

Hope and Dread in Psychoanalysis

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II

SELF IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

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Multiple Selves, Singular Self

These [more "intimate reactions"] I have always found it difficult to commit to paper—at least for the eyes of others. Perhaps I was too much of a coward: too conscious of the fragility of the individual's innermost identity; too respectful of that identity's need for and right to privacy; too accustomed to view this as a privileged inner chamber, cluttered with fragile objects, into which the clumsy finger of the outsider could not be thrust without creating breakage and havoc. I preferred, I thought, to leave all this to the novelist or the poet, whose greater brutality, in the one case, and more natural use of the allusive rather than the explicit, in the other, permitted a bolder penetration into these dangerous premises.

—George Kennon, *Sketches from a Life*

Language cannot be separated from the world, from others, and from ourselves. It is not an alien enclave that can outwit me or subvert my purpose; it is me, so that I am nearer to being myself when I am farther away—with others and among things; it is the indissoluble reciprocity of men and their struggles together embodied by the internal relations of this linguistic whole that has neither door nor window, where we can neither go in nor come out, where we are.

—Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Family Idiot: Gustave Flaubert*

The two passages serving as epigraphs for this chapter suggest sharply contrasting views of self.

George Kennon, the historian, political theorist, and diplomat, ex-

plains in the preface to his autobiographical *Sketches from a Life* that he has held back his more personal self, his "innermost identity," which he preserves in a "privileged inner chamber," protected from his readers' view. This is a view of self as layered, with a singular inner core, its exposure or concealment operating fully under the subject's control.

Sartre, the philosopher and political theorist, explains early in his biography of Flaubert that self exists in relations with others. There is no hidden chamber, nor does the subject maintain control over exposure or concealment. Self is woven into reciprocal interactions between the subject and others, particularly in the language that is the common medium for those interactions. This is a view of self as multiple and embedded in relational contexts.

These two very different ways of thinking about self also have appeared in the psychoanalytic literature of recent decades. They provide powerful and compelling frameworks for organizing clinical data. Both speak directly to the experience of patients.

ROBERT AND THE VOLCANO

Robert, a writer in his late twenties, sought analysis because of a chronic sense of inadequacy and anxieties and inhibitions with respect to sexual functioning. It was difficult for him to experience a securely anchored sense of his own sexual potency and masculinity.

At times Robert could successfully complete intercourse with a woman only with great anxiety and difficulty. He would begin to lose his erection during coitus, and could regain it only by conjuring up an image of a hypermasculine, macho type of man—sometimes drawing on the cigarette advertisement of the "Marlboro Man." (This was quite a few years ago, when cigarette smoking was not generally regarded as being suicidal, and often homicidal, in the way it is today.) Robert was worried about the possible homosexual implications of this fantasy. However, the fantasy seemed to work not by generating erotic excitement about the man but rather by making possible an identification with his imagined potency.

Robert was the older of two sons born to a couple who seemed, according to his accounts, oddly unsuited to each other. His mother was a librarian in a small, rural town in New England; his father had apparently been a ne'er-do-well, largely unemployed and alcoholic, who had abandoned the family when Robert was eight years old. Robert never saw him again and found out in his early twenties that he had died, apparently

from alcoholism. Robert and his brother were raised in relative isolation by their competent but very depressed and overprotective mother.

During the course of treatment, early memories emerged of his mother's administrations of enemas to him when he was a small boy. One memory was particularly vivid. He suffered episodically from constipation and, on this occasion, was in the bathroom trying to move his bowels. His mother had decided to administer an enema and entered the bathroom unannounced. Her eyes focused on his penis, which was resting on the rim of the toilet. He sensed her recoiling, and felt enormously ashamed. He tucked his penis underneath the rim of the toilet, as if removing the offensive organ from her view, and offered her his anus for her cleansing ministrations. We came to realize that this early memory was emblematic of Robert's chronic sense of his need to disclaim his masculinity by surrendering to his mother's powerful, encompassing, purifying care.

Consider one other bit of family life. When mother and sons would go out to dinner as a family, it was never possible for the two brothers to go to the men's room together—each would quietly slip away and return as quickly as possible. When Robert and I explored this taboo, he realized that he believed deeply that for the two boys to participate with each other in as important an activity as urinating, outside the mother's purview, in the men's room, no less, would have been exceedingly painful for her.

After several months of cautiously testing the analytic waters, Robert became intensely involved in the analysis. He began to focus on a deep and painful longing for his father, which had secretly dominated most of his life. It seemed very difficult for him to allow himself to have these feelings when around his mother, and his mother seemed to be always around (either actually, or as a kind of internal perpetual presence in his experience). He had a belief, which we traced through various manifestations throughout his development, that other men knew something, had something, that he did not, because it was never given to him by his abandoning father.

I spent considerable time exploring and questioning his assumption of an effortless communion that he assumed other men felt with each other. I frequently pointed to his tendency to disclaim his own substantial resources and actual potency, in many forms, to keep alive the hope that an ideal father would someday return, rescue him, and properly confer manhood upon him. I think partly as a result of those interpretations, there was a very dramatic and moving session in which he experienced himself as a frightened little boy and imagined crawling across the

room to lie, curled in a fetal position, at my feet. It was not long after that phase, about two years into the analysis, that he reported the following dream.

I was looking out across a great expanse of flat land—an enormous plain. Way in the distance was a big mountain, very far away. As I was looking, I noticed a wisp of smoke coming from the top of the mountain, and realized that it was a volcano. As I watched, the smoke thickened and it became apparent that the volcano was about to erupt. It was so far away that I did not feel threatened, although I was fascinated. After a while a crack appeared down the sides of the volcano, and it split in two, with the two halves falling away to reveal inside a giant ball of molten lava, reddish-orange in color. Losing its containment in the mountain, the ball began to collapse and flow down onto the plain. It was so far away that at first I still did not feel threatened, but little by little the lava began to flow across the plain in my direction. I began to get very anxious and was looking around for a way to save myself. Everything was very flat and therefore unprotected. The red-orange of the lava was a brilliant, terrifying color, which began to dominate everything. I started to panic. The dream gets hazy after this, but I think there was a man who appeared and showed me a way to escape through a woods with a stream.

We lived in that dream landscape for many months. One of the most important associative paths developed from the color in the dream, which led him back to the small bedroom he shared with his brother before the father's departure. The room was painted red-orange and was near enough to the living room to allow him to hear his parents' arguments at night when they thought the children were asleep.

As I encouraged him to enter into the feelings and textures of the dream, he uncovered a memory, undoubtedly partially a screen memory, of the particular night when his father walked out. His parents were fighting, but this fight was much more explosive. He was afraid that his father would hurt his mother; he wanted to protect her but felt impotent. He was enraged at his mother for making life so difficult for his father; he was enraged at his father for what he felt was his verbal brutalization of his mother. His father smoked cigarettes, although it is not clear whether they were Marlboros. (Remember the smoking volcano.) As Robert reconnected with those memories, he reported a sensation that our room seemed to be glowing a red-orange color. The visual image in the memory, my office, his own insides—all seemed to be joined in this glowing, smoldering, terrifying color.

How are we to think of the organization of Robert's experience of self? His tentative sense of sexual potency and masculinity? His chronic sense of weakness and inadequacy?

Is Robert's singular, true self, his innermost identity, hidden and isolated (in the volcano of his dream) under the necessity for his adaptation to his mother's worldview? The familiar sense of self that developed during his childhood feels real enough, but weakened, empty, needful of resources and sustenance. He sometimes experiences himself as layered and hidden, with a deeply buried, smoldering core.

Or is Robert's self variable, organized in different ways at different times, embedded in each of his relationships with significant others? There seems to be a smoldering rageful self, in close identification with his father's eruption. There is a passive, yielding self, longing to be penetrated and cleansed by his mother's controlling ministrations. There seems to be a disclaimed masculine self, tied to his discredited father, waiting for another, credible father to grant him his rightful place in the community of men. His self-organization, as it unfolds in the analytic process, appears as multiple patterns grounded in different, prototypical interactions with others.

Are these two approaches to self fundamentally irreconcilable, or are they integratable? This is the major question I explore in this chapter. I will return later to Robert's experience in analysis to explore different ways in which self is understood, explored, broadened, and enriched in the analytic process.

SELF IN PSYCHOANALYSIS: SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL METAPHORS

The self has been the central and most important concept in psychoanalytic theorizing of the past several decades.¹ The most striking thing about the concept of self within current psychoanalytic thought is precisely the startling contrast between the centrality of concern with self and the enormous variability and lack of consensus about what the term even means. The self is referred to variably as: an idea, or set of ideas in the mind; a structure in the mind; something experienced; something that does things; one's unique life history; even an idea in someone else's mind (Shane and Shane, 1980); and so on. Khan (1963), whose central concern has been the self, admitted that no one has defined self experience successfully (p. 303), and even Kohut, whose theory is named after the term self, acknowledged difficulty in clearly defining what he meant by it (1977, pp. 310–12.) Why is something so clinically important and affectively central so conceptually elusive, so hard to grasp?

One radical and tempting answer is that self as such does not exist, that it involves a mistaken use of language. John Stuart Mill pointed to the ease with which language can cause us trouble.

The tendency has always been strong to believe that whatever received a name must be an entity or being, having an independent existence of its own. And if no real entity answering to the name could be found, men did not for that reason suppose that none existed, but imagined that it was something particularly abstruse and mysterious. (quoted in Gould, 1981, p. 185)

One might argue, as do Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein, that the treatment of the "self" as an entity is a reification, a misuse of the reflexive pronoun referring to the person in question. "Myself," "yourself," "oneself"—these are ways of talking in which we refer back to the person concerned; perhaps taking "self" out of that context and setting it up as if it were a phenomenon in its own right is merely a trick made possible by the ambiguities of language. Perhaps contemporary psychoanalytic concepts of self are like a hall of mirrors in which distorted reflections create elaborate and fantastic images, appearing "abstruse and mysterious," out of the simple, everyday person.²

Yet activities involving "self-definition," on many different levels, have always been a central human concern, even more so for people living in our time. Sass (1988, p. 552), in surveying the contemporary intellectual scene, notes that "according to many historians, concern about the self is *the* central theme of the last several centuries of Western culture." What does it mean to be a person? What sort of persons are we? How are we connected and related to each other? This sort of self-reflection has become a preoccupying concern: on a global level, in the face of self-contamination and self-annihilation; on an international level, in the wake of astounding shifts in the way nations are positioning themselves vis-à-vis each other; on a national level, in the context of shrinking economic and political horizons; and on an individual level, in the wake of historically unprecedented shifts in social, economic, and gender roles. The central focus on self in psychoanalytic theories of the second half of the twentieth century reflects these concerns, very different from those of Freud's patients, who lived in a much more stable, hierarchicalized society.³ Psychoanalysis, as a set of ideas, a process of discovery, and a worldview, helped to create our contemporary western concepts of self. Psychoanalysis, with its languorous pace, its fascination with the textures and shadings of experi-

ence, its profound privacy, remains one of our most precious methods for understanding, protecting, and developing our sense of self, both individually and as a culture.

The diverse ways in which psychoanalysts have written about self are separable into the two different models or accounts of self advanced by Kennon and Sartre and illustrated by Robert's analysis: self as layered, singular, and continuous and self as multiple and discontinuous. These two different ways of thinking about self and mind in general are based on two fundamentally different metaphors.

There has been considerable interest in contemporary philosophy and linguistics in the way metaphor shapes understanding and experience. Concepts as vague and insubstantial as "psyche," "mind," or "self" are impossible to grasp in precise, denotative terms. We understand and come to experience them in terms of other, generally more concrete kinds of experiences and activities. (See Lakoff and Johnson, 1980.)

The view of the self as layered, singular, and continuous is grounded in a spatial metaphor: The mind is a place where things happen; the self is something in that place, which is composed of constituent parts or structures. This way of thinking comes directly from Freud. (Freud did not invent spatial metaphors for thinking about mind; they have a long history in western philosophy. (See Ryle, 1949, for an extended critique of this way of talking about mind.) In both the topographical and the structural models, Freud grounds his theorizing in a clearly defined spatial metaphor: "The hypothesis we have adopted for a psychical apparatus extended into space" (1940, p. 196). If we think about mind in terms of spatial metaphors, as if it existed in space, with structures, within a topography, then it makes sense to approach it as we would an onion, to try to locate its singular "core" or "heart," to delineate its layers, to differentiate its authentic pieces from its false, protective covering, and so on.

Some of the more careful psychoanalytic theorists have taken pains to point out that the concept of psychic structure refers not to something substantive but to recurring patterns of experience and behavior over time.⁴ Yet, in common usage, deriving from Freud's manner of talking about the psyche as occupying spaces with structural properties, the spatial metaphor pervades psychoanalytic discourse on self.⁵

The view of self as multiple and discontinuous is grounded in a temporal rather than a spatial metaphor: Selves are what people do and experience over time rather than something that exists someplace. Self refers to the subjective organization of meanings one creates as one moves through time, doing things, such as having ideas and feelings, in-

cluding some self-reflective ideas and feelings about oneself.

In *The Magic Mountain*, Thomas Mann (1927) draws a contrast between the spatial properties of bodies and the temporal properties of life (or self), anticipating the widespread current interest in narratives as the form through which self is experienced and develops.

For time is the medium of narration, as it is the medium of life. Both are inextricably bound up with it, as inextricably as are bodies in space. Similarly, time is the medium of music; music divides, measures, articulates time . . . Thus music and narration are alike, in that they can only present themselves as a flowing, as a succession in time, as one thing after another; and both differ from the plastic arts, which are complete in the present, and unrelated to time save as all bodies are, whereas narration—like music—even if it should try to be completely present at any given moment, would need time to do it in. (p. 541)⁶

People often experience themselves, at any given moment, as containing or being a “self” that is complete in the present; a “sense of self” often comes with a feeling of substantiality, presence, integrity, and fullness. Yet selves change and are transformed continually over time; no version of self is fully present at any instant, and a single life is composed of many selves. An experience of self takes place necessarily in a moment of time; it fills one’s psychic space, and other, alternative versions of self fade into the background. A river can be represented in a photograph, which fixes its flow and makes it possible for it to be viewed and grasped. Yet the movement of the river, in its larger course, cannot be grasped in a moment. Rivers and selves, like music and narratives, take time to happen in.⁷

As we explore the spatially grounded approach to self as singular, layered, and continuous and the temporally grounded approach to self as multiple and discontinuous, we will discover that their apparent contradiction actually provides a creative tension that makes possible a more complex and useful view of the place of self within experience and the transformations of self in psychoanalysis. In the following two chapters, I extend this perspective on self to the problem of the core or center of the self (chapter 5) and the ancient controversy over the nature of aggression (chapter 6).

MULTIPLE, DISCONTINUOUS SELVES

Consider the experience we have all had that is reflected in the statements “I am not myself today”⁸ or “I am not all here today.” For the

clinician, it is not just the absence that is important in that experience, but also the presence of some other experience of being. “Who are you today?” and “Where else are you?” might become important questions. The everyday observation of different organizations in our experience of ourselves, discontinuities in our sense of self, has become a crucial dimension of contemporary psychoanalytic theorizing, particularly within British object relations theories. Like most important psychoanalytic understandings, this line of thought began with Freud.

Freud’s portrayal of the relationship between the ego and the superego (in the structural model, introduced in 1923) is the original paradigm from which derives much current psychoanalytic theorizing. To highlight this link with later developments, I am going to describe the structural model in an unusual fashion, shifting from spatial to temporal terms.

We sometimes operate and/or experience ourselves as the active agent of our experience, a way that Freud called the “ego”; we sometimes operate and/or experience ourselves in a different way, taking ourselves as an object and overseeing and judging ourselves, a way that Freud called the “superego.” Our ego way of being and our superego way of being are oriented toward each other, Freud suggested, rather like a relationship between two independent people.

For Freud, the underlying motivational source of all experience derives from the formless energy of the id. Our ego way of being and our superego way of being, and their relationship to each other, develop out of the encounter between the id’s impulses and the real world and are superimposed, in Freud’s vision, like a membrane on the surface of the id. Thus, ultimately, Freud still considered the relationship between the ego and superego, a very novel way of thinking about mind, to be shaped by the need to gratify or defend against the id’s ceaseless pressures. The very purpose of mind is the discharge and/or control of that energy, and the experience of self is derivative of that function. To be a person is to struggle with powerful asocial impulses, to check, divert, or sublimate them, to reconcile them with internalized parental presences. Freud’s image of the id, drawn from Newtonian physics and Darwinian biology, remained, throughout his writings, one of raw, unstructured energy and explosive bestial passions.

The key transition to postclassical psychoanalytic views of the self occurred when theorists began thinking about the id in a different way, as structured rather than formless, as directed rather than explosive. They began to think of the repressed not as disorganized, impulsive fragments but as constellations of meanings organized around relation-

ships. Thus, they began to conceive of the id as involving a way of being, a sense of self, a person in relation to other persons, bringing it much closer in nature to Freud's portrayal of the ego and superego. (Melanie Klein, Fairbairn, Edith Jacobson, Loewald, Lacan, Otto Kernberg—all in their own ways and in their own language portray the id as a person or collection of persons in passionate relationships to other persons or parts of persons.)

Since Freud's death, in a halting, diffuse, and informal fashion, his structural model has been largely replaced (often not terminologically, but conceptually) by different versions of a relational model. Freud pictured conflict as the clash among impulses (id), regulatory functions (ego), and moral prohibitions (superego). In a growing sector of contemporary psychoanalytic thought (often connected with the term object relations theories), the joints of the mind are located at the borders between different versions of self. Conflict is now envisioned as the clash between contrasting and often incompatible self-organizations and self-other relationships.

The model of self to be found in object relations theories, in their emphasis on multiplicity and discontinuity, portrays experiences of self as inevitably embedded in particular relational contexts. Because we learn to become a person through interactions with different others and through different kinds of interactions with the same other, our experience of self is discontinuous, composed of different configurations, different selves with different others. But that is not all. There are times when I experience myself as myself in relation to a significant other—a dependent child cared for by a solicitous mother, for example. But there may be other times when I organize my experience and sense of meaning around my image of that other in relation to me (my identification with them)—for example, as a solicitous maternal figure taking care of a dependent child. Each relational configuration yields two ways of being in the world; each actual relationship may contain multiple self-organizations; and there may be many such relationships.⁹

The result is a plural or manifold organization of self, patterned around different self and object images or representations, derived from different relational contexts. We are all composites of overlapping, multiple organizations and perspectives, and our experience is smoothed over by an illusory sense of continuity. Ogden (1986) has compared the subjective sense of self as unified and continuous to the manner in which the mind weaves together the discordant visual images from our two eyes into an apparently seamless, unitary visual field. The relationships among these different versions or organizations of self are com-

plex and depend largely on degrees of conflict and issues of loyalty in the real, external relationships from which they derive.¹⁰

Variations in the use of language often provide a dramatic indication of variations in self organizations. Studies of bilingual patients suggest that, especially when one language is learned at a developmentally later point than an original language, the different languages reflect very different organizations of self. A person feels different when speaking and thinking in the language learned in early childhood; there are enormous differences in nuance, affective tone, and often access to memories, coded and filed in one rather than the other language (Foster 1992). Studies of children speaking to other children suggest that the syntax and grammatical structure of their spoken language is quite different when children are speaking to an older child than when they are speaking to a younger one (Snow and Ferguson, 1977). The language differences seem to reflect discontinuous, variously organized, developmentally sequenced versions of self.

There is some evidence to suggest that different versions of self may be not only encoded in different language systems, but that they may be accompanied by and experienced in different physiological states as well. It has been documented that the different identities in patients who suffer from multiple personalities often have strikingly different physiologies, including cardiovascular function and blood chemistry. In non-multiple personalities, different states of mind are clearly associated with different bodily states, creating complex cycles of mind/body interaction. Depression is physically enervating, slowing down activity, which in turn constricts emotional experience. Joy is invigorating, encouraging activity, which in turn makes new experiences possible. Happy versions of self are often distinctly different, both emotionally and physically, from depressed versions of self.¹¹

Is the degree of discontinuity among different versions of self a measure of the degree of psychopathology? Does the analysis and end treatment with a more unified, more homogeneous self? Certainly psychopathology might well be measured by degrees of dissociation of important versions of self. Yet it seems mistaken to assume that a digestion and blending of different versions of self is preferable to the capacity to contain shifting and conflictual versions of self. Mixing colors together does not increase their intensity or beauty; it washes them out into a featureless gray. Discontinuities in self-organization are part of what enriches life, enabling conflicted domains of experience to be developed without the pressure of continual moderation and integration.¹² (The issue of integration versus discontinuities in versions of self will be

taken up again in the next two chapters, in connection with authentic versus inauthentic experience and loving and hateful versions of self.)

Emerging from a very different context, American operationalism and the development of interpersonal psychiatry, Harry Stack Sullivan also stressed repeatedly the illusory nature of the self we ordinarily take ourselves to be—singular, unique, in control of our self-revelations and self-concealments—which he felt was at enormous odds with what we actually do with other people. In contrast to this illusory, subjective experience of self, Sullivan suggests that the same person may be quite different with different people or integrate a relationship in very different ways with the same person in different contexts. We operate, he suggests, in “me-you patterns,” never singularly, always in relation, and we tend to form very different, discrete “me-you patterns” in different circumstances. Sullivan (1938) came to regard the experience people have of possessing a unique personal individuality as essentially a narcissistic illusion—“the very mother of illusions”—in the service of allaying anxiety and distracting attention from ways in which people actually operate with others.

Thus, Sullivan too arrived at a view of self as manifold. Although we experience ourselves as transparent to ourselves and much the same person in our dealings with various other people, we are, in a fundamental sense, quite different persons at different times. Of course, in some obvious way, we are the same person; I am putting it this way to stress Sullivan’s point that at any given time we operate out of a particular way of representing ourselves to ourselves, in relation to a portrayal of a distinct sort of other with whom we are engaged—“me-you patterns.” These different forms of self-representation may be quite fully developed, cognitively and affectively, entailing a full sense of personhood, yet they are likely to be discontinuous, one from the other. We are not generally aware, Sullivan suggests, of this discontinuity.

