

# The Anatomy of Prejudices

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Harvard University Press

Cambridge, Massachusetts

1990

at home. This approach is very different from Tom Metzger's most recent political turn, to recruit apolitical or even antiracist skinheads associated with big-draw heavy metal bands for the WAR ranks. His idea, in the obsessional antisemitic mode, is to create a grand conspiracy to attack the Jewish conspiracy. "Tom Metzger's hope," the Center for Democratic Renewal reports, "is that the skinheads will become educated racists like he is and that they'll penetrate into the military, the government, all aspects of life, until they can seize power."<sup>64</sup> The Klan groups and WAR appeal to different sorts of adolescents who have had different histories, and it is to these various typical adolescent and childhood developmental courses that I turn in the next two chapters.

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### Origins and Developmental Lines: Children and Prejudice

Theorizing by social psychologists and sociologists about social character could not progress until the idea that character is hereditary or instinctual had been met and surpassed. Nature and nurture, biology and environment, had to be given at least equal weight before the contributions to character of culture—in the broadest sense of the word—could be compassed. In the domain of studies in prejudice, the same development slowly came about—twice: once with respect to prejudice itself, and once with respect to victims of prejudice.

Social scientists had to argue that prejudice is not innate or instinctual just as they had to argue that charging a racial or ethnic or sexual group with innate inferiority is prejudice. Until the late 1920s and early 1930s the notion that races fall into a natural hierarchy in terms of abilities (particularly intelligence) and accomplishments was so taken for granted that Anglo-American statements about the inferiority of Negroes, Asians, and southern European immigrants were viewed not as examples of prejudice but as manifestations of an inborn classificatory radar, an innate sense of race. People were also routinely said to be endowed with an instinctual feeling for their own kind and a biologically rooted fear of strangers. Social psychology studied the psychology of the various races, not attitudes toward the races or prejudices.

### Learning Stages

When social scientific attention shifted away from "race psychology" to studies in prejudice, questions about how prejudice is learned dominated. Research focused on children, both in family contexts and in schools. In American social science, Bruno Lasker's *Race Attitudes in Children* (1929) provided the first major psychological attack on the double innateness idea to be organized around study of children.<sup>1</sup> On the one hand, this study set patterns of concern in place that have not—to this day—shifted. First, Lasker concerned himself only with white racism. Race prejudice was the central and the model prejudice, just as it was, again, in and after the heyday of the Civil Rights movement. He did not connect or compare race prejudice to antisemitism, the prejudice that came to be called sexism, or ethnic prejudices. Second, Lasker concerned himself only with childhood, not with puberty or adolescence—so that the later preadult years fell out of the picture of prejudice study. This tendency to focus on childhood was reinforced by the fact that scientific study of adolescence, although it began at the turn of the century, did not really gather momentum until the late 1950s when "alienated youths" and non-conforming juvenile delinquents became a social concern in America and Europe.

Lasker's study, on the other hand, raised valuable questions about how children's attitudes had been described and studied during the dominance of "race psychology." Lasker reviewed, for example, all of the considerable evidence that young children have fear reactions to people who differ from themselves—say, in skin color—and noticed how conceptually jumbled the data became when interpreted:

The existing confusion on the nature of first exhibitions of fear in children in the presence of certain phenomena is simply due to faulty observation; and the controversy as to whether certain fears are instinctive or acquired might quickly yield to agreement if there were a sufficient body of accurate and complete data . . . All observations made carefully and over a sufficient length of time suggest that it is unprofitable to study race attitudes apart from other aspects of child psychology. If most of the noticeable reactions of small children to race are fear reactions, as seems to be the fact, we shall do well to acquaint ourselves more thoroughly with the nature and causes of fear in childhood. (pp. 8, 10)

Lasker, in effect, admonished social scientists to make the acquisition of race attitudes or prejudice a topic within a socially and culturally oriented developmental child psychology. And by the early 1950s that transition had come about. Kenneth Clark could announce confidently in *Prejudice and Your Child* (1955): "Social scientists are now convinced that children learn social, racial and religious prejudices in the course of observing, and being influenced by, the existence of patterns in the culture in which they live."<sup>2</sup>

Mary Ellen Goodman, author of *Race Awareness in Young Children* (1952), referred to the abandoned position of innatism as a belief in a "prejudice unit-of-personality," some ingredient of personality that produces prejudice or predisposes one to prejudice, some unit that—by this moment in American history—was widely evaluated negatively as a "bad seed," as though prejudice resulted from bad breeding. "What we are dealing with is not a simple matter," she cautioned. "It is a complex set of causes, lying behind a complex set of ideas, habits, and feelings."<sup>3</sup> There is no bad seed, handed down to children, that can be extirpated to create "racial democracy," Goodman's ideal.

The transition from hereditarily focused race psychology to studies in prejudice learning involved a rejection of instinctual unit-of-personality antipathies. But it also involved a complex and ambivalent adoption of Freudian psychoanalysis. On the one hand, study of children and developmental psychology in general had been decisively shaped by Freud's work—in the very notion of developmental stages of the ego and the very idea that prejudice might be learned in childhood and then have an influence throughout later life. On the other hand, Freud's instinctual drive theory was associated with both the doctrines of hereditarians and the specific claim that prejudice is instinctual—exactly the notions rejected by Lasker and those who followed him. Lasker himself confused Freud's instinctual drive theory with the general doctrine of instinct that had been used by the discredited American proponents of race psychology.

The result of the simultaneous rejection of Freud's instinctual drive theory and acceptance of his ego developmental scheme is obvious in Goodman's pioneering *Race Awareness in Young Children*. She provided an enormous amount of material gathered from five years of observational work in three nursery schools, where she had worked with 103 four-year-olds, 57 Negro and 46 white, and many parents and teachers. About a quarter of the four-year-old children had already developed

strong systems of preference relating directly to skin color (and less directly to other physical characteristics like hair texture). All of the children were clearly aware of racial differences, and among both the Negro and the white children, white skin was considered superior. Goodman carefully correlated her observations to stages of ego development, focusing a great deal of attention on issues of self-esteem or (among the Negro children) lack of self-esteem. In this emphasis, she agreed with Ruth Horowitz, who in 1939 had argued Freudianly that the beginnings of race consciousness should be understood "as a function of ego development."<sup>4</sup> But Goodman did not relate the development of racial attitudes to libidinal development, although she acknowledged that childhood sexuality was just as complicated an area of development as racial awareness.

Again and again, as Goodman noted that parents and teachers were shocked to find out from her that their children and students were so aware of racial differences, she drew a key connection: "Precocious sexuality shocks them and so does precocious raciality."<sup>5</sup> Among the adults Goodman and her staff interviewed, ignorance—or denial—of children's racial attitudes was the norm, and Goodman consistently charged this oblivion to prudery. "There is a prevalent feeling among our parents that race, like sex, is a rather hazardous topic and one best left alone, at least so far as the children are concerned. They feel so partly because both topics rouse their own emotions." But her clarity about the adults in her observational world did not lead Goodman to take sexuality or libidinal development into account in her study of the four-year-olds.

Goodman's ego-centered approach, with its courageous if limited frankness, did, however, leave her optimism intact. Any theory of innate or instinctual race attitudes seemed to this generation of progressive researchers to imply that prejudice was natural and thus ineradicable, irreversible. They rejected Freud's instinctual drive theory because it was associated—mistakenly—with the instinct doctrines of race psychology, and attention to libidinal development went out the research door with the theory. As a result, non-Freudian—or rather half-Freudian—child study was left a strangely abstract business. It filled up with images of social learning that later lent themselves very well, in the 1960s and after, to cognitive learning theorists because they were almost free of any notion that children have desires or that their prejudices have

affective content and emotional dimensions. Faulty learning seems quite a correctable condition.

There are now many works available on prejudice learning as a cognitive matter, including the book I examined in Chapter 1, Frances About's *Children and Prejudice* (1988). Much of the research done as the cognitive approach reached its apogee has been ably summarized by Phyllis Katz in "The Acquisition of Racial Attitudes in Children" (1976), and the cognitive approach itself has been placed in a larger theoretical social science context by John Duckitt in *The Social Psychology of Prejudice* (1992).<sup>6</sup> But, to my knowledge, there has been only one study written from a Freudian developmental point of view, which neither Katz nor Duckitt mentions. Like these surveys, however, Marjorie McDonald's Freudian *Not by the Color of Their Skins* (1970) deals only with race prejudice, or more specifically skin color prejudice.<sup>7</sup> McDonald posits "skin color anxiety" as a normal—this does not mean *instinctive*—component of development that can become woven into and inseparable from, either normal or pathological courses of development unless it is defused, discharged, and detached from the conflicts typical of the various developmental stages.

In the remainder of this chapter, in reviewing the various types of child study literature on prejudice, I will give a picture of the kind of developmental study that points to the three character types—and thus prejudice types—that I suggested and presented preliminarily in the last chapter. The lack of attention in the child study literature to Freud's instinctual drive theory and the lack of appreciation of the way in which drive components are laced into overall character development has allowed researchers to continue to speak of prejudice in the singular and prejudice as only a cognitive matter when they try to show how children acquire prejudices. Even Marjorie McDonald herself, the Freudian child analyst, operated with the Allportian general concept: "All forms of prejudice have certain common characteristics in the mechanisms which form and maintain them. The uniqueness of a particular prejudice is usually marked by the superficial manifestation of its content (racial, religious, etc.)."<sup>8</sup> Differences are superstructural, commonalities are structural. But the doctrine of common features, when held by child psychologists, also produces a characteristic image: there is a single trait of prejudice in children—not given from birth, but acquired early—that grows up over time into a single full-grown plant. There may

be no inborn bad seed, but there is a single type of socially constructed weed.

A linguistic problem largely explains why Freud's instinct theory was left out of account in Freudianly influenced child study. In the six passages in all of his writings where Freud used the German word *Instinkt*, he made comparisons with phenomena that can be observed in the animal world, like instinctive recognition of dangers. He defined the word as "inherited mental formations." But he was not convinced that inherited mental formations exist in humans as they do in animals.<sup>9</sup> Children, for example, do not recognize dangers as animals do, so they need a protecting adult nearby (20:168). But, if humans do have some kind of instincts comparable to those of animals, they must, Freud argued, "constitute the nucleus of the unconscious" (14:195).

It is hard to dismiss the view that some sort of hardly definable knowledge, something, as it were, preparatory to an understanding, [is at work in small children]. We can form no conception of what this may have consisted in; we have nothing at our disposal but the single analogy—and it is an excellent one—of the far-reaching instinctive [*instinktiv*] knowledge of animals.

If human beings, too, possessed an instinctive endowment such as this, it would not be surprising that it should be very particularly concerned with the processes of sexual life, even though it could not be by any means confined to them. This instinctive factor would then be the nucleus of the unconscious, a primitive kind of mental activity, which would later be dethroned and overlaid by human reason, when that faculty came to be acquired, but which in some people, perhaps in everyone, would retain the power of drawing down to it the higher mental processes. (17:120)

Freud's caution about *Instinkt* was not known to his American and English readers in the 1930s, however, because when they read "instinct" in their translations, they were reading about *Trieb*, not *Instinkt*. Freud never used the word *Trieb*, which would be more accurately rendered "drive," to indicate any primitive mental activity like the recognition of danger so obvious in animals. *Trieb* meant, rather, a continuous stimulation or excitation arising in human organs and pressing upon the mental capacities for some kind of work ("an instigation to mental activity" as he said once, 20:200). Such internal stimulations cannot, like external stimulations, be escaped by retreat or flight; they must be

either gratified or repressed. The *Triebe* are continuous drives or pushes or pulsions that can be represented mentally, consciously or unconsciously, but that themselves never come to consciousness. Translating *Trieb* as "hormone effect" would avoid the confusions of "instinct" and be accurately suggestive, if not technically accurate because *Trieb* is a wider, less strictly biochemical concept.<sup>10</sup>

Freud used the technical word "libido" for the energy of the sexual drive, which he at first distinguished mainly from hunger (an instinct), as sex and hunger had always, in the entire history of psychology with which he was familiar, been acknowledged as the great animators, the great movers and shakers of people and animals. Libido has, Freud always noted, aims and objects—ends and means. Generally, the aim of the sexual drive is pleasure as satisfaction, relief of tension, but intermediate, diverting, or alternative aims can provide the route to satisfaction. The object is that part of a person's own body or that fantasized Other or that external person in which or through whom the aim is attained. Originally, Freud held, drives do not have predetermined objects—they find them, gain them, in the quest for satisfaction, and they may change them over time, as a child changes from seeking satisfaction in the mother's breast to seeking it in thumb sucking to seeking it in food, kissing another person, and so forth. There is always, he argued in the 1920s, a degree of variability in people between on the one hand their sexual anatomies and physiologies, their developed sexual mental attitudes (their sense of themselves as masculine or feminine or some mixture), their aims and on the other their objects—there is no formula, no simple fixity, among these dimensions.<sup>11</sup> No psychologist has ever made a stronger contrast to the doctrines of hereditarians than this argument.

