

Ambiguous Business Cycles

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Motivation

- Role of uncertainty shocks in business cycles?
- usually: uncertainty = risk
- ⇒ agents confident in probability assessments
- ⇒ shocks to uncertainty = shocks to volatility
- this paper: uncertainty = risk + *ambiguity* (*Knightian uncertainty*)
- ⇒ allows for lack of confidence in prob assessments
- ⇒ shocks to uncertainty can be shocks to confidence

Overview

- Standard business cycle model with ambiguity aversion
 - ▶ recursive multiple priors preferences
 - ▶ ambiguity about mean aggregate productivity
 - ⇒ 1st order effects of uncertainty
- Methodology
 - ▶ study uncertainty shocks with 1st order approximation
 - ▶ simple estimation strategy based on linearization
 - ▶ motivate & bound set of priors by concern w/ nonstationarity
- Properties
 - ▶ ambiguity shocks work like “unrealized” news shocks with bias.
 - ▶ in medium scale DSGE model estimated on US data, ambiguity shocks
 - ★ generate comovement and account for $> \frac{1}{2}$ of fluctuations in Y, C, I, H .
 - ★ imply countercyclical asset premia.

Literature

- 1 **Multiple Priors Utility:** Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989), Epstein and Wang (1994), Epstein and Schneider (2003).
- 2 **Business cycles with preference for robustness:** Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1999), Cagetti, Hansen, Sargent and Williams (2002), Smith and Bidder (2011).
- 3 **Signals:** Beaudry and Portier (2006), Christiano, Ilut, Motto and Rostagno (2008), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), Lorenzoni (2009), Blanchard, L'Huillier and Lorenzoni (2010), Barsky and Sims (2010, 2011).
- 4 **Risk shocks:** Justiniano and Primiceri (2007), Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007, 2010), Bloom (2009), Bloom, Floetotto and Jaimovich (2009), Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010), Gourio (2010), Arellano, Bai and Kehoe (2010)

Ambiguity aversion & preferences


- S = state space
 - ▶ one element $s \in S$ realized every period
 - ▶ histories $s^t \in S^t$
- Consumption streams $C = (C_t(s^t))$
- Recursive multiple-priors utility (Epstein and Schneider (2003))

$$U_t(C; s^t) = u(C_t(s^t)) + \beta \min_{p \in \mathcal{P}_t(s^t)} E^p [U_{t+1}(C; s^{t+1})],$$


- Primitives:
 - ▶ felicity u (possibly over multiple goods) & discount factor β
 - ▶ one-step-ahead belief sets $\mathcal{P}_t(s^t)$ – size captures (lack of) confidence
- Why this functional form?
 - ▶ preference for known odds over unknown odds (Ellsberg Paradox)
 - ▶ formally, weaken Independence Axiom

Ellsberg Paradox

Risky Urn



Ambiguous Urn



- bet on black from risky urn \succ bet on black from ambiguous urn
- bet on white from risky urn \succ bet on white from ambiguous urn
- expected utility cannot capture choices, but $\min_{p \in \mathcal{P}} E^P[u(c)]$ can!

A stylized business cycle model with ambiguity

- Representative agent with recursive multiple priors utility.
- Felicity from consumption, hours

$$u(C_t, N_t) = \frac{C_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \beta N_t$$

- Output Y_t produced by

$$Y_t = Z_t N_{t-1}$$

- Labor chosen one period in advance
- Belief sets that enter utility
 - ▶ specify ambiguity about exogenous productivity
 - ▶ beliefs about endogenous variables derived from “structural knowledge” of economy
 - ▶ true TFP process: iid lognormal with $E[Z_t] = 1$, $\text{var}(\log Z_t) = \sigma_Z^2$

Belief set: time variation in ambiguity

- Agents experience changes in confidence, described by process a_t
- ⇒ Representation of one-step-ahead belief set \mathcal{P}_t

$$\log Z_{t+1} = \mu_t - \frac{1}{2}\sigma_z^2 + \sigma_z \varepsilon_{z,t+1}$$
$$\mu_t \in [-a_t, a_t]$$

- Examples for evolution of (lack of) confidence a_t
 - Linear, homoskedastic law of motion

$$a_t = (1 - \rho_a) \bar{a} + \rho_a a_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{a,t}$$

Interpretation: intangible information affects confidence

- Feedback from realized volatility

$$a_t = \sqrt{2\eta} \sigma_{z,t}$$

Interpretation: observed turbulence lowers confidence

Follows if \mathcal{P}_t is "constant entropy" ball around true DGP:

$$\mu_t \in [-a_t, a_t] \Leftrightarrow R_t = \frac{\mu_t^2}{2\sigma_{z,t}^2} \leq \eta$$

Social planner problem

- Bellman equation

$$V(N, Z, a) = \max_{N'} \left[u(ZN, N') + \beta \min_{\mu \in [-a, a]} E^{\mu} V(N', Z', a') \right]$$

- Worst-case belief: future technology is low

$$\mu^* = -a$$

⇒ planner acts as if bad times ahead

- Interpretation: precautionary behavior
- First order effects of ambiguity.

