

## FREUD'S BESTIARY: HOW DOES PSYCHOANALYSIS TREAT ANIMALS?

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Any reader of Freud will have noticed that his work contains many animals. This is especially evident in the case histories. For example, Ernst Lehrs in "Notes upon a case of Obsessional Neurosis" (Freud, 1909b) presented Freud with his fear of rats. Along the way, we discover that the Rat Man was also nicknamed *Leichenvogel*, a corpse-bird; in addition, Freud thought that Lehrs was an *osphresiolagniac*, a snooping and sniffing dog-child. Moreover, the wolves and dogs of "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis" (1918) have caught the attention of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) and Abraham and Torok (1986).

In this investigation we do not offer an exhaustive taxonomy of Freud's animals. Rather, we are guided by the idea of the bestiary and identify Freud with the figure of the bestiarist. Freud established a collection of fables about animals out of the menageries of his analysands as well as his own textual, extratextual, and extraanalytic experiences. We do not assume that there is a fable for every animal. In fact, Freud subsumed many animals under a single apologue.

We proceed, then, in the following manner. In Section I we take up Deleuze and Guattari's charge that Freud lacked a truly zoological vision and argue that he did have such a vision, albeit a restricted one. In our discussion of Freud's primary fable of the

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animal and the father in Section II, we come to appreciate both the blinkers and the blindsides of his "vision." Section III contains a counter-assay of Deleuze and Guattari's reading of the Wolf-Man, while Section IV continues in the same contentious vein but with reference to their appropriation of Judge Schreber's *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* [Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken] (1988). In Section V we present an interpretation of Freud's "Psychoanalytic Notes upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)" (1911b), which centers on the simile of milking a he-goat.

### I. THE QUESTION OF FREUD'S ZOOLOGICAL VISION

Freud's own domestic menagerie consisted of his and Anna's dogs: Sigmund's succession of chows, Lin Yug (Jones, 1957, p. 150, gives the name as Lun-Yu), Jo-Fi (Doolittle, 1956, uses Yofi) and Lün; and Anna's Alsatian Wulf or Wolfi. While Freud's love of dogs is the stuff of psychoanalytic legend, it also informs us about the sort of animals he favored. Freud was at home with domesticates, although not all of them were in his *ménage*, and his patients were not his only source of beasts, even though they helped to stock the collection. The analytic session was the *locus*, the menagerie, where beasts were paraded before the bestiarist and, after having been made to obey, turned back to their respective analysands. The case history was a privileged place for the psychobestiarist to display his own menagerie (and even his animal magnetism), especially with respect to those "patients" whom Freud never met (i.e., Schreber and Leonardo).

Did Freud have a zoological vision? Deleuze and Guattari answer in the negative and shift their loyalty behind the Wolf-Man who, they say, took revenge upon psychoanalysis in a letter to Muriel Gardiner in 1945, by pointing out its irreversible blindness to animals. They fail to mention that in the letter in question the Wolf-Man directed his remarks to Gardiner's daughter (who showed an interest in animals that Sergei thought should be encouraged): "Nothing . . . can be of greater value to a young person than a love of nature and understanding of natural science, particularly animals." Deleuze and Guattari omit the tail end of the remark:

"Animals played a large part in my childhood also. In my case they were wolves" (Gardiner, 1972, pp. 315–316).

Even with such supplementary material in hand, the question of a zoological vision remains a difficult one to answer. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) answer with a twofold no: the only kind of animals that psychoanalysis understands are "individuated animals, family pets, sentimental, Oedipal animals each with its own petty history, 'my' cat, 'my' dog" (p. 240). In this view, Freud did not permit the Wolf-Man to become wolf, to join the pack that he was already in communication with, up to the moment when his wolves were turned into oedipal animals *par excellence*, doggies. Deleuze and Guattari isolate a trend in Freud's thought, one that he would not allow to emerge even though he had stumbled upon it: the becoming-animal of analysands. Consider the Rat Man. He "coined himself" a rat currency, says Freud; he empathized with rats; he was a dirty little rat-child who liked to bite people (he also had the nose of a dog!); he found a "living likeness of himself in the rat," muses Freud (1909b) quoting Goethe (p. 72). While Deleuze and Guattari prefer the character "Willard" in *Ben*, Mann's B-movie of 1972, for us Lehrs suffices to illustrate the notion of becoming-animal. Freud settles for mere resemblance (likeness); Willard responds to the advances of a woman who looks like a rat, "but it is only a resemblance," and thus he could establish nothing more than a weak bond with her; Ben lures Willard into the sewers; Freud burns his "verbal bridges" before he reaches the haunts of town rats, rat cellars, rathskellers. In becoming-animal one neither imagines that one takes on the features of a given animal nor actually becomes one. Instead, and thus "becoming" is neither totemic nor biological, "what is real is the becoming," a block of becoming, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, which is to say a bundle of tendencies that produce a hybrid beast. This is the phenomenon that Freud came upon but abandoned. If he had seen that in every becoming-animal there is a multiplicity—packs of rats and wolves, a pride of lions—this insight alone, we are led to believe, would have constituted a pivotal turn toward a zoological vision that could not have been so easily oedipalized. Consider, the Rat Man, Wolf-Man, Ferenczi's Little Árpád, Little Hans, and so on, and the Freudian fable is the same.

What is a zoological vision, anyway? For Deleuze and Guattari

(1987), it is the ability to recognize that “every animal is fundamentally a band, a pack” (p. 239). “Man” becomes animal through a fascination with nonhuman multiplicities; “man” is gripped by the pack form. Freud, who sought to occlude his patients’ passage into their packs by the “talking cure,” therefore could not by this definition have had a zoological vision. To be sure, he did have such a vision by another stipulative definition: he was not blind to animal life since he saw that animals were surrogates for the father, both in phylo- and ontogenetic terms. We will return to this fable in the following section.

On another hand, why would Freud wish to commit himself to the premise that every animal is a pack, and fundamentally so? The opposite of a pack, to carry through this zoological rhetoric, is a solitary pair. Deleuze and Guattari are content to refer to swarms of bees, for instance. Are all bees of the superfamily *Apoidea* pack insects? No, one finds social and solitary bees, just as one finds solitary sand and mud wasps that live outside of a nest-community, usually in pairs. A pair, however, is not a pack, especially when it is formed only for the purposes of reproduction; one might, of course, become a pair.

Let us consider the question of Freud’s so-called “lack” of a zoological vision from another vantage point. Jones (1957) has observed in an offhanded way that “like most Jews of his generation Freud had had little contact with animals” (p. 150). Until Anna’s dog entered the family, Jones implies, Freud had little or no contact with animals, even domesticates.

