doctor's power to cure were to be found, and it was in so far as the patient found himself, through so many ancient links, already alienated in the doctor, inside the doctor–patient couple, that the doctor had an almost miraculous ability to cure him.

There was nothing extraordinary about that power in the days of Pinel and Tuke, as it could be explained and demonstrated by the sole efficacy of moral conduct; it was no more mysterious than the power of an eighteenth-century physician when he diluted fluids or relaxed fibres. But very quickly, the meaning of this moral practice escaped doctors, as they began to wrap up their knowledge in the norms of positivism. By the early nineteenth century, psychiatrists no longer understood the nature of the power that they had inherited from the great reformers, whose effectiveness seemed so distant from the idea that they had of mental illness, and the medical practice of all other doctors.

This dense mystery that surrounds psychiatric practice, which is obscure even to those who used it, is largely responsible for the strange situation of the mad inside the medical world. First, because mental medicine, for the first time in the history of Western science, was to take on almost complete autonomy. Since the Greeks, it had only been one chapter in medicine, and as we saw above, physicians like Willis studied madness under the rubric 'diseases of the head'; after Pinel and Tuke, psychiatry was to become medicine of a particular style: even those most determined to find the origins of madness in organic causes or in hereditary dispositions would not escape this style. All the more so as this particular style – involving the use of continuously more obscure moral powers – was at the origin of a sort of bad conscience: the more they felt that their practice escaped the confines of positivism, the more rigorously they attempted to pursue it.

As positivism imposed itself on medicine, and above all on psychiatry, the practice became more obscure, the power of the psychiatrist more miraculous, and the doctor–patient couple sank ever deeper into a strange world. In the eyes of the patient, the doctor was a miracle worker, and the authority that he borrowed from order, morality and the family he now seemed to derive from himself. It is as a doctor that he is believed to have such powers, and whereas both Pinel and Tuke underlined quite clearly that their moral actions were not necessarily linked to any scientific

competence, it came to be believed, above all by patients, that it was some esoteric, almost demoniacal secret in his knowledge that gave him the power to undo alienation. Patients increasingly accepted this abandonment in the hands of a doctor who was both divine and satanic, or in any case beyond human measure; the more they were alienated in the doctor, accepting entirely in advance all his prestige, and submitting immediately to a will that they felt to be magical and to a form of science which seemed endowed with prescience and divination, the more such patients became the ideal and perfect correlate of the powers that were projected onto the physician, pure objects with no resistance other than inertia, ripe to become precisely the hysterical woman in whom Charcot exalted the marvellous powers of the doctor. Anyone who wants to pursue an analysis of the deep structures of objectivity in the knowledge and the psychiatric practice of the nineteenth century, from Pinel to Freud,[77] needs to show that, from the very beginning, objectivity was a reification of a magical type, which could only be accomplished with the complicity of the patients themselves, starting out from a transparently clear moral framework which was slowly forgotten as positivism imposed its myth of scientific objectivity. The origins and the meaning of the practice were forgotten, but its use persisted and it was always present. What we call psychiatric practice is a certain moral tactic contemporaneous with the late eighteenth century, which is preserved in the rituals of life in asylums, covered over by the myths of positivism.

But if doctors soon became miracle workers in the eyes of patients, to their own eyes they could never be anything other than positivist physicians. A status still had to be found for this dark power whose origins had disappeared, where the complicity of the patient could not be deciphered, as doctors refused to recognise the ancient powers that lent it its strength. As there was nothing in positive knowledge that could justify such a transfer of will, or these operations that seemed to take place at a distance, the moment would soon come when madness itself was to be held responsible for these anomalies. Cures without any solid basis, yet whose reality was undeniable, were quickly transformed into real cures of false illnesses. Madness was not what one thought, nor what it claimed to be; it was infinitely less than itself, a blend of persuasion and mystification. We can see here the genesis of Babinski's pithiatism.[78] And by a strange return, thoughts went back nearly two centuries to the time when the distinctions between madness, false madness and simulated madness

were far from clear, and all that held them together was the knowledge that they were all linked to guilt in some manner. Going back further still, medical thought finally operated a process of assimilation that all Western medicine had refused since the Greeks: the assimilation of madness and madness, i.e. of the medical and the critical concepts of madness. During the late nineteenth century, in the thought of Babinski's contemporaries, we find the first daring formulation of the idea that medical thought had so long refused – that madness, after all, was perhaps just madness.

