UNITED NATIONS  DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia

General
 
The Somali National Regional State, geographically one of Ethiopia’s largest territories, is one of the country’s most undeveloped and neglected regions. A history of political instability, insecurity and alien administration by a distant and unresponsive central government still dogs the efforts of the new Somali-led regional government to guide the region’s recovery from years of turmoil and civil strife into a new era of unity, stability and security. The road to recovery has not been smooth: since the overthrow of the Derg regime by EPRDF forces in 1991, three successive regional administrations have been disqualified by charges of incompetence and corruption from completing their terms of office. The fourth, formed by the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League following the party’s victory in elections last year, still faces political opposition and skepticism among certain groups that it really represents a change from the poor performance of former governments.
 
Although the new regional administration has done much to promote consensus and dialogue among the Somali communities of the region, it is also hindered by internal constraints on its capacity and competence. Given the youth of the new government and the paucity of the Somali Region’s human resource pool, the government suffers from lack of capacity at almost all levels. From technical expertise, administration and management, to planning, policy development and research, manpower is inadequate. and materiel is at a premium.

According to the regional Planning Bureau, the absence of data required for policy development and strategising is especially problematic: the Bureau is unable to provide the administration with even the most basic information concerning population, livestock, infrastructure and service delivery. Much of what is available is incomplete, outdated, or unreliable, leaving bureaux to rely on anecdotal reports and external sources like NGOs, UN agencies and SERP. These practical curbs on long-range planning effectively confine the government’s development horizon to the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the extension of essential services.

Even these limited objectives are circumscribed by the government’s lack of capacity at the regional, zonal, and wereda level. Deficiency of effective direction, management, and technical expertise, combined with insufficient transport, communications and logistics, all conspire to impede the new administration’s efforts to transcend the inactivity, despondency and corruption that typified its predecessors.
 
Reform of regional government will be a lengthy and difficult process, and much of the initial energy and expertise will be absorbed in simply keeping the administration functional; however, the administration cannot afford to remain inactive, nor does it plan to. For reasons political as well as practical, it is not possible for the administration to abandon its basic functions until it has completed internal reforms. Essential services like human and animal health, water development, and education are to be extended; much of the region’s infrastructure including roads, bridges and government buildings is in urgent need of repair and plans for upgrading several roads and airports have been announced.

Lack of transport and communications links means that much of the region is essentially as remote from the regional capital as it was four decades ago when first handed over to Ethiopian administration, and expansion of the regional telecommunications network is among the administration’s priorities. Real, tangible improvements of this nature are the only way the new government will be able to convince an ambivalent population that it represents a qualitative break with the past.

The Somali Region’s partners in development share the government’s concerns, and are seeking ways to co-operate in giving the regional rehabilitation and development strategy a "jump-start." UNHCR and UNICEF’s collaboration on resettlement programmes for returnees from Somalia and Djibouti is also aimed at improving conditions for resident "host" communities. UNDP is actively engaged in augmenting the government’s capacity in several key sectors. But beyond Jigjiga and a few select weredas, underdevelopment is itself posing an obstacle to development programmes. Tenuous administrative control, absence of communications and banking facilities discourage even private contractors from undertaking projects in the region. Rigid UN requirements for programme design and management are poorly adapted to the realities of the Somali region. Exceptional flexibility will be required if the UN is to become a truly effective partner in promoting the Somali region’s parity with the rest of Ethiopia.

Approaches to recovery and development in Somali areas

The weakness of government services and aid programmes throughout much of Region 5 is a marked contrast to the situation across the border in Somaliland and even in parts of Somalia. Although many parts of Somalia lack effective administration and face serious security problems, both humanitarian and development programmes are more prevalent in these areas than in Region 5.

As both the government and its aid partners explore ways of bringing essential services to the region, and various strategies for disaster prevention and preparedness in this crisis prone area, examples of successful programmes elsewhere may serve as points of reference for Region 5. Given the very demanding environment, and the generally unsatisfactory record of international aid programmes among Somali communities, the few notable success stories should serve as a positive basis from which to identify lessons learned and to develop more effective strategies.

UNDP/OPS programmes in Somaliland and Bay region are an excellent example of what is possible through systematic, sensitive collaboration between a UN agency, local government and community leadership. Through a broadly inclusive and consultative process, UNDP/OPS supported the execution of dozens of projects, with relatively little overhead expenditure and - for most of the project duration - with only one expatriate officer. Despite political problems encountered in early 1995, community responses to the project were extremely positive, and in some places residents demonstrated against UNDP/OPS departure when the programme was suspended in early 1995 (activities resumed again late last year). Throughout Awdal and Woqooyi Galbeed regions, numerous wells, schools, markets, police stations, and other community services owe their existence to UNDP/OPS.

