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Why War? – Psychoanalysis, Politics, and the Return to Melanie Klein

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Part III Returning to Klein

5 Negativity in the Work of Melanie Klein

> Analytic theory has treated the two instincts in an unusual manner: the libido is the first-born and privileged child, the destructive instinct is the latecomer, the step-child. Libido was recognised as such from the first; the other instinct, its adversary, went under various disguises, and had several names before its true identity was established.
>
> Paula Heimann, *Freud – Klein Controversies 1941–45*

> If we stick to Freud's elaborated categories . . . we are able to conceive the primitive psychical make-up of an infant and the elaborate organisation of an adult personality as a lawful continuity.
>
> Hedwig Hoffer, ibid.

For anyone attempting to follow the tracks of the psyche across the terrain of contemporary political life, it is hard to avoid Melanie Klein. The new brutalism of Thatcherism in the 1980s and the Gulf War, with its renewed and absolute moral antinomies for the West, are just two instances where some seemingly irreducible negativity, bearer of a violence sanctioned – if only momentarily – by State and subjects, appears to rise up to the surface of political consciousness, setting the parameters of our being-in-the-social, confronting us with something at

the limits of psyche and social alike. High priestess of psychic negativity, Melanie Klein pushed the institution of psychoanalysis in Britain – and, some would argue, her child patients – close to the edge. In the tradition of Freud, she saw her task as one of excavation, as the retrieval of something which even Freud, she argued, had barely been able to approach. Thus outmanoeuvring the father of psychoanalysis, while claiming her unswerving loyalty to and continuity with his project, she assigned to him as much the role of represser as uncoverer of the hidden repressed. And yet, in the recent and continuing turn to psychoanalysis in the humanities, Klein – compared with Freud – has received relatively little attention. Why, then, has there been no rereading of Melanie Klein?[1]

In the context of the humanities, the idea of rereading has become something of a commonplace. Without assuming that a writer has necessarily been read before, it refers instead to a strategy of reading which heads past the most immediate or professionally received meanings of the writer, straight for the points of creative tension in her or his works. This way of reading 'otherwise' is interested in the moments when writing slips its moorings, when it fails – as all writing must fail, it is suggested – its own tests of coherence, revealing – the analogy with analysis is intentional – its 'other' scene. In relation to psychoanalysis, this way of reading, often described as 'deconstructive', takes on a particular weight. Less interested in a general instability of language, it places itself instead *inside* the psychoanalytic project, aiming to demonstrate the triumph of the unconscious over all attempts at hermeneutic or therapeutic control. In a recent discussion on 'Melanie Klein Today', organized in London as part of a series aiming to promote dialogue between psychoanalysis in the clinic and psychoanalysis in the academy, Elizabeth Bott Spillius, editor of two volumes of contemporary analytic essays on Klein, argued

that Klein was not a theorist in the strict sense of the term.[2] What happens if we read her comment not as a statement *against* theory, but as suggesting that Klein does theory *otherwise*, that Klein produced a theory which, because of what it was trying to theorize, could not, by definition, contain or delimit itself? Another way of putting this would be to ask whether Klein's writing is a monolithic, singular text; or, can she be read as producing in her writing something as intractable, as creatively unmasterable, as what many readers have become accustomed to discovering in Freud?

In the humanities, a post-Lacanian orthodoxy has blocked access to Klein. In a reading of which it should theoretically, according to its own tenets, be more suspicious, this orthodoxy has accused her of taking apart – but only to resolder more rigidly – body, psyche, and speech; it has imputed to her something of a psychic and sexual fix. Klein's ego is too coherent; it eventually takes all conflict and phantasy under its control. Her concept of the instinct is reductive; deriving all mental operations from biological impulses Klein leaves no gaps, no space for the trials and errors of representation, in the mind. Her account of sexuality is coercive; sexual difference, and hence heterosexuality, is given in advance by the knowledge which the bodies of girl- and boy-children are assumed, from the beginning, to have of themselves.[3] And yet, alongside these criticisms, we have to place the no less fervent rejection of Klein for proposing something so negative that it is incapable of assimilation by human subjects, by theory. Especially in the United States, Klein's work has been rejected on account of its violence and negativity. It is a critique which, as we will see, was at the centre of the fierce dispute which, in England too, was originally aroused by her work.

Far from offering reassurance, these reactions suggest, Melanie Klein disturbs. That disturbance, largely responsible for the rejection of Klein in analytic circles in

the United States, has been mirrored in recent feminist debate. Searching for an alternative femininity free of the dictates of patriarchal, oedipal law, one feminism has turned to the preoedipal relation between mother and girl-child only to find Klein's account of early psychic processes standing in its way.[4] Too negative, this account blocks the new identification, troubles the ideal. Against the idyll of early fusion with the mother, Klein offers proximity as something which devours. Is there a way of linking the two criticisms – Klein as too safe and too dangerous, Klein as taking too much under, letting too much slip out of, control?

It is in the context of these issues that I want to return here to the earliest disagreement over Melanie Klein's work in England, which threatened to divide the psychoanalytic institution and has left its traces on the organization of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis to this day. The focus for this was the 'Controversial Discussions', relatively unknown outside analytic circles, which took place at the scientific meetings of the British Psycho-Analytic Society between 1943 and 1944, centring on the disagreement between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. In this instance, the theoretical issue reveals itself unmistakably as an issue of the psychoanalytic institution and its continuity. As if in response to the dictates of unconscious time – amnesia as the first stage in allowing something to return – this moment of psychoanalytic history has gradually and recently come back to the fore of debate. In 1991, the full edition of the 'Controversial Discussions' was published as Volume 11 of the New Library of Psychoanalysis, a monumental feat of editing running to over 900 pages and including all the original papers and the ensuing debates (prior to this, only a selection of the papers had been available in a 1952 edition itself reprinted in 1989).[5] Articles have been written on the subject; two books have appeared on the institutional vicissitudes of psychoanalysis in Britain –

Freud in Exile and an anthology of articles *The British School of Psychoanalysis – The Independent Tradition* (the independents were those who chose to affiliate with neither party to the dispute).[6] Within feminism, a sometimes celebratory (Klein as 'mother' of a new second-generation psychoanalysis), sometimes critical (Klein as sexually normative) attention has produced something, if not quite, in the order of a 'return' to Melanie Klein.[7]

More oddly, this originating moment of local institutional dispute had its highly successful passage across the London stage. Nicholas Wright's play *Mrs Klein* played to packed houses in 1988 at the Cottesloe Theatre, and then transferred to the West End.[8] Vicariously, the play offers the spectacle of three women – Melanie Klein, her daughter Melitta Schmideberg, and Paula Heimann – battling it out over the legacy of Klein's work. Femininity becomes the site on which the vexed question of affiliation and institutional continuity is explored. It is a shocking play, not least of all, as one student commented, because of the terrible way analysts are seen to behave. Now this story of dreadful behaviour on the part of analysts has of course been told over and over again in relation to Freud; for some thinkers, it has become the key to the analytic institution itself (Roazen, Roustang, Derrida, Grosskurth[9]). But this has been seen to date as an affair strictly between men. The affair involved here, by contrast, is strictly between women, between mothers and daughters (literally and metaphorically), which might suggest another reason for looking at it again.

It is a point worth making in relation to a book like François Roustang's *Dire Mastery*, one of the more nuanced, less simply accusatory readings of the historic trials of psychoanalytic affiliation and descent. Roustang traces what he sees as the psychotic fantasies underpinning the institution and its (patri)lineage, and locates these fantasies on more than one occasion in an unconscious image of femininity which, he argues, that same

institution refuses and on which it relies. Yet, he never makes the link from there to the work of Melanie Klein – theoretician of the psychotic in all of us and, together with Anna Freud, the first woman inheritor, contester, and transmitter of the legacy of Freud. When Jacques Derrida asks in a final essay in his book on Freud: 'Who will analyse the unanalysed of Freud?' ('*Qui paiera à qui la tranche de Freud*?'; more exactly, 'Who pays the price for the unanalysed slice of Freud?'), it is tempting to answer, 'Melanie Klein'.[10] Similarly, Julia Kristeva has argued that Freud's obsessional return to the oedipal narrative was a way of rationalizing his own more psychotic discovery of a negativity which he both theorized and effaced. Freud, she suggests, thus repeated in his own intellectual trajectory that process of flight from, disavowal, and semi-recognition of something murderous and unmanageable which, at the end of his life, he read in the story of Moses.[11] What all this points to is a residue – theoretical, institutional, sexual – of the Freudian institution, in which Melanie Klein, or more specifically the controversy over her work, occupies a crucial place.

Two issues arise centrally from this moment of analytic history, both with relevance for how we think about psyche and the social (the psyche as social) today. The final two essays in this book will address each of them in turn. First, the concept of psychic negativity in Klein: What is it? Is it an instinctual reductionism, with biology the final court of appeal for what is most troubling in the mind? Or is it something else, perhaps closer to, even if crucially distinct from, the negativity which Lacan places at the heart of subjectivity – not as instinctual deposit, but as the price that all human subjects pay for the cruel passage of the psyche into words? Secondly, what was at stake in the row over child analysis between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein? Central to the psychoanalytic institution is the problem of how to transmit

knowledge of – which must mean educating – the unconscious without effacing the force of the unconscious as such. What happens when this problem turns into the question of whether one can, or indeed should, analyse a child? It is the point where the institution comes up against its own subjective origins, or rather the fantasy of its own origins, its own infancy – an infancy which, according to its own theories, it must both relinquish and repeat. It is also one of the points where the issue of power in the analytic scenario reveals itself most starkly, since the analyst's intervention in the mind of the child seems to be disputed according to the alternatives of education or violation, moral control or abuse. Clearly a matter of psycho-politics, because it touches on the limits of the psychoanalytic institution in its dealings with its own outside. But if the issue of psychic negativity can be included under the same heading, it is because it also seems to bring us up against a limit: the limit of what a society, of what a subject, can recognize of itself. It does so, however, in a way which is absolutely unassimilable to that idea of transgressive liberation which has been the most frequent radical political version of Freud (what would a 'liberation' of unconscious negativity mean?).

In the context of Klein's work, the dialogue between psychoanalysis and politics therefore shifts. As it does, we can see just how tightly the institutional and disciplinary boundaries and points of affiliation have recently and restrictively been drawn. Instead of the dialogue between psychoanalysis and literature or film, for example, we find psychoanalysis in confrontation with pedagogy and the law. Instead of the unconscious as the site of emancipatory pleasures, we find something negative, unavailable for celebration or release. One could argue that it has been too easy to politicize psychoanalysis as long as the structuring opposition has been situated between an over-controlling, self-deluded ego and the disruptive

force of desire; that this opposition has veiled the more difficult antagonism between superego and unconscious, where what is hidden is aggression as much as sexuality, and the agent of repression is as ferocious as what it is trying to control. Much of the psycho-political colouring of the past decade suggests that the political import of psychoanalysis may reside in what it has to say about the passage across the social of thanatos as much as eros (not the unconscious which the social denies, but the unconscious which it sanctions and pursues). By seeing the unconscious as the site of sexual or verbal free fall, the humanities have aestheticized psychoanalysis, bypassing other points of (greater) friction, both internal to psychoanalytic thinking and in the historically attested confrontations between psychoanalysis and its outer bounds. Could it be that the humanities, inadvertently repeating a legacy of which they have been unaware, have, like psychoanalysis itself, preferred the 'legitimate heir' over the 'stepchild'?

The 'Controversial Discussions' were originally published in 1952 in a collection edited by Joan Rivière under the title *Developments in Psycho-Analysis* (Volume 43 of the Hogarth International Psycho-Analytical Library). The book included three of the original papers; 'The Nature and Function of Phantasy' by Susan Isaacs, 'Certain Functions of Introjection and Projection in Earliest Infancy' by Paula Heimann, and 'Regression' by Paula Heimann and Susan Isaacs. It also included an introduction by Rivière, additional papers by Heimann and Rivière, as well as four papers by Klein, including a revised version of the paper which she herself delivered to the scientific meetings in March 1944.[12] In what follows, I concentrate on the papers by Isaacs, Rivière, and Heimann. Apologias for, and defences of, Klein's work, they speak for Klein, although not in her voice, hovering in that

hybrid space of identification where bodies and psyches at once recognize each other as separate and get too close (whether identification as incorporation necessarily destroys its object will be one of the issues of theoretical dispute). Less well known than Klein's own writings, these papers offer perhaps the clearest account in Kleinian writing of negativity in the process of emergence of the subject, as the passage through which subjects come to be. What is also remarkable about them is their degree of theoretical self-elaboration, or self-consciousness about theory, which means that they read very differently from that extraordinary direct lifting of theory out of the act of interpretation which more than one commentator has remarked on in relation to Klein.[13] Taken in conjunction with the responses now made available with the 1991 publication of the full text of the debates, these documents provide a unique opportunity to examine *in statu nascendi* the founding, theoretically, of a school. It should be stressed, then, that this is an analysis of one key moment of self-representation in a body of evolving thought, not an account of what Kleinianism has become, in theory and practice, today.

One reason for the self-elaboration of these papers is that they are presented, had to be presented, in terms of an argument for their own legitimacy, their right to contest areas of Freudian orthodoxy even as they claim to be developing from the true letter of his text. In Britain, Melanie Klein was to find herself at once the heiress and usurper of Freud – brought to England by Ernest Jones in 1926, twelve years before Freud himself arrived in 1938 accompanied by Anna Freud. Recently published correspondence shows Freud, long before his arrival, troubled by a number of Klein's theoretical innovations (on the superego, on the sexual development of the girl), but even more concerned about the critiques of his daughter by Klein and her supporters, which he took as a personal affront.[14] When Anna Freud arrived, therefore,

she took up a position which was at once laid down – she was the daughter of the founding father of psychoanalysis – and occupied or contested in advance. Who, we might ask in this context, is the legitimate child?

It follows that Klein and her followers could only partially base their claims for authority on their fidelity to Freud. In his Preface to the 1952 collection, Ernest Jones writes: 'What is certainly illegitimate is the Procrustean principle of assessing all conclusions with those reached by Freud, however great our respect for the latter can and should be.'[15] Joan Rivière opens her General Introduction with this quotation from Freud: 'I have made many beginnings and thrown out many suggestions . . . I can hope that they have opened up a path to an important advance in our knowledge. Something will come of them in the future.'[16] Given what we know of Freud's vexed relation to filiation and legacy, we already have to view this with caution, as something of a rhetorical strategy, a calling up of Freud against Freud. Freud is being invoked here as permitting – demanding even – a future for his discipline which goes beyond his own name (something of a self-cancelling proposition in itself). But it allows Rivière to argue that, while Freud's central discovery was the world of unconscious phantasy, 'there are many problems to which he did not apply it', which have subsequently been brought nearer to a 'solution' by Klein ('her consistent awareness of its significance').[17] And she continues: 'The circumstances under which his work began and was carried through, i.e. its origin in medicine, no doubt affected his outlook,' leading him to concentrate on the differences between 'normal' and 'morbid' mentality at the expense of general laws and to an overestimation of the 'force of the reality principle'.[18]

The case for Melanie Klein rests, therefore, on this image of her as inheritor of the Freudian 'truth' (Rivière's word), one which the limits of Freud's own scientific

training made him unable fully to pursue. What is already clear is that this truth, in the name of which Rivière speaks for Klein, does not belong to an order of scientifically verifiable knowledge. In the heat of the discussions, Susan Isaacs replies to her critics: 'Dr Friedlander refers to the fact that Mrs. Klein's views as to mental life is "inferred knowledge" as of course it is.'[19] Critiquing the Kleinian concept of phantasy, Marjorie Brierly states: 'if we persist in equating mental functions with our subjective interpretations of them, we forfeit our claim to be scientists and revert to the primitive [sic] state of the Chinese peasant who interprets an eclipse as the sun being swallowed by a dragon.'[20] To which Paula Heimann replies: 'The science of psychology is not to be equated with the science of astronomy. What *we* are studying is *not* the solar system, but the mind of the Chinese peasant, not the eclipse but the belief of the peasant concerning the eclipse. How do such beliefs arise? . . . And further, how does the knowledge that the sun is *not* swallowed by a dragon develop in the mind of peasants and philosophers?'[21] For Heimann, psychoanalysis makes no distinction between peasants and philosophers. The unconscious conditions of all knowledge and belief systems are what need to be explained. As Rivière later puts it, citing Bacon: 'There is a superstition in avoiding superstition.'[22] The dispute about the transmission of the Freudian legacy thus appears as a dispute about the possibility of objective knowledge and (thinly veiled behind the first) the scientific supremacy of the West.[23]

These, then, are the grounds of the first opposition to Klein; the second Rivière attributes to Klein's idea of a destructive instinct and a psychotic part in all human subjects: 'The concept of a destructive force within every individual, tending towards the annihilation of life, is naturally one which arouses extreme emotional resistance; and this, together with the inherent obscurity of

its operation, has led to a marked neglect of it by many of Freud's followers, as compared with any other aspect of his work'; '[in] the very early phases of mental life . . . she finds in operation mental mechanisms (splitting, projection, etc.) closely similar to those of the psychotic disorders, another aspect of her work which arouses strong emotional resistance.'[24] Thus the argument about fidelity to, and divergence from, Freud carries the weight of psychosis and death – precisely the discoveries which Kristeva argued were rationalized by Freud. (Note too the link between destruction and obscurity as if destruction were conceivable only if it can be fully – scientifically – mastered or grasped.) It is, however, another classic rhetorical move, where opposition or resistance to a theory is seen to belong inside, or be tributary of, what it is that the theory itself invokes. But we should perhaps ask what a legacy can be in this context, how an institution can perpetuate itself, when what it offers as the true content of that legacy is death? Death, after all, as Paula Heimann puts it in her paper on introjection and projection, is the one thing which the mind cannot expel.[25] It is in this context with all its institutional ramifications, that the 'Controversial Discussions' offer their account of what is meant by the destructive impulse or the death instinct in the work of Melanie Klein.

The first thing that becomes clear is that the concept of the death instinct or impulse is in no sense a biologistic concept in the work of Klein.[26] It was the Anna Freudians who insisted on the biological status of the concept (the principle of conservation and the return to the inanimate state) in order precisely to keep it outside the range of analytic work. The objections to the centrality accorded to the concept by Klein rested, therefore, not on her biologizing of the concept (instinctual reductionism) but on the opposite, on the way she assigned to it psychic significance, made it part of the phantasy life of the child. Whether the child could inhabit a world of meanings would be another central issue in the dispute over Klein's work. To site Isaacs: 'The word "phantasy" serves to remind us always of this distinctive character of meaning in mental life'; Michael Balint: ' "Phantasy" suggests "meaning" '; Barbara Lantos: 'This pleasure we call auto-erotic . . . organ pleasure . . . and intellectual pleasure – they all are the same in so far as they are pleasures in themselves, that is to say: pleasures without meaning'; Edward Glover: 'And so we come back once more to the dispute over "meaning" and "implicit meaning".'[27]

Death for Klein was *meaning*, which also meant that death *had* meaning for the infant. When Freud argues that the infant could have no knowledge of death, this does not preclude the possibility, Rivière argues, that the child 'can experience feelings of the kind, just as any adult can feel "like death", and in a state of great anxiety often does'.[28] What seems to be going on here, if we look closely at the passage, is not an undiluted appeal to feeling, but rather the suggestion that feeling itself is simile ('feel "*like* death" '), that the most severe anxiety the child can feel opens up the path of indirect representation by putting it at a fundamental, at *the* most fundamental, remove from itself. Thus the child's anxiety becomes the foundation for the first experience of 'as if': 'We surmise that the *child feels as if*'; ' "He behaves as if", to my mind, is the same thing as saying "He has phantasies . . .".'[29]

It is this fundamental negativity which these papers put at the basis of subjectivity. This is a moment of infancy when, if an ego can be postulated, its powers to integrate mental processes are weak. The problem for Klein's critics was that conflict was seen to arise before there was an ego there to manage it: 'According to the theory of the English school of analysis, introjection and projection, which in our view should be assigned to the period after the ego has been differentiated from the

outside world, are the very processes by which the structure of the ego is developed.'[30] Edward Glover, in his long critique of Klein published in the first volume of *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* in 1945 argued that, unlike the customary teaching which overestimates the primitive ego, there is an underestimation of the primitive ego in Klein.[31] Two common recent theoretical assumptions about Klein therefore fall to the ground: her biologism and the pre-given category of the ego. If Klein was objected to, it was precisely because she was seen as bringing the death drive under the sway of a subject, as making the death drive constitutive of a subject, who is not yet enough of a subject for death to be mastered or controlled.

