



*Dandelion, Hemlock and Ivy.
The Field, Blunt House, Croydon.*

'Dandelion, Hemlock and Ivy. The Field, Blunt House, Croydon. April-July 1862'

THE NOTE-BOOKS
AND PAPERS
of
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COMMENTS ON THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES
OF ST. IGNATIUS LOYOLA

(1878-1885;
see note on p. 428)

ON *Principium sive Fundamentum*¹

'HOMO creatus est'—Aug. 20 1880: during this retreat, which I am making at Liverpool, I have been thinking about creation and this thought has led the way naturally through the exercises hitherto. I put down some thoughts.— We may learn that all things are created by consideration of the world without or of ourselves the world within. The former is the consideration commonly dwelt on, but the latter takes on the mind more hold. I find myself both as man and as myself something most determined and distinctive, at pitch, more distinctive and higher pitched than anything else I see; I find myself with my pleasures and pains, my powers and my experiences, my deserts and guilt, my shame and sense of beauty, my dangers, hopes, fears, and all my fate, more important to myself than anything I see. And when I ask where does all this throng and stack of being, so rich, so distinctive, so important, come from/ nothing I see can answer me. And this whether I speak of human nature or of my individuality, my selfbeing. For human nature, being more highly pitched, selved, and distinctive than anything in the world, can have been developed, evolved, condensed, from the vastness of the world not anyhow or by the working of common powers but only by one of finer or higher pitch and determination than itself and certainly than any that elsewhere we see, for this power had to force forward the starting or stubborn elements to the one pitch required. And this is much more true when we consider the mind; when I consider my selfbeing, my consciousness and feeling of myself, that taste of myself,² of *I* and *me* above and in all things, which is more distinctive than the taste of ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnutleaf or camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man (as when I was a child I used to ask myself: What must it be to be someone else?). Nothing else in nature comes near this unspeakable stress of pitch, distinctiveness, and selving, this selfbeing of my own. Nothing explains it or resembles it,

except so far as this, that other men to themselves have the same feeling. But this only multiplies the phenomena to be explained so far as the cases are like and do resemble. But to me there is no resemblance: searching nature I taste *self* but at one tankard, that of my own being. The development, refinement, condensation of nothing shews any sign of being able to match this to me or give me another taste of it, a taste even resembling it.

One may dwell on this further. We say that any two things however unlike are in something like. This is the one exception: when I compare my self, my being-myself, with anything else whatever, all things alike, all in the same degree, rebuff me with blank unlikeness; so that my knowledge of it, which is so intense, is from itself alone, they in no way help me to understand it. And even those things with which I in some sort identify myself, as my country or family, and those things which I own and call mine, as my clothes and so on, all presuppose the stricter sense of *self* and *me* and *mine* and are from that derivative.

From what then do I with all my being and above all that taste of self, that selfbeing, come? Am I due (1) to chance? (2) to myself, as selfexistent? (3) to some extrinsic power?

(1) Chance in name no one acknowledges as a cause or principle or explanation of being. But to call things positive facts and refuse further explanation is to explain them by chance. What then is chance proper, not chance as we use it for causes unknown or causes beside a present purpose?—Chance applies only to things possible; what must be does not come by chance and what cannot be by no chance comes. Chance then is the *ἐνέργεια*, the stress, of the intrinsic possibility which things have. A chance is an event come about by its own intrinsic possibility. And as mere possibility, passive power, is not power proper and has no activity it cannot of itself come to stress, cannot instress itself. And in fact chance existence is a selfexistence. Chance is incredible or impossible by this *a priori* consideration, but more strikingly is it incredible from experience. It is never verified and the more examined the less is it verified, the more is it out of the

question. For if it is a chance for anything at any given instant to exist and exist as so-and-so it is so for the next. These chances are equal and in any finite time it is infinitely unlikely that it should continue being and being what it was, for there are infinite instants. It is incredible then that its continued existence should be due to chance. If you say that its being is the mental flush of a string of broken existences at very small average intervals, this is incredible because monstrous. Moreover its nature should quite change, for its parts might chance elsewhere and the parts of other things here, and the variation will be infinite. The most plausible, if anything is plausible here, is that virgin matter is due to chance, other things not. But as this does not affect the present case it may be let alone. No man then can believe that his being is due to chance.

(2) Can I then be selfexistent and even in some way necessary?—This is clearly not true of my body and that crowd of being in me spoken of above, but may it be true of some part of it or something in it, *aliquid ejus*, the soul, the mind and its consciousness?

The mind and all my being is finite. This is plain in its outward and inward operations. In its outward, for there is a resistance in the body and things outside the body which it cannot overcome; there is a degree of effort, pain, weariness to which it yields. And in the inward; it has a finite insight, memory, grasp of apprehension, power of calculation, invention, force of will.

Nothing finite can exist of itself. For being finite it is limited and determined in time and space, as the mind is limited and determined to particular dates of time and place by the body. And apart from the body it is determined. I say apart from the body because it may be maintained that the mind has no bound from space nor even from time, for it may exist after death and may have existed before birth. Nevertheless it is finite in its own being, as said above, and determined. Its faculties compared one with another and compared with those of other minds are determined; they might be more, they might be less, they might be otherwise;

they are then determined and distinctive. It is plain it might have more perfection, more being. Nevertheless the being it has got has a great perfection, a great stress, and is more distinctive and higher selved, than anything else I see, except other such minds, in nature. Now to be determined and distinctive is a perfection, either self-bestowed or bestowed from without. In anything finite it cannot be self-bestowed; nothing finite can determine its own being, I mean its being as a whole; nothing finite can determine what itself shall, in the world of being, be. For to determine is a perfection, greater than and certainly never less than, the perfection of being determined. It is a function of a nature, even if it should be the whole function, the naturing, the selving of that nature. It always in nature's order is after the nature it is of. Nothing finite then can either begin to exist or eternally have existed of itself, because nothing can in the order of time or even of nature act before it exists or exercise function and determination before it has a nature to 'function' and determine, to selve and instress, with; how much less then when the very determination is what the determiner itself is to be and the selving what its self shall be like! And this is above all true of that inmost self of mine which has been said to be and to be felt to be, to taste, more distinctive than the taste of clove or alum, the smell of walnutleaf or hart'shorn, more distinctive, more selved, than all things else and needing in proportion a more exquisite determining, selfmaking, power.

But is it as a last alternative possible that, though neither my body nor the faculties and functions of my soul exist of themselves, there should be one thing in the soul or mind, as if compounded or selved-up with these, which does? a most spiritual principle in some manner the form of the mind as the mind or the soul is said to be of the body; so that my mind would be one selving or pitch of a great universal mind, working in other minds too besides mine, and even in all other things, according to their natures and powers and becoming conscious in man. And this would be that very/ distinctive self that was spoken of. Here we touch the *intellectus agens* of the Averrhoists and the doctrine of the Hegelians and others.

Whether anything of this sort can be true or not, alike I find that I myself can not be selfexistent. I may treat the question from the side of my being, which is said to be compounded, selved-up, or identified with this universal mind, or from the side of the universal mind itself. And first from my side.

The universal mind being identified not only with me but also with all other minds cannot be the means of communicating what is individual in me to them nor in them to me. I have and every other has, as said above, my own knowledge and powers, pleasures, pains, merit, guilt, shame, dangers, fortunes, fates: we are not chargeable for one another. But these things and above all my shame, my guilt, my fate are the very things in feeling, in tasting, which I most taste that selftaste which nothing in the world can match. The universal cannot taste this taste of self as I taste it, for it is not to it, let us say/ to him, that the guilt or shame, the fatal consequence, the fate, comes home; either not at all or not altogether. If not at all, then he is altogether outside of my self, my personality/ one may call it, my *me*. If not altogether, if for instance there is something done or willed which I am wholly chargeable with and answerable for and he only so far as I am a part of him, a function or selving of his, then only so far is he answerable and chargeable, and this difference may make the difference of mortal and venial sin and of a happy or unhappy fate. Put it thus: suppose my little finger could have a being of its own, a personal being, without ceasing to be my finger and my using it and feeling in it; if now I hold it in the candleflame the pain of the burning, though the selfsame feeling of pain, experienced by me in my finger and by my finger in itself, will be nevertheless unlike in us two, for to my finger it is the scorching of its whole self, but to me the scorching only of one finger. And beyond this, taking it morally, if I have freely put my finger into the flame and the finger is unwilling, but unable to resist, then I am guilty of my folly and self-mutilation, but my finger is innocent; if on the other hand my finger is willing, then it is more guilty than I, for to me the loss of a finger is but

mutilation, but to my finger itself it is selfmurder. Or if again it were selfsacrifice the sacrifice would be nobler in the finger, to which it was a holocaust, than in me, in whom it was the consuming of a part only. Though then I most intimately share my finger's feeling of pain, for indeed it is to me and to it one and the same, I do not share its feeling of self at all and share little, if I share any, of its guilt or merit, fortune and fate. So then the universal mind is outside of my inmost self and not within it; nor does it share my state, my moral standing, or my fate. And for all that this universal being may be at work in mine it leaves me finite: *I* am selfexistent none the more for any part the self-existent plays in me.

And the same conclusion follows if I look at the matter from the other side, that of the universal mind or being itself. For (1) the universal being too must have its self, its distinctive being, and distinctive more than mine. For if this is what I find myself to have above all other things I see, except only my peers in nature, other men, this self, in its taste to me so distinctive, how much more this greater being! Now if it, or he, has the same intimate feeling, consciousness, of all that goes on in me as I have of what goes on in my finger, so that even I were to him like a part or member, or not to speak of parts or members in what is infinite, as a feature or a selving, yet as my self was outside my finger's in the case supposed above and its self outside mine so must this infinite being's self be outside of mine as clearly as mine is outside of his: he must be able to think, mean, and say *I* and *me* as much as I am and when he says them he does not mean me who write this. Then too if, as said above, he does not (or not in the same degree) bear my guilt or merit or feel my shame, neither do I his: if e.g. it is ambition in him to want to be identified with or compounded or selved-up with all things, that is not my case nor my ambition, for I am compounded only with him and that by no choice of mine; if it is charity in him so to impart him self to all, that is not my case nor my merit either. And more generally (2) his *inlaw*, the law of his being is unlike mine, as the Ten of Hearts

is unlike any one of the hearts in it: it is many or made of many, each of them is one. In fact his very composition with me, being a sample of his composition with other things, all things, makes him unlike me or any other one thing. If X is compounded with A, B, C, D etc so as to give AX, BX, CX, DX etc, then X has its being in a series, which is its inlaw, but A and B or AX and BX have not. And if it has besides a simple being X besides the series, that makes the matter no better. Whether then the universal mind by *me* and *myself* means his Being X or his Being in the shape of the series AX, BX etc he has another self than mine, which is, say, CX; either way self tastes differently to him and to me.