We shall not impute religious motives to Freud and, for instance, attempt to explain his lack of an instinct for the animal pack by the uncleanness of swarming things, as in *Deuteronomy* 14.18. Rather, we note that his “vision” was limited by the animals of human, Viennese society, his sociopsychocultural milieu: horses, dogs, cats, pigeons, even animals of the medical establishment such as mice. He may not have had an emotional investment in Judaism (Freud, 1925), but he did have one in animals, especially his own. I do not mean to imply that Freud did not experience *wild* animals during his sporting or nature walks in the Hohe Tauern, or on those famous long walks that he took with Fliess. Freud was more familiar with animal hallucinations (zoopsia) than living domesticates. He would come to be intimate with household pets, those animals that

are part of human ensembles, and enter into metonymic relations with them. We shall come to see the implications of these factors in our discussion of *Totem and Taboo* and Deleuze and Guattari's reading of the Wolf-Man.

The burgeoning literature on the so-called "Jewish" origins of psychoanalysis, especially Roth's (1987) argument that Freud's model of femininity was influenced by his unconscious assimilation of a traditional stereotype and his unsuccessful rebellion against it, a conflict that produced a caricature of women as castrated men, suggests to us that his zoological vision may have been influenced by his situation as an urbanite and perhaps, secondarily, by his absorption of some aspects of the doctrine of *tsha'ar ba'ale hayim*, the prevention of cruelty to animals. This is a doctrine that dictates that in the interrelationship between "man" and animals, "man" holds animals accountable for their actions, which is to say that they are subject to retribution if they act contrary to God's will or, rewarded if they act righteously (Cohen, 1959). We used the word "secondarily" in virtue of Oxaal's (1988) warning against overestimating religious/ethnic causation in considerations of Freud's work (p. 51). It is tempting, but for no good reasons, to draw the conclusion that given the aforementioned doctrine, which is most easily enacted and respected with regard to animals one is in close contact with, that Freud's attitude toward animals — exemplified by his love of dogs — was overdetermined by it and the idea of domestication it implies to the detriment of other ways of thinking animals, especially as far as knowledge about the behavior of wild animals is concerned. Freud's experience of animals in the city was as transcultural as his theory of psychoanalysis. His "religion," then, had no significant influence since, *qua* urbanite, he must have had a limited range of encounters with animals. And it is precisely this limitation, which he shared with his "fellows," Jewish and otherwise, which had the most profound influence on his understanding of animal life and impaired his zoological vision.

## II. PHOBIC ANIMALS

In "The Return of Totemism in Childhood," in *Totem and Taboo* (1913), we find the singlemost important moral of the Freudian bestiary, at least as far as the "larger [domestic] animals" and male

children are concerned: in children's animal phobias, animals are substitutes for the father. An animal phobia arises out of the Oedipus complex and is "a very common, and perhaps the earliest, form of psychoneurotic illness occurring in childhood" (p. 187). Although the child may find *some* relief from his ambivalent attitude toward his father (as a rival in competition for his mother and as an object of affection and admiration) in displacing such emotions onto an animal, there is no end to the conflict since his ambivalent feelings have merely shifted onto a new object. This new object, a horse in the case of Little Hans, as Freud explains, is approached with both fear and interest (p. 190).

Freud also enlisted Ferenczi's (1952) case of Little Árpád to further his project of oedipalizing totemism. Árpád, like Hans, identified with his totem animal, the chicken or more generally poultry (domesticated fowl), and did so with a similar ambivalence. Árpád, however, completely identified with his chickens while Hans was only able to achieve a heightened identification when his anxiety had diminished; recall that Hans identified with his father by becoming a horse, trotting around the household, neighing, wearing a nosebag, and, finally, by biting his father and behaving in a fearless way toward him (Freud, 1909a, pp. 213-214). On the other hand, Ferenczi's "Little Chanticleer" expressed that he had become a chicken in numerous ways over time: he began by cackling and crowing, moved into singing songs with chicken themes, played with toy fowls by "slaughtering" and "caressing" them, and so on. Perhaps Freud refers to the Hans case as negative totemism and the Árpád case as positive totemism since in the former the child's identification with his totem increased as his ambivalence toward it decreased, while in the latter the identification was as "superlative" as Árpád's emotional ambivalence toward poultry.

Despite the differences between them, the cases enabled Freud to find the dead father behind the animal totem in totemism, and find the substitution of the animal for the father in animal phobias. That is, an ambivalent attitude (to obey and transgress) toward the two principal taboos of totemism, which are also the primal wishes of children and the two crimes of Oedipus, is shared by "primitive savages" and children, given that both animal phobias and totemism are parallel "products" of phylo- and ontogenetic complexes.

The moral remains the same: animals are sign vehicles for the

expression of the male child's (the "son's") relations with the father. To call the Wolf-Man's wolf a "totemistic father-surrogate," as Freud does, is to say, first, that the patient had a conscious fear of wolves and an unconscious fear of the father and, second, that a further phase in his relationship with his father was expressed through an identification with Christ, loving son of his Father, the divine Father; the latter, Freud argued, was a father surrogate that arose "after" the animal totem. Freud's injection of totemism into animal phobias and projection of the Oedipus complex onto totemism, also proved to be a means of positing a phasic development of the surrogate's form at the phylogenetic level (primal father → animal totem → male, human figure) and on the ontogenetic level in his commentary on the unfolding of the Wolf Man's relationship with his father.

An animal phobia occurs like a "strange rift," a sudden tear in hitherto "excellent relations" between children and animals. A species of animal in which the child had shown a "lively interest," a situation opposed to that of a favored individual ("my" doggie), has a phobia attached to any member of it. Given this premise of an antecedent familiarity, Freud (1913) writes: "there is no large choice of animals that may become objects of a phobia in the case of children living in towns: horses, dogs, cats, less often birds, and with striking frequency very small creatures such as beetles and butterflies" (p. 187). The phobia is in one respect contextual: for children who live in towns, town animals are likely candidates for phobias; for those who live on farms, farm animals may play host to a phobia, and so on. However, in both places a fear of "insects" may arise given their ubiquity. In a further respect, animal phobias are textual: phobias may become attached to "animals only known to the child from picture books and fairy tales" (Freud, 1913, p. 187).

Little Hans was a "town boy" who had a "town animal" phobia. Moreover, he was also familiar with giraffes and elephants since he had pictures of them posted on the wall above his bed; yet, inasmuch as he visited the zoological collection at Schönbrunn, he would have had a contextual counterpart to his textual animals. In "towns" that have zoos, one finds that exotic animal phobias may have contextual, albeit nonmetonymic origins (unless they are "petting" zoos). In the case of the Wolf-Man, a fear of lions (which must have had a textual origin) replaced his fear of wolves. In Sergei's case, Freud favored an explanation that emphasized the textuality of his phobic

animals: “this phobia [wolves] was only distinguished from other similar cases by the fact that the anxiety-animal was not an object easily accessible to observation (such as a horse or a dog), but was known to him *only from* stories and picturebooks” [my emphasis] (Freud, 1918, p. 217). We shall see that there is good reason to think that Sergei may have had several quite different contextual encounters with wolves.

