Persistent Misconceptions about Chinese “Legalism”

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The reasons for avoiding the term “legalism” in the study of classical Chinese philosophy were summarized years ago by Herrlee G. Creel, and most scholars would probably agree, if pressed, that the term is flawed, and yet one continues to find it deployed in published books and articles—almost as though no one is prepared to admit that it has to be abandoned. I believe that “legalism” is virtually useless as a hermeneutic lens; indeed, in many contexts it obscures more than it clarifies. Even as a bibliographical category, as it was frequently used in imperial times, its value is questionable. In the following pages, I shall first review the weaknesses of the term “legalism,” then ask why scholars persist in adopting it even though they can hardly be unaware of its defects, and finally suggest a better approach to the material that is conventionally categorized as “legalist.”

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“Legalism” is an imprecise Sinological translation of the Chinese term fajia 法家.

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As far as one can tell from the extant sources, *fajia* was invented by Sima Tan (司馬談) (d. 110 B.C.), father of the famous historian Sima Qian (司馬遷) (145?-86? B.C.), in his essay, “The Essential Implications of the Six Houses of Thought” (“Lun liujia zhi yaozhi” 論六家之要指). Sima Tan’s aim was to sketch what he took to be the six main schools of pre-imperial philosophy, and then to show how the group that he called *daojia* 道家 incorporated the strengths of each of the other five, but without succumbing to any of their weaknesses. (Incidentally, *daojia* cannot mean “Daoism,” as it is so often translated today, because it is apparent from Sima’s text that he used the word as an abbreviation for *daode* 道德 jia—but that would be a matter for a different essay about a different set of persistent misconceptions.)

Sima Tan’s syncretic maneuver was a common one in early Chinese writing: disparate thinkers may have been right about one particular thing, but they were not necessarily right about anything else; one view supersedes the rest by encompassing all of them, and that one view, consequently, is right about *everything*. The most famous example is the “All under Heaven” (“Tianxia” 天下) chapter of the *Zhuangzi*, but the oldest is probably Xunzi’s “Dispelling Obfuscation” (“Jiebi” 解蔽), in which he lists

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4 *Fa* is listed with *ming* 名, *Ru*, and *Mo* as one of the four dominant schools of thought in the “Dadao shang” 大道上 chapter of *Yin Wenzı* 尹文子; text in Xu Zhongliang 徐忠良, *Xinyi Yin Wenzı* 新譯尹文子, ed. Huang Junlang 黃俊朗, Guji jinzhu xinyi congshu 新出簡牘的學術探索, Beijing Shifan Daxue shixue tansuo congshu (Beijing, 2010), 75. But I am of the opinion that the received *Yin Wenzı* is a forgery.

several prominent earlier thinkers, asserts that each one was “beclouded” by one particular corner of the way, and concludes that only Confucius perceived the Way in its totality.

Confucius was humane and wise, and moreover not beclouded; thus his study of diverse techniques was sufficient to bring him [to the level of] the Former Kings. One school attained the Way of Zhou; he held it up and applied it, and was not beclouded by accumulated details. Thus his virtue was equal to that of the Duke of Zhou, his name on a par with those of the Three Kings. This is the blessing of not being beclouded.

Xunzi’s use of the keyword jia 家 suggests that this text may have been a model for Sima Tan, who used the same rhetorical device, but with the purpose of arguing that the daojia, not Confucius or his followers, were the ones who had attained the privileged synoptic viewpoint. This is what Sima Tan had to say about fajia:

The fajia are strict and have little kindness, but their alignment of the divisions between lord and subject, superior and inferior, cannot be improved upon. … Fajia do not distinguish between kin and stranger or

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8 Both jia 家 and zhou 周 can be construed in two different ways. Jia can mean “school of thought,” as in the above translation, and also “specialist, expert,” as will be discussed below. Zhou can refer to the Zhou dynasty, as in the above translation, and can also mean “round, universal” (e.g., Analects 2.14: junzi zhou er bu bi 君子周而不比). It is likely that Xunzi intended all of these connotations.


10 “Taishi gong zixu” 太史公自序, Shiji (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959), 130.3289 and 3291.
differentiate between noble and base; all are judged as one by their fa.
Thus they sunder the kindnesses of treating one’s kin as kin and honoring
the honorable. It is a policy that could be practiced for a time, but not
applied for long; thus I say: “they are strict and have little kindness.” But
as for honoring rulers and derogating subjects, and clarifying social
divisions and offices so that no one is able to overstep them—none of the
Hundred Schools could improve upon this.¹¹

The weakness of fajia philosophy, on this account, is that it forces everyone to abide by
cold-blooded rules; the strength is that it inhibits dissension by clearly demarcating
everyone’s role in society.

