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ABSTRACT

We study the behavioral consequences of interpersonal communication prior to experimental Trust games. We manipulated the richness of the communication medium and the size of the communicating group. Communication richness failed to produce significant differences in first-mover investments, but the size of the communicating group did: The amounts sent were significantly higher in the dyadic communication conditions than in the group communication and no-communication conditions. We also found that first-movers' expectations of second-movers' reciprocation strongly predicted their levels of investment.

KEY WORDS • communication • computer-mediated cooperation • communication laboratory experiments • trust

Introduction: Why communication matters

There is a growing interest in the role of communication in mixed-motive interactions (for reviews see Dawes, Van de Kragt, and Orbell 1990; Ostrom 1998; Shankar and Pavitt 2002; Bicchieri 2006). In this paper, we present new experimental results on the impact of the size of communicating groups and of media richness on behavior in Trust games.

The positive effect of *face-to-face* communication (FtF) on pro-social behavior, which Bicchieri (2006) dubs the 'communication effect,' has been a robust finding in the experimental study of mixed-motive games (Bicchieri, Lev-On and Chavez 2009). For example, in an extensive survey of the experimental literature on public goods, Ledyard (1995) singles out communication and the marginal per capita return as the two variables most conducive to cooperation. Likewise, in a meta-analysis of 35 years of social dilemma experiments, Sally (1995) shows that the ability to communicate increases cooperation over base rates by 40%.

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The 'communication effect' also occurs when communication is *computer-mediated*, but it is more fragile as it depends on the properties of the communication medium. In a survey of social dilemma studies that allowed inter-subject computer-mediated communication (CMC), Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007) highlight some features of the influence of computer-mediated communication on cooperation in experimental social dilemmas. They show that the 'poorer' the communication medium, the longer it takes to reach agreements and establish cooperation, and even when such agreements are reached, they are violated more frequently than agreements reached by FtF. Most importantly, the communication effect varies in degree according to the richness of the communication medium (other things being equal). Generally, the CMC effect approximates the FtF effect the closer the communication channel reproduces the features of face-to-face interactions.

Due to carefully designed experiments, several hypotheses about the causes of the 'communication effect' have been rejected. Such hypotheses indicate that communication may (1) provide information and facilitate understanding of the game, (2) promote coordination of cooperative action, (3) alter the expectations about other players' behaviors (even when promises are not involved), (4) invoke generic norms of cooperation, (5) humanize other players, or (6) contribute to the creation of group identity (for further analysis see Dawes, Van de Kragt and Orbell 1990; Shankar and Pavitt 2002; Bicchieri 2006).

Recently, the 'communication effect' has been explained by Bicchieri (2006) in terms of her theory of social norms. The 'communication effect,' in her view, is due to the fact that the parties exchange promises to cooperate (or reciprocate, depending on the experimental context), and thus elicit a powerful norm of promise-keeping. Indeed, in all experiments in which communication did not (or could not) include promising, cooperation (or reciprocation) was very low. Yet eliciting a norm, or making it salient, is no guarantee such a norm will be followed: it is a necessary, not a sufficient condition. According to Bicchieri's theory, the existence and motivational force of a social norm depend upon there being a sufficiently large number of people who believe that it exists and applies to a particular situation, and prefer to conform to it as long as:

(a) They expect that enough others follow it in similar contexts [*empirical expectations*], and
(b) They expect that enough others believe they should conform to the norm as well [*normative expectations*], and may be willing to sanction behavior [*normative expectations with sanctions*] (Bicchieri 2006: Ch.1).