UNICEF’s programme in Somaliland has similarly overcome problems of political dissent and civil strife to reach all five regions with a combination of essential services for women and children. The geographic scope of the programme, its high profile in the Somaliland community and its resilience in the face of a complex socio-political environment stand in contrast to the relative absence of programming in most of Region 5. Today, many of the services supported by UNICEF in Somaliland are also frequented by residents of Ethiopia’s Somali Region who lack comparable access to services on their side of the border. Exchange of methodology and cross-fertilisation of techniques between the two programmes would serve to redress the existing imbalance across this porous international boundary.

Diverse projects with proven track records in Somalia and Somaliland provide illustrative examples of the various recovery strategies that have proven successful in Somali communities. In addition to the UNDP/OPS and UNICEF programmes, some notable examples include:

• ICRC’s veterinary scouts programme
• Soyaal Vocational Training Centre
• Swiss group (CARITAS) credit schemes
• Farm Africa’s pastoral development programmes (North-east Kenya)
• UNHCR / Somaliland government water-tankering project for drought relief
• UN Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS) possesses a comprehensive Documentation and Research Centre for Somali affairs. Data and information is available through UNDOS on a broad range of Somali-specific development-related issues. Such information could provide invaluable background material and insight into successful development strategies and methodology. Material specific to Region 5 may also be available or could perhaps be sought upon request. A linkage with UNDOS is therefore to be encouraged.

The Somali Region’s major aid partners are few and concentrated mainly around Jigjiga and, to a lesser extent, Gode. Among UN agencies, UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP are the most active, particularly in the domain of refugee and returnee support. Modalities for collaboration have already been worked out between these two agencies and a newly signed global memorandum of understanding signed between their headquarters promises to strengthen their co-operation even further.

Many of the current UN programmes in Region 5 are primarily concerned with rehabilitation or to upgrading of services. In refugee-settled areas, services are being adapted to meet the needs of the communities who will remain once refugees have left the area. Such programmes are not particularly elaborate or complex, but given the present inadequacies of the regional administration, prospects for follow-up programming are poor over the medium- to long-term term.

UNICEF and UNHCR have therefore expressed their concern that some attention be given to the long term survival of programmes: specifically their concerns pertain to government capacity to acquire and maintain new infrastructure, and on support to communities until they are able to manage the projects themselves. UNDP involvement in the planning and support of such projects would help to ensure their sustainability once UNHCR or UNICEF’s involvement comes to and end.

On the other hand, neither the government nor its development partners, notably UNDP, has an interest in inheriting poorly planned, unsustainable or unnecessarily expensive programmes upon which communities have already come to depend. Both the government and, where appropriate, UNDP, should be involved in the early stages of project planning and implementation to ensure that programmes design is consistent with long term policy objectives and is within the government’s capacity to support.

Outline of a possible approach

Planning and implementation should, as a general rule, be as inclusive, consultative and transparent as possible. For UNHCR and UNICEF programmes, this implies consultation with UNDP at roughly the same stage as consultation with the government. If UNHCR and UNICEF are concerned about the long-term viability of certain programmes then they may wish to consult with the government and UNDP simultaneously to identify resources available either for long-term support to these programmes or for expansion of government capacity with regard to sectoral and specific programme needs. UNDP would then have the opportunity to advise its partners from the early stages of programme design as to whether or not UNDP resources might be allocated in support of these programmes, and to exchange views on the long-term viability of these programmes.

From the UNDP perspective, the reverse is also true. Needs assessments for UNDP-supported programmes should endeavour to involve major partners as closely as possible from the start. UNHCR and UNICEF are more active in the field, and their contributions during UNDP’s consultations with the government would provide invaluable, operational insights informed by a presence in the field. In certain cases, where UNDP-programmes are located in areas where either or both major UN partners has a particular concern (i.e. substantial refugee or returnee communities), UNDP and the government might consider inviting UNHCR and UNICEF to participate as partners in the needs assessment phase. In principle, Region 5 government officials suggest that they would favour such an approach.
 
 
 

Traditional system of authority

This anthropological section seeks to examine two issues that are crucial to development in the Ethiopian Somali National Regional State (ESNRS): 1) the traditional system of governance based on lineage leaders, and, 2) land rights. Both issues are deeply rooted in the pervasive segmentary social organisation of the Somali society and have direct relevance for development activities carried out by external organisations in the ESNRS. Often misunderstood and disregarded, the understanding of these subjects by the development staff is necessary. Without full participation of the community leaders of the Somali kin groups we seek to assist, the participatory approach achieves little despite our goal to deliver development assistance to what is historically a neglected peripheral and primarily nomadic region in Ethiopia.