What exactly does Sima Tan’s neologism fajia mean? Although they are very
common words in the Chinese language, neither fa nor jia is straightforward in this
context. There are two main theories about the meaning of jia. The older one is that it
means “school of thought” (not, of course, implying any institutional structure: “school”
as in “the Realist school,” not as in “The Wharton School of Business”).¹² Thus fajia
would mean “the fa school of thought.” Jens Østergård Petersen has recently argued that
it means “specialist” or “expert” instead—a usage that has survived in modern Chinese
(as in yishujia 藝術家, “artist,” jianzhujia 建築家, “architect,” and so forth).¹³ Petersen
could be right—that is to say, classical Chinese grammar and usage do not rule out his
interpretation—but any understanding of jia in Sima Tan’s essay must take into account a
phenomenon that I think Petersen does not explain adequately: Sima Tan never says
Mojia 墨家 to refer to Mohists or Rujia 儒家 to Confucians; instead, he always calls

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¹¹ Compare the translation in Smith, 141.

own rendering of jia, namely “lineage” (53f.), is potentially even more misleading, as Sima Tan never
implies that members of a jia are bound by either real or fictive kin relations.

¹³ “Which Books Did the First Emperor of Ch’in Burn? On the Meaning of Pai Chia in Early Chinese
Sources,” _Monumenta Serica_ 43 (1995), esp. 34ff. Petersen’s understanding of jia as “expert” is followed
by Mark Csikszentmihalyi and Michael Nylan, “Constructing Lineages and Inventing Traditions through

¹⁴ Wang Li 王力, _Hanyu shi gao 漢語史稿_, revised edition (Beijing: Kexue, 1980), 230, argued that the jia
of fajia, in line with the traditional view, refers to schools of thought (xuepai 學派), and cannot be
associated with the jia of yishujia or jianzhujia, but he did so on the questionable grounds that fajia is (or
appears to be) an uncountable noun and yishujia is undoubtedly a countable one.
them Mozhe 墨者 and Ruzhe 儒者. Petersen writes: "Rujia and Mojia were impossible constructions to Sima Tan because Ru and Mo denote groups of people, and one cannot (in any meaningful sense of the word) specialize in belonging to such groups."\(^\text{15}\) The problem is that Rujia and Mojia are both amply attested after Sima Tan, and the ancients never expressed doubt about the meaningfulness of such phrases.\(^\text{16}\) Moreover, Rujia and Mojia do not have to be construed as “specialist in being a Ru” and “specialist in being a Mo” or anything silly like that; they can simply mean “Ruist specialist” and “Mohist specialist.”

That is, if they mean “specialist” at all. Sima Tan’s pointed use of the terms Ruzhe and Mozhe should suggest that he was not referring to specific people when he said jia.\(^\text{17}\) This is because of all the names that he used to designate schools of thought, only Ru and Mo were current in pre-imperial times and employed by thinkers as a mode of self-identification. It made perfect sense to call oneself (or one’s opponent) a Ru or a Mo, but no one ever called himself (or his opponent) a fajia or a daojia. Mozhe was the most natural way of referring to Mohists in classical Chinese texts. In Mencius 3A.5, Yi Zhi 畿之, the Mohist whose philosophy Mencius famously goes on to crush, is introduced straightforwardly as Mozhe Yi Zhi 墨者畨之. In the Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋 tale about the contingent of Mohists who chose to kill themselves after being abandoned by their patron, rather than fleeing and thereby disgracing their tradition, they are once again called Mozhe—and indeed refer to themselves as such.\(^\text{18}\) Similarly, though the

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\(^{15}\) Petersen, 35, with Romanization converted.

\(^{16}\) Liu Xiang 劉向 (79-8 B.C.) is reported by Xun Yue 荀悅 (A.D. 148-209) to have used both phrases (perhaps in his Bielu 別錄); see “Xiaocheng huangdi ji er” 孝成皇帝紀二, Hanji 漢紀, in Zhang Lie 張列, ed., Liang Han ji 兩漢紀 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 2002), 25.436. It is noteworthy that of the six hits I attained for Mojia through the CHANT (Chinese Ancient Texts) database of pre-Qin and Han literature, four are from the Lunheng 論衡 of Wang Chong 王充 (A.D. 27-ca. 100). For an overview of Wang Chong’s view of Mohism, see Zheng Jiewen 鄭傑文, Zhongguo Moxue tongshi 中國墨學通史, Guojia sheke jijin 國家設科記 (Beijing: Renmin, 2006), I, 202-10.