For, to speak generally, whatever can with truth be called a self—not merely in logic or grammar, as if one said Nothingness itself—, such as individuals and persons must be, is not a mere centre or point of reference for consciousness or action attributed to it, everything else, all that it is conscious of or acts on being its object only and outside it. Part of this world of objects, this object-world, is also part of the very self in question, as in man's case his own body, which each man not only feels in and acts with but also feels and acts on. If the centre of reference spoken of has concentric circles round it, one of these, the inmost, say, is its own, is *of* it, the rest are *to* it only. Within a certain bounding line all will be self, outside of it nothing: with it self begins from one side and ends from the other. I look through my eye and the window and the air; the eye is my eye and of me and me, the windowpane is my windowpane but not of me nor me. A self then will consist of a centre *and* a surrounding area or circumference, of a point of reference *and* a belonging field, the latter set out, as surveyors etc say, from the former; of two elements, which we may call the inset and the outsetting or the display. Now this applies to the universal mind or being too; it will have its inset and its outsetting; only that the outsetting includes all things, with all of which it is in some way, by turns, in a series, or however it is, identified. But then this is an altogether different outsetting from what each of those very things to its own particular self has. And

since self consists in the relation the inset and the outsetting bear to one another, the universal has a relation different from everything else and everything else from everything else, including the universal, so that the self of the universal is not the self of anything else. In other words the universal is not really identified with everything else nor with anything else, which was supposed; that is/ there is no such universal.

(In shewing there is no universal a true self which is 'fetched' or 'pitched' or 'selved' in every other self, I do not deny that there is a universal really, and not only logically, thus fetched in the universals, but either it is selfless and they Selves, as may be the case in Man, or else it may be a true Self and they like its members only and not true Selves, something like which I am inclined to believe the species and individual in the brutes, or at least that the specific form, the form of the whole species, is nearer being a true Self than the individual. But these universals are finite only.

In the case of such a universal as humanity these questions would arise: *first* of the attributes—say the merit or guilt—of each member, each individual by and to itself; *next* those of the universal collectively, the average morality; *thirdly* those of each member considered as a pitch of the universal and so of the universal morality and the degree in which each agrees or disagrees with, avows or disavows this average morality.

Neither do I deny that God is so deeply present to everything ("Tu autem, O bone omnipotens, eras superior summo meo et interior intimo meo") that it would be impossible for him but for his infinity not to be identified with them or, from the other side, impossible but for his infinity so to be present to them. This is oddly expressed, I see; I mean/ a being so intimately present as God is to other things would be identified with them were it not for God's infinity or were it not for God's infinity he could not be so intimately present to things.

There is another proof that the universal being cannot be selved in or identified with all other things. Either the universal is selved not only in this world of things but in all possible ones or only in this one. If in all possible worlds

then there is no difference between possible and actual and all possible and 'impossible', incompatible, frames of being exist together or *are* together, for what coexist with a third thing (or are as true as a third thing) coexist with (or are as true as) one another. But this is absurd. Only then is this. Then this world must have been determined by the universal being out of all possible worlds, for, as shewn above, it could not determine its own being or determine itself into being. If so the universal exercises choice, is selfdetermining. But this is a great proof of self. It has then a self independent of its supposed selving in other things or, in other words it is not selved in or identified with other things.

No thing then, including myself, is in any sense selfexistent except this great being.

(3) The third alternative then follows, that I am due to an extrinsic power.

(Remark that the assumption in no. 2 is to assume in oneself a hypostatic union.)—Aug. 12 1882

ON *Prima Hebdomada. Examen Conscientiae Generale*

'DE Cogitatione'¹—By the will is meant that which decides action in us, *arbitrium*, or the faculty which is affected well or ill towards things, *voluntas*. If these are both one and the same faculty, then the first is the faculty at pitch, the other not, or it is the faculty at splay. The state of the will towards action beforehand, taking will in the second sense, the sense of affection, is desire, [*fainness*, the contrary of which is *lothness*, most hits it,²] (see that threefold division of *concupiscentia*, *delectatio*, *consensus*), wish; at the time of action it is enjoyment (*delectatio*); after/ it is *gaudium*, the being glad of it. There is something corresponding for the other sense of will: beforehand it is purpose (and other words are used, as determination, resolution, decision, intention); at the time it is something for which perhaps there is no *ἄνομα κέρριον*—one may say consent, avowal, willingness, even *usus* in the sense of not having only but employing the power then

acted on or *fruitio* in the sense of enjoying an income; not necessarily liking what one is said to enjoy; only *usus* might be said of any faculty and *fruitio*, even in the above sense, belongs rather to the will as affection; after action it is avowal, ratification: here again there is no proper word. All these three states of the will and that in either of its senses, but especially the sense of *arbitrium*, are consent. Of the third of them St. Ignatius does not speak. But it is this third nevertheless which most clearly shews that the consent of the will to right or wrong may be unaccompanied by action.

Then further we must distinguish in right or wrongdoing, but let us say wrongdoing, sin, only, for simplicity's sake, the evil forbidden, the *commission* (or omission; but here too let us treat only of commission) and the consent of the will to it, its approval of it. Evil is primarily in the commission, for that is primarily forbidden, as to eat of the tree of knowledge, and after that in the consent and the will. (It may further happen that evil is primarily in something prior to commission; as if for instance the forbidden fruit had been poisonous and forbidden on that account: then first would have been the physical evil of being poisoned, then the moral evil or at least the voluntary evil of poisoning oneself, then the distinctly moral evil of poisoning oneself against God's command to the contrary. But in this case there was no such direct physical evil.) On the other hand guilt is primarily in the will and its consent, next in the commission or act forbidden.

Now the consent to commit wrong and the commission itself may be completely separate, as when the king commands and the hangman or assassin kills, when the husband prostitutes his wife and she commits adultery. Or they may be distinct in time though in the same person; as if a man took poison or intoxicating drink or cantharides, which did not act at first and then acted suddenly, destroying reason, so that there was no renewal of consent nor pleasure in it nor consciousness of it nor even in the case of death fruition (in life) of the consequence. Yet it is the consequence, the commission—death, suicide; the being drunk, self-intoxication; the indulgence of lust—that is primarily forbidden: the taking

the drink or drug is not strictly and necessarily sinful. One might take them five minutes before one was going to be hanged, which might be an hour, say, before they could begin to act. Or again one might not even take the means to action: a woman might take a narcotic from a profligate; but narcotics are no evil nor the taking them a means towards action other than that of going to sleep; only she consents to be violated thereby. Or one might consent to be killed in one's sleep. In these cases then the guilt is purely in the consent, in the will. Therefore St. Ignatius says it is one way of sinning mortally '*quando homo praebet consensum malae cogitationi ad operandum postea*

[“Venialiter peccatur”—There seem three distinct points here, as expressed by the three clauses disjoined by *vels*, and not two only. The first kind of venial sin will be an imperfect consent, *not* an act performed without consenting (or fully consenting), but the almost consenting to act; which maybe, in the case of sins of the flesh, quite without *morosam delectationem*. This is a venial sin *of malice*; it being a tampering with the rebels to lend ear to temptation. The next is imperfect execution (“*recipiendo aliquam delectationem sensus*”) and is material sin properly so called. Such a sin will sometimes only want full consent or full advertence to make it mortal. This is a sin of frailty, and it throws light on the nature of sins of frailty in general. The last is negligence and stands midway between formal consent, which is pride and rebellion, on the one hand, and mere cowardice and yielding, on the other, being passive towards both sides, neither consenting to the tempter nor yet rejecting the tempting thought. This negligence is dishonouring to the lawgiver. It is reducible to ignorance: that is/ if one saw what one were doing one would wake up and bestir oneself.—Nov. 7 1878, but the matter belongs to some earlier date. It applies to sin venial *ex defectu formae*, not *material*. It seems supported by what follows upon mortal sin, in which no one would think of a third member besides consent and execution and which therefore differs from venial sin in that respect, so that it was worth while to give a special instruction upon venial sin]

sicut consensit [he is thinking of *morosam delectationem*: the man offers no resistance to or ceases resisting the impure

thought and then follows the enjoyment of it] vel ad eam opere exequendam si posset [here it is question of a sin to be afterwards committed outwardly]’.

But if a man is conscious and free at the time when the consequence of such steps as taking cantharides comes, that is/ when the commission is come, then there will be one of three alternatives. First suppose the cantharides were given to him without his knowledge by another, work their effect, and he freely commits an act of lust: then he is guilty not of the means or purpose, (taking purpose for previous consent) but only of the commission. Next suppose he took it himself, but, from doing so often, forgets when he does and in this instance imagines that it is unassisted nature that is prompting him, and commits the act of lust: then there are two distinct sins, one of purpose, the other of commission; but they are distinct in the will only, for it was always this same act that was intended beforehand and is enjoyed now; there is one commission in outward act but two sins of the inward faculty, *purpose* first and *permission* or *enjoyment* after. Lastly he may remember his purpose and the purpose

[He names three sins in word, two against the 2nd and 8th commandments, and so mortal (unless in trifling matter), the third of its nature venial. This division is perhaps meant to be exhaustive]

persist: then there is but one sin in the will, but it has its phases and features—first purpose, then permission or enjoyment; and this latter will be a great aggravation, as St. Ignatius says, (1) because the continuance or persistence of guilty consent, of a sinful state of will, is one measure of its guilt: the longer we are sinning the greater the sin; (2) because the consent is intensified at the time of commission, in some sort renewed and at all events enjoyed; (3) because the material act or commission is now in being, which is one element of sin and the primary seat of the *mischief* of sin, with, as St. Ignatius implies, all the further evil or *mischievous* consequences it may carry. Besides, that must be a great aggravation of mortal sin which if I only forgot my purpose

would be a mortal sin by itself. This does not however shew that such a sin is strictly as great as two; because it is harder to withdraw the consent once given than to refuse it at first.