The social organisation of the Somali nationality in Ethiopia and Somalis elsewhere is fundamentally based on a patrilineal system in which descent is traced through the male line to a common ancestor. This and segmentary kinship order are all-encompassing and unite the total Somali population in the Horn at the highest level of grouping, but divides them to different kin groupings at the lower levels. This all-embracing but elaborately segmented social order is important because it determines relations of co-operation and conflict between different levels of political groupings, economic co-operation between individuals belonging to a corporate unit and between different groups. Although political affiliation is fluid and shifts with the changing circumstances, kinship places each and every Somali in a corporate unit which guarantees his basic rights in a wider kinship network.

The most important political segments of this social system are the clan and the dia-paying group (dia represents a collective responsibility to pay "blood money"). Depending upon varying numerical strength, clans consist of several lineages and traditionally act as the upper limit of political action. When its collective interest is violated by rivals, all clansmen act together to defend this joint interest. Since the failure of the Somali state at the beginning of 1991 and the ensuing dismemberment, the clan has emerged as the most effective political entity in former Somalia and in the linked Ethiopian Somali Region, where the formation of an alternative modern administration is still in its infancy. The political significance of the clan is further enhanced by its association with a customary territory.

For the present, the clan and some of the larger sub-clans have clan heads, variously titled as sultan, ugas, etc. However, it is important to understand that sultans lack absolute power and therefore act as nominal figure-heads and spiritual leaders of their groups. Although they have little instituted authority, as distinguished spiritual heads sultans enjoy considerable moral authority that helps them dispense their difficult leadership responsibilities.

Within the clan the most important lineage is known as the dia-paying group. It is made of a small lineage or several lineages, varying in strength from a few hundred to a few thousand persons.

For all intents and purposes, the dia-paying group is the most stable political group. This stability and its corporate character is given legitimacy and function by a collective obligation binding closely related kinsmen of the dia-paying group to collectively receive and pay blood compensation, dia. Accordingly, political and economic co-operation or moral assistance is most pronounced among closely related kinsmen of this group.

The cohesive dia-paying group, which occupies the bottom of the highly segmented political culture of the Somali, has an acknowledged head commonly known as akil. As the only acknowledged head of a group other than the clan, the akil acts as a nominal leader vested with spiritual and moral authority just like the sultan. In spite of lack of absolute power and authority, in collaboration with the elders of his group, the peacekeeping role of the akil contributes to the maintenance of law and order that is kept best at this level.

Given the remarkable absence of hierarchy in the lineage system of the Somali and the nominal power and authority vested with the sultan and akil, the significance of traditional leaders with respect to co-operation with the regional administration and international development organisations can be elusive.

In the remaining part of this section, the role of traditional leaders will be discussed.

As spiritual leaders of their respective groups, sultans and akils have an advantage over other informal leaders (influential elders) in the collective decision-making process. Their nominal status and moral authority is effectively used in the deliberation of matters that are of common interest to their groups in the council of elders, the shir - the most important political institution in Somali society. The shir is an ad hoc and informal gathering of kinsmen attended by elders and married adult men, including sultans and akils. The shir is organized as the need arises in order to attend to current affairs affecting the groups concerned. Arbitration of a dispute between individuals of the dia-paying group, which if not promptly resolved could threaten harmony, land disputes between lineages, or affect development programmes in the sphere of influence of a particular lineage are examples befitting the call for a shir.

Unlike hierarchical societies where traditional leaders, e.g. kings, have absolute power that allows them to make and enforce decisions upon their subjects, the Somali society is egalitarian. It is highly democratic, and the principle of equality of kinsmen runs so deep in their polity and in the pastoral economy that their ‘pastoral democracy’ borders anarchy. Therefore the duty of Somali leaders is to work with elders in the shir to help shape opinion and generate consensus to reach binding decisions on matters being discussed by the clan or dia-paying councils. They also oversee that agreements made in the shir are enforced.

As sometimes happens, development organisations deal directly with genuine and sometimes self-styled leaders in the project area in isolation from their dia-paying groups. This approach obviously runs counter to the democratic decision-making tradition of the Somali. It will not deliver the popular participation that is necessary for the implementation and subsequent maintenance of a project. This should not mean that outsiders should totally disregard or bypass traditional leaders and deal directly with the beneficiary group; akils and sultans provide an indispensable link between the local group and external organisations. However, to ensure total participation of the beneficiary group in the decision-making process and implementation of the project, it is necessary that outsiders engage a sustained dialogue with the local beneficiaries, including sultans and akils in the shir. Dealing only with traditional leaders fosters suspicion on the part of clansmen regarding the intention of their lineage leaders. It could also lead to a suspicion of a connivance between traditional leaders and the external organisations such that the wider interests of the group may be marginalised.