Freud was for the most part concerned with relations between animals and children after a regular animal phobia had developed, and he said little about prephobic relations except that children identify strongly with nonhumans (animals are seen as “full equals”; human and nonhuman “natures” are not rigidly demarcated). He encountered animals as they appeared in neuroses, and these phobic creatures colored his zoological vision in several important ways. First, he showed little interest in the positive relations that may again obtain between children and animals after a successful analysis. A “positive vision” would consist in part in the recognition that a “cure” would entail the resumption of prephobic, weakly divided relations, a sign that one no longer has an unconscious need to employ an animal as a device with which to siphon excess ambivalent affect. In short, it was not only that Hans “ceased to be afraid of horses.” Rather, he recovered the pleasure that they gave him and the wonder they inspired. Since his animal “vision” lost the ambivalence that had worked to disenchant horses or, since his feeling toward them were no longer infected by oedipal associations, Hans would have been able (we do not know that he did) to re-enchant them in being successfully oedipalized. Psychoanalysis, then, does show itself to have a certain unrealized potential in reconstituting the relations between children and animals, if only as an added extra that arises from the child’s passage through the Oedipus and castration complexes.

Secondly, Freud would not have emphasized the pack because many domesticates relate poorly or show no interest in their conspecifics, having become absolutely dependent upon their owners and simplified behaviorally through selective breeding. Even though relations between children and species may be reconstituted through the work of analysis, the individuals of a species could not form a pack given their domesticity. Children might become animals once again, but not pack animals.



### III. WOLVES, DOGS, AND SHEEP

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) begin "1914: One or Several Wolves" with a passage that reads like a dramatization of the Wolf-Man's conscience:

That day, the Wolf-Man rose from the couch particularly tired. He knew that Freud had a genius for brushing up against the truth and passing it by, then filling the void with associations. He knew that Freud knew nothing about wolves. . . . The only thing Freud understood was what a dog is, and a dog's tail. It wasn't enough. It wouldn't be enough. (p. 26)

It is true, Freud loved his succession of chows. A chow looks nothing like a wolf (except, perhaps, for a child, who might think of it as a friendly wolf), sitting quietly "at the foot of the couch during the analytic hour" (Gay, 1988, p. 540), black tongue lolling out of its mouth; Doolittle (1956), however, once complained that "the professor was more interested in Yofi than he was in my story" (p. 162). It was not that Freud put the Wolf-Man's anxiety-animal through his chow model; no, it was rather unlikely that the Wolf-Man rose from the couch, having noticed that Freud's attention had floated over to his chow — "the analyst's bow-wow," as Deleuze and Guattari put it — and realized that he was just another beautiful bitch. Freud, in fact, did not acquire his first chow until 1928 (Jones, 1957, p. 180). Still, in principle, the transference is complicated by the presence of a dog.

There was another dog in the apartment on Berggasse "that day," a wolf-like dog, Anna's Alsatian. Brunswick (1928) reports in her analysis of the Wolf-Man that "when visiting Freud, the patient had on more than one occasion seen his large gray police dog, which looked like a domesticated wolf" (p. 101). Let's be clear about these dogs: the Alsatian is known as a German Shepherd, which is also a police dog, and it belonged to Anna rather than Sigmund, although he, as Gay (1988) remarks of his *qua* dog fancier, "paternally . . . entered into Anna's fondness for her dog" (p. 540). Freud certainly knew the difference between a chow-chow and an Alsatian, while Deleuze and Guattari remain silent about these dogs, even the one that looked like a wolf.

The Wolf-Man may have met a dog that looked like a domesticated wolf with pricked up, pointy ears a number of times, perhaps

even six or seven times, but to advance such a speculation is to give the Wolf-Man little credit, to diminish his zoological vision. Not only did Anna's dog look like a wolf, it was named Wulf. Brunswick (1928) suggests that the first version of the famous dream that the Wolf-Man produced for her was populated by gray wolves after the color of Anna's dog. The white wolves of his original nightmare, then, aged as they were reproduced, only to finally disappear in the so-called clarified wolf-dream, a wolf-less dream (p. 111).

There was yet another dog that found its way into the picture. Deleuze and Guattari refer to it obliquely, as if it were the only dog on the scene: a sheep-dog with pricked-up ears, as the Wolf-Man described it in his explanation of the features of his white dream wolves. It was neither a chow, nor an Alsatian, but a pair of copulating sheep dogs that Freud chose as his top dogs. Deleuze and Guattari object to Freud's shift away from wolves to [sheep] dogs because that move from wild animals to domesticates purged the former pack of which the patient spoke in the name of a therapy that let him speak but would not or could not listen to what he said. No matter how much the Wolf-Man howled Freud's answer was the same: "It's Daddy."

Freud (1918) maintained that the "wolves of the dream were actually sheep dogs and, moreover, appear as such in the drawing" (p. 246). The patient may have observed sheep dogs copulating *a tergo*, according to their nature, prior to the primal dream and subsequently displaced that sight onto his parents. However, if young Sergei had not witnessed animal coitus, he nevertheless possessed the phylogenetic experience of having observed parental intercourse. Such intercourse would have been performed *a tergo more ferarum* (from behind in the manner of beasts), since Freud thought that it was "phylogenetically the older form" (p. 227), a bit of pure speculation furthered by Annaud in his filmic version of the primal episode at the waterhole in *Quest for Fire* (1982).

Where wolves were, dogs (and goats) shall be. Although Freud admitted that his patient was a "foreigner" and that an "alien national character" presented additional problems in the analysis (p. 198), it did not occur to him that a Russian might dream of white wolves because such wolves are found in his homeland. Indeed, in his *Memoirs*, the Wolf-Man described his father's *second* estate in White Russia, a rather backward region, he recalled, as wolf coun-

try: "Primeval forests, ponds, lakes large and small . . . impressed one as a remnant of nature still untouched by man. There were wolves in the forests. Several times every summer a wolf-hunt was organized by the peasants of adjacent villages" (Gardner, 1972, p. 12). The culture of the wolf hunt was as much a part of rural Russian popular culture as it was aristocratic sport (the alleged "Great Conservationist" Theodore Roosevelt was one such "good sport"), both in the summer and winter. One can imagine the sight of wolves hanging from the trees after a successful hunt and the impression such a sight would have made on young Sergei. The manner in which these hunts were carried out varied enormously: one might set out on horseback with Siberian wolfhounds, white borzoi, staghounds, and the like, in order to flush out a wolf or, in the wintertime, drag a butchered calf or pig behind a horse-drawn sleigh until the wolves picked up the scent, coming within the range of one's rifle; it is even the case that one might use a specially bred subspecies of the golden eagle to hunt a wolf by training it to slam into and bind the wolf's spine with its claws (Lopez, 1978, p. 150). Freud did not experience a wolf-hunt. He did, however, lose his first chow to a train in Salzburg station (Jones, 1957, p. 150).

