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Adolescent Development Reconsidered

Carol Gilligan

In an essay, "On the Modern Element in Modern Literature," Trilling
(1967, pp. 164-165) writes of his discomfort in teaching the course in mod-
ern literature at Columbia College. No literature, he observes, "has ever
been so shockingly personal as ours—it asks every question that is forbid-
den in polite society. It asks us if we are content with our marriages, with
our family lives, with our professional lives, with our friends. . . . It asks
us if we are content with ourselves, if we are saved or damned." How is
one to teach such literature? After addressing the technicalities of verse
patterns, irony, and prose conventions, the teacher must confront the neces-

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sity of bearing personal testimony, "must use whatever authority he may possess to say whether or not a work is true, and if not, why not, and if so, why so." Yet one can do this only at considerable cost to one's privacy. What disturbs Trilling is that in the absence of such confrontation, the classroom lesson exemplifies the very problem displayed in the novels— the costs of detachment and dispassion in the face of what is most intensely passionate and personal.

To talk about health of adolescents raises a similar problem. Once we have covered the technicalities of physical disease and psychic mechanisms, how will we respond to the adolescent's questions, or the questions behind the adolescent's questions: What is true? What is of value? Who am I now? Where is my home? I have studied identity and moral development by listening to the ways in which people speak about themselves and about conflicts and choices they face. In this context, I have thought about the nature of psychological growth as it pertains to questions of truth and of value. Adolescence is a naturally occurring time of transition—a time when changes happen that affect the experience of self and relationships with others. Thus adolescence is a situation for epistemological crisis, an age when issues of interpretation come to the fore. The turbulence and indeterminacy of adolescence, long noted and often attributed to conflicts over sexuality and aggression, can also be traced to these interpretive problems. In this chapter, I will join concerns about the development of contemporary adolescents with concerns about questions of interpretation within psychology. I will begin by specifying four reasons for reconsidering the psychology of adolescence at this time and then offer a new framework for thinking about adolescent development and secondary education.

Four Reasons for Reconsidering Adolescent Development

First, the view of childhood has changed. Since adolescence denotes the transition from childhood to adulthood, what constitutes development in adolescence hinges on how one views the childhood that precedes it and the adulthood that follows. Recent research on infancy and early childhood reveals the young child to be far more social than psychologists previously imagined, calling into question most descriptions of the beginnings or early stages of cognitive, social, and moral development. Stern's recent book, *The Interpersonal World of the Infant* (1985) and Kagan's *The Nature of the Child* (1984) document the interpersonal capabilities and the social nature of young children: their responsiveness to others and their appreciation of standards. Previously described as "locked up in egocentrism," as "fused" with others, as capable only of "parallel play," the young child now is observed to initiate and sustain connection with others, to engage in patterns of social interaction with others and thus to create relationships with them. Emde, Johnson, and Easterbrooks's (1987)

research shows that nine-month-old babies prefer mothers to respond to their actions rather than to mimic, or mirror, their behavior. In addition, infants by this age have established distinctive patterns of social interaction with others, so that their relationships can be differentiated in these terms by the researcher, and presumably by the baby, since the patterns repeat. Thus relationships, or connections with others, are known to the young child as patterns of interaction that occur in time and that extend through time: themes and variations.

It may well be that the tension between this felt knowledge of human connection, this earliest grasp of what relationship means, and the ability to represent this knowledge in language underlies many psychological problems people experience and also many problems within the field of psychology itself. Despite the fact that psychologists constantly talk about interaction or relationship—between self and others, between person and environment—the language of psychology is filled with static, visual images of separation. Thus psychologists delineate borders and boundaries in an effort to classify and categorize and ultimately to predict and control human behavior, whereas behavior, especially when observed in its natural settings, often resists such classification. At present, Hoffman's (1976) observations of empathy and altruism in young children and Gottman's (1983) monograph "How Children Become Friends"—studies that derive from watching children in the natural settings of their daily lives—challenge existing stage theories of social and moral development by revealing the disparity between the stage theory description of the young child as asocial or amoral and the intensely social and also moral nature of the young child's relationships with others. Like Bowlby (1973, 1980), who observed the young child to grieve the loss that separation entails, Hoffman saw young children perceive and respond to the needs of others, and Gottman saw children remember their friends—even after surprisingly long intervals of physical distance and time.

These radical changes in the view of childhood necessitate a revision in the description of adolescent development, since they alter the foundation on which psychologists have premised development in the teenage years. If social responsiveness and moral concern are normally present in early childhood, their absence in adolescence becomes surprising. Rather than asking why such capacities have failed to emerge by adolescence, implying that the child is stuck at some earlier or lower stage, one would ask instead what has happened to the responsiveness of infancy, how have the child's capacities for relationship been diminished or lost? This change in perspective also offers a new way of thinking about resistance—especially the signs of resistance often noted among teenage girls (Gilligan, 1986a). Rather than signaling conflicts over separation, such resistance may reflect girls' perception that connections with others are endangered for girls in the teenage years on a variety of levels.

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The second reason for reconsidering what is meant by development in adolescence follows directly from this observation. Repeatedly, the inattention to girls has been noted as a lacuna in the literature on adolescence (Bettelheim, 1961; Adelson and Doehrman, 1980)—which raises the question: What has been missed by not studying girls? The answer generally is felt to be something about relationships, and those who have studied girls and women confirm this speculation. Konopka (1966, p. 40), who entered the locked world of delinquent girls to learn about their own stories, found that these stories were centrally about "loneliness accompanied by despair"—a desperation of loneliness "based on a feeling of being unprotected, being incapable of making and finding friends, being surrounded by an anonymous and powerful adult world." Konopka observed that although the need for connection with others, which means involvement with others who are "real friends" or with an adult who appears as "a person," is unusually intense among delinquent girls, the "need for *dependence* . . . seems to exist in all adolescent girls." Miller (1976), writing about women who come for psychotherapy, noted that women's sense of self is built around being able to make and then maintain connections with others and that the loss of relationships is experienced by many women as tantamount to a loss of self. Listening to girls and women speaking about themselves and about their experiences of conflict and choice, I heard conceptions of self and morality that implied a different way of thinking about relationships—one that often had set women apart from the mainstream of Western thought because of its central premise that self and others were connected and interdependent.

Thus to say what is true—that girls and women have not been much studied is only to begin to appreciate what such study might entail. To reconsider adolescent development in light of the inattention to girls and women is to hold in abeyance the meaning of such key terms of psychological analysis as *self* and *development* and perhaps above all *relationship*.