Thus, while the mentally ill person is wholly alienated in the real person of his doctor, the doctor dissipates the reality of mental illness in the critical concept of madness. So much so that beyond the empty forms of positivist thought, all that remains is a single concrete reality: the doctor–patient couple, in which all alienations are summed up, formed and resolved. It is in that respect that all the psychiatry of the nineteenth century really does converge on Freud, who was the first to accept the seriousness of the reality of the doctor–patient couple, and who consented never to avert his gaze and his research from this link, and who sought not to mask it in a psychiatric theory merely attempting to keep in harmony with the rest of medical knowledge: he was the first to have followed the rigour of these consequences very closely. Freud demystified all the other asylum structures: he abolished silence and the gaze, and removed the recognition of madness by itself in the mirror of its own spectacle, and he silenced the instances of condemnation. But, on the other hand, he exploited the structure that enveloped the medical character: he amplified his virtues as worker of miracles, preparing an almost divine status for his omnipotence. He brought back to him, and to his simple presence, hidden behind the patient and above him, in an absence that was also a total presence, all the powers that had been shared out in the collective existence of the asylum; he made him the absolute Gaze, the pure, indefinitely held Silence, the Judge who punishes and rewards in a judgement that does not even condescend to language; and he made him the mirror in which madness, in an almost immobile movement, falls in and out of love with itself.

Freud made sure that all the structures integrated by Pinel and Tuke into confinement were appropriated by the doctor. He freed the patient from that asylum existence to which his 'liberators' had condemned him, but

he failed to spare him the essential components of that existence. He concentrated its powers, stretched them to the limit, and placed them in the hands of the doctor. He created the psychoanalytic situation, where, in the short circuit of a stroke of genius, alienation became disalienating because, in the doctor, it became subject.

The doctor, as an alienating figure, remains the key to psychoanalysis. Perhaps because it has never suppressed that ultimate structure, but included all the others in it instead, psychoanalysis cannot and will never be able to hear the voices of unreason nor decipher on their own terms the signs of the insane. Psychoanalysis can untangle some forms of madness, but it is a perpetual stranger to the sovereign work of unreason. It cannot liberate or transcribe, and *a fortiori* explain, what is essential in that work.

Since the late eighteenth century, the life of unreason has only manifested itself in the incendiary work of a small number of writers such as Hölderlin, Nerval, Nietzsche and Artaud – works that could never be reduced to these alienations that cure, resisting, through their own strength, that gigantic moral imprisonment that became known, ironically perhaps, as Pinel and Tuke's liberation of the mad.

1786). There were numerous anonymous writings too: *Précis des vues générales en faveur de ceux qui n'ont rien* (Lons-le-Saulnier, 1789), followed by *Un moyen d'extirper la mendicité* (Paris, 1789); *Plaidoyer pour l'héritage du pauvre* (Paris, 1790). In 1777, the academy at Châlons-sur-Marne offered a prize for the best essay on 'Causes of Begging and Means of Making Them Disappear'. They received more than 100 memoirs, and published a resumé. Means suggested included the following: sending beggars back to their original communities and obliging them to work there; abolishing public alms; decreasing the number of hospitals; reforming the remainder; setting up public pawn shops; setting up workshops, and reducing the number of feast days; opening correction centres for 'anyone who troubled the harmony of society'. Cf. Brissot de Warville, *Théorie des lois criminelles*, vol. I, p. 261, note 123.