Any external visible, touchable area of the human body, including any part of the skin or the skin as a whole, and any internal organ can become an expressive area for the sexual drive, but certain areas characteristically have the quality of high erotogenicity because they are related to the major organic needs (nourishment, defecation, urination, discharge of sexual tension) and because they are important in children's relations with their surroundings and their loved ones (technically called "objects"). The mouth, through which a suckling infant receives nourishment and is bound to the breast of the mother or nurse, is the first characteristically erotogenic zone. The anal zone becomes particularly important as children become aware that they produce

feces out of their bodies and learn to keep themselves clean. The urethral-phallic zone (a general term covering the girl's clitoris and the boy's glans penis) takes center stage when children experience and acknowledge sensations in their genitals (which they may associate with urination), when they come to enjoy exhibiting themselves and masturbating, and when they explore the differences between adults and children's genitals and between the genitals of the two sexes. Oral, anal, and phallic stages form, as Anna Freud once put it, "the inborn, maturational base" for the broad developmental line that leads from dependence on maternal care to early adult ability to be emotionally and materially self-reliant.<sup>12</sup>

As a child reaches puberty, these independent sources of excitation and satisfaction become gradually secondary to the pleasures that the biologically mature genitals afford. Then the sexual drive's aim is release of "sexual substances" (genital swelling and tension, and sperm in the male) and the sexual object is another person. But the early discovered sources of excitation and gratification do normally continue to play a role in mature sexual pleasure, especially as they are involved in sexual foreplay. Any of these zones may become particularly important to a child and then to a mature person if the pleasures they afford are particularly intense, or particularly conflictual, or associated with particular fantasies. They may, therefore, become sites for fixation (that is, play a major role in all future pleasures) or for regression (be the sites from which pleasure is sought nostalgically when other avenues are blocked or forbidden).

But the significance of the zones themselves for any individual cannot be understood without the corresponding development of object relations and emotional and material self-reliance. On weaning, a child's early pleasure in nursing gives way to autoerotic pleasures like thumb sucking, and also often to an intense erotization of the skin as that which the mother continues to hold, stroke, cleanse, after the weaning takes place. Anal pleasures such as retaining a stool, enjoying the release of one, or playing with one, though autoerotic, are closely tied to their effects on the adults around, who may react anxiously to retention or to messing, and who very often (especially in hygiene-conscious or anticorporeal cultures) stigmatize "waste products" as dirty or disgusting. Pleasures arising from urination, exhibiting the genitals, or masturbating are also autoerotic but inseparable from fantasies of other people and other peoples' actions and reactions. As I have noted, Freud posited

a normal stage ("primary narcissism") of transition from predominantly autoerotic pleasures to pleasures involving other people directly, and he emphasized that this stage of narcissism or love of the pleasure-giving whole body and the developing ego is crucial to a child's ability to love others, to turn outward what has been concentrated on his or her own body and developing ego. This stage, like the erotic-libidinal stages, can also be, however, a site of fixation or regression, as it is in narcissistic character developments and in narcissistic pathologies.

In a child's developmental sequence, different ingredients that may coalesce later into prejudices come into play at different times, in different contexts. Marjorie McDonald, building on work by Rene Spitz and others, observed that infants are able to differentiate color, including skin color, by the second half of their first year and also noted that many have, at about eight months, what is known as "stranger anxiety."<sup>13</sup> Children who have reacted relatively indiscriminately toward people other than their caretakers begin to react to others as *not* their caretakers, *not* their mothers, because they are able to cognize their mothers as distinct and special to them and also as apt to disappear, be lost to them, unavailable. A mother can go away, and a mother's love can be lost. Frustration teaches anxiety. A mother's existence in the web of a child's narcissistic fantasy can be disturbed—the child's sense that the mother lives, so to speak, inside him or her is disproved by her absence, her unavailability, her frustrating actions. A child who is developing the notion that there is a border—literally at the child's own skin or at the mother's—between the child and the mother, a child who is anxious about strangers, may at the same time be especially sensitive to differences in skin color and, to a lesser degree, skin texture, as one of the signs of separation and difference. Discovery of skin differences "either comes at a time when the skin is highly invested and the ego functions are barely developed, or else it comes after the skin (oral) phase and *reawakens* the invested memories of this early period."<sup>14</sup>

For children in whom the oral stage—with its preliminary differentiations of self and other, its preliminary ego development—remains strong and conflicts remain unresolved, skin color anxiety can become merged with frustration and separation anxieties. Children, for example, whose object relations continue to display the features common to the oral stage—complete merging with some people and angry, explosive intolerance of others who are perceived as not adequately gratifying—can manifest their feelings in food fads as well as people fads. Like

their people preferences, their food preferences can be organized along color lines—they eat only white rice or bread (not dark) and reject anything not covered in white sugar. There are good and bad people, good and bad foods, good and bad colors. If such faddishness continues and is reinforced over years, it can become part of the hysterical trait complex or character that is especially marked by inconstancy and volatility in love relations. Dark skinned children living in white-majority or white dominated cultures often display an early preference not for dark but for white colors, a preference they leave behind later unless it is reinforced in their milieus. Their white preference can, in adverse circumstances, develop into a split-off “white” or good self.

Children raised by biracial couples, children with a nurse not of their own color, and children who live in truly color-integrated environments learn color difference as an integral part of the world they are coming to know as not-themselves, as separate and on the other side of their skin. Theirs will not be *stranger* anxiety, but it may be anxiety about the differences among loved ones—particularly if those differences are problematic to the adults. Children raised in relative segregation may be startled by their first experience of color difference and have to be reassured so that color difference does not jar their normal narcissistic sense of their own bodily integrity.

Children who do not have the opportunity to experience people of a different color at the time when their own sense of themselves as separate, skin-bordered beings emerges, and when their skin is highly libidized as the body part through which the mother is loved and loves, may have more difficulty integrating the differences later. James Baldwin described well the extreme case in an essay he wrote after living for several brief periods in a remote Swiss village where none of the children had ever seen a black man. The children in the village shouted *Neger! Neger!* at him in the street; they wanted to touch his hair, and they were astonished that his color did not rub off on them. “In all of this, in which it must be conceded there was the charm of genuine wonder and in which there was certainly no element of intentional unkindness, there was yet no suggestion that I was human: I was simply a living wonder.”<sup>15</sup>

Children in the anal stage or still working through its excitements and the common adult prohibitions on its pleasures are particularly concerned with brown, with darkness, and with the association between dirt and feces and skin color. Light-skinned children will often touch

the skin of darker children and call it dirty or wonder as the Swiss children did whether it will rub off on them and dirty them. Dark-skinned children sometimes think of their own skin as dirty, particularly if they have had no encouragement to think otherwise. The common association of brown skin and feces is not hidden. Goodman, without commenting, gives a clear example of how a child’s anal anxiety can be read into his observation of color difference and suffused with the aggression characteristic of the anal stage. A white four-year-old, looking at a picture of a brown-skinned boy, grew alarmed: “He’s black! He’s a stinky little boy.—He’s a stinker—he sh——! Take it away! I want another little boy!”<sup>16</sup>

Some psychoanalytic commentators, Lawrence Kubie for example, find this kind of reaction endemic not just to the anal stage and its afterlife, but to the more general phenomenon of body shame, which may be accentuated in the anal stage as a child is taught cleanliness, often in a shame-inducing way. He asks why body shame and hostility focus on pigmentation and answers:

We know that in the beginning children have no such derogatory feelings about themselves. They delight in nakedness and its free display. They delight in all the apertures of the body and in all body products. They like the feeling, the sense of movement, the warmth, the smells and tastes of their own bodies and . . . products, and they have the same joy in the bodies of others. They know no hierarchies of dirtiness, leading from that which is so clean it can be taken into the mouth to that which is so filthy that it cannot be touched, looked at or named or thought about even to oneself and not even in solitude and silence. The child picks up or “learns” this contrast between “clean” and “dirty” in subtle ways. Like the caste system of Indian culture, he develops a caste system for his body: with untouchable or unmentionable body parts and products, parts that he must neither touch nor mention nor look at nor think about nor even have words for, so he makes up slang substitutes. This is associated with the fact that the apertures and also hairy places of the body are more darkly pigmented than is the rest of the body’s surface, and that all body products, except tears, have some degree of color, flavor and odor. Without our ever intending to do this, we teach the toddler to feel that his body is an animated, mobile, more or less symmetrical dirt factory.<sup>17</sup>

Like most psychoanalytic commentators, Kubie emphasized the child’s projection onto others of its body shame: “Thus out of the de-

fense against the initial concept of an untouchable 'I' with untouchable, unmentionable, unthinkable body parts comes the concept of an untouchable 'You.' " But Kubie did not note that in the oral and anal stages, or in regression to them, children often display something else: a fear of contamination, which implies a projective identification and a fear of incorporating, bringing into their own bodies, what has been judged dirty or corrupting. Bruno Lasker's extensive collection of examples includes one of a five-year-old white boy who backed off in fear from a Negro child saying "Look out, little black child, don't breathe your black breath on me!"<sup>18</sup> Displacement outward of a frightening feeling or a frightening fantasy seems a more characteristically anal stage defense; rejecting incorporation of a projected fear by withdrawal is more oral.

The anal phase is also characterized by vacillations between activity and passivity—the activity being often tightly connected to aggressive rebellion against training and to the overall body mobility and the enormous joy that children who are graduating from crawling to walking usually take in their freedom. Cross-culturally, in all social strata, from the exhausted adult point of view, the designation the "terrible twos" captures the trials of this period, writ as they are in motion and aggression. Many children develop at the same time rudimentary sexual theories that feature anal products as babies or babies being born anally like feces. Images of sexual intercourse formed from observing people or animals often revolve around anal penetration and mounting, and little boys as well as little girls can identify with the one being penetrated, particularly if this reinforces great pleasure in passively retaining and actively expelling stools. Associations between dark or feces colors and anal eroticism as a kind of proto-intercourse can greatly influence later race attitudes, though, on the surface, they appear to relate to phallic sexuality. These associations especially affect people with many obsessional character traits, including the three—stubbornness, cleanliness, and parsimony—explicitly linked by Freud with anal eroticism.

McDonald stated in *Not by the Color of Their Skin*: "In the phallic phase the skin color difference and genital difference can become confused, so that castration anxiety and skin color anxiety now take on a complex relation to each other."<sup>19</sup> But she also carefully recorded that in the Cleveland nursery school where she and her staff made their observations on children between the ages of three and seven, the number of

anally tinged racial conflicts they observed far outnumbered those revealing phallic conflicts, a result that surprised her "because our culture seems to place so much stress on sexual dangers and conflicts as an important basis for our current racial problems."<sup>20</sup> She interpreted the surprising result as evidence that the therapeutic approach of the nursery school had helped the older (phallic-stage) children achieve a significant severing of their sexual conflicts from their conflicts over skin color. The children had achieved "an advanced stage of psychological racial integration." She might also have noted that in the late 1960s, when she was collecting her observations, African American culture was asserting "Black is beautiful," which helped many children of color avoid stages of color dislike or work through them with less than the previously usual damage to self-esteem, and which made it harder for white children to look down on Blacks.

The surprising result could also be explained by the preoccupation that phallic-stage children have with sex differences and with differences between their own genitals and those bigger ones of their parents and other adults. Strong phallic narcissism, as I indicated before, tends to minimize all differences except *the* difference of genitalia. Skin color distinction can be put into the service of intense sexual exploration and curiosity. Also, as McDonald's study only dealt with children, she did not have an opportunity to observe how skin color distinctions become erotically charged in adolescence, with the upsurge then of libido. Often, the anal stage association of black skin with dirt and feces is transcended in this libidinal upsurge, overtaken by phallic concerns, so that skin color distinctions are genitalized. This development does not occur in antisemites, as I will explain later.

Despite her overall result, McDonald did observe behavioral correlates of phallic conflicts, particularly in the Black children, who had the double burden of dealing with their own intrapsychic, developmental issues at the same time that they were reacting to the skin color anxiety of the (majority) white children. The Black boys tended to identify dark skin color with femininity, and to avoid the Black girls, as though fearing contamination and emasculation. Both Black boys and girls tended to identify their hair with phallic power and to be anxious when they got haircuts or when comparisons with the white children's long, straight hair came up. McDonald's book was published in 1970, when the Black Power fashion of up-standing Afros was well known in urban



nursery schools. The current fashions for equating power and hair are, of course, more diverse and multicultural—African braiding and beading, Jamaican rastas, tall flattops and intricate hair-carved sign systems.