The third point of dispute was the early relation to the object (these are the three basic points of disagreement which Rivière lists in her Introduction). For the Anna Freudians, the infant – again posited in essentially biological terms – is narcissistic and auto-erotic, pure pleasure-seeker under the sway of the erotogenic zones. One way of describing the Freudian position, then, would be as a plea to keep pleasure out of the reach of meaning, to leave pleasure *alone*: 'Does Isaacs think – as we do – that there are activities just carried out for the sake of auto-erotic pleasure without any phantasies being attached to them . . . just for the sake of the organ-pleasure which is gained?'[32] For the Kleinians, the child relates to the object from the start, meaning not that the child has some inherent capacity for relatedness, the version of object-relations which has become best known, but that even in the state of auto-eroticism there are bits and pieces of objects – fragments of introjects, objects that are not quite objects – inside the mind. Objects without propriety, neither fully appropriated nor whole: 'Miss Freud speaks of object relationship "in the proper sense". I do not think there is a "proper" sense.'[33]

No ownership, therefore, and no agent of control. At each stage, the infant and its world seem to emerge *in absentia, or at a loss*. It is by withholding that the external world comes to be. Rivière writes: 'painful experience does much to bring about the recognition of an external object.'[34] The infant oscillates between 'seeking, finding, obtaining, possessing with satisfaction' and 'losing, lacking, missing, with fear and distress'.[35] In this scenario, and despite references to satisfaction obtained, the emphasis is far more frequently on the negative pole. For the loss of the object forces a breach in the primitive narcissism of the subject, a breach which, in a twist, then produces the object as its effect: 'the ego's need to dissociate itself from the unpleasure is so great that it *requires an object* upon which it can expel it . . . For such an experience of unpleasure is too intense to be merely "killed", hallucinated as non-existent. Narcissistic phantasy would thus in itself lead to object-relations, and these object-relations will at first be of a negative order.'[36] Note again that reference to death in the instigation of the object, an experience of unpleasure so intense that it cannot be 'killed', cannot be negatively hallucinated. And note too how different this is from the more familiar idea of hallucination ('narcissistic phenomenon *par excellence*'[37]) – not in this case something desired, but something instead which fails to be effaced. The lost object is not, therefore, only the hallucinated object of satisfaction; it is also and simultaneously an object which, because of this failure of negative hallucination, is required – is actively sought after – *in order to be bad*. In these papers from the 'Controversial Discussions', the genesis of the famous Kleinian bad object is nothing less than the genesis of the object itself.

Rivière will qualify her account in her 1950 footnotes to her essay: 'The view that the earliest relation was negative and hostile was expressed by Freud. Later work leads to a correction of this hypothesis', referring to two

later papers by Klein included in the 1952 collection; and in her Introduction to the book: 'it will be seen from Chapters VI and VII that this is not Melanie Klein's view.'[38] Likewise she will answer those who objected to the weakness of the Kleinian ego by insisting on its integrative powers. But in the overall context and feel of the papers, these qualifications sit oddly – symptomatic presence of something which it became too difficult to sustain? Another way of putting this would be to ask how an unconscious identification with death *could* – theoretically, institutionally – be sustained. This would be just one way of reading the editing, the start of a theoretical shift between the original discussions and the 1952 publication of the book.

In these earlier papers, it is stated over and over that the subject first comes to experience itself negatively. Self-alienation gives the colour of the subject's coming-to-be: 'nothing good within *lasts* . . . the first conscious idea of "me" is largely coloured by painful associations'; 'It would seem with every infant that we have to give far more experimental weight to the felt hostility of the external world over a considerable period in early development than we had thought'; 'the relation of hate to objects is older than that of love.'[39] The persecutory object-relation rises up as the first defence against something without 'definite name and shape' (like the patient Klein describes in *Narrative of a Child Analysis* who dreamt of an 'indefinite object' stuck to a car, something which 'she both wished to see and not to see'[40]). Object-relations are 'improvements on' and 'protections against' primordial narcissistic anxiety; distrust of the object is better than despair.[41]

More than primitive instinct, therefore, the Kleinian concept of negativity appears as a psychic activation of the *fort-da* game as famously described by Freud, an answer of a sort to this question which, as Klein and Heimann both point out, was left in suspense by Freud:

'When does separation from an object produce anxiety, when does it produce mourning and when does it produce pain? Let me say at once that there is no prospect in sight of answering these questions.'[42] Freud did not believe that absence of the mother could be connoted as loss of love or anger, whereas for Klein the mother rapidly comes to be experienced as bad. 'This fundamental fear of loss of the loved object', Klein states, 'seems to me psychologically well-founded' – 'predetermined, one may say, in the infant from the experience of birth'.[43]

It is at this point that the account offered here of psychic beginnings starts to sound uncannily like that of Jacques Lacan; so it is perhaps not surprising to discover Klein and Lacan converging on Freud's paper on 'Negation' (the link is not wholly coincidental, since this was the time when Lacan was working on his never to be completed translation of Klein).[44] 'Negation' was the key text for Rivière, Isaacs, and Heimann, who took it as the model for their theory of the subject's relation to its object-world.[45] Given the awkwardness as we have seen it of their relation to Freud's legacy, the terms with which Rivière declares this affiliation are at least worthy of note: 'one of the richest and most highly condensed productions that he ever composed . . . Melanie Klein's theories dovetail with exquisite precision into its tight and rigorous propositions.'[46] Easy or forced entry? What more fitting image for an intimacy uncertain of the legitimacy of its own claims. As if it were being acknowledged that the only passage for these doubtful inheritors was to come up on Freud from behind (sphincter theory, we might say).

The problem of beginnings, it would seem, is at least partly tributary to the problem of descent. What 'Negation' offers is a way of theorizing a subject who comes into being on the back of a repudiation, who exists in direct proportion to what it cannot *let be*. If there is no presupposed category of the subject in Kleinian theory,

then the subject can emerge only in a moment of self-differentiation, as a difference from itself: 'when exactly does the ego, the differentiation from the amorphous id, begin?'[47] It is through the category of negation, the category in which Lacan locates the fundamental negativity of the symbolic function, that Klein and her followers find the reply. Let's consider first what Lacan reads in this famous – and famously cryptic – text by Freud.

Lacan's discussion of Freud's article takes up three chapters of the full version of his 1966 *Écrits* – an analysis by the Hegelian scholar Jean Hyppolite with an introduction and commentary by Lacan.[48] All three were originally part of Lacan's first seminar of 1954 on the technical writings of Freud[49] – the only works by Freud, interestingly, not included in the Pelican Freud, a comment in itself on the severance between psychoanalysis as clinical and as wider cultural discourse in Great Britain today. Hyppolite focuses on this sentence from the end of Freud's paper: 'Affirmation – as a substitute (*Ersatz*) for uniting – belongs to Eros; negation – the successor (*Nachfolge*) to expulsion – belongs to the instinct of destruction (*Destruktionstrieb*).'[50] He reads in Freud's distinction between 'substitute' (or 'equivalent') and 'successor' a crucial difference in the way affirmation and negation relate to the instincts from which they are said to derive. For Hyppolite that 'successor' (as opposed to 'equivalent') opens up a gap between negation and destruction; they are precisely not equivalents, not the same thing. Hence, he argues, we can read in Freud two concepts of negation: on the one hand, a pleasure of denying which results simply from the suppression of the libidinal components under the domination of the instincts – this already suggests, in a way that troubles some cherished boundaries, that the instinct of destruction is attached to the pleasure principle (Riviere: 'many psychic manifestations show that a threat from the death instinct produces a strong uprush of Eros'[51]) – and, on the other,

negation as the basis of the symbolic function: 'a fundamental attitude of symbolicity (symbol-making capacity) made explicit'.[52] What Freud's article shows is that this capacity emerges in a 'space of suspension', from a 'margin of thinking' where thinking – and being – can only emerge through what they relegate to non-being, to the not-thought: 'what one is in the mode of *not* being it'.[53]

It is this second emphasis which is picked up by Lacan: 'negativity of discourse, insofar as it brings what is not into being, sends us back to the question of what non-being, manifested in the symbolic order, owes to the reality of death.'[54] Negation, for Lacan, is death in the structure, or what he also calls the 'real', which, for symbolization to be possible, has to subsist outside its domain. Negation shows the subject, and its world, arising in an act of demolition. For the subject to enter into the possibilities of language and judgement, something has to be discarded, something falls away. For Lacan, therefore, negativity resides on the edge of speech. In an account which is strikingly resonant of this vision, Ella Sharpe reinterprets Melanie Klein: '[the breasts] become the symbol of that undecomposed world which was once the baby's before knowledge entered to start him on the path of detachment.'[55] Knowledge, as much as – inseparably from? – aggression, breaks up the unity of the world. We could say that Lacan goes furthest in detaching negation from the destructive impulse – 'successor' precisely, but not 'equivalent' – because the moment of negation posits the end of equivalence, the end of unity, as such. As Hyppolite puts it: 'primordial affirmation is nothing other than to affirm, but to deny is more than to want to destroy.'[56] For those accustomed to reading Freud in terms of the concept of 'after-effect' (*Nachtraglichkeit*), it is easy to read in that *Nachfolge* or 'following after' the idea that what precedes has not necessarily come before.

In this commentary by Lacan, the reference to Melanie Klein, moreover, is explicit. A discussion of

Klein's 1930 paper on symbol formation ('The Importance of Symbol-Formation in the Development of the Ego') follows immediately after Hyppolite's commentary when it was originally presented to Lacan's seminar in 1954, and the discussion ends with a link between Hyppolite and Klein for what they each demonstrate regarding 'the function of destructionism in the constitution of human reality'.[57] In his reply to Hyppolite, Lacan makes a passing reference to a paper by Melitta Schmideberg, identifying her as the first analyst of a patient of Ernest Kris whose acting out of a prematurely cut short orality might explain, he suggests, the relative failure of that earlier analysis with Schmideberg.[58] Thus Lacan's commentary on Freud's 'Negation' leads, in a beautiful circularity, back to Melanie Klein.

In fact, the reference to Schmideberg could be seen as the vanishing-point of Lacan's commentary, as well as of the history and theory being discussed here – a part of analytic literature which, as Lacan says, has 'unfortunately become very difficult of access',[59] and an orality embedded somewhere in a paper by an analyst, the daughter of Melanie Klein, who, one could argue, as an effect of its unbearable intensity, its acting out inside the analytic institution, will finally reject all such concepts and sever her links with the pychoanalytic world. Ella Sharpe: 'I assume hopefully a possibility of discussing Mrs. Klein's theory, of being critical in the constructive meaning of that word, of accepting some things without its being interpreted that one has swallowed Mrs. Klein and her work whole.'[60]

It is through orality that Isaacs and Heimann read Freud's paper on 'Negation'. For them, this is the key passage:

> Expressed in the language of the oldest – the oral – instinctual impulses (*Triebregungen* – impulses of the drives), the judgement is: 'I should like to eat this', or 'I should like to spit it out'; and, put more generally: 'I should like to take this into myself and keep that out.'
>
> That is to say: 'It shall be inside me' or 'it shall be outside me'. As I have shown elsewhere, the original pleasure-ego wants to introject into itself everything that is good and to eject from itself everything that is bad. What is bad, what is alien to the ego and what is external are, to begin with, identical.[61]

For Isaacs what this passage reveals is that the function of judgement is derived from the primary instinctual impulses. This is the famous 'instinctual reductionism' for which Klein is often criticized.[62] Indeed, Isaacs stresses the concept of derivation, and dismisses Freud's phrase 'expressed in the language of the oral impulses' as 'picturesque'.[63] But, as her commentary on this passage makes clear, it is the mechanisms of introjection and projection which are crucial, and the role of phantasy as the operational link between the two, 'the means by which the one is transmuted into the other': ' "I want to eat that and therefore I have eaten it" is the phantasy which represents the id impulse in the psychic life; it is at the same time the subjective *experience* of the mechanism or process of introjection,' an interpretation in turn, therefore, of the symbolic process of taking in.[64] Judgement devours and expels its objects: it derives from an orality which in turn becomes a metaphor for judgement itself. This, as I read it, is less derivation than circularity: 'one of the "results of the phantasy of introjection" is the process of introjection.'[65] No less than Lacan's commentary, which turns on the concept of foreclosure, the ability of the psyche under pressure of denial to wipe something out, this is a process which can have as its logical outcome the effacement, or scotomization, of the world:

> the mechanism of denial is expressed in the mind of the subject in some such way as 'If I don't admit it [i.e. a

painful fact] it isn't true.' Or: 'If I don't admit it, no one else will know that it is true.' And in the last resort this argument can be traced to bodily impulses and phantasies, such as: 'If it doesn't come out of my mouth, that shows it isn't inside me'; or 'I can prevent anyone else *knowing* it is inside me'. Or: 'It is all right if it comes out of my anus as flatus or faeces, but it mustn't come out of my mouth as words.' The mechanism of *scotomisation* is experienced in such terms as: 'What I don't see I need not believe'; or 'What I don't see, other people don't, and indeed doesn't exist.'[66]

What is striking about this passage is the way it seems to undermine the very causal sequence from which it claims to derive. For, if the body can become a mechanism of disavowal for language ('it is all right if it comes out of my body as flatus or faeces, but it mustn't come out of my mouth as words'), then the body is already being inscribed in a linguistic process, is being called up as metaphor even as it is metaphor – the passage of bodily process into language – that the subject resists. So the more Isaacs carries out her derivation of phantasy from impulse, the more the impulse becomes after the fact ('successor' we might say) the metaphoric correlate of the phantasy it supports. Thus the Kleinians flesh out the structure of negation. At one level it is without doubt a more literally – vulgarly – corporeal reading than that of Lacan; but no more than his can it guarantee the reality of the world which it constitutes but can equally efface. Orality appears here as the transcription or metaphor of itself. What primacy is being given here to the concept of the impulse – 'mythological beings superb in their indefiniteness' as Heimann and Isaacs put it, citing a famous remark of Freud's?[67]

It is, I think, worth stressing this question of transcription because, in relation to Klein, it is most often misread. Thus Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok criticize what they call Klein's 'panfantastic instinctualism'; while

Jean Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis takes Isaacs's definition of phantasy as the 'mental expression' of the impulse as evidence of a potential reductionism in Klein, one which Klein herself resisted but which has been exacerbated by other interpreters and followers of her work.[68] In her Introduction to the 1952 collection, Rivière cites Isaacs's definition together with the lines from Freud on which it is based: 'Freud said: "We suppose that it [the id] is somewhere in direct contact with somatic processes and takes over from them instinctual needs and gives them mental expression." Now in the view of the present writers, this *mental expression is* unconscious phantasy.' But, Rivière continues, the passage goes on: 'There is no impulse, no instinctual urge or response which is not experienced as unconscious phantasy.'[69] The two propositions are clearly not symmetrical: to say that one thing is the *expression of* another is not the same thing as to say that one thing *has to find another* in terms of which it can be expressed. As Isaacs summarized in her original paper, 'instinctual urges . . . cannot operate in the mind without phantasy.'[70] The second implies translation, mediation, or, as Isaacs puts it, 'operative link'; that is, it implies interpretation, or rather misinterpretation, the word used explicitly by Rivière: 'on Freud's own hypothesis, the psyche responds to the reality of its experiences by interpreting them – or rather *mis*-interpreting them – in a subjective manner.'[71] Subjective experience involves the child in perpetual misreadings of the world: '[the child's] misunderstanding of the situation is precisely that subjective interpretation of his perception.'[72]

Phantasies, Isaacs writes, are the 'expression of wishes and passions': 'It is primarily because he *wants* his urine to be so very powerful that he comes to believe it is so.'[73] The destructive impulse therefore turns on a tautology – destructive because of the omnipotence with which the child wields and translates it to or her or his own ends.

This is the impulse 'pressed into the service of need' of phantasy, to use Riviere's expression, far more than phantasy as the 'mental expression of' instinctual need;[74] not a reduction of phantasy to a biological instinct, but a massive inflation of the power of phantasy to make, and break, the world.

What emerges most strongly from these papers is the impossibility of assigning some simple origin to destruction. Hate may be older than love, but Melanie Klein's conclusions: 'do not stand or fall on the concept of the death instinct.'[75] What seems to be outrageous – paradoxically harder to manage than death as a pure force, as something which assaults the subject from outside – is this internalization of death into the structure. If death is a pure point of biological origin, then at least it can be scientifically known. But if it enters into the process of psychic meanings, inseparable from the mechanisms through which subjects create and recreate their vision of the world, then from where can we gain the detachment with which to get it under control?

It is clear that for the critics of Klein and her supporters, it was the priority accorded to subjective experience and the implications of this for knowledge which was at stake. (Recently Meltzer has suggested that this is *the* philosophical problem posed by Klein.[76]) Klein, Isaacs, and Heimann were confusing 'the mental corollary to instinct' with 'what we are used to call phantasy', subjective definition with mental mechanism – 'The mixing-up of conceptions impresses all of us as most undesirable'; 'What happens when the distinction is lost?'[77] Each time, Isaacs and Heimann respond by insisting on the impossibility, within the logic proper to psychoanalysis, of holding the elements apart: '*What I believe is that reality-thinking cannot operate without concurrent and supporting Ucs phantasies*' (emphasis original); 'A rigid separation between "mechanism" and "content" is a danger to psychological understanding . . . it springs

from a basic fallacy: a rigid divorce between the id and the ego'; 'perception and image-formation cannot be sharply separated from unconscious phantasy'; 'the suggestion that we should discuss "the nature of the process itself" rather than its content seems to rest on a false assumption. The nature of mental process, as well as of the structure and mechanisms of the mind, is partly determined and characterised by phantasies, that is to say, by the subjective content of the mind.'[78] Compare Anna Freud from her 1945 paper 'Indications for Child Analysis': 'All through childhood a ripening process is at work which, in the service of an increasingly better knowledge of and adaptation to reality, aims at perfecting these functions, at rendering them *more and more independent of the emotions until they become as accurate and reliable as any non-human mechanical apparatus*' (my emphasis).[79]

What seems to be involved, therefore, is something in the nature of a boundary, or category, dispute. How much is subjective experience allowed to *take in* (can the category of cats be a member of itself)? Marjorie Brierly proposes that 'introjection' be kept as the term for the mental process, 'incorporation' for the experience of taking things in: 'When the baby is trying to put everything into its mouth, it comes across many things that won't go in. Image formation as a function of mind will not go in to incorporation.'[80] To which Heimann replies: 'Mentally, anything can go into anything.'[81] But if anything can go into anything – both mentally and theoretically – then what is there to distinguish psychoanalysis, as a form of mental activity, from the all-devouring, all-incorporating child?