For the present, to take seriously psychologists' past omission of girls and women and to see this absence as potentially significant means to suspend for the moment all discussion of sex differences until the standards of assessment and the terms of comparison can be drawn from studies of girls and women as well as boys and men. The deep sense of outrage and despair over disconnection, tapped by Konopka, Miller, myself, and others—the strong feelings and judgments often made by girls and women about excluding, leaving out, and abandoning, as well as the desperate actions girls and women often take in the face of detachment or indifference or lack of concern—may reflect an awareness on some level of the disjunction between women's lives and Western culture. Yet the equally strong feelings often expressed by girls and women that such feelings are illegitimate and the judgments often made that such exclusion is justified or deserved serve to undercut this awareness. What Adelson and Doehrman

(1980, p. 114) call "the inattention to girls, and the processes of feminine development in adolescence" tacitly supports the suspicion of girls and women that nothing of importance or value can be learned by studying them. In the moral conflicts adolescent girls and women describe, a central and searing dilemma is about this problem of disconnection: Is it better, women ask, to turn away from others or to abandon themselves. This question—whether to be selfish or selfless in choosing between self and others rests on the premise that genuine connection must fail. One reason for reconsidering the psychology of adolescence is to examine this premise.

The third reason for reconsideration pertains specifically to cognitive development and involves the definition of cognition—what knowing and also thinking mean. Following Sputnik in the late 1950s, Americans became concerned about the state of math and science education as part of an effort to "catch up with the Russians." The revival of Piaget's work in the early 1960s provided a psychological rationale for this endeavor, since in Piaget's view cognitive development was identical to the growth of mathematical and scientific thinking (see for example Inhelder and Piaget, 1958). This conception of cognitive development conveys a view of the individual as living in a timeless world of abstract rules. Within this framework, there is no rationale for teaching history or languages or writing or for paying attention to art and music. In fact, the flourishing of Piagetian theory within psychology over the past two decades has coincided with the decline of all these subjects in the school curriculum.

Educators looking to psychology to justify curriculum decisions still can find little basis for teaching history or for encouraging students to learn more than one language or for emphasizing complex problems of interpretation and the strategies needed for reading ambiguous texts. In the timeless world of critical thinking, the fact that one cannot say exactly the same thing in French and in English becomes in essence irrelevant to the development of intelligence. Ravitch (1985) recently has chronicled the decline of historical knowledge among high school students and lamented the transposition of history into social science. Yet the humanities, in order to gain funding or to defend their place within the curriculum, have often had to justify their educational value in terms psychologists have derived from analyzing the structure of mathematical and scientific reasoning.

The ahistorical approach to human events underlies the fourth reason for reconsideration: namely, the overriding value psychologists have placed on separation, individuation, and autonomy. To see self-sufficiency as the hallmark of maturity conveys a view of adult life that is at odds with the human condition—a view that cannot sustain the kinds of long-term commitments and involvements with others that are necessary for raising and educating a child or for citizenship in a democratic society (see Arendt, 1958). The equation of development with separation and of matu-

rity with independence presumes a radical discontinuity of generations and encourages a vision of human experience that is essentially divorced from history or time. The tendency for psychologists to characterize adolescence as the time of second individuation (Blos, 1967) and to celebrate an identity that is self-wrought (Erikson, 1958) encourages a way of speaking in which the interdependence of human life and the reliance of people on one another becomes largely unrepresented or tacit. The way in which this value framework colors the interpretation of research findings is exemplified by an article recently published by Pipp and others (1985), who set out to discover how adolescents view their relationships with their parents over time—what changes they see in such connections from early childhood to late adolescence. Thus college sophomores were asked through drawings and questionnaire ratings to indicate the nature of their relationship with their parents at five points in time ranging from early childhood to the present. The authors note two distinct trends. One was expected and is familiar to anyone conversant with developmental theory: a linear progression whereby incrementally over time child and parent move from a relationship of inequality toward an ideal of equality. Thus the child is portrayed as gaining steadily in responsibility, dominance, and independence in relation to the parents, who correspondingly decline on all these dimensions. With this shift in the balance of power, child and parent become increasingly alike or similar over time. The other trend was unanticipated and showed a striking discontinuity. With respect to variables pertaining to love and closeness, college sophomores saw their relationships with their parents as closer at present than in the years preceding, more similar in this respect to their relationships with their parents in early childhood. In addition, differences emerged along these two dimensions between the ways students represented their relationships with their mothers and fathers in that they felt more responsibility toward their mothers, whom they perceived as especially friendly, and they felt more similar to their fathers, whom they perceived as more dominant.

The unexpected finding of two asymmetrical lines of development tied to different dimensions of relationship is of great interest to me because it corroborates the developmental model I have derived from analyzing the ways people describe themselves and make moral judgments—a model built on the distinction between equality and attachment as two dimensions of relationship that shape the experience of self and define the terms of moral conflict. For the moment, however, I wish to focus on the way Pipp and others interpret their findings, specifically to note that in discussing their results, they collapse the two trends they have discovered and in doing so reveal an overriding concern with equality and independence. The fact that nineteen-year-olds describe themselves as their parents' children thus is taken by Pipp and others (1985, p. 1001) as a sign of limitation, an indication that the process of individuation is not yet complete.

> Although [our subjects] felt themselves to be more independent of the relationship than their parents were, there were indications that they still felt themselves to be their parents' children. . . . The results suggest that the individuation process is still ongoing at the age of 19. It would be interesting to see whether it continues throughout adulthood.

With this interpretation, the authors align themselves with the field of psychology in general. Viewing childhood attachments as a means to separation, they portray continuing connections between adolescents and parents as a sign of dependence, negatively valued and considered as a source of limitation.

To summarize this first section, the need to reconsider adolescent development at present stems from changes in the understanding of infancy and childhood, from the recognition that girls have not been much studied and that studies of girls are overlooked or not cited, from the observation that Piagetian theories of cognitive development provide no rationale for roughly half of what has traditionally been regarded as the essence of a liberal arts or humanistic education, and from the fact that a psychology of adolescence, anchored in the values of separation and independence, fails to represent the interdependence of adult life and thus conveys a distorted image of the human condition, an image that fosters what is currently called the culture of narcissism.

I take from these observations several cautions: that there is a need for new concepts and new categories of interpretation; that the accumulation of data according to old conceptual frameworks simply extends these problems; that the assessment of sex differences cannot be undertaken until female development is better understood; that such understanding may change the description of both male and female development; and that the approach to the psychology of adolescence and to subjects pertaining to adolescent development and education must be informed by the insights of such disciplines as anthropology, history, and literature. Specifically, psychologists need to incorporate anthropologists' recognition of the dangers in imposing one set of ethnocentric categories on a different population and to take on the concerns of anthropologists, historians, and literary critics with the complexity of interpretation and the construction of alternative world views.

Formulating an Approach

In the 1971 issue of *Daedalus* devoted to the subject of early adolescence, several articles addressed the question of values. If the high school does not have a coherent set of values or a moral philosophy, Kagan argued (as did Kohlberg and myself), it cannot engage the commitment of

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its students. The school and the culture at large must offer some justification for learning to adolescents who are distracted by other concerns, who are capable of spotting contradiction, who have a keen eye for adult hypocrisy, and who are unwilling to put their self-esteem on the line when failure seems inescapable. Bettelheim (1965, p. 106) linked the problems of youth to the problem of generations: "Whenever the older generation has lost its bearings, the younger generation is lost with it. The positive alternatives of emulation or revolt are replaced with the lost quality of neither." Erikson (1975, p. 223), writing at a time when the dissent of contemporary youth was rising, noted that for adults "to share true authority with the young would mean to acknowledge something which adults have learned to mistrust in themselves: a truly ethical potential." To Erikson, ethical concerns were a natural meeting ground between adults and adolescents, both rendered uncertain by the predicament of modern civilization.