77 Coqueau, pp. 23–24.
78 Coqueau, p. 7.
79 The French original indicates the eighteenth century here, which is probably a typographical error.
80 Coqueau, p. 7.
81 Ibid.
82 Desmonceaux, *De la bienfaisance nationale*, Paris, 1789, pp. 7–8.
83 Récalde's request was that a committee should be set up 'for the general reform of hospitals', then 'a permanent commission, invested with the authority of the King, which would work ceaselessly to maintain order and equity in the use of the funds allocated to the welfare of the poor' (p. 129). Cf. Claude Chevalier, *Description des avantages d'une maison de santé* (1762). Dulaurent, *Essai sur les établissements nécessaires et les moins dispendieux pour rendre le service dans les hôpitaux vraiment utile à l'humanité*, Paris, 1787.
84 Dupont de Nemours, *Idées sur les secours à donner aux pauvres malades dans une grande ville*, 1786, pp. 10–11.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., p. 113.
87 At the request of Turgot, Brienne opened an inquiry into assistance in the region of Toulouse. He drew up his findings in 1775, and read them in Montigny. He recommended help in the home, but also the creation of hospices for certain categories like the mad. (BN, Fonds français 8129, fos. 244–287.)
88 Nicholls, *The English Poor Laws*, vol. II, pp. 115–116.
89 F. Eden, *State of the Poor*, vol. I, p. 373.
90 La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt (Procès-verbal de l'Assemblé nationale, vol. XLIV, pp. 94–95).

III THE PROPER USE OF LIBERTY

1 A circular to all superintendents from March 1784, quoted in Funck-Brentano, *Les Lettres de cachet à Paris*, p. XLII.
2 They were the Duke de Liancourt, the curé de Sergy, and the curé de Cretot, who were all deputies, and Montlinot and Thouret, who were *agrégés externes au travail du Comité*. Cf. *Rapport au Comité de mendicité*, p. 4.
3 *Rapport au Comité de mendicité*, p. 47.
4 Ibid., p. 78. Summing up its work at the end of the Constituent Assembly, the Committee requested the creation of 'two hospitals reserved for the curing of madness' (Cf. Tuetey, *L'Assistance publique à Paris pendant la Révolution*, vol. I, Introduction, p. xv).
5 Article IX of the decree.
6 Cf. the *Moniteur* of 3 April 1790.
7 There were numerous discussions about what should be done with the mad in the hospitals. In the hospice in Toulouse for example, the Minister of Police refused to free the mad for safety reasons, despite the fact that the Minister of the Interior had granted them their freedom because of the poverty of the hospital, and because 'assistance was very costly and difficult to provide' (Archives nationales, F 15, 339).
8 Title XI, article 3.
9 These dispositions were also to found in the Penal Code. Portalis refers to them in a circular of 30 Fructidor Year XII (17 September 1804).
10 Letter from the Minister of the Interior (5 May 1791) to M. Chalan, *Procureur Général* and *Syndic* of the Seine-et-Oise department. (Manuscript quoted by Lallemand, vol. IV, ii, p. 7, note 14.)
11 Cf. Pignot, *Les Origines de l'hôpital du Midi*, pp. 92–93.
12 Report of the Government Commissioner Antoine Nodier to the Tribunals, 4 Germinal Year VIII. Quoted in Léonce Pingaud, *Jean de Bry*, Paris, 1909, p. 194.
13 The *Mémoires du Père Richard* note that 400 political prisoners once arrived at Bicêtre on the same day (fos. 49–50).
14 Pinel, who had taken up office at Bicêtre on 11 September 1793, was later nominated to the Salpêtrière, on 13 May 1795 (24 Floréal Year III).
15 Letter from Létourneau, the bursar of the House of the Poor in Bicêtre, to citizens Osmond and Grand Pré. Quoted in Tuetey, *L'Assistance publique à Paris pendant la Révolution*, vol. III, pp. 360–362.
16 La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, p. 95. Our emphasis.
17 Brissot de Warville, pp. 183–185. It is worth noting that Sade wrote or made a plan to write 'a dissertation on the death penalty, followed by a project on the useful employment of criminals for the good of the State'. *Portefeuille d'un homme de lettres*, quoted by G. Lély, *Vie du marquis de Sade*, vol. II, p. 343).
18 Musquinet de la Pagne, *Bicêtre réformé, où l'établissement d'une maison de discipline*, Paris, 1790, pp. 10–11.
19 Musquinet de la Pagne, p. 26.
20 Ibid., p. 27.
21 Ibid., p. 11.
22 It should not be forgotten that Musquinet himself had been confined in Bicêtre under the Ancien Régime, and was sentenced and locked up again during the

Revolution – at one time because he was considered a madman, and at the other as he was thought to be a criminal.