Common to both Sullivan’s interpersonal theory and object relations theories is a view of the self as multiple and discontinuous.¹³ The interpersonal approach focuses on what people actually do with each other and the strategies they have learned for being a person with other persons. It is a view of self as action. The basic mode within the interpersonal approach to the analytic process consequently involves questions and detailed inquiry: What happened? What was the precise sequence? Who did what, when, and to whom?

The object relations approach focuses on phenomenological units, the kind of person one experiences oneself as being when one does what one does with other people. These phenomenological units are under-

stood to derive either from how one felt with a significant other in a particular context or from one’s sense of how it felt to be that other in relation to oneself. The basic mode within the object relations approach to the analytic process is, correspondingly, not so much an active inquiry but the facilitation of a kind of unraveling. The protection and timelessness of the analytic situation, the permission, or even the injunction to free associate, to disorganize, allows the sometimes smooth but thin casing around the self to dissolve and the individual strands that make up experience to separate themselves from each other and become defined and articulated.

Interpersonal theory might be regarded as a depiction of the transactional manifestations of internal object relations; or, conversely, it might be regarded as a depiction of the implicit and largely unconscious senses of self underlying interpersonal transactions. Both types of theorizing presume a multiple, discontinuous, and relational view of self.¹⁴ (Joyce McDougall [1985] has elaborated this view in her metaphor of mind as theater.)

THE SELF AS INTEGRAL AND CONTINUOUS

We began our consideration of the psychoanalytic view of self as multiple and discontinuous with the experience captured in the statement “I am not myself today.” Let us return to this statement and proceed along a different route. In this sentence, self is being represented in two different ways. There is a variable “I” that has changeable content, that feels different today from most days, and that contains different suborganizations. Yet despite the discontinuities, I still recognize all these differences as versions of a more or less invariant “myself.” I do not, even for a moment, consider the possibility that I actually have awakened as someone or (Kafka notwithstanding) something else. There is a sense of self that is independent of shifts over time, connected with the function of self-reflection, providing continuity from one subjective state to the next. I can represent that enduring sense of self as “myself” and assign it specific content, which my current experience can either match or not match, and which enables me to feel either very much “myself” or “not myself.” But even when I am not myself, I experience a continuity with previous subjective states.

This experience of self as integral and continuous also has been very much illuminated within contemporary psychoanalytic thought. Among the antecedents of this approach is William James’s notion of a central

self or a "self among selves," and Carl Jung's (1933) notion of an archetypal predisposition for people to form a singular, integrated sense of self. The most important contribution to this perspective on self in recent decades has been Kohut's self psychology, in which the effort to organize and maintain an integrated sense of self has been assigned a primary, superordinate motivational status.

Kohut does speak of subordinate selves, trapped in what he terms vertical and horizontal splits, but these are seen as quite pathological. The central thrust within mind is viewed as integrative, and that continuous line of subjective experience forms the core of the self. To Sullivan, the idea of uniqueness each of us maintains is the greatest psychological impediment to constructive living; he believes that an appreciation of our commonality with others, not our distinctness, holds the key to a richer life. In self psychology, it is not possible to connect with others in a way that is vital and alive without first being centered in and deeply connected with one's own distinctive subjectivity. In this approach to the self, the analytic process is not viewed as an unraveling. It is as if there is one thread or one voice within the textured complexity of the patient's experience that represents the patient's true subjectivity. The analyst, in her "empathic attitude," finds and mirrors that core subjectivity, and this confirmation constitutes the key therapeutic action of the analytic process.

A crucial premise in this perspective is that whatever else is going on at any particular moment in the analysis, the patient is also struggling to locate and express the center of his own subjectivity. A key feature of this self-forming and self-articulating process, in the self-psychological view, is the patient's search for long-sought healthy experiences with an Other, a perpetual effort to find a constructive bridge over developmental impasses, the search for a "new beginning." The task of the analyst is to locate and ally herself with that hopeful self-expressive, self-forming process. That constructive hope, that positive developmental striving is the voice among the others that Kohut feels needs to be found, amplified, and warmly responded to if the damaged self is to be repaired.¹⁵

Kohut was getting at something very important in the analytic process that tends to be overlooked in perspectives that emphasize the multiplicity of self. What distinguishes multiple personalities from the rest of us is precisely that in multiple personalities, there is no sense of continuity from one self-organization to the next, no recognition of a continuous, enduring subjectivity. The discontinuities are too discontinuous. Kohut was addressing the sense of self as integral and continuous

(as did Winnicott in a somewhat different language). At every moment, people create subjective meaning out of the context in which they are operating. The content of the meaning created may vary relatively widely (as organized according to different internalized object relations or "me-you patterns"); yet there is a sense that the "I" that is creating meaning today, processing and organizing experience, is a continuation of the "I" that created subjective experience yesterday and the day before. By recognizing the "I" that organizes my experience, I recognize myself as myself.¹⁶

We each have some sense of our own particular style or aesthetic or pattern of self-organization, our personal "signature" (Donald Spence, 1987), our "idiom" (Bollas, 1987). This personal sense of self is deeply private and ultimately ineffable, much easier to feel than to describe. The content I select in trying to represent my idiosyncratic patterning of experience today may be very different from the content I chose yesterday, or the way I would represent myself to myself tomorrow. Yet except for patients who suffer major dissociative states, the experiences all feel like "mine." Thus, Ernest Wolf (1991) refers to "my conviction that I am the person who was born in a certain place at a certain time as the son of the parents whom I knew and that I am the person who has had a history in which I can identify the 'I' of yesteryear as the 'I' of yesterday and, hopefully, of tomorrow" (p. 169).

Another aspect of experience closely connected with the concept of self as integral and continuous is the sense of agency. Kohut (1977, p. 99) described the self as "a center of initiative"; this continuity in action also is at the heart of the centrality Schafer (1976) assigns to "agency" in his "action language." All of us, Schafer argues, generate all aspects of our experience through our actions. Many of our actions are disclaimed, so that we feel our experience is happening to us rather than created by us. The processes of psychoanalysis unmask disclaimed actions, revealing the person as the singular agent of her experience.

It is very tricky, however, to separate out subjective from objective features in this assignment of integrity and continuity to the self as agent. It may be that I do everything that I do, but I may do certain things in a very different experiential context than I do other things. The I that does these different things is a quite different I at different times. In fact, as Ogden (1991) has argued, the very sense of being an agent who does things may be missing in more disturbed patients (living in the paranoid-schizoid position); they experience feelings and thoughts as happening to them rather than as generated by them. Over the course of treatment, the patient often learns to wrap a sense of

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agency around states previously experienced more passively. But it seems strained to assume that the self (agent) that is experienced after analysis has facilitated the integration of experiences was there, although disclaimed, all along.

Adherents of the view of the self as singular and integral sometimes claim that such an experience of self is somehow wired in human biology and develops in sequential stages. Wolf (1991), for example, argues that there is "a biologically given need of the subject to organize experience into patterns that make sense as the bedrock from which springs the emergence of the self as an organization of experience" (p. 169*n*). This assumption that the self of self psychology is biologically mandated is often connected with what is termed a developmental point of view, in which such a self unfolds in a preordained, universal sequence. (See Philip Cushman's [1991] critique of Daniel Stern's work along these lines.) Compare this claim with the following statement from the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1979) in a paper entitled, interestingly enough, "From the Native's Point of View":

the Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgement, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures. (p. 59)

To assume that there is a sequence of universal developmental needs or self-object experiences leading to a form of life consistent with our ideas about mental health is as ethnocentric as Freud's assumption, along with most other intellectuals of his day, that so-called primitive societies could be arranged in a hierarchical fashion, leading to the acme of human development—late-nineteenth-century upper-middle-class Viennese society.

In light of the previous discussion of multiple versions of self, one might argue that the feeling of continuity in self experience is thoroughly illusory. Although at any moment I may experience myself as always having been the self I am currently experiencing, the self changes continually over time. In some sense, I am never "myself" today. Yet most of us do seem to have, and perhaps need to have, such an experience of self. The experience of self as singular and constant serves an important adaptive, psychological purpose. (In nonwestern cultures, the

concept of the supraindividual, invariant group carries much of this burden.) Without a sense of self as constant and unaffected by time, as continuous and unvarying (even though from a temporal perspective it is discontinuous and continually changing), we would have no way to prioritize our goals, motives, and impulses—we would be all over the place (Minsky, 1985). So we need to feel we have an "innermost identity," as George Kennon (1989) puts it, and act accordingly, even though the content of that identity may change considerably over time; we claim and commit ourselves to some experiences and disclaim and avoid others. What may have begun as an illusion often becomes an actual guide to living by virtue of our necessary belief in it.¹⁷

SELF AS INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATE FROM OTHERS

One of the most appealing features of the view of the self as integral and continuous is its seeming separability from its interactions with others. As the excerpt from Kennon at the beginning of this chapter illustrates, Freud was not alone in thinking of the mind in spatial and topographical terms; we all have some sense of our most personal self as an entity residing deep inside us, revealed to or concealed from others at our will. The sense of intimacy with another is often forged precisely out of such revelatory experiences. It feels as if our personal self is ours in some uniquely privileged way; we control access to its protective layers and its "core"; only we know and understand its secrets. It feels as if the self is not inevitably contextual and relational but has an existence and a life that is separate and autonomous from (perhaps even, as Winnicott [1963] argues, inevitably unknown by) others. Yet the self that seems so personal and interior is, in a broader perspective, deeply embedded in relations with others.

Consider the sort of access one has to oneself. Can one experience oneself in a direct fashion, unmediated through relations with others? We cannot look at our complete physical selves directly with our own eyes: We have to rely on reflections. In some ultimate sense, we do not really know what we look like; we know how we appear in particular contexts, depending on the nature, quality, and conditions of the reflecting substance. But perhaps the self has more mobility than our eyeballs, trapped forever in their sockets. When we speak of "self-observation" and "self-reflection," does not the self stand outside itself, taking itself as its own object? Does not this capacity to objectify ourselves, to play both subject and object, establish our independence

from other people? Is it not this very possibility of establishing our own inner dialogue that serves as the grounding for the sense of privacy of the self?

Yet when one considers the categories, the basic language in which one observes and reflects upon oneself, the self as subject loses some of its seeming mobility and independence. That language derives from past interactions with others, past reflections; the very terms and categories in which we experience ourselves, in which we represent ourselves to ourselves, embody a social history, a family history, a complex interpersonal history. It has been argued that thought itself is interiorized, inhibited speech (Dennett, 1991; Ryle, 1949, p. 27), and it is not just within contemporary psychoanalytic theory but also within current thinking in neurophysiology that the individual brain and mind are regarded as organized through social interaction.¹⁸

One of the most consistent themes in the "independent group" of the British psychoanalytic world has been the deep privacy and interiority of the self: Winnicott (1963) speaks of the true self as "incognito"; Khan (1963) speaks of the "privacy of the self"; and Enid Balint (1991) considers some of the deepest forms of experience as simply unable to be organized into language, and hence ineffable. However, when it comes to the separability of the self, it is crucial to distinguish between the subjective experience of interiority and the theoretical understanding of how that experience comes about and how it operates.

Paradoxically, when we feel most private, most deeply "into" ourselves, we are in some other sense most deeply connected with others through whom we learned to become a self. Thus, Winnicott (1958) argues that the very capacity to be alone is first established in the experience of being alone in the presence of another, whose nonintrusive receptivity makes it possible for the baby to surrender to the flux of the spontaneous stream of "going-on-being."

Melanie Klein believed that we each experience the world around us as the inside of our mother's body. Recent infant research on the communication of affect between mother and infant makes it possible to think about this concept in a somewhat different way. The mother's emotions "become" part of the baby's emotional experience, supplying the tone and the contours that make up the world in which the baby lives. Thus, the child's sense of the world and its contents literally derives in no small measure from the contents of the mother's affective life. There are people whose life's project seems to be the creation of experiences that give meaning and form to affective states inherited from parents (for example, grief connected to losses before the child was

born, common in children of survivors of catastrophic tragedies like the Holocaust).

The dialectical play between self and other pertains not only to past relationships. The pragmatic requirements involved in operating as a person amid the enormous complexities of our daily lives make self-observation always a limited affair. Of course, we usually have some idea of what we are up to, but it is very difficult to become aware of and articulate the complex array of our motives and concerns. It is not uncommon for people to have a sense that they do not fully know what happened in some complex interpersonal situation and that they do not as fully know "themselves" until they have had a chance to "process" the events in an intimate relationship with someone else. This is partly because awareness often comes from the opportunity to put inchoate feelings into words; partly it is the chance to overcome subtle, inevitable self-deceptions. The opportunities for what Sullivan termed "selective inattention" are too great for people to slide through complex experiences by translating events into old categories. It is too easy to collapse new situations into recurrent scenarios in which one always turns out to be one's fondest version of hero, victim, or perhaps both. Psychoanalysis with another person is a very different experience from self-analysis, no matter how faithfully attempted. It is often not until the other person's participation is felt—the questions, feedback, skepticism, support—and the participation of the other breaks up the facile, habitual categories in which one's own experience is automatically packaged, that one arrives at a richer, fresher sense of oneself. Is the self-understanding before such a conversation more "personal" than the self-understanding arrived at through dialogue? That which is most deeply personal is often arrived at only through interaction. It was not there and revealed through mirroring; it was created through dialogue.

There is another important sense in which the very nature of self is necessarily dialectical and interpersonal. Self-definition always implies definition of others. In the very process in which I decide "This is me. This is the sort of person I am," I am delineating and deciding the sort of person I am not. Thus, the self is defined and experienced largely through contrasts and in relation to others. Children define themselves vis-à-vis parents; siblings define themselves vis-à-vis each other; men and women shape their gender identities vis-à-vis images of the so-called opposite sex; one defines oneself in the present vis-à-vis images of the past and future, developmentally earlier and later selves (Greenberg, 1991). "I" always implies "you," in the same way that "light" implies "dark" or defining "day" implies a definition of "night." The self forms

itself through processes of inclusion and exclusion: "This is me." "This has always been me." "This is no longer me." As one moves through time, one selects different content, including some, excluding others. Self and not-self are created in the same process, and not-self becomes others. Jung's (1933) concept of the "shadow" refers to the inevitable counterpoints and exclusions that accompany self-formation. Inclusion and exclusion are characterized in a different sense in the Kleinian depiction of introjection and projection, taking in and extruding. We are often involved, in our experience of others, with discovering and enjoying in them or revealing and controlling in them aspects of ourselves that have been underdeveloped and/or disallowed.

Experience is never completely communicable to or knowable by another. The mind is extremely complex, and therefore revelation and recognition are always highly selective processes. In that sense, the self, although formed continually in a relational field, is always in some sense immutably and profoundly private. Further, we generally spend most of our time being conscious; not self-conscious, being aware of ourselves as an ongoing process, without objectifying ourselves in an active effort to grasp or understand or communicate. Bromberg (personal communication) refers to a sense of "interiority," which derives "from being conscious of oneself without thinking about oneself." The capacity to take oneself for granted derives from experiences with others; it is the kind of experience one may have in the presence of others; yet it is impossible ever to represent or communicate the texture or contours of these most private dimensions of experiences to others.

The experience of the self as distinct and separable from relations with others—the "individual's innermost identity," as Kennon (1989) puts it—is a central feature of human subjectivity, at least as it is lived within western culture; it is, perhaps, a psychological necessity. Yet contemporary psychoanalytic theorizing has expanded our understanding of the relational and temporal context within which that phenomenology takes place, and that expanded, enriched vision of the ground of personal subjectivity is part of what the patient gains from the analytic process.

MULTIPLE SELVES, INTEGRAL SELF

The portrayals of self as multiple and discontinuous and of self as integral, continuous, and separable seem to be at odds, mutually exclusive. They are not. People act both discontinuously and continuously; people

organize their experience into both multiple and integral configurations. Any given piece of experience can be looked at and felt both in terms of a particular relational context, a particular self/other integration and, at the same time, in terms of a larger, variegated, singular process that forms itself into different patterns at different times. At any given moment, a person operates out of a particular relational context (internally and/or interpersonally); at the same time, that very version of self contributes to the shaping of a continuous sequence of experience that has its own distinctive characteristics. Thinking about self in temporal as well as spatial terms makes it possible to account for both continuities and discontinuities as they appear, disappear, and reappear over time.¹⁹

Think of self as operating like cinematic film, composed of discrete, discontinuous pictures that, when run together, create something very much continuous and integral. Of course, with both film and selfhood, in a literal sense the experience of "motion" and continuity is an illusion. Yet this is an extremely dull and misleading literalness. The "illusion" creates an experience that has a powerful subjective richness of its own, creating a larger, "moving" picture, very different from (and much more than) the simple sum of the discrete pictures. Each frame is both a discrete, discontinuous image and a subunit of a larger, continuous process that takes on a life of its own. The most interesting feature of contemporary psychoanalytic perspectives on self is precisely the creative tension between the portrayal of self as multiple and discontinuous and of self as integral and continuous.²⁰

Psychoanalysis fosters experiences of self as both an array of multiple, discontinuous relational configurations and as an integral, continuous process. The analyst implicitly or explicitly asks the patient, "How do you experience yourself today, in this particular transference-countertransference situation? Don't worry about yesterday; don't bother with tomorrow. Don't concern yourself with explaining it or reconciling it; let's just trace its outlines and learn its ways." It is precisely the timelessness of the analytic situation that fosters the unraveling and makes learning about and connecting with multiple self configurations possible without having to account for oneself in the way one has to in ordinary life. The suspension of time and continuity in each individual analytic session allows the patient to find herself in the phenomenological "space" of the moment.

Yet the analyst, whatever else she is struggling with in terms of her own reactions and feelings, also attempts to hold on to the content of the sessions over time. The analyst accompanies the patient at each moment in the various ways of generating their own subjectivity. It is that

experience over time that helps generate a sense of the self as functionally dependable across discontinuities.

One of the great benefits of the analytic process is that the more the analysand can tolerate experiencing multiple versions of himself, the stronger, more resilient, and more durable he experiences himself to be. Conversely, the more the analysand can find continuities across his various experiences, the more he can tolerate the identity diffusion entailed by containing multiple versions of self. The analyst helps to enable him to find and recognize himself when he is experiencing and behaving "out of character," and it is that re-cognition that opens up the possibility of a more complex, richer experience. Robert captured this process in an ironic quip in the middle of his analysis. He had come to treatment with many sexual and social inhibitions, and now, quite some time later, he reported going up to a woman on a train, managing to meet her, and securing her phone number. "And that," he noted emphatically, "is precisely the kind of thing I do not do."

Satisfaction and the relative richness of life have a great deal to do with the dialectic between multiplicity and integrity in the experience of self, the balance between discontinuity and continuity (Harris, 1991; Dimen, 1991). Where there is too much discontinuity, there is a dread of fragmentation, splitting, dislocation, or dissolution. (Sullivan, 1958, spoke of a dread-filled dimension of experience he termed the "not-me.") Where there is too much continuity, there is a dread of paralysis and stagnation. Meaningful hope is often generated in analysis precisely when a sense of continuity begins to emerge from within disconnected fragments of experience or when a compulsive, rigid character armor melts into a new freedom to discover the self in different forms.

Parallel to the development of the experience of self is the experience of others. This also involves a dialectic between multiplicity and singularity. Earlier developmental theorizing portrayed the infant as swamped by multiple, discontinuous images of the mother, forming a consistent sense of "object permanence" only slowly over time. Some more contemporary authors suggest that the infant is capable of perceiving both self-invariants and invariance in others from the earliest months (Daniel Stern, 1985). Yet both young children and adults have difficulty throughout life reconciling different experiences of others, different "sides" of caregivers and other significant others. Not necessarily on a cognitive or perceptual level, but rather on a deeper emotional level, children have very different and often discontinuous images of those closest to them: angry father, gentle father, excited father, and so on. In one sense, these are all the same father; in another sense, these are

quite different fathers, and will always remain so. From the earliest interactions between infant and caregiver to the complex relationships between adults, experiences of others, like experiences of self, operate in a perpetual dialectic between multiplicity and integrity, change and continuity.

RETURNING TO ROBERT

What does the patient need to learn about himself in analysis? How will the analytic process make that learning possible? What sorts of participation are required by the analyst? How do different ways of understanding self translate into different forms of analytic engagement?

Robert's capacity to sustain a positive sense of himself as effective and powerful was compromised as a result of chronic interpersonal deprivation in early experiences with both parents. His mother was able to tolerate in her sons no independent viewpoint or source of initiative. We came to understand his early memory of the enema as emblematic of this central feature of his relationship with his mother. If he could conceal his active sexuality, his potency, his manhood, his sense of his own autonomy, his mother would take him over and nestle him in her protective care. His father offered no compelling alternative to Robert's efforts to find his own voice, to ground his own experience in a subjectivity that was uniquely his. The father seemed to have totally abandoned the boy and offered no refuge. He was interested only in his own autonomy, which he gained at the cost of destroying everything that Robert loved.

Robert was easily bruised and very vulnerable to feeling unprotected and endangered. One important dimension of his experience in analysis was the discovery and belief in the voice within the complex textures of his experience that was forced go underground, to conceal its rightful claims. My participation as analyst included helping him find and value that voice, through a sustained and detailed exploration of his feelings, his fantasies, his ideas. From this perspective (along self-psychological lines), analysis helped Robert reclaim a sense of centeredness, continuity, and integrity of experience.

Robert also needed to learn that what he experienced as his separate, distinct self is actually composed of complex forms of being with others. In continually reconstructing a sense of himself as weakened and in need of purification and bolstering, he was perpetually resurrecting his mother's protective care and reassuring her that he had not left the do-

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main of her power. In his passive surrender to others to whom he attributed great power, he was maintaining a sense of his own connection both to the enema-bearing mother and to the powerful but dangerous father, whose return he was continually longing and preparing himself for. In maintaining his rage in a distant, smoldering container, he was protecting his tie to his father from the fearful, leveling intrusion of his mother (and his tie to her) and, at the same time, protecting his mother (and his identification with her) from both himself and his father. In recreating painful, unsatisfying relationships in his current life, he was enacting his devotion to both parents, "exciting objects" who seemed to promise a great deal but who always managed to remain unsatisfying and unresponsive.