Or, to put it another way, what is left of identity and its (self-)definition if these distinctions cannot be sustained? If incorporation cannot be distinguished from introjection, or introjection from identification (as Sharpe points out, Freud often blurred the distinction

between the two), then the idea of identity as distinct from, even if created through, its objects becomes unclear. How can incorporation be the foundation of identity when it seems to imply as a concept a dissolution of the separateness on which identity relies?[82] The issue here is not whether these distinctions can, or cannot, be theoretically mounted, but the form of loss that seems to threaten when they fail. What do these uncertainties imply for an adult subject (an adult science)?

Brierly makes it explicit that the distinction between subjectivity and mechanism carries with it the distinction between first and third person, between identification and object-relationship, between knowledge and science.[83] If psychoanalysis cannot distinguish between knowledge and phantasy, it becomes an infant incapable of taking its measure of reality, incapable of stepping out into the world. So when Glover insults his adversaries – accusing, for example, Klein of projecting into children, Heimann of playing with Freud's theories like a 'kitten plays with a ball of wool' – I read this as more than personally symptomatic.[84] He has, like others of Klein's critics, spotted one of the most far-reaching and troubling implications of her theories: not just the point convincingly made by many recent commentators of Freud – that psychoanalysis can be only a speculative form of knowledge, that it must, if it is to remain loyal to its object, undo its claims to authority as it goes[85] – but that, in relation to the project of child analysis, that same undoing propels the analyst *and her theories* back into the realm of the child. Psychoanalysis cannot ignore, cannot separate itself from, the unconscious conditions of knowledge. Could it be the force of this recognition during the 'Controversial Discussions' that led, in reaction, to what today is often seen as the opposite – the rigidity of Kleinian interpretation, the fierceness with which Kleinian thinking now lays claim to its status as science? Walter Schmideberg: 'I listened

to [the papers] in silence and some of them made me think that the accusations of our enemies that it is impossible to distinguish between the phantasies of the patients and those of the analyst contained more than a grain of truth'; Karin Stephen: 'Do we really know what we are doing?'[86] What happens if we read this as the insight and not the failure of the dispute?

Clearly, then, it is the status of psychoanalysis as scientific knowledge which is at stake – what might be called its coming of age. Is psychoanalysis an adult science? Do children develop from point A to point B, or do they evolve according to a different sequence, one which throws into crisis our idea of what a sequence should be? Thus the question of development arises logically out of the question of knowledge and science. It is, writes Brierly, 'to put the cart before the horse' if you make introjection, based on bodily behaviour, responsible for image formation.[87] If mental mechanisms are partly determined by phantasy, then 'expressed in theoretical terms this would mean that the end results of mental processes determine the processes themselves which is absurd'.[88] Complicated emotional attitudes are assumed to be in existence before instinctual urges; the infant interprets its experience in terms of a superego not yet in force: 'Coming events cast their shadow before.'[89] What has happened to sequence and causality? What priority – theoretically – is being given to unconscious time?

Once again the theoretical point takes its colour from the psychic processes being described. What Brierly and Glover have identified is that Klein's account of beginnings, of the infant's first being in the world, inaugurates circular rather than sequential time. This is how Rivière describes the 'vicious circle' which is the child's first apprehension of cause and effect: ' "You don't come and help, and you hate me, because I am angry and devour you; yet I *must* hate you and devour you in order to make you help." '[90] The child is caught in an impasse, 'the fear

of destroying the mother in the very act of expressing love for her' and of 'losing her in the very process designed to secure her possession'.[91] Incorporation does not only take everything in; it also abolishes its object. If we go back to those moments of primordial absence and negation and put them together, we can watch this scenario emerge. What is lost is a persecutor; the only way of being of the object is as something devoured or expelled; the lost object is bad *because* the only way of being the object is as something devoured or expelled. If this is a vicious circle, it is also, in these early papers, a process without end; inherently contradictory, these mechanisms serve the very impulses against which they defend, and they founder on the 'problem of preservation' as emptiness, aggression, and sadistic impulses all return: 'The omnipotence of phantasy is a weapon which cuts both ways.'[92] Similarly, what is seen to resolve the cycle belongs no less in circular time: 'Here we have a benign circle.'[93]

One of the most interesting things about these papers, therefore, is that they lay out so clearly the problem of generating an account of positive development out of the processes they have described – positive as in psychic, positive as in linear time. Not that Klein does not add, as Rivière insists, a new emphasis on the mother as good object, on the early love relation, on the depressive phase in which the child takes everything back (as opposed to 'in') and subjects it to a meticulous and loving repair. 'Even during the earliest stage,' Klein writes, 'persecutory anxiety is to some extent counteracted by the experience of the good breast.'[94] And yet, even inside this account (and on the same page), the experience of gratification turns into idealization, which then sets up the object as 'perfect, inexhaustible, always available, always gratifying'.[95] As Klein puts it in the discussion following her paper in 1944: 'Even when the feeding situation is satisfactory, hunger and the craving for libidinal gratification stir and reinforce the destructive impulses';[96] and again in an earlier paper: 'some measure of frustration is inevitable . . . what the infant actually *desires* is unlimited gratification.'[97] Gratification therefore sets up the terms of its own demise. Or, where it repairs, it also repeats: 'The experience of gratification at the mother's breast after frustration' develops the infant's confidence that 'bad things go and good things come'[98]; it enters into the logic of explusion and projection that it is also intended to subdue.

Klein's contribution to the debate can be read at least partly as a reaffirmation of love against what has come before. But this love, she insists, is complex; it is not a value or thing in itself. If it is present from the earliest stages, it none the less comes at least partly in reply to the mother's demand ('an infant knows intuitively that his smile and other signs of affection and happiness produce happiness and pleasure in the mother'); turning on her pleasure, it seeks out her desires and her words. Klein provides a graphic image of this early relation in the five-month-old patient who put his fingers in Klein's mouth in 'an attempt to fetch the sounds out' (introjection, as Lacan would put it, as 'always introjection of the speech of the other').[99] These feelings, Klein states in reply to Brierly, are not a 'primary simple affect'.[100]

Likewise, reparation can reinforce omnipotence. (Although Klein herself had insisted on the distinction from 1935, one point of dispute was whether it simply derived from Freud's concept of reaction formation and obsessional undoing.[101]) In these discussions the concept of reparation appears less as part of a naturally evolving development, more as a *requirement*, something enjoined – internally and externally – on the child. It is, in fact, striking the way it appears as a concept in the imperative mode: 'The objects within, feelings about people *must* be put right'; 'The external objects, real parents, brothers

and sisters and so on, *must* be pleased and made happy'; 'the full internalisation of real persons as helpful loved figures *necessitates* abandoning this defence-method of splitting feelings and objects into good and bad'; 'good and bad feelings *have to be* tolerated at one and the same time.'[102] Manifestly replying to criticisms from the earlier debate, Rivière states: 'The significance of the phantasies of reparation is perhaps the most essential aspect of Melanie Klein's work; for that reason her contribution to psycho-analysis *should not be* regarded as limited to the exploration of the aggressive impulses and phantasies.'[103]

To what *necessity* we might ask – theoretical and institutional as well as psychic – does the concept of reparation correspond? Two recent Kleinian commentators have described the development of the concept as something of a mystery in Klein's work. For Meltzer, at the point where Klein starts to distinguish between manic reparation 'as defence against persecutory or depressive anxiety' and 'something more genuinely in the service of the objects', it begins to take on a 'more mysterious meaning'; in the discussion cited at the start of this chapter, Elizabeth Bott-Spillius described as 'mysterious' the shift of attention from sadism to love in Klein's later work: 'I don't know where it came from.'[104] It is as if reparation can theorize itself only as absolute necessity and/or absolute unknown. What these papers suggest is that reparation cannot be detached from the issue of knowledge. Indeed, one might say that, as psychic process, reparation requires a suspension of absolute knowledge if it is not to turn into pure omnipotent defence. It is not, therefore, to deny the validity of the experience of reparation to note that it has often come to serve in the Kleinian corpus as a solution to difficulties – of negativity, causality, and knowledge – which, in this earlier debate, seem to be without end. The point is made, although from very different perspectives, by both Glover and Lacan.

For it is central to Kleinian theory that the anxiety which leads to fixation and regression in both sexes also plays its part in precipitating the libido on its forward path: 'each of the fixations and pathological symptoms apt to appear at successive stages of development have both a retrogressive and progressive function, binding anxiety and thus making further development possible.'[105] Which is to say that development is in some sense pathological – Heimann calls this the 'negative aspect of progression'.[106] Klein herself states repeatedly, with reference to the depressive position, that each step in unification leads to a renewed splitting of the imagos – of necessity, since the depressive position genetically derives from the paranoid state that it is meant to surpass. What Heimann and Isaacs refer to as a 'benign circle' follows the same logic: 'These ego achievements . . . are prime factors in the fight against anxiety and guilt. A certain degree and quality of guilt and anxiety stimulate reparation and thus encourage sublimation.'[107]

Thus, when Isaacs writes, *'the established principle of genetic continuity is a concrete instrument of knowledge'* (emphasis original), 'the essence of Freud's theory lies in just this fact of detailed continuity', this is not a developmental paradigm in any straightforward sense.[108] The movement is constantly in two directions – progression being constantly threatened by the mechanisms which move it on. Hence the well-known paradox that, in Klein's account, homosexuality arises out of the anxieties of heterosexual phantasy; that if heterosexuality is somewhere pre-established for the subject, it is so only as part of an unmanageable set of phantasies which are in fact incapable, in the theory, of ensuring heterosexuality itself.[109] As much as the idea of a developmental sequence, this could be argued to be the logic proper to Kleinian thought: 'Anxiety and guilt at times check and at other times enhance the libidinal development'; 'while in some ways these defences impede the

path of integration, they are essential for the whole development of the ego.'[110] Thus, as Lacan points out in his commentary on Klein's paper on symbol formation, the ego appears twice over and in the space of a single sentence as precocious or overdeveloped and as what, through its weakness, is preventing normal development from taking place: 'The early operation of the reactions originating on the genital level was the result of premature ego development, but further ego development was only inhibited by it' (Lacan: 'She says that the ego was over precociously developed . . . and then in the second part of the sentence that it is the ego which is preventing development from taking place').[111]

Too much and too little of an ego whose role it is to master the anxiety out of which it has itself been produced. Anna Freud objects: 'According to the theory of the English school of analysis, introjection and projection, which in our view should be assigned to the period after the ego has been differentiated from the outside world, are the very processes by which the structure of the ego is developed.'[112] Only if the ego comes first is development assured. Those who criticize Klein for developmental normativity (the idea that subjects progress naturally to their heterosexual goals) would do well to note that, at least as much as regards Freud's own normative moments, it is not in these terms that Klein's writings can theoretically sustain themselves.[113] The value of the stress on negativity would then reside in the trouble it poses to the concept of a sequence, the way that it acts as a bar, one could say, to what might elsewhere (and increasingly) appear as normative and prescriptive in the work and followers of Melanie Klein.

For Glover, in his long critique of Klein, a central problem – if not *the* central problem – was that 'the author cannot tell a developmental story straight'.[114] (For those in the humanities seeking after the trials of writing, this would be the ultimate accolade.) The 'subversive nature' of Heimann and Isaacs's paper on 'Regression' is precisely that 'if fixation can be regarded as a reaction to (result of) regression and if regression itself works backwards through a developmental aggression series, it follows that progression must be attributed to the same factors'.[115] For Glover, this is to undermine – or deviate from – the 'biological progression of an instinct-series' – that is, the whole conception of libidinal development as laid down by Freud: 'It subverts all our concepts of progressive mental development.'[116] Only 'if we stick to Freud's elaborated categories', writes Hoffer, are we 'able to conceive the primitive psychical make-up of an infant and the elaborate organisation of an adult personality as a *lawful continuity*'.[117] Thus Melanie Klein, in the eyes of her critics, theoretically disinherits herself.

The objections to these papers thus make it clear that the emphasis on negativity operates not as a primordial, biological pre-given from which an orderly sequence ('an orderly series and correlations') can be derived, but as the subversion of sequence and biology alike. And Glover is explicit that this subversion is the direct consequence of the emphasis on phantasy in the work of Klein. It is at that moment of primitive hallucination when, whe argues, the child misinterprets its experience 'against the whole weight of the biological evidence of survival' that the instinct loses the 'realistic aim' on which such a concept of orderly progression relies. And what, Glover asks, does this make of the infant if not 'fantast' and 'fool'?[118]

It seems to me that this is the problem which then works itself out inside the analytic institution and specifically in relation to the analysis of children. Let's note that the genesis of the persecutory object in Kleinian thinking casts a shadow over interpretation, since, according to the logic of negation, interpretation comes as a stranger from the outside. And let's note too that if Klein makes

of the analyst a fool and a fantast, it is from this place that the analyst has to try to speak, bridging the gap, as Rivière puts it at the end of her Introduction, between the baby ignorant of the external world and the scientist aware of nothing else. For the baby derives and imputes meanings which, because they do not relate to external or material reality, the scientific worker cannot appreciate. And the analyst can bridge the gap only in so far as 'she can assume the baby's condition'.[119] What is this, other than to require psychoanalysis to enter into what Kleinians seem to theorize, to the consternation of their critics, as an infinite regress? a place which Rivière assigns to those 'gifted and intuitive mothers and women' who know that the child inhabits a world of psychic significance and who are 'almost as inarticulate as babies themselves'.[120] Leaving aside this extraordinary image of women's relationship to language in an introduction to a book in which only women in fact speak,[121] the question has to be asked: What problems must it pose for an analytic school to situate itself in the place of an infant to whom interpretation is by definition unwelcome and who is fantast and fool?

A point finally about the wider political resonance of this dispute. The discussions, as is well known, were staged at the height of the Second World War. The emphasis on negativity, the ambivalence about reparation (reparation as ambivalent), takes its reference from, even as it casts light on, the conflict going on all around. Ella Sharpe comments: 'For a belief in the actual good object the actual bad one results in world affairs with a Hitler-ridden Germany and pipe-smoking optimists elsewhere who say "God's in His Heaven, all's right with the world".' And again: 'The "status quo" is a frequent phrase heard today. The full phrase is "the status quo ante". How many people still hope that the end of the war may mean a restoration of the pre-war conditions for which they are most homesick, although progressive

minds on every hand warn us that restoration of old conditions could only lead to renewed disaster.'[122] What clearer statement of the political provenance of theory? What clearer indication that, for this analyst at least, if psychoanalysis concentrates on the good and the restorative, it heads straight into a theoretical and political blind?

A Postscript on Black Holes

During the course of working on this chapter, I read Stephen Hawking's *A Brief History of Time* (I am one of thousands, as it has been at the top of the best-seller list in Britain and the United States since it was first published in 1988).[123] I could not help but be struck by the remarkable analogies between what Hawking was describing in the realm of cosmology, the theoretical difficulties and points of tension of that description, and what Melanie Klein confronted in her attempt to theorize the negative components of psychic life. Hawking's investigation of black holes and the Big Bang theory of the universe can be read as an investigation of how to think negativity and outer boundaries, the points where what we take to be the recognizable and at least partly knowable universe comes into being, goes off its own edges, collapses into itself, ceases to be – all questions which are central to the psychoanalytic discussion of the boundaries, coming into being, and internally intractable limits of the psyche. As Paula Heimann put it: 'when exactly does the ego, the differentiation from the amorphous id begin?'[124] Compare Hawking: 'What really happens during the very early (. . .) stages of the universe? (. . .) Does the universe in fact have a beginning? (. . .) What were the "boundary conditions" at the beginning of time?' (pp. 115, 122)

In his book, Hawking discusses the famous concept of the black hole – points (or singularities) in the universe where all matter collapses in on itself: stars which have contracted to the point where light cannot escape, and if light cannot escape, since nothing can travel faster than light, 'neither can anything else; everything is dragged back by the gravitational field' (p. 87). All-incorporating, the black hole has, at the very least, extraordinarily metaphoric resonance for anyone thinking about Melanie Klein's work (irresistibly, current attempts at unified theory in physics are called 'grand unified theories' or GUTs).[125] However, it is in the relation between the black hole and its conceptual theorization that I think the most interesting points of connection appear. How can a black hole – how can negativity – be thought? This, as much as resistance to the idea of a destructive force in all of us, is what I consider to have been at the heart of the dispute with Melanie Klein.

It is central to Hawking's account of the black hole that what happens inside it cannot, by definition, be known. Since anyone entering a black hole is destroyed by it, she or he cannot observe it; inversely, those at the distance that allows observation are protected from the breakdown of the laws of science which occurs inside a black hole. If you are inside, you lose the capacity and conditions for knowledge; outside, you retain knowledge, but cannot grasp what it is you need to know. The black hole thus provokes two complementary anxieties: too close, it devours you; safely outside, you don't know what's going on. This is called the 'cosmic censorship hypothesis' (rephrased by Hawking as 'God abhors a naked singularity': p. 88). Like the unconscious, a black hole is censored, and can be known only by its effects. As a concept, the black hole wipes out the possibility of knowledge, of its own total or absolute theoretical grasp. It is therefore the place where not only all light and matter, but our laws of science in relationship to them, as well as the relationship we presume between observation and knowledge, equally disappear.

