CHAPTER 3

On Mondialatinization, or Saving the Name of the Latin

Jaime Hanneken

If Derrida's concept of *mondialatinization*[1] is of consequence to the future prospects of Latin Americanism, it is at least in part because the conceptualization of Latin America, practically since it came to be called that, has been nourished by a belief so fervent in the ineffable, exceptional quality of "Latin" history and place as to be considered religious. Religious, to be sure, because it is mobilized in the name of the geographic, racial, and linguistic vicissitudes of Latinity, but more pointedly in the way this mobilization seeks salvation and self-preservation simultaneously in the purported singularity of Latin events, texts, cultures, and places, and in their untrammeled universalization. Thus, the name "Latin" serves Latin Americanism as a toponym for the same kind of autoimmune activity that Derrida sees patent in religion's mondialatinization.

As an intellectual aegis of culture and knowledge, recourse to Latin identity has traditionally been as empty as it is powerful. For early twentieth-century movements such as *Arielismo*, *Ateneísmo*, or José Vasconcelos's cosmic race, the Latin denoted a spiritual refinement rooted in millennial Greco-Roman civilization that secured Latin America's place as a utopian stage for the future of humanity. Under midcentury anti-imperialism—

liberation theology, *foquismo*, *testimonio*—it is associated as much with giving voice to local, marginalized communities as with the impending suspension of Western history through tricontinental revolution. And in its powerful revival since the advent of postcolonial studies, "Latin" acts as an appropriative watchword for all that is in and from "here"—subaltern ways of knowing, border epistemologies, the Iberian legacy of imperial modernity—and which for that reason claims at once to be radically heterogeneous to hegemonic power structures and poised to destabilize them from within. At every turn, the Latin referent oversees the double movement of mondialatinization: It attaches and detaches the identitarian ties of place and community, preserving their most sacred covenant by opening them up to machinic abstraction and global exchange. As Brett Levinson has phrased it, "The Latin American difference, even when presented as a specific alterity or identity, discloses the intrinsic heterogeneity of being, freed from the despotism of the One: a global heterogeneity that names the future liberation of mankind" ("Globalizing Paradigms," 73).

To begin with, then, mondialatinization aptly describes the fundamental discursive features of dominant Latin American(ist) production. But what makes it all the more strikingly pertinent to this dynamic, and what will mainly interest me here, is the way the theorization of this concept is emphatically linked to a "Latin" history of religion and philosophy. In "Faith and Knowledge"—a work dedicated to deciphering and dissecting the "return of religion" through contemporary forces of globalization—Derrida insists time and again on naming, dating, and remarking the particularly Latin character of his problematic, reminding us that the 1994 conference from which the book originates took place on the "Latin" island of Capri among European "Latins" speaking French, Italian, and Spanish; and announcing at the outset that before embarking on any history of religion and reason, faith and knowledge, "we must formally take note of the fact that *we are already speaking Latin*" (Derrida, "Faith and Knowledge," 74). The question of *religio*, he suggests, quite simply merges with the question of Latin. The underlying Latinity of the history of religion "remains contingent and significant at the same time. It demands to be taken into account, reflected, thematized, dated" (53). Indisputably, to Derrida's mind a formal acknowledgment and even commemoration of the Latin is in order if we are to understand the religious compulsion behind globalization.

My purpose here is to conduct a reading of "Faith and Knowledge," though I aim to draw attention not so much to the historico-thematic analogies (the centrality of Christianity, Roman heritage, and so on) that can be made to Latin Americanism, as to the ways *religio* has already structured the possibility of speaking for any given singularity as a kind of enshrinement of the sacred. There already exist a number of compelling deconstructive critiques of Latin Americanism's own historic enshrinement of experience, testimony, and place that unequivocally illustrate the way its objects of study are from the beginning predicated on and sedimented in the flows of global exchange.[2] I do not plan to dispute these but rather to consider how their by now familiar points can be accented with a more earnest consideration of the singular than even logically irrefutable conclusions about Latin America's "impossibility" or its existence qua phenomenon of globalization have so far managed to produce. Put briefly: If the very process of deconstructing mondialatinization, on Derrida's account, demands that we take the Latin into account, that we save its name, so to speak, even as we pull apart the notion of salvation, how do we translate his exhortation to the mondialatinization of Latin America?[3] My explorations of this question will focus on the impossible relation Derrida locates at the core of *religio* between faith as testimony or credit and the holy as indemnification. A proper reckoning of this relation, I argue, requires us to affirm deconstruction not only as a logical calculus of what remains in each case to be deconstructed, but also and simultaneously as an experience of the undeconstructible.