From this perspective (along the lines of object relations theory, especially Fairbairn's), Robert needed to loosen the tight constraints within which he experienced himself, to hear the echoes of other voices, to feel other presences of earlier selves and earlier experiences of others. He needed to be able to surrender his hold on the misleading, apparent continuity of his experience, to discover its discrete and discontinuous subplots and worldviews. My participation helped him feel safe enough to unravel, to suspend continuity, to discover the hidden worlds embedded in his experience.

A very crucial dimension of Robert's analysis was learning about his tendency to draw others into repetitive enactments of his early relationships with his mother. He engaged others in a way that suggested a very discerning activity on his part, drawing on his own considerable intelligence and resources. His entire focus came to be on the other's beliefs, values, expectations. A subtle but pervasive molding of his own experience around the other was accomplished, which left out his own self-direction and also fueled and perpetually replenished his considerable resentment toward others. He ended up experiencing himself as passive, weak, at the mercy of the other's expectations, as if he were simply being dominated by virtue of some chronic weakness on his part. Other people, including me, tended to become controlling in either a misguidedly benign or sometimes malicious fashion.

From this perspective (along the lines of interpersonal psychoanalysis), Robert needed to come to appreciate that he was much more effective than he knew. He needed to become intrigued by the highly complex although unwitting fashion in which he enacted situations from his past, selected an appropriate supporting cast, taught them their roles, and reviewed and reported on events to himself always along pre-selected lines. He needed to become a skeptical detective in pursuit of

his own operations. My participation included a modeling of that appreciative/skeptical inquiry.

A final but extremely important dimension of Robert's analysis was the development of his appreciation of his projective use of others as a vehicle for managing his own experience. He had great difficulty in consciously owning the more spontaneous, more sexual, and more aggressive dimensions of himself, all of which seemed extremely dangerous. He feared becoming fully immersed in his own sexuality or aggression for fear that he, like his father, would destroy the world and damage his mother, which he both wanted to do and also desperately did not want to do. He experiences these disowned aspects of himself in others and then tries to control these qualities in them by controlling and distancing them. Thus, it seemed much safer for him to experience power, potency, and aggression in others to whom he could passively surrender, and thereby control, than to contain these feelings within the borders of his own sense of self.

From this (Kleinian) perspective, Robert needed to discover the permeability of the boundaries between his experience of self and others and to appreciate what is often the exchangeability of the contents assigned to each. He needed to understand that what he was drawn toward and repulsed by in the Marlboro man, the analyst, and others were disclaimed and undeveloped aspects of his own experience. My participation included an illumination of these processes, both through interpretive description and through efforts to delineate, understand, and work out of the roles Robert and I alternatively enacted.

Consider these different dimensions of Robert's analysis with respect to the dialectic between multiplicity and integrity of self experience. The interpretive work on Robert's quest for an ideal father, played out in his actual relationships and in his manipulation of fantastic images in his mind, revealed an experience of self as helpless and profoundly dependent on me, the analyst. The expression and containment of that experience in the analytic relationship, in turn, seemed important in allowing him access to a very different version of himself—explosive, dangerous, and powerful—which the dream prefigured. That previously inaccessible internal domain, in turn, became the space in which we now worked (as the color of the lava, the color of his memory, became the color of the analytic room). Intrapsychic becomes interpersonal; interpersonal transforms intrapsychic, in a perpetual cycle of expansion and enrichment. New versions of self emerge and are embellished; an ongoing sense of self as more resilient, variable, and dependable is established.

An additional feature of the analysis was a loosening of the uni-

dimensional images Robert had maintained of both his parents. His convictions about both his mother's power and intolerance of his autonomy and his father's neglect and abandonment—these were all convictions that Robert had come to have an investment in. They sustained his subjective world as he had constructed and maintained it. The images of others he constructed and controlled in his reenactments of these dynamics with others were partially a product of his projections. As he became more able to contain other ways of experiencing himself, he came to be able to tolerate other dimensions of his parents and important people in his current life. Over the course of the analysis, other features of both parents emerged.

In every analysis, the analyst participates in a variety of ways, which lead to different sorts of experiences of self in the analysand. These forms of participation entail the use of language in different ways. These contrasts are not distinct and mutually exclusive; there are subtle, tonal emphases deriving from the very different purposes to which language can be put.

In the kind of inquiry emphasized by the interpersonal analyst, language serves to clarify, to articulate distinctly, to illuminate.²¹ In the "empathic stance" developed within self psychology, "understanding" assumes priority over "explanation," and language serves not to illuminate but to convey a sense of accompaniment, an "attunement"; the goal is not clarity or detail but the sense of "being-with" the other.²² In the form of participation that facilitates the unraveling of the multiple versions of self, as suggested by many object relations authors, language has a distinct and somewhat different function—neither to illuminate nor to accompany, but to establish and embellish a resonance with dimly felt, often developmentally earlier self-organizations. Here the aim is to use language to evoke original feeling states and earlier versions of self in relation to significant others. In this case, the evocative use of language dissolves its consensual dimensions to allow hidden resonances to be heard.²³

Although one or another form of participation tends to be stressed by each school of analysis, most practicing clinicians find themselves interacting with their analysands in quite different ways at different times, facilitating a broad range of experiences. Of course, different types of patients with varying forms and degrees of psychopathology require very different weightings in the way these experiences are balanced. Subtle shifts are made all the time, from clarifying, to accompanying, to evoking.

I want to stress that I do not think these shifts tend to be made through conscious, deliberate choices by the analyst—nor should they be. Rather, analysand and analyst draw each other into patterns of interaction whose constructive and destructive, novel and perseverative features can be sorted out and understood only slowly over time (Gill, 1982a; Hoffman, 1987a; Levenson, 1983; Racker, 1968).

New forms of experience of self cannot be taught to the analysand in didactic fashion. Rather, they are learned only by being lived in, through participation in the psychoanalytic process, in a variety of different ways: through the analyst's interpretations, curiosity, and other features of a distinctly analytic presence; through the atmosphere created by the structure of the analytic situation; through the profound form of intimacy created and protected by the structure of the analytic relationship; and, finally and perhaps most important, through the model of the analyst's sense of herself, in the countertransference, as a container of multiple versions of self, providing a vehicle for understanding the manifold intricacies of relatedness.²⁴ It is here that the revolution in theory (What does the patient need?) and the revolution in metatheory (What does the analyst know?) most fully converge—in the analyst's use of her own participation in the process to facilitate an enriched sense of personal subjectivity in the analysand.

Nowhere is the inadequacy of the medical model approach to psychoanalysis more apparent than when one considers the experience of self that is generated by the analytic process. This is not a return to "normality," some premorbid standard of health, but rather a form of being, an appreciation of one's own subjectivity, that has its own unique qualities. Nor do I think it sufficient to designate what the analysand gains in terms of a particular function, such as a capacity for self-observation or self-reflection or self-analysis. Rather, psychoanalysis, at its best, makes possible a more variegated experience of self: Past and present, fantasy and actuality, interpenetrate each other; the phenomenology of the self as independent and separable is illuminated by an awareness of the self's embeddedness within a relational matrix; the experience of the self as layered in space is expanded by an appreciation of the self as continually regenerated in time; and an appreciation of the multiplicity within the integrity of self-organizations enriches the tapestry of subjective experience.

It is a great irony of the psychoanalytic experience that, in some respects, the patient is actually less known at the end of analysis than at the beginning (Graham Bass, personal communication). Early on, the patient's sense of who he is is reductively collapsed and stereotyped: the

self as heroic, the self as monstrous, and so on. Much of the analysis involves a slow and painstaking revelation and articulation of these configurations, in the process of which the patient comes to feel very deeply and profoundly known indeed. At the end of analysis, the patient's ways of representing himself to himself tend to be much more fluid, complex, subtly textured. He experiences himself in many more ways than can be conveyed in the three or four or five analytic sessions per week. He becomes aware of how highly selective the presentation of self within analysis really is. The freedom and loneliness of that realization are an important part of termination.

5

True Selves, False Selves, and the Ambiguity of Authenticity

His desire to set a beginning to the chain of events to which he belonged encountered the same difficulty that it always does: the fact that everybody has a father, that nothing comes first and of itself, its own cause, but that everybody is begotten and points backwards, deeper down into the depths of beginnings, the bottoms and the abysses of the well of the past.

—Thomas Mann, *Joseph and His Brothers*

Revelation is addictive because the pursuit of the esthetic—at the expense of the accurate—is essentially coarsening. Ordinary, fragmentary truth, on a more modest scale, appears by contrast trivial and inadequate—appears, in short, untrue, since it so conspicuously lacks the splendor and intensity of feeling by which one has come to recognize the validity of revelations. In this way one's assumptions about truth fasten on the revelatory, and this habit of discovery quickly becomes addictive.

—Leslie Farber, *Lying, Despair, Jealousy, Envy, Sex, Suicide, Drugs, and the Good Life*

The major influences on Freud's thought include not only the rationality of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, which laid the philosophical foundation for the modern scientific worldview, but also the powerful romantic vision of nineteenth-century poets and painters. Central to the vision of the latter was a call for the shedding of the trappings of civi-

lization and a return to the power and immediacy of the "natural" world. For Freud (1940), the embodiment of the "natural" world in man is the "id," where he locates the instincts, at the core of the self; they represent "the true purpose of the individual organism's life. This consists of the satisfaction of its innate needs" (p. 148); the ego and the superego are secondary formations, social adaptations, formed on the surface of the id. For Freud, an understanding of the body-based instincts makes psychoanalysis a "depth" psychology, grounded in the most central, most "primitive" wellsprings of the individual.

The commitment of many contemporary analysts to Freud's drive theory is based on their belief that only by appreciating drives can the deepest understanding of the individual be found, underneath the more superficial, cultural, adaptive overlays. Just as society requires us to wear clothing to cover our physical nakedness, social necessities create layers of regulatory and defensive adaptations to cover our true animal motives and nature. Robert Waelder's (1960) homage to what he called the "imperative, majestic, power of Trieb" (p. 98) is emblematic of the elemental and elevated primacy attributed to the drives.

From this viewpoint, by abandoning the theory of drives, various relational theories, including self psychology, interpersonal psychoanalysis, and some versions of object relations theories, have lost the basis for an understanding of the individual in any depth. They have given up the tools for exploring true, passionate, authentic individuality, in contrast to the more superficial, shallow, interpersonal, and social overlays. In fact, many European analysts see the movement away from an exclusive focus on drives in contemporary American Freudian theory, exemplified by ego psychology, as an abandonment of the individual, personal depths of human experience, a denial of the unconscious. The call for a "return to Freud" and much of the contemporary loyalty to classical theory derive from the concern that the increasing emphasis on relational factors in recent psychoanalytic theorizing threatens to eliminate the personal, the uniquely individual, which Freud located in the body-based, sexual, and aggressive impulses of the presocial id.¹

Where is the core of the self within a relational perspective? This is a real problem. As we saw in the last chapter, in most relational theorizing (consistent with most contemporary infancy research as well as with contemporary linguistics) it is assumed that the self cannot exist in isolation. The very capacity to have experiences necessarily develops in and requires an interpersonal matrix, and the organization, the patterning of all experiences is an extremely complex product of the interactions between the baby (with its temperamental sensitivities and thresholds) and

the semiotic and interactive styles of the caregivers. There is no experience that is not interpersonally mediated. The meanings generated by the self are all interactive products.²

But where is the center, the heart, the core of the individual in such a perspective? How can we find a place in the self where the individual qua individual might be thought to begin or reside? With the relational emphasis on attachment, interpersonal relations, identifications, and so on, how can psychoanalysis fail to become a form of sociology or social learning theory in which the individual is viewed as a product of the social environment? If there are no body-based drives to represent "nature" at the intrapsychic core of the individual, how does psychoanalysis retain its most important and precious legacy as an instrument for inquiry into the depths of personal experience? The distinction between the true self and false, between the superficial and the more deeply felt, between conformistic adaptations and the more truly personal, between the authentic and the inauthentic: These distinctions are crucial to the analytic enterprise, and they seem to require that we locate the core or center of the self for use as a reference point.

THE SEARCH FOR THE CORE

There have been various attempts to deal with this problem instead of retaining Freud's outmoded concept of drives as preexperiential, pre-linguistic archaic, phylogenetic residues.

One strategy has been to grant primary importance to the body, its parts and processes, and particularly to infantile bodily experiences, yet without Freud's notion of "drives." Why would the body be important if not for drives? There might be many reasons. Schafer, whose identity as a Freudian despite his disavowal of drive theory is based largely on the importance he places on infantile sexuality and aggression, believes that infantile body parts and experiences are the cognitive paradigms for organizing all experience (1978, p. 196). Our early life is dominated by powerful and absorbing physical events—eating, urinating, defecating, arousal, quiescence—and these events and processes become the basic categories, the underlying metaphors through which all subsequent experience is patterned.

This approach makes possible an interesting and valuable reinterpretation of Freudian and Kleinian concepts of instincts from energetic into cognitive and linguistic terms, and characterizes some of the most important contemporary contributions to psychoanalytic theorizing. (See

Ogden [1986, 1989].) Yet it does not help solve our problem of locating the core of the self. Freud thought that body parts and processes are represented directly and invariably in experience; that the ego is first and foremost a body ego; and that "anatomy is destiny." This made sense within the context of drive theory, because the bodily tensions drive the mental apparatus, because instinctual experiences are the sole motivational energy for the mind, and because the self as a whole is derivative of and superimposed upon the vicissitudes of body-based drives. But if we eliminate drive theory as a motivational substructure, how do we understand the *meaning* that body parts and experiences take on for the individual? They must derive to a significant degree from the mutually regulatory, interpersonal, linguistic, and cultural matrix into which the individual is born.

In most relational approaches, in contrast to drive theory metapsychology, it makes no sense to talk about raw bodily experience, which is subsequently controlled or regulated through cultural processes. As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980), who have made important recent contributions to our understanding of the metaphorical structure of language, argue:

what we call "direct physical experience" is never merely a matter of having a body of a certain sort; rather, *every* experience takes place within a vast background of cultural presuppositions. It can be misleading, therefore, to speak of direct physical experience as though there were some core of immediate experience which we then "interpret" in terms of our conceptual system. Cultural assumptions, values, and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place upon experience as we choose. It would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural through and through, that we experience our "world" in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself. (p. 57)

It is also true that individuals experience culture through their own bodies. In that sense, all experience is also bodily through and through. The cultural input can sometimes be factored out, because it appears across individuals and its transmission is often visible and apparent, as in a particular cultural value system, such as American individualism or Victorian attitudes toward sexuality. Bodily experience only becomes known in necessarily social experience with others, and the very terms and categories through which it becomes known are shaped by linguistic and social experience. Thus, there is no way to ascertain what it is

like to have a male as opposed to a female body, apart from a particular culture and its gender definitions within which the meanings of those bodies are shaped.³

The physical structure of the body probably provides constraints on body-based elaborations of meaning. The penis probably lends itself to a somewhat different, although overlapping, array of possible meanings and metaphors than either the clitoris or the vagina, although this is impossible ever to really determine. Within the framework of drive theory it made sense to think one could separate out the universal from the socially elaborated in bodily experience and assign the core of the individual to the former. Without the presumption of primary drives as the underlying motivational push, it makes no sense to think about the distillation of a pure, "natural" dimension of experience.

Another way to relocate the importance of the body within a relational framework is to argue that intense bodily happenings—such as sexual arousal, orgasm, eating, defecating, perhaps rage—have a pre-emptive physical claim and explosive power that inevitably places them at the core of personal experience. This is a very useful approach, but once again, it does not help us with the problem of locating a core self.

In Winnicott's writings, for example, the self is derived from interactions between the baby and the mother. "Instinctual experiences" (the phrase Winnicott often uses for intense bodily events, which has very little to do with Freud's drive theory) can facilitate and vitalize the self, but they also can operate totally outside it. Winnicott warns that the baby can be "fobbed off" by a good feed. What does that mean? The self does not develop out of instinctual experiences such as feeding but rather out of the subtle dialectic of maternal responsiveness. If feeding occurs in the context of good-enough mothering, it becomes a vehicle for growth of the self. If the mothering is inadequate, the power of the feeding experience actually detracts from self-development. The meaning of the bodily event depends on its position vis-à-vis the self.

There are people who experience sexual desire, or hunger for food, as a welcome sign of vitality. Others experience desire as a toxic impingement. Still others have no idea at all when they might be desirous of sex or food but decide by the clock. Finally, others never seem to experience desire or hunger at all. The location of experiences of anger or rage in relation to the self is similarly crucial; anger can vitalize, intrude upon, or deplete the self. The meaning of these bodily events, the psychological significance they contain regarding self, derives not from their inherent properties but from the way early relational patterns have structured them vis-à-vis the self. Such physical experiences cannot represent the

core of the self, since they operate rather as vehicles to self experience, in either authentic or inauthentic ways.

Another aspect of constitutional, bodily factors—temperament—has been similarly recently appropriated as a route to finding the core of the self. In their eagerness to jettison the concept of innate drive, early relational theorists often wrote as if all babies were the same and as if the course of development derived purely from environmental input. Critics now correctly argue that babies are quite different from each other and that these temperamental differences have major implications for development. These differences have been amply demonstrated empirically over the past several decades, and recent models of infant-mother interactions stress the “fit” or lack thereof between particular mothers and particular babies. Bollas (1991) has explored and extended this factor in stressing the importance of constitutionally based temperamental differences leading to a particular personality style or personal “idiom” and to a sense of “destiny.”

Differences in temperament, although extremely important, are nevertheless a problematic place to locate the core of the self. Temperament is not in any obvious sense motivational, and it is not represented directly in experience. The experience and meaning of temperamental differences are interpreted, often through identifications and counteridentifications. What is “high energy” in one family is hyperactivity in another. What is “sensitivity” in one family is weakness and inadequacy in another. Temperamental factors, like bodily configurations and processes, can be used by the self to fill out and represent various self-expressions and self-definitions. But they do not in themselves lead to particular forms of self-formation outside of complex social interaction.⁴

There have been other attempts to search for a new locus of individuality apart from the body per se, but located in very early experience. In the place previously occupied by Freud’s id, Kohut (1977) puts a pre-programmed “destiny”; Guntrip (1969) places a regressed, schizoid baby; Winnicott designates a creative omnipotence; and so on. Each theorist wants to divide the content of the self, to cut up the pie into socially negotiated segments and something else, which exists prior to social interaction and which can be considered the core of the self.

This approach is closely connected with a linear perspective on development and developmental arrests. The infant is presumed to begin life with a whole, or integral, self, at least in potentiality; that self is either facilitated by the human environment or blocked and thwarted in some fashion. If the self is blocked, the potential for authentic experience is

frozen at that developmental point, and a reanimation of the true self is possible only through a regeneration of those developmental needs. One artifact of this strategy for locating the core of the self outside of and prior to the relational field is that it leads to a regressive cast in theorizing. Earlier is presumed to be somehow more primary, more personal, more “primitive,” as if the core of the individual existed preverbally, even pre-experientially before the infant encountered others.

One way in which this sort of developmental approach is framed is to speak of the self of the child-to-be as existing in potentiality in the infant and intuited and reflected by the mother (Kohut, 1977; Loewald, 1960). I have no problem with this notion if it is understood that the child has many potentialities with respect to self-development and that the one intuited by the mother is regarded as also partially a reflection of her own subjectivity.⁵ The father, after all, may very likely intuit a quite different child in potential. In fact, it is precisely because the mother’s child is somewhat different from the father’s child that conflict between different organizations of self is generated so universally. Thus, to speak of the core of the self as existing in potentiality is to beg the question. Either it exists in already organized fashion and unfolds in a receptive environment—a notion I find implausible—or unorganized, temperamental differences that exist are organized and selected through interaction with caregivers. This brings us straight back to the problem of locating the core of the self.⁶

TEMPORALITY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CORE

In the last chapter I suggested that the apparent contradiction between a view of self as multiple and discontinuous and a view of self as integral, layered, and continuous was due to the tendency to employ reified spatial metaphors in thinking about self. We saw that regarding self in temporal as well as spatial terms was helpful in establishing a constructive dialectic between these two lines of theorizing.

Thinking about self in temporal terms also is helpful in providing a fresh look at the problem of locating the core or “true” center of the self. The common subjective sense of depth, or plumbing a core to one’s self, is created through the spatial metaphor, and arises at any particular moment in time when experience is generated in a more spontaneous fashion, less focused on externality. If conceptualized in objective terms, however, this project is necessarily ill-fated and futile. Subjective experience is an important but not infallible guide (as discussed in chapters 2

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and 3) to generating the most helpful understanding of the factors that make those subjective experiences possible. Thinking about self in terms of time rather than space provides a more useful way of approaching the important issue that the search for the core of the self was meant to solve—the need to distinguish among degrees of authenticity in experience.

All the strategies for theorizing about the “true” or “core” self that we have considered employ, explicitly or implicitly, a spatial metaphor in their attempt to locate the elemental and essential from the superficial features of the self, to locate its center or foundation. They want to get underneath the adaptations that the self has made in its negotiations with others, to get at its beginnings, its true, presocial essence. This search for a core is what continues to make Freud’s id and its romanticization of a pure, animal nature so compelling.

But if the self moves in time rather than exists in space, it has no fixed core. Rather, it has many different ways of operating. The pursuit of an invariant core or true self entails a removal of self from time, a misguided effort to make the shifting organizations of self experience static. As I mentioned earlier, spatial metaphors capture the sense of self at particular moments, like a snapshot of a river. But any effort to fix a core to the river, as one can determine the center of a snapshot, is doomed to fail.

Daily clinical work entails comparisons among different versions of self: Some seem spontaneous and constructive, some tortured and hidden; some more truly expressive of the individual, some a strategic adaptation for defensive purposes. How does an account of self as temporal make possible the necessary comparison among these different versions of self?

Some of the ways in which I operate and express myself I consider more “authentic,” more important to or representative of “me” than others. Although these are difficult discriminations, we are all involved in making them a good deal of the time. At times I feel more “myself” than others, feel I have presented my thoughts and feelings accurately and succinctly, been comfortable enough to allow myself to reveal more of my spontaneous repertoire. At other times I feel less “myself,” jumbled, unable or unwilling to make myself clear, too awkward or too constrained to reveal myself in anything but a stereotyped or constricted fashion. We all operate in this range of possibilities. The extreme form of inauthenticity is deliberate lying. When I am lying, I am misrepresenting my feelings or events and am being less authentic than when I am trying to represent myself and events more accurately.