We are then to distinguish, according to St. Ignatius (and I think Scotus has a distinction amounting to it), the act of commission and the act of consent. The first can never be guilty without the second, without, I mean, the second physically existing before, or with or at all events, after it (as in ratification, after-avowal) to give it guilt; but the first, the act of consent, may exist in all its guilt without the second. But this *without* is to be understood in different degrees. There may be consent to sin without the commission of that sin by oneself, yet it may be carried out, only by another; as murder by commission (in quite a different sense of *commission*) or proxy. Or one may be prevented from carrying it out oneself or may repent before the time comes. Or there may be no outward commission intended, but yet *morosa delectatio* in lust or, in a spiritual faculty, a thought of pride. This is in the will itself. The most inward and intimate kind of commission will be the intensity of the act of consent itself; for to consent implies no degree, it is a pure Yes or No; to intensify this consent then is to go beyond consent to an act of commission. And in fact physically bare consent, the act of the bare *arbitrium*, seldom or never exists: it would be a manifestation of bare personality, unclothed in circumstance, which is impossible.

Applying this doctrine to what is said of merit pp. 42, 43, the first way of meriting is by simple dissent (= consent inverted), the second by dissent from or disavowal of the commission which is then in some sort taking place in the subject himself in his own despite; for the constant repetition, the continuity, of the bad thought is that actualising of it, that instressing of it, which he refuses himself to be guilty of but which is carried out by a power not his doing him violence.*

In looking into Suarez *De Mysteriis Vitae Christi* on Christ’s

* I have expressed this doctrine more clearly and correctly in the rough draft of the Commentary for the Provincial.

COMMENTS ON THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES

Prayers this morning I happened to find in the article of St. Thomas embodied there this doctrine implied or expressed of the distinction of the will as *arbitrium* and, so St. Thomas speaks, as nature. No doubt it is to be found in him elsewhere.

Here I may put down some thoughts which throw light on and receive light from the above upon personality. A person is defined a rational (that is/ intellectual) supposit, the supposit of a rational nature. A supposit is a self. Self is the intrinsic oneness of a thing, which is prior to its being and does not result from it *ipso facto*, does not result, I mean, from its having independent being; for accidental being, such as that of the broken fragments of things or things purely artificial or chance 'installs', has no true and intrinsic oneness or true self: they have independent existence, that is/ they exist distinct from other things and by or in themselves, but the independence, the distinctness, the self is brought about artificially; naturally ivory is a tusk, the sphere of ivory meant to be a billiard ball is artificially made so, by turning. Now a bare self, to which no nature has yet been added, which is not yet clothed in or overlaid with a nature, is indeed nothing, a zero, in the score or account of existence, but as possible it is positive, like a positive infinitesimal, and intrinsically different from every other self.

For in the world, besides natures or essences or 'inscapes' and the selves, supposits, hypostases, or, in the case of rational natures, persons/ which wear and 'fetch' or instance them, there is still something else—fact or fate. For let natures be A, B, . . . Y, Z and supposits or selves *a*, *b*, . . . *y*, *z*: then if *a* is capable of A, B, . . . Y, Z (singly or together) and receives, say, A, if *b* capable of the same receives also A, and if *c* capable of the same receives M, so that we have *aA*, *bA*, *cM*, these combinations are three arbitrary or absolute facts not depending on any essential relation between *a* and A, *b* and A, or *c* and M but on the will of the Creator. Further, *a* and *b* are in the same nature A. But *a* uses it well and is saved, *b*¹ ill and is damned: these are two facts, two fates/ not depending on the relation between *a* and *b* on the one hand and A on the other. Now as the difference of the facts

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and fates does not depend on A, which is the same for both, it must depend on *a* and *b*. So that selves are from the first intrinsically different.

But this intrinsic difference, though it always exists, cannot appear except in a rational, to speak more to the point/ in a free/ nature. Two eggs precisely alike, two birds precisely alike/ will behave precisely alike: if they had been exchanged no difference would have been made. It is the self then that supplies the determination, the difference, but the nature that supplies the exercise, and in these two things freedom consists. This is what I have before somewhere worked out in a paper on freedom and personality and I think I used the terms *freedom of pitch* and *freedom of play*: they are good at all events and the two together express moral freedom.

Now if self begins to manifest its freedom with the rise from an irrational to a rational nature it is according to analogy to expect it will manifest more freedom with further rise in nature. Accordingly we find a more tremendous difference in fate between the good and the fallen angels than between good and bad or even saved and lost men. And this reasoning is of wide application. But the scale of natures is infinite up towards the divine. Now as the evil of venial sin is that if only the quantity of the matter were increased or the consent more perfect it would be mortal: so mortal sin itself seems to take its malice from an ideal sin worse and blacker than any that ever were or could be committed, in this way: he who breaks one commandment is guilty of all, St. James says, because he breaks *God's commandment*; murder is a mortal sin against God because if you will murder man you may come, as Caiphas and Pilate did, to *murder the man who is God*; and in general, if only God could be put into the position: the mortal sinner would have his way with him (the men of Sodom, Judas, and Caiphas are three typical cases), spoil him, sell him, or make away with him. Or to put it another way, if the sinner defiles God's image so he might God's person if he could; if he takes the limbs of Christ and makes them members of a harlot so he would Christ; if he could be, as Christ was, 'in the form of God' he would make God sin

and do the deeds 'of a slave'. Sin seems to reach up to an, as it were, preposterous and wicked godhead: in this lies the infinity of its malice, so far as that is infinite, and the realising this is that pain, in the pain or penalty of loss, which is even relieved by the realising, in the pain of sense, the very act of sin which merited it.

But if this is so and guilt can grow greater with increase in perfection of nature how is it that every being might, if God chose, be saved? For it would appear that with higher opportunities Judas and Satan might have sinned more, not less. Here then we must consider that as there is a scale of natures, ranging from lower to higher, which height is no advantage at all to the evil self, the self which will give nature, and the higher the nature the more, a pitch to evil; so also there is a scale or range of pitch which is also infinite and terminates upwards in the directness or uprightness of the 'stem' of the godhead and the procession of the divine persons. God then can shift the self that lies in one to a higher, that is/ better, pitch of itself; that is/ to a pitch or determination of itself on the side of good. But here arises a darker difficulty still; for how can we tell that each self has, in particular, any such better self, any such range from bad to good? In the abstract there is such a range of pitch and conceivably a self to be found, actually or possibly, at each pitch in it, but how can *each* self have all these pitches? for this seems contrary to its freedom; the more so as if we look at the exhibition of moral freedom in life, at men's lives and history, we find not only that in the same circumstances and seemingly with the same graces they behave differently, not only they do not range as fast from bad to good or good to bad one as another, but, even what is most intrinsic to a man, the influence of his own past and of the preexisting disposition of will with which he comes to action seems irregular and now he does well, now he sins, bids fair to be a sinner and becomes a saint or bids fair to be a saint and falls away, and indeed goes through vicissitudes of all sorts and changes times without number.

This matter is profound; but so far as I see this is the truth. First, though self, as personality, is prior to nature it is not

prior to pitch. If there were something prior even to pitch, of which that pitch would be itself the pitch, then we could suppose that that, like everything else, was subject to God's will and could be pitched, could be determined, this way or that. But this is really saying that a thing is and is not itself, is and is not A, is and is not. For self before nature is no thing as yet but only possible; with the accession of a nature it becomes properly a self, for instance a person: only so far as it is prior to nature, that is to say/ so far as it is a definite self, the possibility of a definite self (and not merely the possibility of a number or fetch of nature) it is identified with pitch, moral pitch, determination of right and wrong. And so far, it has its possibility, as it will have its existence, from God, but not so that God makes pitch no pitch, determination no determination, and difference indifference. The indifference, the absence of pitch, is in the nature to be superadded. And when nature is superadded, then it cannot be believed, as the Thomists think, that in every circumstance of free choice the person is of himself indifferent towards the alternatives and that God determines which he shall, though freely, choose. The difficulty does not lie so much in his being determined by God and yet choosing freely, for on one side that may and must happen, but in his being supposed equally disposed or pitched towards both at once. This is impossible and destroys the notion of freedom and of pitch.

Nevertheless in every circumstance it is within God's power to determine the creature to choose, and freely choose, according to his will; but not without a change or access of circumstance, over and above the base act of determination on his part. This access is either of grace, which is 'supernature', to nature or of more grace to grace already given, and it takes the form of instressing the affective will, of affecting the will towards the good which he proposes. So far this is a necessary and constrained affection on the creature's part, to which the *arbitrium* of the creature may give its avowal and consent. Ordinarily when grace is given we feel first the necessary or constrained act and after that the free act on our own part, of consent or refusal as the case

may be. This consent or refusal is given to an act either hereafter or now to be done, but in the nature of things such an act must always be future, even if immediately future or of those futures which arise in acts and phrases like 'I must ask you' to do so-and-so, 'I wish to apologise', 'I beg to say', and so on. And ordinarily the motives for refusal are still present though the motive for consent has been strengthened by the motion, just over or even in some way still working, of grace. And therefore in ordinary cases refusal is possible not only physically but also morally and often takes place. But refusal remaining physically possible becomes morally (and strictly) impossible in the following way.

Besides the above stated distinction of freedom of pitch and freedom of play there is a third kind of freedom still to be considered, *freedom of field*. (This is the natural order of the three: freedom of pitch, that is/ self-determination, is in the chooser himself and his choosing faculty; freedom of play is in the execution; freedom of field is in the object, the field of choice.) Thus it is freedom of play to be free of some benevolent man's purse, to have access to it at your will; it is freedom of pitch to be allowed to take from it what you want, not to be limited by conditions of his imposing; it is freedom of field to find there *more than one coin to choose from*. Or it is freedom of pitch to be able to choose for yourself which of several doors you will go in by; it is freedom of play to go unhindered to it and through the one you choose; but suppose all were false doors or locked but the very one you happened to choose and you do not know it, there is here wanting freedom of field.

The *arbitrium* is indeed free towards all alternatives, even though one of them should be absolute evil, evil in itself; but not so the affective will: this must always be affected towards the stem¹ of good and *malum quidem appetit sed sub specie boni*. Therefore all rival objects of desire being banished or sunk to insignificance and absolutely or practically emptied of their attractiveness, the will, still remaining free in itself as faculty or power, free to choose and even free of play, has no freedom of field and will choose necessarily the only object that attracts it.