What is first observed in Derrida's mondialatinization, to the contrary of Latinist rhetoric in Hispanism, is that it does not speak Spanish but is expressed in an Anglo-American idiom, "like an English word that has been to Rome and then taken a detour to the United States" (74). It refers to the global expansion of teletechnoscience driven by the two primordial sources of religion: on one hand, the experience of belief, credit, and trustworthiness; on the other, the experience of the sacrosanct, the holy, and the unscathable. Derrida's whole point in "Faith and Knowledge" is to show that the development of reason and science, teletechnoscience, "far from opposing religion, bears, supports, and supposes it" (73). Mondialatinization entails religion, not only because a basic act of faith underwrites the capitalist logic of globalization but also because telemediatic rationality, in its expropriation of national or ethnopolitical structures, drives the resurgence of radical indemnification evidenced, for example, in religious and communitarian fundamentalisms. This is why it is out of breath, *essoufflée*, despite its apparently total colonization of the forms of exchange, knowledge, and belief today. Insofar as the sources of religion provide mondialatinization's condition and internal limit, it is propagated by the social nexus of faith in its secular form—this is the performative "believe me" of any address, the fiduciary link forged through language that engenders God as its absent center, a "transcendental addressing machine" in which faith sets the social bond in motion and continually renews it with "the production and reproduction of the unproducible absent in place, . . . the presence of that absence" (73).

The constitutive function of faith in mondialatinization also binds it to a specifically Latin heritage of revelation and belief, the history that Derrida says we must account for, reflect, and thematize, by virtue of the indivisibility of the two sources of religion just outlined: If language through iterability and repetition, the absent presence of God, makes belief possible in general as social nexus, it is also, as Derrida says, inseparable from the "political, familial, ethnic, communitarian nexus, from the nation and from the people: from autochthony, blood and soil" (52). The import of mondialatinization's Latin provenance, the reason, in Derrida's mind, that we should consider religion as especially Latin, thus is indebted from the start to a double bind: on one hand, the founding prophecies and formulations of the sacred in Judeo-Christian tradition inform and survive in the general structure of the return of religion in processes of globalization; on the other, these events as expressions of the ethnic covenant are also indebted to the mechanical principle of faith. The Testamentary events of Occidental monotheism—Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, the crucifixion, and so on—in this sense "only happen by taking on the meaning of engaging the historicity of history—and the eventfulness of the event as such" (56). To envision this opening of history, Derrida suggests the figure of a desert within a desert: a desertification beyond the historic sites of Middle Eastern deserts, conjured in a performative belief that does not belong to the set that it founds, a no-place that gives revelation its "taking place" or "having place" (*avoir lieu*). This is what Derrida wants to signal as the historicity of history, the eventfulness of the event engaged by the Latin *religio*. The desert in the desert, a figure tied both to the messianic—an opening of the future without horizon of expectation—and the *chora*—that in our memory which even our memory cannot reappropriate—gives and takes away the taking place of Latinity's history.