In differentiating authenticity from inauthenticity, the crucial difference lies not in the specific content of what I feel or do but in the relationship between what I feel and do and the spontaneous configuration

and flow of my experience at that point in time. A particular act or self-expression—a piece of self-revelation, for example, or a sexual overture—may feel extremely authentic at one point and extremely inauthentic at another. In the first case, it feels “right,” suits both the external, interpersonal context and the internal emotional context. In the second case, it feels “off,” forced, contrived, out of “sync” interpersonally, internally, or both. The degree to which an act or feeling represents or misrepresents the personal self depends not on its content (not on what is in it) but on its place in the context and configuration of experience as it is continually organized, disorganized, and reorganized in time.

In using the terms authentic and inauthentic, are we not measuring our experience against some implicit standard, some preconceived idea of what is “me”? Do these terms also not imply a “core” or “true” or “real” me that exists somewhere (smuggling back the spatial metaphor)? No. One has a sense of one’s experience over time. One can measure a new experience in terms of continuity or discontinuity with the past and present; a new experience can represent and express one’s history and current state or deny and betray one’s history and current state, or reshape one’s history and current state in a new and enriching way. The sense of authenticity is always a construction, and as a construction, it is always relative to other possible self-constructions at any particular time. Speaking of authenticity versus inauthenticity or true versus false experience frees us from the spatial metaphor in a way that speaking of a true or false self or a “core” or “real” self does not.

It is important to note that a sense of authenticity and inauthenticity is complexly related to the intricate textures of experience as it is composed of multiple versions of self. What may seem authentic in the context of one version of self may be quite inauthentic with respect to other versions. (Remember my reaction to the portrait painter, subsequently unrecognizable to my ordinary sense of self.) There are also times that an action that seems inauthentic with respect to preceding experience becomes more authentic over time, as one grows into and fully identifies with a new possibility. We will see in the final chapter that the constructive use of imaginative interpretations in analysis often works in precisely this way.

INTERNALITY VERSUS EXTERNALITY

Consider Winnicott’s (1960, 1963) depiction of the earliest feeding experiences, which he establishes as the basis for the split between true

and false selves. In pathological feeding, he suggests, the infant takes its cues from impingements from the outside. The baby's own impulses and needs are not met by the mother, and the baby learns to want what the mother gives, to become the mother's idea of who the baby is. Authentic feeding experience, on the other hand, derives from the baby's spontaneously arising gestures, which the good-enough mother meets and actualizes, creating what Winnicott terms the "moment of illusion."

What is the content of these spontaneous gestures? Even in the earliest feedings, Winnicott suggests, the baby's "readiness" to imagine a breast leads immediately to experiences in the real world out of which develops the baby's idea of the breast, which is further matched by the mother's responsiveness. It cannot be the content that differentiates authentic from inauthentic experience; the image of the breast in the two experiences is virtually the same. What is crucial is the point of origin of the idea at any given time, and that makes all the difference. At one moment a movement toward the breast occurs spontaneously in the baby; at another moment it is a response to the mother's idea of what the baby wants, a compliance with external impingement. Does the idea of the breast at a particular moment come from the baby or the mother? Does it arise spontaneously in the baby, or is it suggested or even coerced from the outside? This is the crucial issue for Winnicott, and it is a very useful starting point for thinking about the problem of authentic individuality in general.

The individual discovers himself within an interpersonal field of interactions in which he has participated long before the dawn of his own self-reflective consciousness. The mind of which he becomes self-aware is constituted by a stream of impulses, fantasies, bodily sensations, which have been patterned through interaction and mutual regulation with caregivers. The experience and meaning of all these have been established and continue to be established, through the physical and mental handling and holding of significant others.⁷ With the gradual dawning of self-awareness, that mental content becomes more fully one's own and can be used in various ways—it can be spontaneously expressed; it can be collaboratively coordinated in interactions with others; it can be deceptively packaged, disingenuously presented; it can be compromised; it can be betrayed.

In classical psychoanalysis, the central and most important question to be asked of the individual is: What are the patterns of gratification, frustration, and sublimation that shape this person's life? In contemporary psychoanalysis, in the work of its most visionary contributors, the most important question to be asked has shifted to: How meaningful

and authentic is a person's experience and expression of herself? Richness in living or psychopathology is the product not of instinctual vicissitudes but of truth or falseness with respect to one's own experience. Why is the self so easily and commonly falsified, so routinely betrayed?

The self operates in the intricate and subtle dialectic between spontaneous vitality and self-expression on the one hand and the requirement, crucial for survival, to preserve secure and familiar connections with others on the other.⁸ Spontaneous self-expression serves as the ground for an array of authentic experience; the need for security leads to a concern with the impact of one's self-presentations on others. If I spontaneously express my feeling or thought or state of mind, do I make the other on whom I am greatly dependent anxious, angry, likely to withdraw? Do I have to conceal my spontaneous experience? Disguise it? Package it in a particular way, perhaps differently for different significant others? It is the necessity for mindfulness (both conscious and unconscious) and some degree of control of one's impact on others that makes inevitable for all people at one time or another a whole array of inauthentic experiences. It is not differences in content that distinguish the authentic from the inauthentic; it is the way the content is organized, particularly in terms of the balance between internality and externality and the purpose to which the content is being put at any given moment.

Deciding what is true and what is false when it comes to self is a tricky business. Although Winnicott's idea of the "true self" is often used in a concrete and reified fashion, he himself suggests that "there is but little point in formulating a True Self idea except for the purpose of trying to understand the False Self, because it does no more than collect together the details of the experience of aliveness" (1960, p. 148). Khan (1963), who wrote of the "privacy" of the self with such eloquence and subtlety, suggests that the "true self" is a conceptual ideal, known concretely mostly by its absence (p. 303).

We are often quite aware when we are being false or betraying ourselves, but authenticity does not often announce itself in such a stark and unambiguous way. In fact, a lack of self-consciousness, posturing, self-arranging, self-presenting, narcissistic pulse-checking is often the hallmark of a truer form of experience, in which the self is taken for granted, unheralded and without banners. The patient who struggles to reveal his "true" feelings or disclose what he is "really like" may reveal a conflict- or shame-ridden aspect of experience, but this is hardly the whole story.⁹

Consider the enormously delicate clinical problem involved in the

psychoanalysis of victims of childhood abuse, sexual or otherwise. There are moments when to speak of anything else is false, inauthentic, a denial of what has taken place. Yet there are other moments when the account of the victimization is serving the purpose not of making oneself known but of creating an impact, making a claim, often turning the tables via an identification with the original abuser (Davies and Frawley 1992). In such moments, which Sandor Ferenczi (1988) termed the "terrorism of suffering," the content is true but the intent is laced with falseness. Any statement about the self and one's past can, and inevitably does, begin to serve other purposes in the present. This is what Sartre (1958) meant by his argument that we are all continually struggling to emerge from "bad faith." Yesterday's insight becomes today's resistance; yesterday's hard-fought self-understanding becomes today's familiar and comfortable refuge.

RECONCILIATION: INSIDE AND OUTSIDE

The seductiveness of discovering one's "true self" is, as Farber suggests in the epigraph to this chapter, both addictive and reductive. This is necessarily so, because of the temporal nature of self and the dialectic between the multiplicity and integrity of the self explored in the previous chapter. There are many conflictual versions of self-organization, and these emerge in and bear on experience in succession over time. At any particular point in time, one may be experiencing and employing a version of self in a true or false fashion, and the sudden, unselfconscious discovery of previously inaccessible aspects of self can be a powerful and transformative experience. However, the self-conscious designation or coronation of one version of self as the true self brings with it an inauthentic foreclosing of experience and an arbitrary claim made both on oneself and on others.

Part of the trickiness of distinguishing "true" from "false" experience is that both the distinction between internality and externality and the distinction between self and other become more complex the more closely they are considered. Winnicott's use of these distinctions for the infant vis-à-vis the breast provides an important starting point, but this is too simplified a situation when we consider adult experience. All personal motives have a long relational history. If the self is always embedded in relational contexts, either actual or internal, then all important motives have appeared and taken on life and form in the presence and through the reactions of significant others.

Let us say a little girl decides she will become a physician through a mixture of motives that we could divide into two groups. Group A includes genuine interest in the workings of nature in general and bodies in particular, sexual curiosity, a concern with helping others, and counterdependent defenses against being sick herself. Group B includes a strong desire to please her parents' thwarted longings to be educated as professionals, identification with their social class aspirations, their anxieties about their daughter's future security, and so on. Let us assume that the little girl sensed the importance of this career path to her parents from the moment they gave her her first Fisher-Price doctor set. How do we evaluate the authenticity versus inauthenticity of this choice and life course? Since the motives in group A reflect internal concerns and those in group B reflect external concerns, the obvious starting point would be to assume that the balance between truth and falseness in this choice would be determined by the balance between motives A and B. But a closer look suggests a greater complexity.

Group B motives began as external considerations. The girl likes to make her parents excited and happy by parading around with her toy stethoscope. But by the time she is applying to medical school, she has long since left home—her parents may even be dead. Externality now means something different. She certainly may still make the choice in order to please her parents; yet her parents are not actual people at this point but internal parents, internal objects. In making the choice to go to medical school, she feels a deep and pervasive connection with her parents, and her feelings of closeness with them perpetuate them as emotional presences in her experience. So these formerly external objects now operate internally.

Conversely, although group A motives seem to be purely self-generated, they cannot be wholly so. Allowing for the importance of constitutional, temperamental factors in terms of activity level, intellectual gifts, and sensibilities, we would have to assume that qualities such as interest in nature, bodies, sexual curiosity, helping others, and counterdependent defenses could not emerge in an interpersonal vacuum or flower in a simply mirroring, facilitating environment. They must have identificatory meanings embedded in interactions with important others, complex reverberations and resonances within various relational configurations. Group A motives, like group B motives, are complex blends of both internal and external factors.

It is not so easy, therefore, to parse self from other, to neatly divide internal from external considerations. The extreme stickiness of this problem is one of the reasons why theories claiming to have located a

center of the individual outside the relational field are so compelling.

Probably we all have had the very private experience of connecting with ourselves in solitude in a way that is not possible in the presence of others, the "incognito" subjective core of Winnicott (1963). And there is the experience of refinding what one really feels or wants to do through a sudden realization that one has been too concerned with the opinions and reactions of others. These considerations suggest that the core or foundation of the individual self is egoistic and discoverable only in isolation.

Yet there also are experiences of losing oneself in private ruminations, self-alienation in solitude, and a sense of refinding oneself through engagement with another. There is a difference for most people between the relative hollowness of masturbation and the fullness of sex with another that probably has something to do with the perpetuation of the species. In sex with another, externality, compromise, and compliance are clearly features. If there is too much concern with externality, there is no spontaneous desire, and the experience lacks depth and passion.¹⁰ On the other hand, if there is no sense of externality, there is no awareness of the other except as a masturbatory vehicle.

The richness of experience is generated in the subtle dialectics between internality and externality, desire and concern, destruction and reparation, self and other. Human beings use each other not just for safety, protection, control, and self-regulation; we also come alive, develop capacities, and expand personal consciousness through interaction in a way that is not possible in isolation. The simple distinction between internality and externality, although a very useful starting point, is not sufficient to distinguish true from false experience.

As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, Freud's notion of the id prior to, buffered from, and uncompromised by social experience reflects a long-standing, romantic tradition in which human freedom is located in an escape from social compliance and constraints.¹¹ However, the strategy of defining freedom in terms of independence of society and culture is not limited to drive theorists. It is central to the vision of Erich Fromm (1941), who regards the threat of social ostracism as the fundamental obstacle to authentic experience in the self-definition of the individual. Fromm once commented that the reason he never had children of his own was that "children make one hostage to the culture" (David Schecter, personal communication). Anyone who has had children understands immediately what Fromm meant. Concern about a child's peer and school adjustment begin to limit, or at least introduce, considerations of restraint and caution into one's own freedom of speech and

expression. Nevertheless, for this to be a reason not to have children suggests the limitations of defining authenticity solely in terms of freedom from social constraint. A more meaningful (although less pure and romantic) definition entails a process of working through social considerations and constraints to a deeply personal, individual experience. What is crucial is the extent to which internal and external considerations, self and other, have been balanced and reconciled.¹²

What is central to the analytic process is precisely an overcoming of the sense that one has to choose between being oneself in the "use" of others or betraying oneself in adaptation to others. Psychoanalysis becomes a struggle to find and be oneself in the process of atonement¹³ and reconciliation in relation to others, both actual others and others as internal presences.¹⁴

Let us return to our would-be medical student. Most clinicians, regardless of ideological persuasion, would be concerned with the following considerations when thinking about her career deliberations: Is this choice consistent with enough dimensions of her personality to represent and work for her in a meaningful way? Will she use enough of herself, or does it draw her away from too much that is important to her? Is she anticipating pleasure in this work, or primarily a fantasied security or fantastic solution to infantile anxieties? These considerations could be translated into different theoretical terms: Have the original motives attained sufficient secondary autonomy? Is she motivated by satisfactions or security? Are the identifications primarily superego or ego identifications? Are her superego and ego reconciled or at odds? Are her internal objects happy? All these questions are concerned, in one way or another, with the way in which what was formerly external has become internal, the extent to which externality and internality have become reconciled or are pulling against each other in different directions, and the degree to which past interpersonal negotiations have been metabolized into nutriment for further growth and development.

Consider other kinds of experiences that provide for some people a deep sense of authenticity: athletic activities or artistic creation. If I am just learning to play tennis, the effort will feel unnatural, inauthentic, modeling, or posturing, not representative of me: "Grip the racket just so; position your feet perpendicular to the net; keep your eye on the ball; keep your weight moving toward the net; swing through the ball." In learning the game I am learning a complex discipline created through a long history by a community of others. Some people are "naturals" with respect to sheer athletic ability, but no one can play tennis natu-

rally, at least not very well. The techniques are essential if you are to get where you want to go.

Yet if I have played tennis for a long time, I may feel truly and deeply myself when I play. When I play well I am likely not only to feel free of any attention to technique or discipline but also to feel free of self-consciousness altogether, playing "in the groove," or "out of my mind." The same techniques so painfully and awkwardly practiced over many years are now a part of me and make possible kinds of experiences not attainable in any other way. Tennis is a set of complex, social conventions that make possible an individual, deeply subjective experience of potentially profound personal significance. Authenticity reflects the use of the interpenetration of internal and external to represent and express myself; inauthenticity reflects the use of the interpenetration of internal and external to create and manage impressions of me in others.

SPATIAL METAPHORS IN EXPERIENCE OF SELF

Certain kinds of experiences—different ones for different people—are difficult or impossible to risk displaying with others. It is as if they exist in secret, hidden recesses of being, and they can feel as if they constitute a core or center of the self. Other ways of being feel stereotyped, facile, and easily conjured up; these ways of being seem to provide a protective buffer, a shell under which or within which more vulnerable, more hidden, and more authentic forms of experience can be concealed.

For some people, sexual responses are impossible to express and integrate in interactions with others and have a "true" or pure quality to them, precisely because their sexuality has rarely been modulated through social interaction. For others, dissociated rage has a pure, deep quality about it, in contrast to the chronic characterological submission that may govern all other interactions (necessitating the dissociation of the rage in the first place). For others, a pure joy or spontaneous laughter remains hidden and unexpressed behind a dour demeanor or a hyperresponsible version of adulthood. For still others, certain kinds of preverbal experiences have been preserved as a refuge for the self, while language in general has been co-opted by deception and self-betrayal. These experiences are sometimes organized into the representation of the thwarted spontaneity of the self as baby, hidden behind the empty, conformistic adaptations of adulthood.

Clinical psychoanalysis, unless it becomes a sterile exercise in "rationality," operates within the phenomenology of the self. Analyst and pa-

tient enter spaces, explore recesses, traverse topographies. Previously inaccessible experiences, running the gamut from totally dissociated to concealed, to conflict-ridden, often make themselves known through personalized metaphors: animals, babies, explosions, elemental forces, closets, demons. These experiences can come alive in the analytic situation only in their own terms. The experience of self as a preverbal baby cannot be talked about, because it is the very corruption of language in the dynamics of particular families that initially makes it impossible for the patient to feel alive through words.¹⁵ The experience of the self as explosively rageful or demonically sexual cannot be translated into polite conversation, because it was precisely the disembodied and mannered forms of familial discourse that created the sense of rage and sexuality as dangerous and primitive. The metaphors around which versions of self are organized generally come in complementary pairs (see also Wachtel's [1987] concept of cyclical psychodynamics): the needy baby/the pale and joyless adulthood; the beast/the civilized citizen; and so on. Versions of the self are states of mind accessible only on their own terms, and the collaborative struggle to discover and create these terms is a crucial dimension of the analytic process.

Ironically, only as the analytic process enables the patient to live in what are felt to be secret, hidden, core spaces within the self does she begin to experience these states as versions of herself, among many other versions, that emerge and are shaped over time. As this capacity to experience self in deeper and richer forms develops, the temporal and spatial dimensions of self fully complement each other. Spatial metaphors often are necessary for any given experience to be expressed and developed. As the temporality of the self is more fully experienced, spatial patterns become less static and confining.

Thinking about self in temporal as well as spatial terms forces a reconsideration of the relationship between body and self. I have argued elsewhere (Mitchell, 1988) that it makes more sense to think about body-based experiences such as sexual desire or rage not as continual, primitive, endogenous pressures located in a place within the psyche (like the "id"), but as reactions to stimuli, internal and external, always in particular relational contexts. From this perspective it makes no sense to say that desire and aggression are any more "primitive," basic, or fundamental than laughing or painting. It is not the content that is important, because no content is more central or primary than any other. What is important is the function of the content in the larger context of experience. Does the desire, rage, laughter, or painting derive from and express spontaneous reactions to both internal and external stimuli, or

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is it contrived to manage self states (for example, by warding off depression) and other people (for example, by pleasing or impressing them)? Body-based experiences of self are no more primary than verbal ones; rather, different ways of organizing experience are coterminous and in dialectical relationship with each other.¹⁶ It is a mistake to think of one form of experience as more basic or deeper, because experiences are not layered in space; rather, they shift back and forth as forms of self-organization over time. The common subjective sense of greater depth that accompanies some experiences in contrast to others should be understood to derive from their relative spontaneity and freedom from attention to their immediate reception by others in the present, not from a deeper origin in some objectively layered psychic structure.

An additional facet of the relationship between the body and self concerns the issue of gender. If one assumes, as did Freud, that "anatomy is destiny" and that the drives constitute the core of the psyche, one would think of the self and of experience in general as gendered. (Freud felt that the array of component drives makes us all bisexual, so that both genders are represented in each psyche.) In contrast, if one assumes that the self is organized in different ways at different points in time, some of those organizations may be gendered (monosexually or bisexually), while others may not. It may be developmentally necessary for a little boy or a little girl to feel very much like a little boy or a little girl, but very unnecessary and enormously constricting for adult men or women to need to experience themselves continually in a gendered way (Dimen, 1991; Goldner, 1991; Harris, 1991). Gender identity, or a gendered identity, is, for most people, extremely important to establish. In fact, the most important function of sexual activity for many people is not the pleasure or release per se but the establishment of the sense of oneself as a woman or as a man. (See Person, 1980; Simon and Gagnon, 1973.) Yet a gendered sense of self may not always underlie experience. In fact, the capacity to organize experience in many ungendered (not bisexual) ways, without a compulsive need to evoke a gendered identity, might be considered a feature of mental health (Goldner, 1991).

REGRESSION: DOWNWARD OR OUTWARD?

The concept of "regression" has been used traditionally to suggest the movement, in the psychoanalytic process, from more developed and integrated layers of the self to earlier, more "primitive" dimensions.

Within the traditional embedded spatial metaphor, the earlier experience is assumed to underlie later, less deeply personal, roots of the self. In my view, regression can be thought about more usefully not as a movement down, into the heart of the self, but as a movement out, as an enrichment and overcoming of constraining self-organizations.

Bollas (1987, p. 218) speaks of patients who seek him out looking for a "Winnicottian" analysis, envisioned as a regressive return to total dependency, a letting go of what they feel are their inauthentic yet perhaps highly effective ways of functioning in the world. The quest of these patients is clearly consistent with one aspect of Winnicott's contribution. (Little [1985] notes that Winnicott "spoke of patients having to 'queue up' sometimes to go into such a state," to wait for their turn at "full regression" [p. 23].) Yet Bollas points out the importance of not assuming that the functional self and the person's resources are any less "true" than the image of the regressed and wholly dependent infant the patient longs to be. The original reasons for someone to become resourceful and effective might well have been "inauthentic" and some distance from where the person genuinely was at the time. Nevertheless, what is crucial now is the use or misuse to which those capacities are put. The idea that one's "core" or "true" self is located in developmentally earlier states is both overly simplistic and also very compelling, as evidenced by the popularity of "the child within" in much mass-market popular psychology. The claim to be helpless and the disclaiming of one's actual resources, although very understandable (it often operates as a testament to hope and an avoidance of coming to terms with irreversibly lost opportunities and experiences), nevertheless serve current purposes that are no longer simply authentic.

Developmentally prior self-organizations often emerge in the analytic situation; one's experience of oneself, the world, and relationships to others is felt to be patterned in a very different fashion from one's ordinary adult life. In many ways the analytic situation is structured precisely to pull for such "regressive" experience in the transference relationship to the analyst. However, the idea that the developmentally earlier versions of self underlie, or are more fundamental than, later versions of self fails to appreciate the flow of different versions of self in time. Again, it is crucial to distinguish subjective phenomenology from theoretical clarity.¹⁷

Another kind of "regressive" process concerns not so much a return to developmentally earlier self-organizations, but the emergence of pieces of experience never integrated into a coherent self-organization and, perhaps, never represented and made real through language. This

kind of regressive experience consists of a kind of constructive disintegration, in which the ordinary contours of self experience become less guarded and more permeable, allowing an opening to and eventual integration of less controlled forms of experience not possible before, such as fusion and surrender (Ghent, 1992). Once again, regression seems an ill-chosen term for such experiences, which are not a return to anything as much as a reclaiming of lost potentials, not a retreat but an expansion.