Particularly if their environments give them opportunity, children in the phallic stage also tend to play out their oedipal conflicts in the medium of color. They can, for example, associate the sexual activities of their parents—so exciting, so jealousy-arousing—with nighttime, darkness, and, by extension, dark-skinned people. More specifically, dark-skinned people can be associated with rivals whom a child wants off the scene. McDonald observed a five-year-old white girl who exiled from her dollhouse the Black girl dolls, so that she could claim for herself the exclusive attention of the white father-figure. She sent away, that is, all siblings and her mother in the medium of the Black dolls. A Black boy of the same age took to criticizing his father's very dark skin while he was trying to win his mother's attention. He succeeded in enraging his father and disrupting the family by playing out his oedipal rivalry in the medium of "colorism." A white South African six-year-old provided the psychologist John Duckitt with a typical example of how oedipal castration fear can be represented by Blacks—one from a South African atmosphere completely lacking any of the therapeutic approaches in McDonald's nursery school. The white boy was explaining why he could not have a Black doll present at his pretend tea party and resorted to an image clearly learned from adults: "If I have to sit next to one of these I'll have a nervous breakdown."<sup>21</sup>

The children in these examples are old enough to be strongly influenced by their parents' attitudes and by their experiences in school with other children's and adults' attitudes. Research done in the 1930s as American social science shifted away from race psychology, like work done in the early 1950s, stressed the importance of direct parental instruction in transmitting racial attitudes—probably for the simple reason that such direct parental instruction typified practices in the American South and North. But Allport's *Nature of Prejudice* marked a shift of emphasis. It gave more weight to indirect socialization and toward studying prejudice as something that is as often—so Allport put it—"caught as taught."<sup>22</sup> This tendency to be more nuanced in discussing how parents influence children also resulted from the baffling failure of empirical study after empirical study to produce strong correlations between parental attitudes and children's attitudes. Some studies even indicated—flying in the face of one of the most commonly held opinions

of the general public—that the correlation between parental attitudes and children's attitudes is quite weak.<sup>23</sup>

As John Duckitt has pointed out, trying to determine whether direct or indirect learning is the more important for children of around five is methodologically very complex and really makes sense only if historical and social contexts are taken into account. Direct instruction is an important and powerful way for children to be inculcated with a prejudice when the prejudice is the norm—that is, in segregated, overtly and uninhibitedly racist societies. Indirect learning is more important in integrated societies where racial equality is preached, if not widely practiced, and where direct instruction is socially unacceptable.

But even this refinement does not reveal much about *how* attitudes are transmitted. And it does not show anything about how transmitted attitudes are woven into children's developing desires and object relations and theories of sexuality. Unfortunately, the cognitive literature gives no help on these questions, although it contributes in other ways. As I noted in Chapter 1, a consensus has emerged among cognitively oriented empirical researchers that indicates three broad stages in acquisition of prejudices. Frances Aboud reports in *Children and Prejudice* that children below the age of three to four are most influenced in their development of racial awareness by "affective processes such as emotions and needs" (such as fear of strangers), while children of three or four and on up to about seven are most influenced by their perceptions of their own and others' appearances and behaviors. In this second stage, differences in appearance—like skin color—are important to a child but not connected in the child's mind with personal qualities or identities. Appearances and behaviors define groups, not individuals. Children may take skin color into account but think that a person can change skin color and thus change group. When children do evaluate groups and differences in this three- to seven-year-old stage, those who are majority whites tend to find whiteness preferable. So do many children of color—although the cognitive researchers agree with McDonald that this tendency among minority children generally diminishes after age seven.

An empirical consensus, moreover, indicates that all children develop cognitive abilities at about age seven which allow them to rely less on appearances for their understanding of the world. They grow to understand that peoples' ethnic identities are constant. Appreciating people in their individuality becomes possible as they recognize different points

of view, note that others have preferences different than their own, make comparisons, and think abstractly. Most empirical studies demonstrate that prejudice or negative evaluations of out-groups diminish in children over seven. But this development takes place, except in unusual cases, only in the absence of social forces that actively teach prejudice. Children over seven are more influenced by prejudiced people in their families and surroundings than younger children, who cannot cognitively appreciate the lessons of prejudice. When familial and social forces do begin to play a larger role in older children's lives, enormous variety comes into the attitudes and evaluations and prejudices formed.

This developmental scenario does not, as I noted, take intrapsychic factors into account, and it explicitly leaves "affective processes such as emotions and needs" out of the picture for any children over age three or four. From a psychoanalytic point of view, the empirical evidence suggests that children who have passed the pitch of their phallic and oedipal period are able, in their less drive-dominated latencies, to direct their attention to other people in and of themselves, not as players by projection or displacement in the children's oedipal dramas. But it also suggests that the intellectualizations that accumulate in the latency period—intellectual products that reinforce and elaborate defenses developed in the oedipal period—are likely to involve prejudices, especially if these are being actively taught in the environment. Most empirical researchers agree that ethnic prejudices and prejudices against groups not visually distinguished by skin color or sexual characteristics—most Jewish populations, homosexuals—appear only in children aged ten or eleven. From a cognitive point of view, these groups require cognitive appreciation of invisibles and values, while from a psychoanalytic point of view these prejudices are second-order defenses and defenses more in the realm of intellectualization. In the scheme I am developing, they are the defenses more typical of obsessionals than of hysterical characters.

Those who study the cognitive stages of prejudice development concur that race awareness—meaning, specifically, skin color awareness—precedes awareness of group differences that are less visual or not apprehendable perceptually. But there are no studies of, for example, the development of antisemitism in childhood. This may well be because antisemitism only appears after children have passed the classification "children," and moved on to "preadolescents." But the fact remains that studies of race awareness and race prejudice have dominated the

whole domain of "children and prejudice," setting the patterns for study, and that the cognitive approach has eliminated any questioning about transformations of prejudices from childhood to latency to puberty and adolescence. On reflections of this sort clinical literature has more to say. But, despite a good deal of clinical material on antisemitism dating from right after World War II, clinical cases by psychiatrists, psychologists, or psychoanalysts in which racial prejudice is a key or even a salient ingredient are very rare. The ones that do exist tend to confirm the close association of phallic stage, oedipal conflict, and color consciousness, while they raise many questions about what kinds of factors turn color preference into fully articulated or actively pursued racism.

### Case Studies: Three Faces of Hysterical Prejudice

In "A Consideration of the Etiology of Prejudice" (1957), the psychoanalyst Brian Bird presented "a young hysterical girl" (aged nineteen, presumably a child during World War II) who was suffering from "phobias, mostly of bodily disease, and overwhelming attacks of unheralded anxiety." In the course of her therapy, the young woman, an inveterate romantic daydreamer, developed a transference to her analyst that she found very threatening. She covered her romantic fantasies about her analyst with a layer of hostility and then felt exposed when the hostility was analyzed and began to recede. At that point in the analysis, she, a Jew dedicated to a vision of racial equality, began to fantasize that Negro men were making advances toward her. She expressed hatred for Negroes, charging them as a race with inferiority and lack of sexual control. This outbreak of racial prejudice, Bird suggested to her, was a way of controlling her own impulses—particularly toward her analyst—by assigning them to the Negroes, projecting them. As she worked with this interpretation and accepted it, the prejudice "evaporated."

In this case racial prejudice was not learned *directly* in childhood. In a more intricate fashion, the young woman had developed the idea that she herself "looked very Jewish and perhaps even Negro," while her mother and older sister, whom she envied, were lighter and not Jewish-looking. The mother and sister also were not—as she felt her father was—uncouth, coarse, ugly, and unsuccessful. The analysis revealed a complex relation between her prejudice against her father (and against herself because she was like him) and her prejudice against male Negroes: she was better able to function when she was feeling prejudice

toward Negroes, when her aggression was directed outward (as it had also been several years earlier in a transitory period of antisemitism). In effect, her prejudice against Negroes served her as a defense against self-reproachful depression. Her self-depreciation, she found, reflected her mother's critical attitude toward her. But more fundamentally it rested on her combination of love, hatred, envy, and fear of competition with regard to her mother and older sister, and on the love disguised by denigration she felt for her father. Her bout of racial prejudice protected her from the intense feelings associated with these preoedipal and oedipal entanglements.

Bird's case study clearly shows racism as a type of what I have called hysterical prejudice. But, just as clinical work on hysterical characters and character disorders has evolved toward a consensus that there are two distinguishable subtypes, oral and phallic, so there also seem to be two distinguishable forms of hysterical prejudice. Without being acknowledged as such, they were described in Richard Sterba's article of 1947 "Some Psychological Factors in Negro Race Hatred and in Anti-Negro Riots," a piece he wrote on the basis of analytic work with white males during the time of the 1943 race riots in Detroit.

In the first part of his article, Sterba noted that several of his patients who had had intense rivalries with their siblings reworked those rivalries in their dreams, with Negroes playing the roles of the siblings. One violent Negro hater, for example, dreamed of being on a small raft in a harbor and seeing a big boat approach. Some Negroes jumped out of the boat's portholes, and the dreamer drove his raft toward them and crushed them against the side of the boat. Sterba, interpreting the dream as the man offered his associations to it, perceived the boat as the body of the man's mother and the Negroes as his siblings, being born from her. The dreamer destroyed the Negroes as he had wished to destroy each of the five younger siblings who had come into life and disturbed his relation with his mother.

The attitude of [racists] toward Negroes mirrors exactly the attitude of the older child toward his sibling rivals: Negroes should be kept in their place, as inferior members of a social group to which they are hardly allowed to belong. They are considered immature, incapable of development, and eternal children. Every attempt at, or actual achievement of a Negro is resented with furious anger and with fear. The reaction of fear is noteworthy, and in its nature is very similar to the fear of dethronization which the older child experiences with re-

gard to his growing rival. Every attempt is made to prevent the Negro's integration into the social structure of the white . . . The greatest horror is therefore expressed about intermarriage, because this would really mean complete acceptance in the family.<sup>24</sup>

Racism as sibling rivalry, then, takes the form of discrimination—exclusionary practices—which unconsciously means crushing Negroes into poverty or lack of any kind of threatening (love) achievement.

Racism as renewed and redirected sibling rivalry uses both male and female Negroes, Sterba pointed out. He also noted that it involves people acting as individuals. In both these ways, it contrasts to the type of Negro hatred manifest in group or mass psychological violence, including riots, against Negro males only. In males, this kind is, psychologically, an outbreak of father hatred, which Sterba described in terms similar to those used by the sociologist Pierre van den Berghe to present the "paternalistic racism" typical of plantation and colonial contexts.

Negro hatred had its origins in the South, where many white children were and are brought up by a Negro "mammy," toward whom they often develop feelings like those toward a mother. Due to the development of the Oedipus complex, the male Negro is then naturally brought into the position of the hated father. The South furnishes the classical example of the race riot in the form of lynching. The rebellious sons unite against the hated father substitute with the aim of killing and castrating him. The inhumanity, cruelty and brutality with which they proceed reveals the origins of this conduct in the most primitive and barbaric layers of our minds, where it is otherwise buried in the unconscious and is brought forth only under the mass psychological conditions of the riot. The fact that the [anti-]Negro riot regularly breaks out through the rumor that a Negro has raped a white woman confirms our opinion about its patricidal origin. Almost without exception the riot is then the revenge for the alleged sexual assault upon a white woman by a Negro.

Sterba's description alludes to the idea, developed by Freud in his speculative culture studies like *Totem and Taboo*, that in current all-male groups such as hunting lodges or army units men reenact a primeval rebellion of sons against father—the group psychological form of the Oedipus complex. This particular Freudian notion, with its corollary of phylogenetic inheritance, is interesting to speculate about, but it is not necessary to appreciate the observations in Sterba's article. He commented, for example, "that among the most embittered participants in

the race riots in Detroit were adolescents, many of Southern origin." These youths, Sterba thought, were experiencing the typical adolescent second stage of their oedipal rivalries with their fathers, when "new currents of sexuality" called for "a more disguised form." The disguise was race prejudice.