There is thus a dual mechanical principle at work in the mondialatinization of faith, one which "repeats again and again the double movement of abstraction and attraction that *at the same time detaches and reattaches* to the country, the idiom, the literal or to everything confusedly collected today under the terms 'identity' or 'identitarian'" (86). Technoscience dissolves and revives the social bonds of religion: Religion does not merely "return"—in fact, it has always been there at the heart of the logic of capitalist globalization—but turns on itself in autoimmune assault, like the "redoubling of a wave that appropriates even that to which, enfolding it, it seems to be opposed" (89). Reading these words today, it is almost impossible not to be reminded of how Christian tenets regarding the sacredness of life are used to underwrite worldwide complexes of humanitarian aid and human rights policing in the name of a universalized, Euro-American Pax Romana, and whose same technoscientific networks feed spectacular, mediatic missions—like those of ISIS or Boko Haram—to destroy life in the name of religious restoration, a new Caliphate. The archaic forces of religion act as the gatekeepers of our cybernetic, twenty-first-century reality, producing, protecting, and annihilating its most precious charge—life, community, identity—from an irreducible distance: The new global wars of religion, as Derrida puts it, are quite literally launched "*with finger and eye*." Every subject of globalization, regardless of how privileged or remote, is also a subject of *religio*, impelled to respond to it and expose oneself to it as a primordial condition of life.

It should by now be obvious that the double movement of religion as faith and the holy or indemnified captured by the notion of mondialatinization also reprises some of Derrida's long-standing concerns with the nature of naming, testimony, signature, and event. Much of "Faith and Knowledge," as I have already noted, is engaged in asking how we can "save the name" of the sacred or historical, of the singular happenings of religion, or at least better formulate their relation to différance as a general structure of experience. Derrida articulates this problem most directly while responding to a question posed at the Villanova roundtable:

> The problem remains—and this really is a problem for me, an enigma—whether the religions, say, for instance, the religions of the Book, are but specific examples of this general structure of messianicity. There is the general structure of messianicity, as the structure of experience, and on this groundless ground there have been revelations, a history which one calls Judaism or Christianity and so on. That is a possibility and then you would have a Heideggerian gesture, in style. You would have to go back from these religions to descry the structure of messianicity on the groundless ground on which religions have been made possible. The other hypothesis—and I confess that I hesitate between these two possibilities—is that the events of revelation, the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions, have been absolute events, irreducible events which have unveiled this messianicity. We would not know what messianicity is without messianism, without those events which were Abraham, Moses, and Jesus Christ, and so on. In that case singular events would have unveiled or revealed these universal

> possibilities, and it is only on that condition that we can describe messianicity. Between these two possibilities I must confess I oscillate and I think some other scheme has to be constructed to understand the two at the same time, to do justice to the two possibilities. (Caputo, *Deconstruction in a Nutshell*, 23–24)

Simultaneously to do justice to these two discrete and heterogeneous possibilities—the originarity of the "revealed" and of "revealability"—is just what Derrida's rethinking of religion attempts to do. We can pinpoint the logic behind this effort in the way he engages the two works referenced in the subtitle of "Faith and Knowledge": Kant's *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1794) and Bergson's *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (1932). Derrida proposes to "condense" them to develop "the logic of what they might have let speak" (84) about religion beyond what they actually say. The two titles are significant both because they each deal with their own historical crises of the return of religion, and because they represent opposite stances on the central enigma of faith: Kant was concerned, of course, with proving its foundation in reason and Bergson with outlining its mystical sources.[4]

Kant argues that a true faith—not simply complying with the moral law but doing it always for the right reasons, with pure maxims—must be located ultimately in the autonomy of human reason. To be moral, we must behave as though God were dead, acting on a belief assured first in our freedom of thought. The principle of his religion is the same fiduciary faith or credit at work in mondialatinization, which Derrida describes at one point as "a strange alliance of Christianity, as the experience of the death of God, and techno-scientific capitalism" (65). Although this autonomous morality must do without the proof of revelation or miracles, becoming true through the finite, sensuous evidence of human embrace of moral laws, it nevertheless counts, in anticipation of its self-wrought salvation, on the aid of divine good will. In other words, Kant puts forth a "reflective faith" that cannot claim to know it is good but can affirm in advance, from the confines of finite experience, that it will have been "antecedently worthy" of God's favor.

