

APHORISMS POLITICAL.

BY

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Aphorisms Political.

I.

O *Bsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.* The Errours and Sufferings of the People are from their Governours.

II.

When the Foundation of a Government cometh to be changed, and the Governours change not the Superstructures accordingly, the people become miserable.

III.

The Monarchy of *England* was not a Government by Arms, but a Government by Laws, though imperfect or ineffectual Laws.

IV.

The Latter Governments in *England*, have been Governments by Arms.

V.

The people cannot see, but they can feel.

VI.

The people having felt the difference between a Government by Laws, and a Government by Arms, will always desire the Government by Laws, and abhor that of Arms.

VII.

Where the spirit of the people is impatient of a Govern-
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ment by Arms, and desirous of a Government by Laws, there the spirit of the people is not unfit to be trusted with their Liberty.

VIII.

The spirit of the people of *England*, not trusted with their Liberty, driven at the Restitution of Monarchy by Blood and Violence.

IX.

The spirit of the people of *England*, trusted with their Liberty, if the form be sufficient, can never restore Monarchy; and if the form be insufficient, will restore it without Blood or Violence.

X.

The sufficiency of the form wherein the spirit of a people may be trusted with their Liberty, amounteth to a well-ordered Commonwealth, or Democracy.

XI.

Where there is a well-ordered Commonwealth, the people are generally satisfied.

XII.

Where the people are generally dissatisfied, there is no Commonwealth.

XIII.

The parties in *England* declaring for a Commonwealth, hold every one of them something that is inconsistent with a Commonwealth.

XIV.

To hold that the Government may be managed by a few, or by a party, is inconsistent with a Commonwealth.

XV.

To hold that there can be any National Religion or Ministry without publick Indowment and Inspection of the Magistracy, or any Government without a National Religion or Ministry, as inconsistent with a Commonwealth.

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XVI.

To hold that there may be Liberty, and not Liberty of Conscience, is inconsistent with a Commonwealth that hath the Liberty of her own Conscience, or that is not Popish.

XVII.

Either Liberty of Conscience can have no security at all, or under Popular Government must have the greatest security.

XVIII.

To hold that a Government may be introduced by a little at once, is to wave prudence, and commit things unto chance.

XIX.

To hold that the Wisdom of God in the Formation of an *House, or of a Government*, goeth not universally upon natural principles, is inconsistent with Scripture.

XX.

To hold that the wisdom of man in the Formation of an *House, or of Government*, may go upon supernatural principles, is inconsistent with a Commonwealth, and cometh to a kind of breaking of Jest; as if one should say, God ordained the Temple, therefore it was not built by Masons; He ordained the Snuffers, therefore they were not made by a Smith.

XXI.

To hold that Hirelings, or an endowed Ministry, ought to be removed out of the Church, is inconsistent with a Commonwealth.

XXII.

Nature is of God.

XXIII.

Some part in every Religion is natural.

XXIV.

An universal Effect, demonstrateth an universal Cause.

XXV.

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XXV.

An universal Cause is not so much natural, as it is Nature it self.

XXVI.

Every man, either unto his terrour or consolation, hath some sense of Religion.

XXVII.

Man may rather be defined a Religious, then a Rational Creature; in regard that in other Creatures there is something of Reason, but nothing of Religion.

XXVIII.

Government is of humane Prudence, and humane Prudence is adequate unto mans nature.

XXIX.

The prudence of Government that is regardless of Religion, is not adequate nor satisfactory unto mans nature.

XXX.

Where the Government is not adequate or satisfactory unto mans nature, it can never be quiet or perfect.

XXXI.

The major part of mankind giveth it self up in the matter of Religion unto the publick leading.

XXXII.

That there may be a publick leading, there must be a National Religion.

XXXIII.

Where the minor part taketh away the National Religion, there the major part is deprived of the Liberty of Conscience by the minor.

XXXIV.