Conformity to a social norm is thus conditional upon having the right kind of empirical and normative expectations. Moreover, a social norm has to become salient in order to be followed. That is, when individuals' attention is focused on a norm, scripts related to the norm are activated. Such scripts contain behavioral rules, beliefs and expectations, causal attributions, and even emotions that are connected to the enactment/transgression of the scripted rules (Bicchieri, 2006: Ch. 3). When communication involves exchanging promises, a script associated with a promise-keeping norm is activated, evoking familiar contexts in which people who make promises tend to keep them. When agents perceive promises to be credible, they simultaneously make judgments about their partner's trustworthiness, form normative and empirical expectations supporting promise-keeping behavior, and are induced to act on such judgments (Bicchieri 2006; Bicchieri and Lev-On 2007).

Communication may be conducive to cooperation even when a computer interface replaces face-to-face interaction. Yet not every type of computer-mediated communication lends credibility to promises. As mentioned before, this happens only when the communication medium allows agents to perceive promises as credible, develop mutual expectation about the future behaviors of their counterparts, feel that they are not exposed to the risks of free-riding and activate the proper pro-social normative scripts.

Communication, group size, and media richness

In what follows we explore two possible influences on the communication effect in Trust games: the medium of communication, and size of the communicating group. Arguments about the importance of group size in collective action problems can be traced back to Olson's (1965) classic book *The Logic of Collective Action*. Here Olson argues that, as the number of participants in collective action becomes larger, problems of crowding effects and decreasing marginal returns become severe, the costs of communication and coordination among participants grow, and the monitoring of free-riders becomes exceedingly difficult. Olson's conclusion is that small groups are, in general, better suited to handle collective action problems than large groups. In contrast to Olson (1965), Hardin (1982) argues that the variable that really matters for the success of collective action is the size of *efficacious* groups – the groups of entrepreneurs able to establish the organization for producing public goods. The larger the size of the efficacious group, the lower the possibility of organizing successful collective action. It should also be noted

that experiments generally find no group-size effects in one-shot games (Franzen 1994; 1995).

Unlike Olson and Hardin, we are neither concerned with the number of participants in collective action, nor with the number of entrepreneurs who organize it, but rather with the size of the group whose members communicate with each other about the Trust game prior to playing the game *in pairs*. We hypothesize that such pre-play discussions can generate normative and empirical expectations that later affect behavior, mainly due to the promises that occur during discussion.

We compare group and two-person (dyadic) pre-play communication. We hypothesize that dyadic communication would be more conducive to trust and reciprocation than group communication, since in dyadic communication the players directly communicate with their counterparts in the actual game that follows, and their actions have a clear consequence for the other player – as agents' choices directly sanction or reward a single identifiable person. Also, a player's promise to invest or reciprocate refers directly to the person with whom they later play the game, thus triggering an additional motive – guilt aversion – for players not to break their promises, in spite of their cheap-talk status.

Yet group communication may also be conducive to trust. A multiplayer pre-play conversation may encourage subjects to focus on public reasons and channel the discussion into a pro-social path, even though subjects are eventually paired with only a single person from the group, without knowing in advance who this person will be. The flip-side is the danger that a small number of subjects may choose to focus the conversation on the incentives to distrust and on their low expectations about other players, thus triggering a 'snowball effect' of mistrust and consequent lack of investment.

A second variable which may influence the 'communication effect' is medium richness. Richness may matter because it affects the background conditions under which promising occurs. When the environment and the means of communicating promises differ significantly from familiar settings in which promises are usually made, agents may become focused on the 'poverty' of the normative environment, fail to develop expectations about the future actions of promise-makers, and as a result may refuse to invest or cooperate themselves (Bicchieri and Lev-On 2007; Bicchieri, Lev-On, and Chavez 2009).

Indeed, experimental work shows that while unrestricted CMC typically yields significantly lower trust and cooperation rates than unrestricted FtF, it also generates significantly higher cooperation rates than no-communication conditions, both in social dilemma and Trust games

(see Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1998; Rocco 1998; Bos et al. 2001; Zheng et al. 2002; Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann 2003; Ben-Ner and Putterman 2006; Bochet, Page and Putterman 2006). These findings suggest that the further removed the act of promising is from daily contexts where promises are made, the less it can ground cooperation. It is realistic to assume that when promises are conveyed through 'poor' media, players do not perceive others' promises as credible, and may even be aware that their own promises might have been regarded with skepticism. In this case, both empirical and normative expectations falter, and agents may not feel bound by a norm of promise-keeping that almost no one expects or is expected to follow (Bicchieri and Lev-On 2007).