For Deleuze and Guattari, the Wolf-Man's wolves never had a chance. Freud, who, as they say, knew nothing about wolves, failed to recognize the obvious fact that wolves travel in packs. He even went so far as to ignore the numberless pack in the story of the tailor and the wolf because it was numberless (p. 229, n.13), which is only to note that it could not be reduced to goats. Further, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) hold that "it was already decided from the very beginning that animals could serve only to represent coitus between parents, or, conversely, be represented by coitus between parents" (p. 28). Animals are sexual operators for Freud, one observes them, despite what the Wolf-Man said about the riveting gaze of the dream wolves, the power of which Freud would not, of course, have understood, not knowing that wolves often engage humans and nonhumans in that way, in what has been called a ceremonial exchange, the conversation of death (Lopez, 1978, p. 94). Still, Freud might have made use of this theme by working it out as a component of the castration complex, since the intense stare thrown by the wolves at the dreaming child fits in well with the threat of castration that Sergei feared.

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) write: "it is so much more reassuring to tell oneself that the dream produced a reversal and that it is really the child who sees dogs or parents in the act of making love" (p. 28). Freud will accept any beasts but wolves, it seems. His fundamental requirement is that it is the child who takes the active position while other nonhuman animals assume the passive role of being looked at (p. 220). This reversal is furthered by the absence of eye contact between the child and the dogs or parents. Freud initiates a unidirectional [com]munication appropriate to the collector: animals are exhibited, mounted or unmounted, in display cases. In breaking the eye contact between the child and the wolves of his dream through the reversal of positions and the associative shift onto dogs, Freud accomplished a full-blown domestication of the scene. The gaze of the other is emptied, symbolically of course, becoming an unseeing look like that of zoo animals, objects for our inspection.

The "deleuzoguattarian" interpretation is packed with packs of wolves, but not without some justification. Freud's menagerie, on the other hand, contained many strange neurotic domesticates—men, women, and animals. When he "brushes up" against the truth of the pack, an ironic allusion to the way that members of a wolf pack bump one another while they are on the run, he fails to make contact, to communicate with it, like a frustrated pet trying to communicate with its conspecifics by urinating on a fire hydrant.

After the death of Jo-Fi, Freud reacquired Lün, a dog that he had returned to Dorothy Burlingham some time earlier because it and Jo-Fi were incompatible housemates. When Felix Deutsch took charge of Lün during one of Burlingham's absences, he remarked that "this dog is a psychosomatic case, indeed!" His job as dogsitter was to provide an "anti-baby-sitting" service since Lün's life would be threatened if she were to become impregnated. Despite Deutsch's best intentions, she began to display "the unmistakable signs of pregnancy" after a visit with the neighbor's "beautiful male poodle." Deutsch continues:

in the fourth month [a clear sign that he knew nothing about the gestation period of dogs], instead of increasing, these signs started to decrease. I rushed with the dog to the veterinarian. Diagnosis: pseudo-cyesis. Have you ever heard of a dog with a false pregnancy?

I am almost inclined to say: "That can only happen to the dog of an analyst!" (Jones, 1957, pp. 226-227)

Deutsch has inadvertently hit upon an important point with his inclination to ascribe the psychological origin of the phantom pregnancy to its owner-analyst.

Pets complement and complete their owner's personalities, having been conditioned to respond to certain cues that lead to the satisfaction of the owner's needs. Freud's love for his dogs provoked Jones (1957) to remark that such fondness was "evidently a sublimation of his very great fondness for young children which could no longer be gratified" (p. 150). If we couple this observation with Freud's genuine sense that he and his dogs shared an intimate mutual understanding, a belonging together, we have an emotional context in which to place *but not explain* the false pregnancy, inasmuch as it seems an exemplary instance of the dog's attempt to satisfy both its own needs as well as those of its owner. Of course, even this nonexplanation might result in severe reprimands from the veterinary community since they prefer hormone-based explanations, when they attempt to tackle the issue. One cannot, however, escape the fact that canines are mediated semiotically for anthropomorphism as meaning-vehicles "designed" for human families.

Freud did establish one sort of connection between wolf and dog, despite needlessly abandoning the former in doing so. In treating the wolves of the Wolf-Man's drawing of the primal dream as sheep dogs, Freud exploited the fact that his patient was not particularly skilled at rendering animals. In his *Memoirs*, the Wolf-Man admits as much and explains that (as children) "my sister and I both liked to draw. At first we used to draw trees. . . . I began trying to draw horses true to nature, but unfortunately every horse I drew looked more like a dog or a wolf than a real horse" (Gardiner, 1972, pp. 9-10). His illustrations of his own menagerie—his sketches and paintings became hot commodities in the American psychoanalytic market—were always ambiguous, lending themselves to associations that followed along certain of their manifest features: assorted iconic markers gave Freud the impression not of similarity but of similarities, associative lines of free flight. Freud's trained eye was able to detect and exploit some of the graphic conventions that inform the representation of animals in the sitting position so as to shift from

wolves to dogs to foxes, thus making the very sort of move that as a child the Wolf-Man recognized his sloppily coded drawings provoked. The shift from wolves to dogs remained in the family of the *Canidae*, thus reflecting the probable phylogenesis of *Canis familiaris* from *Canis lupus*, although the ontogenetic peculiarities of the Wolf-Man dictate that dogs might have been “earlier” than the wolves of his primal dream.

### III. THE PACK AND ITS VICISSITUDES

We have to this point discovered three chows, one Alsatian, a pair of copulating sheep dogs, and only need to mention in passing Freud’s final dog, a substitute for Lün who had been quarantined by the British authorities, a pekinese named Jumbo (Jones, 1957, p. 246); but further, Mahony (1989, pp. 62–63) has pursued the caninophilic element with reference to Marie Bonaparte’s chow Topsy (Bonaparte, 1936)<sup>1</sup> and the death of Freud’s Jo-Fi. These dogs do not in themselves constitute a pack, although if they were present in the same place at the same time they may have pursued one another in what might have mistakenly been called a formation akin to one. A pack is not, on the other hand, reducible to a predatory wolf-multiplicity, as Deleuze and Guattari admit, while at the same time privileging such an arrangement. The assemblage of wolves is an instance of a kind of relation that they wish to establish between a human subject and a pack, one such that the former, like the wolf, is both an interdependent and independent member of the latter. Perhaps everyone but Freud knows that wolves travel in packs, even though those who possess this knowledge, such as Abraham and Torok (1986, p. 17), consider it unimportant. They maintain that in Russian, *Shiest* or six, *Shiestiero* and *Shiestorka*, or six and a lot of six, lead directly to the sister, *Siestra*. The pack of wolves contains the idea of the sister, the *siswolf*, *Siestorka-Buka*, rather than a multiplicity. Here, then, is a further moral: as significant as it can be, zoological knowledge is not an unassailable measure.