ONE-PERSON/TWO-PERSON?

As relational theory has become more and more prominent over the past several decades, one finds increasing discussion in the literature about the relationship between a two-person, interpersonal perspective and the more traditional one-person, intrapsychic perspective of classical theory. There have been several ways of approaching this problem.

One strategy (developed most explicitly by Levenson, 1983, 1992) has been the establishment of a "radical interpersonal" position, which is thoroughly two-person and eschews all intrapsychic concepts. In this view, everything important is happening in the interpersonal field. There are no mysterious dynamics inside the patient; rather, the patient and analyst enact the important dynamics in their interactions with each other. The patient's problem is not the father or mother but the analyst, who will inevitably act like the father or mother. To speak of internal object relations, inner worlds, even identifications, is to compromise a radically interpersonal perspective with residues of traditional intrapsychic theorizing and, ultimately, to deny what is most important, the enactment of crucial dynamic issues in the analytic relationship.¹⁸

The counterpart to Levenson on the other end of the continuum are more traditional Freudian authors who regard psychoanalysis as essentially the study and treatment of one person.¹⁹ The analyst is merely an observer or technician; her personhood has nothing to do with it. For these authors, the "interpersonal" is as much of a contaminant and danger as is the "intrapsychic" for the "radical interpersonalist." The patient's problem is with the father or mother. It is ultimately irrelevant whether the analyst does or does not act similarly. The analytic field is merely the empty stage upon which the internal dynamics of the patient come to life.²⁰

I regard approaches located on both extreme ends of the one-person/two-person continuum as unnecessarily reductive and narrow.

On the one hand, isolating any aspect of human experience or the analytic relationship outside of its embeddedness in an interactive, relational matrix starts one off on the wrong footing. On the other hand, to consider only that which is currently interactional for fear of intrapsychic ghosts is a massive and unfortunate overcorrection. The human psyche, in my view, is both intrapsychic and interpersonal, simultaneously both a one-person and two-person phenomenon. (See Benjamin, 1992b, for a similar view.)

Is there something problematic or difficult to grasp about regarding mind in both intrapsychic and interpersonal terms? Some writers (such as Arnold Modell) have suggested that this amounts to bringing together two essentially incompatible frames of reference and therefore constitutes a paradox. Since Winnicott has made the concept of paradox acceptable (even fashionable!), maintaining both the intrapsychic and the interpersonal in a contradictory but complementary juxtaposition is thought to be possible.

This position often reflects an effort to preserve the particular version of the intrapsychic as developed in the classical tradition while adding to it interpersonal considerations. The intrapsychic within Freud's drive theory is constituted by a priori, preformed instinctual organizations; to combine that version with a more interpersonal vision is truly paradoxical. However, the intrapsychic as envisioned by many relational authors (such as Fairbairn, Loewald, and Racker) is itself the residue of prior interactions. Here we have an intrapsychic that is, in its basic constituents, interpersonally derived. In this sort of framework, not only are the intrapsychic and the interpersonal not incompatible, they are natural extensions of each other.²¹

To consider the relationship between one-person and two-person psychologies as paradoxical is to beg the question of exactly what sort of one-person psychology is being advocated. In my view, the intrapsychic and the interpersonal are perpetually interpenetrating realms that continually fold back into each other. The process of self-discovery generally leads to the discovery of past relationships, and in encountering others, one frequently also discovers oneself. There is nothing fundamentally paradoxical about the relationship between the intrapsychic and the interpersonal, or one-person and two-person frameworks, any more than there is something paradoxical about being both an individual and, simultaneously, a member of a couple or family. Surely, sometimes one might be acting solely on one's own behalf, at other times for the couple, and at other times on behalf of the family. But there is nothing contradictory and therefore nothing paradoxical about these differ-

ent dimensions. The fundamental authenticity of self experience rests precisely on the reconciliation and effective transversing of these different realms.

THE ANALYST'S AUTHENTICITY

In puzzling through the ambiguities of authenticity, I have used career choice and tennis as examples. To highlight other features of these issues, I would like to consider the problem of authenticity in relation to the experience of the analyst. This issue is becoming increasingly important in the analytic literature as we move farther into the postclassical era of psychoanalysis. Is the analyst true to himself and being authentic when being an analyst? This question provides an interesting complement to the problems we have been struggling with in connection with establishing authenticity with respect to the patient.

Even to pose the question of authenticity in terms of the analyst's experience makes no sense in most traditional views of the analytic process. In the classical model, the analyst is essentially playing a role, serving a particular function. In the "handling of the transference" as Otto Fenichel (1940) puts it, "not joining in the game" is the principle task" (p. 73). The patient experiences a range of different sorts of passionate feelings; the analyst experiences the feelings consistent with their observing, interpretive function. Thus, Schafer (1983), in his generally classical approach to technique, describes doing analysis as entailing a "subordination" of the analyst's personality; this tradition lays a great emphasis on control and restraint in descriptions of the analyst's experience (for example, Abend, 1986; Silverman, 1985). To ask whether the analyst's true self is being expressed in this process is a meaningless question, akin to asking whether the analyst is being authentic while driving a car across a mountain pass on a rainy night. The analyst is doing a complicated, hazzardous job requiring great concentration; self-expression has nothing to do with it. Consider this representative but especially vivid description in which the role of the analyst seems rather like Ulysses resisting the sirens, tied to the mast of neutrality:

If the analyst is indeed immersed in the intense emotional interchange that the analytic situation is designed to provoke, he is subjected to powerful pressures to abandon his analytic neutrality. He is bombarded by a stream of complaints, supplications, subtle seductions, bitter accusations, and ingenious bits of blackmail from his patients.

He is also subjected to an intense pull from within his own being to ease his burden by obtaining some measure of instinctual gratification from the analytic experience to make up for the deprivation and abuse to which he has given himself up. The analyst is continually drawn to do more than analyze, and his very humanness makes it difficult for him to invariably resist all the temptations. (Silverman, 1985, pp. 176-77)

Countertransference, in this progressive but traditional perspective, may at times be inevitable, but it is essentially a contaminant, distracting and potentially dangerous. According to the implicit anal metaphor embedded in the classical concept, countertransference is something that "happens," but something that needs to be gotten under control and eliminated as much as possible.

The same irrelevance regarding the analyst's authenticity applies to some versions of the self-psychological approach. Here too the analyst is understood to be providing necessary functions—self-object functions. The whole point of listening in the "empathic mode," as it has been developed by Kohut, Schwaber, and others, is to be listening and articulating things from what is assumed to be the patient's point of view. Allowances are made for the inevitable intrusion of the analyst's point of view, but it is regarded as essentially an intrusion and contaminant, diverting the analyst from his function as a benign reflector of the patient's experience.²²

The question of authenticity arises in perspectives on the analytic process influenced by interpersonal theory, particularly the line of interpersonal psychoanalysis shaped by Fromm. (Sullivan saw the analyst in more traditional terms, as an "expert" serving a function.) But for Fromm, the place of authenticity and inauthenticity in the analytic relationship is crucial. Fromm felt that people in our culture rarely speak truthfully and frankly to each other. The patient comes to analysis partly, or largely, in search of a more authentic response. If the analyst plays a role, subordinating her own reactions to the patient, the analysis is built on bad faith. From this perspective, analytic "neutrality" is an inhibiting fraud, and "holding," "mirroring," and other more self-consciously benign roles are forms of infantilization. What the patient requires more than anything else is some sense of his impact on another, some honest expression of what the analyst is really feeling.²³

Good classical or self-psychological analysts pay attention to what they are feeling. What I am suggesting is that in those two models, there is one primary focus of attention—the patient's associations, the pa-

tient's experience. In the interpersonal and in some versions of the Kleinian approach, there are two primary foci. The analyst's experience, particularly passionate experience, may contain information crucial to the analysis not obtainable in any other way.

But how does the analyst know what he is feeling? If we want to locate authenticity in the analyst in his current affective state, how does the analyst who is conscientiously trying to be true and authentic, first to himself and then, when optimally useful, with the patient, decide which among his various feelings and reactions are most authentic?

There are times when a particular reaction dominates the countertransference—rage or erotic interest, for example. Feeling enraged at or aroused by a patient is similar to feeling enraged at or aroused by someone else in a different context, but not exactly the same. With a patient, there is also, no matter what else is going on, a commitment to the analytic process, to the inquiry. Outside analysis, one might feel free to pursue a fight or flirtation with a certain abandon: I will figure out what to do later when I get there. What is going on right now may be more fun or compelling. Doing analysis demands a self-reflectiveness that struggles to keep rage from becoming an unloading on the patient, to keep arousal from becoming a seduction of the patient, either through affective ambience or through "interpretations."

Some argue that one might as well just express whatever one is feeling because it becomes apparent to the patient anyway. This seems simplistic and somewhat disingenuous to me. The analyst feels many things and is constantly selecting and making choices, both in terms of what to say and also in terms of what to think about. No analysis in which the analyst simply reports on her personal experience would uphold the crucial importance of the patient's sense that the analysis is for him. (Ferenczi's experiment in "mutual analysis" foundered on these shoals.) So analysts make choices and spend a great deal more time thinking than speaking. Authenticity in the analyst has less to do with saying everything than in the genuineness of what actually is said.

Am I being less authentic restraining an angry or erotic impulse in the analytic situation and struggling to reflect upon it than I am in situations outside analysis where I might pursue impulses with relatively greater abandon? In some ways yes; in some ways no. Analytic reflection forces an attention to other features of the analyst's feelings about the patient than may be in the immediate forefront at any particular moment. Perhaps the rage or arousal is not the "truest" or most "authentic" feeling at all, but merely the one with the most intense immediate charge. Perhaps abandoning myself to the fight or arousal

would entail a betrayal of myself and/or the relationship in a much more profound way.

When my older daughter was about two or so, I remember my excitement at the prospect of taking walks with her, given her new ambulatory skills and her intense interest in being outdoors. However, I soon found these walks agonizingly slow. My idea of a walk entailed brisk movement along a road or path. Her idea was quite different. The implications of this difference hit me one day when we encountered a fallen tree on the side of the road, about twenty yards from our house. The rest of the "walk" was spent exploring the fungal and insect life on, under, and around the tree. I remember my sudden realization that these walks would be no fun for me, merely a parental duty, if I held on to my idea of walks. As I was able to give that up and surrender to my daughter's rhythm and focus, a different type of experience opened up to me. Was this shift a movement from something authentic in me to something inauthentic? It is hard to say. My natural pace is quite rapid, but that rapidity could be thought of in terms of hypomanic defenses. Perhaps I became more truly authentic when I slowed up. If I had simply restrained myself out of duty, I would have experienced the walk as a compliance. But I was able to become my daughter's version of a good companion and to find in that another way for me to be that took on great personal meaning for me.

A very important counterbalance to the pursuit of the analyst's authenticity is the usefulness (sometimes) to the patient of the analyst's allowing himself to be "used" by the patient as a vehicle for self-exploration.²⁴ Intimacy, sexual and otherwise, involves a continual, mutual surrender. One offers oneself up to be shaped, arranged, explored, in the service of the other's self-expression. This happens all the time in analysis, sometimes deliberately in the analyst's allowing the transference to deepen in certain ways, sometimes unwittingly in the analyst's discovery that he has become a character in the patient's inner world.

Would we want to consider the process of the analyst offering herself up for use by the patient (to use Winnicott's evocative term) a form of inauthenticity, a denial and betrayal of the analyst's true self? Probably not. One of the most unique and essential dimensions of the analytic process is precisely this form of play in the transference and the countertransference, this process of forming and unforming, integration and disintegration, in which the patient is able to encounter and reclaim features of his inner world and also to imagine and invent new versions of themselves for the first time.

The exploration of the interaction between analysand and analyst and the expansion of the analysand's own inner world are not alternative routes but different facets of the same route. It is a mistake to assume that the analyst who offers himself up for the patient to shape and use is really leaving himself behind; his own familiar subjectivity has merely become part of the background. What happens most frequently (as in the interaction between me and my daughter) is that a surrender to shaping by another becomes a vehicle for discovery of a new, often unanticipated, form of authentic experience, which then enriches the interpersonal interaction.

It is important to note that no analyst is—nor should any strive to be—infinately malleable. There are subtle but crucial borders between an openness in interaction with a patient, allowing one's experience to be shaped by him, and a squelching of the analyst's capacity for authentic participation in a fashion that destroys the possibility for constructive engagement. The analyst's knowledge of her own personal limits is crucial. If the analyst transcends those limits, guided by ideals like neutrality (Freud), empathy (Kohut), or object-usage (Winnicott), the stage is set for a masochistic experience in the countertransference and her eventual active or passive retaliation.

One important dimension of the analyst's work is a sorting through of the patient's productions, to distinguish the potentially useful from the diversionary, the analytically fruitful from the familiarly perseverative. Another central feature of the craft of psychoanalysis is a continual monitoring and sorting through of the analyst's own experiences and self-states with the patient: steering away from those that seem unproductive; entering further into those that seem important to explore; struggling to remain in those that are opaque but may become useful later on.

The relationship between reality and fantasy in the analytic relationship is extraordinarily complex. In a superficial way, the analytic relationship could be defined as unreal, in contrast to real relationships in the rest of the analyst's life. Yet the unreal dimensions of the analytic situation often serve to make possible a much deeper, personally riskier, more profound experience than is possible in "real" life. In this sense, the analytic situation is often more real, for both participants, than non-analytic relationships. The challenge, of course, is to find a way to integrate the depths of self experience discovered in the "unreal" analytic situation into the "realities" of ordinary life. In a parallel fashion, many people use the "unreal" features of extramarital affairs in contrast to the daunting "realities" of married life to discover and develop deeply

personal aspects of self. Deciding which is real and which is artificial is often very tricky. As in the relationship between analytic and extra-analytic realities, the possibility for a less fragmented experience depends on the integration of the real and the fantastic so that they potentiate rather than deplete each other.

The assumption that anger or arousal is more authentic than curiosity is a holdover from classical theory and nineteenth-century romanticism. What is so unique and invaluable about the analytic process is precisely that it demands a curiosity about one's feelings on the part of both participants and especially a curiosity about the moments when one feels a virtual lack of curiosity. The outcome is not a less authentic experience, but a pushing through to a level of experience that may be much more deeply authentic, both for the patient and for the analyst. I argued in chapter 2 that self-understanding, as well as understanding of another, is not a revelation but a construction. What is crucial in the self-understandings constructed by the analyst is the struggle toward an emotional position that also keeps going the inquiry into the patient's experience.

Authenticity for the analyst as well as for the patient is essentially ambiguous, more discernible in its absence than its presence. Critics of the classical notion of "neutrality" have been extremely useful in pointing out the manner in which a preoccupation with neutrality or objectivity can constrict the analyst's experience in an unhelpful fashion. When trying to enact the role of the analyst or trying to apply technique, one is not doing analysis.

However, the argument for a freer attitude toward the analyst's own experience is a corrective more than a guide. It points out a way the analyst can close himself off to useful information, not a set of criteria on the basis of which the analyst can decide what to do with all the information, all the reactions, all the ideas that he has. How to decide which among many potentially authentic voices will move the inquiry forward remains an extraordinarily ambiguous and complex problem.²⁵

According to the Taoists, setting out to find Enlightenment is like pursuing a thief hiding in the forest by banging loudly on a drum. Setting out to find one's true self or trying to hold onto one's true self entails similar problems. The rushing fluidity of human experience through time makes authenticity essentially and necessarily ambiguous. The fascination with and pursuit of that ambiguity lies at the heart of the analytic process. Clinicians who love doing analytic work hold this fascination in common. I do not agree with Schafer (1983) that doing analysis entails a "subordination" of the analyst's personality. Certainly

there is a kind of discipline involved, but, like the discipline and technique in sports or artistic expression, the form makes possible a liberating kind of experience that is hard to come by in any other way. Doing analysis, either as a patient or as an analyst, involves a struggle to reach a fully authentic experience of a particular kind that, when fully engaged, makes possible a kind of freedom and authenticity that is both rare and precious.

The analytic process, for both the analysand and the analyst, provides a deeply personal experience. What makes psychoanalysis a quintessentially personal process is not deriving individual experience from outside the social field, but its focus on the subjective meaning of any piece of mental life. Psychoanalytic theorizing will have more to contribute to our understanding of personal individuality if we can get away from a search for presocial or extrasocial roots of the core or true self and focus on what it means at any particular moment to be experiencing and using oneself more or less authentically.

6

Aggression and the Endangered Self

Whatever cultural conditioning we may do, we must remain cognizant of the fact that human beings who have been trained and conditioned to be nonviolent retain the capacity for violence; as constrained as that capacity may be in certain contexts, it can come out in others. It is subdued, reduced, dormant, yes. But it is never abolished. It is never nonexistent. It is always there.

—M. Konner, *The Tangled Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit*

It would be hard to find an issue that has generated more controversy during the history of psychoanalytic ideas than aggression. Divergent views on aggression played a major role in the split between Freud and Adler as far back as 1908; and differences in thinking about aggression play a significant role in the attitudes today toward the major contemporary psychoanalytic schools (for example, the Kleinian school and Kohut's self psychology).

Since 1908, theorizing about aggression has tended to bifurcate into two positions, depending on whether aggression is viewed as a fundamental and irreducible human instinct. That question seems to be answerable by either a yes or a no and which side one comes down on has profound consequences for theory-making. If the answer is yes, aggression in its various manifestations is seen to operate necessarily and inevitably at the center of emotional life. Sadism, hatred, the thirst for revenge—the darker passions—are regarded as a fundamental and in-

escapable domain of the self. Prolonged immersion and direct work on negative transference (and perhaps negative countertransference) are viewed as crucial and unavoidable realms of analytic experience.

If the answer is no, aggression is seen as reactive and defensive, lacking in primary dynamic significance. The explanatory emphasis tends to shift to the environment that provokes aggression—family pathology and early deprivation. The analytic focus similarly shifts to the affective experience that is felt to underlie or precede the aggression: for example, anxiety (Sullivan) or the experience of empathic failure and the disintegration of a cohesive self (Kohut).

In thinking about aggression, polarization, one might almost say “splitting,” transcends psychoanalytic circles. Aggression has been a fundamental problem of human experience in all cultures and at all points in history. How one understands the origins of aggression determines one’s positions on many of the most problematic features of life: historical, philosophical, political, and theological. How does one account for the horrifying bloodbaths that characterize human history? How does one understand the cruelties that seem to be a never-absent feature of human interactions? What are the origins of social violence? Why are good and evil so closely intertwined?

It is not just in psychoanalytic theory that we gravitate to one or the other clear solution to the problem of evil. Consider the political poles of conservatism versus liberalism. From one perspective, violent crime is a product of laxness in controls and a failure to maintain “law and order.” The problem is in the individual, in whom it must be controlled. From the other perspective, violent crime is a social disease from which the individual suffers. The problem is in the environmental failures to which the individual reacts.

Clearly the question of the nature and origins of aggression is not merely an abstract or intellectual consideration. How one thinks about and experiences the roots of evil and cruelty, the darker passions, is an important part of the shaping of the personal self. In finding our own position on the origins of aggression, we are framing a view of our individual experience, establishing a version of personal history, shaping the categories and tones of inner life. Where does one place oneself within one’s own life historical events? How does one understand one’s own motives? explain one’s own cruelties and betrayals?

In the choice of a psychoanalytic theory, no small part is played by the way in which the ideology of that theory explains one to oneself, assigning blame and innocence, responsibility and victimization, locating causes and justifications. And when it comes to issues related to aggres-

sion, explanations tend to drift to the two clear and polarized positions: We are driven by our instincts toward hatred and cruelty and life is a struggle to master and renounce those passions, or we are born innocent and some of us are made hateful through deprivation and cruelty perpetuated upon us. Perhaps it is precisely because the theoretical issues have such profound personal dynamic implications and resonances that we tend to move generally with great conviction toward one or the other solution.

For many analysts, the very identity “Freudian” embodies this central issue, pro and con. Those who choose it feel that those who do not are denying the darker, bestial side of human experience, taking the easy way out by avoiding the deeper, darker truths about human nature and motivation. Those who do not choose the identity of “Freudian” tend to feel that those who do root human difficulties in a psychological version of “original sin” rather than in the abuse, neglect, and mystification perpetuated upon children.

I propose a perspective that overcomes this traditional polarity regarding aggression, grounded in the perspective on self developed in the preceding chapters, viewing self in temporal as well as spatial terms. I believe that the impossible choice between locating aggression at the core of the self or at its periphery is anchored in a reified spatial account of the self as layered. Thinking about self in temporal terms once again provides a crucial counterpoint. But first I must trace more fully the two major lines of psychoanalytic contributions on aggression—aggression as a drive and aggression as a secondary reaction. I will be drawing a great deal from both.

AGGRESSION AS A DRIVE

Before 1920 Freud regarded the pleasure principle, along with self-preservation, as the basic motivational framework of mental life. Adler had proposed that aggression is better understood as an autonomous drive. No, Freud countered, aggression is a reaction to frustration in pleasure-seeking.

In 1920, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud dramatically reversed himself and adopted a view similar to Adler’s, establishing aggression as a special and self-subsisting instinct arising independently from libido, from the Death Instinct, and operating “beyond the pleasure principle.” (Freud did view libido and aggression as merging continually through instinctual fusion.)

When Freud established aggression as a primary drive, he attributed to it the same properties he ascribed to libido, which were built into the very definition of what he meant by "drive" (*trieb*). Freud regarded aggression as an endogenously arising, continuous pressure demanding discharge. There is a need to harm and destroy, which often finds frustrations to serve as a rationale; but if there are no causes to be found, no rationales, the need for the discharge of aggression may overrun the defensive controls that ordinarily hold it in check and aggression emerges spontaneously.

