

# 14 Unemployment

Why unemployment?

- So far we have studied models where labor market clears.
- Is that a good assumption?
- Why is unemployment important?
  1. Reduces income
  2. Increases inequality.
- How can we think about unemployment in an equilibrium model?

## Concepts and Facts from the Labor Market

- The labor force is the number of people, 16 or older, that are either employed or unemployed but actively looking for a job. We denote the labor force at time  $t$  by  $P_t$ .
- Note that actively looking for a job is an ambiguous term.
- Let  $WP_t$  denote the total number of people in the economy that are of working age (16 - 65) at date  $t$ . The labor force participation rate  $f_t$  is defined as the fraction of the population in working age that is in the labor force, i.e.  $f_t = \frac{P_t}{WP_t}$ .

- The number of unemployed people are all people that don't have a job. We denote this number by  $U_t$ . Similarly we denote the total number of people with a job by  $N_t$ . Obviously  $P_t = N_t + U_t$ . We define the unemployment rate  $u_t$  by

$$u_t = \frac{U_t}{P_t} = \frac{U_t}{N_t + U_t}$$

- The job losing rate  $s_t$  is the fraction of the people with a job which is laid off during a particular time, period, say one month (it is crucial for this definition to state the time horizon).
- The job finding rate  $e_t$  is the fraction of unemployed people in a month that find a new job.

## Basic Facts

- U.S. Labor Force in feb 2002: 142 million people
- U.S. working age population in 1994: 212 million people
- Labor force participation rate of about 67.0%.
- Between 1967 and 1993 the average job losing rate was 2.7% per month
- Average job finding rate was 43%.
- Average unemployment rate during this time period was about 6.2%

## Job Creation and Destruction

- The gross job creation  $Cr_t$  between period  $t - 1$  and  $t$  equals the employment gain summed over all plants that expand or start up between period  $t - 1$  and  $t$ .
- The gross job destruction  $Dr_t$  between period  $t - 1$  and  $t$  equals the employment loss summed over all plants that contract or shut down between period  $t - 1$  and  $t$ .
- The net job creation  $Nc_t$  between period  $t - 1$  and  $t$  equals  $Cr_t - Dr_t$ .
- The gross job reallocation  $Ra_t$  between period  $t - 1$  and  $t$  equals  $Cr_t + Dr_t$ .

## Main Findings of Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996)

- Data from all manufacturing plants in the US with 5 or more employees from 1963 to 1987. In the years they have data available, there were between 300,000 and 400,000 plants.
- Gross job creation  $Cr_t$  and job destruction  $Dr_t$  are remarkably large. In a typical year 1 out of every ten jobs in manufacturing is destroyed and a comparable number of jobs is created at different plants.
- Most of the job creation and destruction reflects highly persistent plant-level employment changes. Most jobs that vanish at a particular plant fail to reopen at the same location within the next two years.

- Job creation and destruction are concentrated at plants that experience large percentage employment changes. Two-thirds of job creation and destruction takes place at plants that expand or contract by 25% or more within a twelve-month period. About one quarter of job destruction takes place at plants that shut down.
- Job destruction exhibits greater cyclical variation than job creation. In particular, recessions are characterized by a sharp increase in job destruction accompanied by a mild slowdown in job creation.

## Unemployment and the Business Cycle

- Gross job creation is relatively stable over the business cycle, whereas gross job destruction moves strongly countercyclically: it is high in recessions and low in booms.
- In severe recessions such as the 74-75 recession or the 80-82 back to back recessions up to 25% of all manufacturing jobs are destroyed within one year, whereas in booms the number is below 5%.
- Time a worker spends being unemployed also varies over the business cycle, with unemployment spells being longer on average in recession years than in years before a recession.



- Length of unemployment spells:

Unemployment Spell	1989	1992
< 5 weeks	49%	35%
5 - 14 weeks	30%	29%
15 - 26 weeks	11%	15%
> 26 weeks	10%	21%

- Other countries: in Germany, France or the Netherlands about two thirds of all unemployed workers in 1989 were unemployed for longer than six months!!