Does this ever take place?—First distinguish prevenient or forestalling grace, grace accompanying, and consequent grace or grace of execution. It is prevenient grace which *rehearses* in us our consent beforehand, when for the moment we find ourselves to have consented, without finally consenting; and I suppose this to be a true and proper consent. For God having moved the affective will to an act, (*actum exercitum*) of consent the *arbitrium* is passive. It cannot dissent, for want of motive; for the motives which may afterwards occur do not so instantaneously act and if they did are outweighed: this is *ipso facto*, for the affective will is moved towards the true good, therefore as a matter of fact and *actu exercito* the countermotives have been outweighed. And this absence of dissent alone would be enough consent morally. But probably there is also a positive and instantaneous consent by way of ratification or after-avowal. Therefore what is called above the necessary or constrained act (of consenting to grace) is really necessary, and in the affective will is constrained, but in the elective will or *arbitrium* is free. But if after this we are left to ourselves for a leisurely and deliberate avowal or disavowal of this 'forestall' (as I shall call it), then as a *motus primo primus*, voluntary in itself, is treated as involuntary in comparison with our leisurely avowal or disavowal of it, so of these forestalls and our subsequent decision (the cases are not in all ways alike, for God's command of the faculties, his dominion over nature, being perfect, the consent to it is much truer¹ and more perfect than what we give to a *motum primo primum*): they are to be considered physically free but morally constrained and irresponsible.

It is now plain that God has only to prevent, by a continuance of his own act, by death, by suspension of faculty, or by whatever means, a return of the creature to the old condition or rather to a condition near enough to it, which is all that is possible, for the wrong choice again to present itself; he has only, I say, to do this/ in order to ensure a free and final correspondence with grace and choice of good.

I think, with God's help, the above is the truth about this

very dark and disputed matter.—It is to be remarked that *choice* in the sense of the taking of one and leaving of another real alternative is not what freedom of pitch really and strictly lies in. It is choice as when in English we say 'because I choose', which means no more than (and with precision does mean)/ I instress my will to so-and-so. And this freedom and no other, no freedom of field, the divine will has towards its own necessary acts. And no freedom is more perfect; for freedom of field is only an accident. So also *pitch* is ultimately simple positiveness, that by which being differs from and is more than nothing and not-being, and it is with precision expressed by the English *do* (the simple auxiliary), which when we employ or emphasise, as 'he said it, he did say it', we do not mean that the fact is any more a fact but that we the more state it. (It is also at bottom the copula in logic and the Welsh *a* in 'Efe a ddywedodd'.) So that this pitch might be expressed, if it were good English, *the doing* be, *the doing* choose, *the doing* so-and-so in that sense. Where there was no question of will it would become mere fact; where there is will it is free action, moral action. And such 'doing-be', and the thread or chain of such pitches or 'doing-be' 's, prior to nature's being overlaid, is self, personality; but is not truly self: self or personality then truly comes into being when the self, the person, comes into being with the accession of nature.

Is not this pitch or whatever we call it then the same as Scotus's *ecceitas*?

Further on the same—As besides the actual world there is an infinity of possible worlds, differing in all degrees of difference from what now is down to the having nothing in common with it but virgin matter, each of which possible worlds and this the actual one are like so many 'cleaves' or exposed faces of some pomegranate (or other fruit) cut in all directions across; so there is an infinity of possible strains of action and choice for each possible self in these worlds (or, what comes to the same thing, in virgin matter) and the sum of these strains would be also like a pomegranate in the round, which God sees whole but of which we see at best

only one cleave. Rather we see the world as one cleave and the life of each person as one vein or strain of colour in it.

This being so, God exercises his mastery and dominion over his creatures' wills in two ways—over the affective will by simply determining it so or so (as it is said the heart of the king is in the Lord's hand to turn it which way he will); over the *arbitrium* or power of pitch by shifting the creature from one pitch contrary to God's will to another which is according to it or from the less to the more so. This is that grace of correspondence of which mention is made in the passage quoted at p. 53.¹ It is plain that this is also to determine, but in another sense: the first is a change worked by God of something in man; the second an exchange of one whole for another whole, as they say in the mystery of Transubstantiation, a conversion of a whole substance into another whole substance, but here it is not a question of substance; it is a lifting him from one self to another self, which is a most marvellous display of divine power.

Dec. 30 1881, from thoughts arising in the Long Retreat.—To make this clearer, we must say that the affective will is well affected towards, likes, desires, chooses, whatever has the quality and look of good and *cannot choose but* so like and choose; so that the affective will, taken strictly as a faculty of the mind, is really no freer than the understanding or the imagination. And in fact to say 'I will do' so-and-so, which belongs to the will is no more than to say (of things within our own control) 'I shall do it', which is a judgment of a fact, or to foresee oneself, forecast oneself (definitely) doing it, which is a simple apprehension or act of 'pure intelligence', of imagination in other words. Now when there is but one alternative, that is/ no alternative, when there is no choice, no freedom of field, the elective will always, without effort, passively, ratifies the spring of the affective will to action. Its freedom of choice comes into play with freedom of field or choice of alternatives, all of which must have, though in different degrees, the quality of good. And it is in presence of the alternatives that the elective will has this freedom, for after their withdrawal it remains as fast as if it were frozen in

its last choice. (How this freedom arises need not be treated here; but briefly it consists in this, that self can in every object it has see another self, personal or not, and taking the whole object not in its fulness and 'splay' but in this 'neap' and fore-drawn condition can treat any one thing how great or small soever as equal to any other thing how small or great soever.) The power therefore of going on from worse to better depends on the outward grace of God's ordinary providence, which brings fresh natural motives day by day before us and in the course of time, in the growing from childhood to manhood and youth to age, on the whole stronger ones. There will therefore always be a freedom to change in a year, month, week, or day, but for great changes there is practically no freedom within short spells of time, as days or hours: the physical freedom there always is, but this is of no use whatever for want of freedom of field. And, practically speaking, for any great change towards any great or important object of affection or disaffection, like or dislike, as the Christian religion, the Catholic Church, a political principle, and so on, a great change of circumstances, of point of view, either *taken* or *given* (which is like saying/ a great change of perspective), is needed. For apart from grace who supposes that, without some accession of knowledge or self interest, a heathen will arbitrarily change from disliking to liking the Christian religion? and so of the rest. And if this never does happen then morally it cannot happen and morally speaking, practically speaking, men are not free—*not free to change*, for free they are—in such matters. For, applying here a pregnant principle which explains other difficulties, the continuance or persistency of a phenomenon may be no more than the splay, the quantitative, the time-long/ *display*, of the oneness of a fact over against a number of other facts filling less time or more foredrawn, and so here the *going on* hating Christians is not the mere consequence of having once hated them and after that never having stopped: it is the attitude of mind freely taken by the man's self towards that other (so to call it) self (for bodies, principles, and so on have a oneness and a self either real and natural or else logical), Christianity,

which arose from the mere contraposition of the two, as from positing 7 and 21 arises the ratio $\frac{1}{3}$, only not freely; and so while Christianity lasts and the man lives, till circumstances notably change this attitude of mind will continue. These attitudes of mind are so lasting, so like everlasting, because they are so nearly absolute.

For a self is an absolute which stands to the absolute of God as the infinitesimal to the infinite. It is an infinitesimal in the scale of stress. And in some sense it is an infinite, if looked on as the foredrawing of its whole being. For the foredrawing of a finite to the infinitesimal will give an infinite in the scale of stress, but only a relative infinite, as the world is only relatively infinite in the scale of extension. (Perhaps the divine Persons may be looked on as foredrawings of the divine nature: this will be like the exchange of the (true) infinite of magnitude for the true infinite of stress or of infinite *simpliciter* for absolute. However it is personality I should rather have said than person; neither do the other words express what is to be thought, for the divine nature is infinite in stress as much as in magnitude and absolute as much as infinite. I think I see how the truth should be stated but I leave this for the time.)

In so far then as the desire or affection we entertain towards any object comes nearer our true selves or bare personality in so far will it be the harder to change and if it were ever the relation of mere self towards that object it would be necessary and unchangeable, though free; neither of course would the subject wish to change it. And in fact the lost do not wish, do not will at all events, if it were even possible, to repent and love God.

From the above also may be seen, if the wills of all his children were contained in Adam's at the Fall and he could sway them and give them the pitch which his own took, in what sense they consented and in what sense not. But this point need not be raised here.

It has been shewn at p. 46 how God can always command if he chooses the free consent of the elective will, at least, if by no other way, by shutting out all freedom of field (which

no doubt does sometimes take place, as in disposing the hearts of princes; but whether in matters concerning the subject's own salvation we do not know: very possibly it does in answer to the subject's own or some other's prayer in his behalf). Therefore in that 'cleave' of being which each of his creatures shews to God's eyes alone (or in its 'burl' of being/ uncloven) God can choose countless points in the strain (or countless cleaves of the 'burl') where the creature has consented, does consent, to God's will in the way above shewn. But these may be away, may be very far away, from the actual pitch at any given moment existing. It is into that possible world that God for the moment moves his creature out of this one or it is from that possible world that he brings his creature into this, shewing it to itself gracious and consenting; nay more, clothing its old self for the moment with a gracious and consenting self. This shift is grace. For grace is any action, activity, on God's part by which, in creating or after creating, he carries the creature to or towards the end of its being, which is its selfsacrifice to God and its salvation. It is, I say, any such activity on God's part; so that so far as this action or activity is God's it is divine stress, holy spirit, and, as all is done through Christ, Christ's spirit; so far as it is action, correspondence, on the creature's it is *actio salutaris*; so far as it is looked at *in esse quieto* it is Christ in his member on the one side, his member in Christ on the other. It is as if a man said: That is Christ playing at me^t and me playing at Christ, only that it is no play but truth; That is Christ *being me* and me being Christ.

It is plain then how true it is what is said at p. 53 about correspondence being a grace and even the grace of graces. For the momentary and constrained correspondence, being a momentary shift from a worse, ungracious/ to a better, a gracious self, is a grace, a favour, and it is grace in the strict sense of that word; it is grace bestowed for the moment and offered for a continuance. But the continued and unconstrained correspondence is a greater blessing and therefore still more a grace and as it was only possible through the first or constrained one (the 'forestall'), the second multiplies

the first and is a grace upon a grace or, as St. John says, *χάρις ἀντὶ χάριτος*, freer on man's part and also doubly free, unconstrained, gratis, grace/ on God's.