Bergson's theory of morality in the *Two Sources* will reverse Kant's order of rational faith: For Bergson, the scrupulous fulfillment and interpretation of moral law does not secure but debase its ideals. Bergson's problem with transcendental reason is that it fails to grasp the singularity of time—it conceives as an analyzable event the progress toward salvation that in reality names only a retrospective illusion of the effects of change on what already exists. One cannot make one's way temporally toward the ideal, because the ideal obtains only in action, in the singular event of revelation. The sacred, in this sense, resides in the flash of mysticism, which the machine-like reproduction of reason can as easily turn toward the basest interests of social control as toward the best. The *Two Sources*, published during the interwar frenzy of industrial automatization and the escalation of interstate and imperial conflict, observes this distortion directly in the way capitalist expansion claimed to increase equality and freedom by usurping its spiritual principles. Thus does the future of religion depend for Bergson on the restitution of mysticism to rational morality—"a machine for making gods" (275).

Derrida offers only scant exegesis of Kant in "Faith and Knowledge"—and he dedicates just a few sentences to Bergson—but his bid to "condense" the two works in his title suggests that his meditations therein as a whole aim to carry the logic of each beyond their own conclusions, asking exactly what "another 'reflecting faith'" (67) or a machine that is mystical (85) would look like. This operation stems from that which both treatises have in common, namely that in their disparate attempts to reconcile the two sources of morality by eclipsing one or the other, they nonetheless maintain the absolute heterogeneity of each. The *Two Sources* is categorical on this score: It holds that religion historically oscillates between what Bergson calls "static" religion (the primitive, instinctive defense of community in ritual) and "dynamic" religion (the spiritual opening toward the totality of life). But the static cannot move toward the dynamic since the difference between them is of quality not quantity. Because time consists of change, from one to the other there is only a leap whose outcome is already in effect and whose trajectory is already gauged in the terms of "the name we give to the supposedly ultimate effect of [its] action, felt to be continuous, the hypothetical terminal point of the movement which is already sweeping us forward" (233). In the General Remarks added to the body of his *Religion* as a kind of postscript, Kant admits a similar point: The achievement of moral goodness, which "must be regarded [by reason] as nothing but an ever-during struggle toward the better," in fact "cannot be brought about through gradual reformation so long as the basis of the maxims remains impure, but must be effected through a revolution in the man's disposition. . . . He can become a new man only by a kind of rebirth, as it were a new creation . . . and a change of heart" (6:47).

The point in each case is that the difference between good and evil, between bad and good religion, cannot be "known": It occupies the future anterior; it only will have been once the revolution has crossed the absolute distance between the two. What both philosophers thus intuit but finally fail to formulate is the impossible "taking place" of religion: Transcendental idealism attempts to bridge the aporia by supplementing reason surreptitiously with divine favor; vitalism presumes the self-presence of moral energy, the élan vital. A deconstructive reading of the same problematic, of course, demonstrates the constitutive contamination of the two realms. It will show, for example, that the mystical force of revelation is the groundless condition of machinic faith, that the sacrosanct foundation of faith, in turn, is always already corrupted by the pronouncement of its promise, and that the finite labor to approximate divine goodness depends on the possibility of radical evil. That much is readily apparent. Nonetheless, the final purpose of deconstruction is not to formalize this contamination but to hold open, simultaneously and distinctly, its absolute co-constitutive possibilities. It seeks, as Derrida's earlier quote stated, to "do justice to the two possibilities" at once. This is the impossible task he refers to through Kant and Bergson in "Faith and Knowledge" ("Respect for this singular indecision or for this hyperbolic outbidding between two originarities, the order of the 'revealed' and the order of the 'revealable,' is this not at once the chance of every responsible decision and of another 'reflecting faith,' of a new 'tolerance'?" [67]), which is also assumed in the elaboration of every other concept related to ethics, justice, and responsibility. Indeed, almost every one of Derrida's later works pronounces a different iteration of this enigma: The decision, he writes in *Rogues*, "cannot be founded on or justified by any *knowledge as such*, that is, without a leap between two discontinuous and radically heterogeneous orders" (145); the act of naming, similarly, is caught between *le salut* as redemption and as call, in the "absolute heterogeneity, irreconcilable difference between the two *saluts*" ("How to Name," 130). Or again, in his remarks on the undecidability of the *chora*: "These two experiences of place, these two ways are no doubt of an absolute heterogeneity. One place excludes the other, one (sur)passes the other, one does without the other, one is absolutely, without the other" (*On the Name*, 76).