## The Evolution of the Unemployment Rate

- $U_t =$  Number of unemployed at  $t$
- $P_t =$  Labor Force in  $t$
- $N_t = P_t - U_t =$  Number of employed in  $t$
- $u_t = \frac{U_t}{P_t} =$  unemployment rate
- $s =$  job losing rate
- $e =$  job finding rate
- Assume that  $P_t = (1 + n)P_{t-1}$

●Then we have

$$\begin{aligned}U_t &= (1 - e)U_{t-1} + s N_{t-1} + (P_t - P_{t-1}) \\ &= (1 - e)U_{t-1} + s(P_{t-1} - U_{t-1}) + (P_t - P_{t-1})\end{aligned}$$

Dividing both sides by  $P_t = (1 + n)P_{t-1}$  yields

$$\begin{aligned}u_t &= \frac{U_t}{P_t} = \frac{(1 - e)U_{t-1}}{(1 + n)P_{t-1}} + \frac{s(P_{t-1} - U_{t-1}) + (P_t - P_{t-1})}{(1 + n)P_{t-1}} \\ &= \frac{1 - e - s}{1 + n}u_{t-1} + \frac{s + n}{1 + n}\end{aligned}$$

## Steady State Rate of Unemployment

- In theory: steady state unemployment rate, absent changes in  $n, s, e$
- Some people call it “Natural Rate”:
- Solve for  $u^* = u_{t-1} = u_t$

$$u^* = \frac{1 - e - s}{1 + n}u^* + \frac{s + n}{1 + n}$$

$$\frac{n + e + s}{1 + n}u^* = \frac{s + n}{1 + n}$$

$$u^* = \frac{s + n}{n + e + s}$$

- From data  $s = 2.7\%$ ,  $e = 43\%$ ,  $n = 0.09\%$ .

## Determinants of the Rate of Unemployment

- We just presented an accounting exercise.
- There was no theory on it.
- We want to have a model to think about the different elements of the model ( $b$ ,  $e$ , etc.).
- There are several Models of Unemployment. We will look at one: SEARCH MODEL. Matching is costly (think about getting a date). We can bring our intuition to the job market.

## A Basic Search Model

- Two period model. In the second period an employed worker gets whatever its wage is  $w$ .
- In the second period, with probability  $p$  an unemployed worker gets a job offer. If she does not get it she gets  $b$  (includes the value of leisure and unempl insurance).
- If she gets a job offer, she draws a wage from a distribution characterized by function  $H$ , where  $H(\hat{w})$  is the probability that the wage offer obtained is higher or equal than  $\hat{w}$ .

- Note that she takes the job in the second period if and only if the wage obtained is higher than  $b$ .
- While an employed worker starts the second period knowing that she will get  $w$  that was the job she accepted in the first period. The unemployed worker's expected utility is given by

$$U_u = (1 - p) b + p [1 - H(b)]b + p \int_b^{\infty} w H(dw)$$

the first term recognizes that she may not get an offer and has to settle for  $b$ , in the second term she may get a job offer too bad to accept (so she gets  $b$ ), and the third term is the expected wage conditional on being good enough to take it.

We we can rewrite this expression as

$$U_u = b [(1 - p) + p (1 - H(b))] + p H(b) E[w|w \geq b]$$

- What to do int the first period?
- A person that does not get an offer obtains

$$b + \beta U_u$$

- A person that rejects an offer gets

$$b + \beta U_u$$

- A person that accepts an offer  $w$  gets

$$w + \beta w$$



- The worker will accept an offer the first period, when

$$w + \beta w \geq b + \beta U_u$$

$$w + \beta w \geq b + \beta \{b [(1 - p) + p (1 - H(b))] + p H(b) E[w|w \geq b]\}$$

where  $w^*$  that makes her indifferent  $w^* + \beta w^* = b + \beta U_u$ .

- To compare  $w^*$  and  $b$ , note that  $E[w|w \geq b] > b$ .

$$b < \{b [(1 - p) + p (1 - H(b))] + p H(b) E[w|w \geq b]\}$$

$$b + \beta b < b + \beta \{b [(1 - p) + p (1 - H(b))] + p H(b) E[w|w \geq b]\} = w^* + \beta w^*$$

And then that  $w^* > b$ . So the option of a new draw makes workers more picky in the first period than in the second and then makes employment lower in the first period.

## What does affect unemployment?

- $p$
- Unemployment insurance,  $b$ .
- Minimum wage. It is illegal to have  $w < \bar{w}$ . If  $b < \bar{w}$  then minimum wage is binding.