Characterizing equilibrium

Two Steps

- 1 Solve planner problem under worst case belief $\mu^* = -a$
Optimal hours from FOC

$$1 = E^{-a} \left[\beta (Z' N')^{-\gamma} Z' \right]$$

- 2 Characterize variables under true shock process (in logs)

$$n_t = -(1/\gamma - 1) \left(a_t + \frac{1}{2} \gamma \sigma_z^2 \right)$$

$$y_{t+1} = z_{t+1} + n_t$$

⇒ Worst case belief reflected in action n_t , but not in shock realization z_{t+1}

Properties of equilibrium

- Dynamics

$$y_{t+1} = z_{t+1} + n_t$$

$$n_t = -(1/\gamma - 1)(a_t + \frac{1}{2}\gamma\sigma_z^2)$$

$$a_t = (1 - \rho_a)\bar{a} + \rho_a a_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{a,t}$$

- ▶ first order effects of uncertainty on output, even as $\sigma_z^2 \rightarrow 0$
- ▶ if substitution effect is strong enough ($1/\gamma > 1$):

- 1 loss of confidence generates a recession
- 2 increase in confidence leads to an expansion

- ▶ TFP is not unusual in either cases
- ▶ hours do not forecast TFP if $cov(a_t, z_{t+1}) = 0$

- Asset prices reflect time varying ambiguity premia

- ▶ price of 1-step-ahead consumption claim = $\frac{E_t C_{t+1}}{R_t^f} \exp(-a_t - \gamma\sigma_z^2)$

Comparison of shocks

- Ambiguity shocks $n_t = -(1/\gamma - 1)(a_t + \frac{1}{2}\gamma\sigma_z^2)$
 - ▶ loss of confidence generates recession if $1/\gamma > 1$
 - ▶ hours do not forecast TFP: regress z_{t+1} on n_t to get slope 0
 - ▶ time varying ambiguity premium on consumption claim = a_t
- News & noise shocks $n_t = (1/\gamma - 1)(\pi s_t - \frac{1}{2}\gamma(1 - \pi)\sigma_z^2)$
 - ▶ signal about productivity $s_t = z_{t+1} + \sigma_s\epsilon_{s,t}$ with $\pi := \sigma_z^2/(\sigma_z^2 + \sigma_s^2)$
 - ▶ bad signal (news or noise) generates recession if $1/\gamma > 1$
 - ▶ hours forecast TFP: regress z_{t+1} on n_t to get slope $\gamma/(1 - \gamma)$
 - ▶ constant risk premium on consumption claim
- Volatility shocks $n_t = -(1/\gamma - 1)\frac{1}{2}\gamma\sigma_{z,t}^2$
 - ▶ volatility process $\sigma_{z,t}^2 = \text{var}_t(z_{t+1})$, mean adjusts so $E_t Z_{t+1} = 1$
 - ▶ volatility increase generates recession if $1/\gamma > 1$
 - ▶ hours do not forecast TFP (but forecast turbulence)
 - ▶ time varying risk premium on consumption claim = $\gamma\sigma_{z,t}^2$

General framework: Rep. agent & Markov uncertainty

- Notation (as before s = exogenous state)
 - ▶ X = endogenous states (e.g. capital)
 - ▶ A = agent actions (e.g. consumption, investment)
 - ▶ Y = other endogenous variables (e.g. prices)
- Recursive equilibrium
 - ▶ Functions for actions A , other endog vars Y , value V s.t., for all (X, s) :

$$V(X, s) = \max_{A \in B(Y, X, s)} \left\{ u(c(A)) + \beta \min_{p \in \mathcal{P}(s)} E^p [V(X', s')] \right\}$$

s.t. $X' = T(X, A, Y, s, s')$

- ▶ endog var determination: $G(A, Y, X, s) = 0$
 - ▶ true exogenous Markov state process $p^*(s) \in \mathcal{P}(s)$
- Analysis again in 2 steps
 - ▶ find recursive equilibrium
 - ▶ characterize variables under “true” state process