Procedure

In this paper, we further explore how the background conditions of communication influence behavior in Trust games. In particular, we offer the first experimental comparison thus far of dyadic and group pre-play communication.

Trust games are in essence sequential dilemma games. Subjects are randomly assigned one of two roles: first-movers and second-movers. The experiments include two decision periods. In the first period, each first-mover receives an endowment and decides to send some, all, or none of it to the second-mover. The amount first-movers do not send is theirs to keep, while the amount sent is multiplied by a given factor by the experimenters, and this is common knowledge among the players. In the second period, the second-mover decides to send some, all, or none of this amount to the first-mover. The amount the second-mover does not send is hers to keep. If trust is established and honored, both players receive a dividend on their 'investment.' For example, if the first mover receives an endowment of \$6 and decides to send all of it to the second mover, the second mover will receive \$18 (\$6 × 3). If the second mover 'reciprocates,' i.e. sends more than \$6 to the first mover, both stand to gain.

Such games are frequently used to study the determinants of trust and reciprocation. In our experiment, we focus on the types of communication that induce the 'right kinds' of expectations that, in turn, assist in establishing trust and reciprocation.

Using a web-based recruiting system, we recruited 60 college students for the experiment. Participants earned an average of \$18.83 (including a show-up payment of \$5.00, SD = \$6.24) across three experimental sessions.

After seating participants, we distributed a set of written instructions and read them aloud. Immediately prior to playing each game, participants also read instructions specific to that game. After reading the instructions for each game, but prior to engaging in any communication (see below), all participants were required to complete a computerized quiz to ensure their understanding of the instructions. All participants in an experimental session communicated either in dyads or groups, based on the condition.

The instructions for the dyadic condition specified the following:

- Each experimental session consisted of three Trust games. For each game, the first-mover had $6, any dollar amount of which he or she could send to the second-mover. The amount second-mover received from the first-mover was tripled by the experimenter. The second-mover could then send any dollar amount back to the first-mover. Participants would be paid in cash for two of the three games they played; the two paid games would be chosen at random at the end of the experiment.
- Participants made all decisions anonymously via a computer interface.
- Participants were paired randomly with a different partner for each game, and this was common knowledge.
- Prior to the first game, participants were not allowed to communicate, making it a no-communication/control condition.
- Prior to the second game, participants communicated in real-time via *computer-based text chat* for five minutes with the person they were paired with in the trust game. Messages entered by each participant appeared in a chat window. The instructions specified that participants were allowed to discuss any topic except those pertaining to (1) their identities or (2) their decisions or earnings from the previous condition. In addition to using generic identifiers, we both verbally and in the written instructions forbade participants from communicating their identities or any identifiers (race, gender, location in the room, etc.). Following the communication period, participants made their decisions in the game privately. First-movers did not receive feedback on the amount that the second-mover returned until the end of the experimental sessions.
- Prior to the third game, participants communicated *face-to-face* for two minutes with the person with whom they were paired. The instructions again specified that participants were allowed to discuss any topic except those pertaining to their identities or their decisions or earnings from the previous conditions. Participants then returned to their computer stations and made their decisions in the game privately.

The instructions for the group condition were identical, except for the following differences:

- Prior to the second game, participants communicated in real-time via *computer-based text chat* for ten minutes in a group of eight people, one of whom was the (anonymous) person they were paired with in the trust game. Messages entered by each participant appeared in a chat window visible to all group members.
- Prior to the third game, participants communicated *face-to-face* for five minutes with the group. Participants then returned to their computer stations and made their decisions in the game privately.