The Wolf-Man bears the same relation to his dream tree, his body without organs, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 30) say, an unorganized, anoedipal, libidinal body crossed by cathectic intensities, currents, and flows, as the wolf does to its pack: the Wolf-Man’s body is populated by the pack of which he is a member. His body

without organs is a band, both in the sense of a *bande de loups* and a libidinal band, which is crossed by the multiplicities of the unconscious; Freud, in his turn, tried to reduce the pack to the father, the one, the singular or molar.

What concerns us is that a *bande de chiens* (i.e., wolfhounds) is just as much a pack as that of wolves, especially for the hunter on a wolf hunt, the very occasion for the potential collision of both wild and domestic (trained) packs. To the extent that Deleuze and Guattari do not treat the dogs of Freud and the Wolf-Man—apartment dogs, sheep dogs fighting off wolves on the first estate, the dog packs of the villagers in White Russia as they prepared for the coursing—but, instead, set up a straw dog that is an emblem of all dogs, they proceed in spite of their belief in the fluidity and convertibility of any pack, to debase domesticates. They are to some degree correct in doing so, as I have suggested with respect to household pets, but there are certain domesticates that are trained to function in packs (hunting dogs, Alaskan malamutes). We wish to see the wild-domesticate dichotomy that Deleuze and Guattari employ collapse so as to accommodate a mixed pack, with neither the romance of the feral dog nor the somewhat surprising bond that wolf pups establish with older dogs in captivity, and constitute a hybrid pack irreducible to Freud's bow-wow, their straw dog, with neither a discrete set of wild nor domestic animals nor a generalization about the pack potential of domestic animals. In short, a loose pack, an unpacked pack that reflects the diversity of pack phenomena, and includes wolves banished from their pack, dog-wolf hybrids, lone hunters that become pack-like only during the mating season, solitary pairs, and so on.

We wish to integrate certain material concerning the relationships between wolves and dogs, matters (factual and speculative) from the lives of Freud and the Wolf-Man, and open the associative chain to animals not so easily subsumed under the morals of castration and father surrogate: neither are we prepared to pay the price of treating the Wolf-Man as a psychotic whose body was trampled by wild packs and teeming swarms, a body, that is, that was never turned off, that never stabilized, and knew no decahexis.

We cultivate the mixed pack because it protects against the excess that overflows from the conjunction of wild and multiple by integrating the domesticate, singular and multiple (this is just the

sort of compromise that Freud constantly sought to achieve, except that he did not do so with respect to animals), while at the same time avoiding the deficiency of the standard moral and the infelicity of romancing the schizo on the model of Schreber's body: Schreber (1988) insisted that his body could not run all of the time, and his art of conduct consisted in finding a middle course, and along the way reacquire a bearable body (pp. 209, 214). We further resist the hyperbolic appreciation of the Wolf-Man's episode with the black-heads on his nose, that field of vaginas he created by squeezing them being a molecular multiplicity, or so they say, an assemblage over and against the molar father, Freud, and the neurotic's vagina, a nostril or a sock (Freud, 1915, pp. 205–206; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 27).

#### IV. SCHREBER'S SWARMS<sup>2</sup>

The Wolf-Man had his wolf tree; Frau Emmy von N. had her hallucination of a "whole lot of mice . . . sitting in the trees" (Breuer and Freud, 1893–1895, p. 131); Schreber (1988) once saw "cats with glowing eyes" in the trees of the asylum's garden (p. 87). Later, however, whether it was the next or another day is unclear, Schreber had a clarified cat vision of empty birches and firs in front of his bedroom window as the shutters were opened (p. 88), a "holy forest" so much like the clarified wolf dream that prompted Sergei to ask himself why he had not painted the beautiful scene of intertwining branches. The Wolf-Man was always, as he tells us in his *Memoirs*, improvising on "lovely landscapes," at first, he used his accordion, and later, his paintbrushes (Gardiner, 1972, pp. 10, 66).

The Wolf-Man found solace in painting; it was his main defense against auditory hallucinations, while Schreber (1988, pp. 176, 197) played the piano, in particular, an aria from *The Magic Flute*. Let's not be carried away by these resemblances: such is our credo. Schreber was persecuted by his menagerie and indulged in a primitive form of self-help art therapy, just as the Wolf-Man took up painting out of doors after the death of his father. To sit on a stool in front of an easel in a landscape is one thing, to be plagued by one's surroundings is quite another. There is no ecological "belonging" to be found in the attack of the landscape on the painter. To be *of* the land without suffering the terrifying flip side of being



haunted by it, yet still cognizant that fear in the face of what one may suffer in nature is an essential part of experiencing it, constitutes a beginning of ecological insight. We cannot side with Baudrillard (1983, p. 201ff) when he posits the objective irony of cunning objects—it is as though nature lay in wait for an opportune moment so that it might hit us with the force of a catastrophe—as if they were testing us by taunting those such as Schreber. As appropriate and necessary as anthropomorphism can be in understanding the nonhuman, Schreber did not suffer from an excess of it.

On the side of schizoanalysis, the body of Judge Schreber is said to be like a lion's mane teeming with fleas (Deleuze and Guattari, 1977, p. 16). Deleuze and Guattari produce this image when they might have looked directly to Schreber for one: his head was repeatedly filled with "Aryan" and "Catholic" scorpions that did him no harm (Schreber, 1988, p. 99). Yes, the Judge's head was filled with harmless arachnids that were "miracled" into him by God, but did he seek such an experience? Was it pleasurable? Deleuze and Guattari (1977) ask of Freud: "how does one dare reduce to the paternal theme a delirium so rich, so differentiated, so 'divine' as the Judge's—since the Judge in his memoirs makes only very brief references to the memory of his father" (pp. 56–57). In the "abridged" version of the *Memoirs* that survives, Schreber (1988) makes only two explicit references to his father, one a positive remark, the other a slight (pp. 100, 142). There is a wealth of psychoanalytic literature (Schatzman, 1973; Niederland, 1984; Israels, 1986), however, that finds traces of the father and his postural "correctives" such as the *Geradehalter* and *Kopfhalter* throughout the *Memoirs*. This literature, perhaps not surprisingly, figures little in Deleuze and Guattari's (1977) *Anti-Oedipus*, but when it does appear (pp. 297–298), it is in the context of their generalization of Tausk's (1948) schizophrenic influencing machines. These machines serve to make a social rather than a familial-oedipal field (or a reductionistic father field) libidinal. Freud (1911b) says Schreber had an excellent father and thought of him affectionately (p. 151). He finds in his backward-looking search for the father that Schreber's (upper) God was a transfiguration of his father. In one respect, Freud had to find father Schreber behind Paul's God because he sensed a "father complex." Since the complex was for Freud "positively toned," he invented a father for Paul on the little evidence and "feeling" that he

had. Even if he had discovered Moritz's machines, for Deleuze and Guattari at least, Freud would have bungled the operation by territorializing the delirium of machinic couplings within the theater of the family: "Mommy-Daddy-Me."