Yet if ethical questions are inescapable in relations between adults and adolescents, if the problems of adolescents are in some sense a barometer of the health of civilization, a measure of the culture's productive and reproductive potential, the issues raised by Trilling become central: How are adults to address the ethical problems of modern society? What claims to moral authority do the teachers of adolescents possess? The great modern novels that Trilling was teaching had as a central and controlling theme "the disenchantment of our culture with culture itself . . . a bitter line of hostility to civilization" (1967, p. 60). Thus the urgency of the questions: Are we content with our marriages, our work, and ourselves? How do we envision salvation? What wisdom can we pass on to the next generation? Twentieth-century history has only heightened ambivalence toward the life of civilization by demonstrating in one of the most highly educated and cultured of nations a capacity for moral atrocity so extreme as to strain the meaning of words. In light of this history, any equation of morality with culture or intelligence or education is immediately suspect, and this suspicion has opened the way for the current revival of religious fundamentalism and of terrorism, as well as for the present skepticism about nineteenth-century ideas about development or progress. The idea of "surrendering oneself to experience without regard to self-interest or conventional morality, of escaping wholly from the societal bonds, is," Trilling (1967, p. 82) notes, "an 'element' somewhere in the mind of every modern person." This element is manifest in one form or another in many of the problems of today's adolescents.

The awesome power of the irrational in human behavior is the subject of both classical tragedy and modern psychology, each attempting in different ways to untangle and explain its logic, to understand why people pursue paths that are clearly marked as self-destructive—why, for example, teenagers stop eating, take drugs, commit suicide, and in a variety of other ways wreak havoc with their future. Two approaches currently

characterize the response of professionals to these signs of disease. One relies on the imposition of control, the effort to override a tortuous reason with behavior modification and biofeedback, to focus attention simply on physical survival by teaching skills for managing stress and regulating food and alcohol consumption. The other approach reaches into reason and joins the humanistic faith in the power of education with the insights of modern psychology. Positing human development as the aim of education, it turns attention to the question: What constitutes and fosters development?

My interest in adolescence is anchored in the second approach. It was spurred by Erikson's attention to the relationship between life history and history and by two insights in the work of Kohlberg: First, that following the Nazi holocaust, psychologists must address the question of moral relativism, and second, that adolescents are passionately interested in moral questions. Thus adolescence may be a crucial time for moral education. Erikson's study of Luther highlighted the central tie between questions of identity and questions of morality in the adolescent years. But it also called attention to a set of beliefs that extend from the theology of Luther's Reformation into the ideology of contemporary psychology: a world view in which the individual is embarked on a solitary journey toward personal salvation, a world view that is centered on the values of autonomy and independence. Luther's statements of repudiation and affirmation, "I am not" and "Here I stand" have become emblematic of the identity crisis in modern times—a crisis that begins with the separation of self from childhood identifications and attachments and ends with some version of Luther's statement: "I have faith, therefore I am justified." In a secular age, the faith and the justification have become psychological. The limitations of this vision have been elaborated by a variety of social critics and are closely connected to the reasons I have given for reconsidering the psychology of adolescence: the view of childhood attachments as dispensable or replaceable, the absence of women from the cosmology, the equation of thinking with formal logic, and the value placed of self-sufficiency and independence. Such criticisms are augmented by the facts of recent social history: the rise in teenage suicides, eating disorders, and educational problems. The need at present for new directions in theory and practice seem clear.

Two Moral Voices: Two Frameworks for Problem Solving

My approach to development is attentive to a moral voice that reveals the lineaments of an alternative world view and is grounded in seemingly anomalous data from studies involving girls and women (Gilligan, 1977, 1982, 1986b)—moral judgments that did not fit the definition of moral and self-descriptions at odds with the concept of self. The data that initially

appeared discrepant became the basis for a reformulation, grounds for thinking again about what self, morality, and relationship mean.

Two moral voices that signal different ways of thinking about what constitutes a moral problem and how such problems can be addressed or resolved draw attention to the fact that a story can be told from different angles and a situation seen in different lights. Like ambiguous figure perception where the same picture can be seen as a vase or two faces, the basic elements of moral judgment—self, others, and relationship—can be organized in different ways, depending on how relationship is imagined or construed. From the perspective of someone seeking or loving justice, relationships are organized in terms of equality, symbolized by the balancing of scales. Moral concerns focus on problems of inequality or oppression, and the moral ideal is one of reciprocity, or equal respect. From the perspective of someone seeking or valuing care, relationship connotes responsiveness, or attachment, a resiliency of connection that is symbolized by a network, or web. Moral concerns focus on problems of detachment or disconnection or abandonment, and the moral ideal is one of attention and response. Since equality and attachment are dimensions that characterize all forms of human connection, all relationships can be seen in both ways and spoken of in both sets of terms. Yet by adopting one or another moral voice or standpoint, people can highlight problems that are associated with different kinds of vulnerability and focus attention on different types of concern.

Evidence that justice and care concerns can be distinguished in people's narratives about moral conflict and choice and that these concerns organize people's thinking about decisions they make comes from a series of studies in which people were asked to discuss conflicts and choices that they faced. In essence, by asking people to speak about times when they confronted dilemmas, it was possible to examine how people think about the age-old questions of how to live and what to do. Most of the people who participated in these studies, primarily North American adolescents and adults, raised considerations of both justice and care when describing an experience of moral conflict. Yet they also tended to focus their attention on one set of concerns and minimally represent the other. The surprising finding of these studies was the extent of this "focus" phenomenon. For example, in a study (Gilligan and Attanucci, 1985) where focus was defined as 75 percent or more considerations pertaining either to issues of justice or to issues of care, fifty-three out of eighty educationally advantaged adolescents and adults, or two-thirds of the sample, demonstrated focus. The remaining third raised roughly equal numbers of justice and care considerations.

The tendency for people to organize experiences of conflict and choice largely in terms of justice or in terms of care has been a constant finding of the research on moral orientation, ranging from Lyons's (1983)

and Langdale's (1983) reports of orientation predominance, to the more stringent analysis of orientation focus by Gilligan and Attanucci (1985), to the most recent analysis of narrative strategies (Brown and others, 1987). This takes into account not simply the number or proportion of justice and care considerations raised but also the way in which concerns about justice and care are presented in relation to one another and in relation to the speaker or narrator of the dilemma—whether justice and care are presented as separate concerns or integrated, whether one or both sets of concerns are aligned with the narrator or claimed as the speaker's own terms. The fact that two moral voices can repeatedly be distinguished in narratives of moral conflict and choice and the fact that people tend to focus their attention either on problems of unfairness or problems of disconnection gives credence to the interpretation of justice and care as frameworks that organize moral thinking and feelings. The focus phenomenon, however, suggests that people tend to lose sight of one perspective or to silence one set of concerns in arriving at decisions or in justifying choices they have made.