What such statements compel us to remember is not only the originary splitting of these concepts but also that deconstruction's responsibility, its chance and threat, lies in its own constitutive splitting between two possibilities. Only from within this disjunction can it do justice to the difference it hopes to hold open. Put another way: To properly affirm the two heterogeneous realms whose distinction cannot be known, deconstruction must also affirm that it *does not know*. It must comprise, as Roland Végső puts it, a "double affirmation." The affirmation of the necessity of deconstruction always also affirms what necessarily remains undeconstructible. According to Végső, the fact that deconstruction, unlike other discourses, claims to coincide with the very condition it critiques—namely, the spacing of time that prevents the self-presence of all discourse—also means it cannot count itself exempt from that condition. There is no infinite deconstruction but only a deconstruction also suspended and interrupted by its undeconstructible limit, for although deconstruction may be exceptional, it cannot claim to be sovereign. It must also hold back in order to continue on, in what Végső calls the Sabbath of deconstruction.

We can better understand this conclusion by beginning with his logical proposition. In the terms of logic, if we consider the central assertions of deconstruction—life is difference, deconstruction is justice, experience is aporia—we begin with a judgment like no other. The statements are affirmative, but at the same time they introduce an exclusion into the identity they establish, because in stating, for example, that experience is aporia, we already accept its existence as a nonpassage, an impassibility—for there is no knowing what, if anything, comes to pass with aporia—and anticipate a following affirmation that experience is not experience at all but its opposite. The formulation is an infinite judgment—the subject is split between the infinities opened between the two affirmations submitted in the copula. What Végső wishes to acknowledge, however, is that this double infinity opened by the statement comes before its logical elaboration: "Before the propositional form of the judgment becomes possible (through the copula), the content of the judgment must be already in force: the content of the judgment precedes its form. . . . The deconstructible form of the judgment (the 'is') points toward an undeconstructible content as the condition of this deconstruction" ("Affirmative Judgments," 79). For the affirmation that experience is aporia, experience must be thought as nonpassage before we can think of it of as passage or undergoing. Similarly, if life is différance, life must first be thought as trace before being can be determined as presence. The priority of the content that conditions deconstructive formulation, the absence of presence that différance, deconstruction, and aporia affirm, cannot itself be deconstructed—it is rather deconstruction's limit. At the moment when the projection of presence is interrupted—when law no longer applies and faith no longer makes belief, deconstruction has also ceased. It must then advance two antithetical propositions: First, "nothing is inherently deconstructible," but also "there is something of the undeconstructible" (80).