What then does Marie Lataste (or Christ in speaking to her) mean by its being granted in answer to prayer?—First that salvation and every necessary grace is so granted. But taking the matter more in particular, I understand at bottom to be meant the simple act of *arbitrium*. For prayer is the expression of a wish to God and, since God searches the heart, the conceiving even of the wish is prayer in God's eyes (see Rom. viii 26, 27.). For there must be something which shall be truly the creature's in the work of corresponding with grace: this is the *arbitrium*, the verdict on God's side, the saying Yes, the 'doing-agree' (to speak barbarously), and looked at in itself, such a nothing is the creature before its creator, it is found to be no more than the mere wish, discernible by God's eyes, that it might do as he wishes, might correspond, might say Yes to him; correspondence itself is on man's side not so much corresponding as the wish to correspond, and this least sigh of desire, this one aspiration, is the life and spirit of man. For beyond this, all the work of actual correspondence, all whatever that has any score or 'afterleave' to any eye but God's, in the corresponding with grace needs fresh grace or the continuance of the offered grace, grace concomitant.

And remark that prayer understood in this sense, this sigh or aspiration or stirring of the spirit towards God, is a *forestall* of the thing to be done, as on the other side grace prevenient is God's forestall of the same, and it is here that one creature, one man, differs so much from another: in one God finds only the constrained correspondence with his forestall (as explained near the top of p. 220); in another he finds after this an act of choice properly so called. And by this infinitesimal act the creature does what in it lies to bridge the gulf fixed between its present actual and worsen pitch of will and its future better one. For the forestall on God's part, in which the creature's correspondence is bound up, is a piece bodily taken out of the possible world, the 'burl

of being', of that creature and brought into this actual one, which is, as has been said, one cleave of it; but the forestall on the creature's side, towards which of course God too plays his part, is in this actual world. Therefore though God can always, for the worst of creatures, for Satan, say, find a pitch at which the creature is in correspondence with his grace, nay any number of them, *by foreclosing the field*, it does not follow that he finds the same with the field open. For this is, as has been said above, to take away choice and freedom. Of this later.

It might be said that prevenient grace is no more than God's action in this world, that there is no ground for resorting to some world of possibility to explain it. And this may be true wherever there is not an absolute consent of the creature's will bound up with it, a consent not to the momentary affection but also to the action which is to follow. But what we experience sometimes in ourselves, and what will be most strongly experienced when the after-consent is most perfect, is a condition, an 'install' of ourselves in which we have consented to do, are doing, or have done that thing to which we feel God to be inviting us. This is a prophecy, a forecast, not of the certain future, for it leaves us free still to discard and unmake that future; therefore of a possible future, in which nevertheless God has already acted, nay we have done so too; hence it belongs to another creation. Let this now suffice, for I see that one might pursue some further subtleties and they weary the mind.

The sigh of correspondence links the present, with its imperfect or faulty pitch of will, to the future, with its uprighter and more perfect one: it *begins* to link it, is the first infinitesimal link in the chain or step on that road which is to created power impassable. For this reason and from this point of view it may be called a forestall of the act to follow. For in so far as it passes into the act to follow it is not the forestalling but the stalling or lodging of that act. And even the sigh or aspiration itself is in answer to an inspiration of God's spirit and is followed by the continuance and expiration of that same breath which lifts it, through the gulf and void between

pitch and pitch of being, to do or be what God wishes his creature to do or be. Cf. Eph. iii 16. 'ἵνα δῶ ὑμῖν κατὰ τὸ πλοῦτος τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ δύναμει [the display of divine power] κραταιωθῆναι [like falling home into a fast bed] διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος αὐτοῦ [the aspiration on God's part] εἰς τὸν ἕσω ἄνθρωπον [known to God, the man created in Christ as ii 10.], κατοικῆσαι τὸν Χριστὸν διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν . . . ἵνα πληρωθῆτε εἰς πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ Θεοῦ'. This *πλήρωμα τοῦ Θεοῦ* is the burl of being in Christ, and for every man there is his own burl of being, which are all 'by lays' or 'byfalls' of Christ's and of one another's.

Now though it is true that God can raise anyone from any pitch of will and being however low to one in which he shall be gracious and consenting to God and in St. Paul's case wonderfully did so and though we cannot know why he does so to one and not to another, not to all, yet it is easy to see certain things which help to explain such cases as those of St. Paul or St. Matthew or of the penitent thief. St. Paul, if he was in sin and vehemently resisting the grace he then had at the time he was struck down, yet when he had been raised to his grace of conversion, even if that had been, which indeed it was not, a violence done to his will for that moment, corresponded most earnestly then and ever after. But if the will is always and even morally and practically free while in pilgrimage, *in via*, he need not have done so; he might still have come to be a cast away: he speaks so himself. And his former zeal of God had something certainly of good in it. So too St. Matthew was perhaps already a willing listener to Christ and the good thief had corresponded with lesser graces before he received his great one or was at the very least acting on natural charity. But it is rather the after use of the uplifting grace that ought to be looked at than the state of the soul before it came: here are the *praevisa merita*, and we must suppose at least that God is more willing to lay out his graces well than ill, to grant the greatest to those who will employ them the best rather than to those who will the worst, and this most of all in the case of the Blessed Virgin. Thus if the apostolic grace and dignity is the highest on earth below

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that of the Blessed Virgin and St. Joseph, why, of twelve Apostles there was indeed one traitor but there was only one; and to judge by what we see, fewer religious are lost than worldlings; fewer Catholics than other Christians, though in good faith; fewer Christians than heathen in the same. And yet it is the holiest that shews his freedom most, the wickedest that is most the slave of sin and carried with the motion of the flesh and of the world and of the Worldwielder. But what are we to say of those saints who, like St. Francis of Assisi, said that had the greatest sinners had the graces granted them they would have made a better use of them?—Perhaps it is the expression of their heaven-enlightened sense of their own shortcomings and yet it may not be in general true; that is/ not true of the crowd of sinners, though here and there such sinners might be found. But all these last speculations are not for me, neither are they necessary towards my purposes.

God's forestalling of man's action by prevenient grace, which carries with it a consenting of man's will, seems to stand to the action of free choice which follows and to which, by its continued strain and breathing on and man's responding aspiration or drawing in of breath, it leads/ as the creation of man and angels in sanctifying grace stands to the act by which they entered with God into the covenant and commonwealth of original justice; further/ as the infused virtues of baptism stand to the acts of faith etc which long after follow. This agrees well with the light I once had upon the nature of faith, that it is God/ in man/ knowing his own truth. It is like the child of a great nobleman taught by its father and mother a compliment of welcome to pay to the nobleman's father on his visit to them: the child does not understand the words it says by rote, does not know their meaning, yet what they mean it means. The parents understand what they do not say, the child says what it does not understand, but both child and parents mean the welcome.

The will is surrounded by the objects of desire as the needle by the points of the compass. It has play then in two dimensions. This is to say/ it is drawn by affection towards any one, A, and this freely, and it can change its direction towards any

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other, as free, B, which implies the moving through an arc. It has in fact, more or less, in its affections a tendency or magnetism towards every object and the *arbitrium*, the elective will, decides which: this is the needle proper. But in fallen man all this motion, both these dimensions, *κεῖται ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ*; so that the uplifting action of supernatural grace takes place as if in a third dimension, motion in which man is totally incapable of. And here remark what now clearly appears, that the action of such assisting grace is twofold, to help man determine the will towards the right object in one field and at the same time from that field or plane to lift it to a parallel and higher one; besides all the while stimulating its action, in the right plane and in the right direction, towards the right object; so that in fact it is threefold, not twofold—(1) quickening, stimulating, towards the object, towards good: this is especially in the affective will, might be a natural grace, and in a high degree seems to be the grace of novices; (2) corrective, turning the will from one direction or pitting into another, like the needle through an arc, determining its choice (I mean/ stimulating that determination, which it still leaves free): this touches the elective will or the power of election and is especially the grace of the mature mind; (3) elevating, which lifts the receiver from one cleave of being to another and to a vital act in Christ: this is truly God's finger touching the very vein of personality, which nothing else can reach and man can respond to by no play whatever, by bare acknowledgment only, the counter-stress which God alone can feel ('subito probas eum'), the aspiration in answer to his inspiration. Of this I have written above and somewhere else long ago.¹

When man was created in grace, that is/ in the elevated, the supernatural/ state, and his will addressed towards God, the work of actual grace was all of the first sort. This may be called creative grace, the grace which destined the victim for the sacrifice, and which belongs to God the Father. After the Fall there came too 'medicinal', corrective, redeeming/ grace, by the restrictions of the Law, by the exhortations of the Prophets, and by Christ himself. And all Christ's words,

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it seems to me, are either words of cure, as 'Veniam et curabo eum', 'Volo, mundare', or corrections of some error or fault; their function is always *ramener à la route*. This then is especially Christ's grace, it is a purifying and a mortifying grace, bringing the victim to the altar and sacrificing it. And as creative grace became insufficient by the Fall: so this grace of Christ's did not avail when he was no longer present to keep bestowing it or when its first force was spent. At Pentecost the elevating grace was given which fastened men in good. This is especially the grace of the Holy Ghost and is the acceptance and assumption of the victim of the sacrifice.

Light is thrown on the above points by Rom. viii 28 sqq. (29. 'οὐς προέγνω [by that touch which only God can apply and the response which only God can perceive] καὶ προώρισεν συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνας τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτον πρωτότοκον ἐν πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς. οὐς δὲ προώρισεν, τούτους καὶ ἐκάλεσεν [*gratia vocans*, the first of the three graces above] καὶ οὐς ἐκάλεσεν, τούτους καὶ ἐδικαίωσεν [the second], οὐς δὲ ἐδικαίωσεν τούτους καὶ ἐδόξασεν [raised to the state when their deeds should be the doing of God in them]') and ib. 38. 'πέπεισμαι γὰρ ὅτι οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε ζωὴ οὔτε ἄγγελοι οὔτε ἀρχαὶ [here add from the Vulgate, which has 'neque virtutes', 'οὔτε δυνάμεις'] οὔτε ἐνεστῶτα οὔτε μέλλοντα οὔτε δυνάμεις [read probably 'δύναμις', for the Vulgate has 'fortitudo': *nor things possible*] οὔτε ὕψωμα οὔτε βάθος [that is/ the whole range of any one strain of personality] οὔτε τις κτίσις ἑτέρα [the world of possibility, the burl] δυνήσεται ἡμᾶς χωρίσαι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦ Θεοῦ τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν'. See also xi 12. 'εἰ δὲ τὸ παράπτωμα αὐτῶν πλοῦτος κόσμος καὶ τὸ ἥττημα αὐτῶν πλοῦτος ἔθνῶν, πόσῳ μᾶλλον τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῶν;'

ON *Prima Hebdomada. Exercitium Primum. Primum Punctum*

'NOLENTES' sqq.¹—It seems some scale—sloth, pride ('devenientes in superbiam'), hatred ('conversi fuerint in malitiam'). From notes made June 17 187(7?). Scotus

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thinks that in Satan's contemplation of his own beauty was a sin of luxury. There was also ambition, avarice of a sort, and envy. Dec. 19 1879

St. Ignatius does not say this sin was in thought only

*Secundum Punctum*¹

'In campo Damasceno'—Said for the 'history's' sake, as 'a Nazareth', 'a Bethania', 'ex Monte Sion' etc in the contemplations on our Lord's life. So also about Eve.—It was in the same plain of Damascus that St. Paul *peccatorum princeps* was new-created, that is/ regenerated, and from it raised to the third heaven. Damascus lies on the north, that is the cold and mournful side, of the Promised Land, in which some traditions, I think, place Paradise.* Sister Emmerich at all events speaks of Adam and Eve coming down from Paradise to the after Garden of Gethsemane.—Caeterum injecta mentione hujus campi Damasceni quasi individuatur Adam et eccitate loci et materiae signatione—Nov. 5 1878

[Here on the *Tertium Punctum* is made a long quotation from Marie Lataste (vol. 2 bk. 1 §§ 15, 16); 'Dieu dans ses jugements secrets et impénétrables . . .']