Thus, participants heard and received written general instructions about the Trust game, and afterwards were engaged in communication (except for the no-communication control treatment). In the *dyadic face-to-face* communication condition, subjects were given two minutes to communicate with the person they were paired with. In the *dyadic CMC* condition, subjects had five minutes to communicate with their partner via a computer chat program. In the *group CMC* condition, subjects could use ten minutes to communicate (excerpts from the conversations in these conditions are found in Appendix A). In the *dyadic CMC* condition, subjects could use five minutes to communicate. The differences in the length of the discussion periods across groups result from the disparities in the number of discussants and medium of communication. [Copies of the communication instructions are available from the authors.]

In the group-communication conditions, subjects participated in communication within a group of eight people. Subjects knew that they would eventually be paired with one of the other subjects in their group, but did not know who this person would be. Unlike the dyadic conditions, where subjects knew that the person with whom they conversed would be their partner in the Trust game, here subjects learned the ID number of the person with whom they were paired (a number which was assigned by the experimenters), but were unable to associate this identifier to the real-world identity of their partner.

To ensure that participants did not reveal their identifiers, experimenters actively monitored both FtF and CMC in real time.

After making their decision, first-movers were asked about their expectations of second-movers' reciprocation. We wanted to know whether expectations differ depending on the communication medium and condition, and if expectations predict the level of trust.

Results

We analyze the effects of group size and communication medium on three dependent variables: (1) trust – the amount in dollars sent by the first-mover (between $0 and $6); (2) reciprocity – the amount returned by the second-mover, *relative to the amount sent*; and (3) expected reciprocity – the amount the first-mover expected to be returned by the second-mover, relative to the amount sent. We varied group size across participants by choosing three experimental sessions to contain group communication only (32 participants), and three sessions to contain dyadic communication only (28 participants). Medium (no communication, computer-mediated, or face-to-face) was varied within participants. This design led to five communication conditions, and a total of 90 observations per dependent variable: no-communication (N = 30), CMC-dyadic (N = 14), CMC-group (N = 16), FtF-dyadic (N = 14), and FtF-group (N = 16).

To analyze the effects of group size and medium in a regression framework, we coded the conditions using three dichotomous variables: no-communication (1 or 0), dyadic (1 or 0), and FtF (1 or 0), which respectively allowed for tests of control vs. any communication, dyadic vs. group, and FtF vs. CMC. The ordering of media was fixed (computer-mediated in the second game, and face-to-face in the third); however, we did not anticipate an ordering effect as pairings for each game were unique and information following each game was minimal.

We modeled the three dependent variables as binomial responses using the generalized linear model (GLM) framework. Using a binomial GLM instead of ordinary least squares was appropriate for two reasons: (1) the distributions of all three dependent variables were non-normal; and for reciprocity (2) the amount returned by the second-mover should only be interpreted relative to the amount sent (and therefore would need to be converted to a proportion of thrice the amount sent). The binomial model allowed us to estimate the probability that the second-mover would return each dollar he or she had available, even though this amount depended on the first-mover's decision. Finally, to assess the main effects and the interaction of group size and medium, we sequentially tested pairs of nested models using likelihood ratio tests based on the Chi-square statistic.

Table 1 summarizes the responses for the five combinations of group size and medium. Both group size and medium had large, positive effects on trust, reciprocity, and expected reciprocity relative to no communication. Dyadic, FtF condition had the largest effects on all three variables, whereas dyadic, CMC condition had the second largest

Table 1. Mean trust, reciprocity, and first-mover expectations by communication medium and group size

	No-communication	*FtF-dyadic*	*CMC-dyadic*	*FtF-group*	*CMC-group*
Trust	3.03	5.57	5.14	4.12	3.94
	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.57)	(0.69)	(0.68)
Reciprocity	1.83	7.57	5.14	3.62	2.12
	(0.60)	(0.96)	(1.33)	(1.11)	(0.95)
Expected	3.50	8.36	7.43	4.31	5.00
Reciprocity	(0.67)	(0.69)	(0.96)	(1.17)	(1.14)

Note. Parenthesized values are standard errors of the mean.