The tendency to focus was equally characteristic of the men and the women studied, suggesting that loss of perspective is a liability that both sexes share. There were striking sex differences, however, in the direction of focus. Of the thirty-one men who demonstrated focus, thirty focused on justice; of the twenty-two women who demonstrated focus, ten focused on justice and twelve on care. Care focus, although not characteristic of all women, was almost exclusively a female phenomenon in Brown and others' study of educationally advantaged North Americans. If girls and women were eliminated from the study, care focus in moral reasoning would virtually disappear.

With this clarification of the different voice phenomenon—the thematic shift in outlook or perspective, the change in the terms of moral discourse and self description, and the empirical association with women—it becomes possible to turn to new questions about development in adolescence and psychological interpretation, as well as to concerns about moral relativism and moral education. It is noteworthy that both sexes raise considerations of care in describing moral conflicts they face and thus identify problems of care and connection as subjects of moral concern. Yet it is women's elaboration of care considerations that reveals the coherence of a care ethic as a framework for decision—its premises as a world view or way of constructing social reality, its logic as a problem-solving strategy, and its significance as a focal point for evaluating actions and thinking about choice. The description of care concerns as the focus of a coherent moral perspective rather than as a sign of deficiency in women's moral reasoning or a subordinate set of concerns within a justice framework (such as special obligations or personal dilemmas) recasts the moral domain as one comprising at least two moral orientations. Moral

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maturity presumably would entail an ability to see in both ways and to speak both languages, and the relationship between these two moral perspectives or voices becomes a key question for investigation.

The significance of the concept of moral orientation for thinking about development in adolescence is illuminated by a brilliant study designed and conducted by Johnston (1985). Johnston set out to examine Polanyi's (1958) suggestion that there are two conflicting aspects of formalized intelligence; one that depends on the acquisition of formalized instruments (such as propositional logic) and one that depends on the "pervasive participation of the knowing person in the act of knowing." Polanyi (1958, p. 70) considers this latter kind of intelligence to rest on "an art which is essentially inarticulate." Johnston's question was whether this way of knowing could be articulated. Her approach to this question was informed by Vygotsky's (1978, p. 57) theory that all of the higher cognitive functions (voluntary attention, logical memory, formation of concepts) originate as actual relations between individuals, so that in the course of development "an interpersonal process is transformed into an intrapersonal one." This is a theory that allows for individual differences and that can explain how different experiences of relationships might lead to different ways of thinking about a problem—such as the sex differences in early childhood relationships that Chodorow (1978) has described. Furthermore, groups like women whose experience in general has been neglected in considering the sources of cognitive and moral proficiency may exemplify ways of knowing or thinking that appear, in the present context, to be inarticulate. Johnston's question was whether tacit knowledge, or intuitive forms of knowing—what Belenky and others (1986) have subsequently called connected knowing—might appear as different forms of moral problem solving.

Thus Johnston asked sixty eleven- and fifteen-year-olds from two schools in a typical middle-class suburb to state and to solve the problem posed in two of Aesop's fables. Of the sixty children, fifty-four (or fifty-six, depending on the fable) initially cast the problem either as a problem of rights or as a problem of response, framing it either as a conflict of claims that could be resolved by appealing to a fair procedure or a rule for adjudicating disputes or as a problem of need, which raised the question of whether or how it was possible to respond to all of the needs. Each way of defining the problem was associated with a different problem-solving strategy, thus tying moral orientation to the development of different kinds of reasoning. For example, in the fable, "The Moles and the Porcupine" (see Exhibit 1), a justice strategy focused on identifying and prioritizing conflicting rights or claims. ("The porcupine has to go definitely. It's the moles' house.") In contrast, a care strategy focused on identifying needs and creating a solution responsive to all of the needs. ("Cover the porcuping with a blanket [so that the moles will not be stuck and the porcupine

will have shelter]" or "Dig a bigger hole.") It is important to stress that these two approaches are not opposites or mirror images of one another (with justice uncaring and care unjust). Instead, they constitute different ways of organizing the problem that lead to different reasoning strategies—different ways of thinking about what is happening and what to do.

Exhibit 1. The Porcupine and the Moles

It was growing cold, and a porcupine was looking for a home. He found a most desirable cave, but saw it was occupied by a family of moles.

"Would you mind if I shared your home for the winter?" the porcupine asked the moles.

The generous moles consented, and the porcupine moved in. But the cave was small, and every time the moles moved around, they were scratched by the porcupine's sharp quills. The moles endured this discomfort as long as they could. Then at last they gathered courage to approach their visitor. "Pray leave," they said, "and let us have our cave to ourselves once again."

"Oh no!" said the porcupine. "This place suits me very well."

The brilliance of Johnston's design lay in the fact that after the children had stated and solved the fable problem, she asked, "Is there another way to think about this problem?" About half of the children, somewhat more fifteen- than eleven-year-olds, spontaneously switched orientation and solved the problem in the other mode. Others did so following a cue as to the form such a switch might take. ("Some people say you could have a rule; some people say you could solve the dilemma so that all of the animals will be satisfied.") Then Johnston asked, "Which of these solutions is the better solution?" With few exceptions, the children answered this question, saying which solution was better and explaining why it was preferable.

This study is a watershed about developmental theory and research practices. The fact that people solve a problem in one way clearly does not mean that they do not have access to other approaches. Furthermore, a person's initial or spontaneous approach to a problem is not necessarily the one he or she deems preferable. Eleven- and fifteen-year-olds are able to explain why they adopt problem-solving strategies that they see as problematic, to give reasons for why they put aside ways of thinking that in their own eyes seem preferable. Whether there are reasons other than the ones they cite is, in this context, beside the point. The fact that boys who choose justice strategies but say they prefer care solutions but consider care solutions to be naive and unworkable is, in itself, of significance. For example, in one high school, students of both sexes tended to characterize care-focused solutions or inclusive problem-solving strategies as utopian or outdated; one student linked them with impractical Sunday school teachings, one with the outworn philosophy of hippies. Presumably, students in the school who voiced care strategies would encounter these characterizations.

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The tendency for children to define the fable problem in terms either of rights or of response, combined with their ability to switch orientations, heightens the analogy to ambiguous figure perception but also raises the question: Why do some people focus on justice and some on care when considering the same problem? Furthermore, why do some people see rights solutions as better and others see response solutions as preferable in the same situation? Johnston found sex differences in both spontaneous moral orientation and preferred orientation, with boys more often choosing and preferring justice formulations and girls more often choosing and preferring care strategies. In addition, she found fable differences, indicating that moral orientation is associated both with the sex of the reasoner and with the problem being considered. (See Langdale, 1983, for similar findings.)

Since people can adopt at least two moral standpoints and can solve problems in at least two different ways, the choice of moral standpoint, whether implicit or explicit, becomes an important feature of moral decision making and of research on moral development. The choice of moral standpoint adds a new dimension to the role commonly accorded the self in moral decision making. Traditionally, the self is described as choosing whether or not to enact moral standards or principles, as having or not having a good will. Yet the self, whether conceived as a narrator of moral conflict or as a protagonist in a moral drama, also chooses, consciously or unconsciously, where to stand—what signs to look for and what voices to listen to in thinking about what is happening (what is the problem) and what to do. People may have a preferred way of seeing and may be attuned to different voices, so that one voice or another is more readily heard or understood. Johnston demonstrated that at least by age 11, children know and can explain the logic of two problem-solving strategies and will indicate why they see one or the other as preferable. In adolescence, when thinking becomes more reflective and more self-conscious, moral orientation may become closely entwined with self-definition, so that the sense of self or feelings of personal integrity become aligned with a particular way of seeing or speaking.