Lacan, in a passage cited by Shoshana Felman, draws on the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, also discussed by Hawking (pp. 53–61) – that it is impossible to locate exactly the speed and place of a particle at the same time (the process of locating one affects the other, and conversely): 'as soon as [the elements] are interrogated somewhere, it is impossible to grasp them in their totality.'[126] Hawking's discussion constantly returns to this question of the possibility of knowledge (although in relation to the uncertainty principle he in fact suggests that some forms of unpredictability might be removed). Thus, for example, the question arises as to why this universe, among the possibility of many different universes or regions of a single universe, developed in such a way that complicated organisms are possible, and why the universe is the way that we see it – to which the reply, according to what is called the strong 'anthropic principle' is: 'If it had been different, we would not have been here' (pp. 124–27). Not everyone accepts this principle of course – Hawking himself is committed to a unified theory of physics which would ultimately reveal the mind of God. But what is striking about the principle is that the state of the universe is explained as the consequence of the subjects who, according to a more obvious logic, should appear as its effect. Or to put it another way, in this account, it is only through a fantasy of our being-in-the-world that we can theorize the fact that the world comes to be.[127]

It is, therefore, not just that contemporary science points to the 'irreducibility of ignorance' (Felman's expression for the epistemological principle proposed by Lacan[128]), but that the question of knowledge and the question of origins – the question of the origins of knowledge – appear to be inextricably linked. At the very least, the terms of this discussion should act as a caution to any attempt to legitimate psychoanalysis through a

naïve appeal to science (since today science itself will not support the idea of definitive knowledge to which such descriptions of psychoanalysis make their appeal). More, and in a way that echoes the insistence by Isaacs and Rivière on the inseparability of knowledge and subjective experience, fantasies are always in on the (scientific) act. 'It is greatly to be hoped', writes Hawking, 'that some version of the censorship hypothesis holds because close to naked singularities it may be possible to travel into the past. While this would be fine for writers of science fiction, it would mean that no one's life would ever be safe: someone might go into the past and kill your father and mother before you were conceived!' (p. 89). The point of quoting this is not to reduce scientific investigation to the status of oedipal fantasy or 'primal scene' (what exactly *did* parents get up to before one was born?), but, resisting any reduction of psychoanalysis to cosmology or the reverse, to suggest that if knowledge always borders on fantasy, fantasy is always in part fantasy about (the borders of) knowledge. Where does the possibility of knowledge come from? Can we conceive of a limit point where it ceases to be?[129]

It is the advantage of theories like that of the black hole or the Big Bang that they are so apocalyptic. The drama of their imagining compensates for what scares. The idea of something negative as explosion or pure inexplicable force seems oddly to be more manageable or acceptable than the idea of something negative which is at once less certain and which seems to wipe out the conditions through which it can, or should, be known. This, it seems to me, is what we saw in relation to Klein: leave the death drive in the sphere of biological science; don't mix it with meaning, with the psychic glosses and qualifiers of the inner world. It is not just that this brings the death drive in closer (Rivière's comment on psychoanalytic 'resistance' to the death drive); it is also paradoxically that this same proximity weakens its visionary

force. In the Kleinian account, it was exactly in proportion as negativity entered the psychic structure that it slipped from the realm of logic and sequence – for the theory and for the psychic development being charted – and out of any totalizing grasp.

It seems significant, therefore, that Hawking has qualified the concept of the black hole – one chapter is entitled 'Black Holes Ain't So Black' – but this is much less often talked about (pp. 99–113). More difficult than the idea of the black hole as total destruct or all-incorporating negativity is the idea that the black hole emits something positive, radiation, which 'seems to imply that gravitational collapse is not as final and irreversible as we once thought' (p. 112). Hawking says that when he presented this result at a conference, he was greeted with incredulity. The images that Hawking offers here are in themselves graphic for psychoanalysis: negative virtual particles which fall into a black hole leaving their positive partner with nothing to 'annihilate with', at which point the partners either also fall into the black hole or, having positive energy, escape (p. 106). Perhaps we could substitute this strange image of partnership for the dualism of the life and death principles – 'pairing' as an alternative to the notions of 'balance' or 'triumph of one principle over the other' through which the link between them is most often described.

Again, more difficult than the idea of the Big Bang is the idea of a universe without beginning or end. This might be why Hawking's new proposal about the initial state of the universe – no boundary to space-time: 'The boundary condition of the universe is that it has no boundary' (p. 136) – is so unsettling. A universe without boundary disturbs, not just because it leaves so small a role for a creator (the Pope instructed the participants at one conference which Hawking attended not to enquire into the Big Bang itself because it was the work of God), but because, paradoxically, it is the idea of something *without* a limit that pushes us conceptually *off* the edge.

The issue then seems to be not how much we can take of negativity, but how much negativity itself can take. If it appears to be the potential black hole of psychoanalytic theory, it is perhaps even more disturbing to think that it might not be such an absolute, that there might be random particles which escape (not a collision between two absolute principles but particles left with no one 'to annihilate with'); that the black hole, like theory, cannot get everything under its sway. It is as if negativity can be taken on board only as Big Bang or black hole (without qualification), either pure origin or end.

It feels to me that, against the grain of this way of thinking, Hawking can be fruitfully read alongside Melanie Klein: negativity as the limit of theory or total knowledge; negativity as caught up in the positive partner as much as antagonist, and not something to which the positive can only be opposed. The concept of negativity will not provide us with a clear account of origins (even if it affects the way that the idea of origins can be thought); nor can we place it at the distance from which it could be conceptually controlled; if it is mixed up with the positive, it ceases to be a pure entity; at the same time the positive, implicated in its process, cannot be appealed to as the counter-principle which will placate and subdue it or get it back under control (the relationships are more shifting than this). In Hawking's universe, as I read it, negativity is unavoidable – on condition that we do not reify it, but recognize its place in the speculations which we cannot but choose to spin about the world and about ourselves.

NOTES

1 Leo Bersani gives a largely critical appraisal of Klein in 'Death and Literary Authority: Marcel Proust and Melanie Klein', in *The Culture of Redemption* (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1990) ch. 1; *Women – a Cultural Review* devoted a large section of its second issue, *Positioning Klein*, to Melanie Klein (November 1990). These appear, however, to be exceptions. There is no full discussion of Klein, e.g., in the influential collection *The Trial(s) of Psychoanalysis*, ed. Francoise Meltzer (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988). For discussion of feminism and Klein see n. 3 and 4 below.

2 Elizabeth Bott Spillius (ed.), *Melanie Klein Today – Developments in Theory and Practice*, vol. 1, *Mainly Theory*; vol. 2, *Mainly Practice*, New Library of Psychoanalysis, vols. 7 and 8 (London and New York: Routledge in association with the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1988).

3 The clearest statement of these criticisms, focusing more directly on Ernest Jones but also addressing Klein, is given in 'The Phallic Phase and the Subjective Import of the Castration Complex', in *Feminine Sexuality – Jacques Lacan and the école freudienne*, ed. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (London: Macmillan; New York: Norton, 1982), pp. 99–122; also Juliet Mitchell, Introduction to ibid., pp. 1–26; and Jacqueline Rose, 'The Cinematic Apparatus – Problems in Current Theory', in *Sexuality in the Field of Vision* (London: Verso, 1986), p. 211n. Bersani, 'Death and Literary Authority'; Noreen O'Connor, 'Is Melanie Klein the One Who Knows Who You Really Are?', *Women – A Cultural Review*, 1, no. 2, pp. 180–8. For a suggestive discussion of Lacan and Klein, see Malcolm Bowie, *Lacan* (London: Fontana Modern Master; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 144–8.

4 See, e.g., Madeleine Sprengnether, '(M)other Eve: some revisions of the fall in fiction by contemporary women writers', in *Feminism and Psychoanalysis*, ed. Richard Feldstein and Judith Roof (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 298–322. The absence of Klein, both in this article and in Sprengnether's more recent book, *The Spectral Mother – Freud, Feminism and Psychoanalysis* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), which describes the absence of/haunting by the mother

in Freud's work and the place of the pre-oedipal mother in subsequent analytic theory, seems striking. In discussion following the original presentation of '(M)other Eve' as a paper at 'Feminisms and Psychoanalysis', a conference held at the University of Illinois, Normal, in 1986, Sprengnether explained the absence of Klein in terms of the negative component of Klein's work. See also *The (M)other Tongue: essays in feminist psychoanalytic interpretation*, ed. Shirley Nelson Garner, Claire Kahane, and Madeleine Sprengnether (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985) and Jane Gallop's critique in terms of what she calls 'the dream of the mother without otherness' ('Reading the Mother Tongue: psychoanalytic feminist criticism', in Meltzer (ed.), *Trial(s) of Psychoanalysis*, p. 136).

5 *The Freud–Klein Controversies 1941–45*, ed. Pearl King and Riccardo Steiner, New Library of Psychoanalysis, vol. 11 (London and New York: Routledge in association with the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1991); and Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann, Susan Isaacs, and Joan Rivière, *Developments in Psycho-Analysis*, ed. Joan Rivière, preface by Ernest Jones, International Psycho-Analytic Library, vol. 43 (London: Hogarth, 1952, and Maresfield, 1989).

6 The fullest and most informative account is given by Riccardo Steiner, 'Some Thoughts about Tradition and Change Arising from an Examination of the British Psychoanalytical Society's Controversial Discussions (1943–44)', *International Review of Psycho-Analysis*, 12, 27 (1985), pp. 27–71; see also Pearl King, 'Early Divergences between the Psycho-Analytical Societies in London and Vienna', and Teresa Brennan, 'Controversial Discussions and Feminist Debate', both in *Freud in Exile*, ed. Edward Timms and Naomi Segal (New Haven Conn., and London: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 124–33, 254–74; and Gregorio Kohon, 'Notes on the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement in Great Britain', Introduction to *The British School of Psychoanalysis – The Independent Tradition*, ed. Gregorio Kohon (London: Free Association Books, 1986), pp. 24–50. For a discussion of the controversy, specifically in relation to the concept of phantasy, see Anne Hayman, 'What do we Mean by "Phantasy"?', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 70 (1989), pp. 105–14.

7 Janet Sayers, *Mothering Psychoanalysis – Helene Deutsch, Karen Horney, Anna Freud, Melanie Klein* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991); *Women – A Cultural Review*, 1, no. 2. The first reappraisal of Klein in this context, although not explicitly addressed to feminism, is Juliet Mitchell's introduction to *The Selected Melanie Klein* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986). Nancy Chodorow discusses Klein in *The Reproduction of Mothering* (Berkeley, Calif., and London: University of California Press, 1978), criticizing her for instinctual determinism, but praising her recognition, *contra* Freud, of the girl's early heterosexuality.

8 Nicholas Wright, *Mrs Klein* (London: Nick Hern Books, 1988); and review by Elaine Showalter, 'Mrs Klein: the mother, the daughter, the thief and their critics', *Women – A Cultural Review*, 1, no. 2, pp. 144–8. Paul Roazen, *Freud and his Followers* (New York: Knopt, 1974; London: Allen Lane, 1975).

9 François Roustang, *Un Destin si funeste* (Paris: Minuit, 1976) trans. Ned Lukacher, *Dire Mastery* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Jacques Derrida, 'Du tout', in *La Carte postale – de Socrate à Freud et au-delà* (Paris: Flammarion, 1980), pp. 525–49, trans. Alan Bass, in *The Post Card: from Socrates to Freud and beyond* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 497–521; Phyllis Grosskurth, *Freud's Secret Ring: Freud's inner circle and the politics of psychoanalysis* (London: Cape, 1991).

10 Derrida. 'Du tout', p. 548; trans. p. 520.

11 Julia Kristeva, 'The True-Real', in *The Kristeva Reader*, ed. Toril Moi (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 214–37. Kristeva is undoubtedly the French psychoanalytic theorist who draws most consistently on the work of Melanie Klein.

12 None of the papers published in the 1952 *Developments in Psycho-Analysis* correspond exactly to the versions delivered to the scientific meetings of the British Society.

I therefore use the different versions where appropriate, always indicating the source in the notes.

13 Donald Meltzer comments: 'Any systematic attempt to teach Melanie Klein's work runs almost immediately into difficulties that are the exact opposite of the problems facing one in teaching Freud. Where the theoretical tail wags the clinical dog with him, hardly any theoretical tail exists to be wagged with her', *The Kleinian Development*, Part 2, *Richard Week by Week* (Perthshire: Clunie Press for the Roland Harris Educational Trust, 1978), p. 1.

14 *Complete Freud–Jones Correspondence*, ed. R. A. Paskauskas (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1993); cf. also Steiner 'Some Thoughts'.

15 Ernest Jones, Preface to *Developments in Psycho-Analysis*, p. v.

16 Joan Rivière, ibid., p. 1.

17 Ibid., p. 2.

18 Ibid.

19 Susan Isaacs, opening statement, 'Fifth Series of Scientific Discussions', 19 May 1943, in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, p. 444.

20 Marjorie Brierly, opening comments on Paula Heimann's paper 'Some Aspects of the Role of Introjection and Projection in Early Development', 'Sixth Discussion of Scientific Controversies', 20 October 1943, in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, pp. 538–9.

21 Paula Heimann. 'Seventh Discussion of Scientific Controversies', 17 November 1943, in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, pp. 569–70.

22 Rivière, Introduction to *Developments in Psycho-Analysis*, pp. 23–4.

23 Meltzer sees this as *the* central problem of Kleinian thought: 'It requires an immense shift in one's view of the world to think that the outside world is essentially meaningless and unknowable, that one perceives the form but must attribute the meaning. Philosophically, this is the great problem in coming to grips with Kleinian thought and its implications' (*Kleinian Development*, p. 86).

24 Rivière, Introduction to *Developments in Psycho-Analysis*, pp. 2–3.

25 Heimann, 'Some Aspects of Introjection and Projection', p. 511.

26 For a critique of Klein's 'instinctual reductionism', see 'Phallic Phase', and Chodorow, *Reproduction of Mothering*; Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, 'Fantasme originaire, fantasme des origines, origine du fantasme', *Les Temps modernes*, 215, (1964); trans. 'Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality', in *Formations of Fantasy*, ed. Victor Burgin, James Donald, and Cora Kaplan, (London and New York: Methuen, 1986), pp. 5–34; first published in English in *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 49 no. 1, (1969) (their criticisms are directed more at Susan Isaacs than Klein); also Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, who refer to Kleinian 'panfantastic instinctualism', 'Deuil ou melancolie, introjecter-incorporer', in *L'Écorce et le noyau* (Paris: Flammarion, 1987), pp. 259–74; trans. 'Introjection-Incorporation: Mourning or Melancholia', *Psychoanalysis in France*, (New York: International Universities Press, 1980) ed. Serge Lebovici and D. Widlocher, pp. 3–16.

27 Isaacs, Balint, Lantos, in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, pp. 272, 347, 349; Edward Glover, 'Examination of the Klein System of Child Psychology', *Pscho-Analytic Study of the Child*, 1, (1945), p. 103.

28 Rivière, 'On the Genesis of Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy', in *Developments in Psycho-Analysis*, p. 43; paper originally published in *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, (1936), pp. 395–422.

29 Isaacs, replying to discussion of her paper 'The Nature and Function of Phantasy', 'Second Discussion of Scientific Controversies', 17 February 1943, in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, p. 373.

30 Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1937), p. 57; passage cited by Susan Isaacs, 'The Nature and Function of Phantasy', in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, p. 295. See also Anna Freud, 'Notes on Aggression', 1949 (1948): 'The presence of mental conflicts and of the guilt feelings consequent on them presupposes that a specific, comparatively advanced stage in ego development

has been reached' (*Indications for Child Analysis and other papers 1945–56,* in *The Writings of Anna Freud,* vol. 4 (New York: International Universities Press, 1968) p. 70.

31 Glover, 'Klein System', p. 88n. citing his own paper 'Grades of Ego-Differentiation', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis,* (1930), pp. 1–11.

32 Barbara Lantos, 'Third Discussion of Scientific Controversies', continuation of discussion of Isaacs's 'Nature and Function of Phantasy', 17 March 1943, in *Freud–Klein Controversies,* p. 413.

33 Isaacs, 'Fifth Discussion' concluding discussion on 'Nature and Function of Phantasy', p. 460.

34 Rivière, 'Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy', p. 45.

35 Rivière, Introduction, p. 29.

36 Rivière, 'Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy', p. 45.

37 Melanie Klein, 'The Emotional Life and Ego-Development of the Infant with Special Reference to the Depressive Position', in *Freud–Klein Controversies,* p. 781.

38 Rivière, 'Psychical Conflict in Early Infancy', p. 45n.; Introduction, p. 15.

39 Rivière, 'Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy', pp. 54–5; Isaacs, 'Nature and Function of Phantasy', p. 302; Heimann, 'Some Aspects of Introjection and Projection', p. 518.

40 Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis: the conduct of the psycho-analysis of children as seen in the treatment of a ten-year-old boy,* in *Writings of Melanie Klein,* vol. 4 (London: Hogarth, 1961, 1975 and Virago, 1988) p. 339.

41 Riviere, 'Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy', pp. 47, 49.

42 Klein, 'On Observing the Behaviour of Young Infants', also cited by Rivière in Introduction, pp. 270n., 30; compare Heimann: 'Freud did not enter into the question of what happens in the infant's mind when he abandons the object' ('Certain Functions of Introjection and Projection', p. 145).

43 Klein, 'Emotional Life of the Infant', pp. 763–4.

44 See Phyllis Grosskurth, *Melanie Klein – Her World and Her Work* (New York: Knopf; London: Maresfield. 1986 pp. 376–7.

45 Isaacs, 'The Nature and Function of Phantasy', *Developments,* pp. 103–7; Isaacs, 'Fifth Discussion', 'Sixth Discussion', pp. 466–7; p. 554; Heimann, 'Some Aspects of Introjection and Projection', pp. 505–6.

46 Riviere, Introduction, p. 10.

47 Heimann, 'Certain Functions of Introjection and Projection', p. 128.

48 Jacques Lacan, 'Introduction au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite sur la "Verneinung" de Freud'; 'Réponse au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite sur la "Verneinung" de Freud'; Appendice 1: Commentaire parlé sur la "Verneinung" de Freud, par Jean Hyppolite', in *Écrits* (Paris: Seuil, 1966), pp. 369–80, 381–400, 879–88. Throughout this section, where I cite these articles in English, I am making use of Anthony Wilden's unpublished translations of the texts kindly made available to me by Richard Macksey.

49 Lacan, *Le Seminaire I: les écrits techniques de Freud* (Paris: Seuil, 1975), pp. 63–73; trans. John Forrester, *Freud's Papers on Technique* (New York: Norton; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 52–61.

50 Freud, 'Negation', 1925, in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud,* ed. and trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth) vol. 19, p. 239; Pelican Freud, 11. p. 441.

51 Rivière. 'Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy', p. 52.

52 Hyppolite, 'Commentaire parlé sur la "Verneinung" de Freud', p. 886.

53 Ibid., p. 880. Hyppolite's reading, and Lacan's through Hyppolite, derives strongly from Hegel: 'The dissimilarity which obtains in consciousness between the ego and the substance constituting its object, is their inner distinction, the factor of negativity in general. We may regard it as the defect of both opposites, but it is their very soul, their moving spirit' (*The Phenomonology of Spirit,* trans. J. B. Baillie, rev. ed. (London: Allen and Unwin; New York: Humanities Press, 1949), pp. 96–7; cf. too Kojève's commentary: 'In contrast to the knowledge that keeps man in a passive quietude, Desire dis-quiets him and moves him to action. Born of Desire, action tends to

satisfy it, and can do so only by the "negation," the destruction, or at least the transformation of the desired object: to satisfy hunger, for example, the food must be destroyed or, in any case, transformed. Thus, all action is 'negating' (Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), p. 11; trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 3–4. For a discussion of negativity in relation to Hegel and psychoanalysis, see Kristeva, 'La negativité, le rejet', in *La Révolution du langage poétique* (Paris: Seuil, 1974), pp. 101–50, trans. Margaret Waller, *Revolution in Poetic Language* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 107–64.

54 Lacan, 'Introduction au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite', pp. 379–80.

55 Ella Sharpe, 'Ninth Discussion of Scientific Differences', discussion of Melanie Klein's paper 'Emotional Life of the Infant', 1 March 1944, in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, p. 811.

56 Hyppolite, 'Commentaire', p. 883.

57 Klein, 'The Importance of Symbol-Formation in the Development of the Ego', 1930, in *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works, 1921–1945*, in *Writings of Melanie Klein*, vol. 1 (London: Hogarth, 1975, and Virago, 1988); Lacan, *Le Séminaire* I, pp. 81–3, p. 95–103, 83, trans. pp. 68–70, p. 78–8, 70. For a discussion of Lacan's reading of Klein's paper, see Shoshana Felman, 'Beyond Oedipus: the specimen story of psychoanalysis', in *Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight – Psychoanalysis in Contemporary Culture* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 105–28. For a discussion in relation to Lacan and Kristeva, see Mary Jacobus, ' "Tea Daddy": poor Mrs Klein and the pencil shavings', *Women – A Cultural review*, 1, no. 2, pp. 160–79.