Figure 1. The amounts received and returned by the second-mover collapsed across medium conditions (no-communication, FtF, CMC), and separated by group size. The values were sorted first by the amount received and then by the amount returned

effects. In addition to main effects of group size and medium relative to the no-communication condition, there appeared to be several interactions, which the subsections below report.

Figure 1 shows the distributions of the amount received and returned by the second-mover for the 90 interactions across all medium conditions (no-communication, FtF, CMC), separated by group size. Several facts stand out. First, trust was greatest in the dyadic conditions, with almost all first-movers sending their entire endowment, compared to only 60% in the group conditions and 30% when there was no communication. Second, when the first-mover sent her or his entire endowment, reciprocity was greatest in the dyadic conditions, with 80% of second-movers returning at least half of the amount they received, compared to only 42% in the group conditions and 44% when there was no communication. Last, across group sizes, when first-movers sent less than their entire endowment, second-movers tended to send back little.



Figure 2. Distribution of trust by group size and medium

Trust

Figure 2 shows the distribution of trust across the five communication conditions. To test for effects of medium and group size, we conducted a simultaneous regression of trust on the dummy variables no-communication, dyadic, and FtF. F-tests revealed significant effects of communication ($\chi^2(1) = 4.88$, $p = 0.03$) and group size ($\chi^2(1) = 26.56$, $p < 0.0001$), but not of medium ($\chi^2(1) = 1.39$, $p = 0.24$). Moreover, there was no interaction between medium and group size ($\chi^2(1) = 1.10$, $p = 0.29$). Thus, trust levels depended on the presence of communication and whether that communication was in dyads or groups, but did not depend on whether communication was face-to-face or computer-mediated.

Reciprocity

Figure 3 shows the distribution of reciprocity across the five communication conditions. The pattern of second-movers' returns was bimodal, with many participants returning nothing or exactly half of the maximum (i.e. \$0 or \$9). This pattern depended on the communication condition, however – for example, almost all participants in the FtF-dyadic condition returned \$9, but almost all participants in the no-communication and CMC-group conditions returned nothing. Although this pattern was due in part to the different levels of trust across conditions, a comparison of Figures 2 and 3 reveals that second-movers behaved qualitatively differently across conditions, even after accounting for first-movers' levels of trust. Finally, for 16 interactions, the amount trusted was zero; because the amount returned necessarily was zero for these data points, we omitted them from the analyses in this section.

We conducted a simultaneous regression of reciprocity on trust and the dummy variables no-communication, dyadic, and FtF. F-tests revealed significant effects of trust ($\chi^2(1) = 20.16$, $p < 0.0001$), group



Figure 3. Distribution of reciprocity by group size and medium

Table 2. Summary of binomial GLM estimates for factors predicting reciprocity ($N = 74$)

Variable	*Estimate*	*SE*	*Z*
Intercept	–3.69	0.61	–6.07****
Trust	0.39	0.10	3.88***
Dyadic	0.66	0.16	4.23****
FtF	0.52	0.16	3.36***
No-communication	0.28	0.22	1.27

Note. Residual deviance: 301.44 on 69 degrees of freedom; ***$p < 0.001$, ****$p < 0.0001$. SE = standard error.

size ($\chi^2(1) = 18.33$, $p < 0.0001$), and medium ($\chi^2(1) = 11.43$, $p < 0.001$), but not of no-communication ($\chi^2(1) = 1.62$, $p = 0.2$). Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients on the log-odds scale, and Figure 4 shows the model's predictions graphically: The probability of returning each available dollar increased with the amount trusted, but increased more rapidly for the dyadic conditions, and most rapidly for the FtF-dyadic condition.