There is no clearer and more powerful depiction of Freud's notion of the aggressive drive than his sober reflections on human misery in *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930):

men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and kill him. *Homo homini lupus*. Who, in the face of all his experience of life and of history, will have the courage to dispute this assertion? As a rule this cruel aggressiveness waits for some provocation or puts itself at the service of some other purpose, whose goal might also have been reached by milder measures. In circumstances that are favourable to it, when the mental counter-forces which ordinarily inhibit it are out of action, it also manifests itself spontaneously and reveals man as a savage beast to whom consideration towards his own kind is something alien. (pp. 111–12)

Two quite different major lines of theorizing have developed out of Freud's theory of the aggressive drive. One strategy, fashioned by Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, developed within Freudian ego psychology; the other strategy has flourished within Kleinian thought.

Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein argue for the separation of the aggressive drive from Freud's more speculative notion of a Death Instinct. Like Freud, they regard aggression as a powerful motivational force from the beginning of life, but unlike Freud, they do not think aggression begins by being directed inward in a Death Instinct. They regard aggression as directed outward, toward others, from the start.¹ Hart-

mann, Kris, and Loewenstein (1949) retain the central feature of Freud's approach to aggression, based on the latter's understanding of sexuality. They emphasize, as did Freud, the endogenous, spontaneous, propulsive origins of aggression, not derivable from deprivation or frustration of pleasure-seeking, but "a constant, driving power comparable to that of libido" (p. 78).

The second line of theorizing deriving from Freud's concept of an aggressive drive was developed by Melanie Klein and has led to some of the most interesting contributions to our understanding of human destructiveness. Unlike Hartmann and Kris, Klein took very seriously the idea that aggression originates in a Death Instinct. Because of the persecutory terror she felt was the consequence of that instinct, she saw aggression as central in the formation of psychic structure beginning early in life and continuing throughout.² For Klein, dealing with the implications and consequences of one's aggression on one's loved ones, both external and internal, is the central drama in life. Hostile destructiveness is never far from love and devotion. In fact, the very capacity to risk loving presupposes the development of a belief in one's own ability to repair the damage one continually inflicts on one's love objects, external and internal.

AGGRESSION AS A SECONDARY REACTION

The alternative strategy for theorizing about aggression, ironically dating back to Freud himself in his argument against Adler (1909, pp. 140–41) is to view it not as a primary motivation but as a derivative of or defense against other primary motivations. This basic starting point is shared by all the major non-drive theory approaches.

For Sullivan, for example, aggression operates largely as a defense against the profound helplessness generated by the experience of anxiety. For Fairbairn, aggression is a reaction to deprivation and lack of gratification of the infant's intense dependency and object-seeking. He argues that it is the "analyst's task to point out to the patient the libidinal factor that lies behind his aggression" (1952, p. 74). The word "behind" is of particular interest here because of the spatial metaphor it implies in visualizing mind and motives. Mind is seen as layered, as if in space; non-drive theorists portray aggression as a more superficial layer, nearer the surface.

The spatial metaphor is more clearly apparent in Guntrip's contributions. He characterizes aggression as a reaction, less basic, less primary,

less fundamental to human nature: "the chronic aggression which has always seemed to be the hallmark of 'man' is but a defense against and a veneer over basic ego weakness" (1969, p. 129). Aggression, in Guntrip's view, is a more superficial, defensive dimension of human experience. The deeper core of the self is concerned with the regressive retreat from object-seeking and love. It is crucial, Guntrip argues, "to separate classic depression as the defensive top layer of aggression and guilt, from regression as the bottom layer of fear, flight, and infantile ego-weakness" (1969, pp. 149–50).

Kohut offers a very similar understanding of aggression as a reaction to "self-object" failure to provide requisite responses for crucial developmental needs. Under normal circumstances, the child manifests healthy assertiveness, which Kohut likens to fundamental biological units, organic molecules. Only under extreme, pathological self-object failures does healthy assertiveness break down into hostile destructiveness, much as organic molecules may be broken apart into inorganic molecules. The inorganic molecules are simpler—more primitive, so to speak—but they are not the fundamental building blocks of organic life. Rather, they are a disintegrative, pathological breakdown product. Thus, Kohut argues (and note again the spatial metaphor of depth and surface):

I believe that man's destructiveness as a psychological phenomenon is secondary; that it arises originally as the result of the failure of the self-object environment to meet the child's need for optimal—not maximal, it should be stressed—empathic responses. Aggression . . . as a psychological phenomenon, is not elemental. . . . The deepest level to which psychoanalysis can penetrate when it traces destructiveness . . . is not reached when it has been able to uncover a destructive biological drive, is not reached when the analysand has become aware of the fact that he wants (or wanted) to kill. This awareness is but an intermediate station on the road to the psychological "bedrock": to the analysand's becoming aware of the presence of a serious narcissistic injury, an injury that threatened the cohesion of the self, especially a narcissistic injury inflicted by the self-object of childhood. (1977, pp. 116–17)

Similarly, in his important treatise *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, Fromm (1973) concludes that aggression in both humans and other animals is a response to a threat to survival or vital interests: "phylogenetically programmed aggression, as it exists in animals and

man, is a biologically adaptive, defensive reaction" (pp. 95–96). Fromm poked fun at the way in which Freud and other "instinctivists" have taken a reaction under very specific circumstances and made it into what they presume is a constant pressure.

The impulse to flee plays—neurophysiologically and behaviorally—the same if not a larger role in animal behavior than the impulse to fight.

Neurophysiologically, both impulses are integrated in the same way; there is no basis for saying that aggression is more "natural" than flight. Why, then, do instinctivists talk about the intensity of the innate impulses of aggression, rather than about the innate impulse for flight?

If one were to translate the reasoning of the instinctivists regarding the impulse for fight to that of flight one would arrive at this kind of statement: "Man is driven by an innate impulse to flee; he may try to control this impulse by his reason, yet this control will prove to be relatively inefficient, even though some means can be found that may serve to curb the power of the 'flight instinct'" (pp. 96–97).

AGGRESSION AND THE RELATIONAL FIELD

The culture comprising psychoanalytic ideas, like most intellectual disciplines, grows in dialectical swings. Each psychoanalytic theorist since Freud is trained and comes to intellectual maturity in a professional community composed of preexisting theoretical positions, commitments, and battles. No psychoanalytic theorist builds theory just to express his own thought or to share her clinical findings. Each also selects from the by-now enormous and heterogeneous collections of psychoanalytic perspectives some particular points of reference, with the intent to expand and develop some and to contrast with and argue with others.

The most important and compelling point of reference on any major theoretical issue is Freud. As we have seen, the choice of whether to commit oneself to Freud on the problem of aggression has dominated the course of subsequent theory development. Those who do are free to grant aggression the psychodynamic centrality it seems to deserve in light of the historical significance and universality of human destructiveness. Yet these same theorists are burdened by a vision of human motivation fueled by innate, propulsive aggression, which, as I will argue, is both anachronistic and improbable. Those who have developed approaches to aggression based on the abandonment of drive theory do so

in dialectical contrast to Freud; they tend to portray aggression not as spontaneous but as provoked, not as inevitable but as avoidable, and not as central but as peripheral to the development and structuralization of the self. In the concern to break with Freud on the origins of aggression, they have not dealt satisfactorily with the implications and consequences of aggression.

The bifurcation of psychoanalytic thinking on aggression between drive and non-drive theorists derives partly, like the search for the core of the self considered in the last chapter, on an account of mind in spatial terms common to both approaches. Both groups of theorists portray mind as layered: Some things are more fundamental, underneath; others are more superficial, less basic. For the drive theorist, since aggression is so fundamental in human experience, it must be at the bottom layer of mind, in a powerful and relentless drive. For the non-drive theorist, human beings are regarded as most fundamentally involved with other motives (such as attachment or self-realization). Therefore, aggression must not be foundational and is located in the upper, more superficial layers of mind. If mind is a place, aggression needs to be located somewhere, at the center, or farther out on the periphery. And where one locates aggression in the mind has enormous consequences in terms of how one organizes and prioritizes clinical data.

Consider the question of justification. Is the child's rage and aggression toward the parents an explosive, propulsive event or a reaction to fear and/or intense frustration, a betrayal of the child by the parents? Is the negative transference of the patient brought to the analytic situation pressing for expression or a reaction to intense disappointment provoked by the analyst's way of participating—a betrayal in the analytic situation?

If one believes in an aggressive drive at the core of the self, then intense aggression (toward parents and the analyst) is assumed to be not justified, and really understanding and accepting its nonjustification is the crucial insight that releases patients from infantile conflicts and makes for an emotionally richer life. Accepting the patient's justifications is a collusion with the patient's disclaimers of his own inherent aggressiveness.

If one does not regard aggression as a drive but as a reaction to frustration and disappointment, the aggression itself is not the crucial analytic focus. The aggression is a reaction to the threat to something more central, more basic. The aggression is justified, and the attention shifts to the traumatizing conditions that are understood to precede and underlie it. The patient's understanding of these more fundamental experi-

ences—the hurt, the anxieties, the longing—is what releases her from the need to react to disappointment and betrayal aggressively, making possible a richer emotional life.³

Here I present an alternative approach to the problem of aggression that struggles to avoid the customary two-sided slippery slopes of the positions that have shaped themselves around the question: Is there an aggressive drive, yes or no? My approach is consistent with those who have abandoned the belief in an aggressive drive when it comes to thinking about the origins of aggression, but much closer to those who have maintained the belief in an aggressive drive when it comes to thinking about the universality, depth, and dynamic centrality of aggression. Once again, thinking about self in temporal as well as spatial terms is crucial.

The term aggression has been used to cover the whole range from assertiveness on one end to hostile destructiveness on the other, and in some theoretical systems this may make sense. What follows, however, is a discussion of hostile destructiveness, not assertiveness, which I believe is something quite different. For Freud, the whole continuum derives from the same source—benign assertiveness is a derivative of more primitive aggression, in the same way that love is an aim-inhibited form of sexual wishes. For Kohut, the whole continuum also derives from the same source, but the other way around. When healthy assertiveness is blocked, hostile destructiveness emerges as a deterioration product.

I believe that assertion and destructiveness are distinctly different experiences: Assertion derives from a joyful sense of living and engagement; destructiveness derives from an endangered sense of personal threat and retaliation. Sometimes they are combined, when self-assertion takes place in a context experienced as combative and hostile. But they are distinctly different experiences. I also believe that a different physiology accompanies these two different psychological states; they feel different and lend themselves to distinctly different, even though closely related, clusters of meaning.⁴

Let us begin by reconsidering the larger context in which Freud developed his concept of instinctual drive.

Freud's application of the Darwinian revolution to psychology is one of the most pervasive of his multifaceted contributions (Sulloway, 1983). Darwin locates humans in a broad evolution from lower and more primitive species. What are the implications of this vision for thinking about the human mind? The structural model is a striking microcosmic replica of Darwin's theory of the origin of species. Mind is layered according to its phylogenetic history; more primitive motives

and impulses of the "id," the "seething cauldron," the "savage beast" are overlaid and tamed, regulated and channeled, by "higher," more civilized and social imperatives and compromises of the ego and superego. Libido constitutes our link to our animal past. After 1920, aggression became a second link.

I have argued elsewhere (Mitchell, 1988) that the metapsychological dimension of Freud's theory of sexuality has essentially been superseded. In contrast to his portrayal of drives as continual, endogenous internal pressures, the evoking stimulus is now understood to play a crucial role in both animal and human sexuality. Sexuality, which is a powerful biological and physiological force, emerges inevitably within a relational context, an object world. The evocation of the physiological response, the manner in which the response is experienced, and the form in which it is remembered—these are all shaped by the interpersonal context within which the sexual response arises and takes on psychological meaning.

In this view, sexuality is most usefully regarded not as a push from within (although it is often experienced in just that way) but as a response within a relational field to an object, either external or internal. This does not make sexuality less biological, or minimize its physiological power. Rather, it posits a different understanding of how the biology of sexuality works. Sexuality is a powerful physiological response, biologically mandated and prewired, which emerges within the mutually regulatory, intersubjective, or relational contexts that constitute the medium within which mind develops and operates.

Many of the authors who have rejected the belief in an aggressive drive—including Guntrip, Sullivan, Kohut, and Fromm—have referred to the notion drawn from classic motivation theory of "fight/flight" behavior in response to danger and threat. This kind of approach is also consistent with the major trends in contemporary ethology, where (apart from Konrad Lorenz) aggression tends to be understood not as a spontaneously arising endogenous stimulus but as a reaction to specific stimuli. As the ethologist Robert Hinde (1977) puts it, "each aggressive act lies in a nexis of events that precede and follow it" (p. 5). Those acts, Hinde argues, have "eliciting factors" and "predisposing factors."

What happens if we think about aggression, like sexuality, not as a push from within but as a response to others, biologically mediated and prewired, within a relational context? Then the question of whether there is an aggressive drive or not is replaced by questions concerning the conditions that tend to elicit aggressive responses and the nature and variation of those responses.

Viewing aggression in this way preserves, in a different manner from drive theory, an emphasis on the importance of what the individual brings to the interpersonal field. Anyone who has spent any time around babies knows they are very different from each other, from very early on. There is by now compelling evidence that temperamental differences are present from birth and hold up over time. One of the most important concepts emerging repeatedly from recent infancy and childhood research is the importance of "fit" between the baby's natural rhythms and thresholds and those of the caregiver. All this suggests that whether and in what way a baby feels endangered is likely to vary greatly from baby to baby. All babies feel uncomfortable and insecure some of the time, but there are strikingly different thresholds, from easily ruffled and irritable on the one extreme to centered and peaceful on the other. The response to discomfort and/or frustration also varies greatly from baby to baby, covering a wide range from fussing, to listlessness, to intense rage.

Thus, to characterize aggression as a response does not minimize its biological basis; rather, the biology of aggression is understood to operate not as a drive but as an individually constituted, prewired potential that is evoked by circumstances perceived subjectively as threatening or endangering.⁵

The often-cited observational data on aggression in children published by Henri Parens (1979) bear directly on the question of whether aggression operates as a propulsive force or as a reaction to the experience of danger. Parens spent a great deal of time observing children and looking for evidence of an aggressive drive. He concluded that the capacity to express aggression is a biological given: "the normal-enough neonate is born with a capacity to experience and express rage . . . born with a ready-to-function organization of rage-experience-discharge, which is not acquired" (p. 107). However, this apparatus does not discharge spontaneously from endogenous pressure. Rather, Parens argues, "a unique condition seemed required for rage to appear: *the internally-felt experience of excessive, sufficient unpleasure*" (p. 108). Although he clearly very much wanted to be able to characterize it as a drive, Parens found aggression to be reactive rather than propulsive.

Two other results of Parens's studies are important to note. First, although aggression operates as a reaction to unpleasure, it seems to be universal in all children. Parens was impressed both by "its early appearance and . . . its overriding unavoidability. It appears even in what seems to be excellent child-endowment and child-object circumstances" (p. 106). Although aggression emerges as a reaction to danger and

threat, all babies at times seem to feel endangered and threatened.

Second, Parens considered the question of the goal of aggressive behavior. Does aggression operate as Freud assumes sexuality operates, toward a goal of discharging aggressive energy? No. Parens's observations led him to believe that the goal of aggression is the elimination of the unpleasure that has precipitated it. If the noxious situation is altered, the aggression stops immediately.⁶

According to Parens's observations, only after prolonged experience of aggression generated by chronic unpleasure does aggression sometimes become a goal in itself, resulting in sadism. Therefore, he concludes, aggression may "appear [to be] an instinctual drive, though it is not, since no absolute vegetative generation of hostility exists which must be discharged" (p. 6).

This way of thinking about aggression might be considered in connection with the different kinds of threats and dangers in infancy and early childhood that have been described in various psychoanalytic (and nonpsychoanalytic) developmental theories: separation (John Bowlby), breaks in attunement (Daniel Stern), spiraling physiological need (Freud), parental anxiety (Sullivan), impingement (Winnicott), being interrupted or interfered with (Jerome Kagan), and so on. All these inevitable features of infantile experience are likely to be experienced as endangering; all are likely to generate aggression.

The universality of some experiences of endangerment in infancy and early childhood leads to the inevitable dynamic centrality of aggression. The infant exists in a state of great dependency; even with the best care, there are inevitable periods of distress, helplessness, and longing. How does the infant understand why this is happening? Racker (1968), in a neo-Kleinian account of "paranoid anxiety," reasons that the baby must feel that the good breast is not there because it is being withheld, that the good breast wants the baby to suffer, because if it did not, it would be always available. Thus, the baby feels persecuted (not, as Klein saw it, through projection of his own aggression), but because this is the most natural way for him to construe his situation. His own aggression is then a subsequent response to the feeling of persecution and endangerment.⁷

The conclusion that one's suffering must be intended by another is a recurrent feature not only of infantile but of adult reasoning. The patient feels that the analyst could be more helpful and forthcoming if she really cared. The lover feels his own sense of hurt and neglect are sure signs of faltering love or uncaring on the part of the beloved. The victim, as we might well characterize it, of a run of bad luck feels

"cursed," looking up to the skies, like Job, and demanding to know "Why me?" For all of us occasionally, and for many people chronically, life itself is "cruel," and that very characterization personifies an agent responsible for our experience. We feel treated badly, done to, and are angry in response.

What about people who constantly seem to be looking for a fight and can generate great quantities of rage with seemingly little or no provocation? Are not such people walking evidence of an endogenously arising, propulsive drive? What needs to be considered in such cases is the climate within the internal object world of such individuals, which may very well generate a chronic sense of threat and danger, both within and, through projection and selective attention, from without. With such people, the aggression and sadism have developed way beyond their points of origin into a complex version of the self, but it is a version of the self that is embedded in and sustained by an enduring sense of internal and external danger.

It is important to note that endangerment is a subjective experience, unrelated to what an external observer might evaluate as degrees of danger. And endangerment does not concern just the threat of physical harm but a subjective sense of endangerment to the self as well. Threats to the integrity of the self, as subjectively defined, tend to generate powerful, deeply aggressive reactions. In fact, the pursuit of revenge generated by a need to redress past insults or humiliations often propels people into situations that are physically very dangerous. Much of the political aggression and violence in the world today is connected with nationalistic and ethnic identifications that are rooted in a collective sense of endangerment and past humiliations.

AGGRESSION AND THE BODY

Aggression is an extremely powerful, universally wired (although individually varied), biological response to the subjective experience of endangerment and being treated cruelly. (It is unnecessary to assume actual and/or intentional mistreatment, although many children are actually and/or intentionally mistreated.) Because of the universality of the subjective experience of endangerment, rage and destructiveness are powerful experiences for all of us, playing a crucial role in the shaping and vitalization of the self.

Today the more interesting question for psychoanalytic theorists is not whether there is an aggressive drive or not, but the nature of human

needs and possibilities for relative security and normative responses to insecurity. How secure is the environment created by "good-enough" parents? What is the normal range of narcissistic injury and threat? What is the range of fight/flight reactions to such threats? What internal residues do the original threats leave behind in enduring psychic structures?

Consider this vivid description of aggression in infancy by Joan Riviere:

The baby's typical response, say to acute hunger, is a reaction in which the whole body is involved: screaming, twitching, twisting, kicking, convulsive breathing, evacuations—all evident signs of overwhelming anxiety. Analytic evidence shows without any doubt that this reaction to the accumulated tension represents and is felt to be an *aggressive* discharge, as we should in any case imagine. If this reaction brings the required satisfaction, narcissistic phantasy can resume its sway. But if the desired breast is not forthcoming and the baby's aggression develops to the limit of its bodily capacities, this discharge, which automatically follows upon a painful sensation, itself produces unpleasure in the highest degree. The child is overwhelmed by choking and suffocating; its eyes are blinded with tears, its ears deafened, its throat sore; its bowels gripe, its evacuations burn it. The aggressive anxiety-reaction is far too strong a weapon in the hands of such a weak ego; it has become uncontrollable and is threatening to destroy its owner. (1952, p. 44)

In this evocative description of the infant's rage, written in a Kleinian mode, the rage is seen not as a propulsive force but as a response to a perceived sense of threat and danger, a response that in itself becomes dangerous, problematic, and dynamically central. If feelings are not substances and motives are not layered on top of one another from surface to depth, aggression may be precipitated by other feelings and yet still be a powerful, fundamental, central constituent of emotional life. To regard aggression as a reaction does not necessarily minimize its motivational or structural primacy.⁸

One of the most persuasive arguments of those theorists and clinicians who still find classical drive theory useful is the centrality it gives to sex and aggression. Drive theory explains, in a direct and simple fashion, why patients' lives, in both their actions in the external world and in the private fantasies of their internal worlds, so often are dominated by conflicts involving sex and aggression. Non-drive theories sometimes seem convoluted, contrived, and pallid in their efforts at

demonstrating that what look like primitive sexual impulses or violent destructive fantasies are really expressions of something else, such as object-seeking or assertion. (On the other hand, drive-theory accounts become convoluted and contrived when they claim that phenomena like attachment and assertion are really derivatives of raw sexual and aggressive impulses.)

In *Relational Concepts in Psychoanalysis* (Mitchell, 1988) I argued that sexuality is central and important in human experience because it is a powerful vehicle for establishing and maintaining relational dynamics. The power of sexuality derives very directly from its sheer physicality, which enables sexual arousal to preempt other concerns, generate an enormous sense of urgency, and provide powerful, transformative experiences.

The same is true of aggression. Non-drive theorists generally do not take into account how exciting, how stimulating aggression can be. Aggression is a psychological experience embedded in and accompanied by a physiological surge. As the passage from Riviere just quoted suggests, the body aspect of the experience is very important. Intense anger is arresting and preemptive. When unintegrated, it can shatter and diffuse other concerns and intentions, generating mental disorganization. When integrated, it can generate and energize other motives and actions. Aggression, like sexuality, often provides the juice that potentiates and embellishes experience.⁹

The physiological charge that accompanies intense aggression often plays an important role in the way in which aggression serves as a vehicle for identification. It is precisely because aggression generates hormonal surges that alter experience, changing states of mind, that it often facilitates identificatory ties to significant others. This is most obvious in men, where identifications mediated through aggression serve as a dimension of what is now popularly referred to as "male bonding."

Recall Robert's crucial, hidden identification with his father, transformed into a desperate search for a man who would be able to introduce him to his own manhood. In Robert's volcano dream, he located his own rage far away from himself, across a vast plain. He had not been able to find a way to draw on that experience, that energy, without threatening his very sense of existence. His own rage was identified with his father's family-smashing defiance, and it was only in analysis that Robert began to find a way to lend structure to those feelings, to draw them together with his loving feelings and his ongoing sense of self.