Sterba did not note the difference in childhood stage-reference of the two kinds of hatred he described, but it seems obvious that the first—the sibling rivalry renewal—echoes early separation experiences and oral greed, not wishing to share the maternal body or breast. But the second—the patricidal reenactment—is oedipal, phallic. In effect, Sterba described "oral" and "phallic" versions of racism in males. Bird's case, detailing the hysteric's rivalry with her sister and her feeling of being frustrated by and criticized by her mother, also resembles the first type, which (as I suggested before) may be the commonest type of hysterical racial prejudice among women, particularly among women who define themselves in an exaggeratedly feminine way and thus forbid themselves the active, conventionally masculine modes they may desire. Female hysterical characters and women with hysterical character disorders are much more inclined to conversion symptoms and depression than are males of either the oral or the phallic sort. Males more frequently engage in risk-taking behavior, in their recreational activities or their jobs, and present their hysteria or hysterical traits in antisocial or delinquent forms or in forms that are legal but excitingly violent, like gun toting and hunting. As two recent clinical commentators have indicated, a male hysteric's "sociopath-like behavior may be confused with the true sociopath; however, the hysteric will show splitting of his personality. The underlying dependency in many of his anti-social acts will seem exaggerated and bizarre, in contrast to the true sociopath, whose actions and personality are more integrated and, in one sense, more mature."<sup>25</sup>

We can discern a third sort of hysterical type and prejudice not included in Sterba's survey. In this type, a hysterical personality and prejudice are overlaid with obsessional features. As Freud noted many times, particularly in his long case study of the patient called the "Wolf Man" in 1918, obsessiveness almost always grows out of hysteria: it supervenes in latency, when defenses generally take intellectualized forms and when prejudices develop that require intellectual skills not available to children. T. C. Rodgers presented a male patient of this type in "The Evolution of an Active Anti-Negro Racist" (1960).

This man had grown up in the 1920s as the only child of upper-middle-class Southern parents, both obsessional, who kept Negro servants, including a nurse who was the patient's "mammy." The patient's mother had toilet trained him very early, with many prohibitions on anal pleasures and a strict taboo on masturbation, but he associated his Negro nurse with a milder regime. As an adult he treated his nurse with great leniency in comparison to the retaliatory obsessional way he treated his widowed mother. He tenderly loved the black woman, but he was terrified of black men.

Rodgers's therapy with this man, who was severely inhibited in his sexual life (which was confined to "degraded" women) and also thwarted in his work life, slowly uncovered his strong hatred and fear of his father. It also became clear that in his dreams and fantasies the patient represented his father by the nurse's Negro husband and by aggressive phallic signs of this man (in one dream he was beaten by a black cane; black bull's horns were prominent in another). The patient deeply feared anal rape by Negro men. But he also strongly identified with the Negro men who were, he fantasized, waiting to attack his mother. Stirred up by his therapy, he elaborately protected his mother from the fantasized Negro attackers, and eventually he became an outspoken advocate of capital punishment for Negro criminals. Finally, when he abandoned his therapy, he took up active work in the White Citizens Council, a racist group specifically opposed to miscegenation and the "mongrelization" of the races. He turned his passive fear of rape into a frantically active aggression against the alleged rapists (and, insofar as he also identified with the rapists, he controlled himself with threats of punishment).

Rodgers's patient certainly learned prejudice from his parents when he was a child, and he clearly remembered specific later instructions, like the ban his father laid on any contact with the girls in "nigger town," who, he was told when he was seventeen, all carried venereal disease. But he worked these instructions into his individual—though not at all untypical—system of obsessional anxieties and defenses. Rodgers indicated that the patient's obsessional defenses, along with his conscious association of Negroes with forbidden and dangerous sexuality, dated from his adolescence, but Rodgers could not in this brief therapy find out much about the patient's childhood symptomology. The kind of hysterical symptoms that usually precede and undergird an obsessional neurosis were, however, apparent in the man's somatizations—

his general body rigidity (hypertonicity), impotence, and "hysterical bowel." More important, the patient's anus was "genitalized"—his phallic desires were primarily passive, and he was identified with his mother in his desire for—and terror about—anal penetration. That is, he had the typical obsessional desire to be the opposite sex. If this man had grown up in a society where antisemitism was common, he might have made a good antisemite, but as it was, he constructed the available Negro "fathers" as his attackers. He could retaliate only through a legal organization, not in the reckless, rioting way more typical of oral and phallic hysterical characters and also quite typical of the hysterical Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s, which could be characterized as a kind of lodge dedicated to hunting Negroes.

#### Case Studies: Obsessional Fortress Building

I have charted three subtypes of hysterical characters and their prejudices—those directed primarily at siblings in competition for the mother, those expressing patricidal desires, and those defending against paternally related homoeroticism. The cases suggesting these subtypes were undertaken by different analysts, working independently of one another and in different periods. The study of racism contains nothing like the multiple-case, comparative work undertaken after World War II to analyze antisemitism.

I have mentioned before the most extensive exploration of antisemitism through case studies, a volume in the Studies in Prejudice series called *Anti-Semitism, an Emotional Disorder*, by Nathan Ackerman and Marie Jahoda. Using material from psychoanalytic treatments of sixteen men and eleven women, they made a composite description and offered some reflections on common childhood developmental factors.

The two authors made clear at the beginning of their work that the antisemites they studied could not be assigned a single diagnostic classification. They also indicated, however, that they had found a proclivity along the obsessional-paranoid axis among their subjects. "We find a preponderance of character disorders, a smaller number of psychoneuroses, including four cases of obsessional neurosis, one case of paranoia, and a number of less precisely defined disturbances."<sup>26</sup> They described numerous features typical of obsessional characters. The antisemitic patients were indecisive and doubt-ridden in both their relationships and

their interests. They were "under continuous apprehension of injury to their integrity as individuals." Their self-esteem was damaged but the damage was denied. They were social conformists but restless and rebellious in groups for fear of submissiveness. On the one hand, they showed enormous fear of passivity, including sexual passivity, and compensated with aggression, incessant activity, and pursuit of power or money or recognition. On the other hand, they also avoided situations where they had to be directly confrontational. They maintained, instead, a general attitude of being opposed, being against, hating. "These people are not only against the Jew; they are against themselves and everyone else. They are notoriously 'against.' The reliance on attitudes of both avoidance and opposition subserves the primary defense pattern of substituting aggression for anxiety."

These antisemites attributed the two sets of characteristics they shared—the great sense of vulnerability, inferiority, and isolation, in combination with aggression and incessant activity—to the Jews. They projected upon the Jews both stereotypical images of weakness—outsiderdom and injury (including the symbolic castration of circumcision)—and stereotypical images of strength. They saw Jewish strength in powerful networks and financial clout, not sexuality. And in this projection the patients resembled the antisemitic people interviewed at the end of World War II by Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz. Those subjects also spoke always of Jewish economic power, not sexual power. Bettelheim and Janowitz observed that American antisemites seldom accuse Jews of sexual prowess in any form, not even in the form of perversity, and that they also very seldom object to Gentile-Jewish miscegenation or intermarriage. "This stands in sharp contrast to an important element of European antisemitism and antisemitic agitation, which stressed the Jew's supposed sexual immorality."<sup>27</sup> (It might be speculated that America, a nation which, unlike the European nations of the World War II period, included a large Negro population and had accumulated centuries' worth of experience with racist fantasies of Negro sexual potency, did not need for its Jews to play this role.)

Several of Ackerman and Jahoda's antisemitic patients reported the kinds of beating fantasies that Freud discussed in his paper of 1919 "A Child Is Being Beaten," that is, fantasies in which the patient reported seeing a Jew being beaten and identified with the Jew. But, in a manner I consider typically obsessional, they immediately turned this passive identification into its opposite and identified with the attacker.

The deep-seated identification with the Jew's symbolic weakness, his crippled, castrated state and his subordinated defenseless position, is denied because of its danger to the integrity of the individual's self and his social position; in its place there is substituted an identification with the attacker, in order to avoid being victimized and also to draw strength from the identification. Thus the Jew, at one and the same time, stands for the weakness or the strength of the self; for conscience, which reproaches the self for its deficiencies and badness, and also for those primitive, forbidden appetites and aggressions which must be denied as the price of social acceptance.

Ackerman and Jahoda noted that their subjects, although very different in terms of sex, age, background, and religion, shared two features of family context. First, their parents were like the parents encountered so frequently by *The Authoritarian Personality* group—strict, rigid disciplinarians who did not always stop short of physical beating as they compelled their children into conformity and submissiveness. The children responded with obedience but also grievance and great reservoirs of unexpressed aggression. Further, “in several cases, the fixation of anal character traits can be traced back clearly to severe, early toilet training which was made a test of the parents' approval and affection.” Second, in all the cases the parents themselves had a hostile relationship, vying for dominance and quarreling. The children were inhibited from secure identifications with either parent. Identifying with the weaker one meant being weak and vulnerable; identifying with the stronger one meant joining the oppressor's camp and becoming part of the battle against the weaker one. In structural terms, these incomplete or insecure identifications meant the antisemitic patients were characterized by ill-formed or faulty superegos. And they all also shared a noticeable instability of conscience and lack of overt guilt feelings. “Examples of this abound in our cases. There is the wealthy business man who cheats his newspaper dealer out of small change; the mother who neglects her small child because she feels like going out for a walk; the woman of forty who does not know whether to approve or disapprove of anything unless she first asks her mother, etc.”<sup>28</sup>

Another common and related family pattern, which appears repeatedly in the psychoanalytic literature on obsessiveness, features children who, viewing one of their parents, usually the mother but sometimes the father, as a burdened, overworked, illness-prone, fragile, inconsistent, even martyred figure, become that parent's protector. If the other

parent is absent or is viewed by the child as an inadequate protector, or even as a source of danger, the effort to take on the protecting role intensifies, fueled by the feeling that the unprotecting parent can be eliminated as a rival. Often the unprotecting parent gets cast as an active aggressor and protection against this aggressor parent is mounted—even while the missing protection continues to be desired. Meanwhile, the child works beyond his or her means managing and ordering the life of an adult who seems to need protection. Reaching for pseudosolutions, the child can invent rituals of caretaking and stick to them religiously, or invent self-berating, self-reproachful thoughts and think them over and over, or develop excessively “good” behaviors meant to solicit love and convince the parents that the child is not bad. Repetitive actions and thoughts can also constrain and banish aggressive wishes—especially death wishes—against the parents who cannot, in their opposite ways, be parental.<sup>29</sup>

The child or adolescent who overmanages and overthinks begins to feel empty and without identity or takes temporary refuge in temporary identities. The conformism of the obsessional often stems from a habit of identifying or forming partial identifications with the people who come along. The child or adolescent becomes first this one and then that one, adopting with each identification that person's mannerisms, accent, style—and prejudices. But it can also turn out that the person who is unable to establish in childhood or adolescence a relationship of normal dependence with parents or family looks outside the family and finds such a relationship on what terms are available. Often this means submitting to someone (often mistaking exploitation for loving attention) or joining a group and obeying the group leaders and rules. The prejudices of the authority figure or of the group then become part of the child's and adolescent's management rituals. The pattern can be seen in many studies of Hitler Youth.

Ackerman and Jahoda pointed to a type of faulty superego in their antisemitic population that is common among obsessionals and that the contemporary French analyst Bela Grunberger has called a “pregenital superego” and described as a “precociously formed superego which is based not on the introjection of complete objects but on their educative function. It pertains to a training role, which is represented in the unconscious by the introjection of an anal phallus as a part object.”<sup>30</sup> Translated from psychoanalytic French, this formulation means that the antisemite's superego comprises partial identifications, commands and

prohibitions, and "shoulds," rather than rounded, full identifications with parental figures; and these commands and prohibitions are assimilated as were the commands and prohibitions that constituted the antisemite's toilet training and, in general, disciplining, so that the commands and prohibitions are experienced as patriarchal-sexual power taken in or intruded anally. The antisemite's morality is, thus, formulaic—perfect manners and impeccable execution of orders will matter to the antisemite much more than right and wrong, or they will, as I noted before of obsessionals in general, take the place of questions about right and wrong. Ideas and formal practices, too, are cut off from affect by the defenses described before as undoing and isolation. Guilt feelings are displaced onto the victim, so that the antisemite does not feel them and feels, instead, coldly numb, empty. In this sense, it was not surprising that Adolf Eichmann at his trial in Jerusalem could accurately state Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative and regret that he had not followed it but express no remorse whatsoever for the mass murders he organized. Hannah Arendt chose to call this characteristic formulaic morality and cold-bloodedness the "banality of evil."

The image patterns typical of the fantasies and dreams presented by Rodgers's mixed hysterical-obsessional patient in his brief analysis can be seen—with changes in the *dramatis personae*—in the antisemitic fantasies and dreams that Ackerman and Jahoda report. They are staples of antisemitic literature. To show this, and to offer an application of the case study method, I want to turn briefly to what is certainly the most influential work of the twentieth century by an antisemite, Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. There, the standard antisemitic image pattern is present—but it has to be read out, or through, Hitler's political vision. I will interpret that vision as though it were a portrait of Hitler's psyche, in much the same way as Rodgers's patient's dream of the black-horned bull was of his.