Freud "dared," then, to force Oedipus on Schreber. Deleuze and Guattari think that this is a good example of the "Oedipal stubbornness of psychoanalysis": it fails to appreciate the "richness" of Paul's "walk" through a deterritorialized garden of free libidinal flows where there are no resistances, no artificial boundaries. Psychoanalysis has failed to appreciate the revolutionary potential of the Schreber case as a text for a "schizoid reading" of an enlivened body, and anoedipal masterpiece of which Freud had only a "dim" understanding, and a *topos* where one might see how oedipalization cuts short Paul's "distant journey" and "escape" into pure and infinite connections, the couplings of desiring-machines. What Deleuze and Guattari have uncovered but not successfully surpassed, as we shall see momentarily, is the undeniable insistence of psychoanalytic interpretation. Freud did reduce the "richness" of Schreber's delusional world to two principal elements (see Section V) in order to present his theory of paranoia and thus keep the complex vehicle of the *Memoirs* from jumping the psychoanalytic "tracks," an *Entgleisung* that nevertheless occurred for many commentators (i.e., Wilden, 1980; Macalpine and Hunter, 1988).

Deleuze and Guattari (1977) imply that Schreber profited from his condition. They claim that he received "recompense" in the form of a "residual share of pleasure" for putting up with an insatiable God (p. 16). Like Freud, Deleuze and Guattari did not consider the *bugs*.

Schreber (1988) explains how he can predict that as soon as he sits down to rest "a fly, wasp or bumble bee or a whole swarm of gnats appear to prevent [him] from sleeping" (p. 186). God's "unfriendliness" toward him brings on "nasty or molesting" creatures that might sting or bite him (pp. 189-190). Here are pernicious swarms that torment Schreber by keeping him awake when he wanted to sleep. These swarms form part of an intensification of his body by means of "nerves" such that his "natural right of mental relaxation," as he states (pp. 171-172), is violated. As soon as Schreber ceases to "cultivate voluptuousness," he is tormented: God cries "help," the swarms reappear, the compulsive thinking machine begins to whir.

Schreber was persecuted by his menagerie. A pack, let us say, has no intrinsic and little residual value. There are, however, potentially positive but essentially neutral pack phenomena: butterflies and moths caused Schreber “no unpleasantness whatsoever” (p. 190). We must avoid the excesses of the reductive pole—a case of pinned specimens—and the overproductive pole of a body without organs crossed by biting insects, a veritable infestation, and a reading emphatic about surface effects on the body as landscape, traversed by schizonomadic waves of “voluptuousness.” The lion must be itchy.

Freud fares no better than Deleuze and Guatarri. Why would an “excellent father” (even a transfigured one) “miracle” swarms of biting insects upon his tired son? Freud’s reading cannot accommodate the counterclaim that such a father would do no such thing because it would contradict his image of Schreber’s father. More importantly, such an admission would imply that a good father might have *done* otherwise. Freud does not want even to suggest that the actions of the father were other than products of the son’s delusional projections. Paul’s unconscious homosexual fantasy, his longing for Moritz (and Gustav), is irreversible. In Freud’s schema, Paul *longs for* his father but is not *longed for* by his father. If the latter were the case, it must only have been a projection in a persecution complex. Recall that in the case of the Wolf-Man, Freud used a reversal to show that it was not the wolves who looked at the child but the child who looked at them, and they were other than they appeared to be (dogs, parents). In the Schreber case, might the members of the menagerie be other than they appear, if we admit that they do contradict Freud’s good father model? For instance, Schatzman (1973) argues that Freud did not see that paranoid persons generate paranoid states in others (p. 138). Schreber’s father, says Schatzman, was one such paranoiac who was not longed for by Paul but, on the contrary, longed for his son (p. 152). In short, what bothered Paul was that his father loved him and would not give him peace. Even if we do not accept Schatzman’s theory of paranoidogenicity, it is impetus enough to consider the swarms that besieged Paul as animal deliria whose symbolic content was the steady stream of unwanted and intolerable attention given to him by Moritz and others, and with respect to the aforementioned and

not unpleasant lepidoptera, those advances (sexual, nonsexual) that were harmless.

#### V. MILKING A HE-GOAT: THE PULL OF ABSURDITY

In the final paragraph of the first part of his presentation of Schreber's *Denkwürdigkeiten* as a case history, Freud (1911b) turns to Kant for a simile that describes how difficult it is to make connections stick:

In Schreber's system the two principal elements of his delusion (his transformation into a woman and his favoured relations to God) are united in his assumption of a feminine attitude towards God. It will be a necessary part of our task to show that there is an essential genetic relation [*eine wesentliche genetische Beziehung*] between these two elements. Or else our attempts at elucidating Schreber's delusions will leave us in the absurd position described in Kant's famous simile in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: — we shall be like a man holding a sieve under a he-goat while some one else milks it. (p. 132)

Our objective in this section is to get the billy goat [(*Ziegen*) *Bock*], as it is said.

Throughout his life's work, Freud did not turn to Kant for substantive material nor, for that matter, did he often turn to him for anecdotal material. When Freud did make a "Kantian turn," if you will, Kant's views (on moral action, on the comic, for example) appeared incidentally, either through the work of others (Hildebrandt and Silberer in *The Interpretation of Dreams*), or as familiar ground predicated by "well-known," "famous," and the like [*berühmten Gleichnis*, famous simile]; or, further, as matters to be explained by psychoanalytic theory (metapsychology), as one finds in "The Economic Problem of Masochism," where Freud (1924b) aligns the categorical imperative with the superego as an heir of the Oedipus complex (p. 422).

Kant's version of the simile appears in the Third Section (The Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic) of the Second Part (Transcendental Logic) of the "Transcendental Doctrine of Elements," *Critique of Pure Reason* [Kritik der reinen Vernunft]:

To know what questions may reasonably be asked is already a great and necessary proof of sagacity and insight. For if a question is absurd in itself and calls for an answer where none is required, it not only brings shame on the propounder of the question, but may betray

an incautious listener into absurd answers, thus presenting, as the ancients said, the ludicrous spectacle of one man milking a he-goat and the other holding a sieve underneath (B83/A58).