Government authorities, NGOs and international organisations need to be careful in the identification of traditional leaders representing the groups in the project area. Lack of formal offices in the highly segmented lineage system has led to abuse of the system by unscrupulous elders for the last two decades. Many urbanized clansmen live in the administrative centres of the region where NGOs and international organisations are based. Some of these leaders certainly represent the legitimate interest of their rural kinsmen and work hard to draw needed resources to the areas controlled by their kin groups. Nevertheless, many of them are self-styled and have a vested self-interest. Since, it is difficult for an outsider to differentiate real leaders from bogus ones, calling of a shir in the project area could be used as vetting exercise to differentiate authentic representatives from those with a private agenda.

To conclude the preceding discussion, akils, sultans and influential elders representing groups in the project area are able to act as a vital link with outsiders. If properly approached and involved through the shir institution, their capacity to motivate and mobilise groups in their areas of influences, could facilitate better co-operation with development organisations working for their well-being. Until effective modern administration is established throughout the region, co-operation and dialogue with traditional leaders in remote areas not served by modern administration is essential.
 
Land rights

To carelessly construct an essential community facility, e.g. a well, in an area which is subject to private control creates internal social tensions with negative implications for access and maintenance. Therefore, an adequate understanding and fair knowledge of traditional systems of governance and land tenure are essential for government officials, NGOs and the international organisations working in the region.

Like Somalis elsewhere in the Horn of Africa, land tenure in the ESNRS is firmly anchored to the all-important segmentary lineage system. As indicated in the preceding section, the resilient traditional system of governance is focused on lineage leaders and respected elders of kin groups. With respect to land tenure, the correlation between kinship and land is illustrated by the fact that the segmentary lineage formation is reproduced on the ground. Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider local clans as land-holding ‘corporations’.

Although the borders between territories controlled by local clans are often blurred, ill-defined, and therefore act as source of frequent tension and friction; each and every clan in ESNRS is associated with a customary territory that is frequented by its clansmen and collectively defended from aggression by rival parties. The constituent lineages of the clan are neatly distributed within the territory controlled by the clan, and within the territory of the lineage its smaller segments hold adjacent lands.

In agro-pastoral areas, e.g. Jigjiga zone, settlement and cultivation brought the development of permanent farming villages and consequent normalisation of customary rights. Except in some peripheral areas that are marginal for cultivation which are used as grazing localities, land is a private property. Arable land was distributed in the past between local lineages and within the lineage between its members on equitable basis. In the past every kinsman was allocated enough agricultural land even though able kinsmen managed to obtain more land than others.

In agro-pastoral areas where land is a controlled by members of the local lineage, it is inevitable that development organisations work with the beneficiaries in identifying an appropriate site for a proposed project. No matter how well intentioned, developing a public well on private land is a silly mistake. It will only benefit the owner, and its access can create a dispute between the owner and the intended beneficiaries. Usually there are many people who express interest in attracting wells to their private land. Therefore, organisations have to be careful not to be overly-influenced by self-interested individuals, claiming to represent local groups.

Development organisations should realise that getting authorisation from the local administration for a project site is not sufficient under the present circumstances. The assistance of local officials should be sought, but they lack the authority and the legal means to appropriate private land for public use. Dealing with elders in isolation in terms of access to a project site also creates problems and is unlikely to guarantee access to land without the approval of the right land holder.

In agro-pastoral areas an inclusive approach is the safest method of obtaining private land for development. Involving the local administration, lineage leaders and the beneficiary group is important, because this collective effort builds pressure on the private holder to release his property for public use. This also acts as a guarantee against possible future violations of the holder relating to abuse of the public property constructed on his land with his permission.

In predominantly pastoral areas, fixed ties to land are not strictly enforced as in settled agro-pastoral parts of the region. Outside trade centres in which villagers exert rights over surrounding land for speculation, and enclosures, obtaining land for development of public well-being is neither difficult nor sensitive. Nevertheless, even here the participation of all parties on site selection and on the different stages of the project is necessary.
 
 

For details on traditional land tenure and the political culture of the Somali society refer to I. M. Lewis: A Pastoral Democracy. A study of pastoralism and politics among the northern Somali of the Horn of Africa. London, Oxford University Press.

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this document do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever of the UN concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.