58 Melitta Schmideberg, 'Intellektuelle Hemmung und Ess-Störung' ('Intellectual Inhibition and Eating Disorders'), *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogie*, 8 (1934), p. 110–16; Lacan, 'Réponse au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite', pp. 396–8. A translation of Schmideberg's article, 'Intellectual Inhibition and Eating Disorders', is included as an appendix to this book and is discussed in chapter 6, 'War in the Nursery'.

59 Lacan, 'Réponse an commentaire de Jean Hyppolite', p. 396.

60 Sharpe, 'Ninth Discussion', pp. 804–5.

61 Freud, 'Negation', pp. 236–7, Pelican Freud, p. 439; cited by Heimann, 'Some Aspects of Introjection and Projection', pp. 505–6; by Isaacs, 'Sixth Discussion', pp. 554–5; by Klein, 'Tenth Discussion of Scientific Differences', formal reply to discussion of 'Emotional Life of the Infant', 3 May 1944, in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, pp. 838 and 843n. (Klein offers a different translation from the version cited here; see Editor's note, p. 843).

62 See n. 26 above.

63 Isaacs, 'Nature and Function of Phantasy', *Developments*, p. 104.

64 Ibid.

65 Isaacs, 'Sixth Discussion', p. 555.

66 Isaacs, 'Nature and Function of Phantasy', *Developments*, p. 106.

67 P. Heimann and S. Isaacs, 'Regression', paper presented 17 December 1943, in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, p. 706. See also Ella Sharpe's 1940 paper on metaphor in which she describes all speech as metaphor – 'an avenue of outer-ance' (in itself a play on words) – through which the child, gradually controlling its bodily orifices, makes speech the outlet for tensions no longer relieved by physical discharge: 'So that we may say that speech in itself is metaphor, that metaphor is as ultimate as speech' ('Psycho-Physical Problems Revealed in Language: an examination of metaphor', in *Collected Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, International Psycho-Analytical Library, vol. 36 (London: Hogarth, 1950), pp. 155–69.

68 See n. 26 above.

69 Rivière, Introduction, p. 16, citing Isaacs, 'Nature and Function of Phantasy', *Developments*, p. 83. Note that in a footnote to this remark Rivière insists that, contrary to responses to Isaacs's paper at the time, this is central to Klein's conceptualization and not an innovation by Isaacs.

70 Isaacs, 'Nature and Function of Phantasy', in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, p. 313.
71 Rivière, 'Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy', p. 40.
72 Isaacs citing Freud, 'Nature and Function of Phantasy', in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, p. 280.
73 Ibid., pp. 96, 94.
74 Rivière, 'Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy', p. 50.
75 Heimann, 'Some Aspects of Introjection and Projection', p. 518; Klein, 'Eighth Discussion of Scientific Differences', discussion of Heimann and Isaacs's paper on 'Regression', 16 February 1944, in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, p. 747.
76 See n. 23 above. Cf. too Steiner: 'The term phantasy . . . after being bounced back and forth throughout these lengthy discussions, seems to have assumed an enigmatic, evocative power. For one side it came to be synonymous with new discoveries – the more the term was analysed, the more it was enriched with new meanings. For the others it seemed to mean something not unlike belief in a new and hazily-defined mysticism. Some of the latter even saw it as something to be exorcised by the expulsion of the entire group led by Klein'. (Steiner, 'Some Thoughts about Tradition and Change', pp. 49–50).
77 Kate Friedlander, Marjorie Brierly, Friedlander, Brierly, in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, pp. 409, 536, 539, 536.
78 Isaacs, *Freud–Klein Controversies*, p. 467, Heimann, ibid., pp. 580, 572, 570.
79 Anna Freud, 'Indications for Child Analysis', in *The Psycho-Analytic Treatment of Children* (London: Imago, 1946), p. 86. For a discussion of Anna Freud's dispute with Klein, see ch. 6 below.
80 Brierly, 'Sixth Discussion', p. 537. For a discussion of the possibility of distinguishing between incorporation and introjection in terms of metaphor, see Abraham and Torok, 'Introjection-Incorporation'.
81 Heimann, 'Seventh Discussion', p. 571.
82 Sharpe, 'Seventh Discussion', p. 582. For a discussion of these problems in relation to Freud's writing, see Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, *Le sujet freudien* (Paris: Flammarion, 1982), trans. Catherine Porter, *The Freudian Subject* (London: Macmillan; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); also Abraham and Torok, 'Introjection-Incorporation'.

83 Brierly, 'Sixth Discussion', p. 536.
84 Glover, 'Sixth Discussion', pp. 559, 562.
85 See, e.g., Samuel Weber, *The Legend of Freud* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982); Derrida, 'Speculer sur Freud', in *La carte postale*, pp. 257–409; Borch-Jacobsen *Le sujet freudien*.
86 Walter Schmideberg, 'The Second Extraordinary Business Meeting'; Karin Stephen, 'Resolutions and the First Extraordinary Business Meeting', in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, pp. 86, 50.
87 Brierly, 'Sixth Discussion', pp. 536–7.
88 Glover, 'Seventh Discussion', p. 586.
89 Friedlander, 'Discussion on "Regression" ' (discussion circulated only), December 1943, in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, p. 728; Glover, ibid., p. 715.
90 Rivière, 'Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy', p. 47.
91 Heimann, 'Certain Functions of Introjection and Projection', p. 161.
92 Rivière, 'Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy', p. 53.
93 Heimann and Isaacs, 'Regression', p. 703.
94 Klein, 'Emotional Life of the Infant', p. 201.
95 Ibid.
96 Klein, 'Tenth Discussion' p. 836.
97 Klein, 'The Oedipus Complex in the Light of Early Anxieties', 1945, in *Love, Guilt and Reparation*, p. 408.
98 Heimann, 'Some Aspects of Introjection and Projection', p. 523.
99 Klein, 'Emotional Life of the Infant', pp. 777–8; Lacan, *Le Séminaire I*, p. 97; trans., p. 83.
100 Klein, 'Tenth Discussion', p. 834.
101 Isaacs in reply to Glover, 'Fifth Discussion', pp. 456–7; Klein, 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States', 1935, in *Love, Guilt and Reparation*, p. 265.
102 Rivière, 'Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy', pp. 60, 62.
103 Ibid.

104 Meltzer, *Kleinian Development*, pp. 46–7. Meltzer relates this issue to Klein's uncertainty about the conceptual status of the depressive position: 'She had never absolutely crystallised this in her mind, for sometimes she speaks of "penetrating" the depressive position, "overcoming", "surpassing", all of which have different implications regarding the meaning of the "depressive position" ' (p. 114).

105 Heimann and Isaacs, 'Regression', p. 183; cf. also: '[Klein] has shown too that specific anxieties not only contribute in both sexes to fixations and regressions, but also play an essential part in stimulating the libido to move forward from pre-genital positions to the genital one', (p. 175); and Meltzer: 'The badness must be sufficiently split off . . . [but] it must not be so widely split off as to diminish the anxiety below the level that is sufficient for development' (*Kleinian Development*, p. 64).

106 Heimann, 'Certain Functions of Introjection and Projection', p. 162.

107 Heimann and Isaacs, 'Regression', p. 703.

108 Isaacs, 'Nature and Function of Phantasy', *Developments*, p. 75.

109 See esp. Klein, 'Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict', 1928, in *Love, Guilt and Reparation*, pp. 186–98.

110 Klein, 'Emotional Life of the Infant', pp. 223, 209.

111 Klein, 'Importance of Symbol-Formation', p. 227; Lacan, *Le Séminaire I*, p. 102; trans. p. 87.

112 A. Freud, *Ego and the Mechanism of Defence*, p. 57, cited by Isaacs, 'Nature and Function of Phantasy', in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, p. 295.

113 Despite the stress on development in Anna Freud's writing, one could equally argue that it is a simplification to read her work exclusively in such terms. Her famous paper 'Studies in Passivity' gives an extraordinary account of the possible vicissitudes of sexual identification and desire in relation to masculinity and of the resurgence in adulthood of the most primary forms of identification, at the same time as recognizing the limits of its own model of explanation: 'These interpretations are not satisfying . . . What is left unexplained', etc – i.e. the text can be read aporetically as much as developmentally (A. Freud, 'Studies in Passivity', 1952 (1949–51), in *Writings of Anna Freud*, vol. 4, pp. 245–59.

114 Glover, 'Klein System of Child Psychology', p. 112.

115 Ibid., p. 110.

116 Ibid., p. 116.

117 Hedwig Hoffer, 'Fourth Discussion of Scientific Controversies', continuation of discussion of Isaacs's paper 'Nature and Function of Phantasy', 7 April 1943, in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, p. 428 (my emphasis).

118 Glover, 'Klein System of Child Psychology', p. 99.

119 Rivière, Introduction, pp. 18–19.

120 Ibid., p. 36.

121 As Grosskurth comments: 'The Discussions were dominated by women – and what women they were!' (*Melanie Klein*, p. 316). This quote from the manuscript of Virginia Woolf's *To the Lighthouse*, however, relates interestingly to Rivière's remark: 'Don't we communicate better silently? Aren't we (women at any rate) more expressive silently gliding high together, side by side, in the curious dumbness which is so much [more] to our taste than speech'; cited by Lyndall Gordon, *Virginia Woolf – A Writer's Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 195. A whole history of women's relationship to language and of psychoanalysis's relation to modernism is implicit in Rivière's extraordinary comment.

122 Sharpe, 'First Discussion of Scientific Controversies', 'Some Comments on Mrs. Klein's theory of a "depressive position",' in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, pp. 340, 805.

123 Stephen W. Hawking, *A Brief History of Time – From the Big Bang to Black Holes* (London and New York: Bantam, 1988). (subsequent references are cited in the text).

124 Heimann, 'Certain Functions of Introjection and Projection', p. 128.

125 In his Brazilian lectures of 1974, Bion refers to black holes: 'I am familiar with a psycho-analytic theory of the mind which sounds like the astronomical theory of the "black hole" ', (W. R. Bion, *Bion's Brazilian Lectures*, vol. 2, (Rio/São Paulo, 1974; Rio de Janeiro: Imago,

1975), p. 61). Discussing this passage, David Armstrong suggests that the theory of the mind alluded to is Bion's own ('Bion's Later Writing', *Free Associations*, 3, 2, no. 26 (1992), p. 267).

126 Felman, 'Psychoanalysis and Education', in *Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight*, p. 78.

127 In his Inaugural Lecture to the University of Cambridge, Hawking states that a quantum theory of gravity (as central to the not yet attained complete unified theory of physics) is essential if the early universe is to be described and its initial conditions explained without 'merely appealing to the anthropic principle' (Hawking, 'Is the End in Sight for Theoretical Physics?', Appendix to John Boslough, *Stephen Hawking's Universe* (Glasgow; Collins, 1984), p. 120). For a critique of Hawking in relation to the anthropic principle, see Feliz Pirani, 'The Crisis in Cosmology', *New Left Review*, 191 (January/February 1992), pp. 69–89.

128 Felman, 'Psychoanalysis and Education', p. 78.

129 Cf. Bion on the question of reduction: 'Why should a psycho-analyst invent a theory to explain a mental phenomenon and, independently, the astronomers elaborate a similar theory about what they think is a black hole in astronomical space? Which is causing which? Is this some particularity of the human mind which projects it up into space, or is this something real in space from which derives this idea of space in the mind itself? . . . I have used this idea of modern cosmology as a model for psycho-analysis, but I would also use psycho-analysis as the starting point of an investigation of the human mind' (Brazilian Lectures, pp. 61–2).

6 War in the Nursery[1]

When Anna Freud first published her 1926–27 technical lectures on child analysis in England in 1945, she prefaced them with this explanation for the delay:

> It is not the author's fault that the early material contained in this publication is presented to the English reader at such a late date. An English version of the *Introduction to the Technique of Child-Analysis* was published in America. Attempts at publication in England were not successful. For the general publisher the subject matter was still too remote and controversial. Professional psycho-analytic circles in England, on the other hand, were at that time concentrating their interest on Mrs. Melanie Klein's new theory and technique of the analysis of children. The British Psycho-Analytical Society devoted a *Symposium on Child-Analysis* to a severe criticism of the author's efforts, which ran counter to Mrs. Klein's outlook. The *Introduction to the Technique of the Analysis of Children* was rejected when offered to the International Psycho-Analytical Library for publication, and the matter lapsed, so far as England was concerned.[2]

The correspondence between Ernest Jones and Freud at the time suggests that this is, predictably, a one-sided account. When Freud accused Jones of arranging a

campaign against his daughter, Jones replied that Melanie Klein's written response to Anna Freud's paper to the Berlin Society had been suppressed. It was because the *Zeitschrift* (*Die Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*) was barred to Klein that she had turned to the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* to publish her critique.[3] In this dispute across national boundaries and languages, Melanie Klein seems to occupy the same position for Jones as Anna Freud does in relation to Freud. It is a strange scenario in which two men already in a father–son relation battle it out over who in turn is the true daughter – as if the intensity of the dispute over *which* daughter is warding off the greater anxiety, their shared recognition that the legacy is passing to the female child.

It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the question of child analysis immediately finds itself caught up in a set of conflicts over the relationship of psychoanalysis to pedagogy, over the issue not only of whether one can, but equally if not more centrally, whether one should analyse a child. At one level, the move to child analysis can be seen as the logical next step after Freud (although as Juliet Mitchell has pointed out with reference to Klein, it can be seen as reversing the true order of analytic time).[4] But that idea of a logical next step conceals a more important factor, which is that this turn to child analysis was also coincident with – might even be seen as a form of acting out of – a crucial moment or difficulty in the transmission of psychoanalysis itself. It seems that, for the psychoanalytic community, child psychoanalysis has not fulfilled its promise. In 1945, Berta Bornstein was to comment that the expectation that every training analysis should include child analysis 'was disappointed'.[5] In 1962 Esther Bick wrote of the 'neglect' of child analysis, of the few adult analysts who go on to train in the field, of the 'specific difficulties interfering with the development of child analysis' (the

developmental model is noteworthy in itself).[6] The question then arises as to what this 'symptomatic blockage' is expressive of – it is apparently still present, since Bick's essay was reprinted in a 1988 anthology *Melanie Klein Today*. How, from this historical distance, might its moment of emergence be read?

What does analysis *do* to children? What is the accountability, or otherwise, of psychoanalysis to social law? What is the social law, the binding and bonding, of the psychoanalytic world? If the psychoanalysis of children can be reconciled with pedagogy (adjunct, enabler, accomplice), then the risk is that it will drive the unconscious to the wall. But if it retains its separate identity, recalcitrant to what is most coercive and invidious about social norms, then it is not clear how psychoanalysis, or the children it analyses, can avoid the status of eternal outlaw, nor indeed how it can legitimate – how it can transmit – itself. There will be no transmission if the second generation refuses the legacy of the ancestors; a rebellious daughter will not obey or perpetuate her father's law. But if that law is the law of the unconscious, then a subservient one paradoxically disobeys and undoes his heritage no less at the very point of her surrender. Nor is it only the order of fathers and daughters which is at play. For Melanie Klein also found herself involved in an impossible drama of legacy when her daughter became, before the most absolute of repudiations, a Kleinian analyst in turn. So what happens when the problem of transmission plays itself out between mother and daughter – that relationship in which Klein herself was the first to locate a violence no less than that which Freud had identified between fathers and sons? In this dispute over child analysis between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud – the quarrel over pedagogy, transference, and the superego – we can uncover some of the most intractable knots of our psychoanalytic inheritance. Rather than reading it as a war of invective,

proof of the self-infantilizing – in the bad sense – of the analytic scene, we might use it instead to identify something about the limits or boundaries of psychoanalysis, as procedure, as discipline, as history; we might ask what the difficulty of analysing children tells us about the transmissibility of psychoanalytic (of any) law.

When, in the course of their correspondence, Jones suggested that Anna Freud had been insufficiently analysed, Freud replied: 'I must point out to you that such a criticism is as dangerous as it is impermissible. Who, then, has been sufficiently well analysed? I can assure you that Anna has been more deeply and thoroughly analysed than yourself.'[7] Not untypically, Freud's mutually exclusive propositions (true logic of the unconscious as he defines it elsewhere) capture the central dilemma in which the two men are caught: are some analyses more sufficient than others, or is psychoanalysis interminable (to use Freud's later expression), something – like the subjectivity it addresses – necessarily insufficient and incomplete? Since Freud analysed his own daughter, we might see both these propositions as the most blatant self-defence (she was adequately analysed; if she wasn't, then nor is anyone else). But Anna Freud will inherit the knot of these intertwining and self-cancelling propositions when she turns to the question of how, or whether, to analyse a child. Let's start by stating the obvious, that in so far as Anna Freud will argue that there can be no child analysis in the full sense of the term, she is issuing the most thinly veiled of reproaches against Sigmund Freud (she was twenty-three when he analysed her, but she was also, and would always remain, his child). It has become customary to criticize her, especially in the early stages of her work, for forcing psychoanalysis into an educational mould. But when she argues for a psychoanalysis in tandem with pedagogic ideals, her apparent social compliance, her plea for a measure of normality, may also be her way of

warding off a more ferocious legislator, the too intrusive and pressing reality of the paternal word. Maybe, as we will see, the issue is not whether you are for or against the law, but *where* you want to situate it, how – the question may be unanswerable – to negotiate between the law inside and the law outside the mind. Maybe – but this is to anticipate – there is not, finally, such a total opposition between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein.

It is generally accepted that Anna Freud's 1922 paper 'Beating Fantasies and Daydreams' is an account of her own analysis with her father. In it she expands on Freud's paper 'A Child is being Beaten', picking up his reference to two female patients who overlaid their beating fantasies with an 'elaborate superstructure of daydreams', offering as her own illustration the fantasy life of a fifteen-year-old girl (it is because Anna Freud was not qualified in 1922 that it is assumed that the patient is herself).[8] The paper starts with the contrast between the fantasy of beating, with its barely concealed sexual encounter with the father, and the 'nice stories' produced in compensation, inspired by a boy's story-book of medieval heroism: a medieval knight is engaged in a long feud with nobles leagued against him; a youth imprisoned by the knight's henchman is first tortured but finally released. Although the daydreams end with reconciliation, the beating fantasies with an act of violence, it is clear that they are thinly disguised versions of the same theme. The identity between them, which transcends the apparent distinction between pleasurable and painful outcome, is made clear when Anna Freud recounts the version of the story which, several years later, the patient wrote down: 'It began with the prisoner's torture and ended with his refusal to escape' (p. 154). In this compacted summary, there is no mention of the reconciliation which might be expected to explain the youth's desire to stay (elaborating, Anna Freud comments: 'Its aim – harmonious union between the former

antagonists – is only anticipated but not really described': p. 154.) Strikingly, then, it appears that it is not reconciliation – the alleviation of torture – which produces the bond between the youth and his captor, but the process of torture itself.