In Schreber's case, Freud enlists Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), a philosophical Copernican revolution, for a fragment, a detail of the revolution, that did not warrant a footnote, explanatory or otherwise, neither in Freud nor Kant. Freud's use of "Kant's famous simile" was not an explicitly discourteous act even though, given the fundamental turn in epistemology that the *Critique* initiated, the appropriation of what amounted to a colorful aside among formidable insights into the *a priori* structures of understanding and sensibility, made it appear as one. This highly selective and learned borrowing is indicative of Freud's attraction to certain aspects of classical antiquity. Indeed, the first thing one notices about the "famous simile" is that it did not originate with Kant. Suffice it to say that the simile has much less psychical import than the drama of Oedipus. We can imagine that for Freud, Kant's revolution paled in relation to those of Copernicus, Darwin, and his own, since Kant sought to reinstate the human megalomania that had and would be dealt "wounding blows" by scientists who decentered humankind (Freud, 1917a, p. 326).

Freud's "train of thought" regarding the relationship between the "two principal elements of Schreber's delusion" only collapses into absurdity if the relation in question cannot be shown to be an "essential *genetic*" one. The simile is put on display as an example of what will occur if one errs: it is the unfortunate side of a disjunction that dramatizes the work of interpretation. Freud does not want to be left holding the sieve, which is to say that the *genetic* relation must be a strong, sound one, otherwise, it will not only leak but come to look like a sieve. A perforated and thus leaky interpretation is just what Freud wants to avoid, and he indicates as much with the term *genetic*: a fundamental tie that binds the two features of Schreber's delusional world that he lifted from a delusional diorama and called "the two principal elements." If the relation were to spring a leak, Freud's interpretation could not be a full one, in the same way as Theophrastus's (1902) disagreeable man could never fill his guests since they were so many leaky sieves (p. 40).

The terms of Freud's relation are united in his understanding of what it means for a man to take a feminine attitude toward God.

That is, the explanation of the “genetic unity” as a homosexual wish-fantasy is put at the core of Schreber’s paranoia. Given that, the psychoanalytic scoreboard lights up: Oedipus, castration, father complex, resistance on the part of the patient, a terrible loss (manhood), and so on. Freud threw all of his weight behind the “un” of unmaning: a *total* detachment from moderately cathected homosexual libido that manifested itself in Paul’s wild delusions, a massive return of the repressed or the “un” of *unheimlich* multiplied to the *n*th degree.


Until we discover Kant’s “ancients” we are still only on the way to the billy goat. In the meantime, for Kant, the ability to ask appropriate questions is a sign of wisdom while the inability to do so indicates folly. Of the many species of folly, one finds absurdity, especially questions that are absurd in themselves. Such questions shame the one who propounds them because they are not really answerable; in addition, the propoundee may also be implicated in the absurdity by providing an answer to a question that does not require one. In such a case any answer given by the propoundee can only be absurd.

The propounder of the absurd question may be likened to the milker of the he-goat while the propoundee is analogous to the one who holds the sieve; both the propoundee and the “sieve holder” are unable to recognize the absurdity of the leads taken by the propounder and the milker, respectively. Moreover, billy goats do not give milk, and milk cannot be collected in a sieve; likewise, absurd questions require no answers, but answers to them are themselves absurd.

Freud, as we can see, reversed the order in which Kant presented the milker and the “sieve holder.” Given this change, let us pursue the analogical relations that structure Freud’s version of the simile. As an analyst-interpreter, Freud questions the “patient,” Schreber, who is also an author, about the relations that obtain between certain elements of the latter’s system. Freud, then, comes to know Schreber’s world through the *Memoirs*; recall Freud’s stipulation that in the case of paranoiacs such as Schreber, a written text may take the place of analytic sessions or at least personal acquaintance with the patient. We have already indicated that Freud thought his failure to show a genetic relation would leave him holding the sieve. In the worst case scenario, Freud is analogous to the

one who holds the sieve; Schreber, however, does not bear a relation to the milker. The referent of "some one else milks it" is Freud's audience, those who read him, the psychoanalytic community, insofar as they, too, like the milker, follow the lead of the "sieve holder" and attempt to milk the he-goat or, to use other words, they iterate nongenetic or corrupt relations in their readings of Freud and Schreber.

In Kant's *Critique* and Freud's "Psychoanalytic Notes," we find the following analogical relations:



Freud sets himself up on the side of wisdom, not so much as the one who knows how to ask the appropriate sorts of questions, those that are answerable, but that too; rather, as one who can choose the correct principal elements out of a field of them and show that there is a fundamental link between the chosen two. From this "wise" view, Freud *qua* sender dispatches his "proof" of genetic relations to his readers. Niederland (1984), for example, thinks that he strengthens the unity that is at the heart of the diagnosis of paranoia by amplifying it diachronically with reference to Moritz Schreber.

In the analogical position of the "sieve holder," Freud becomes an accomplice rather than an instigator (a milker). This position is no less negative or absurd, although it allows him to shift some of the responsibility for the potential inadequacy of his reading onto others in the future: "It remains for the future to decide whether there is more delusion in my theory than I should like to admit, or whether there is more truth in Schreber's delusion than other people are as yet prepared to believe" (Freud, 1911b, p. 182). In short, "future milkers" may be scapegoats in advance.

There is a certain rhetorical safety in scapegoatism since it permits one to deflect in advance criticism that strongly associates one with the milking of he-goats, an association that yields the idea

of an author who milks his own he-goat or engages in masturbatory theoretical productions. A self-milker makes no essential connections. If Freud's reversal of the terms of the simile was the sort of misreading that one might call a fortunate slip of the pen, it was a defensive one, not because it was determined by a need to give the impression of propitious conditions, but to make the best of an absurd situation in the worse case scenario by cultivating ambiguity (i.e., there may already be more delusion in Freud's theory than he implicitly admits is present in some measure).

Kant's "ancient" source of the simile must have been Lucian (1913) of Samosata, second Christian century author of satirical dialogues. At *Demonax* 28, we read:

On seeing two philosophers very ignorantly debating a given subject, one asking silly questions and the other giving answers that were not at all to the point, he [Demonax] said: "Doesn't it seem to you, friends, that one of these fellows is milking a he-goat and the other is holding a sieve for him!"

Kant preserved both the form and the content of Lucian's version of the simile, while Freud did otherwise (although Lucian suggests that the roles may be reversed). The expression *τράγονάμέλγε|ν*, to milk the billy goat, appeared earlier in Virgil's *Ecologues* III.90-91:

M[enalcas]: Qui Bavium non odit, amet tua  
carmina, Maeuius,  
at que idem iungat vulpes et  
mulgeat hircos.  
[Let he who does not hate Bavium  
love your songs, Mavius,  
and may he also yoke foxes [to the  
plough] and milk he-goats].

The Latin *mulgeat hircos* is the equivalent of the aforementioned Greek phrase, and according to several commentators on the *Ecologues*, it (including to yoke foxes) was a 'proverbial expression of the impossible' (Williams, 1979, p. 103) and a "traditional metaphor of incompetence in popular speech" (Coleman, 1977, p. 123). Lucian's embellishment of a traditional gibe (perhaps it was an expression used by Demonax the Cynic) suggests that to say of a speech that it milks the he-goat alludes to the emission of an ejaculator, human and otherwise, philosopher and fool alike. Let us say that



any milky fluid would pass through a sieve, any spilt milk, that is, and for Freud it was worth crying over. For us, Schreber's insects pass through Freud's sieve like bees pour through the door of their hive.