Characterizing equilibrium: a guess-and-verify approach

- basic idea
 - ① guess the worst case belief p^0
 - ② find recursive equilibrium under expected utility & belief p^0
 - ③ compute value function under worst case belief, say V^0
 - ④ verify that the guess p^0 indeed achieves the minimum
- “essentially linear” economies & productivity shocks
 - ▶ environment T, B, G s.t. 1st order approx. ok *under expected utility*
 - ▶ ambiguity is about mean of innovations to s
- simplification in essentially linear case
 - ▶ in step 1, guess that worst case mean is linear in state variables
 - ▶ step 2 uses loglinear approximation around “zero risk” steady state (sets risk to zero, but retains worst case mean)
 - ▶ step 4 then checks monotonicity of value function

An estimated DSGE model with ambiguity

- Similar to CEE (2005), SW (2007)
- ① Intermediate goods producers
 - ▶ Price setting monopolist; competitive in the factor markets
 - ★ mark-up shocks.
- ② Final goods producers.
 - ▶ Combines intermediate goods to produce a homogenous good.
- ③ Households: **ambiguity-averse**
 - ▶ Own capital stock, consume, monopolistically supply specialized labor
 - ▶ investment adjustment costs, internal habit in consumption.
 - ★ efficiency of investment and price of investment shocks.
- ④ “Employment agencies”
 - ▶ aggregate specialized labor into homogenous labor.
- ⑤ Government
 - ▶ Taylor-type interest rule: reacts to inflation, output gap and growth.
 - ★ government spending and monetary policy shocks.

Technology

- The intermediate good j is produced using the function:

$$Y_{j,t} = Z_t K_{j,t}^\alpha (\epsilon_t L_{j,t})^{1-\alpha} - F_t$$

- Final goods:

$$Y_t = \left[\int_0^1 Y_{j,t}^{\frac{1}{\lambda_{f,t}}} dj \right]^{\lambda_{f,t}}$$

- Capital accumulation:

$$\bar{K}_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)\bar{K}_t + \left[1 - S \left(\zeta_t \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \right) \right] I_t.$$

- Beliefs about technology:

$$\log Z_{t+1} = \rho_z \log Z_t + \mu_t + \sigma_u \epsilon_{z,t+1}$$

$$\mu_t \in [-a_t, a_t]$$

$$a_t - \bar{a} = \rho_a (a_{t-1} - \bar{a}) + \sigma_a \epsilon_{a,t}$$

Solution method: Steps

- Let x_t and s_t denote endog and exog vars
- ① Find deterministic “distorted” steady state x_o and s_o based on

$$\log Z_o = \rho_z \log Z_o - \bar{a} + 0$$

- ② Linearize around distorted SS: Find A, B :

$$x_t - x_o = A(x_{t-1} - x_o) + B(s_t - s_o)$$

$$s_t = \begin{bmatrix} s_t^* \\ a_t \\ z_t \end{bmatrix} = \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} \rho & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \rho_a \\ 0 & \rho_z & -1 \end{bmatrix}}_P \begin{bmatrix} s_{t-1}^* \\ z_{t-1} \\ a_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \Xi_t$$

$$\Xi_t = \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_t \\ \varepsilon_t^a \\ \varepsilon_t^z \end{bmatrix} \sim N(0, \Sigma)$$

$$\tilde{E}_{t-1} z_t = \rho_z z_{t-1} - a_{t-1}$$

3 True dynamics:

- ▶ True DGP:

$$z_t = \rho_z z_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^z = \tilde{E}_{t-1} z_t + \varepsilon_t^z + a_{t-1}$$

- ▶ Endogenous variables:

$$x_t - x_o = A(x_{t-1} - x_o) + B(s_t - s_o)$$

$$s_t - s_o = P(s_{t-1} - s_o) + \hat{\Xi}_t, \quad \hat{\Xi}_t = \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_t \\ \varepsilon_t^a \\ \varepsilon_t^z \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 0_{(n-2) \times 1} \\ 0 \\ a_{t-1} \end{bmatrix}$$