It is not coincidental that Végső regards this double affirmation as an experience of the undeconstructible: It is logical to conclude, following his foregoing arguments, that in honoring the irreducibility of aporia—precisely the aporia as the general structure of experience—deconstruction coincides with the conditions of experience, and forcibly experiences them.[5] Remembering that religion is defined in "Faith and Knowledge" as "the experience of belief, on the one hand" (77), and "the experience of the unscathed, of sacredness or of holiness, on the other" (78), it stands to determine how exactly deconstruction is supposed to experience it. Its endeavor to hold open these two experiences, which as we have seen are constitutively entwined, must operate in the ellipsis between them, where the defense of the sacred opens out in autoimmune gesture toward belief. What is protected above all in sacredness is the dignity of human life, as exemplified by the primacy of sacrifice in the history of revelation—it is in appropriating its other, nonlife, that sacrifice preserves the value of life, since, in Derrida's words, "life has absolute value only if it is *more than* life. . . . It is sacred, holy, infinitely respectable only in the name of what is more than it" (94), so that the price of human life is truly priceless. The holy must preserve and reproduce this more than itself, the death it appropriates, in a performative repetition that "reproduces with the regularity of a technique the instance of the non-living or, if you prefer, of the dead in the living" (94). The automatic safeguarding of the life of the sacred also performs its incessant interruption: not just a sacrifice, says Derrida, but a self-sacrifice, a *halte*, holding back or reticence, which responds not only to reverence for the holy but also to the autoimmunity that keeps it alive, thus "open to something other and more than itself: the other, the future, death, freedom, the coming or the love of the other, the space and time of a spectralizing messianicity beyond all messianism" (95). Would the deconstruction of religion, conceived on the order of experience, not also be precisely such a self-sacrifice, holding itself back in respect before the possibility of the sacred, on the one hand, and the opening to messianicity, on the other, exactly that which is undeconstructible in religion?[6] In this suspension deconstruction would also then inexorably partake of religion and faith, which is what Végső no doubt intimates when he refers to it as a Sabbath.

What I have tried to highlight in the motif of self-sacrifice or holding back is the way that, in confronting its own conditions of possibility—différance as absolute heterogeneity—deconstruction summons restraint as before the sacred, before that which must remain intact or unscathed. It therefore cannot be, as Martin Hägglund has it, a radical atheism. Hägglund limits the infinite deferral of différance to what he calls the "infinite finitude of life": for him "messianic hope . . . is a hope for temporal survival, faith is always faith in the finite, and the desire for God is a desire for the mortal" (*Radical Atheism*, 120). On this view, the originary spacing of time that prevents self-presence overdetermines im-possibility from the start—immunity *as such* is not merely im-possible but unthinkable. This premise leads to Hägglund's reading of salvation, which he must qualify as follows:

> Insofar as salvation is understood as the absolute immunity of immortality, it is out of the question. There can be no such salvation, since nothing can happen without the greeting of an other that can come to compromise any immunity. However, insofar as salvation is understood as a survival that saves one from death by giving one more time to live, it is not out of the question. (131)[7]

We confront here two salvations, one unimaginable, undesirable, out of the question, and another that is merely im-possible. Yet if we are to take seriously Derrida's pretension to do justice, separately, to both poles of the radical heterogeneity it addresses, then deconstruction cannot make such a qualification. The modal difference between immortality and finitude is itself integral to this heterogeneity, proven by the fact that each time we renew faith through survival, redemption has not come. By subsuming this not-coming to its theorization, by affirming solely a spacing of time that limits salvation to survival, deconstruction makes just one affirmation: It affirms deconstruction as its own horizon, its own infinity. But unlike différance, deconstruction is as finite as what it deconstructs and must therefore hope to live on, by coming to and affirming its own end.

Let us go back now to the remarks I first made about Latin Americanism's fervent belief in the singularity of its referent. Hägglund's reading of salvation is an apposite point at which to return to that question because it closely echoes the conclusions of a certain deconstructive critique of Latin Americanism that has become familiar and influential in recent years: to wit, that the representation of any experience, no matter how silenced or Other, is subject to the effects of deferral and universalization that make representation possible, and that furthermore, to imagine a subject of any kind—indigenous, revolutionary, popular, and so on—that could resist these conditions of possibility from some perspective radically exterior to it is to imagine nothing at all, because such a perspective could not exist. Or worse, Hägglund tells us, it would be to imagine radical evil, a total stasis where neither resistance nor salvation could ever come to pass. We must therefore accept, a priori, that Latin Americanism, or that which it names, is impossible. David E. Johnson, to cite just one example, arrives at such a conclusion: "Insofar as Latin America is named, it is in name only, which means Latin America is not in itself; it is not proper to itself or as such. Latin America belongs therefore neither to itself nor to any other. Rather, Latin American Studies is impossible, but no less necessary for this impossibility, because it is unlocatable. Indeed, its discovery or invention, that is, its having been named, by anyone and everyone, depends on its impossible location" ("How (Not) to Do Latin American Studies," 16).