That Anna Freud should become the theorist of 'altruistic surrender' or 'overgoodness' has often been seen as the logical theoretical accompaniment of, and way of protesting, her life time's devotion to her father.[9] Somewhere between '*gutseins*' ('being good') and '*etwashabenwollen*' ('wanting something of her own'), it is almost too easy to track the partially sublimated expression of her own interminably repeated surrender and escape.[10] In her biography, Elizabeth Young-Bruehl presents this more in terms of a narrative of self-discovery and emancipation; from her father to Lou Andreas-Salomé, to Max Eitingen, Anna Freud painfully constructs a path to analytic and personal autonomy. That narrative of progress looks less assured, however, when we remember that Anna Freud sent Dorothy Burlingham, centre of the family which she finally made her own, into analysis with Sigmund Freud.

At the end of 'Beating Fantasies and Daydreams' Anna Freud charts the emergence of the writer: 'the private fantasy is turned into a communication addressed to others . . . regard for the personal needs of the daydreamer is replaced by regard for the prospective reader' (p. 156). But if this is an account of the emergence of sublimation (a self-created representational space), it is none the less worth noting that it is the version of the story in which the prisoner's father appears for the first time: 'the story being presented in the frame of a conversation between the knight and the prisoner's father' (p. 154). In the very activity of writing, the father 'frames' the scene. The youth may be the hero of the story, but it is not to him that we look for the symbolic capacity to narrate. Anna Freud thus transposes herself in fantasy into a boy only to come straight up against paternal law. It is therefore a symbolic as well as a sexual trajectory which the different stages of the story describe. If this paper draws on fantasy material from Anna Freud's analysis, could we not read it as referring, as much as to the sexual contents of her unconscious (beating as the expression of forbidden desire) to the process – tortuous, pleasurable – of the analysis itself?

At the end of this paper, Anna Freud describes the developmental gain of writing: 'renouncing her private pleasure in favour of making an impression on others, the author has accomplished an important developmental step: the transformation of an autistic activity into a social activity' (p. 155). Narcissism, as Freud himself theorized, is the key social affect ('the satisfaction which the ideal offers to the participants in the culture is of a narcissistic nature'[11]). By 1926, when Anna Freud delivered the first of her lectures on the technique of child analysis ('An Introductory Phase in the Analysis of Children'), an author's ability to hold on to her audience has become the model of the analytic scene: 'My way was rather like that of a film or a novel which has no other intention than to attract the audience or reader to itself' (p. 10). Manipulating her audience – in 1926 her patient – Anna Freud passes from the pleasures of torture into her analytic role: 'My first aim was in fact nothing else but to make myself interesting to the boy' (p. 10). With the unerring clarity of symptomatic logic, what then surfaces in the lecture, as the rite of passage into analysis, is a drama of mastery whose ultimate objective is the child's total surrender to her will: 'he got the habit of relying on analysis as a protection from punishment and claiming my help for repairing the consequences of his rash acts; he let me restore stolen money in his place and got me to make all necessary and disagreeable confessions to his parents . . . I had

however only waited for this moment to require of him in turn . . . the surrender, so necessary for analysis, of all his previously guarded secrets' (pp. 10–11).

Thus Anna Freud seems to carry over into her procedure something which looks like a parody of an earlier parental-cum-analytic scene. We can criticize her, as the Kleinians did at the time, for the crudest manipulation of her patient; or we can note what this bizarre process of transmission reveals about the perverse components – punishment as torture and pleasure – of analytic and social norms. What seems clear is that the question of the child's criminality and the question of subjection and mastery are intimately related to each other. Acknowledge my criminality for me, take me under your wing. In a move which strangely anticipates Melanie Klein's famous papers on crime,[12] Anna Freud seems inadvertently to be suggesting here that crime is not, at the deepest level, antisocial behaviour, but the means through which the subject tortuously affirms her or his social being, surrenders her or himself.

In terms of the most immediate opposition between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, Anna Freud is on the side of convention. Although this dispute has been well documented, it might be worth laying out the basic argument again here.[13] Anna Freud believed, at this stage in her work, that there could be no full analysis of children.[14] For her, the still vivid presence of the parental figures meant that the transposition from person into imago from which transference proceeds could not take place. Unlike the adult, the child is not ready to produce 'a new edition of its love-relationships' because the 'old edition is not yet exhausted' (p. 34). Reluctant to make the transition (to leave, psychically, the family home), the child must be won. It is because the child is still in a state of total psychic dependence on the parents that the analyst has to woo and manipulate her or his way into the child's mind. The more positive the attachment

of the child to the parents, the harder this will be, the more essential it becomes for the analyst to take up a positive role. Idealization of the parent–child relation thus leads straight into the production of a parallel idealization of the analyst on the part of the child.

It follows from this first point – the still present reality of the parents – that the analyst becomes no less real. In the analysis of adults 'we remain impersonal and shadowy, a blank page on which the patient can transcribe his transference-fantasies, somewhat after the way in which at the cinema a picture is thrown upon an empty screen' (the image of the cinema again) (p. 35). But the child's analyst must be 'anything but a shadow' because of the way she must seek the collaboration of the child and because of the 'educational influences' involved in the analysis of children, which mean that the child knows full well what it is that the analyst desires, what he sanctions, of what he disapproves (p. 35). The argument thus seems to move in two directions at once: there must be pedagogy because there is no transference; there can be no transference because pedagogy is the final aim. At the end of this lecture, Anna Freud argues that, even were it possible to generate a full transference by removing the child from the parents, the outcome on the child's return would be either renewal of the neurosis or open rebellion, something which may therapeutically appear as an advantage, but which in terms of social adjustment, which 'in the child's case most matters in the end, is certainly none' (p. 37). For Anna Freud, the child's superego, undetached from the parents, is weak; there is always the risk, therefore, that this childish superego will not withstand the lifting of repression in analysis and that the outcome will be direct, and unmanageable, gratification of libidinous and aggressive impulses on the part of the child. The analyst must, therefore, '*succeed in putting himself in the place of the child's Ego-ideal*' (p. 45); (emphasis original).

Once again, it is hard not read this as a veiled account of the dangers, the seduction, that Anna Freud felt herself courting in analysis with Freud, hard not to see it as her way of commenting on the extraordinary tension, if not tease, behind the analytic injunction to speak but not act. And from where – if not from an analysis with one's own father – would the conviction that parent and analyst are indistinguishable, the belief in their joint and indissoluble reality, be more likely to arise?

It is customary to read the emphasis by Anna Freud on the pedagogic function of analysis as betraying true analytic goals (in a 1931 paper entitled 'Some Contrasted Aspects of Psycho-Analysis and Education', Nina Searl insists on their 'irreconcilable' nature[15]). Freud himself, on more than one occasion, has been described as an 'anti-pedagogue'.[16] It may be, however, that Anna Freud is revealing something about the analytic contract which a mere insistence on the incommensurability between analysis and education cannot quite resolve. In her essay on psychoanalysis and pedagogy, Shoshana Felman discusses the links between transference and the function of authority.[17] Since transference bestows authority, there is a sense in which the analyst is always already a pedagogue. Conversely, since education always contains a transference component, it could be argued that the analytic scenario is present, *in potentia*, wherever a relationship to knowledge is at play. (Lacan wrote: 'As soon as there is somewhere a subject presumed to know, there is transference.'[18]) In a famous comment, Freud described analysis, teaching, and government as the three impossible professions, but he did not elaborate on the transferability, so to speak, of their authority and/or pedagogic aims.[19] Felman cites this passage from Freud's essay on schoolboy psychology to illustrate the link between teaching and transference in the analytic sense of the term: 'These men [the teachers] became our substitute fathers. That was why, even

though they were still quite young, they struck us as so mature and so unattainably adult. We transferred to them the respect and expectations attaching to the omniscient father of our childhood.'[20]

From fathers to teachers to analysts, Anna Freud seems to be doing no more than uncovering something about authority, something startlingly focused by her own experience, but unavoidable in the analytic scene (something which her own insistence on the absence of full transference in child analysis cannot finally remove). If the debate over child analysis is so fierce, it might be because it forces on to the agenda, over and above the differences between the protagonists, an insoluble problem of analytic authorization and how it transmits itself. How can you pass on knowledge from generation to generation – how can you secure the child's passage into the adult world – without precisely generating, indeed relying on, the transference and its latent pedagogic imperative which psychoanalysis is meant ultimately to dissolve? The question of psychoanalytic inheritance and the question of pedagogy are in fact one and the same thing.

In a passage from the paper on schoolboy psychology not cited by Felman, Freud says some more about those earlier teachers: 'We courted them or turned our backs on them, we imagined sympathies and antipathies in them which probably had no existence, we studied their characters and on theirs we formed and misformed our own. They called up our fiercest opposition and forced us to complete submission.'[21] The passage graphically fills out what is psychically at play – courting and rejection, projection, identifications which form and malform what the child comes to be (compare from the other passage: 'we transferred to them the respect and expectations attaching to the omniscient fathers of our childhood'). From deference to projection, the difference almost anticipates one conceptual shift from Freud to

Melanie Klein. Even more striking in this context is that acknowledged relation between rebellion and the utmost defeat, as if it were not only the authority professionally accruing to the teacher which engineers the final submission, but also the pleasures and dangers internal to the relation, not to say the process of resistance itself. In a way which anticipates the daydreams of his daughter – youths tortured by henchman in service to their beleagured knight – Freud offers us an account here not just of the pedagogic relation, but of what we might call fealty, its perversions and its discontents.

Melanie Klein's main disagreement with Anna Freud turned on the question of the superego. For Klein, far from the childish superego being weak, it was fierce and inexorable, the product of the internal rage attendant on the extravagance of the child's impulses and its thwarted being in the world. The task of analysis, child analysis included, was not to align with or reinforce the superego, but to reduce and assuage the inexorability of its law: 'what is needed is not to reinforce this superego, but to tone it down.'[22] No less than for Anna Freud, the child was, for Klein, a potential criminal; but in her account this is because the child is warding off, through socially unacceptable behaviour, the edicts of an internal persecutor compared with which the chastisement of an external authority is a positive relief. Crime does not engender guilt; it is the consequence of a guilt that is already there. As Klein puts it in her paper 'On Criminality' of 1934: 'it is not lack of conscience, but the overpowering strictness of the superego, which is responsible for the characteristics of asocial and criminal persons'.[23] (The row between her and Melitta Schmideberg over this paper is put at the centre of the play *Mrs Klein.*) For Anna Freud, on the other hand, it is the collapse of the superego precipitated by mental illness or criminality in the parent that is responsible for asocial tendencies in the child. If the child is guilty, it is because

the parent was guilty before it, guilty of a failure at the site of the superego – whereas for Klein the problem is precisely that the superego *never* fails.

It follows for Klein that the aim of the analysis must be to attract on to the analyst everything that is most negative in the child's inner world so as to dissipate, finally, its unbearable force: 'My method presupposes that I have from the beginning been willing to attract to myself the negative as well as the positive transference' (p. 145). That negativity will be necessarily, if relatively, autonomous from the reality of the parental figures in the outside world. For Klein, the child is a phantasy-spinner from the start – hence the possibility, and painful nature, of the psychoanalysis of children. What we see here are the repercussions of Klein's emphasis on the destructive impulses for the activity of analysis. Precisely because of that irreducible negativity, we could say, transference – phantasy driven by its own inner process – is something assumed in the analysis of children by Melanie Klein.

Is it surprising that the one who holds on to the image of the analyst as essentially benevolent is none other than the daughter of Freud? At the same time it is important to acknowledge that Klein's stress on negativity could also be seen – was seen by her critics – as playing a defensive role.[24] The attraction of hostile impulses on to the person of the analyst, far from endangering the child's relation to the parents, protected them from the worse ravages of their effects. At the same time, an emphasis on the negative inner imago of the parents – the insistence that this was *only* an imago – could paradoxically serve their idealization, an acceptance at face value of the way they see themselves (for Melitta Schmideberg this will be the fundamental reproach).

It is usually assumed that on the issue of the superego Anna Freud was in agreement with her father. Indeed, he intervened on her behalf over this specific issue in the

course of the debate. In his correspondence with Jones, Freud argued that Klein's belief in a superego belonging in the early years, prior to Oedipus and autonomous from the parents, was simply wrong: 'I would like to challenge Frau Klein's statement that the superego of the child is as independent as that of the adult. It seems rather to me that Anna is right in emphasizing the point that the superego of the child is still the direct parental influence.'[25] So much, so clear. But is it? Anna Freud may talk of the 'prestige' of the superego, whose authority rises and falls with the benevolence with which the parents are viewed, while Melanie Klein charts its fierce and manic oppression; yet each of their accounts of psychic and social regulation appears to contain something which, in the very name of the control it promises, is completely beyond their (anyone's) sway. Internal persecutor or henchman, the images are remarkably close; in fact, they can both be seen as sketching out, for children and for the psychoanalytic institution, the 'unpsychological proceedings of the cultural superego', to cite a famous definition of Freud's.[26] In doing so, they confront us with an impasse at the heart of social identity, one which, one could argue, was dislodged or displaced on to the dispute about how or whether to analyse a child. Before lining up Anna Freud and Melanie Klein on either side of the law – indeed, before asking whether psychoanalysis supports or undermines social regulation – we should perhaps first ask what exactly, for psychoanalysis, the law *is*. For if the law is a henchman, the question is not whether to obey it, but what exactly obedience, no less than disobedience, might involve.

More than one commentator has read *Civilisation and its Discontents* as an account of the perverse nature – tortuous and self-defeating – of social law.[27] Indeed, it is hard not to see this text as the Urtext for many of the fantasies and narratives which we have been tracking so far. For it is central to the Freudian account of the

superego that it draws its force from the violence it controls and, in the form of its terrifying injunctions, repeats it. (This is why if we turn our attention to the question of the superego, we at once make psychoanalysis more directly socially accountable and remove the possibility of using it for a simply liberationist goal.) The superego inherits the aggression of the drives it curtails; in fact, it appears as nothing other than their deflection. Subjects introject their own aggressiveness, sending it back, so to speak, to where it originally belonged: 'There it is taken over by a portion of the ego, which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as super-ego, and which now, in the form of "conscience", is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals.'[28] The superego even incorporates the subject's resistance to the superego itself, entering into possession of 'all the aggressiveness which a child would have liked to exercise against it'.[29] Inside the child is a degraded relic of the father's authority: 'Here as so often the [real] situation is reversed: "If I were the father and you were the child, I should treat you badly".'[30] The model for the superego is therefore a drama of torture which takes place between father and child. If we refer back to Freud's essay on schoolboy psychology, what he seems to be providing here is the ferocious underside of transference to the pedagogue.

This superego sounds uncannily like the master who tortures at whim: 'the new authority, the superego has no motive that we know of for ill-treating the ego', which it none the less 'torments'.[31] Strictly without reason, this instructor offers to the subject its first model of social control. Relentless, it pronounces an ethical imperative which is self-defeating and impossible to obey. Conscience torments the saint far more than the sinner: 'virtue forfeits some part of its promised reward; the docile and continent ego does not enjoy the trust of its

mentor and strives in vain, it would seem, to achieve it.'[32] The less we offend, or rather the more we obey this law, the crueller it becomes. As Lacan points out in his seminar on ethics, this logic does not work the other way round. If the saint is troubled by his conscience in proportion to his virtue, it is not the case that the sinner, in proportion to his pleasure, finds himself liberated from his debt to the law.[33] It is, we could say, the superego which is the prime culprit – the purveyor, not the assuager, of guilt.

When the Kleinians insist, *contra* Anna Freud, that a rebellious child is in fact testing or appealing to the law which she appears, wildly, to be free of, I would suggest that they are repeating in the frame of child psychology this impasse or impossible dictate which psychoanalysis exposes at the heart of socialization. In fact, Lacan is nowhere closer to Klein than on this very issue: 'It is a capricious, arbitrary, oracular law, a law of signs where the subject is guaranteed by nothing, in regard to which he has no security or safeguard [*Sicherung*], to use another Kantian term. Which is why, this *Gute* [the Good], at the level of the unconscious, is also, and fundamentally, the bad object, which Kleinian articulation still speaks of.'[34] As Rivière put it during the symposium of 1927, the child's sense of goodness, its superego, is derived from the bitterness of its experience in frustration.[35] In this context, reparation, as theorized by Klein, can be seen as an attempt to keep the ethical instance (the good) separate from the bad object – despite the fact (or because) it is from the bad object that it so clearly and unavoidably derives.

If we turn back to the dispute between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, we can now see how the ethical question and the question of negativity, as discussed in the last chapter, might be linked. What Klein allows us to do is to delve one step deeper into what it is that this punishing ethical imperative is trying to control, what it

is that, every time it voices its injunction, it draws on and repeats. One of Anna Freud's own examples can be used to suggest what might be involved – the case of a six-year-old girl which runs through the lectures, who, as soon as the analysis relaxed her inhibitions, turned from obsessional to pervert, cheerful, and overbold, whose pleasure in recounting her anal fantasies at the dinner table destroyed the appetites of all the grown-ups. Faced with which, Anna Freud decided that she had made a serious blunder, and admonished the child, thereby making her once again inhibited and apathetic. Compare Isaacs: 'It is all right if it comes out of my anus, but it mustn't come out of my mouth as words.'[36] If this little foulmouth transgresses, it is because she is more than happy – indeed, finds her happiness – in the effluence which pours out of her mouth – one kind of oral production (the child's verbage) which makes it impossible for everyone else to eat.

The issue would thus seem to be not just the child's social manageability, but what that same manageability is designed to ward off: an unspeakable orality and anality where the drive, as theorized by Klein and her supporters, transmutes itself in an uncomfortable and dangerous proximity into the fact of speech. Which is not to say, as we have already seen, that language is the untranslated or direct expression of the drives, but something about the inextricability of the two. The aggression of the drive does not seem here to precede language, but rather to be its effect, as it is speech which makes of it a projectile, seizing it in that logic of expulsion which is the basis of judgement as such. After all, instinctual gratification in this instance (the feared outcome of child analysis for many critics who objected to it as early as the case of 'Little Hans') means talking about it.

What does it mean to ask that this process be managed? What – equally if not more to the point – would

it mean to ask that it not be? What is Anna Freud being asked, or trying, to put back in place? As we watch her describe her attempt to calm the child's guardian who presumably, along with the whole household, was on the verge of starvation (they had lost 'all appetite'), it seems as if something is being expressed not just about the child, but about the whole family scene. In a comment remarkably resonant for this case, Rivière commented on the way that a real, objectifiable situation can take on the weight of what is unmanageable within: 'the destructive condition (starvation) becomes equated with the destructive impulses', giving the impulses an object and turning them into less of an internal threat.[37] Like Dora, this little girl seems to be refusing to be the 'prop for the common infirmity' of those around her (the expression is Lacan's), by speaking in her symptoms what the family cannot bear.[38] In Dora's case, we know that Freud was only partially able to recognize the reality she was refusing (her exchange for her father's lover), that he first acknowledged Dora's protest but then demanded that she once again comply.[39] I see Anna Freud as caught in an equivalent dilemma, only this time it is not a question of an oedipal triangle, but precisely of what that narrative – as Freud later recognized – repressed: a primitive orality which it is impossible to extricate from the very fact of judgement and speech. Is this the horror which underlies the injunctions which issue from the voice of the law? The scandal of the Kleinians would then be that they force us to look inside the mouth of God.