But adolescence, the time when thinking becomes self-consciously interpretive, is also the time when the interpretive schemes of the culture, including the system of social norms, values, and roles, impinge more directly on perception and judgment, defining within the framework of a given society what is the "right way" to see and to feel and to think—the way "we" think. Thus adolescence is the age when thinking becomes conventional. Moral standpoint, a feature of an individual's moral reasoning, is also a characteristic of interpretive schemes, including the conventions of interpretation or the intellectual conventions that are taught in secondary education. The justice focus, which is explicit in most theories of moral development (see Freud, [1925] 1961; Piaget, [1932] 1965; Kohl-

berg, 1969), also characterizes and makes plain the correlation found between tests of moral development and tests of cognitive and social and emotional development; although measuring different things, all these tests may be measuring from the same angle. Thus a care focus that otherwise can be viewed as one aspect of moral reasoning becomes a crucial perspective on an interpretive level, challenging the prevailing world view. Here the questions raised by Trilling become especially pertinent, articulating a central theme in modern culture that is at odds with the dominant viewpoint in contemporary psychology—the theme of disenchantment. Psychology's response to the moral crisis of modern civilization has become a kind of heady optimism, reflected in the language of current stage theories and intervention promises, conveying the impression that the nature of moral maturity is clear and the road to development apparent. To bring in a standpoint missing from such theories enlarges the definition of cognition and morality and renders the portrayal of human development and moral dilemmas more complex. The following example, taken from a study of high school students, speaks directly to these questions and suggests how a prevailing justice orientation may impinge on the judgments adolescents make, influencing both the concerns that they voice and also what they hold back or keep silent. The example contains both a theoretical point and a methodological caution: Two judgments, one directly stated and one indirectly presented, highlight a developmental tension between detachment and connection and underscore the limitations of data gathered without attention to the issue of standpoint or the possibility of alternative frameworks or world views. At the heart of this illustration of alternative world views and the problems posed by alternative world views is a critical but subtle shift in perspective, caught colloquially by the difference between being centered in oneself and being self-centered.

An Example of Alternative World Views

A high school student, Anne, was attending a traditional preparatory school for academically talented and ambitious students, a boy's school that in recent years became coeducational. When asked to describe a moral conflict she faced, Anne spoke about her decision not to buy cigarettes for someone who asked her to do so. Her reasoning focused on considerations of justice: "If I am against smoking, but yet I buy cigarettes for a person, I think I am contradicting myself." Noncontradiction here means reciprocity in the sense of applying the same standard to herself and to others, treating others as she would treat herself or want to be treated by them, and thereby showing equal respect for persons. Asked if she thought she had done the right thing, she answers, "Yes . . . I think it was, because I did not contradict myself, because I held with what I believed." Thus she assesses the rightness of her decision by examining

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the consistency between her actions and her beliefs, justified on grounds of respect for life and valuing health. Then she is asked, "Is there another way to see the problem?" and she says,

> Well, no. I mean yes. It is not as simple as buying cigarettes or not. It has a lot to do with everything that I believe in. . . . In another sense, it represents how I deal with what I believe. I try not to break down just because somebody pressures me, but I don't feel like I get into situations like they always write about in books. . . . I don't think people are represented the way they are sometimes.

It is important to emphasize that this intimation of another way of seeing, and the suggestion that the way people and situations are commonly represented may not be an accurate representation, occurs only after the interpretive question "Is there another way to see the problem?" is raised. And the interpretive question leads to confusion, to a dense statement that appears to alternate between two perspectives, one elaborated and one implied. The implied perspective, which "has a lot to do with everything that I believe in," is only clarified when Anne speaks about a friend whom she characterizes as "self-centered." In this context, the meaning of being self-centered shifts from "holding with what I believe" to "not thinking about how one's words or actions affect other people." With this shift, the alternative world view and the problem posed by alternative world views become clear.

Anne says that her friend does not recognize how what she says affects other people: "She does not think about how it affects them, but just about the fact that she told them." In other words, she acts as if speaking could be divorced from listening, or words from interpretation. Because her friend is inattentive to differences in interpretation, she "does not always recognize that what she likes to hear is not what other people like to hear, but may hurt their feelings." She is self-centered in that she does not realize that "other people are not all like her."

Thus attention to differences in interpretation is central to making connection with others. The interpretive question raised by the researcher that leads Anne to attend to the issue of perspective also leads her into a way of thinking where the failure to see differences becomes morally problematic, signifying carelessness or detachment (being self-centered) and creating the conditions for the unwitting infliction of hurt. This is a very different set of concerns from the concerns about noncontradiction and acting consistently with her beliefs, which characterized Anne's justice reasoning. With the shift in perspective, the word *autonomy* takes on different connotations: To be self-regulating or self-governing can mean being centered in oneself but it also can mean not attending or responding

to others. The tension between these two ways of seeing and listening creates a conflict that, as Anne says, is "not as simple as buying cigarettes or not," a conflict that in addition is not well represented by the common depiction of adolescent moral conflicts as peer-pressure problems.

Asked if she had learned anything from the experience, Anne speaks in two voices. She asserts her satisfaction with her ability "to stay with what I believe, and as far as learning something from it, I was able to say no and so I could say it again." But she also asserts her unease about shutting herself off from others, about becoming impervious to the changing circumstances of her life and unresponsive to the people around her.

> But I don't know that I will always say no to everything. You can't all the time, and as you make better friends and as you are under different circumstances and different situations, I think my answers will change—as I become more like the people in this school. Because no matter where you are, you tend to become at least a little like the people around you.

Anne does not doubt the wisdom or the rightness of her decision to say no in this instance, but the incident raises a further question: How can she stay with herself and also be with other people? Viewing life as lived in the changing medium of time and seeing herself as open to the people around her, she believes that in time both she and her answers will change. The dilemma or tension she faces is not that of peer pressure—how to say no to her friends or classmates. Instead, it stems from a different way of thinking about herself in relation to others, a way that leads into the question of what relationship, or in this instance friendship, means.

The ability to sustain two perspectives that offer divergent views of a scene or to tell a story from two different angles can be taken as a marker of cognitive and moral growth in the adolescent years—a sign perhaps in the context of ordinary living of what Keats called "negative capability," the ability of the artist to enter into and to take on ways of seeing and speaking that differ from one's own. For example, with respect to the question of separation or individuation as it pertains to adolescents' perceptions of their relationships with their parents, one teenager says, "I am not only my mother's daughter, I am also Susan." Another, describing her anger at her holding-on mother, recalls herself as saying to her mother, "You will always be my mother. . . . I will always be your daughter, but you have to let go." These not only/but also constructions used by teenage girls in describing themselves in relation to their mothers convey a view of change as occurring in the context of continuing attachment and imply a vision of development that does not entail detachment or carry the implication that relationships can be replaced. From this standpoint, the moral

problems engendered by the transformations of relationships in adolescence pertain not only to injustice and oppression but also to abandonment and disloyalty. Thus seen, development in adolescence takes on new dimensions. The much discussed problem of moral relativism is joined by the problem of moral reductionism, the temptation to simplify human dilemmas by claiming that there is only one moral standpoint.