In the argument itself, of course, there is nothing to impugn. Its verdict is perfectly logical and true to the fundamental precepts of deconstruction. My doubt, and hope, does not concern the correctness of this sort of reading but how to shift its constative impetus toward the experiential register it hides, to account for Latin America's impossible unlocatability not as the always already split possibility of a proper name, but doubly at once as a chance between its singular occurrence and its total dispersion. As I have argued, this would amount for Derrida to doing justice to what in the name Latin America remains undeconstructible.

How could the calculating operation of deconstruction be infused with the added affirmation of its experience, of its holding open before that which will not be divulged? It would be something like reading a shibboleth, a watchword for a secret belonging. In an essay titled "Shibboleth," Derrida explores at length the various connotations of this figure: It serves as a password to distinguish ally from enemy in times of war, a cut or partition that, as in circumcision, names the event of legitimate entry into a community; in addition, as a cut, the shibboleth also cuts off the singularity of any name or date from its silence or ruin. The power of partition—Derrida means to exploit the dual meaning of *partager* as "to divide" and "to share"—signals the shibboleth's existence first and foremost as a happening. Because its meaning is arbitrary, empty—like the memorable "Hispanic" shibboleth *perejil* that decided the 1937 massacre of Haitians in Hispaniola—its truth is made in an absolute decision: Either one can pronounce it or they cannot, and the outcome of its trial irrevocably creates the alternative of inclusion or exclusion, life or death. For the same reason, Derrida remarks, the shibboleth cannot be properly known but only made. Its constative and performative functions are held resolutely separate, related without relation. So it is as well with language: "What enters and incises language in the form of a date, is that there is a partaking of the shibboleth, a partaking at once open and closed. The date (signature, moment, place, gathering of singular marks) always operates as a shibboleth. It shows that there is something not shown, that there is ciphered singularity: irreducible to any concept, to any knowledge, even to a history or tradition, be it of a religious kind" ("Shibboleth," 33). What "there is" in his description, it must be noted, is not the singularity itself of any signature, but the absolute heterogeneity of the shibboleth's "terrifying ambiguity . . . indiscernible discernment between alliance and war" (48). We partake of what is ciphered there twice, once in entrance to its covenant and once sundered from it before its inscrutability, living each chance separately and simultaneously. The shibboleth thus has a secret readability, like the *no pasarán* of the Spanish Republic, a "handclasp, a rallying cipher, a sign of membership" (23) that is legible only to the chosen—and as with salvation, we do not know we are saved until it has always already happened. Deconstruction can refuse to sacralize the object of Latin American studies while continuing to affirm the ambiguity of its secret, partaking without knowledge of what is still there in the Latin. From there it will remain open to the coming of the life that is left in the machine of mondialatinization.

NOTES

1. Derrida's neologism *mondialatinization* underscores the sense of a "world," not necessarily physical, communicated by the French *monde*—which, as Jean-Luc Nancy avers, is replaced in the English "globe" by the sense of "an enclosure in the undifferentiated sphere of a unitotality" (*Creation of the World*, 28). In his English translation of Derrida's "Faith and Knowledge," Samuel Weber proposes "globalatinization," noting that, while the emphasis on earthly space conveyed by the English obscures Derrida's distinction between earth and world, the fact of Anglo-American dominance witnessed by the very translation of *mondialatinization* forces us to consider the larger epistemological issue of "what happens to the notion of 'world' . . . if the predominant language of 'mondialatinization' tends to speak not of 'world' but of 'globality'" (109). Because my focus here is on the singular dimension of the Latin highlighted by Derrida, I have chosen to maintain his original French term. On the question of translation of notions of world and globalization, see also chapter 5 of Emily Apter's *Against World Literature*.