Expectations

To determine whether expected reciprocity predicted the first-mover's level of trust, we converted expected reciprocity into the *expected percentage reciprocity* (the amount expected to be returned divided by the amount available × 100), and then regressed trust on this variable using ordinary least squares. This conversion was necessary to control for the dependency of the maximum amount that could be returned on the amount sent.



Figure 4. Predicted reciprocity by level of trust

Table 3. Estimates for expected percentage reciprocity as a predictor of trust ($N = 90$)

Variable	*Estimate*	*SE*	*T*
Intercept	1.27	0.29	4.41****
Expected percentage reciprocity	8.75	0.73	11.94****

Note. $R^2 = 0.61$; ****$p < 0.0001$. SE = standard error.

The estimated coefficients in Table 3 show that trust increases with the expected percentage reciprocity. When the first-mover expected nothing to be returned, the predicted amount sent was only $1.27. For each percent of the amount sent that the first-mover expected to be returned, however, the first-mover sent an additional $0.88. Thus, the median expected percentage reciprocity of 50% resulted in a $4.4 increase in the amount returned. Moreover, the R^2 value of 0.61 indicates that a large percentage of the variance in trust is explained by the expected percentage reciprocity.

Conclusions

Our results show that the behavior of first-movers is strongly determined by their expectations of second-movers' reciprocation. The variable most conducive to creating such expectations is not the medium of communication, but rather the number of communicators. Investments in the dyadic communication conditions were significantly higher than in the group communication conditions, which were in turn significantly higher than in the no-communication condition. As a general rule, higher levels of trust, reciprocation, and expectations of reciprocity were recorded in the dyadic conditions, compared to the group conditions. Since a pledge to trust/reciprocate was far more common in dyadic communications, this result is not surprising. In the group condition, however, when promises to trust/reciprocate were made, trust and reciprocation were far more frequent than in the control, no-communication condition.

Note that although the behavior of first-movers is strongly determined by their expectations of second-movers' reciprocation, these expectations are rarely met, as expected reciprocation has been lower than actual reciprocation, across all conditions. This was especially evident in the CMC-group condition, where mean reciprocation (2.13) was less than half the mean expected reciprocation (5.00).

By contrast, the medium of communication did not significantly predict trust (note, for one, that the mean investment in the CMC-dyadic communication condition was higher than the mean investment in the FtF-group condition). This finding does not conform to other experimental results (see Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1998; Rocco 1998; Bos et al. 2001; Zheng et al. 2002; Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann 2003; Bochet, Page, and Putterman 2006) that found significant differences in cooperation rates between 'richer' and 'poorer' communication conditions. In these studies, however, the number of communicators in a group remained constant. In another experiment (Bicchieri, Lev-On, and Chavez 2009), we manipulated media richness and topics of conversation prior to Trust games. Analogous to our findings here, we found that communication *richness* failed to produce significant differences in first-mover investments, but the *topics of conversation* made a considerable difference: the amounts sent were significantly higher in the unrestricted communication conditions than in the restricted communication and no-communication conditions. It is important to note that in the unrestricted communication conditions promises were routinely made, and thus a strong norm-abiding effect was to be expected.

Our results suggest that, in addition to the influence of communication media found in earlier experiments, there are additional variables (such as the content of conversation and the number of discussants) that mitigate the perception of the credibility of promises and generate expectations and behavioral consequences. In a group context, unless all members promise to trust/reciprocate, it is more difficult to establish expectations conducive to support such behaviors. Furthermore, promises are much more frequent in groups engaging in face-to-face communication than in groups that communicate via computer, thus explaining the differences in trust/reciprocation we found among these two conditions.

Results are more nuanced regarding second-mover reciprocation, where we found significant effects of trust, medium, and group size. Note, however, that first-movers seem to overestimate the willingness to reciprocate of second-movers; first-movers expected higher returns than the actual returns they did receive, regardless of the condition. First-movers received little benefit from their investment, with the exception of the FtF-dyadic condition and, to a lesser extent, the CMC-dyadic condition.