None of this requires an antiquated view of aggression as an autonomous, relentless endogenous force. By redefining drive as a psycho-

physiological reaction in a relational context rather than an extrapsychological push deriving from the body, it is possible to retain the body-based centrality of aggression without the anachronistic drive metapsychology.

The bodily states accompanying aggression, in which one's sense of self is transformed by altered physiology ("I don't know what came over me"), often make aggressive, destructive versions of self difficult to integrate and contain alongside of other versions of self. This is particularly difficult for women in our culture, where acceptable levels of aggression are so closely tied to gender stereotypes. Where aggressive men are considered "macho," a term reflecting considerable ambivalence, aggressive women are considered "bitchy," a thoroughly negative designation. Women who are aggressive toward men also are frequently called "castrating," which reflects implicit assumptions about who is allowed what versions of self. It is as if such a woman, by acting aggressively, is taking away something, something very important, that belongs to men, that makes a man a man. For men, on the other hand, passive and yielding versions of self are often extremely dangerous, because gender identity as a male is so often tied to aggression and the powerful surges of aggressive states of mind.

AGGRESSION IN A RELATIONAL CONTEXT: JUSTIFICATION RECONSIDERED

Regarding aggression as a biologically based response to subjectively perceived endangerment allows us to keep what is most helpful about the two polarized traditional approaches to aggression.¹⁰ From the drive theory side comes the notion that aggression is biologically based, physiologically powerful, and universal, playing an inevitable and central dynamic role in the generation of experience and the shaping of the self. From the non-drive theory side comes the notion that aggression is a response to endangerment within a personally designed subjective world, not a prepsychological push looking for a reason.

Aggression in childhood and in the analytic situation is always both justified and unjustified. Because it is a response, not a push, aggression is always subjectively justified in that it always has reasons, meanings related to the perception of threat or danger. These are not post-hoc rationales for discharge; they are the actual triggers for the aggressive response. If there is aggression, there is, by definition, threat. (The development of this principle has been one of the most important contribu-

tions of Kohut; it was anticipated by Sullivan [for example, 1956, pp. 95-98].)

Yet because the response to endangerment is a prewired, individually styled one, arising in the context of a subjectively constructed world, aggression is never simply reducible to its external causes. There is always more to say; acknowledging the subjective perception of an empathic failure, for example, is not enough. The reasons never fully explain or account for the response, which can be fully understood only in the context of an analytic inquiry into the structure of the analysand's subjectivity: the personal world, both external and internal, in which the analysand lives and reacts, lovingly and aggressively. Chronic aggression is continually regenerated in the context of ongoing commitments to internal object relations and familiar patterns of integrating interpersonal relations.

We all expect to find in new situations what we have experienced in the past and what we carry around internally. But even the most regressed schizophrenic is not wholly out of touch with actuality. We all selectively find and sometimes induce the patterns we anticipate, and although they may be highly selective, our interpretations of these situations are always compelling and plausible, at least to us (Gill, 1982).

For many patients—perhaps for all in some way—the analytic situation is reasonably construed as extremely dangerous and threatening to the integrity of the self. No matter how neutral or empathic the analyst is trying to be, there is always ample evidence of danger, including, perhaps, the analyst's need to be regarded as neutral and/or empathic.¹¹ To regard aggression as a drive (in Freud's and Kernberg's sense) and therefore, by definition, as distorting and unjustified, demands wrenching it from its psychological context of endangerment, forcing either a compliance to or defiance of the analyst's interpretations, generally both.

On the other hand, there are people for whom aggression has become a way of life, whose sense of self and connection with others is vitalized through hatred. Analysands come to the analytic situation not only with good intentions but also with bad and destructive ones. The latter always feel subjectively necessary and may be plausibly justified; yet to regard that aggression as simply a defense against frustration of more fundamental, benign motives may draw the patient away from some of the deep roots of her being. Neglecting the central place of aggression within human motivation and psychic structure may engender a splitting of both internal world and external relationships into the "sensitive" (including the more conscious aspects of self in relation to the analyst) and the villainous (generally including the more unconscious

aspects of the self in relation to dissociated identifications with the parents).¹²

ATTACKS AGAINST THE SELF: VICTIM AND EXECUTIONER

George, a moderately successful salesman in his mid-forties and the father of two young sons, had been in a series of nonanalytic therapies, none of which had relieved him of his deep self-hatred and profound doubts about his own value as a person. He began treatment by describing a sense of inner weakness, a feeling that he had long ago withdrawn from the real world; his considerable skills and successes were false contrivances, a mimicking of the strong mentors he attached himself to. He would attack himself mercilessly for his incompetencies and ignorance and continually express a plaintive lament of "too late" regarding any real possibility for change. George was a broken spirit, "damaged goods," thoroughly and irreversibly.

His father was a passive man, very much in the shadows in the home. His mother was very effective, intimidating, and explosive; she felt she could accomplish anything, loved to fight, and took care of her children in a fiercely protective fashion. One prototypical memory concerned his ride on a roller coaster when he was quite small. George had gone on the ride with his older brother, but as soon as the roller coaster picked up speed, he became quite scared, probably like everyone else on a roller coaster for the first time. His mother, down on the ground, perceived his fear and, to the great amazement of all, managed, through her great insistence and persuasiveness, to get the operator to stop the roller coaster and bring her boy back to the ground slowly and carefully. This feat, roughly equivalent to stopping the earth's rotation, left him feeling both humiliated and profoundly taken care of.

My initial experience in the countertransference was an uncomfortable feeling that I was being called upon to witness his self-flagellation. Any effort to intervene in his systematic attacks on himself, to protect him from himself, to call for mercy, were totally ineffective. We realized that my position was a re-creation of his own early experiences as more or less helpless witness to his mother's attacks on both his father and his older brother, but that realization did not seem to change anything. George would criticize himself mercilessly, and any attempt I made to intervene on his behalf, to plead for greater generosity or tolerance for himself, were basically regarded as indications of misguided benevolence or lack of understanding. At those points, the aggression and con-

tempt implicit in his attitude toward me became quite explicit. So I gave up and learned to tolerate the helplessness and sadism generated in the countertransference. He felt that although nothing was changing and probably nothing could, we were dealing with his pain at a deeper level than had been possible in any of his previous treatments.

Certain things became clear about his aggression toward himself. The original model for this critical rage and unyielding perfectionism was his mother. George had felt abjectly dependent upon her protection, despite the fact that it made him feel perpetually worthless. I pointed out that her protection seemed to operate like the "protection" sold in extortion by the Mafia—you pay them to protect you from them. He felt greatly endangered by his mother and her intimidating, critical strength and also that his only safety lay in surrendering to her care.

In his current life, George would seek out mentors to apprentice himself to. They would give advice, which he would use in a self-deprecating fashion, desperately needing the guidance but berating himself for never knowing what to do on his own. I began to become interested in some of these exchanges. I pointed out that often the advice he would get from his current mentor was inconsistent with previous declarations, so that there was no way for him ever to really learn to do anything on his own. The solution kept changing. It became clear that the content of the solution was irrelevant. What was important was the certainty with which the advice was given; it was the deep conviction in the other person that made him feel safe. George then lapsed into an extended criticism of himself for his spineless, wishy-washy ways: He is a jerk who has never felt certain about anything.

I noted, somewhat admiringly, that there was one thing he had felt very certain about for a long time—that he was a loser. I had begun to feel genuinely impressed with his high standards and his dedication to them, against which his status as a loser was determined. That intrigued him very much and served as a point of departure for both of us to become much more interested in and identified with the version of him that criticized, berated, and punished himself rather than the version of him that was the damaged victim of those attacks. Interestingly, toward the end of that session he lapsed into an extended silence, which he later described as an extremely peaceful state in which he was listening to the birds outside my window and just enjoying being, an experience he allowed himself very rarely. The tone of subsequent sessions began to shift slowly; he started to bring in different kinds of experiences, including moments of pleasure, pride in some of his accomplishments, assertion and anger used effectively against others, including me.

The considerable rage generated in this man's childhood was tightly organized around his identification with his mother, who loomed larger than life as both his endangerer and his protector. The only safe forum for his aggression was his self-directed attacks. George recognized himself only as the victim of those attacks, not the tormentor. My counter-transferential shift from identifying with him as victim to identifying with him as tormentor seemed to open up the possibility for him to relax his self-attacks, to start to claim his aggression, his own certainty, his own perfectionism, and, eventually, his own prideful effectiveness.

At the heart of the resolution of each analysis is an individually crafted or, considering the role of the analyst, jointly coauthored movement beyond either/or solutions to the problem of justification. The analysand is more able fully to identify with and experience as justified his aggression and destructiveness. At the same time, the analysand is able to appreciate his reactions as an individually styled, creative adaptation to a limiting and limited set of circumstances. He now has greater resources, broader options, the possibility of more constructive solutions.

AGGRESSION AND THE SELF

What is the place of aggression within the development of personality in general? One might think of aggression as a relatively ad hoc, transitory reaction, similar to a discharge, which serves to reestablish a threatened self whose equilibrium has been undermined by narcissistic injury and threat. (Kohut took this position in his important 1972 paper on narcissistic rage and revenge. He argued that it is more useful to address aggression indirectly, rather than directly, by focusing on the narcissistic injury that disturbs the equilibrium of the self, which the aggression functions to shore up.) This view posits an essentially singular, coherent if brittle self, with aggression as a bolstering device.

I find it more compelling to think of aggression not as bolstering a singular, essentially nonaggressive self but as a central organizing component among multiple self-organizations. In this view, all of us experience enough danger and threat in childhood, regardless of the balance of health or pathology in our caregivers, to have experienced at least a fair amount of destructive aggression. It is universal to hate, contemplate revenge against, and want to destroy those very caregivers we also love. Therefore, multiple self-organizations develop, in different relationships with different significant others, and with different dimensions of the same significant other. It is normative for these different self-

organizations to remain somewhat discrete from and in inevitable conflict with each other.

All patients (and all analysts as well) are likely to experience, either consciously or unconsciously, one or more versions of themselves as quite destructive, sadistic, and vengeful. The aggression operates not only as a temporary equilibrating device but as a version of the patient with its own history, worldview, values, and interests. One important task of the analysis is to create an atmosphere in which that version of self can come to life, become known, so that the patient can become better able to contain and to be reconciled with various versions of the self, including destructive versions. From this perspective, one cannot simply work on or through aggression indirectly (as Kohut suggests), because in so doing, one bypasses a full immersion in and conscious processing of an important domain of self experience.

Is it desirable that hostile aggression be more or less eliminated at the end of a successful analysis? Both drive and non-drive theorists tend to overlook the constructive, arousing, enlivening features of hostility: Drive theorists regard aggression as something to be renounced and controlled; non-drive theorists think aggression fades as the threat to the self is diminished.

In my view, each of us maintains destructive versions of self. Endangerment is an unalterable and perpetual feature of human existence. Destructive versions of self are not, at the end of analysis, subsumed by a more loving version. They remain intact, with their own physicality, their own developmental history, their own worldview. Arriving at a sense that "I am a basically loving person who sometimes, atypically, gets angry and hateful when threatened" is not an ideal ending of an analysis. Such an ending leaves out too much and smooths over a great deal that is potentially vitalizing and enriching in aggressive experience. A more ideal ending involves a sense that "I exist in different states of mind at different times, some loving, some hateful." A more meaningful sense of continuity and integrity of experience over time entails not a tucking in or concealment of aggression into a preferred, loving view of self but an increased ability to recognize, hold, and work through aggressive states. What changes is one's ability to contain destructive states of mind and to recognize them as one among many expressions of a distinctively subjective and potentially constructive personal experience.¹³

In a deeply analytic experience, analysands learn to appreciate the destructiveness that is so central to the experience of self and the always-present underside to the capacity to love. Only by embracing one's de-

structiveness can one transcend it through forgiveness and reparation toward real others, internal objects, and ultimately, the self. The drive models of aggression have contributed to our understanding of the profound significance of destructiveness in human motivation and its centrality in the shaping of the self. The non-drive models of aggression have contributed to our understanding of the subjective context within which rage and destructiveness arise. Good analysts of any persuasion probably work in both realms and generally regard their theory as adequately comprehensive. Yet in my view, the polarization around the concept of an aggressive drive has precluded the development of a perspective that grants aggression the centrality it needs while placing it in its original context of an endangered self, which makes possible its fully analytic resolution.

III

THE ANALYTIC RELATIONSHIP

8. Thus, Warren Poland decries those who see various psychoanalytic models as competing with each other, in contrast to those more helpful theorists who "strove to integrate."

Many of the "interpersonalists" in the middle of the century, like many in new schools now, saw themselves as their generation's revolutionaries. Then, like now, new conceptions which might have enriched analytic understanding often served to screen out unconscious forces. (in Jacobs, 1991, p. xii)

9. This is a common but very serious misreading. Kuhn argues that the choice between paradigms is not purely a question of logic or evidence, because different paradigms are concerned with different problems and have their own logical and evidential signature. But this does imply that Kuhn thinks choice between paradigms is irrational. "Kuhn always intended to distinguish forms of rational persuasion in argumentation that take place in scientific communities from those irrational forms of persuasion that he has been accused of endorsing" (Bernstein, 1983, p. 53). Kuhn regards work within the paradigms themselves, in either normal or evolutionary science, as necessarily rational, if they are to be considered scientific. This is not "a model of rationality that searches for determinate rules which can serve as necessary and sufficient conditions" but "a model of practical rationality that emphasizes the role of exemplars and judgmental interpretation" (Bernstein, 1983, p. 57).
10. For example:

Psychoanalysis, Freud once said, is a cure through love. On the manifest level, Freud meant that psychoanalytic therapy requires the analysand's emotional engagement with the analyst and the analyst's empathic understanding of his patient. But the latent content of this remark, which Freud only gradually discovered, and then through a glass darkly, is that psychoanalysis in its essence promotes individuation. (Lear, 1990, p. 27)

CHAPTER 4

1. The key concept in Harry Stack Sullivan's "interpersonal psychiatry," developed in the 1930s and 1940s, was the "self-system." The object relations theory developed in the 1940s and the 1950s by Fairbairn uses the traditional term ego, but his libidinal ego and antilibidinal ego were a far cry from Freud's use of the term and more properly termed "selves." Winnicott, who has had an enormous impact on contempo-

- rary psychoanalytic thinking, was concerned, more than anything else, with the authenticity versus falseness of self-experiences. Melanie Klein's seminal work implicitly shifted from a framework based on impulses as the fundamental units of mind to selves (good and bad) as the basic units, a shift that became explicit in the neo-Kleinian work of Racker and current Kleinian- (and Winnicottian-) inspired writers like Ogden. Finally, the contributions of the most important writers within more mainstream psychoanalytic thought, like Loewald and Schafer, have been concerned most fundamentally with various aspects of the concept of the self. And the self has been the central domain of Kohut and post-Kohut self psychologists.
2. It has been noted that Freud used no term systematically that is easily translated into "self." Freud's *ich*, and Strachey's Latinized translation into "ego," sometimes refers to the person as a whole, sometimes to a specific function or set of functions. From this perspective, Freud had no use for another term, since there is no "self" as such, only the person and specific functions of the person.
3. The self also has been a major focus in virtually all contemporary intellectual disciplines: philosophy (Taylor, 1989), social and cognitive psychology (Curtis, 1991), literary theory, and politics. My concern here is exclusively with the self in psychoanalysis.
4. For example, David Rapaport (1957) defines structure as a "relatively stable (having a slow rate of change) characteristic configuration that we can abstract from the behavior observed" (p. 701).
5. In the discussion that follows I am indebted to Schafer (1976, 1983, 1992) for his critique of spatial metaphors and his rethinking the nature of mind in his work on action language and narrative. However, Schafer tends to present his contributions as merely extensions and clarifications of preexisting Freudian theory, in a clearer, less muddled, less scientized form. I believe that thinking about mind in temporal as well as spatial terms (encompassing action and narrative) leads to a quite different understanding of mind, self, psychopathology, and the analytic process than Freud ever envisioned. I am thus extending some of Schafer's original insights in ways he himself did not pursue.

Although he has abandoned drive theory metapsychology, Schafer has always been loath to replace it with a systematic alternative, such as, for example, a comprehensive relational metapsychology. (See Mitchell, 1988.) Consequently, many of his emphases (for example, on sexuality and aggression) seem arbitrary and not persuasively grounded or justified. In his early contributions (1968, 1976), Schafer found little use for the concept of the "self," which he re-

- garded as an illusory derivative of infantile experience employed in the service of disclaiming action. In his latest contributions (1992), Schafer has seemingly reluctantly granted the self a central place in the development of "narrative" accounts of the actions that constitute experience. Yet because he does not envision self in the context of a relational matrix, Schafer's "self" narratives have an oddly cognitive and arbitrary tone. A key difference between his approach and mine is that Schafer envisions a single narrator of multiple selves who seemingly operates outside of relational configurations; I envision multiple narratives told always from a perspective deeply embedded in an affectively charged relational context. This makes relationships with others not as easy simply to rewrite as Schafer seems to suggest. Schafer similarly (and in my view mistakenly) grants the analyst total narrative freedom and control by placing the analyst outside the transference/countertransference interaction. (See Hoffman's [1992] critique of Schafer as a "limited constructivist.")
6. Matisse, as a painter, described the same contrast from the other side. The artist should avoid narrative description, he argued. His "work of art must carry within itself its complete significance and impose that on the beholder even before he recognizes the subject matter" (quoted in Elderfield 1992).
 7. I am indebted to Neil Altman (personal communication) for this analogy and for helping me work out my thinking about the dialectical relationship between spatial and temporal accounts of self.
 8. I am borrowing this example from a discussion of self from a somewhat different angle in Polly Young-Eisendrath and James Hall (1987).
 9. *The person's self is the history of many internal relations. . . . there is no one unified mental phenomenon that we can term self. . . . The concept of self should refer to the positions or points of view from which and through which we sense, feel, observe and reflect on distinct and separate experiences in our being. One crucial point of view comes through the other who experiences us.* (Bollas, 1987, pp. 9-10)
 10. Daphne Socarides and Robert Stolorow (1984) argue that splitting in the child may be derived from the parents' perception of the child as "split" and discontinuous (p. 71). Ogden (1989) has suggested that demands for allegiances by a parent may greatly affect the possibility for containing and integrating "masculine" and "feminine" dimensions of the self. And Harold Searles (1986) has pointed out how "disharmoniously-wedded parents have counterparts (however much

- exaggerated or otherwise distorted) in comparable poorly-married parental introjects" (pp. 195-96).
11. Van der Kolk (1989) has recently reviewed studies pointing to the underlying physiology of attachment. Networks of endorphin releasers are laid down in the early months of life in the context of attachment to caregivers with different styles of caregiving. One could extend this line of thought to speculate about whether different versions of self developed in different important early relationships correspond to subtle but important differences in physiological function.
 12. Both Ogden (1989) and Jay Greenberg (1991) have recently argued that the patient at the end of analysis has a richer, more varied, but not necessarily more homogeneous experience.
 13. Theorists coming from traditions in which the self is viewed in spatial terms as integral, continuous, and layered sometimes criticize object relations theorists and interpersonal theorists for lacking a theory of psychic structure. Kernberg (1980, p. 42), for example, drawing on metaphors from Freudian ego psychology, sees Melanie Klein's theory as lacking for precisely this reason. Yet this is not simply an omission. Kleinian theory presupposes a much more fluid, temporal vision of mind as shifting from one self-organization to another, not the stable, layered self of Kernberg's ego psychological model.
 14. This kind of approach both to mind and self has interesting parallels in many other areas of contemporary science: in Lewis Thomas's (1974) biology, in which the individual is viewed as a symbiotic community of organisms; in Gerald Edelman's (1987) "neural Darwinism," in which networks of neurons with different patterns of organizing the external world compete for dominance; in Michael Gazzaniga's (1985) neuroscience, in which the brain is pictured as a social organization composed of modules; and in Marvin Minsky's (1985) artificial intelligence, in which the mind is understood to be composed of collections of quasi-independent agents.
 15. The exclusivity and simplicity in which Kohut sometimes presents his injunction for the analyst to empathize with the patient's subjective point of view (which he generally equates with this positive developmental striving) have led to some confusion about how this applies to the patient's multiple, conflictual, and unconscious points of view. Does the analyst remain attuned and empathic only with what the patient consciously experiences and wants? What about the analyst's response to experiences and needs that are unconscious and disclaimed? Suggestions have appeared in recent self-psychological literature that when the analyst interprets unconscious content or confronts the patient with ideas that are discrepant with what the patient thinks or

feels, this response is truly "empathic" as well, because it reflects an empathy with what the patient "really" needs. In this way, empathy is being defined post hoc in terms of what turns out well, and the original meaning of the empathic attitude as a resonance with and confirmation of the patient's own consciously felt experience of her own subjective point of view has been totally lost. These recent lines of development in self psychology sometimes seem to be approaching a notion of multiple subjectivities, multiple versions of the self.

16. Daniel Stern (1985) argues that a "sense of a core self" is built up out of what he describes as "self-invariants," involving experiences of agency, coherence, affectivity, and continuity, combining together to create a sense of one's own subjective perspective.
17. In a similar vein, William Grossman (1982) argues that what he calls the "self-concept" is a fantasy, but a fantasy that plays a central role in organizing experience and guiding behavior.
18. The neurophysiologist Horace Barlow (1987) argues that:

the infant brain must build a model of what it is interacting with. . . . Thus the content and validity of introspection can be enlarged, but only by social experience leading to the incorporation of models of other people's minds. . . . Thus consciousness becomes the forum, not of a single mind, but of the social group with whom the individual interacts. (p. 373)

19. There are important similarities between the temporal view of mind presented here and the view of mind developed over the centuries in eastern philosophy and meditation. In the Buddhist notion of "mindfulness," for example, mind is explored as process, with apparently substantial selfness revealed as transitory and illusory. (See, for example, Epstein, 1990.) In the more psychoanalytic perspective developed here, self-organizations, even if shifting, multiple, and rife with reified spatial metaphors, are regarded as extremely durable, important, and worthy of detailed investigation. Whereas the Buddhist ideal involves a letting go of content and a surrender to process, the analytic ideal involves a dialectic between an exploration and immersion in content and a freedom to move past it in the flow of experience. This dialectic is very much what Winnicott had in mind in his discussions of "play."