Stripped down to its essential ingredients, its core content, the guiding ideology of *Mein Kampf* looks like this: The motherland—in *Mein Kampf*, Hitler spoke of Germany always as the motherland ("beloved mother . . . the young Reich")—must grow because its self-sufficiency depends on growth. It must grow to the East, into Russia, on contiguous continental land, not to overseas colonies, for Germany's land base for eventual rule over the world must be wide and firm, like the base of a pyramid. The motherland must be able to feed and supply her own

people, take care of her population, which must increase. Germany has historically suffered at the hands of her enemies because she has been a land of mixed racial stocks, which has meant that she never had the unity, the organic evolutionary thrust, the herd instinct, to achieve supremacy and to take revenge upon her past predators and ancient enemies. Her Aryan stock should be promoted with a policy encouraging the pure Aryan young to breed and discouraging racial pollution. Germany's pure stock must also be preserved from spiritual corruption, and this means corruption by the false god of the modern world, money, by international finance, and by any economic ideology, capitalistic or socialistic. Behind all of Germany's enemies—her external foes and her internal impure elements—stand the Jews, who aspire to world conquest racially and spiritually. They are the blood poisoners and the money idolaters, and they must be expelled or eliminated.

Above all, Hitler conveys an image of autarky and activism. Germany must never depend on others and must never be passive, which means penetrable by outside others or pollutable by inside others. It is a fortress image. Even though the ultimate goal is world conquest, the impulse is isolationist. It fairly screams, "Do not enter!" The world will be controlled from the base of the great Reich; tentacles of power will reach out from a closed state. To keep this autarkic realm pure, and thus strong and aggressive, internal corruption and waste must be removed. Dirty people and dirty ideologies of money must be evacuated. The cleansing takes place by identification with the power of the imagined attackers: the beaten country rises up and is the beater.

Interpreted as a psychic image, a vast blow-up of Hitler's feeling about himself, a portrait of himself or (to use Freud's term) his unconscious "endopsychic perception" of himself as the German motherland, the image says: I am my mother, beaten, passive, and penetrable, but I will—by force of will—masculinize myself and not be, as it would be evil to be, this female. No father, no male, will force himself on me, enter my anus, or beat me, and I will grow big, strong, and able to put my evil out onto them. No Jew—no "emasculating germ" as he called the Jew—will survive, much less triumph. His motto might well have been the one created for the Hitler Youth: "Youth shapes its own destiny."

As every one of his psychologically inclined biographers has noted, Adolf Hitler was deeply tied to his mother and, as an adolescent, at war with his father, a violent drunkard who seems to have beaten his much younger wife—and thus provided his son with opportunity to identify

with the beaten mother or the beating father, or both. Ostensively, the son's battle focused on the father's demand that the son prepare for civil service, not for art school. When Hitler's father died abruptly in 1903, the fourteen-year-old son lived with his mother. Until her death from cancer in 1908, the son was weak, stalled and listless, unable to pursue the art school route left open, directionless. Then, at the beginning of 1909, when he was twenty, he left home and went to the site of his father's civil service career, Vienna, to try to make his fortune as an artist, the career his father had forbidden him. He had no success whatsoever and drifted through four years of abject poverty and struggle for survival. In Vienna, he encountered for the first time a large Jewish population and waves of antisemitism. "At home, as long as my father lived, I cannot remember that I ever heard the word [Jew]." "I detested the conglomerate of races that the . . . capital manifested . . . among them Jews and more Jews. To me the big city appeared as the personification of incest."<sup>31</sup>

Hitler biographers usually read this striking image—"the personification of incest"—as a clue that Hitler conflated his incestuous desire for his mother with the Jewish traffic in prostitutes that he described so frequently and with such horror in *Mein Kampf*: "an icy shudder ran down my spine when seeing the Jew for the first time as a cool, shameless, and calculating manager of this shocking vice . . . But then my indignation flared up." Hitler is seen as a projector of incest guilt onto the Jews, those corrupters of Aryan racial purity. Or, along the same lines, he has been interpreted as a youth who projected his oedipal rivalry onto the Jews, who fought his father in the form of Jewry. Erik Erikson has offered the diagnosis "hysteria" because Hitler acted out his oedipal rivalry so grandiosely, with such imposture on the great stage of the world.<sup>32</sup> But it seems much more likely that Hitler identified with the prostitutes and feared the predations of the Jews—that his passive shudder was followed by aggressive indignation according to an old habit of obsessional defense. For it is fear and anxiety that are palpable in his descriptions of Jewish male sexuality: "the black-haired Jew boy, diabolic joy in his face, waits in ambush for the unsuspecting girl whom he defiles with his blood." As Bela Grunberger comments generally about antisemites: "The anal struggle in toto is projected onto the Jew. Not only as regards dirtiness and all forms of money but also all forms of aggression and treachery, culminating in the paranoiac fear of anal penetration. . . The anal components of sexuality are also projected

upon the Jews—lewd monsters who rape innocent German girls in order to pollute the race."<sup>33</sup>

### Why Can't a Woman Be More Like a Man?

The psychoanalytic clinical literature does not contain cases focused on sexism as a development in and from childhood. Psychoanalytic theory has been for most of its existence too sexist to focus on sexism either as a symptom or as a character trait, in the sense that many behaviors and attitudes that would constitute sexism from a feminist point of view have qualified as ego syntonic or culturally syntonic among analysts. Nevertheless, within the history of psychoanalytic theory and case literature, sexism—under the labels "misogyny," or "denigration of women"—has been investigated, and those investigations fall into roughly two periods. The first period, dominated by Freud's ideas, concentrated on male oedipal castration anxiety. (Even the early critics of Freud's views on female psychology, such as Karen Horney and Ernest Jones, focused on the "phallocentrism" of Freud's theories, by which they meant the castration anxiety displayed in those theories.) The second period presupposed several decades of work in which the preoedipal period in males and females received the attention of critical or dissident Freudians, and it related sexism to difficulties in the processes of male children's disidentifications with their mothers and to narcissism. The approach I am taking here to the narcissistic prejudices draws on both psychoanalytic epochs.

Any number of passages from Freud's work could be offered to demonstrate the ingredients of his view, but I think this one from his essay on Leonardo da Vinci (written in 1910) is particularly instructive:

Before the child comes under the dominance of the castration-complex—at the time when he still holds women at full value—he begins to display an intense desire to look, as an erotic instinctual [*triebisch*] activity. He wants to see other people's genitals, at first in all probability to compare them with his own. The erotic attraction that comes from his mother soon culminates in a longing for her genital organ, which he takes to be a penis. With the discovery, which is not made until later, that women do not have a penis, this longing often turns into its opposite and gives place to a feeling of disgust which in the years of puberty can become the cause of psychical impotence, misogyny and permanent homosexuality. But the fixation on the object that



was once strongly desired, the woman's penis, leaves indelible traces on the mental life of the child, who has pursued that portion of his infantile sexual researches with particular thoroughness. Fetishistic reverence for a woman's foot and shoe appears to take the foot merely as a substitutive symbol for the woman's penis that was once revered and later missed; without knowing it, 'coupeurs de nattes' [perverts who enjoy cutting off females' hair] play the part of people who carry out an act of castration on the female genital organs. (*Standard Edition* 11:96)

Freud anticipated that this passage would be met with the disbelief that it has, in fact, prompted, so he followed it with an elaborate disquisition showing adoration of the genitals as common among those who have not ruined their appreciation with civilized ideas about the genitalia as shameful. Ancient androgynous deities whose sculptural and pictorial representations are mistakenly called hermaphrodites are, he explained, females with a penis, not beings with the characteristics of both sexes. They are females, with full breasts, to whom a penis has been added.

What Freud was stressing in this and similar passages was the male child's narcissism: the child who assumes all beings are like himself and disparages the woman when he discovers she is other. And in his later work, Freud extended this theme by suggesting that children create an "ego ideal" while their primary narcissism still reigns, employing its materials, which are fantasies of parental omnipotence. This ideal comprises a wish or a composite of wishes, the image of what the child wishes to be and to have. An image of the omnipotent and phallic mother takes up residence in the boy's ego ideal, as does one of the omnipotent father. Through the course of life, and particularly in adolescence, the ego ideal is modified by its encounters with reality, including the reality of the mother's genital condition as well as of her necessarily frustrating unavailability and her alliances with other people, including the father, who are rivals. Or, if the ego ideal is not modified by reality, its persistence helps occasion the ego's divorce from reality. An unmodified ego ideal becomes implicated in the sometimes debilitating waxings and wanings of self-esteem that characterize narcissists. The depressed narcissist, his self-esteem lost, suffers from the gap between the ego ideal and his self.

Among his early colleagues, no one followed Freud more seriously on this line of thought about narcissism than Wilhelm Reich, who in-

terpreted Freud very literally and under the aegis of his own (perhaps quite narcissistic) celebration of normative heterosexual genital "orgiastic potency." He set a kind of standard with passages like this one about phallic-narcissistic characters from his *Character Analysis* (1933)

Phallic-narcissistic men show a high erective potency, although they are orgiastically impotent. Relationships with women are disturbed by the contempt for the female sex which is rarely lacking. In spite of this, [such men] are highly desired sexual objects because in their appearance they show all the traits of masculinity. In women, the phallic-narcissistic character occurs much less frequently. The definitely neurotic forms are characterized by active homosexuality and clitoris sexuality; those who are genitally healthier are characterized by great self-confidence, based on physical vigor and beauty . . .

Typically, analysis [of men] reveals an identification of the total ego with the phallus, in women the fantasy of having a penis; also, a more or less open display of this ego . . . The frustration of genital and exhibitionistic activity at the height of their development by the very person [of the opposite sex] toward whom the genital interest is displayed results in an identification with that person on the genital level [and a need for sadistic revenge] . . . In such men, the sexual act has the unconscious meaning of again and again proving to the woman how potent they are; at the same time it means piercing or destroying the woman, in a more superficial layer, degrading her. In phallic-narcissistic women, the leading motive is that of taking vengeance on the man, of castrating him during the act or of making him impotent or of making him appear impotent.<sup>34</sup>

Reich was here focused on the oedipal stage, imagining first a time of disillusionment about the mother's phallus and then a period of men identifying with their mothers, women with their fathers, in the course of further frustration of their narcissistic and genital-exhibitionistic desires.

But this strand of elaboration on Freud's view of male narcissism as the foundation for derogation of women disappeared from psychoanalysis over the next decades. It was replaced by the idea that men derogate women *because* they view them as castrated beings, not because they first imagined them as phallic and then were disillusioned, or because they enjoyed exhibiting in front of them and then were frustrated when they did not win them, besting the father, with this exhibiting. The emphasis that Freud put on the boy's and the man's fantasy that

women really do have a penis has, in fact, been so difficult to accept that even psychoanalysts pursuing Freud's understanding of the roots of sexism will not concentrate on it.

For example, Harold Blum, in an exposition contained in a volume he edited called *Female Psychology: Contemporary Psychoanalytic Views* (1977), claimed in awed tones: "Freud's genius uncovered the universal unconscious fantasy of men and women that women are castrated. This fantasy pervades institutions and social attitudes and becomes a ubiquitous myth structuralized as a 'cultural force.' Freud first analyzed the fantasy, but did not discuss in depth the sociocultural influence exerted by the fantasy of a castrated, inferior female." Repeating himself, Blum pushed the point: "Freud's discovery of the castration complex was an extraordinary event in the history of ideas, and an extremely important discovery for the 'liberated' sexual and social role of women. For the first time there was a scientific understanding of the contempt and derision toward women based upon overdetermined, irrational unconscious fantasies. Both boys and girls and their parents unconsciously regarded the female as castrated and, therefore, inferior." Viewing Freud as a liberator, Blum could conclude only that it was paradoxical that his liberating discovery coexisted with a view of the "female as having a diminished and constrained libido, a weaker and masochistic sexual constitution, an ego with an incapacity to sublimate and a tendency toward early arrest and rigidity, a relatively defective superego, and incomplete oedipal and preoedipal development"—that is, with a view of the female as, *in fact*, not in irrational fantasy, castrated.<sup>35</sup>

Male castration anxiety, in Freud's understanding, is the male's anxiety that what has happened to the woman could happen to him. The "castrated woman" fantasy, to say the same thing differently, is a product of disappointed or disillusioned narcissism, and it reflects the anxiety this disappointment lets loose. The boy concludes, trying to control his anxiety: If there really is a being who is castrated, she must be less, inferior. But it certainly seems unlikely that Freud's discovery of castration anxiety or his achievement of conscious knowledge that the castrated woman is a fantasy would have prevented him from making and accepting a portrait of women as castrated. Putting castration anxiety into a theory does not automatically entail relief from castration anxiety, healing of the wound. Intellectual discoveries, as Freud himself knew, do not heal. They offer a new venue for fantasies, they are a sublimation. Neither the fantasy of the castrated woman as inferior nor the discovery

that the fantasy is a fantasy has power to give relief equal to restoration of the original fantasy of the phallic woman, paradise regained. Indeed, fantasizing the castrated woman, whether consciously or unconsciously, would only keep alive for the male the ominous possibility of his own castration. If sexism consisted only of the claim, vastly institutionalized, that men are superior and women inferior, then the fantasy of the castrated woman could sustain it. But if sexism must do more, if it must *relieve* male castration anxiety, then the fantasy of the castrated woman cannot sustain sexism—on the contrary, it undermines it.