For Freud, as we know, the law was always the law of the father. He never – a point made by Julia Kristeva[40] – retheorized his account of social bonding subsequent to his later writings on femininity; he never asked whether his narrative of inter-male rivalry and truce-making might need to be altered in view of the 'discovery' of pre-oedipality and of the crucially important early relation between the mother and the girl-child (the

fact that he assumed that women were never quite 'in' culture is a related but separate point). The dispute between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud can be seen as enacting for the participants this unwritten version of social lineage: in the content of the dispute – in the negativity, orality, and incorporation which appear as the underside of that finally more civilized, or socially familiar and acceptable, war of identification between men; in its frame – what this group of women succeed and fail in transmitting among themselves. A logical, or perhaps even inevitable, outcome once you add to the image of knights and henchmen as arbiters of the law what Melanie Klein uncovered in the unconscious of the child.

In the course of her lectures, Anna Freud acknowledged that hostility towards the mother was something she was unable analytically and, one can speculate, personally to approach. In the case of the six-year-old girl it appears as the 'climax' of the analysis, as well as a type of vanishing-point of the whole dispute: 'At the climax of her analysis it was a matter of elucidating for her her hatred of her mother, against the knowledge of which she had previously defended herself by the creation of her "devil" as the impersonal deputy for all her hate impulses. Although up to now she had co-operated readily, she began at this stage to shrink from further progress' (p. 25). Alongside, or behind, the struggle with the (paternal) master, hostility towards the mother, and even more the struggle over its resistance to knowledge and articulation, appears to propel and set the limits to the analytic scene: 'Finally she surrendered outwardly before these constantly recurring proofs, but demanded to know from me also the reason for such a hostile feeling towards her apparently well-loved mother' (ibid.). But at the very point where she gets the child to surrender, it is her own knowledge which comes abruptly to an end: 'Here I declined to give further information, for I too was at the end of my knowledge' (ibid.).

For Melanie Klein this moment is crucial. In her intervention during the 'Symposium on Child Analysis', she seizes on it as the moment when the 'substitution' of analysis by pedagogy takes place (pp. 161–2). It signals for her that Anna Freud's refusal to negotiate the negative transference has resistance – resistance to knowledge of hostility towards the mother – as its base. Today, what is equally striking is the way in which Anna Freud's language reiterates in the field of child analysis that tension between forcing ('finally she surrendered') and the failure of knowledge ('I too was at the end of my knowledge') which readers of the Dora case have commented on in relation to Freud: his oppressive assertiveness in tandem with his inability to recognize the presence of transference and the homosexual factor in the case.[41] This is a strange irony for a feminism which has wanted to read behind Freud's own resistance to knowledge a positive orality for women, the founder – potentially – of another femininity to be located in the earliest relation between the mother and the girl-child. As Anna Freud puts it, hostility to the mother is the hardest thing to incorporate (it was the little girl's only 'serious resistance' in the 'progressive reincorporation' of all her impulses (p. 61); just as death, in Paula Heimann's formulation, is the one thing which cannot be expelled.[42]

How then do Melanie Klein and her supporters get round this seeming 'impasse' (how do they incorporate it, we might say)? One way is clearly through the figure of Melanie Klein herself. In the symposium, Nina Searl describes how her hesitance to use direct interpretation with a pre-latency boy was traced, after conversations with Klein, to fears about the stability of her early superego, fears which her analysis subsequently resolved.[43] Her remarks give a sense of that always present overlap between theory and institution in what is unmistakably here the founding of a school (the creation of the Kleinian group will follow the 'Controversial Discussions' of 1941–5); or rather, between theory, institution, and founder, since Klein so clearly occupies the place of knowing subject, site of interminable transference, as François Roustang put it in relation to Freud. If Freud held off the more negative or psychotic instance by binding filiation to his person, Melanie Klein effects no less of a binding when she chases up that instance and forces it in turn to speak. We should hardly be surprised that if it works, as it seems to – at least at this moment – for Nina Searl, it was unlikely to work for her own daughter.[44]

It is the case reported by Ella Sharpe during the symposium, however, which gives the most dramatic illustration of the way this difficulty inscribes itself in the framework of analytic space – a case which reads like a cross between that of Dora and Henry James's *The Turn of the Screw*.[45] Not quite child analysis, it involves a fifteen-year-old girl brought to analysis by her horrified parents when she is sent home from school after she is discovered writing what was described as an obscene letter to a boy (in fact, she was brought by her mother because the father promptly retired to his bed). In her preliminary meeting with the analyst, the mother immediately made clear that, for her, the aim of the analysis was to ensure that the daughter does not begin to think that mothers do not understand their daughters, that she remain dutiful and obedient, and that she get these things, which she had learnt from the boy and were not her own thoughts, 'out of her mind in a month so that she could go back to school' (p. 381). Until a year ago, the mother insisted, she had known all her daughter's thoughts, and she could not see what good it could do to talk to the analyst (true self-cancelling logic, this, where the analysis is deemed pointless at the same time as it is ordered to have instant effects). What is perhaps most chilling is that the girl's head is clearly to be emptied so that the mother can get back in.

Ella Sharpe immediately lays out the ramifications of this situation for the analytic process, whose aim must be, she states, to make the girl 'mistress of her own sexual thoughts':

> not only is the mother negative to the suspect analyst, but the analyst is in immediate opposition to the wishes of the mother. The analyst is aware that not only does the parent here represent in reality the deepest layers of the infantile superego in the analyst, but that the conscious purposes of the analyst are in accord with the deepest levels of that hostile negative attitude to the parent who forbade sexual activity and knowledge. (p. 381)

What is this other than analysis as a declaration of war, against a mother who concretely attempts to repress the sexual thoughts of her daughter, but – and this is more difficult – against the dictates of the infantile superego, a superego by definition in excess of the mother, but which the mother cannot fail, for both patient and analyst, to represent? Repeating a primitive childhood conflict, the analyst's conscious (her *analytic*) purpose re-enacts the battle once raged against the unreasonable dictates of the superego by the child: 'I detected here reverberations never stirred by an adult analysis' (p. 382). Thus Ella Sharpe anticipates Esther Bick's observation of 1962 that unconscious conflict in relation to the child's parents is a key factor in explaining why counter-transference stresses are so much greater in the analysis of a child.[46]

When the patient sides with the mother against the analyst, recognizing, not unreasonably, that in so far as the analysis requires her to talk about sexuality, it is asking her to repeat the original offence, Sharpe catches herself thinking: ' "It isn't *my* fault you have had to come, you should not have written that letter, then you wouldn't be coming to me!!!" ' (p. 382); that is, she catches herself in an identification with the parent, 'at the mercy of the infantile superego condemnation of myself' (ibid.). The only way out of this impasse is, as she sees it, to dissolve the severity of the superego, by recognizing its autonomy and detaching it from the mother who seems to embody it with such force: 'The freedom to speak plainly to the mother corresponded to a release in myself from the deeper levels of the unconscious negative to the condemning parent in my own mind' (p. 383). Only when this detachment has been effected can the analyst proceed to analytic interpretation, hampered up to then by unconscious guilt. It is therefore the severity of the infantile superego which stops interpretation, stops the analytic engagement with the word. For Sharpe, only this concept of interpretation can bring about a transference in the full analytic meaning of the term: 'I proved in the last analysis that transference occurred through interpretation alone' (p. 384). Another way of putting this would be to say that negativity must, finally, be seen to be its own master if the analytic process is to proceed.

Not that this ensures a successful outcome of the analysis. By making herself the ally of the girl's unconscious wishes, Sharpe provokes her conscious hostility; she sides with the mother, and the analysis is brought to an abrupt end (this in itself should serve as a caution against seeing women patients who walk out of analysis – a point often made in relation to Dora – as casting a type of proto-feminist vote). In this context, however, what matters is the effects of this scenario for child analysis itself: 'The problem of child analysis seems more subtly implicated with the analyst's own deepest unexplored repressions than adult analysis' (p. 384). Sharpe's final comments are clearly directed against Anna Freud: 'Rationalisations that the child is too young, that the weakness of the superego makes an admixture of pedagogy with analysis indispensable, and so on, are built upon the alarms of that very same infantile superego in the analyst that he has to deal with in the child before

him. That infantile "supergo" in the last resort becomes the dictator between analyst, child and parent' (ibid.).

All of which leaves a further question: how can analysis proceed, how can it institutionalize itself, when it has so clearly identified as persecutory (as dictator) nothing other than the bearer or instance of the social institution as such? Thus, not for the first time will women have the privilege of identifying the violence – not to say perversity – of the social tie (the point is made by Julia Kristeva in her essay 'Women's Time'[47]). But what Ella Sharpe's example shows is that it is not easy for this insight to pass from one woman to another, even less from mother to daughter, since their interaction is bound to be a site – if not *the* site – where that problem or conflict is played out. Since Freud could not, any more than his daughter, talk about the mother, it was his blindness that he passed as legacy to his (psychoanalytic) child. In different ways it was a legacy which could not help but be enacted by both Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. Note that this has nothing to do with 'mothering' psychoanalysis,[48] but everything to do with the difficulty for psychoanalysis, as practice and institution, of what the mother represents.

So what, then, of Melanie Klein's daughter? It is tempting, although also too easy, to see her as the element which, for the Kleinians to constitute themselves *as* Kleinians, had to be expelled. (When I asked Hanna Segal, the best-known commentator on Klein's work, about Melitta Schmideberg during the course of an interview in 1990, it was the one topic on which she was unwilling to reply.[49]) Melitta Schmideberg was analysed by Melanie Klein; it is generally assumed that she is the girl referred to in the 1921 paper 'The Development of a Child' and named as Lisa in the 1923 paper 'The Role of School in the Libidinal Development of the Child'. (In the play *Mrs Klein*, Melitta reproaches her mother for having analysed her, as well as for describing her in

the first paper as of 'only average intellect'.[50]) Commentary on the dispute that developed between Klein and her daughter has tended to pathologize Melitta (in one letter Klein herself referred to her 'illness'[51]), although not consistently. Paula Heimann, for example, suggests that she was driven from England; Phyllis Grosskurth, Klein's recent biographer, discusses the ethical and psychic issues raised by Klein's analysis of her own children, as one among a number of grounds for potential reproach, including Melanie Klein's mourning of her brother during her pregnancy with Melitta and her frequent absences when Melitta was a child.[52]

What seems to me important in this context, however, is not the question of legitimate or illegitimate recrimination by either party (how, from this distance, or even at the time, could one decide?), but the way that Melitta Schmideberg's writings resonate with the problems of psychoanalytic transmission as I have tried to outline them here. Seen in these terms, the importance of Melitta Schmideberg resides not in the question of her participation – interestingly rebellious or virulently obstructive – in the controversy surrounding Melanie Klein, but in what she reveals about the institutional and theoretical difficulties of the collective project in which all the participants were caught.

'A neurotic woman patient said: "In fact everything – reading, going to the theatre, visiting – is like eating. First you expect a lot, and then you're disappointed. When I come to analysis, I eat your furniture, your clothes, your words. You eat my words, my clothes, my money." '[53] In her 1934 paper 'Intellectual Inhibition and Eating Disorders', Melitta Schmideberg provides one of the clearest accounts of the relationship between orality and intellectual production, between eating and mouthing, between taking in and giving out words. Since it can be read as an extended gloss on the concerns of the last chapter, I have included a translation as an

Appendix here (it is this paper to which Lacan refers as part of psychoanalytic material which has become difficult of access today). It was written in her mother tongue, but remained untranslated into the language which both mother and daughter finally made their own – the clearest statement of the allegiance between them, it never passed into the language of their falling out.

Already Schmideberg lays out in it something of a psychic double bind: the woman who rejects her mother's nourishment or experiences it as bad will be bound to that same mother, in the apathy of failed autonomy, for life; the woman who achieves intellectual and personal independence acknowledges, in that very gesture, the indissoluble nature of her – oral – debt (it is exactly the oedipal drama that Freud describes for fathers and sons rewritten for girls). Ironically, then, according to her own account, Melitta Schmideberg's final repudiation of her mother – the daughter strikes out on her own – is a form of perverse tribute, the point of her greatest allegiance, to the body of Klein's work. This trajectory would then have to be placed alongside – it does not neutralize it, but gives it a different refrain – the journey from the endless citation of her mother in her early papers ('M. Klein has shown . . .'; 'M. Klein points out . . .'; 'M. Klein believes . . .'; 'Mrs Klein has emphasized . . .'; 'Cf. the writings of Melanie Klein'; 'these conclusions agree with those which Melanie Klein has embodied [sic] in her book'[54]) to the utter repudiation of her work and the entire psychoanalytic project for which she is most renowned.

Even in those early papers, however, we can see Melitta Schmideberg making some kind of bid for herself – in her frequent allusions to a primordial narcissism, a concept she saw as discarded by current theory, in which reality is equated not with the mother's body, but with the child's own.[55] Anna Freud, in a related but distinct movement, will argue in her paper on passivity that there

is a point, prior to object love, of primordial identification with the object which in later life threatens the subject with the complete dissolution of self.[56] Parodies of total autonomy and total surrender – how far back, in order to bypass the object which most immediately confronts them, do these daughters of psychoanalysis feel they have to go?

This searching back would then be the other face of the opposite and more obvious move in her writing – away from psychoanalysis and outwards into a larger world, from the impulses and phantasy life of the infant to the factors of environment and external reality which, she argued, Melanie Klein ignored.[57] Certainly she saw her trajectory very much in these terms – from 'external factors can probably contribute' ('The analysis of these patients showed that their anxiety derived from instinctual sources and not from the ill-treatment they suffered') to 'the fateful effect of unfavourable reality', to 'I was criticized because I paid more attention to the patient's actual environment and reality situation', to the reproach that analysis had become the hallmark of a liberalism untested by 'the stress and possible dangers inherent in being involved in social and racial issues'.[58]

Thus Melitta Schmideberg seems to cross from one side to the other of the inner/outer boundary which, as I discussed in chapter 3, has so often been at the heart of the psychoanalysis and politics debate. In fact, even when she became involved in social work, she never relinquished her commitment to the complexities of the inner life; her 1948 book *Children in Need* can be seen as exemplary of a psychoanalytically informed project of social reform.[59] And in the 1971 paper in which she attacks the institution of psychoanalysis most strongly, she herself acknowledges, in the face of alternative therapies, the importance of the 'scrupulousness and rigid adherence' to psychoanalytic rules.[60]

But there is, I would suggest, another way of reading her writing that can avoid this inner/outer dichotomy which, in her dramatic shift of allegiance and identity, she none the less seems so starkly to embody or repeat. And that is to read her repudiation in terms of a problem theorized by psychoanalysis which has recurred throughout these texts: the problem of how subjects take on, in the fiercest and most punishing core of their identities, a social legislator both unavoidable and impossible in any simple way to obey. If this cannot be reduced to an inner/outer dichotomy, it is because it is precisely the point where inner and outer worlds clash and coalesce. (As Lacan puts it, it is the psychoanalytic account of social exigency which makes it incompatible with any theory based on the distinction between the individual and her or his social world.[61])

Like Anna Freud, Melitta Schmideberg provides her own commentary on the way in which this problem rebounds on the process and dynamic of analysis itself. When she talks of the patient's reality, it is the reality of the *analytic scene* that she is most often talking about. When she introduces the element of reassurance into her technique, it is not – as with Ferenczi (she insists on the difference[62]) – 'active' or 'relaxation' therapy attached to the principle of pleasure, but a way of trying to alleviate what she sees as the punishing elements of analysis, the extent to which the analysis itself, as much as the analyst, can take on the role of the superego who puts, or rather takes, its subject to task. The superego, she writes after Klein in her paper on 'asocial' children, 'is never lacking', unlike the more beneficent figures of the ego-ideal (another reproach against her mother?) which can fail.[63] If the superego is a persecutor – site of 'psychotic anxiety [*Gewissensangst*]'[64] – then how can analysis proceed; how can interpretation reach its object, since once it is uncovered in the course of analysis, the obvious

place for the superego to take up residence is in the speech of the analyst herself?

What Melitta Schmideberg seems to be asking is whether, finally, Kleinian analysis (whether analysis) can dissolve the ferocity of this superego or whether, despite its best intentions, it can only drive it further in. It is this question of the superego as *generic* to the analytic scenario which underlines the more obvious questions about ethics and procedures which she raises. Thus, when analysis aims for the relinquishment of pre-genital defences, how can it be certain that it has not simply ensured that ~~they are~~ more successfully repressed? When the child gives up its asocial habits, is reduced anxiety or an increase in inhibition the cause? What does it mean to require of the patient that he or she be depressed? What, finally, is normality in a Kleinian world? 'The objection that a patient cannot be well because he still has manic defences, unconscious paranoid anxieties or an anal fixation would be justified only if it could be proved that there are people without them.'[65]

To put it at its crudest, the risk is that the Kleinian analyst, no less than the Anna Freudian, will identify with the police:

> Thus a patient may remain homosexual or polygamous, continue to bite his nails, or to masturbate, though usually not to excess, without feeling guilty about it. In evaluating symptoms, I should be disposed to attach greater importance to those representing inhibitions of instinct than to manifestations of primitive instinctual life. This policy might usefully be adopted if only to counteract the analyst's unavoidable moral bias . . . especially when he fears the disapproval ~~of parent-substitutes:~~ other analysts, the patient's parents, the police, probation officers., etc.[66]

(There is an interesting slide here from authorities inside to those outside the analytic community – is it really the police who disapprove of masturbation?)

Health, Melitta Schmideberg seems to be arguing, can be the ultimate form of consent. What is the fantasy of a 'fully analysed person'?, she asks, rejoining the question which Freud put to Jones at the very beginning of the dispute.[67] The point here is not to evaluate her contribution to analytic technique, but at least to hand back to her the validity of her dilemma and of the questions which she raised. How could the analytic theory which most graphically described the fierceness of the superego be expected to avoid, clinically or institutionally, the worst of its effects? (The history of the analytic institution – of most institutions – suggests that the Kleinian aim of dissolving its severity is not in itself enough.) How, as Fornari puts it, can you analyse the unconscious components of political violence without provoking a transference war?[68] How, finally, can you pass on the legacy of the unconscious, so stunningly elucidated by Melanie Klein, without founding an institution, without – for all the differences with Anna Freud – setting up school?

We come back, therefore, to the beginning of these essays, or at least to the general principle that has informed them. That psychoanalysis is political in two senses: in what it has to say about the fantasies which inform our political identities and, in what it reveals in its own history about the vicissitudes and blind spots of political allegiance, the two senses linked by the question of what it means to try and constitute oneself as any kind of social or political group. For those of us still committed to some form of socialist vision, the fourth Conservative election victory in Britain has forced us to recognize this as one of the most difficult and challenging issues today. One of the things that the Conservatives seem to have mobilized so effectively in the last election is, not so much the opposition between collective and individual priorities, as a fear of the group; the only group that can be trusted, they constantly reiterated, is the one that tells you to trust only yourself. ('[The Labour Party] is still too closely identified with groups. It is thought to be the party that, as one interviewee said, "would rather group you together".'[69]) As Rivière puts it, if individual security depends on autonomy in phantasy, then sharing and co-operation, the condition of collective security, threatens at the very moment it protects.[70] While the concept of rights starts from that recognition, we could say that what distinguishes Conservatism is that it exploits the fear on which it rests.