Our results show the advantages of dyadic over group communication for trust and reciprocation, over and above the richness of the communication medium. These results have interesting implications for managing virtual teams or other distributed, ad hoc workgroups where individuals cooperate with other team members whose identity they may not know in advance. Since dyadic, and not whole-group, communication seems crucial for accomplishing a group's goal, our results demonstrate that a 'motivational' conversation with all workgroup members is not a proper substitute for direct communication, when possible, with the person whom one should eventually trust and with whom one should cooperate.

Appendix A: Excerpts from the conversation in the *group CMC* condition (excerpts are taken from different sessions)

Excerpt #1
<tz200> so i think it's only fair that we try to make sure everyone earns the same amount
<tz400> as long as there's money
<tz500> the prospect of cash is never boring … i need money for dinner tonight

<tz300> ?
<tz600> yeah, me too
<tz200> i mean we all put in the same amount of time
<tz700> yeah
<tz700> $$ is good
<tz800> so...send the most amount and then split it equally?
<tz100> as a first mover i am sending all 6 – at least we get all the money they want to give
<tz700> yeah
<tz600> plus, it's to the first-movers advantage to give the second-mover something because then each person can earn more
<tz200> exactly
<tz700> but
<tz700> can we trust second-movers?
<tz700> some of them can be very stingy
<tz200> that is the question isn't it
<tz300> good questions
<tz100> trust it dude –
<tz600> second-movers just want money too, but first-movers can be stingy
<tz400> people are not so stupid
<tz500> i don't know … i don't think first-movers should be inclined to give anything unless they can be sure they will get AT LEAST their six dollars back
<tz600> yeah, true
<tz800> well if they send everything … we can both get nine
<tz600> but you've got to be fair to the second-movers as well
<tz700> i don't know … i consider myself to be quite generous

Excerpt #2
<tx600> hey, i trust the second-movers
<tx300> exactly, so then we can have a little bit of trust, but you don't have to entrust all of your funds
<tx200> you're a saint
<tx1500> i don't trust the second-movers
<tx100> So what do first-movers think is the best?
<tx1500> i don't even know them
<tx200> fair is fair
<tx300> i think it is best to send all six
<tx100> First-mover's rule!!

<tx300> but i can see how there is very little trust
<tx600> it's a difference between 7 and 9 dollars
<tx1500> FINAL CONCLUSION____ DO WHATever you want, there will be no consensus here
<tx600> which isn't all that much
<tx1500> NO CONSEQUENCES
<tx1500> for OUR ACTIONS
<tx300> so a compromise of sending 2 is best
<tx600> yea
<tx1500> SO WHY SHOULD THERE BE A CONSENSUS
<tx200> yeah
<tx1500> no compromise
<tx300> there are consequences, because if i get screwed out of money, i will be pissed
<tx1500> send none
<tx1500> to bad
<tx1500> if u get screwed
<tx300> and i will wreak vengeance upon all of you
<tx600> well, then we'd all be happy people, if there were a consensus
<tx200> how will you do that
<tx1500> so put yourself in a position as to not get screwed
<tx300> it was a long day at work today, and i am not about to get screwed out of free money
<tx300> but we should all get a good chunk
<tx400> if we were happy people, we wouldn't be doing a psych experiment at 4:30 on a thursday.
<tx100> I'm all for not getting screwed
<tx600> lol
<tx1500> if you're first-mover – don't send any over, if you're second-mover – too bad
<tx600> that's evil
<tx300> i'm not a a hole
<tx1500> that's the way
<tx1500> this works
<tx1500> this the prisoner's dilemma
<tx300> we know
<tx100> Anyone up for happy hour after this?
<tx1500> this will always happen
<tx1600> w/ no opportunity to increase your funds at all
<tx300> we all took econ 001

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