For a male, restoring the original fantasy (or restoring the original condition of primary narcissism) is the route that feels reparative. He can develop many ways to recreate the phallic woman of the nirvanic past—and to connect her new forms with the original fantasy. The original fantasy that women are omnipotent and have a penis, even if reality or science "proves" it wrong, never disappears; it only becomes part of the ego ideal.

Freud considered fetishism one of the chief modes of reparation. The male finds the missing female phallus in, say, an article of clothing, which operates as a token of the female phallus, and he worships it, basks in its power. It is magically able to restore the phallic woman. But even this solution, Freud saw clearly, has its limits. It does not entirely still the fetishist's anxiety, and he will usually express that anxiety by behaving toward the fetish in a mixed manner—worshipful but also castrating. He will do unto the fetish what he still fears may be done unto him. In 1931 in the essay "On Fetishism," Freud explained the behavior of the *coupeurs de nattes* more complexly than he had been able to in 1910, when he had not yet elaborated his views on narcissism:

In very subtle cases the fetish itself has become the vehicle both of denying and of asseverating the fact of [female] castration . . . It is not the whole story to say that he worships it; very often he treats it in a way which is plainly equivalent to castrating it. This happens particularly when a strong father-identification has been developed, since the child ascribed the original castration of the woman to the father. Tender and hostile treatment of fetishes is mixed in unequal degrees—like the denial and recognition of castration—in different cases, so that one or the other is more evident. Here one gets a sort of glimpse of comprehension, as from a distance, of people who cut off women's plaits of hair—in them the impulse to execute the castra-

tion which they deny is what comes to the fore. (*Standard Edition* 21:157)

This same ambiguity in the fetishist's behavior could be looked at in another way. Because the restoration of the original fantasy, the primary narcissistic condition, is so uncertain—reality keeps intruding—the second-order or reparative phallic woman fantasy is seldom without an ingredient of aggression. The phallic woman of the restorative fantasy can be an aggressor, unlike the original blissfully nurturing omnipotent maternal phallic woman. The restorative fantasy woman is, then, less maternal, more of a knife-wielder, a castrater. It is thrilling to a man to imagine her loving him or being loved by him, in all her power—she restores his omnipotence—but she is also dangerous and could turn on him. In many current Hollywood films, the classic solution to this dilemma appears: a phallic woman who gets out of hand and threatens a “fatal attraction” is killed off by a maternal woman (a mother of children) or she destroys herself. Generally, the phallic woman causes so much anxiety that she is almost always understood as violent and castrating, a view that overlooks her original blissfully empowering function. (There is a theoretical reason, too, for this emphasis, which I will come to shortly.)

Finding a fetish is only one reaction to the disillusionment of discovering sexual difference. Another mode of reparation would be homosexuality, which can, of course, come about by many other developmental paths as well. The path most to the point here involves a man's effort to find a man who is “feminine,” that is, a female partner with a penis—like the phallic mother. Such a partnership means, as well, that the frightening “castrated” genitals of a woman can be avoided (as they are, in various ways, by all types of male homosexuals and by many heterosexuals who avoid the female genitals by being impotent or by engaging in practices that do not involve the genitals or that allow them to be “blind” to the genitals, for example having sex only in the dark or only from the rear). The homosexuality of the Greeks was of this sort, as older men sought in younger men “feminine” partners whom they could educate into adulthood, into a secure masculinity—giving unto the young what they had given unto themselves as a defense against anxiety.

Homosexuals and fetishists (who may by their fetishistic route be heterosexual, after their fashions) have very clear strategies for restoration

of the phallic woman fantasy and for dealing with castration anxiety, even if it is not clear why they came to their particular strategies and not others. But the most mysterious case is neither of these—it is the “normal” man. As Freud noted: “Probably no male human being is spared the terrifying shock of threatened castration at the sight of the female genitals. We cannot explain why it is that some of them become homosexual in consequence of this experience, others ward it off by creating a fetish, and the great majority overcome it” (*Standard Edition* 21:154). How do the great majority overcome it?—particularly if developing a fantasy of the castrated woman and denigrating her offers no solace and only keeps the anxiety lively?

The most common method, the one adopted by Freud himself, creates not fetishes—tokens of the female phallus—but images of the phallic female *as an existing being*. The ancient androgynous sculptures of goddesses, like the Egyptian Mut, with both (maternal) breasts and a penis are the archetypes. Freud's own psychoanalytic theory includes images of women who are not, or are no longer, castrated. There are the mothers who, Freud explained, get a penis by having a male child, by fulfilling the equation of penis and baby that exists in the female unconscious. Some kind of mother-with-son image like Freud's is, I think, the “normal” man's reparative image: a woman who has a baby has a penis. To put the fantasy from the son's angle: a mother is restored to her phallic condition by her son, by his existence. He is his mother's happiness, her pride and joy—and thus she is, once again, his nirvanic happiness.

As Thomas Laqueur has shown in enormous historical detail in *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (1990), from ancient Greece until the seventeenth century, images of the female as a being with a phallus dominated medical and more general knowledge in Europe. Women were said—adamantly by Galen, the “father of medicine”—to possess genitals exactly like the male genitals except inside the body rather than outside. In what Laqueur calls the one-sex theory, the woman's vagina was a penis, her ovaries the testes, and so on down to the last details. Her orgasm was just like his orgasm, except internal; and conception was thought to be impossible without an orgasm, as it is impossible without ejaculation. At the same time, women were held to be inferior, less perfect, lacking in sufficient body heat to descend their genitalia or to produce male-standard spirit and rationality. This tradition denied and simultaneously asserted difference, particularly on

the mental plane, in the realm of secondary or defensive narcissism—the assertion of difference marking the incomplete success of the nostalgic denial of difference, like the fetishist's castration.

Laqueur offers cultural explanations for this phallic woman and for the amazing tenacity with which she survived centuries of medical research that was, in such a graphic way, blind to the appearance and structure of female genitals. Similarly, he offers cultural explanations for how a shift finally came about. He discusses, for example, how the clitoris, which had been there all along, was acknowledged. But dephallicizing women was not simple, and the clitoris was promptly called a homologue for the penis, a female penis, sometimes despite the assertion of a vagina-penis. Movements for equality during the Enlightenment, Laqueur argues, at last brought about a two-sex theory in which women were no longer imagined as failed or less-than-perfect men, in which they were granted a sexuality and genitalia of their own.<sup>36</sup> *Making Sex* has no psychological explanation for the normal (medical) man's phallic woman, but she does seem to be the Freudian phallic woman, who can, as much as possible, restore in the boy his undisturbed primary narcissism, his fantasy of the phallic woman, the imagistic source of his ego ideal.

But such images can also be found in contexts with less of a medical-theoretical orientation. Indeed, this woman whose partner is the little man born from her genitals and now standing by her, her pride and joy, is omnipresent. She is there whenever men create images of women who feel unfulfilled without male attention, women who cannot live without men, women who are weak without men, or women who fade or swoon away when men leave them. She is there being protected by him, being completed by him. She is no longer the inferior castrated woman but the woman who needs a man to be herself—her phallic self—to be a natural woman, to fulfill her womanly nature, and thus to be not different. She is there, the preoedipal and oedipal mother, loved by her son. She is there, the goal of his sexism both in the sense that she is his nostalgic destination and in the sense that every mere woman is not *her*, is less than her as well as threatening to him.

The ban upon incest, taking various forms but universally promulgated, signifies that this reparative fantasy could easily prompt the ultimate action—the son could become the mother's lover, penetrating her with his penis, impregnating her. So the fantasy of the phallic mother often takes a shape that shows strong respect for the incest barrier. *She*

is a virgin, never penetrated by any man, and he is a baby Jesus sitting on her lap or a crucified Christ draped across her knees in a pietà. He must not grow up to become his father's rival, for this would renew the very threat of castration that the image of the mother-son unit assuaged. In this safe fantasy, the son stays always what he was as a baby, a child—the apple of his mother's eye. He stays wrapped in a narcissistic cloak, his very existence a wonder.

Or, if his fantasies challenge the incest barrier, a defensive fantasy arises in which the son rescues the mother, a fantasy actually meaning that he gives her a child—one like himself, that is, conceived on a narcissistic basis. The boy, now identified with his father, has taken his father's place and fathers himself.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, if the incest barrier is breached in behavior, in sexual practice and object choice, it will have to be on a denial basis: the man will have to split his love, giving one part over to a woman who, like his mother, can be loved but not desired, and giving the other part over to a degraded woman, a sensual, lower-class, "fallen," or more darkly colored woman, who can be desired but not loved. He loves dissociatively, half as a boy, half as a man, or, as Freud put it, half out of the affectionate current of his childhood love and half out of the sensual current of his postpuberty desires. Here, narcissism meets the hysterical mode of prejudice typical of racists and classists.

This path of Freud's thought implies that the prejudice called "sexism" is the ego's social mechanism for defense of the ego ideal from modification by reality or for restoration of the fantasy of the phallic woman. Sexism is the preservation of narcissism by social means. The same conclusion might be translated into affective terms by saying that sexism is the social means for avoiding the shame of falling short of the ego ideal. But these implications have never been developed. Freud's studies of the ways in which men derogate women to make them the not-mother have been, along with the fantasy of the castrated woman, the main strands of his work used to interpret sexism. Even those who have used these two strands, however, have not gotten behind them, developmentally underneath them, to the territory of original narcissism and the phallic mother fantasy and thence to the reparative sequels. There has been little emphasis on the idea that a fantasy which restores the phallic mother also reinforces the son's original narcissistic position, the very position in which he assumed that all creatures are like him, with a penis

like his. The circuit closes: the fantasy of the mother with her penis-son is a fantasy in which the penis-son is encouraged not to grow up, not to leave his infantile narcissism, not to overcome the psychic position that gave rise to the fantasy of the phallic mother in the first place. But this man—this man forever a young man—was the one whose existence called forth the second period of psychoanalytic effort to understand sexism (not, of course, under the title “sexism”), the period in which investigation of narcissism has loomed large in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis.

The inception of this period can be seen in the case material published in 1954 by Peter Blos, an Austrian émigré to America who made a specialty of adolescent analysis. Many features of Blos’s cases were quite specific to that moment in American history and to the milieu of the conformist middle class, to a period when middle-class families were pervasively engaged in the project of assuring for their children a future of speedy upward mobility and grand fulfillments of the American Dream. These were the sons Margaret Mead invoked as the bearers of the American “national character” in *And Keep Your Powder Dry* (1942). But at a deeper level, Blos’s cases transcended time. Young men in whom “exalted self-expectations figured dominantly” were operating “under the influence of parental ambition and narcissistic overevaluation.” When adolescence—inevitably—brought challenges to their ego ideals, blows to their ambitions, and defeats, they responded by desperate attempts to make good. Prolonging their adolescence, they tried to retain the illusion that their lives really were going to unfold along the scintillating lines imagined for them by their parents and built into their own ego ideals. Being unable to tolerate living without the self-image that they had created and that had been created for them, they stayed emotionally tethered to it:

One might say of these young men that their great future lies behind them when they reach the threshold of manhood; nothing that reality has to offer can compete with that easily obtained feeling of elation and uniqueness which the child experienced when he was showered with maternal admiration and confidence. Both mother and child—for reasons of their own—have persistently overlooked the child’s early failures, inhibitions, nervous habits or feminine exhibitionistic traits. The sanction of the parent nullified the significance of failure; the child came to substitute narcissistic aggrandizement for reality mastery. Fantasy never became distinctly separated from reality-directed

thinking. The sense of time has become affected by the constant substitution of the past for the future and, in addition, by the vague belief that a lucky break could accomplish what ordinarily in a man’s life will take years to achieve.<sup>38</sup>

Blos noted that boys who, being identified with their mothers, do not enter into oedipal rivalry with their fathers—indeed, who may look on their fathers with versions of the mother’s pity and contempt—must conduct their adolescent rebellion, if and when it comes, against her. They must disidentify with her. But the great temptation is to persist in closeness and identification with her, enjoying all the narcissistic gratification that position carries. A boy will be greatly aided in his strategy by a cultural atmosphere full of messages that success will come with a lucky break, not long years of effort; that elation can be restored quickly with a big business deal or a grand enterprise, with a trip to the casino or the stock market, or with a drink or an aggrandizing snort of cocaine. He will be ready to believe messages that tell him his next lover will be the one who gives praise and adoration in the right (unreal) form—the maternal form.