ON *Prima Hebdomada. Exercitium Tertium.*² *Colloquium Primum*

THERE is a way of thinking of past sin such that the thought numbs and kills the heart, as all this Week of the Exercises will do if care is not taken in giving it. It does not seem that we are to pray for this, but for that feeling towards past sin which our Lady felt or would feel when sins were presented to her and shrunk from them instantaneously and which our Lord feels in His members and God Himself, who means us to copy His nature and character as well as we can and put on His mind according to our measure. For they turn from sin by nature (or our Lady as if by nature)

* However Damascus itself is looked on in the East as an earthly Paradise (L. R.)

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and finding it embodied with a thing they love find it infinitely piteous: 'O the pity of it!' and why should it ever have been?—these are the sort of words that express it. So that we may pity ourselves in the same way, that such a thing as sin should ever have got hold of us.—This pure pity and disavowal of our past selves is the state of mind of one whose sins are perfectly forgiven. But as long as we are not certain this is the case, which is always; as long as we have before God the status of penitents, which we should have till death, we must not wholly get rid of the shame of sin, for it is a part of penance. Disavowal of sin is the same thing as repentance; it is an act or state of mind the counterpart of the act of will by which a man sinned and the state of will which was induced by it. It is an election of the free will, *arbitrium*. It is unfolded into these three things—(1) penalty, penance (or a penance), pain (called *of sense*, though it need not affect the senses), and this corresponds to the material sin committed, the sinful act itself or evil executed, the *mischief* or damage done; (2) shame, which is nearly the same thing as penitence in its narrowest sense and corresponds to the dishonour done, which dishonour is measured by the disproportion between God and the sinner; (3) repentance proper or the change of mind from a resistance to God's will to an obedience to it, which is the counterpart of the rebellion or revolt made against God's precept and expressed will, the resistance of will to will which is in man malice or uncharity, in God reprobation

We are to hate disorder because it is the soil of sin, being by itself a negative thing without natural ugliness. You must consider its known consequences. It is like sleep in a pointsman, steersman, or sentinel. And the world is a frame of things consistent with and in part founded on sin—Understand the above *sensu diviso et composito*: sleep is a thing indifferent, but in a pointsman it is a crime. Disorder or *deordinatio* considered formally appears positive and naturally ugly, but the inordinate act or train of acts may be indifferent; will be so when you are contrasting disorder with sin (L.T., Nov. 27 1881). However it will be true to say that *deordinatio*

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is a negative evil, because it is a want of subordination, of obedience to God's order; whereas sin is positive *insubordination* or disobedience

ON FR. ROTHAAAN'S NOTE TO *Secunda Hebdomada. De duobus Vexillis.*¹ *Secundum Punctum*

'S.P. MENTIONEM' etc—For it is question of Christ's historical coming upon earth and calling men who should call other men. Lucifer, who was never incarnate, can only call men by devils; yet he would set up, as Christ has, an earthly power and kingdom and so enthrones himself now at Rome, by Nero and Diocletian to persecute the early Christians; now at Bagdad; now at Stamboul. For he is always being brought to confusion and vice, which is *φθαρτικὴ ἀρχὴς*, cannot be consistent like virtue. And God is continually confounding the builders of Babel or of Babylon (Nov. 20 1881, L.T.)—and so dividing Satan's kingdom against itself. And here I see an answer to the difficulty I have often felt about that very text. When Mahomet overthrew idolatry Satan was divided against himself, but it was a weak and ineffective empire he overthrew to found a strong and central one, it was a sacrificing of the tail to the head; whereas to cast out devils is to overthrow Satan's empire in its head, the dominion of the body and even of the mental faculties of man—which if Beelzebub ever did/ it would be to send mightier devils in their place

ON *Tertia Hebdomada. De Ultima Coena. Prima Contemplatio. Primum Punctum*²

'VIDERE personas': see on 'videndo locum'—As all places are at some point of the compass and we may face towards them: so every real person living or dead or to come has his quarter in the round of being, is lodged one-where and not anywhere, and the mind has a real direction

towards him. We are to realise this here of 'the persons of the Supper': as we have got the orientation of the room, its true measurements and specifications, properly furnished it and so on, so now we are properly to people it and give it its true personallings. It is in this way that Scotus says God revealed the mystery of the Trinity that His servants might direct their thoughts in worship towards, determine them, pit them, upon the real terms, which are the Persons, of His being the object of that worship. 'Fructum': we shall look on Christ with adoration, on St. Peter with reverence as our foundation, St. Matthew and St. John as our informants, on Judas with grief, and so forth

ON *Contemplatio ad Obtinendum amorem*¹

THE last mystery meditated on in the Spiritual Exercises is our Lord's Ascension. This contemplation is that which comes next in order, namely the sending of the Holy Ghost; it is the contemplation of the Holy Ghost sent to us through creatures. Observe then it is on love and the Holy Ghost is called Love ('Fons vivus, ignis, *caritas*'); shewn 'in operibus', the works of God's finger ('*Digitus paternae dexteræ*'); consisting 'in communicatione' etc, and the Holy Ghost as he is the bond and mutual love of Father and Son, so of God and man; that the Holy Ghost is uncreated grace and the sharing by man of the divine nature and the bestowal of himself by God on man ('*Altissimi donum Dei*'): hence we are to consider 'quantum . . . Dominus desideret dare seipsum mihi in quantum potest'; hence also the repetition in pt. 2 of 'dans'. Remark also how after the benefits of creation and Redemption he does not add, he means *us* to add, that of sanctification. Again in Pt. 2 'templum', in 3. 'operatur' as above, in 4. 'a sole . . . radii, a fonte aquae' ('*Fons vivus, ignis*') (Dec. 8 1881). All things therefore are charged with love, are charged with God and if we know how to touch them give off sparks and take fire, yield drops and flow, ring and tell of him.

'Faciens me templum, cum creatus sim ad similitudinem et imaginem'—The word Temple at first sight hides the thought, which is, I think, that God rests in man as in a place, a *locus*, bed, vessel, expressly made to receive him as a jewel in a case hollowed to fit it, as the hand in the glove or the milk in the breast (Dec. 8 1881). And God *in forma servi* rests *in servo*, that is/ Christ as a solid in his member as a hollow or shell, both things being the image of God; which can only be perfectly when the member is in all things conformed to Christ. This too best brings out the nature of the man himself, as the lettering on a sail or device upon a flag are best seen when it fills

NOV. 8 1881 (*Long Retreat*)—ON CREATION AND REDEMPTION¹

TIME has 3 dimensions and one positive pitch or direction. It is therefore not so much like any river or any sea as like the Sea of Galilee, which has the Jordan running through it and giving a current to the whole.

Though this one direction of time if prolonged for ever might be considered to be parallel to or included in the duration of God, the same might be said of any other direction in time artificially taken. But it is truer to say that there is no relation between any duration of time and the duration of God. And in no case is it to be supposed that God creates time and the things of time, that is to say/ this world, in that duration of himself which is parallel with the duration of time and was before time. But rather as the light falls from heaven upon the Sea of Galilee not only from the north, from which quarter the Jordan comes, but from everywhere/ so God from every point, so to say, of his being creates all things. But in so far as the creation of one thing depends on that of another, as suppose trees were created *for* man and *before* man, so far does God create in time or in the direction or duration of time.

There is therefore in the works of creation an order of time,

as the order of the Six Days, and another order, the order of intention, and that not only intention in understanding and intention in will but also intention or forepitch of execution, of power or activity. In the order of intention 'other things on the face of the earth' are created after man; the more perfect first, the less after. From this it follows that the more perfect is created in its perfection, that is to say/ if perfectible and capable of greater and less perfection, it is created at its greatest. And thus it is said 'Ipsius enim sumus factura, creati in Christo Jesu in operibus bonis, quae praeparavit Deus ut in illis ambulemus' (Eph. ii 10., and he had already dwelt on these Gentiles and on himself too as having been children of wrath, dead in sins, and so on). And further it follows that man himself was created for Christ as Christ's created nature for God (cf. 'omnia enim vestra sunt, vos autem Christi, Christus autem Dei' 1 Cor. iii 22, 23.). And in this way Christ is the firstborn among creatures. The elect then were created in Christ some before his birth, as Abraham, some before their own, as St. Ignatius; so that their correspondence with grace and seconding of God's designs is like a taking part in their own creation, the creation of their best selves. And again the wicked and the lost are like halfcreations and have but a halfbeing.

The first intention then of God outside himself or, as they say, *ad extra*, outwards, the first outstress of God's power, was Christ; and we must believe that the next was the Blessed Virgin. Why did the Son of God go thus forth from the Father not only in the eternal and intrinsic procession of the Trinity but also by an extrinsic and less than eternal, let us say aeonian one?—To give God glory and that by sacrifice, sacrifice offered in the barren wilderness outside of God, as the children of Israel were led into the wilderness to offer sacrifice. This sacrifice and this outward procession is a consequence and shadow of the procession of the Trinity, from which mystery sacrifice takes its rise; but of this I do not mean to write here. It is as if the blissful agony or stress of selving in God had forced out drops of sweat or blood, which drops were the world, or as if the lights lit at

the festival of that 'peaceful Trinity' through some little cranny striking out lit up into being one 'cleave' out of the world of possible creatures. The sacrifice would be the Eucharist, and that the victim might be truly victim-like, like motionless, helpless, or lifeless, it must be in matter. Then the Blessed Virgin was intended or predestined to minister that matter. And here then was that mystery of the woman clothed with the sun which appeared in heaven.¹ She followed Christ the nearest, following the sacrificial lamb 'whithersoever he went'.