Where the major part is deprived of the Liberty of Conscience by the minor, there they will deprive the minor of that Liberty of Conscience which they might otherwise enjoy.

XXXV.

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XXXV.

In *Israel* there was an endowed Clergie or Priesthood, and a National Religion under inspection of the Magistrate: whence the Christians in Apostolick times defraying their own Ministry, could have Liberty of Conscience; whereas if the Christians by going about to take away Tythes, and abolish the National Religion, had endeavoured to violate the Consciences of the unconverted Jews, these being far greater in number, must needs have taken away the Liberty of Conscience from the Christians.

XXXVI.

Paul in *Athens* could freely and undisturbedly convert *Dionysius* and others; therefore in *Athens* there was Liberty of Conscience: but if *Paul* and his Converts had gone about to drive Hirelings, or an endowed Priesthood or Clergie out of that Church, who seeth not that the *Athenians* would have driven *Paul* and his Converts out of *Athens*?

XXXVII.

That there may be Liberty of Conscience, there must be a National Religion.

XXXVIII.

That there may be a National Religion, there must be an endowed Clergie.

XXXIX.

Till a Commonwealth be first framed, how such a Commonwealth should make an effectual Union with another Nation, is not possible to be seen.

XXXX.

The Union with *Scotland*, as it is vulgarly discoursed of, is destructive both to the hopes of a Commonwealth in *England*, and of Liberty in *Scotland*.

XLI.

The Union vulgarly spoken of, is by uniting Deputies of divers Commonwealths or Nations in the same standing Councils.

XLII.

If the Commonwealth of *England* receive Deputies from *Scotland* in a greater number then that of her own, she receiveth Law from a forraign interest, and so loseth her own Liberty.

XLIII.

If *Scotland* be received in an equal number, it obstructeth the freedom of both, or occasioneth War or Dissention.

XLIV.

If *Scotland* be received in an inferiour number, she receiveth Law from *England*, and so loseth her Liberty.

XLV.

Where Countries are divers in their Laws, and yet are to receive Laws one from the other, neither the Commonwealth giving Law knoweth what to give, nor the Commonwealth receiving Law, understandeth what she receiveth: in which case the Union returneth unto force or confusion.

XLVI.

The best way of holding a Nation different or not different in Laws, is by way of Province.

XLVII.

A Province, especially if she have strong holds, may by defraying of a small guard, be kept unto a just League, and for the rest enjoy her own Laws, her own Government, and her perfect Liberty: other ways of Union, will be found more chargeable, and less effectual, on both sides: for if *England* have no Army in *Scotland*, *Scotland* will receive no Law from *England*; and if *England* have an Army there, her hold consisteth not in the Union, but in the force.

XLVIII.

If a Country be very small, and not able to subsist of it self, as *Wales*, it may be safely united, and held: but the advantage that *Wales* hath in participation of all Magistracies and Offices, is not that which *England* is able to afford unto such a Country as *Scotland*, without subjecting her neck under the yolk.

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XLIX.

The order of a Commonwealth requireth, that it consist first of a Civil; secondly, of a Religious; thirdly, of a Military, and fourthly, of a Provincial Part. The manner of uniting Provinces or different Nations, appertaineth unto the last part; and in the formation of a Commonwealth, to begin with that first, which is naturally last, is to invert the order, and by Consequence the Commonwealth, which indeed is nothing but order. L.

Where there can be any other Government, there can be no Commonwealth.

LI.

Where there can be a Commonwealth, what tumults soever there happen, and which soever prevail, there can be no other Government; that is to say, without forraign invasion, which throughout, I must be understood to except.

LXII.

If Sir *George Booth* had prevailed, he must either have introduced a Commonwealth, or have restored a King.

LXIII.

If a King were restored, he must either govern by an Army, or by Parliaments.

LXIV.

A King governing now in *England* by an Army, would for the same Causes finde the same effects with the late Protector.

LXV.