23 *Journal de médecine*, August 1785, pp. 529–583.

24 Cf. Sérieux et Libert, 'L'Assistance et le Traitement des maladies mentales au temps de Louis XVI', *Chronique médicale*, 15 July–1 August 1914.

25 Tenon, *Mémoires sur les hôpitaux de Paris*, Paris, 1788, fourth Mémoire, p. 212.

26 Tenon, *Projet de rapport au nom du comité de secours*, ms. BN fo. 232.

27 Ibid. Cf. in the same perspective *Mémoires sur les hôpitaux*, fourth Mémoire, p. 216.

28 Ibid.

29 1791: 'Report submitted to the department of Paris by one of its members on the state of the mad women in the Salpêtrière, and adoption of draft regulations for the admission of the insane.' The text is quoted in full, without the author's name, in Tuetey, *L'Assistance publique à Paris pendant la Révolution. Documents inédits*, vol. III, pp. 489–506. Much of it was repeated in *Vues sur les secours publics*, 1798.

30 *Vues sur les secours publics*, in Cabanis, *Œuvres philosophiques*, Paris, 1956, part II, p. 49.

31 Cabanis, p. 51.

32 Ibid., p. 58.

33 Tenon had nothing but praise for the straitjacket, which he had seen at Saint Luke's: 'if there is a risk that the madman might harm himself or others, his arms are restrained with long sleeves that knot behind the back' (*Projet de rapport au nom du comité des secours*, fo. 232).

34 Cabanis, 'Report submitted to the department of Paris by one of its members on the state of the mad women in the Salpêtrière, and adoption of draft regulations for the admission of the insane' (quoted by Tuetey, vol. III, pp. 492–493).

35 Des Essarts, *Dictionnaire universel de police*, Paris, 1786, vol. VIII, p. 526.

36 The decrees of 21 May–7 June 1790 replaced the seventy districts with forty-eight sections.

37 Quoted in Joly, *Les Lettres de cachet dans la généralité de Caen au XVIIIe siècle*, Paris, 1864, p. 18, note 1.

38 Bertin's text, quoted above, stipulates the precautions to be taken: 'Such measures should be taken in addition to an exact verification of their statement.'

39 Cf. the report presented by the Justice Minister to the Legislative Assembly (*Archives parlementaires*, supplement to the session of 20 May 1792, vol. XLIII, p. 613). Between 11 December 1790 and 1 May 1792, the court in Saint-Germain-en-Laye ratified a mere forty-five judgments by the family tribunal.

40 See above, Part One, chapter IV.

41 See above, Part One, chapter V.

42 Brissot de Warville, *Théorie des lois criminelles*, vol. I, p. 101.

43 Ibid., p. 49–50.

44 Ibid., p. 114.

45 Ibid., p. 50.

46 An example: on 30 August 1791, a woman was condemned for a sex crime

> to be led by the high justice executioner to all the usual public crossroads, and particularly to the place du Palais-Royal, mounted on a donkey, facing backwards, with a straw hat on her head and a panel on her front and her back reading 'corrupter of the youth', and to be beaten and whipped with sticks, naked, and branded with a hot iron in the shape of a fleur-de-lys.
>
> (*Gazette des tribunaux*, I, no. 18, p. 284. Cf. ibid, II, no. 36, p. 145)

47 BN collection Joly de Fleury, 1246, fos. 132–166.

48 The hero of Prévost's *Manon Lescaut* (1731), whose overwhelming passion for the heroine leads him to crime. [TN]

49 Bellart, *Œuvres*, Paris, 1827–28, vol. I, p. 103.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., pp. 76–77.

52 Ibid., p. 97.

53 Ibid., p. 103.

54 Ibid., p. 90.

55 Ibid., pp. 90–91.

IV BIRTH OF THE ASYLUM

1 Dr Delarive, Letter to the editors of the *Bibliothèque britannique*. Quoted in S. Tuke, *Description of the Retreat, an Institution near York for Insane Persons*, York, 1813, (reprinted in facsimile, London: Process press, 1996), p. 221. Delarive visited the Retreat in 1798.