The struggle to find the best way to grasp the dialectic between continuity and discontinuity is also an important theme in western philosophy and can be traced back to the pre-Socratics. Heraclitus' river is never the same from moment to moment, yet it remains the same river; the flame of the candle changes constantly, yet it retains the same form.

20. Could we equate the experience of self as integral and continuous with consciousness and the organization of self into multiple and discontinuous patterns with the unconscious? No. Multiple organizations of self are not infrequently experienced simultaneously in consciousness ("I am of two minds about it"). Conversely, the experience of the self as integral and continuous sometimes can be inaccessible to consciousness. There are people who experience themselves as dealing with each interpersonal situation as a threat requiring a particular adaptation. It may be only after a considerable time in analysis that an experience of self emerges that suggests a continuity and consistency across those different adaptations.

Similarly, we cannot simply equate the concept of self as integral and continuous with "subjectivity" and the concept of self as multiple and discontinuous with "objectivity" or observable, patterned variations in behavior. There often is an objective integrity and continuity to the way a person functions across different relational contexts (apparent to an external observer), apart from his own subjective experience of that continuity. It is often of extreme analytic importance and utility for the patient to realize that while he has experienced himself as dealing with various people in different ways, each on his or her own terms, he actually has been acting in a quite repetitive, stereotyped fashion. Conversely, the multiple, discontinuous configurations that may, in an objective sense, constitute patterns of behavior also are important components (either consciously or unconsciously) in the fabric of subjective experience.

Finally, we cannot simply equate the distinction between multiple and discontinuous selves and an integral and continuous self with the distinction in Freudian ego psychology between self-representations and ego. Although the traditional terms can be reworked in this way (both Fast, 1990, and Greenberg, 1991, independently have recently proposed just such a reworking), what I have been describing is different both connotatively and denotatively from the way these terms have been used traditionally. The term *representation* has a cognitive connotation; representations are conceptual images of certain types of experience on a more abstract, cognitive plane. The multiple versions of self I have been describing are more than representations. They are not ideas in the mind; nor are they aspects of the person—feelings, impulses, or values. They are dynamic versions of the person herself; they embody active patterns of experience and behavior, organized around a particular point of view, a sense of self, a way of being, which underlie the ordinary phenomenological sense we have of ourselves as integral. (See also Grotstein, 1977.) Each version does all the things generally attributed to the "ego."

The sense of self as integral and continuous certainly can be encompassed within the term *ego*, but it has a very different place in contemporary theorizing than “ego” does in classical ego psychology. In the latter, the major dynamic scene of the action is in structural, drive-related conflict. The conscious and preconscious sense of self, assignable to the ego, is an epiphenomenon of unconscious conflict resolution. In postclassical theorizing, the self-forming process is a central dynamic scene of the action in its own right and has conscious, preconscious, and unconscious dimensions. As we have seen in chapter 1, the engagement of the patient in a fashion that will help generate and confirm a sense of continuity of personal experience has become an essential feature of contemporary psychoanalytic technique.

21. This is language in what Sullivan (1938) terms the “syntactic” mode, established through the process of “consensual validation”: “the words have been stripped of as much as possible of the accidents of their personal history in you, and it is by that process that they come to be so peculiarly impersonal” (p. 213).
22. In this analytic mode, language serves the purpose of conveying what Kohut (1984) termed, in defining empathy, “vicarious introspection”: “the capacity to think and feel oneself into the inner life of another person” (p. 82).
23. Loewald (1976) was interested in embellishing precisely these qualities of language that Sullivan aimed at stripping away: “The emotional relationship to the person from whom the word is learned plays a significant, in fact crucial, part in how alive the link between thing and word turns out to be” (p. 197).
24. Racker (1968) captures this dialectic between unity and multiplicity in the relationship between the analyst and analysand as the analytic process deepens and the patient becomes more able to use the analyst’s input:

With this greater activity and freedom the analyst includes himself more in the psychoanalytic process, and likes to do so; thus, the transference and countertransference experiences become more intensely mobilized and enriched. His passivity gives place to a greater interchange of roles with the patient, analyst and patient oscillating to a higher degree between listening and speaking, between passivity and activity, between femininity and masculinity; and thus the infantile psychosexual conflicts are analyzed as they are manifested in these aspects of the analyst-patient relationship. (p. 180)

CHAPTER 5

1. It is important to note that the slogan “return to Freud” often serves more as a rhetorical device than a genuine preservation of Freud’s original concepts. The “Freud” who is returned to is often one fashioned along contemporary lines. Consider, for example, the striking differences between Freud’s drives, embedded in nineteenth-century biology and Newtonian physics, and Lacan’s version of Freud, embedded in twentieth-century structural linguistics. This is why Schafer (1992) suggests that “‘Back to Freud!’ is perhaps the greatest rhetorical ploy of all. The advisor is saying ‘Back to my Freud; repress the rest’” (p. 152).
2. Chodorow (1980) suggests that “the central core of self is, internally, a relational ego, a sense of self-in-good-relationship” (p. 427).
3. In most realms of contemporary thought impacted upon by “post-modernism,” the traditional polarity between nature and nurture has been thrown into question. The assumption of either separate “drives” or an autonomous “culture” is no longer tenable. In fact, the very concept of “nature” (as well as “culture”) held at any particular historical time is best viewed itself as a construction.
4. For this reason, I do not find helpful Bollas’s (1993) claim that “each infant is born with a personality.” Surely genetic differences in constitution and temperament are crucial, but “personality” for me presupposes an interpersonal field wherein genetic and environmental factors are forged into interactive patterns and character structure.
5. These issues concerning early development are an exact parallel to the issues discussed in chapter 2 regarding the analyst’s inevitable impact on the development of the patient’s self experience in the analytic process.
6. An interesting variant of the developmental strategy has been developed recently by Malcolm Slavin and Daniel Kriegman (1989), who have proposed a new paradigm for psychoanalysis derived from evolutionary biology and broad considerations concerning genetics and adaptation.

They suggest that Freud’s concept of endogenous instinctual drives, representing peremptory, aggressively self-interested, asocial, exclusively personal needs, can be thought to refer to that aspect of the personality that shapes and maintains the self as individual versus the self as embedded in a relational matrix: “In the drives we have a mechanism that guarantees access to some types of motivation that arise from non-relational sources and are, in a sense, totally dedicated toward the promotion of our individual interests” (p. 37).

A close reading suggests that Slavin and Kriegman alter Freud's notion of "drives" in order to make it work within their larger scheme:

Drives, and the structural model of drive-defense conflict, assume a subsidiary role within a larger, relationally designed and configured psyche. But, to the extent that the classical agenda is read as a "narrative of conflict," it captures certain major, significant features of the relational world and the inherently "divided" way we are adapted to it. (p. 47)

"Drives" relocated and reset into a relationally configured psyche are no longer Freud's "drives," prewired, endogenous pressures whose meaning is represented within the mind unmediated by the semiotic, metaphoric meaning systems of the relational world. Once again, the effort to portray a part of the psyche as separate from, prior to, and sheltered from the interactive, mutually regulatory structures of the relational matrix proves problematic.

7. Bollas (1987) argues that there is no purely generic "holding environment"; the particularities of the individual mother's handling of the baby become the existential medium of the baby's world and are structured into the developing child's personal idiom.
8. Sullivan's (1953) basic motivational distinction between the need for interpersonal security and needs for satisfaction reflects this duality. More recently, both Greenberg (1991) and Spezzano (1993) have made the conflict between self-development, self-expression, or self-reaction on the one hand and the safety provided by affiliation on the other the centerpiece of their motivational theories.
9. Farber (1976, chap. 12), from which the second epigraph at the beginning of this chapter is drawn, provides a wonderful account of the deceptiveness of revelatory models of insight. Similarly, Masud Khan (1963) alerts us to the elusiveness of the "true" self and chides Guntrip for having fallen prey to the seductive "danger of romantization of a pure self system" (p. 304).
10. Winnicott (1968) suggests that the capacity to "use" the other is a precondition for fully passionate experience.
11. For example, Greenberg (1991) notes: "David Rapaport made a great deal of the importance of the drives in protecting people from passive submission to external pressures. He wrote that our innate drive endowment guarantees autonomy from the environment; it provides our ultimate 'safeguard from stimulus-response slavery'" (p. 39).

12. The ideal balance between self-definition and membership in a social unit varies from culture to culture—consider, for example, the contrast between our more individually oriented western tradition and the supraindividual units of eastern traditions—and from individual to individual, with probable roots in temperament.
13. Loewald (1978) defines the self as "an atonement structure," shaped in a context of inevitable generational conflict, and repeatedly depicts the richest form of experience as one that overcomes the compulsive separation between self and other, inside and outside, on different levels of organization. Philip Bromberg (1991) has similarly noted the fluidity of the relationship between internality and externality in health and their forced separation in serious forms of psychopathology.

Most people take their own subjective states of interiority for granted, and can routinely accept the fact that there is more to them than meets the eye as a mental state that joins them to the rest of mankind without intrinsic emotional isolation. They can be both in the world and separate from it as a unitary experience that blends selfhood and relatedness. Others, more developmentally fragmented, protect their subjective interiors as a lifelong task of emotional survival, while paying the price of never-ending efforts at self-validation, or desperate aloneness. (p. 400)

14. Thus, Taylor (1991) argues against what he calls the "monological ideal." Our identities are always defined "in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the identities our significant others want to recognize in us. And even when we outgrow some of the latter—our parents, for instance—and they disappear from our lives, the conversation with them continues within us as long as we live" (p. 33).
15. Bromberg (1991, p. 417*n*) points to the danger of "adult-erating" the patient if the experiential reality of the self as preverbal baby is not acknowledged and worked with in its own terms. Emmanuel Ghent (1991) makes a similar point about the subjective reality of the patient's experience of self as baby.
16. Daniel Stern (1985) suggests that what he calls different "senses" of self—emergent, core, intersubjective, and verbal—are not passed through sequentially in stages but coexist together in adult experience. Ogden (1989) argues that what he terms the "autistic-contiguous" mode of experience, involving a basic kinesthetic sense of sensory continuity and embodiment, operates in a continual, dialectical interplay with paranoid-schizoid and depressive modes of organizing experience.

17. Certain people feel that, at a point in their childhood, time stopped in any personally meaningful sense. When such patients regress to that developmental fixation point, they can experience a reanimation of time (Joseph Newirth, personal communication).
18. This represents an essential narrowing of Sullivan's interpersonal theory, from which it is derived. Sullivan took great pains to describe ways in which interactions are structured through "personifications" of self and others.
19. This position is also found in some versions of self psychology (such as Goldberg) but not in others, where there is an increasing focus on interaction (for example, in the "intersubjective perspective" of Stolorow and his collaborators).
20. Some more progressive contemporary Freudians (for example, Jacobs, 1991), while still committed to a one-person perspective, allow for the importance of different degrees of interaction and the analyst's more personal experience, while all the time affirming the central priority of the one-person framework.
21. See Mitchell (1980) for an extensive treatment of the relationship between the intrapsychic and the interpersonal in Sullivan's contributions. There I suggest that it is most useful to regard people as simultaneously self-regulatory and field-regulatory. See Beatrice Beebe and Frank Lachmann (1992) for a similar approach.
22. James Fosshage (1992) has recently argued for a more interpersonal approach to countertransference combined with an essentially self-psychological perspective.
23. The concern with what the analyst is feeling also becomes a key factor in approaches drawing on Klein's concept of projective identification, particularly as amended by Bion. Here the patient communicates largely through unconscious fantasies of placing sectors of her experience into the analyst's mind; the analyst knows about these processes largely through their impact on the analyst's own experience. Bollas and other members of the British Independent group have reworked Bion's contributions on projective identification together with Winnicott's (1949) important contribution on "objective countertransference."
24. The importance of the analyst's offering herself to be used as an object by the patient as developed by the British Independent group has been an important counterpoint to the emphasis on the analyst's establishment of her own personal subjectivity in analytic interaction in American interpersonal psychoanalysis.
25. See Michael Tansey and Walter Burke (1989) for a helpful effort to sort out the useful from the not so useful in the analyst's experience.

CHAPTER 6

1. They also introduced the concept of drive neutralization, through which the aggressive drive becomes stripped of its primitive, propulsive qualities and used by the ego for its conflict-free operations.
2. While Hartmann and other Freudian ego psychologists use the concept of "neutralization" to portray the development of the self out of modulated and de-aggressivized energy, Klein sees primitive aggression as with us always.
3. The importance of the question of justification in the polarization of psychoanalytic positions around the issue of an aggressive drive is dramatically illustrated by the positions taken on this question by Kernberg (1984) on the one side and Stolorow, Brandschaft, and Atwood (1987) on the other. Each side regards the other theory as not just wrong but as exacerbating the patient's problems and leading to the worst possible mishandling of the patient's aggression.

Kernberg sees the rejection of instinct theory in favor of a theory of environmental failure by self psychology and many versions of object relations theory as equivalent to a rejection of the biological basis of human development. They lead, in Kernberg's view (1984, pp. 187-89), to an inevitable neglect of the clinical importance of aggression and unconscious conflict, particularly in terms of understanding the transference. Through his eyes, aggression is not a response to a situation, but an unjustified, distorted, prestructured set of proclivities brought to a situation. The abandonment of the theory of an aggressive drive leads to a failure to interpret these proclivities, causing the non-drive analyst to coddle the patient in a very nonanalytic fashion.

Stolorow, Brandschaft, and Atwood (1987) do not regard the intense aggression of the "borderline" patients Kernberg describes as an intrinsic feature of the dynamics of these patients. Rather, they see this rage toward the analyst as a justified reaction to the analyst's misunderstanding of them. In this view, Kernberg's postulation of an aggressive drive is not only wrong, but it also leads the clinician to mistreat the patient, producing the very aggression that is assumed to be there to start with!
4. Gill (1991) has argued that defining an action as assertion or hostility is a construction of the observer, not an inherent property of the affect itself. I do not believe it is entirely a matter of construction. Sex and hunger are different organismic states. They can each be interpreted in many different ways, and sometimes confused with each other—but they begin as different phenomena. I believe assertion and aggression, while obviously more closely related, are based on distinctly different organismic states.

5. Grotstein (1982) argues for a reinterpretation of Klein's notion of a biologically rooted Death Instinct operating along the same lines, grounded in a phylogenetically developed reaction to natural dangers to the species. "To the aggressive instinct, one could see an inherent preconception of the predator, that is, the hereditary, phylogenetic enemy of the species. . . . Bowlby (personal communication) believes that all animal species, including human, have some awareness of being prey and predator . . . and that stranger anxiety is the human form of predator fear" (p. 201).
6. This is consistent with Lichtenberg's recent work on affect, in which he argues that aggression is an inborn response with a very specific, adaptive function: "[It is] . . . an aversive response available from birth as an indicator of distress within the caregiver-infant unit; it signals the need for a response from the caregiver" (1989, p. 168).
7. Grotstein makes a similar point, arguing that "via phenomenological inference . . . unpleasure by its very nature is experienced as the invasion of the self by a cruel 'not me'" (1982, p. 204).
8. Schafer argues that much of the ordinary language of experience is derived from preverbal, infantile bodily experience, with all of the mistakes and misunderstandings of infantile thought. It is precisely these misunderstandings that are illuminated through the analytic process, allowing the patient to own and assume agency over a subjective world previously disclaimed and experienced as given and immutable. The great irony is that traditional psychanalytic language portrays mind in precisely those same kinds of terms, as a collection of spaces filled with things and substances. The concept of an aggressive drive, which accrues spontaneously, builds up more and more pressure, demands discharge, feels cathartic when discharged, causes a toxic kind of sickness if dammed up—the very concept of an aggressive drive, in this view, derives from a reified anal metaphor: "It does not go too far to suggest that, however austere this conceptualization may be expressed, it implies an archaic, animistic, usually excremental model of aggression" (1976, p. 282). Thus, Schafer, consistent with the perspective developed here, abandons Freud's notion of drive as a propulsive force yet grants aggression a central role in the early shaping and definition of the child's sense of self.
9. Minsky (1985) provides a fascinating argument for the adaptive, evolutionary function of affects such as anger as anchored in their role in motivating behavior. An author who has trouble getting down to writing, for example, conjures up an image of a rival working on similar material. The competitive anger that is generated fuels activities that now take on a greater priority.

10. Many theorists and clinicians who think of themselves as believing in Freud's drive theory actually understand aggression as operating in the fashion I have been developing here, as innate but lacking the self-propelling quality Freud (and Hartmann) considered crucial. (See, for example, Pine, 1990, pp. 84–85.) Because this revised version of drive is not distinguished sharply from Freud's version of drive, the two very different concepts become conflated and attributes of each are drawn upon without awareness of their incompatibility.
11. Ogden (1989) has described this inevitable deep dread in both analysand and analyst in vivid terms.

The patient unconsciously holds a fierce conviction (which he has no way of articulating) that his infantile and early childhood experience has taught him about the specific ways in which each of his object relationships will inevitably become painful, disappointing, suffocating, overly sexualized, and so on. There is no reason for him to believe that the relationship into which he is about to enter will be any different. . . . Everything that the analysand says (and does not say) in the first hours can be heard in the light of an unconscious warning to the analyst concerning the reasons why neither the analyst nor the patient should enter into this doomed and dangerous relationship. (pp. 181–82)

12. Both Kleinians and self psychologists often neglect what are to me crucial dimensions of the analytic situation. In locating negative transference in an aggressive drive, Kleinians often miss the justifiable reasons for the patient's aggression in a subjectively experienced endangerment in the analytic situation. On the other hand, to assume that intense, chronic aggression in the analytic situation is an iatrogenic consequence of bad theory and/or bad technique fails to deal adequately with the degree to which the patient's style of response to endangerment, with its biological and temperamental origins and its embeddedness in a firmly established world of bad objects, precludes the development and enrichment of relations with others.
13. Along similar lines, Ogden (1989, 1992b) suggests that the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position are more usefully thought of in a healthy dialectical relationship with each other. (He also adds a third, more primitive organization, the autistic-contiguous position.) To live always in the paranoid-schizoid position is to be wracked and torn by impossible demands for a pure love and pure hate. But to live always in the depressive position, even if it were possible, would be to fade into the muted, gray tones of am-

bivalence. One would see good and bad in everyone; fairness would prevail. Kohut suggests that idealization (even if greatly unrealistic) can play a positive, enriching role in the lives of healthy adults. Similarly, Ogden points to the way in which the pure loving and hating of the paranoid-schizoid position can serve as the wellsprings of passion, breaking apart the measured balance of ambivalence and integration when they have become stale and constricting.

CHAPTER 7

1. Many do not seem to be bothered by guilt in this regard. The most extraordinary expression of this arrogant and elitist attitude I have ever heard was by a speaker arguing against the necessity and/or merits of altering the analytic frame. Defending classical theory of technique in all circumstances, he told the following joke: A young woman hung around the stage door following a theatrical performance starring a famous male actor. She told him of her admiration for him, and one thing led to another. The next morning, the woman told the actor that she was poor and hungry, and asked for money to buy some bread. The actor gave her a ticket to that evening's performance. She explained again that she was hungry and that the ticket was of little use to her. He replied, "If you wanted bread, you should have fucked a baker."
2. Winnicott's distinction between classical neuroses and false-self disorders, Kohut's (1971) distinction between classical neuroses and disorders of the self, the distinction between structural conflict and developmental arrests (Stolorow and Lachmann, 1980)—all work the same way.
3. Stolorow and George Atwood (1992) might consider this traditional approach as suffering from what they call the "myth of the isolated mind."
4. Winnicott (1956a) speaks of the mother failing the child, incrementally and usefully, as she emerges from her primary maternal preoccupation and reclaims herself.
5. As Daniel Stern (1985) points out,

any change in the infant may come about partly by virtue of the adult interpreting the infant differently and acting accordingly. Most probably, it works both ways. Organizational change from within the infant and its interpretation by the parents are mutually facilitative. The net result is that the infant appears to have a new sense of who he or she is and who

you are, as well as a different sense of the kinds of interactions that can now go on. (p. 9)

6. Ghent (1992) has written beautifully about the complex and often paradoxical relationship between benign and malignant features of the patient's longings, in which legitimate needs are often defensively "black-washed" into coercive "neediness." Similarly, Peter Shabad (1993) has described the ways in which early pain and loss are often sustained by being organized and perpetuated into self-defeating demands.
7. These include: splitting, projective identification, dissociative fragmentations into true and false selves, the importance of early parental responsiveness, and the devastating impact of child abuse.
8. See Davies and Frawley (1993) for an excellent review of and contribution to contemporary work with survivors of childhood sexual abuse that explores these reenactments and reversals of the abuse in the analytic relationship.
9. See Aron (1992) and Burke (1992) for a very helpful dialogue on the implications of the mutual but asymmetrical nature of the analytic relationship.
10. Consider the response of a contemporary analyst to a patient in the stalemating kind of despair that Ferenczi was struggling with:

At this point the analyst, who had felt all along that she was being dragged towards a deadly abyss, told the patient about it saying "I'm afraid I can't help it either, I'm willing to walk with you up to the edge of the abyss and, as we have been doing all along, try to see things together, but I shall not jump down with you. I will be very sorry indeed if you do . . . but I shall let you go by yourself . . . this is your choice and I cannot prevent it." (Mehler and Argentieri, 1989, p. 300)
11. For a vivid presentation of this point of view and some very interesting clinical material, see Roth and Segal (1990).
12. Samson and Weiss (1986) see situations like this as representing unconscious tests of an analyst's ability, unlike an incestuous parent, to resist illicit overtures.
13. Casement's (1991) writings are rich with instructive examples of the analyst's struggle to find and meet the patient's needs yet generate and maintain a deep analytic process:

when a patient is prompting the analyst to depart from classical technique, particularly if it is being rigidly adhered to, this need not always be seen as seductive or manipulative. The patient may be searching for a more viable balance between the

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