A study conducted at a high school for girls clarified the ways in which moral conflicts in adolescence catch the transformation of relationships along the two dimensions of equality and attachment, highlighting problems of unfairness but also problems of disconnection. As the balance of power between child and adult shifts with the child's coming of age, so too the experience and the meaning of connection change. What constitutes attachment in early childhood does not constitute connection in adolescence, given the sexual changes of puberty and also the growth of subjective and reflective thought. Thus the question arises: What are the analogues in adolescence to the responsive engagement that psychologists now find so striking in infancy and early childhood? What constitutes genuine connection in the adolescent years?

I raise this question to explicate a point of view that at first glance may seem inconsequential or even antithetical to concerns about adolescent development and health. One can readily applaud Anne's decision not to buy cigarettes for another (argued in terms of justice) and see her ability to say no as one that will stand her in good stead. My intention is not to qualify this judgment or to diminish the importance of this ability but to stress the importance of another as well. Like concerns about submitting or yielding to pressure from others, concerns about not listening or becoming cut off from others are also vital concerns. The ability to create and sustain human connection may hinge in adolescence on the ability to differentiate true from false relationship—to read the signs that distinguish authentic from inauthentic forms of connection and thus to protect the wish for relationship or the openness to others from overwhelming disappointment or defeat. The capacity for detachment in adolescence, heightened by the growth of formal operational thinking and generally prized as the hallmark of cognitive and moral development, is thus doubled edged, signaling an ability to think critically about thinking but also a potential for becoming, in Anne's terms, self-centered. Although detachment connotes the dispassion that signifies fairness in justice reasoning, the ability to stand back from oneself and from others and to weigh conflicting claims evenhandedly in the abstract, detachment also connotes the absence of connection and creates the conditions for carelessness or violation, for violence toward others or oneself.

The adolescent's question "Where am I going?" is rendered problematic because adolescents lack experience in the ways of adult work and love. High school students, including inner-city youth living in poverty,

often speak about their plans to work and have a family. Yet even if such goals are clearly envisioned, teenagers have no experience of how to reach them. When you do not know where you are going or how the route goes, the range of interpretation opens up enormously. The adolescent's question "Where is my home" is commonly raised for college students who wonder, is it here at school, or back in Ohio, or in Larchmont? Where will it be in the future? How do I interpret whatever new moves I make in my life?

These interpretive questions fall on the line of intellectual and ethical development that Perry (1970) traced—a line leading from the belief that truth is objective and known by authorities to the realization that all truth is contextually relative and responsibility for commitment inescapable. Yet Perry, although addressing the existential dilemma, leaves open the issue of detachment that bothered Trilling, posing the teaching quandary Trilling raised: What commitments can one defend as worth making and on what basis can one claim authority? Erikson (1958) wrote about the penchant of adolescents for absolute truths and totalistic solutions, the proclivity to end, once and for all, all uncertainty and confusion by seizing control and attempting to stop time or blot out, or eliminate, in one way or another the source of confusion—in others or in oneself. Many destructive actions on the part of adolescents can be understood in these terms. Because adolescents are capable not only of abstract logical thinking but also of participating in the act of knowing; because they are in some sense aware of subjectivity and perspective, or point of view; because they are therefore able to see through false claims to authority at the same time as they yearn for right answers or for someone who will tell them how they should live and what they should do; the temptation for adults dealing with adolescents is to opt for the alternatives or permissiveness or authoritarianism and to evade the problems that lie in taking what Baumrind (1978) has called an authoritative stance.

Resisting Detachment

One problem in taking an authoritative stance with adolescents is that many of the adults involved with adolescents have little authority in this society. Therefore, although they may in fact know much about teenagers' lives, they may have little confidence in their knowledge. Rather than claiming authority, they may detach their actions from their judgment and attribute their decisions to the judgments of those who are in positions of greater social power. But another problem lies in the perennial quandary about adolescents: what actions to take in attempting to guide teenagers away from paths clearly marked as destructive and how to read the signs that point in the direction of health. To reconsider the nature of development in adolescence itself raises a question of perspective: From what angle or in what terms shall this reconsideration take place?

Recent studies of adolescents in families and schools have been discovering the obvious, although the need for such diversity also seems obvious since the implications are repeatedly ignored. The studies find that adolescents fare better in situations where adults listen and that mothers and teachers are centrally important in teenagers' lives. Mothers are the parent with whom adolescents typically have the most contact, the one they talk with the most and perceive as knowing most about their lives (Youniss and Smollar, 1985). Most researchers consider it desirable for fathers to be more involved with adolescents, but they find, in general, that fathers do not spend as much time or talk as personally with their teenage children. In studies of schools, teachers are cited as central to the success of secondary education. The good high schools identified by Rutter and others (1979) and by Lightfoot (1983) are characterized by the presence of teachers who are able, within the framework of a coherent set of values or school ethos, to assume authority and to take responsibility for what they do. Yet mothers of adolescents are increasingly single parents living in poverty, and teachers at present are generally unsupported and devalued. Psychological development in adolescence may well hinge on the adolescent's belief that her or his psyche is worth developing, and this belief in turn may hinge on the presence in a teenager's life of an adult who knows and cares about the teenager's psyche. Economic and psychological support for the mothers and the teachers who at present are the primary adults engaged with teenagers may be essential to the success of efforts to promote adolescent development.

The question of what stance or aim or direction to take is focused by the research on moral orientation, which points to two lines of development and to their possible tension. If a focus on care currently provides a critical interpretive standpoint and highlights problems in schools and society that need to be addressed, how can this perspective be developed or even sustained? The evidence that among educationally advantaged North Americans care focus is demonstrated primarily by girls and women raises questions about the relationship between female development and secondary education. But it also suggests that girls may constitute a resistance to the prevailing ethos of detachment and disconnection, a resistance that has moral and political as well as psychological implications. Thus the question arises as to how this resistance can be educated and sustained.

In tracing the development of women's thinking about what constitutes care and what connection means, I noted that a critical junction for women had to do with their inclusion of themselves (Gilligan, 1982). This inclusion is genuinely problematic, not only psychologically for women but also for society in general and for the secondary school curriculum. As self-inclusion on the part of women challenges the conventional understanding of feminine goodness by severing the link between care and self-sacrifice, so too the inclusion of women challenges the interpretive

categories of the Western tradition, calling into question the description of human nature and holding up for scrutiny the meanings commonly given to relationship, love, morality, and self.