How difficult it is to make connections stick! In another of Freud's "famous similes," this time one borrowed from Schopenhauer, it is said that "the nature of the emotional relations that hold between men in general" may be expressed by the simile of the freezing porcupines: "no one can tolerate a too intimate approach to his neighbour" (Freud, 1921, p. 130). Just as humans form close libidinal ties at certain times and under certain conditions, porcupines huddle together in order to keep from freezing to death; but, the closer that both humans and porcupines come to their respective fellows, and thus acquire various kinds of warmth, they feel each other's quills, intemperate wrangling or grumbling, whatever the case may be, and separate, only once again to try to huddle together (Freud, 1921, p. 130, n.1).

The morals of this story are that ties bind only for a time, and the pack is stable in its instability, inasmuch as it composes and decomposes itself in its very unfolding.

## VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Several important questions remain for us to puzzle over.

Why does a child (and a primal son) choose an animal equivalent for the father? Freud suggests that a daughter would do the same, primal or otherwise, with respect to the mother, but that does not answer the question. For the primal sons, some time after their crime, "the animal struck [them] as a natural and obvious substitute for their father" (Freud, 1913, p. 206). There is an irreducible "around and aboutness" to their choice, thinks Freud, one that was natural and perhaps necessary. If we look for a further explanation in Freud's work, we shall only be struck by its stunning circularity: given the primal crime and the guilt that it engendered, the sons "revoked their deed by forbidding the killing of the totem" (p. 205), thereby (at first) allaying their remorse through their relations with it. The totem in question was an animal, and already so. The choice of an animal, as Freud stated (1939, p. 326), was "strange" indeed,

but no more than that: the “natural” phylogentic choice was simply inherited by Hans, Sergei, and so forth.

There are some matters that are as unintelligible as they are universal, Freud (1917c) wrote, such as a “snake phobia,” since even Darwin could not help but experience fear when one struck at him, “though he knew that he was protected from it by a thick sheet of glass!” (p. 447). There is an archetypal, primal, chosen “animal” in the textual imaginary of psychoanalysis, and it is not alone. The Theban sphinx sent by Hera and produced by two monsters, Echnidna and Orthus, themselves the offspring of monsters, was without doubt Freud’s favorite monster, an ineluctable hybrid with the face of a woman, the body of a lion, and the wings of a bird. Although Freud (1910) was not much of a birder, since he could not tell a vulture from a kite (p. 117), he did decode the riddle of the bird-like sphinx, and gave it a privileged place in his menagerie alongside his primal animal placeholder.

What is the relationship between psychoanalysis and domestication?

“Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God,” Freud (1930) wrote (p. 280), and an unhappy God at that. The power of “his” protheses has, for example, enabled humankind to exterminate many wild animals and breed others as domesticates. The domestication of animals caused for Freud a fundamental disruption in the relations between the primal sons and their father surrogate, the totem animal (and other animals as well), since domestication served to desacralize animals (Freud, 1913, pp. 197–198, 210).

We are able to pose the paradox of civilization through the problematic of domestication since, as Freud (1933) remarked in his letter to Einstein of September 1932, the evolution of civilization “is perhaps comparable to the domestication of certain species of animals” (p. 361). The strengths and weaknesses of civilization are to be found in the aim inhibitions, sublimations, and displacements that it forces upon the individual’s sexual and aggressive desires. In the organic process of domestication as it pertains to animals, we are “unfamiliar,” says Freud, with the effects, while on the other hand, the psychic consequences of the process of domestication, as it concerns humans, are “unambiguous” and fall within the purview of psychoanalysis. We are familiar neither with the nonorganic consequences nor, Freud implies, with many of the organic (i.e., evolu-

tionary) consequences of the domestication of animals and humans, respectively. Of the latter type, Freud (1930) speculated that "man's adoption of an erect posture" (therewith began humankind's civilization) had far-reaching consequences, especially in the domain of sexuality, which henceforth became a constant concern; a similar heightening of sexuality is produced in some animals through their domestication and hybridization (pp. 288–289 n.1). In Section III, I suggested some of the nonorganic disturbances that may arise in nonhuman domesticates as a result of organic changes (i.e., selective breeding may produce "ornamental" features such as excessive facial hair and unusually droopy ears, which have negative nonorganic effects).

Psychoanalysis, then, speculates about, describes, and seeks to alleviate some of the ills of civilization, but it also contributes to them in its own way. In Section I we saw that Freud, *qua* urbanite, was "at home" with domesticates. He also demanded a high degree of followership from his disciples (1914, p. 112ff; 1924c, p. 173), while at the same time he applauded their work in the diffusion and elaboration of psychoanalytic concepts, just as an owner demands of a pet both obedience and innovation within certain boundaries. In Section II, however, we found that implicit in the resolution of a child's animal phobia was the potential reenchantment of the previously existing and untroubled bond between the child and animals. This does not constitute a resacralization of animals since it takes place with respect to domesticates, which are by definition already desacralized. Even within Freud's domesticated, discontented civilization, there are spaces for the preservation of wildness. On several occasions (1911a, p. 39, n.2; 1917b, p. 419), Freud drew a parallel between the mental realm of fantasy, in which children fantasize and adults daydream, and nature reserves. The former is split-off from the reality principle; the latter are established against the civilizational forces that seek to dominate nature. One's "pleasure ego" fulfills its wish to elude the demands of the "reality ego" by escaping into fantasy *or* a wilderness site, places from which one must return, with various degrees of success (i.e., the environmentalist, perhaps like the artist, may be able to bring others around to such experiences by adjusting them to the world). Freud suggests to us that fantasies that are informed by wildness and wilderness, especially the experience (contextual and textual) of nature reserves,

produce a crack in the near-ubiquitous domestication of life, and thus provide for the child's and adult's enchantment of their relations with animals, some of whom were never desacralized or remained "wild."

As much as psychoanalysis shows signs of domestication, it also leaves room for potential escape routes into the paradomestic, even though this potentiality cannot correct Freud's zoological vision, since it required elaborate protheses of its own.

#### NOTES

1. I have not been able to consult the French and German editions of Bonaparte's *Topsy*. I have, however, consulted the English translation by Princess Eugenie of Greece, *Topsy, The story of a golden-haired chow* (London: The Pushkin Press, 1940).
2. John O'Neill (1989) has worked on the image of the swans in Schreber's poetry and *Memoirs* in an unpublished paper, "Schreber's Swan Song: Love and Desire in *Memoirs Of My Nervous Illness*."

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