A King governing now in *England* by Parliaments, would finde the Nobility of no effect at all.

LXVI.

A Parliament where the Nobility is of no effect at all, is a meer popular Council.

LXVII.

A meer popular Council, will never receive Law from a King.

LXVIII.

A meer popular Council giving Law unto a King, becometh

men thereby a Democracy; or equal Commonwealth; or the difference is no greater then in the imperfection of the Form.

LIX.

A Commonwealth or Democracy to be perfect in the Form, must consist especially of such an Assembly, the result whereof, can go upon no interest whatsoever, but that only which is the common interest of the whole people.

LX.

An Assembly consisting of a few, may go upon the interest of one man, as a King; or upon the interest of one party, as that of Divines, Lawyers, and the like; or the interest of themselves, and the perpetuation of their Government.

LXI.

The popular Assembly in a Commonwealth, may consist of too few, but can never consist of too many.

LXII.

If the popular Assembly consist of so few, and so eminent persons as are capable of any orderly debate, it is good for nothing but to destroy the Commonwealth.

LXIII.

If the popular Assembly consist of so many, and for the greater part of so mean persons as are not capable of debate, there must be a Senate to help this defect.

LXIV.

The Reason of the Senate, is, that a popular Assembly rightly constituted, is not capable of any prudent debate.

LXV.

The Reason of the popular Assembly, is, that a Senate rightly constituted for debate, must consist of so few and eminent persons, that if they have the result too, they will not resolve according unto the interest of the people, but according to the interest of themselves.

LXVI.

The Senate and the popular Assembly being once rightly

constituted, the rest of the Commonwealth will constitute it self.

LXVII.

The *Venetians* having slain divers of their Dukes for their Tyranny, and being assembled by such numbers in their great Council as were naturally incapable of debate, pitched upon thirty Gentlemen who were called *Pregati*, in that they were prayed to go apart, and debating upon the Exigence of the Commonwealth, to propose as they thought good unto the great Council; and from thence first arose the Senate of *Venice*, to this day called the *Pregati*; and the *Great Council*, that is, the Senate and the popular Assembly of *Venice*: and from these two arose all those admirable Orders of that Commonwealth.

LXVIII.

The popular Assembly of *Venice* at this day, consisteth of about two thousand: the popular Assemblies in the Province onely of *Holland*, consist of about five hundred; by which I guess, that in all the united Provinces, they may amount unto about three thousand: in *Switz* they come unto a far greater number; and all, or the most of these, are perpetually extant.

LXIX.

If a popular Assembly consisting of eleven hundred or a thousand, may be so framed in *England* as to be sufficient to preserve the interest of the people, such an Assembly of so few, in a Territory of so large an extent, will be altogether new in the world, and without any example.

LXX.

That a people of themselves should have such understanding, as when they of *Venice* did institute their *Pregati* or Senate, is rare.

LXXI.

That a Senate or Council of Governours having supreme power, should institute a popular Assembly, and propose to it, though in all reason it be the far more facile and practicable, is that which is rarer.

LXXII.

LXXII.

Where such Elections are proposed unto the people, as being made accordingly, must needs produce a well-ordered Commonwealth, and the people (who never stick at such work) elect accordingly, there not the Proposers of any power in them, but the people by their peculiar and natural right and power, do institute and ordain their whole Commonwealth.

LXXIII.

An Assembly of men (being all Assemblies are naturally void of invention) is not capable of inventing any perfect Model or Method of Government.

LXXIV.

The wisest Assemblies (through this necessity) have in the Formation or Reformation of their Governments, still pitched upon some one man.

LXXV.

It is not below the dignity of any Assembly, but according unto the practice of a good Commonwealth, to admit of any man that is able to propose to them.

LXXVI.

One mans reason is as another mans judgment; yet is it in Art to say things which will do themselves, at least it is lawful for any man to appeal unto Event, and so do I in these Aphorisms.

Aug. 25. 1659.

F I N I S.