4 Zero risk steady state

- ▶ In Steady State:

$$\hat{\Xi} = \begin{bmatrix} 0_{(n-1) \times 1} \\ \bar{a} \end{bmatrix}$$

- ▶ Steady state exogenous vars s^{SS} :

$$s^{SS} - s_o = P(s^{SS} - s_o) + (\hat{\Xi} - \Xi_o)$$

- ▶ Then solve for endogenous vars x^{SS} :

$$x^{SS} - x_o = A(x^{SS} - x_o) + B(s^{SS} - s_o)$$

A bound on ambiguity

- Beliefs about technology

$$\log Z_{t+1} = \rho_z \log Z_t + \mu_t + \sigma_u \varepsilon_{z,t+1}$$

$$\mu_t \in [-a_t, a_t]$$

$$a_t - \bar{a} = \rho_a (a_{t-1} - \bar{a}) + \sigma_a \varepsilon_{a,t}$$

- ▶ agents view innovations as risky ($\sigma_u \varepsilon_{z,t+1}$) and ambiguous (μ_t)
- ▶ they know empirical moments of true $\{\mu_t^*\}$, but not the exact sequence
- ▶ empirical moments say $\log Z_{t+1} - \rho_z \log Z_t \sim i.i.N(0, \sigma_z^2)$; $\sigma_z^2 > \sigma_u^2$
- ▶ agents respond to uncertainty about μ_t^* as if minimizing over $[-a_t, a_t]$

- Constrain a_t to lie in a maximal interval $[-a^{\max}, a^{\max}]$

- ▶ require that “boundary” beliefs $\pm a_{\max}$ imply “good enough” forecasts:
- ▶ there exists σ_u^2 s.t. for every potential true DGP $\{\mu_t^*\}$, a_{\max} or $-a_{\max}$ is best forecasting rule at least α of the time
- ▶ a_{\max} is best forecasting rule at date t if true mean $\mu_t^* > a_{\max}$
- ▶ for example, $\alpha = 5\%$ implies $a_{\max} = 2\sigma_z =$ bound used in estimation

Parametrization

- Recall

$$a_t - \bar{a} = \rho_a (a_{t-1} - \bar{a}) + \sigma_a \varepsilon_{a,t}$$

- Restrictions: process a_t s.t.

- a_t is positive:

$$\bar{a} - m \frac{\sigma_a}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_a^2}} \geq 0$$

- a_t is bounded by the discipline of the non-stationary argument

$$\bar{a} + m \frac{\sigma_a}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_a^2}} \leq 2\sigma_z$$

- Scale

$$\bar{a} = n\sigma_z, \quad n \in [0, 1]$$

- Directly estimate n, ρ_a .

Estimation

- Linearization → estimation using standard Kalman filter methods.
- Data: US 1984Q1-2010Q1: Output, consumption, investment, price of investment growth, hours, FFR, inflation.
- Law of motion for a_t is estimated
- Estimates:

- ▶ productivity dynamics

$$\rho_z = 0.95, \sigma_z = 0.0045$$

- ▶ confidence dynamics

$$\bar{a} = 0.0043, \rho_a = 0.96, \sigma_a = 0.00041$$

- ▶ other parameters broadly consistent with previous studies.


Role of ambiguity in fluctuations

- Variance decompositions: business cycle frequency


Shock/Var.	Output	Consumption	Investment	Hours
Ambiguity	27	51	14	30
Stationary techn.	11	13	9	2
Efficiency of invest.	33	7	53	32
Stochastic Growth	7	7	6	13
Price mark-up	12	12	12	13

- ▶ any other shocks < 5% for above variables.
- ▶ long-run theoretical decomposition: $\varepsilon_{a,t}$ about 50% of fluctuations.





Dynamics: loss of confidence



Estimated ambiguity path



Historical shock decomposition



Welfare cost of fluctuations through ambiguity

Setting $\sigma_z = 0$ vs estimate $\implies \bar{a} = 0$ vs estimate

- Welfare: $\bar{V} \equiv$ Value function under "zero risk steady state" (with estimated \bar{a})

- ▶ Welfare cost of fluctuations, as % of $C_{SS}(\bar{a} = 0)$, due to:

- 1 ambiguity:

$$\lambda^{ambig} = [\bar{V} - V^{SS}(\bar{a} = 0)] (1 - \beta)\beta^{-1} = 13\%$$

- 2 risk (known probability distributions):

$$\lambda^{risk} = V_{\sigma\sigma}(1 - \beta)\beta^{-1} = 0.01\%$$

★ $V_{\sigma\sigma}$: effect of fluctuations in $\varepsilon_{z,t+1}$ in a second order approx. of $V(\cdot)$.

- Other vars: Output, Capital, Consumption, Hours lower by 15%

Conclusion

- Standard business cycle model with ambiguity aversion:
 - ▶ recursive multiple priors preferences.
 - ▶ ambiguity about mean productivity.
 - ▶ discipline from modeling concern with nonstationarity
- With ambiguity, uncertainty shocks have 1st order effects:
 - ▶ can apply standard linearization techniques for solution and estimation
 - ▶ work like “unrealized” news shocks with bias
 - ▶ potentially large role in business cycle
- Next
 - ▶ characterize further essentially linear settings