Perhaps for this reason, high school girls describing care focus dilemmas will say that their conflicts are not moral problems but just have to do with their lives and everything they believe in—as Anne said when she intimated that in fact she had another way of seeing the dilemma that she had posed in justice terms. From a care standpoint, her otherwise praiseworthy ability to say no to others seemed potentially problematic: What had seemed a valuable ability to stay centered in herself, to hold with what she believed, now seemed in part self-centered, a way of cutting herself off from the people around her. Thus development for girls in adolescence poses a conundrum, and at the center of this puzzle are questions about connection: How does one stay in touch with the world and others and with oneself? What are the possibilities for and the nature of genuine connection with others? What are the signs that distinguish true from false relationship? What leads girls to persist in seeking responsive engagement with others? What risks are attendant on this quest? And finally, what are the moral and political and psychological implications of resisting detachment? If one aim is to educate this resistance, secondary education may play a crucial role in this process.

Bardige (1983, 1985), analyzing the journals kept by seventh- and eighth-graders as part of the social studies curriculum, "Facing History and Ourselves: Holocaust and Human Behavior" by Strom and Parsons (1982), found evidence of moral sensibilities that seemed to be at risk in early adolescence. Specifically, she observed that the journal entries written by eight of the twenty-four girls and one of the nineteen boys in the two classes studied showed the children's willingness to take evidence of violence at face value, to respond directly to the perception that someone was being hurt. Because this responsiveness to evidence of violence was associated with less sophisticated forms of reasoning and because detachment and dispassion were linked with the ability to see both sides of a story and to reflect on the multiple lenses through which one can view or present a set of events, the tension between responsiveness and detachment poses an educational dilemma: How can one develop moral sensibilities anchored in common-sense perception while at the same time developing the capacity for logical thinking and reflective judgment? The present skewing of the secondary school curriculum, both in the humanities and the sciences, toward reasoning from premises and deductive logic, the emphasis placed on critical thinking, defined as the ability to think about thinking in the abstract, leaves uneducated or undeveloped the moral sensibilities that rely on a finely tuned perception—the ability to take one's reponses to what is taken in by seeing and listening as evidence on which to recognize false premises, as grounds for knowing what is happening and for thinking about what to do.

Given the heightened self-consciousness of teenagers and their intense fear of ridicule or exposure, secondary education poses a major challenge to teachers: How to sustain among teenagers an openness to experience and a willingness to risk discovery? The responsiveness of the relationship between teacher and student, the extent to which such connections involve a true engagement or meeting of minds, may be crucial in this regard. Yet when reliance on human resources is construed as a sign of limitation and associated with childhood dependence, the ways in which people can and do help one another tend not to be accurately represented. As a result, activities of care may be tacit or covertly undertaken or associated with idealized images of virtue and self-sacrifice. This poses a problem for teachers, parents, and adolescents, one which, for a variety of reasons, may fall particularly heavily on girls.

Psychologists recently have sought to understand the terms in which girls and women speak about their experience and have drawn attention to terms of relationship that suggest both a desire for responsive engagement with others and an understanding of what such connection entails (see Belenky and others, 1986; Josselson, 1987; Miller, 1984, 1986; Surrey, 1984). In addition, Steiner-Adair (1986), studying the vulnerability of high-school-age girls to eating disorders, found that girls who articulate a critical care perspective in response to interview questions about their own future expectations and societal values for women are invulnerable to eating disorders, as measured by the Eating Attitudes Test. The critical care perspective provided a standpoint from which to reject the assumptions embodied in the media image of the superwoman—assumptions that link separation and independence with success both in work and in love. Steiner-Adair found that in the educationally advantaged North American population where eating disorders currently are prevalent, girls who implicitly or explicitly take on or endorse the superwoman image, who do not identify a conflict between responsiveness in relationships and conventional images of femininity or of success, are those who appear vulnerable to eating disorders. Thus girls who show signs of vulnerability to eating disorders seem to be caught within a damaging framework of interpretation; when discussing their own future wishes and societal values, they do not differentiate signs of responsiveness and connection from images of perfection and control.

Along similar lines, Attanucci (1984) and Willard (1985), studying educationally advantaged North American mothers of young children, noted a disparity between mothers' own terms in speaking about their experiences as mothers and the terms used to characterize mothers and mothering in contemporary cultural scripts. Mothers' own terms included terms of relationships that convey mothers' experience of connection with their children, so that caring for children is neither selfish nor selfless in these terms. In contrast, the terms used by psychologists to describe good

or good enough mothers convey the impression that women, insofar as they are good mothers, respond to their children's needs rather than to their own, whereas women, insofar as they are psychologically mature and healthy persons, meet their own needs and separate themselves from their children. Willard found that mothers who draw on their own experience of connection with their child in making decisions about work and family (whatever the specific nature of these decisions) do not suffer from symptoms of depression. In contrast, women who cast employment decisions in terms derived from cultural scripts, whether for good mothers or for superwomen, show signs of depression, suggesting that cultural scripts for mothers at present are detrimental to women. What differentiates these scripts for mothering from mothers' own terms is the division made between the woman herself and her child, so that mothers in essence are portrayed as caught between themselves and their child. The ability of adolescent girls and adult women to define connection and care in terms that reflect experiences of authentic relationship or responsive engagement with others and that encourage inclusive solutions to conflicts was associated in these three different studies by Steiner-Adair, Attanucci, and Willard with resistance to psychological illness—with invulnerability to eating disorders and the absence of depressive symptoms.

But the importance of reconsidering what is meant by care and connection as well as what responsiveness in relationship entails is underscored also by recent studies of inner-city youth (see Gilligan and others, 1985; Ward, 1986). The ability of teenagers living in the inner city to reason about care was often far more advanced than the level of their justice reasoning. In addition they often spoke clearly about the necessity for care and the reliance of people on human resources. For example, a fifteen-year-old, when asked to describe a moral conflict he had faced, spoke of a time when he wanted to go out with his friends after a dance but his mother wanted him home. He decided to go home, he said, to avoid "getting into trouble with my mother." However, when asked if he thought he had done the right thing, he spoke about the fact that he knew, from watching what had happened when his older sister stayed out late, that his mother would not sleep until he came home. His reason for going home was not simply grounded in a desire to avoid punishment (Stage I reasoning in Kohlberg's terms) but also in a wish not to hurt his mother and not to "just think about myself."

> My mother would have been worried about me all night if I stayed out. . . . [When] my sister used to do it to her, she didn't get any sleep all night. . . . I would be pretty bad if I kept her up like that, you know, just thinking about myself and not thinking about her. . . . Why should I just go off and not worry about her and just think about myself?

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Hearing this teenager's concerns about avoiding punishment and getting into trouble, the psychologist schooled in the conventions of developmental psychology might well suspend further questioning, assuming a match with a codable low-level classification, a match rendered plausible because of this teenager's low socioeconomic status. Yet when the researcher, perhaps rejecting a Stage I depiction of a fifteen-year-old as implausible, chooses another line of questioning and pursues the boy's recognition that his actions can hurt his mother, the boy's moral strengths appear. He expresses concern about hurting his mother, and his awareness of how he can do so reveals a care perspective. Furthermore, his knowledge of what actions will cause hurt is based on his observations. Thus he does not need to put himself in his mother's place (which would earn him a higher score on stages of social, moral, and ego development) because he knows from experience with his mother how she will feel.