In going forth to do sacrifice Christ went not alone but created angels to be his company, lambs to follow him the Lamb, the flower of the flock, 'whithersoever he went', that is to say, first to the hill of sacrifice, then after that back to God, to beatitude. They were to take part in the sacrifice and he was to redeem them all, that is to say/ for the sake of the Lamb of God who was God himself God would accept the whole flock and for the sake of one ear or grape the whole sheaf or cluster; for redeem may be said not only of the recovering from sin to grace or perdition to salvation but also of the raising from worthlessness before God (and all creation is unworthy of God) to worthiness of him, the meriting of God himself, or, so to say, godworthiness. In this sense the Blessed Virgin was beyond all others redeemed, because it was her more than all other creatures that Christ meant to win from nothingness and it was her that he meant to raise the highest.

Christ then like a good shepherd led the way; but when Satan saw the mystery and the humiliation proposed he turned back and rebelled or, as that Welsh text² says, flung himself direct on beatitude, to seize it of his own right and merit and by his own strength, and so he fell, with his following.

Here I have thought of a parable of a marriage cavalcade, in which some as soon as they see the bride's lowly dwelling refuse to go further, are themselves disowned by the bridegroom and driven off, but keep attacking the procession on its road.

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The mystery remained in some sort a mystery. When Satan saw Mary and Christ in the flesh he did not recognise them. This may be the meaning of the woman's hiding in the wilderness, that is/ the material world. The river that the dragon vomited to sweep the woman away perhaps means that Satan, who is the *κοσμοκράτωρ*, the worldwielder, gave nature all an impulse of motion which should destroy human life, and the earth's helping the woman and swallowing the river that nature absorbed this motion and was overruled to digest and distribute it throughout, making it still habitable by man. I understand the sun, moon, and stars to mean two things—first to compare the woman to the earth, this planet, which is clothed in sunlight, ministered to more humbly by its satellite, and graced by the beauty of the zodiac and other signs of the firmament, and then to her being adorned with God's grace, the service of material nature below, and the service of angels above. By the 'other sign that appeared in heaven', of the red or fiery dragon I understand the counterpageant or counterstandard set up by Lucifer which reduced a third of the angels and he is said with his tail to have swept the third part of the stars down to the earth because he drew them in his hair and they were involved in his fall, not that he cast them down before himself. As the woman is compared to the earth in the solar system so the dragon is to the constellation Draco, the tail of which sweeps through 120° or a third of the sphere and which winds round the pole (the polestar was once in the head of Draco, I mean a star in the head of Draco was then the polestar), this world's seeming axis and the earth's real one, so as to symbolise how Satan tried to possess himself of the sovereignty of things, taking 'The mountain of the North', that is to say/the culmination of the firmament towards the pole, as a throne and post of vantage and so wreathing nature and as it were constricting it to his purposes (as also he wreathed himself in the Garden round the Tree of Knowledge); though he was foiled, cast from heaven, and left master only of the material world, by a figure the earth.

A coil or spiral is then a type of the Devil, who is called the

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old (or original) serpent, and this I suppose because of its 'swale' or subtle and imperceptible drawing in towards its head or centre, and it is a type of death, of motion lessening and at last ceasing. *Invidia autem diaboli mors intravit in mundum*: God gave things a forward and perpetual motion; the Devil, that is/ thrower of things off the track, upsetter, mischiefmaker, clashing one with another brought in the law of decay and consumption in inanimate nature, death in the vegetable and animal world, moral death and original sin in the world of man. This seems to expand the meaning of that river explained on last leaf and also of the river running through the lake spoken of against p. 37.

The snake or serpent a symbol of the Devil. So also the Dragon. A dragon is or is taken to be a reptile. And first a dragon is a serpent with any addition you make, as of feet or of wings or something less. I found some Greek proverb 'The serpent till he has devoured a serpent does not become a dragon' and the snakes found in China and preserved in temples for adoration are called dragons in virtue of some supposed incarnation which has taken place in them, but they are and look ordinary snakes. So that if the Devil is symbolised as a snake he must be an archsnake and a dragon. Mostly dragons are represented as much more than serpents, but always as in some way reptiles. Now among the vertebrates the reptiles go near to combine the qualities of the other classes in themselves and are, I think, taken by the Evolutionists as nearest the original vertebrate stem and as the point of departure for the rest. In this way clearly dragons are represented as gathering up the attributes of many creatures: they are reptiles always, but besides sometimes have bat's wings; four legs, sometimes those of the mammal quadrupeds, sometimes birds' feet and talons; jaws sometimes of crocodiles, but sometimes of eagles; armouring like crocodiles again, but also sturgeons and other fish, or lobsters and other crustacea; or like insects; colours like the dragonfly and other insects; sometimes horns; and so on. And therefore I suppose the dragon a type of the Devil to express the universality of his powers, both the gifts he has by nature

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and the attributes and sway he grasps, and the horror which the whole inspires. We must of course remember how the Cherubim are in Scripture represented as composite beings, combinations of eagles, lions, oxen, and men, and that the religions of heathendom have sphinxes, fauns and satyrs, 'eyas-gods', 'the dog-Anubis', and so on. The dragon then symbolises one who aiming at every perfection ends by being a monster, a 'fright'.

The word Throne, one of the nine choirs, suggests that the rebel angels might claim that the sacrifice should be offered in them as living altars, not on earth or in anything earthly. Satan sets up a rival altar and sacrifice, which did not please, any more than those of Cain or of Core, and fire, as with Core, broke out from below. Whereas the manchild to whom the woman gives birth is, like a pleasing sacrifice, caught up to God's throne.

Nov. 14—And this morning I had more light on this mysterious subject. The angels, like Adam, were created in sanctifying grace, which is a thing that affects the individual, and were then asked to enter into a covenant or contract with God which, as with Adam, should give them an original justice or status and rights before God. The duties of this commonwealth were, for them, to contribute each in his rank, hierarchy, and own species, towards the Incarnation and the great sacrifice. Sister Emmerich saw this under the figure of the building of a tower: it might perhaps also be called a temple and a church. It was in fact the Church and the heavenly Jerusalem. It is also compared to a concert of music, the ranks of the angelic hierarchies being like notes of a scale and a harmonic series: the working of the commonwealth and building of the tower or temple would be like the playing on these notes, like the tune, the music. They are also compared to heavenly spheres, planetary distances, and so on; and indeed these things, music and astronomy, are compared among themselves (in the Music of the Spheres and the morning stars singing for joy)—(Dec. 13) And lastly they are compared to a pedigree, to generations; and through such a pedigree or tree of generations in some sort it is likely

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that Christ passed, taking the stead but not the true nature of a race or series of angels. Into such pedigrees or genealogies St. Paul discouraged St. Timothy from enquiring, St. Ignatius the Martyr¹ says that he could if he chose explain them, and out of them sprang the Gnostic heresies (in which the place of Sige, silence should be remarked).

The term of these generations was the victim of the great sacrifice, a victim in a material or, to speak more strictly, earthly nature. And I suppose that Christ reached this term during the time of probation, the *via* or pilgrimage, of the angels; nay instantaneously and from the first, for reasons given above. This took place by means of some dimension counter to the leading dimension of the angelic action: the matter is most recondite and difficult. At any rate I suppose the vision of the pregnant woman to have been no mere vision but the real fetching, presentment, or 'adduction' of the persons, Christ and Mary, themselves; though this need not have been known to the angels then. And I cannot help suspecting that the attack on the woman which the dragon makes was, though I cannot yet clearly grasp how, the actual attack which he made, is making, and will go on making on the human race.

But first I suppose that Christ, in his first stead of angelic being, led off the angel choir (and in this the Babylonian² and the Welsh text agree), calling on all creatures to worship God as by a kind of *Venite adoremus*. They obeyed the call, which indeed was a call into being. For what followed see at p. 96. This song of Lucifer's was a dwelling on his own beauty, an instressing of his own inscape, and like a performance on the organ and instrument of his own being; it was a sounding, as they say, of his own trumpet and a hymn in his own praise. Moreover it became an incantation: others were drawn in; it became a concert of voices, a concerting of selfpraise, an enchantment, a magic, by which they were dizzied, dazzled, and bewitched. They would not listen to the note which summoned each to his own place (Jude 6.) and distributed them here and there in the liturgy of the sacrifice; they gathered rather closer and closer home under

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Lucifer's lead and drowned it, raising a countermusic and counter-temple and altar, a counterpoint of dissonance and not of harmony. I suppose they introduced a pathos as of the nobler nature put aside for the higher and even persuaded themselves that God was only trying them; that to disobey and substitute themselves, Lucifer above all, as the angelic victim of the world sacrifice was secretly pleasing to him, that self-devotion of it, the suicide, the semblance of sin was a loveliness of heroism which could only arise in the angelic mind; that it was divine and a meriting and at last a grasp of godhead.

Meanwhile as they drew back from their appointed lots the score of their disobedience rose as in a mirror in the vision of the woman with child: she felt it as birthpangs and cried aloud. For this they despised her the more and hated the presumption of so weak a creature, not knowing the weakness was their own sin. And Lucifer who had drawn so many of the angels into his train prepared to consume, absorb, the woman's offspring too. But this hope and all their hopes of acceptance must have been dashed to the ground by the assumption and acceptance of the newborn child. Was it at this point then that they broke out into open rebellion? on which followed the war in heaven and their expulsion, which was not *ipso facto*. See against pp. 61 and 204. It was St. Michael and his angels who attacked them, not they St. Michael; it was a sort of crusade undertaken in defence of the woman in whom the sacrificial victim had lain and from whom he had risen, a sort of Holy Sepulchre and a heavenly Jerusalem, and this is perhaps the explanation of the curious construction in the Greek: 'καὶ ἐγένετο πόλεμος ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ· Μιχαὴλ καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι αὐτοῦ πολεμήσαν [Vat.: Alex. τοῦ π.] μετὰ τοῦ δράκοντος, καὶ ὁ δράκων ἐπολέμησε καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι αὐτοῦ' / And war arose in heaven; that is to say he whose name is called *Who is like God?* raised that warcry and other angels rallied to it and with that cry they declared war upon the dragon and his, and the dragon and his adherents, they raised their answering warcry (say of *Non servietus* / We will not be slaves); but it would not do, 'καὶ οὐκ ἴσχυον'. It

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would seem that their fall was at once the attack of Michael and their own act: Michael and his angels instressed and distressed them with the thought of their unlikeness to the Most High; they from their self-raised pinnacle and power of eminence flung themselves, like the sally of a garrison, with the thought of / We are like the Most High, thinking in their madness their heroism, which was the divine in them, would declare itself as the godhead and would bear them up and its splendour dismay and overwhelm their enemies; but it was a blow struck wide, a leap over a precipice, and the weight of that other word bore them headlong down.