Blos was studying a particular phenomenon—prolongation of adolescence on narcissistic grounds—in a particular social context of absent or remote fathers and ambitious, pushy mothers denied fulfillment of their own in sexist societies and seeking it through their sons. But he heralded a development in psychoanalysis that has, in the course of a generation, moved the science away from Freud’s emphasis on castration anxiety and the Oedipus complex into an emphasis—often exclusive—on preoedipal mother-child bonds. Many who subscribe to the newer psychoanalytic emphasis consider all disorders with preoedipal roots narcissistic disorders, just as the reigning normality and pathology in the present cultural moment in the West is narcissistic, as Lasch argued in *The Culture of Narcissism*. This stretch of psychoanalytic history, identified in this country with the names Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg, the former having put his exploratory lens on normal narcissism and the latter having analyzed pathologies of narcissism, is much too complex for quick summary. It is a stretch of history—like so many others in psychoanalysis—that eventually produced a *reductio ad absurdum* in the field, the sweep and jargonization of which can be illustrated by a statement in which an analyst at the Menninger Clinic asserts that there are basically two sorts of children and adolescents in the world.

There are those who have been well cared for in their preoedipal years by a "good enough mother" (who has obeyed this analyst's sexist prescription that she stay at home to care for her child full-time) and those who have not, that is, the narcissistically disturbed.

[While] oedipal-type conflicts and rivalries certainly appear during the latter part of a child's preschool years, the healthy child, possessed of a sound, nascent self-identity resulting from an optimal balance of interdigitated growth and dependency needs, proceeds to deal with these conflicts and rivalries with little or no personal and interpersonal perturbation. Of course, such balance is achieved as a result of the child's mutual attunement with an empathic, good enough mother and a healthy father who both nurtures the mother and provides for the child's ongoing separation-individuation . . . The same may be said of the period of adolescence, the regressive-recapitulative features of which were classically cited to support the long since discredited view of the adolescent as a turmoil-ridden, even normally psychotic victim of untrammelled instinctual drives unleashed by surging and shifting hormones and the psychological effects of frightening bodily changes.<sup>39</sup>

When this kind of simplistic and narcissistic (as well as sexist) thinking of "us versus them" became typical, a part of the avenue within psychoanalysis for understanding narcissism—not to mention narcissistic prejudices—closed off.

Moreover, the part of that avenue that remained open changed character. Analysts began to see the phallic mother as, from the beginning, a frightening, dark figure, not an object of nostalgia at all. The omnipotent preoedipal phallic mother, then, is a fantasy creature born out of the male child's fear of a castrating, penetrating mother who takes advantage of his weakness and vulnerability. According to the theories of Melanie Klein, the phallic woman is the male child's aggression against his mother projected, and she is also his mother as a being who has (he imagines) orally incorporated his father's penis in intercourse. From the beginning, she is a witch with a broomstick, and his developmental task is to overcome his fear and anger, reconciling himself to the inevitability of frustration.<sup>40</sup> In other words, this approach to narcissism exclusively emphasizes frustration and aggression and learning to control or make reparations for aggression. No paradise is there to be lost, even though the images of raging frustration do imply a prior condition of satisfaction.<sup>41</sup>

To my knowledge, the only psychoanalytic theorists of narcissism who retain the original Freudian emphasis on primary narcissism as a condition of satisfaction and omnipotence that is the goal of all future nostalgic narcissistic desires are Janine Chassequet-Smirgel, Bela Grunberger, and Joyce McDougall, all working in Paris, independently of the various French schools, including the Lacanians. In *The Ego Ideal* (1974) particularly, Chassequet-Smirgel emphasizes the role in development of the child's ego ideal, his or her image of "narcissism lost," of the time when the child *was* his or her own ideal. The ego ideal is projected onto others in the course of development and, normally, onto the father by the male child, for whom being like the father represents the only fulfillment of the desire for return to the mother that is possible or permissible.<sup>42</sup> For the female child, who also desires return to fusion with the mother, the ego ideal can be projected onto the condition of motherhood, in which she can experience a reunion with her mother in a way that is socially sanctioned (as homosexually choosing a "maternal" lover is not in many societies).

If the male child's projection does not take place, and the boy remains tied to his mother and specifically to the original narcissistic fantasy of her as phallic, then his sexuality will remain pregenital. In this understanding, perversions, of which fetishism is the paradigm, are fixations, narcissistic attachments that cannot be given up. Similarly, if the girl's projection does not take place, she will remain fixed on fusion with her mother without being propelled toward her father, without the typically feminine—typically bisexualizing, one might say—condition of having her eroticism "run counter" to her ego ideal, her father love against her narcissistic mother love.<sup>43</sup> In both sexes, the strength of the nostalgic pull toward lost narcissism colors the whole of development, especially because development itself is, normally, desired by those who are able to project this nostalgia forward, to make maturity the condition of paradise regained.

A view like this, although it emphasizes heterosexual normal development, also stresses the enormous variety of ways in which children emerge from their early symbiosis, their initial dependency, their internal "narcissistic milieu." It thus stays away from recent psychoanalytic efforts to divide the species into the narcissistically disturbed and the normal, or those who are forever enraged at their frustrating mothers and those who get over it, making reparations for their aggression. But the complexities of this view also point up how difficult it has become

to entertain the idea that many paths diverge from the elemental human experiences of discovery—"she is not me, she is not always available to me, she is not all-powerful so neither am I, she and he are a couple that I am not in, and [for males] she is not like me." Similarly, it is difficult to entertain the idea that there are many ways in which humans try, always unsuccessfully, to deny or rearrange the results of these discoveries. But these difficulties within psychoanalysis itself seem to me a manifestation of the very problem under study. That is, the primordial nostalgic sexism of "we are all alike here," the sexism sustained by fantasies of a phallic mother who is omnipotent *and empowering*, not castrating, is usually obscured by layers of later developments. The developmentally second-order sources of sexism in defense mechanisms of disavowing or denying the continually obtruding reality of difference (and thus castration) preponderate, just as mental narcissisms have built up in complex layers over body narcissism, obscuring this experiential core. Psychoanalytic theory reflects the situation by emphasizing how infants experience difference, not how they long nostalgically for sameness.

Interestingly, within feminism, which also deals almost exclusively with the preoedipal period, it is the psychoanalytic emphasis on separation-individuation in object relations terms, but not the corresponding focus on narcissism, that has had the greatest influence. Among American feminists, as I noted in Chapter 4, the main "origins and development" explanation for sexism has centered on the male child's preoedipal process for separating from his mother, individuating and disidentifying with her, and eventually identifying with his father. It is assumed that the boy disparages his mother and her femininity to establish his own male identity as different. This process, then, becomes the habit of his lifetime, which he shares with all other males as they build patriarchal institutions. He embraces difference.

The feminist focus on the object relations, separation-individuation strand of child development theory, and the correlative disinterest in male narcissism largely results from the very phallogocentric theorizing feminists have been working to illuminate. Women characteristically misinterpret male narcissism because it is so unlike their own, and their own has been little explored precisely because, in psychoanalysis, it has been interpreted as a fallback position. When a woman discovers that she does not have the penis and develops penis envy, so this explanation

goes, she lavishes attention on her own body, making the best of what she has, even going so far as to treat her whole body in fantasy as a phallus. Men worship phalluses and women worship perfect female figures (by whatever standards prevail). Their children, however, particularly their sons, can relieve women's lack and make object love possible for them. Women overcome their defensive narcissism in motherhood.

This idea is, I have suggested, part of the male reparative fantasy of the phallic mother. Clinically, it does seem that there are women whom it fits quite well, but that does not in any way justify universalizing the script. On the contrary, if all human beings, as Freud himself believed, start off as incarnations of primary narcissism or ego libido, unable as yet to recognize the mother as an other or attach any of their libido to objects, then female infants must, like males, begin with the fantasy that all humans are like themselves. They would not originally develop the fantasy that all humans have a penis but would create the fantasy that all humans have female genitalia (insofar as the female genitalia, which are so much more hidden than the male, are apprehended by the girl).<sup>44</sup> For example, a female child might fantasize on a narcissistic basis, with reference to her mother, who is like her, that there is a perfect femininity—most basically, a perfect female body (not a phallus-body). Such a fantasy might then, for just one developmental example, be the ground on which she later narcissistically sought a female lover incarnating the perfect femininity she wished for herself.

Again, following the analogy between girls and boys: a girl's discovery of sexual difference, her encounter with the reality of male penises, would, then, be a wound to her narcissism, too. And her response would, analogously, be to deny the reality of the penis or, later, to disparage the penis as inferior. But Freud's interpretation of the female child's experience leaves out the possibility that she might create a reparative fantasy that does not include the phallus. He assumed that females, discovering the penis, feel immediate envy. They do not deny the reality of the penis for a time and then slowly accept it; immediately, they believe the evidence of their senses. Why? In his late essays on female psychology, Freud gradually came to the recognition that for his ideas about female penis envy and his ideas about primary narcissism (including female primary narcissism) to make sense together, one would have to assume that before she made the acquaintance of the penis, the girl was a disappointed creature, that she had already felt that she was inadequate, so that discovering the boy's possession could, then, *explain*

her inadequate state: "Ah, it is that which I do not have, then I want it." She would have to feel that the penis is the organ, owned by her father, needed to win her mother's love: "So, it is that which wins her, then I want it." The condition that brings her disappointment and causes her to seek an explanation is called by Freud "loss of love." She suffers not castration anxiety but anxiety over loss of love—her mother's love, which she feels she loses on weaning, in the oral stage, or in being trained, in the anal stage. But even this hypothesis does not explain why she does not respond to loss of love, to her own raging frustration, with a reparative fantasy of omnipotence and perfect femininity.

In psychic and social circumstances in which female children are not wanted or are considered second best—which, in Freud's view, they would be by any mother who wanted a penis-son, and by any father who found the existence of penisless creatures anxiety producing—feeling inadequate in some unspecified way could easily be *la condition féminine*. When sexism reigns in a family and a society it means, in a female infant's life, that she is inadequate, and it makes fantasies of adequacy hard to create. This is a powerful, and often accurate psychosocial portrait. But it omits the possibility that a girl might come to the experience of sexual difference as many boys do, that is, without any sense that she was inadequate in gender terms, without prior narcissistic wounding precisely over her anatomy, if she had had the fortune to be wanted as a girl, well loved in her femininity by her mother and her father. Such a girl might then deny the penis, view it as a detachable part, or take pity upon the boy for having such a piece of equipment (a pity often noted in the Freudian literature but interpreted as a reaction formation covering up her envy). She would be a female chauvinist.

We must be careful to distinguish female chauvinism from sexism in women. When women are sexist in the sense of denigrating women or worshipping phallic power—not chauvinistically elevating women over men but participating in male sexism—they, too, may be sustained by a fantasy of a phallic woman. They may restore their sense of power and adequacy in the male manner. Narcissistic fantasies created in this way to assuage narcissistic pain resemble the one described in the autobiography of a 1960s revolutionary aptly titled *With the Weathermen*. Susan Stern, who had attached herself to the male leadership of the Students for a Democratic Society and lived in the light of their celebrity, felt loved and admired by the males for her fervor and recklessness. In an "acid frenzy" she painted on her wall "what I wanted to be somewhere

deep in my mind: tall and blond, nude and armed, consuming—or discharging—a burning America." The mural depicted "an eight-foot tall, nude woman with flowing green-blond hair, and a burning American flag coming out of her cunt!"<sup>45</sup>

The fantasy of the phallic woman is not an original fantasy for a woman, but it can be reparative for her, as for the boy. It does not, however, restore her to her original condition or psychic position and it need not be, ultimately, a fantasy of a phallic mother. If she fantasizes a phallic woman, she may be attaining the penis she envies. And it could be enjoyed in the mode of "I am a phallic woman" or "I love a phallic woman" (the first could be enjoyed by a "masculine" heterosexual or homosexual female, the second by a "feminine" homosexual). Her body may, in her fantasy, be a phallus, perhaps her father's, which allows her to win her mother as he did or in competition with him.<sup>46</sup> She could, however, fantasize "I am a phallic mother" or "I love a phallic mother." For a woman, the fantasy that a male child is a penis could mean that she herself will get a penis through the child (Freud's idea about what a woman wants) or that she can take him from another woman. In other words, the phallic woman fantasy can take many forms and have many meanings for women, supporting sexism or female chauvinism in many ways, while it seems to be rigidly singular for men.<sup>47</sup> For him, it always means, at bottom, "she is like me [and there is no castration]."