In his 1955 paper 'The Freudian Thing' (in some senses the basis for the seminar on ethics of 1959–60), Lacan suggests that there has been a move in psychoanalytic theory from guilt to frustration.[71] The issue of guilt, he writes, its meanings, its discovery in the action of the subject, dominated the first phase of psychoanalysis, to be superseded by the concepts of emotional frustration and dependence. Something which Freud recognized as a fundamental aporia at the heart of social identity was, as Lacan saw it, taken over by an emphasis on what was needed for the subject to be socially, no less than sexually, completed or fulfilled. In one of his first public interventions, Lacan argued that what distinguished human subjects was the existence of the superego, the internal arbiter of the mind (he was repeating something of a pattern, since he was speaking against, indeed addressing, his analyst, Loewenstein).[72] Although he is closer than anywhere else to Klein on this subject, he none the less felt that she detached the superego from the moment of social recognition, running it back to the mythic body of the mother towards which the subject must then make restitution, thereby repairing the mother and securing a harmonious social participation at one and the same time.[73] The subject and social redeem themselves together (everybody makes up).

It is, I have suggested, arguable whether Klein ever in fact theorized this moment with the singular completion that this reading suggests. Meltzer, for example,

distinguishing between manic and true reparation, where objects repair each other or are repaired not defensively but for their own sake, describes the way in which reparation takes on a more 'mysterious meaning' at this point in Klein's account.[74] Certainly the institutional history and the writings on war, conducted at the same time as the disputes described in these two chapters, offer a type of caution to the more redemptive movement in Klein's own work.[75] In this context and reversing the normal order of things, the political component might be seen as the 'repressed' of the clinical debate.

There is, however, a more general point to be made. It has become commonplace, especially for feminism, to argue, that psychoanalysis reveals a failure of sexual norms, that the meaning of the unconscious is that it always knows more than what our socially circumscribed sexual identities appear to declare to the world. But for the most part that recognition has not been accompanied by an equivalent acknowledgement of the social aporia, or impasse of social identity, which psychoanalysis simultaneously describes. It is as if there has been a type of lag in the theory – sexuality as trouble against a social reality theorized as monolithic in its origins and effects (the idea of patriarchy, for example, as efficient or functioning exchange). But if social being is slashed with the same bar that distances the subject from her or his sexual roles, then it becomes impossible to pit 'another' sexuality as simply antagonistic to social law. There is no simple 'outside' of the law any more than there is a simple 'outside' of sexual norms – it is the participation in *and* refusal of those norms which psychoanalysis so graphically describes (take the first without the second and you get normalization; take the second without the first and you get a euphoric but ineffective liberationist version of Freud).

At a time when we seem to be confronted with the blandest and most terrifying versions of a seemingly interminable Conservatism in Britain, when claims for

national identity at the heart of Europe seem barely to articulate their legitimate aspirations before tipping over into their most disturbing separatist and absolute forms, the idea that we are by definition at odds with a social reality in which we cannot at the same time help but participate might be worth restating once again. Against those accounts that turn to Klein for a redemptive account of social and political being, I would suggest that the value of Klein's insights resides precisely in their negativity, in their own points of internal resistance to narratives of resolution, even if it is those narratives which her own writings and those of her followers have increasingly come to propose. The history of her (but not only her) institution suggests that we are never more vulnerable to the caprices of the superego and to the potential violence of identities than when we take it at its word.

Notes

1 I take my title from Denise Riley's brilliant account of the relationship between psychoanalysis, social policy, and politics, with special reference to Melanie Klein and John Bowlby, at the end of the Second World War; *War in the Nursery – Theories of the Child and Mother* (London: Virago, 1983).

2 Anna Freud, *The Psycho-Analytical Treatment of Children*, 1945, Preface, p. ix (subsequent references are cited in the text).

3 Riccardo Steiner, 'Some Thoughts about Tradition and Change Arising from an Examination of the British Psychoanalytical Society's Controversial Discussions (1943–44)', *International Review of Psycho-Analysis*, 12, no. 27 (1985), pp. 33–4; cf. also *Complete Freud–Jones Correspondence* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1993).

4 Juliet Mitchell, Introduction to *The Selected Melanie Klein*, ed. Juliet Mitchell (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), pp. 25–30.

5 Berta Bornstein, 'Clinical Notes on Child Analysis', *Psycho-Analytical Study of the Child*, 1 (1945), p. 151.
6 Esther Bick, 'Child Analysis Today', in *Melanie Klein Today – Developments in Theory and Practice*, ed. Elizabeth Bott Spillius, vol. 2, *Mainly Practice*, pp. 168–9. Bick draws attention to the fact that the symposium she was addressing was the first symposium on child analysis at an International Congress of Psycho-Analysis, the previous symposium of 1927 being held before the British Psycho-Analytical Society.
7 Cited by Steiner, 'Some Thoughts about Tradition and Change', p. 32.
8 A. Freud, 'Beating Fantasies and Daydreams', 1922, in *The Writings of Anna Freud*, vol. 1, 1922–35 (London: Hogarth, 1974), p. 138 (subsequent references are cited in the text); Sigmund Freud, 'A Child is being Beaten: a contribution to the study of the sexual perversions', 1919, in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. and trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth), vol. 17, pp. 177–204; Pelican Freud vol. 10, pp. 159–93; and commentary, Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, *Anna Freud – A Biography* (New York and London: Simon and Schuster, 1988), pp. 104–9.
9 Young-Bruehl, 'Being Analysed', in *Anna Freud*, ch. 3, p. 186; Adam Phillips, 'A Seamstress in Tel Aviv', review of *Anna Freud*, by Young-Bruehl, *London Review of Books*, 14 September 1989, p. 6. Anna Freud introduces the concept of 'emotional surrender' in 'A Form of Altruism', in *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*, 1936, in *Writings of Anna Freud*, vol. 2, pp. 122–34.
10 Young-Bruehl, *Anna Freud*, pp. 127, 131–3, 135–8.
11 S. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, 1927, in *Standard Edition*, vol. 21, p. 13; Pelican Freud, vol. 12, p. 192.
12 Klein, 'Criminal Tendencies in Normal Children', 1927; 'On Criminality', 1934, in *Love, Guilt and Reparation and other works, 1921–1945*, in *The Writings of Melanie Klein*, vol. 1 (London: Hogarth, 1975, and Virago, 1988), pp. 170–85, 258–61.
13 See, e.g., Young-Bruehl, 'Psychoanalysis and Politics', in *Anna Freud*, pp. 140–84; Phyllis Grosskurth, 'London 1926–39' and 'The Controversial Discussions 1942–4', in *Melanie Klein – Her World and Her Work* (New York: Knopf; London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986), pp. 151–246, 279–362.
14 See Anna Freud, *Psycho-Analytical Treatment of Children*, Preface, pp. xi–xii, for subsequent modification of her views.
15 Nina Searl, 'Some Contrasted Aspects of Psycho-Analysis and Education', *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, 2 (1932), p. 288.
16 Catherine Millot, *Freud – anti-pedagogue* (Paris: Bibliothèque d'Ornicar, 1979).
17 Shoshana Felman, 'Psychoanalysis and Education', in *Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight – Psychoanalysis in Contemporary Culture* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 68–97.
18 Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire XI: les quatres concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse* (Paris: Seuil, 1973), p. 210; trans. Alan Sheridan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* (London: Hogarth, 1977), p. 232; cited by Felman, 'Psychoanalysis and Education', p. 85.
19 S. Freud, Preface to Aichorn's *Wayward Youth*, 1925, in *Standard Edition*, vol. 19, p. 273; cited by Felman, 'Psychoanalysis and Education', p. 70.
20 S. Freud, 'Some Reflections on Schoolboy Psychology', 1914, in *Standard Edition*, vol. 13, p. 242; cited by Felman, 'Psychoanalysis and Education', p. 85.
21 S. Freud, 'Some Reflections on Schoolboy Psychology', p. 242.
22 Melanie Klein, 'Symposium on Child Analysis', held before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, 4 and 18 May 1927, first published in *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 8 (1927), pp. 339–91; Melanie Klein's contribution with a qualifying note on Anna Freud's subsequent modification of her views is included in *Love, Guilt and Reparation*, pp. 139–69: see esp. p. 164. Because of its greater availability I cite this edition for Klein's intervention (subsequent references are cited in the text).
23 Klein, 'On Criminality', p. 258.

24 Edward Glover, 'Examination of the 'Klein System of Child-Psychology', *Psycho-Analytic Study of the Child*, 1 (1945), p. 114.

25 Cited by Steiner, 'Some Thoughts about Tradition and Change', p. 31; cf. also *Complete Freud–Jones Correspondence*.

26 S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, 1930 (1929), in *Standard Edition*, vol. 19, p. 143; Pelican Freud, vol. 12, p. 337.

27 Leo Bersani, *The Freudian Body – Psychoanalysis and Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), ch. 1, 'Theory and Violence', pp. 7–27; Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, 'The Freudian Subject: from politics to ethics', *October*, 39 (Winter 1986), pp. 109–27: Lacan, *Le Séminaire VII: l'éthique de la psychanalyse* (Paris: Seuil, 1986), trans. Dennis Porter, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 1992).

28 S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, p. 123; Pelican Freud, p. 315.

29 S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, p. 129; Pelican Freud, p. 322.

30 Ibid. At one point, Anna Freud gives a definition of the superego which is uncannily close to this one by Freud: 'What else is the superego than identification with the aggressor': discussion at Hampstead Centre on 'The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence' (*Hampstead Bulletin* and Sandler et al., *The Analysis of Defence* (New York: International Universities Press, 1985)), cited by Young-Bruehl, *Anna Freud*, p. 212.

31 S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, p. 125; Pelican Freud, pp. 317–18.

32 S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, Pelican Freud, p. 126; p. 318.

33 Lacan, *Le Séminaire VII*, p. 208; trans., pp. 176–7. In her discussion of Klein, Anne Alvarez makes the distinction, after Money-Kyrle, between 'persecuting conscience or god, who demands penance and propitiation' and a 'more depressive god who . . . is felt to grieve at his children's moral failure rather than to threaten punishment' (*Live Company – Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy with Autistic, Borderline, Deprived and Abused Children* (London and New York: Tavistock/Routledge, 1992), p. 142).

34 Lacan, *Le Séminaire VII*, p. 89: trans., p. 73 (translation modified).

35 Joan Rivière, 'Symposium on Child Analysis', pp. 374–5.

36 Susan Isaacs, 'The Nature and Function of Phantasy', in *Developments in Psycho-Analysis*, ed. Joan Rivière, International Psycho-Analytic Library, vol. 43 (London: Hogarth, 1952, and Manesfield, 1989), p. 106.

37 Joan Rivière, 'On the Genesis of Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy', in *Developments in Psycho-Analysis*, p. 47.

38 Lacan, 'Intervention sur le transfert', in *Écrits* (Paris: Seuil, 1966), pp. 215–26; trans. Jacqueline Rose, 'Intervention on Transference', in *Feminine Sexuality – Jacques Lacan and the école freudienne*, ed. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose, (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 70.

39 For various readings of the 'Dora' case, see *In Dora's Case – Freud, Hysteria, Feminism*, ed. Charles Bernheimer and Claire Kahane (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Virago, 1985), esp. essays by Suzanne Gearhart, Toril Moi, Neil Hertz.

40 Julia Kristeva, *Pouvoirs de l'horreur* (Paris: Seuil, 1980), 'De la saleté à la souillure', pp. 69–105, trans. Leon S. Roudiez, *Powers of Horror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 'From filth to defilement', pp. 56–89.

41 See essays by Gearhart, Moi, and Hertz in *In Dora's Case*.

42 Paula Heimann, 'Some Aspects of the Role of Introjection and Projection in Early Development', in *Freud–Klein Controversies*, p. 511.

43 Nina Searl, 'Symposium on Child Analysis', p. 379.

44 See Grosskurth, *Melanie Klein*, pp. 230–1 for an account of Searl's eventual resignation from the British Society.

45 Ella Sharpe, 'Symposium on Child Analysis', pp. 380–4 (subsequent references are cited in the text).

46 Bick, 'Child Analysis Today', p. 170.

47 Kristeva, 'Le temps de femmes', *33/44: Cahiers de recherche de science et de documents*, 5 (Winter 1979), pp. 5–19: trans. Alice Jardine and Harry Blake, 'Women's Time', in *The Kristeva Reader*, ed. Toril Moi (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 187–213.

48 Janet Sayers, *Mothering Psychoanalysis – Helene Deutsch, Karen Horney, Anna Freud, Melanie Klein* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991).
49 'Interview with Hanna Segal', *Women – A Cultural Review*, 1, no. 2 (1990), pp. 198–214.
50 Klein, *Love, Guilt and Reparation*, pp. 1–53, pp. 59–76, p. 46.
51 Klein, cited in Grosskurth, *Melanie Klein*, p. 197; Grosskurth comments in a note on the same page: 'There is no indication that Melitta was suffering from any physical ailment. Is she suggesting that Melitta was schizoid?'
52 Ibid., pp. 381, 53, 90, 99–100, 218.
53 Melitta Schmideberg, 'Intellektuelle Hemmung and Esstorung', p. 109, trans. Robert Gillet and Jacqueline Rose, 'Intellectual Inhibition and Eating Disorders', p. 262.
54 Schmideberg, 'A Contribution to the Psychology of Persecutory Ideas and Delusions', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 12 (1931), pp. 343, 344, 349; 'Some Unconscious Mechanisms in Pathological Sexuality and their Relation to Normal Sexual Activity', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 14 (1933), pp. 228, 252, 256.
55 Schmideberg, 'Persecutory Ideas and Delusions', p. 344; 'Some Unconscious Mechanisms', p. 248.
56 A. Freud, 'Studies in Passivity', 1952, in *Writings of Anna Freud*, vol. 4, p. 259.
57 This is, at the very least, a difficult issue, and is a reproach often made against Melanie Klein. The 'Controversial Discussions' and the papers subsequently published in *Developments in Psycho-Analysis* make it clear, I think, that it involves a simplification of the complex significance which Klein and her supporters attach to the external world. While it is undoubtedly the case that their unique emphasis was on internal psychic factors, the intensity of the latter in fact *increased* the importance of the environment. In 'Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy', Rivière describes the way that 'inexorable internal need' is '*referred* as a demand upon the external mother' (p. 46; my emphasis); the fact that the child experiences the behaviour of real objects as a 'mirror reflection' of its feelings towards them is what 'determines the importance of the child's real experience and of the environmental factors in development' (p. 56). Note too that Anna Freud's position is also a nuanced one; while she stresses external and environmental factors, she comments, for example, that conclusions drawn from home life can be 'as misleading in some cases as they are accurate in others' ('Certain Types and Stages of Social Maladjustment', 1949, in *The Writings of Anna Freud*, vol. 4, p. 85). In relation to Melanie Klein, it is in fact very hard to establish a clear causality between inner and outer. Cf. for example this passage from her late paper 'On the Theory of Anxiety and Guilt' (1948): 'The frustrating (bad) external breast becomes, owing to projection, the external representative of the death instinct; through introjection it reinforces the primary internal danger-situation; this leads to an increased urge on the part of the ego to deflect (project) internal dangers (primarily the activity of the death instinct) into the external world' (in *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–63*, in *Writings of Melanie Klein*, vol. 4, p. 31). In an unpublished paper, 'The Fissure of Authority: violence and phantasy in the work of Melanie Klein', John Phillips gives a very convincing description of how ambiguity between external and internal determination is integral to Klein's work.

58 Schmideberg, 'Persecutory Ideas and Delusions', pp. 349–50; 'The Psycho-Analysis of Asocial Children and Adolescents', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 16 (1935), p. 45; 'A Contribution to the History of the Psycho-Analytical Movement in Britain', *British Journal of Psychiatry*, 118 (January 1971), pp. 63, 67.
59 Schmideberg, *Children in Need*, with an introduction by Edward Glover (London: Allen and Unwin, 1948).
60 Schmideberg, 'History of the Psycho-Analytical Movement in Britain', p. 67.
61 Lacan, *Le Séminaire VII*, p. 126; trans., p. 105.
62 Schmideberg, 'Reassurance as a Means of Analytic Technique', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 16 (1935), p. 317.
63 Schmideberg, 'Asocial Children and Adolescents', p. 37n.

64 Schmideberg, 'The Play-Analysis of a Three-Year-Old Girl', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 15 (1934), p. 261.
65 Schmideberg, 'After the Analysis . . .', *Psycho-Analytic Quarterly*, 7 (1938), pp. 135–7.
66 Ibid., p. 140.
67 Ibid., p. 128; Freud to Jones, cited by Steiner, 'Some Thoughts about Tradition and Change', p. 32.
68 Franco Fornari, *The Psychoanalysis of War* (Bloomington, Ind., and London: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 247.
69 Giles Radice, Labour MP for Durham North, reporting on research conducted in five South-East marginal seats that Labour failed to capture in April 1992: 'This is How Labour can win', *Independent*, 29 September 1992.
70 Rivière, 'Hate, Greed and Aggression', in Melanie Klein and Joan Rivière, *Love, Hate and Reparation, Psycho-Analytical Epitomes*, vol. 2 (London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1937), p. 8.
71 Lacan, 'La chose freudienne', in *Écrits*, p. 433; trans. 'The Freudian Thing', in *Écrits: a selection*, p. 142.
72 Cited by Elizabeth Roudinesco, *La Bataille de cent ans: l'histoire de la psychanalyse en France*, vol. 2, *1925–85* (Paris: Seuil, 1986), p. 136; trans. Jeffrey Mehlman, *Jacques Lacan & Co. – A History of Psychoanalysis in France 1925–85* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; London: Free Association Books, 1990), p. 122.
73 Lacan, *Le Séminaire VII*, p. 127; trans., p. 106.
74 Donald Meltzer, *The Kleinian Development*, Part II (Perthshire: Clunie Press, 1978), p. 47.
75 Leo Bersani, *The Culture of Redemption* (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1990) criticizes Klein in terms of the concept of redemption. Bersani's writing on violence and culture in relation to Freud anticipates some of the themes addressed here (cf. *The Freudian Body*: Columbia University Press, 1986, esp. Ch. 1, 'Theory and Violence'); see also Jessica Benjamin, *The Bonds of Love* (New York: Pantheon, 1986, London: Virago, 1988).

An Interview with Jacqueline Rose

Conducted by Michael Payne and Maire Jaanus

JAANUS I thought that the first question I would ask you is about questions, because it is so noticeable to me when I read you that both the beginnings and the ends of your essays are always questions. You take other people's – often feminists' – answers, and you undo them as questions, or you re-pose questions as new questions. As I was reading your essays, I thought that they are just propelled by questions. There's a motor movement, an unrest in the essays, and it makes them very difficult. I was reminded of Derrida saying that the question is the real discipline in philosophy. And Kristeva saying that a question is a suffering. And then I thought, I will ask her, what is a question for her?

ROSE I don't have my definition of a question; but a way of understanding what you are saying would be in terms of the difficult forms of compatibilities which I would like to put into play. On the one hand, there are political questions in the very substantial sense of the word, as in the feminist struggle to transform forms of oppressive social organization for women, questions which can be transmuted fairly directly into political demand. On the other hand, I would want to place alongside these the project, which I have always seen myself as part of, which is involved in trying to articulate