2. To name just a few: Scott Michaelsen and Scott Cutler Shershow, "Rethinking Border Thinking" (which appeared together with Brett Levinson's and David E. Johnson's essays that I quote above and below in the special issue of *South Atlantic Quarterly* "Latin America in Theory," and which also can be counted as the type of deconstructive reading I am referring to); Alberto Moreiras's *The Exhaustion of Difference*; Gareth Williams's *The Other Side of the Popular*; and Abraham Acosta's *Thresholds of Illiteracy*.

3. My use of this phrase is meant to retain the primary association it has in Derrida's discussion of negative theology—that of the sacrifice involved in keeping the name safe by saving all except (save) the name.

4. Kant published *Reason* shortly after the ascension of Frederick William II and the subsequent curtailment of religious freedom, including the requirement of formal confession of faith for all theology candidates and public censorship (see Shell, *Kant and the Limits of Autonomy*, 186–88); Bergson's *Two Sources* appeared concomitantly with the rise of Nazism and on the crest of post-WWI commercial expansion. The contexts of their publication are thus directly reflected in Kant's repudiation of "dogmatic" faith and Bergson's trepidation before the "frenzy" of industrial growth, which he saw as a sign of a bloated but static state of religion.

5. See Végső, "Deconstruction and Experience," for a thorough demonstration of the experiential dimension of deconstruction.

6. Rei Terada ("Scruples," 256) infers a similar suggestion in Derrida's motif of self-sacrifice.

7. What Derrida says here, in "How to Name," is "It is necessary that *le salut* of salvation or health, *le salut* of redemption or resurrection never be assured. Not that it is out of the question, but it is necessary that it always could be refused, threatened, forbidden, lost, gone" (130).

WORKS CITED

Acosta, Abraham. *Thresholds of Illiteracy: Theory, Latin America, and the Crisis of Resistance*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2014.

Apter, Emily. *Against World Literature: On the Politics of Untranslatability*. New York: Verso, 2013.

Bergson, Henri. *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. Translated by R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton. London: Macmillan, 1935.

Caputo, John. *Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida*. New York: Fordham University Press, 1997.

Derrida, Jacques. "Faith and Knowledge." Translated by Samuel Weber. In *Acts of Religion*, edited by Gil Anidjar, 1–39. New York: Routledge, 2002.

———. "How to Name." In *Recumbents*, by Michel Deguy, translated by Wilson Baldridge, 191–221. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 2005.

———. *On the Name*. Edited by Thomas Dutoit. Translated by David Wood, John P. Leavey Jr., and Ian McLeod. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.

———. *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason*. Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.

———. "Shibboleth." In *Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan*, edited by Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen, 1–64. New York: Fordham University Press, 2005.

Hägglund, Martin. *Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.

Johnson, David E. "How (Not) to Do Latin American Studies." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 106, no. 1 (2007): 1–16.

Kant, Immanuel. *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*. Translated by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960.

Levinson, Brett. "Globalizing Paradigms, or The Delayed State of Latin American Theory." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 106, no. 1 (2007): 61–83.

Michaelsen, Scott, and Scott Cutler Shershow. "Rethinking Border Thinking." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 106, no. 1 (2007): 39–60.

Moreiras, Alberto. *The Exhaustion of Difference. The Politics of Latin American Cultural Studies*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001.

Nancy, Jean-Luc. *The Creation of the World, or Globalization*. Translated by François Raffoul and David Pettigrew. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007.

Shell, Susan Meld. *Kant and the Limits of Autonomy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009.

Terada, Rei. "Scruples, or Faith in Derrida." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 106, no. 2 (2007): 237–64.

Végső, Roland. "Affirmative Judgments: The Sabbath of Deconstruction." *parallax* 16, no. 3 (2010): 74–84.

———. "Deconstruction and Experience: The Politics of the Undeconstructible." In *A Leftist Ontology: Beyond Relativism and Identity Politics*, edited by Carsten Strathausen, 125–46. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009.

Williams, Gareth. *The Other Side of the Popular: Neoliberalism and Subalternity in Latin America*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002.