2 Georges Couthon (1755–1794), a member of the Convention and part of the triumvirate of the Committee of Public Safety (with Robespierre and Saint-Just), who died on the guillotine in 1794. [TN]

3 Scipion Pinel, *Traité complet du régime sanitaire des aliénés*, Paris, 1836, p. 56.

4 See above, Part Three, chapter 2.

5 Voltaire, *Lettres philosophiques*, ed. Droz, vol. I, p.17, translated as *Letters on England*, with an introduction by Leonard Tancock (Harmondsworth: Penguin books, 1980), p. 27.

6 33. George III, cap. V.

7 35. George III, cap. 101. On the repeal of the Settlement Act, see Nicholls, vol. II, pp. 112–113.

8 Sewel, *The History of the Rise, Increases and Progress of Christian People*, 3rd edition, p. 28. [Fox's autobiography claims that the Darby imprisonment was in 1650; 1649 found him in prison in Nottingham. TN]

9 Sewel, p. 233.

10 Voltaire, *Lettres philosophiques*.

11 Like the Protestant mystics of the late seventeenth century, and the last Jansenists.

12 Samuel Tuke, *Description of the Retreat, an Institution near York for Insane Persons*, York, 1813, pp. 22–33. [Foucault omitted the word 'milder'. TN]

13 Quoted in Tuetey, vol. III, p. 369.
14 It was in the Pension Vernet, in rue Servandoni, that Pinet and Boyer had found a hiding place for Condorcet, when a warrant was issued for his arrest on 8 July 1793.
15 Dupuytren, *Notice sur Philippe Pinel*. Excerpt from the *Journal des Débats*, 7 November 1826, p. 8. Dupuytren was probably alluding to the Abbé Fournier, who had protested from the pulpit against the execution of Louis XVI, and who, after being confined to Bicêtre due to 'an attack of madness', went on to become Napoleon's chaplain, and then the Bishop of Montpellier.
16 Cf. for example the decree from the General Safety Committee ordering the transfer to Bicêtre of a madman who could not be kept 'in the great hospice of humanity' (Tuetey, vol. III, pp. 427–428).
17 Letter from Piersin to the Civil Administration Commission, 19 Frimaire Year III (Tuetey, vol. III, p. 172).
18 Piersin calculated that there were 207 madmen in Bicêtre, on 10 Frimaire Year III (Tuetey, p. 370).
19 Pinel had been the editor of the *Gazette de Santé* before the Revolution, and had written several articles about mental illness, including in particular, 'Are fits of melancholy not more common and more to be feared in the first months of winter?' (1787), and 'Observations on the moral regime most fitting for the restoration of reason in maniacs' (1789). In *La Médecine éclairée par les Sciences physiques*, he had published an article 'about a particular variety of melancholy that leads to suicide' in 1791.
20 *Gazette nationale*, 12 December 1789.
21 Quoted in Sémelaigne, *Philippe Pinel et son œuvre*, pp. 108–109.
22 Cf. the correspondence between Létourneau and the Public Works Commission quoted in Tuetey, vol. III, pp. 397–476.
23 In his concern to portray Pinel as a victim of the Terror, Dupuytren recounts that he was 'arrested, and was about to be dragged before the Revolutionary Tribunal; luckily the authorities were made to understand the necessity of his work with the poor at Bicêtre, and he was set free' (Dupuytren, p. 9).
24 Report to the Society of Friends, 5 April 1793, quoted in Tuke, p. 36.
25 Tuke, pp. 93–95.
26 Ibid., pp. 130–131. [Foucault ends this section by quoting 'et les premiers jours de repos qu'ils avaient l'occasion d'y prendre', '[and by] the first days of rest that they took there', although there is no such line in Tuke's text. TN]
27 Tuke, p. 137, note.
28 Ibid.
29 Share-based systems had been common among the Quakers since the seventeenth century. Anyone who contributed a minimum of £20 to the Retreat got an annual return of 5% on their investment. From a financial point of view, the Retreat appears to have been a considerable success, as can be seen from the profits in its early years: £268 in June, 1798; £245 in 1799; £800 in 1800; £145 in 1801; £45 in 1802; £258 in 1803; £449 in 1804; £521 in 1805. (See Tuke, pp. 72–75).
30 Tuke, p. 178.
31 In fact only a member of the Commune could be designated to inspect a hospital. But Couthon was never a member of that particular assembly. (See Emile Richard, *Histoire de l'Hôpital de Bicêtre*, Paris, 1889, p. 113, note).
32 Scipion Pinel, *Traité complet du régime sanitaire des aliénés*, Paris, 1836, pp. 56–63.
33 Hegel, *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, no. 408, note. [Foucault removed the reference to Pinel here. TN]
34 Tuke, p. 50.
35 Ibid., p. 23.
36 Ibid., pp. 160–161.
37 Ibid., p. 23.
38 Ibid., p. 141.
39 Ibid., pp. 146–147.
40 Ibid., p. 156.
41 Ibid., p. 183.
42 Ibid., p. 157. [Foucault translated desire as need here, the '*desire* for esteem' becoming 'le *besoin* d'estime'. TN]
43 Tuke, p. 178.
44 There were plenty of physical constraints still in use at the Retreat. To force patients to eat, Tuke recommended the use of a simple door key forced between the patient's jaws and slowly turned as necessary. In his view, patients' teeth were broken less often this way (Tuke, p. 170).
45 Tuke, pp. 172–173.
46 Delarive, quoted in Tuke, pp. 223.
47 *Traité médico-philosophique*, p. 265.
48 Ibid., p. 458.
49 Ibid. All of the statistics drawn by Pinel can be found on pp. 427–437.
50 Ibid., pp. 268.
51 Ibid., pp. 116–117.
52 Ibid., pp. 270–271.
53 Ibid., p. 141.
54 Ibid., p. 417.
55 Ibid., pp. 122–123.
56 Ibid., p. 237.
57 Ibid., pp. 29–30.
58 Pinel invariably privileged legislation over the advancement of knowledge. In a letter to his brother, written on 1 January 1799, he notes:

> If you glance at the systems of legislation that have flourished around the world, you soon see that in the institution of society, laws always precede the light of science and art, which presupposes a well-policed people, led by circumstances and the passage of time to a form of authority that allows the seeds of letters to germinate . . . No one will say that the English owe their laws to the flourishing state of the arts and the sciences, as that legislation predates it by several centuries. When those proud islanders began to stand out for their genius and their talent, their laws were already all they could be.
>
> (Quoted in Sémelaigne, *Aliénistes et philanthropes*, pp. 19–20)

59 Scipion Pinel, *Traité du régime sanitaire des aliénés*, p. 63.
60 Quoted in Sémelaigne, *Aliénistes et philanthropes*, appendix, p. 502.
61 Philippe Pinel, p. 256.
62 See Part Two, chapter V.
63 Pinel, *Traité médico-philosophique*, pp. 207–208.
64 Cf. above, Part Two, chapter IV.
65 Pinel, *Traité médico-philosophique*, p. 205.
66 Ibid., p. 205.
67 Ibid., p. 206.
68 Ibid., p. 291, note 1.
69 Rules of the Retreat, Section III, article 5, quoted in Tuke, pp. 89–90.
70 'The admission of the mad or the insane to establishments that are or will be reserved for them anywhere in the department of Paris will be done on the recommendation of a physician or a legally recognised surgeon.' (*Projet de Règlement sur l'admission des insensés*, adopted by the department of Paris, quoted in Tuetey, vol. III, p. 500.)
71 For the same reasons, Langermann and Kant preferred that this essential role be played by a 'philosopher'. This is not in opposition to the beliefs of either Tuke or Pinel, rather the reverse.
72 Cf. what Pinel said of Pussin and his wife, whom he appointed as his assistants at the Salpêtrière (Sémelaigne, *Aliénistes et philanthropes*, Appendix, p. 502).
73 Pinel, pp. 292–293.
74 Tuke, pp. 110–111.
75 Ibid., p. 115.
76 John Haslam, *Observations on Insanity with practical remarks on this disease*, London, 1798, pp. 122–123, quoted by Pinel, pp. 253–254.
77 These structures still persist in non-psychoanalytic psychiatry, and in many ways still inside psychoanalysis as well.
78 Joseph Babinski (1857–1932), a French neurologist who coined the term in 1901 for conditions he described as 'caused by suggestion, cured by persuasion'. [TN]

V THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL CIRCLE

1 Boissier de Sauvages, *Nosologie méthodique*, VII, p. 4.
2 Ibid.
3 Abelly, *Vie de saint Vincent de Paul*, Paris, 1813, II, chapter XIII.
4 Troxler, *Blicke in Wesen des Menschen*, quoted in Béguin, *L'Âme romantique et le rêve*, Paris, 1939, p. 93.
5 Hölderlin, *Hyperion* (quoted in Béguin, p. 162).
6 Nerval, *Aurélia*, Paris, 1927, p. 25.
7 The first line of Nerval's mystic sonnet *Artémis*, from *Les Chimères*. [TN]
8 It is in Zarathustra that this laughter will finally come together, in a single midday intoxication: a *tragic* rip in the fabric of the *world*, which each instant wrenches its truth from its appearance, and the *lyrical* promise that any end in *man* is a new beginning. Shimmering noon promises *tragic man* the *lyrical return* of the world. Both experiences come into contact in a poetic language where both fundamental expressions of madness meet. [This footnote appeared in the first edition, *Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (Paris: Plon, 1961), p. 435, and was deleted from subsequent editions. It contains allusions to Paul Valéry's poem: 'Le Cimetière marin'. TN]
9 Hoffmann, quoted by Béguin, p. 297.
10 Pinel, quoted without a reference in Sémelaigne, *Philippe Pinel et son œuvre*, p. 106.
11 Matthey, p. 67.
12 Spurzheim, *Observations sur la folie*, pp. 141–142.
13 Hegel, *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, no. 408.
14 Ibid. [Foucault omits the reference to Pinel here. TN]
15 Leuret, *Du traitement moral de la folie*, Paris, 1840.
16 Pinel, *Traité médico-philosophique*, p. 214.
17 In the face of general paralysis, hysteria was 'bad madness': there was no fault that could be identified, nothing organic to be blamed, no possible communication. The general paralysis/hysteria duality marks the extremes of the domain of psychiatric experience in the twentieth century, the perpetual object of a double and constant preoccupation. It could and should be demonstrated that explanations for hysteria (up to and excluding Freud) were all taken from the model of general paralysis, but that the model was purified, made more psychological and more transparent.
18 Pinel, *Traité médico-philosophique*, p. 156
19 Esquirol, *Des maladies mentales*, II, p. 335.
20 As late as 1893, the Medico-psychological Association devoted its 35th annual conference to the problems of 'Moral Insanity'.
21 U. Trélat, *La Folie lucide*, Avant-propos, p. x.
22 See above, Part Two, chapter IV.
23 Some of these affairs generated an immense medical and juridical literature. See the case of Léger, who ate the heart of a young girl, Papavoine, who, in the presence of their mother, slit the throat of two children that he was seeing for the first time, or Henriette Cornier, who cut off the head of a child that she did not know. England had the Bowler case, and Germany had the Sievert affair.
24 Cf. Élias Régnault, *Du degré de compétence des médecins*, 1828; Fodéré, *Essai médico-légale*, 1832; Marc, *De la folie*, 1840; see also Chauveau and Hélie, *Théorie du code pénal*. And a whole series of communications by Voisin to the Académie de médecine (*Sur le sentiment du juste*, 1842, *Sur la peine de mort*, 1848).
25 Esquirol, *De la monomanie homicide*, in *Des maladies mentales*, chap. II.
26 This led Régnault to note: 'In homicidal monomania, it is only the will to kill that overpowers the will to obey laws' (p. 39). A magistrate said to Marc, 'If monomania is a disease, when it leads to capital crimes, it should also lead to public execution in place de Grève' (vol. I, p. 226).