Further I suppose that the procession or liturgy of the angelic host was to have its score upon the world of matter and the angels thus to unfold and by cooperating create the species and the order of the lower world; which in consequence is marked everywhere with the confusion, clashing, and wreck which took place in the higher one and was there repaired at once but here not all at once. If this is so and the beginnings at least of every form were in the first *move* of the heavenly hierarchy made / one can see how it was possible for Satan to attack man even before his fall, that is / before it was complete. In Cassian Germanus (Conf. 8 cap. 9) is corrected by Abbot Serenus for supposing that the temptation of Eve was the Devil's first sin and the cause of his fall. But he may have tried to destroy by violence before he succeeded in ruining by fraud.

NOTES TO THE COMMENTS ON THE SPIRITUAL
EXERCISES

309. 1. *Principium sive Fundamentum*. See note on 'The Principle or Foundation', above, p. 415. This comment is written continuously on the interleaved sheets opposite pp. 28-32 of the book described in App. I. R. The headings here and later are added to Hopkins's MS. from the printed text.
309. 2. *taste of myself*: here and all through this passage compare *Poems*, 45, and also 34.
317. 1. '*De Cogitatione*'. This long section of the commentary runs continuously on six of the interleaved sheets which have been torn out of the book, but preserved in it: they are closely written on both sides. Sheet 1 originally faced pp. 42 and 43; sheet 2 pp. 44 and 45; sheet 3 pp. 46 and 47; sheet 4 (to which Hopkins gives a special reference at the end of 3) came after the Index to the Exercises and is specially numbered as p. 220; sheet 5 and sheet 6 were the next following it, two blank sheets bound in consecutively. The General Examination of Conscience is divided into three main sections, 'Of Thoughts', 'Of Words', 'Of Deeds'.
317. 2. *fainness . . . hits it*: a marginal note in MS.
319. 1. '*Venialiter peccatur*'. An independent note let into the argument; on the paragraph: '*Venialiter peccatur, quando eadem cogitatio peccandi mortaliter venit, et homo ei praebebat aures, aliquantum et immorando, vel recipiendo aliquam delectationem sensus, vel ubi sit aliqua negligentia in rejicienda tali cogitatione.*'
322. 1. *b ill and is damned*: MS. reads 'B'.
326. 1. *stem of good*: MS. uncertain; appears to read 'stew'.
327. 1. *truer*: MS. reads 'true'.
329. 1. *the passage quoted at p. 53*: this refers to Marie Lataste, vol. ii, bk. i, §§ 15, 16. See p. 339.
332. 1. *Christ playing at me*: cf. *Poems*, 34, ll. 12-14.
337. 1. *Of this I have written . . . somewhere else . . .*: this may refer to the *Wreck of the Deutschland*, i. 8.
338. 1. '*Nolentes*'. In the First Exercise of the First Week 'The first point will be to apply the memory to the first sin, which was that of the

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- angels . . . how being created in grace, yet *not willing* to help themselves by means of their liberty to reverence and obey their Creator and Lord, they fell into pride, were changed from grace into malice . . .' (trs. Longridge, p. 56). Hopkins's note faces p. 52 of his book.
339. 1. *Secundum punctum*: 'The second point will be to do the same, i.e. to apply the three powers to the sin of Adam and Eve . . . how, after Adam had been created in the plain of Damascus . . .' (ibid.). The note faces p. 53.
339. 2. *The third Exercise* of the First Week is a repetition of the first and second Exercises, making three colloquies. 'The first colloquy addressed to our Lady, that she may obtain for me grace . . . that I may feel an interior knowledge of my sins, and an abhorrence of them; second that I may feel the disorder of my actions . . .' (ibid., p. 64). Hopkins's notes face pp. 58-9 of his edition.
341. 1. *De duobus Vexillis*. The meditation on the standards of Christ and Lucifer comes on the fourth day of the second week. The second point is 'to consider how he [Lucifer] calls together innumerable demons, and how he disperses them some to one city, some to another, . . . omitting no provinces, places, states of life, nor any single individual'. Fr. Roothaan's note concerns the fact that St. Ignatius makes no mention of the good angels. Hopkins's note faces p. 97: he has a number of other notes on this meditation.
341. 2. *De Ultima Coena*. In the first contemplation of the third week, on the Last Supper, the first point is 'to see the persons at the Supper, and reflecting on myself, to take care to derive some profit [fructum] from them'. Hopkins's note faces p. 122 of his edition: the previous interleaved page, containing the note on 'videndo locum' has been torn out and lost.
342. 1. *The Contemplation for obtaining Love* immediately follows the end of the exercises proper: Hopkins's first note (opposite p. 139) is a general introduction to it, which should be compared with *God's Grandeur* (*Poems*, 7). The second note printed is opposite p. 145 and refers to the second point: 'to consider how God dwells in . . . me . . . making of me a temple, seeing that I am created in the likeness and image of His divine Majesty.'
343. 1. *on Creation and Redemption*: this note is not properly a part of the Commentary on the Exercises at all; but it has cross-references to much of their subject-matter, was written at the same time as much of the Commentary. It is written upside down on the interleaved paper opposite pp. 31-33.
345. 1. *the mystery of the woman . . .*: see Revelation, ch. xii.

COMMENTS ON THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES

345. 2. *that Welsh text*: on the blank page opposite the beginning of the Index to his edition Hopkins has written a long Welsh quotation from the Tolo MSS.: '*Hyma Rol a Chyfrif, sef yn gyntaf y soner am a fu ar gof cyn cadw ar gyfrif, nid amgen . . .*'

349. 1. *St. Ignatius the Martyr: Epistle to the Trallians*, 5.

349. 2. *the Babylonian text*: above the Welsh text on the same page Hopkins has made an extract from *Records of the Past*, vol. vii, pp. 127, 128; Chaldean hieratic tablet, date about 600 B.C. but copied from an older one, discovered by George Smith—'The Divine Being spoke three times, the commencement of a psalm . . .' &c. down to 'And may the god of divine speech expel from his five thousand that wicked one thousand'.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

- (k) H. autograph extract from St. Bonaventure's *Life of St. Francis*, ch. ix: 'Ut autem ex omnibus . . . dulciter hortabatur'.
- (l) H. autograph tiny slip saying: 'Quid tam in voluntate quam voluntas est? (*Aug. 1 de Lib. Arb. 1. 1. c. i*)'.
- (m) Two press cuttings:
 (i) Poems *Songs of the Autumn Nights* and *The Sabbath*. No date.
 (ii) 'A Happy Christian' from *Metropolitan Tabernacle Pulpit*, pp. 99-100.
2. Found in note-book D. IX.
 (a) H. autograph extracts from *My beautiful lady*.
 (b) " transcript of *Tell me my heart*. T. Morton.
 (c) " " of *A Smile and a Sigh and Dead Hope*. Christina Rossetti.
 (d) H. autograph transcripts of *Lady Lilith*, *Sibylla Palmifera*, *Venus Verticordia*. D. G. Rossetti.
 (e) H. autograph transcript of *My mother bids me bind my hair*.
 (f) " page of odd notes on Aristotle's logic.
 (g) Notes on Sophocles' *Antigone* in unknown hand.
3. Verses *The Lady of Lynn*, initialed M.C. with note 'If you show it to anyone you must copy it out again'.

R. THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES

EXERCITIA / SPIRITUALIA / S.P. IGNATII DE LOYOLA / CUM VERSIONE LITTERALI / EX AUTOGRAPHO HISPANICO / notis illustrata / addita appendice / DE RATIONE MEDITANDI / EDITIO PARISIENSIS PRIMA / iuxta Romanam editionem quintam / [I.H.S.] / . . . 1865. An interleaved copy with notes by Hopkins between 1878 and 1885: in his Latin quotations he uses the literal, not the Vulgate text: they are printed in parallel columns with Fr. Roothaan's notes beneath. A number of the interleaved pages are torn out, of which six survive. Apart from those now printed Hopkins's longest notes are on *Poenae* opposite p. 60 and on the *De Regno Christi*, the material of which overlaps with a sermon now printed.

APPENDIX II

List of Sermons in 'Fr. Humphrey's book'

A.

- (i) For Sunday July 6 1879, Feast of the Precious Blood—to be preached at St. Clement's, Oxford pp. 1-5
 I preached this in the main again July 1, 1883 at Stonyhurst. I had only one day to prepare. I did draw up another sermon to satisfy my conscience but thought it safer to preach the above in the end
- (ii) For Sunday Aug. 10, 10th after Pentecost, at St. Clement's—*Parable of the Pharisee and Publican* (Luke xviii 9-14).
 These notes are got mainly from the sermon preached last year at Farm Street on the same gospel pp. 6-8
 Much this preached again at Clitheroe July 22 1883
- (iii) For Sunday Aug. 17 11th after Pentecost, at St. Clement's—*Cure of the Deaf and Dumb Man; Ephphetha* (Mark vii 31-37.) pp. 9-11
- (iv) For Sunday Aug. 31, 13th after Pentecost, at Worcester—the *Ten Lepers* (Luke xvii 11-19.) pp. 12-15
 In the evening I preached on the Guardian Angels, it being the feast, but have not kept the notes
- (v) For Sunday Sept. 7, 14th after Pentecost—Gospel from the Sermon on the Mount (*No man can serve two masters* etc, Matt vi 24-end), at St. Aloysius', Oxford pp. 16-19
 The next Sunday Sept. 14 at St. Clement's on the duty of hearing Mass, of which I have not found time to enter here the notes
- (vi) For Sunday Sept. 21, St. Matthew's Day, for St. Clement's and St. Giles's both—on St. Matthew's Calling (Matt ix. 9. sqq., Marc. ii 14 sqq., Luc. v. 27 sqq.) pp. 20-23
- (vii) For Sunday Oct. 5 18th after Pentecost at St. Joseph's Bedford Leigh—on the *Cure of the Sick of the Palsy* (Gospel Matt. ix 1-8.: see also Mark ii 3 sqq., Luke v 18 sqq.) pp. 24-27