The change in assessment that follows from listening for two voices in the moral conflicts related by inner-city teenagers is further illustrated by a twelve-year-old girl who, asked for an example of moral conflict and choice, described a decision she made to override her mother's rules (Gilligan and others, 1985). Having laid out the moral world in terms of a stark contrast between "good guys" and "bad guys," she also contrasted this familiar moral language with the language of necessity. "Good guys," she explained, sustaining both languages, "know what's wrong and what's right and when to do right, and they know when it's necessary to do wrong." Her example of moral conflict involved precisely this judgment. A neighbor who had cut herself badly called because she needed bandages; the twelve-year-old had been told by her mother that she was not to leave the house. Discussing her decision to leave, she speaks repeatedly of the fact that she had to, referring to the neighbor's need and to her own judgment that it was absolutely necessary to help: "She needed my help so much, I helped her in any way I could. I knew that I was the only one who could help her, so I had to help her."

This example also contains a contrast between a seemingly simplistic moral conception (here a notion of absolute rules that determine right and wrong, irrespective of intention or motivation—a heteronomous morality in Piaget's terms or a low-stage morality in Kohlberg's terms) and a more sophisticated moral understanding, captured by the language of necessity—the need of people for help and the ability of people to help one another. Although the seeming inability of this girl to anticipate her mother's approval of her decision would qualify her for a low level of interpersonal perspective taking in Selman's (1980) terms, her insistence that "I did the right thing" and her belief that her actions would have been right even if her mother had disagreed with her decision suggests a more autonomous moral sense. Her decision in the instance she describes was guided by her judgment that help must be provided when it is needed

and where it is possible: "You can't just stand there and watch the woman . . . die" (Gilligan and others, 1985). This disparity, between seemingly low stages of social and moral development, as measured by conventional psychological standards, and evidence of greater moral understanding and sensibilities than the developmental stage descriptions imply was encountered repeatedly in the study of inner-city teenagers, raising the kinds of questions about the moral life of children that have been articulated so pointedly by Coles (1986).

The implication of these studies, taken together, is that interpretive problems cannot be separated from the consideration of adolescent development and that these problems raise questions not only about adolescents but also about the society and culture in which these teenagers are coming of age. The observation often made by teachers that girls, in general, become less outspoken following puberty, less likely to disagree in public or even to participate in classroom discussions, together with the observation that school achievement tends to drop off in adolescence for the children of ethnic minorities suggest that secondary education, or the interpretive frameworks of the culture, may be more readily accessible and comprehensible to those students whose experience and background are most similar to that of those who shape the frameworks. If at present a care perspective offers a critical lens on a society that seems increasingly justice focused, it is also one that clarifies and makes sense of the activities of care that teenagers describe—not only helping others but also creating connections with others, activities they link with times when they feel good about themselves.

Gender differences along the same lines as those found among educationally advantaged teenagers were also observed among inner-city teenagers. Nine of eleven boys who described moral dilemmas involving friends focused their attention on the question of resisting peer pressure, while six of the ten girls whose dilemmas involved friends focused on questions of loyalty in relationship, citing as moral problems instances of abandonment, disconnection, and exclusion. In addition, girls in the inner city were more likely than boys to describe dilemmas that continued over time, rather than dilemmas portrayed as one-time occurrences or repeated instances of the same problem. Perhaps as a result, girls were more likely to seek inclusive solutions to the problems they described, solutions that contributed to sustaining and strengthening connections in that they were responsive to the needs of everyone involved. While girls were apt to talk about staying with a problem in relationships and with the people involved, boys were more likely to talk about leaving. The one boy in the study who described a continuing dilemma to which he sought an inclusive solution spoke about his problems in maintaining a relationship with both of his divorced parents. Thus the tendency to voice concerns about connection and to seek and value care and responsiveness in relationships

was associated in these studies both with social class and with gender (see also Stack, 1974, and Ladner, 1972), like the findings reported by Johnston (1985) and Langdale (1983) that moral orientation, or the standpoint taken in solving moral problems, is associated both with gender and with the problem being considered.

The language of necessity that distinguishes the moral discourse of inner-city youths offers a compelling rendition of a care perspective in an environment characterized by high levels of violence. Ward's (1986) study of the ways in which adolescents living in the inner city think about the violence they witness in the course of their daily lives reveals the strengths of a focus on issues of care and connection—the association with nonviolent responses to violence and with holding off from violent response (often cast in the logic of retributive justice). Ward's study also reveals the importance accorded by teenagers to mothers who label violence in the family as violence (rather than speaking about love or not talking about what is happening) and who takes action to stop it. The clear sex differences with respect to violent action and the effects of these differences on male and female adolescents are curiously overlooked in current discussions about sex differences in moral development. Yet such differences pose major questions for theory and research.

Reconsidering adolescence from the two standpoints of justice and care and thinking about what constitutes development in both terms also spurs a reappraisal of traditional research methods, specifically a rethinking of the detachment that has been embedded in research practice. When interviewing pregnant teenagers who were considering abortion, I was struck by the fact that most of them knew about birth control. Their pregnancies seemed in part to have resulted from actions that comprised sometimes desperate, misguided, innocent strategies to care for themselves or others, to get what they wanted, or to avoid being alone. Engaging with these teenagers in the context of inquiring about their moral conflicts and interpretive quandaries raised a question about the effects of research as an intervention with both clinical and educational implications. What lessons are taught about connection and detachment, about care and justice, through the practice of asking teenagers, in the context of a research interview, about their experiences of moral conflict?

It may be that asking teenagers to talk about their own experiences of moral conflict and choice in itself constitutes an effective intervention, as some preliminary evidence suggests. Such questioning may reveal to teenagers that they have a moral perspective, something of value at stake, and thus that they have grounds for action in situations where they may have felt stuck or confused or unable to choose between alternative paths. The efficacy of the intervention may depend on the responsiveness of the research relationship, on whether the researcher engages with the teenager's thinking rather than simply mirroring or assessing it. For the adolescent, the reali-

zation that he, and perhaps especially she, has a moral perspective that an adult finds interesting, or a moral voice that someone will respond to, shifts the framework for action away from a choice between submission and rebellion (action defined in others' terms) and provides a context for discovering what are one's own terms. In adolescence, this discovery galvanizes energy and stimulates initiative and leadership.

But the same is true for teachers as well. The interpretive and ethical questions raised by considering adolescent development form a basis for genuine collaboration between psychologists and secondary school teachers. Such collaboration joins a naturalistic approach to research with what is perhaps the oldest strategy of education: not to teach answers but to raise questions that initiate the search for knowledge and, in the spirit of discovery, to listen for what is surprising. If the "modern" element in modern literature is the theme of disenchantment with the idea of culture or civilization, the challenge to those of us who would speak about development in adolescence, psychological health, or education is to take seriously the questions about truth and values that are raised by adolescents coming of age in modern culture and then, in responding to these questions, to imagine that this generation may hear different voices and may see from a new angle.

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*Carol Gilligan is professor of education at Harvard University.
Her major research interest is moral development in
adolescence.*