My proposal—that the narcissistic fantasy of the phallic woman is at the motivational core of the many layers and forms of sexism and has been since the incipit of the sculptures with breasts and penises that Freud described—is, so to speak, more Freudian than the Freudians. As I have noted, discussions of sexism—no matter what their provenance—always emphasize male assertions that women are different and, by implication, inferior. Correlatively, an assertion that women are the same appears to support equality. Even the image of the phallic woman could be construed this way: giving the woman a phallus would thus be like giving her the vote or any other instrument or emblem of equality. It looks like antisexism in a patronizing mode—"you, too, can be a man, so we will all be equal." But creating fantasies to restore the original fantasy of the phallic woman does not give women male power or make them into spear-wielding Amazons, equal in phallic assertiveness. It alleviates male castration anxiety and restores male supremacy in the sense that the original fantasy promotes—namely, there are only males here. The



phallic woman is a "male," but not an enemy male, not a rival, not a paternal figure. She has the phallus, but not *phallic* power, for her phallus is not her own: it is the male's, it is *the male himself*. She is the female whose "maleness" ultimately depends upon her son; he controls it. And *that* control is the core of sexism.

Exercising that control, a man dictates the conditions of female reproduction. The dictation reveals the primal fantasy. In the present debate about abortion, for example, many people who call themselves "pro-life" assert that a fetus (at any stage after fertilization) in a woman's body is a little person, which should be so precious and so sacred to her that the thought of destroying it—aborting it—should fill her with horror and shame. She should not be allowed to entertain such a thought, much less to act on it with a rationale that she cannot care for a child, cannot afford a child, cannot give to a child resources she must give to other children or to herself, cannot love the child because it was conceived against her will. My argument implies that men who urge their vision of the fetus upon pregnant women are identified with the fetus.

If control over the female, sustained by and serving a controlling reparative, nostalgic fantasy, is the motivational core of sexism, then social control of women's bodies and particularly their reproductive functions—their function for producing men, as it were—should be the site for marking the intersection of this psychological exploration and the wider sociohistorical arena of sexism. I will try to make this connection after adding one more building block to the psychological analysis—a look at how sexism and the other orectic prejudices consolidate in adolescence.

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### Adolescence and the Aims of Hatreds

The case literature available for studying the origins and developments of the various prejudice types suggests that adolescence is the key period for the conversion of incipient prejudices into fully articulated prejudices and acts of discrimination or violence. But following the suggestion implicit in these cases is not an easy matter. Amazingly, the vast recent literatures on adolescence, nonpsychoanalytic and psychoanalytic, do not make prejudices a developmental topic. This is so even though almost every report on prejudice involving vandalism (against property) and violence (against people) notes that those most frequently involved are aged fifteen to twenty-five. Social psychologists, sociologists, and more recently cognitive scientists have simply assumed that prejudices are acquired in childhood and then, without alteration, translated into adult life. Many psychoanalysts make the same assumption, as the child analyst Marjorie McDonald did when she chose not to consider prejudice among adolescents.

Authors of books with titles like *Adolescent Prejudice* study the prejudices of adolescents, of course, but not *developmentally*. The crucial psychosocial questions go unposed.<sup>1</sup> In the stages of adolescence, with their developmental tasks, what becomes of the prejudicial attitudes children have acquired in the service of their efforts to resolve stage-specific childhood conflicts? Do childhood attitudes directly support later prejudices, or do they become transformed in the transformations of pu-

Klan but from Metzger's White Aryan Resistance, which has a *Race and Reason* radio show on nearly sixty cable-access channels. Current technologies offer modes of linkage to dispersed groups and weigh somewhat against the perennial Klan factionalism, while electoral successes like those David Duke managed in Louisiana provide publicity. For the Klan groups, antisemitism functions as it did in the early 1920s—it is an outreach prejudice, one that connects the Klan to people who feel manipulated by unseen forces and victimized by complex economic trends.

54. Jeff Coplon, "The Skinhead Reich," *Utne Reader*, May/June, 1989, p. 89.

### 8. Origins and Developmental Lines

1. Bruno Lasker, *Race Attitudes in Children* (New York: Henry Holt, 1929). Page citations in text refer to this edition.

2. Kenneth Clark, *Prejudice and Your Child* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963, orig. 1955).

3. Mary Ellen Goodman, *Race Awareness in Young Children* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1964, orig. 1952), p. 217.

4. Ruth Horowitz, "Racial Aspects of Self-Identification in Nursery School Children," *Journal of Psychology* 7 (1939): 91–99.

5. Goodman, *Race Awareness*, p. 44, and citation following, p. 136.

6. Phyllis Katz, "The Acquisition of Racial Attitudes in Children," in *Towards The Elimination of Racism*, ed. Kate (New York: Pergamon Press, 1976), pp. 125–154.

7. Marjorie McDonald, *Not by the Color of Their Skins: The Impact of Racial Differences on the Child's Development* (New York: International Universities Press, 1970).

8. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

9. Freud, *Standard Edition* 14:195 (the other five passages are 7:168, 13:123 [note], 17:120, 18:117–120, 20:168). Subsequent citations in text are to the *Standard Edition*.

10. Freud's translator James Strachey was the first to point out (7:216, note 1) that the discovery of sex hormones required little modification in Freud's hypothesis that as yet unknown chemical substances underlie sexuality. There is, however, no simple or monocausal relationship between changing levels of hormones and sexual activity, sexual aim, or sexual object. This view, often equated with Freud's descriptions of *Trieb*, is not Freud's.

11. The clearest statement Freud made of his position can be found in *Standard Edition* 18:170:

The mystery of homosexuality is . . . by no means so simple as it is commonly depicted in popular expositions—"a feminine mind, bound therefore to love a man, but unhappily attached to a masculine body; a masculine mind, irresistibly

attracted by women, but, alas! imprisoned in a feminine body." It is instead a question of three sets of characteristics, namely—

- Physical sexual characteristics  
(physical hermaphroditism)
- Mental sexual characteristics  
(masculine or feminine attitude)
- Kind of object-choice

which, up to a certain point, vary independently of one another, and are met with in different individuals in manifold permutations.

12. Anna Freud, *Normality and Pathology in Childhood* (New York: International Universities Press, 1965), pp. 64–65.

13. Phyllis Katz, in her review of the literature on children's acquisition of prejudice (see note 6), claims that there has been no research on children less than three years old, but she ignores completely the psychoanalytic literature. See especially Rene Spitz, "Environment versus Race," in *Psychoanalysis and Culture: Essays in Honor of Geza Roheim*, ed. G. B. Wilbur and W. Munsterberger (New York: International Universities Press, 1951), pp. 32–41. Also Rene Spitz, *The First Year of Life* (New York: International Universities Press, 1965).

14. McDonald, *Not by the Color*, p. 113.

15. James Baldwin, "Stranger in the Village," in *Notes of a Native Son* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984, orig. 1957), p. 162.

16. Goodman, *Race Awareness*, p. 120.

17. Lawrence Kubie, "The Ontogeny of Racial Prejudice," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease* 141, no. 3 (1965): 267–268.

18. McDonald, *Not by the Color*, p. 178, cites this example, and compares it to Freud's description of the Wolf Man, who was compelled as a child to breathe out whenever he passed a crippled person in the street, in order to avoid incorporating or identifying with the frighteningly damaged and pitiable person (see *Standard Edition* 17:66–67, 88–89).

19. McDonald, *Not by the Color*, p. 105.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

21. Cited in another context by John Duckitt, *The Social Psychology of Prejudice* (New York: Praeger, 1992), p. 131.

22. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*, p. 300.

23. See A. Davey, *Learning to Be Prejudiced: Growing up in Multi-Ethnic Britain* (London: Edward Arnold, 1983): Altemeyer's work on RWAs (discussed in Chapter 4); and, for an earlier American study showing weak correlation, Else Frenkel-Brunswik and J. Havel, "Prejudice in the Interviews of Children," *Journal of Genetic Psychology* 82 (1953): 91–136.

24. Richard Sterba, "Some Psychological Factors in Negro Race Hatred and in Anti-Negro Riots," in *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, ed. Geza Roheim, vol. 1 (New York: International Universities Press, 1947), p. 420; citations following, pp. 411–427.

25. Mardi Horowitz, ed., *Hysterical Personality Style and the Histrionic Personality Disorder* (Northvale, N.J.: J. Aronson, 1991), p. 46.

26. Citations are from "The Dynamic Basis of Antisemitic Attitudes," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 17 (1948): 240–260, which is a shorter, less technical version of *Anti-Semitism an Emotional Disorder* (New York: Harper, 1950).

27. Bettelheim and Janowitz, *Social Change and Prejudice*, p. 134.

28. As I noted in Chapter 7 and will note again below, obsessionals do have strong, if faulty, superegos but often do not feel guilt because they have projected it onto others; their prejudices relieve them of it.

29. Anna Freud, "Obsessional Neurosis: A Summary of Psychoanalytic Views," in *The Writings of Anna Freud*, vol. 5 (New York: International Universities Press, 1969), pp. 242–261.

30. Bela Grunberger, "The Anti-Semite and the Oedipal Conflict," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 45 (1964): 380. "Part objects" are the important, impressive, libidinally invested body parts of the parental figures, such as the breast and the penis, which are incorporated by children not yet mature enough to incorporate whole objects or full parental images.

31. All citations from Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943).

32. Erik Erikson, "The Legend of Hitler's Childhood," in *Childhood and Society* (New York: Norton, 1963, orig. 1950), p. 330. Erikson uses the term "hysteria," but everything else in his description of Hitler's habits suggests obsessionality, particularly things like rigid abstinence from meat, coffee, alcohol, and sexual activity, as Erikson himself notes.

33. Grunberger, "Anti-Semite and Oedipal Conflict," p. 382.

34. Wilhelm Reich, *Character Analysis*, trans. T. Wolfe (New York: Farrar, Straus, Groux, 1970), p. 202.

35. Harold Blum, "Masochism, the Ego Ideal, and the Psychology of Women," in *Female Psychology: Contemporary Psychoanalytic Views*, ed. Blum (New York: International Universities Press, 1977), pp. 168, 170.

36. Most anatomy texts still do not accurately treat female genitalia, as Josephine Lowndes Sevely, a Harvard Medical School researcher, has shown in *Eve's Secrets: A New Theory of Female Sexuality* (New York: Random House, 1987). Sevely demonstrates the similarities of female and male sexual anatomy by reversing the usual route—that is, she shows what male anatomy has in common with female.

37. On the man who fathers himself, see Freud, "A Special Type of Object Choice Made by Men" (1910), in *Standard Edition* 11:173.

38. Peter Blos, "Prolonged Adolescence," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 24 (1954): 733–742.

39. Donald Rinsley, *Developmental Pathogenesis and the Treatment of Borderline and Narcissistic Personalities* (New York: J. Aronson, 1989), p. 43.

40. In Klein's technical terms, infants go through a schizoid position, associated with weaning and characterized by frustrated and envious rage, and into a depressive position in which they make reparations to their mothers for the aggression loosed on her earlier. Mental health depends upon whether they emerge from the depressive position with its guilt and self-punishment.

41. Klein held that the infant has an ego at birth, and therefore she did not agree with Freud's notion that there is a primary narcissistic stage before ego differentiation. She thought of idealization as the child's means for denying the existence of the death instinct, not as a displacement of primary narcissism that comes about when the infant, experiencing dissatisfactions, tries to retain its satisfying state.

42. Chassequet-Smirgel, *The Ego Ideal*, p. 43.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 35: Chassequet-Smirgel notes that if a female child denies the differences between the sexes and the generations, desires to be able to be the right sex and to be big enough to be the father with her mother, then she will entertain the fantasy that making a baby does not require a father—she alone is sufficient. She connects this with adult women's utopian fantasies in which females are able to reproduce without men, which, given current technologies, can refer to artificial insemination rather than invoking immaculate conception or some kind of Herland fantasy.

44. Elizabeth L. Mayer argues this proposition with clinical examples in "Everybody Must Be Just Like Me": Observations on Female Castration Anxiety," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 66 (1985): 331.

45. Susan Stern, *With the Weathermen* (New York: Doubleday, 1975), p. 243, cited in Lasch, *Culture of Narcissism*.

46. See Annie Reich, "Narcissistic Object Choice in Women," in *Psychoanalytic Contributions* (New York: International Universities Press, 1973), pp. 179–208, a study of women who either attach themselves to one man who supplies them with a kind of vicarious phallic power or go quickly from one "deified" phallic creature to the next in rapid succession.

47. The great contemporary literary explorer of these female fantasies is Monique Wittig, especially in *Les guérillères*.

## 9. Adolescence and the Aims of Hatreds

1. Charles Glock et al., *Adolescent Prejudice* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), is based on an elaborate five-year University of California sociological study of antisemitism and racism in three high schools. Its central claim is that prejudice is strongest among those who are socially and educationally deprived, who lack the cognitive skills to combat stereotyping. Except for some remarks on peer group formation and peer pressure, the authors give no indication at all that adolescence is a developmental stage with particular developmental tasks; the