\(^{17}\) Cf. Li Rui, 74.

question of whether Ru refers exclusively to Confucianism is a matter of much scholarly controversy these days, it is undeniably the term that Mohists used when they wished to identify Confucius and his followers.\(^{19}\)

Thus when Sima Tan referred to philosophies corresponding to organized schools of thought that his audience would have had no trouble recognizing, he used the word zhe; when he referred to philosophies that did not correspond to any organized school of thought, he used the word jia in an inventive sense: “house of thought.” In both cases, it should be recognized, Sima Tan’s criteria were purely ideological; personal relations play no role in his schema. Fajia refers to the view that kinship and social status should be disregarded by administrative protocols, which treat everyone equally and thereby elevate the sovereign over the rest of humanity. If you believe this, you belong to the fajia too. If not, you belong somewhere else on the intellectual roadmap.

If fajia means roughly “the house of \(f_a\) philosophy,” then, the other difficult term remains to be explained. What is \(f_a\)? The translation “legalism” reflects the supposition

\(^{19}\) As in the chapter “Refuting the Confucians” (“Fei Ru” 非儒). Note also that in the chapter entitled “Discussing the Ru” (“Lunru” 論儒) in Yantie lun 鹽鐵論, the representatives of the government state: “You literati transmit Confucius as your forebear; you sing the praises of his virtue; you hold that from antiquity until today, there has been none like him” 文學祖述仲尼，稱誦其德，以為自古及今，未之有也. See Wang Liqi 王利器, Yantie lun jiaozhu (dingben) 鹽鐵論校注（定本）, Xinbian Zhuzi jicheng (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1992), 2.11.149.

The strongest objections to interpreting Ru as “Confucianism” have come from Michael Nylan, e.g., The Five “Confucian” Classics (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), 2n.: “Ru, conventionally translated as ‘Confucian,’ means ‘classicist.’” (Nylan calls Rajia 儒家 the “classicist affiliation.”) This interpretation not only fails for “Fei Ru,” but would also seem to force Mozi into the Ruist camp, inasmuch as Mozi and his followers were no less devoted to the classics than the Confucians were. (On this point, see, e.g., Zheng Jiewen, I, 75-111.) “Traditionalists,” proposed by Graham Sanders in Words Well Put: Visions of Poetic Competence in the Chinese Tradition, Harvard-Yenching Monograph Series 60 (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 2006), 15n.1, is vulnerable to the same objection. For an evenhanded consideration of the Ru controversy, see Nicolas Zufferey, To the Origins of Confucianism: The Ru in Pre-Qin Times and During the Early Han Dynasty, Schweizer Asiatische Studien: Monographien 43 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2003); also Christoph Harbsmeier, “The Birth of Confucianism from Competition with Organized Mohism,” Journal of Chinese Studies 56 (2013), esp. 13-19. My own view is that although it is sometimes inappropriate to restrict the sense of Ru to “Confucians” (especially in later imperial contexts), the term nevertheless frequently refers to Confucius and people who explicitly identified themselves as followers of his teachings. See also Chen Lai, “Ru: Xunzi’s Thoughts on \(ru\) and Its Significance,” tr. Yan Xin, Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4.2 (2009), 157-79.

that *fa* means “law.” But this is a grave error. Though *fa* can surely include “law,” it covers a much larger semantic range, and it is precisely in this larger range that the word usually has to be located. The two basic meanings of *fa* are “method” and “standard.”

The Mohist Canons explain *fa* as instruments, including “such three things as ideas, compasses, and circles” 意、規、員，三也, that help determine whether something conforms to a standard. Thus an object is round if it conforms to a circle. Although “law” is one of the most prominent senses of *fa* in Modern Chinese, it is only a derived meaning; in classical and pre-classical Chinese, the ordinary way of referring to the law was *xing* 刑 (now usually relegated to the sense of “punishment”). Even in imperial China, *fa* tended to mean something more like “government program” or “institution” than “law”—as in, for example, the failed “Green Sprouts Policy” (*Qingmiao fa* 青苗法), which was Wang Anshi’s 王安石 (1021-1086) attempt to establish a government credit bureau.

Creel’s objection to translating *fajia* as “legalism” is still valid today and deserves to be repeated:

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20 Incidentally, this point nullifies the recent attempt by Victor H. Mair, “Religious Formations and Intercultural Contacts in Early China,” in *Dynamics in the History of Religions between Asia and Europe: Encounters, Notions, and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Volkhard Krech and Marion Steinicke, Dynamics in the History of Religions 1 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012), 89ff., to interpret the right side of *fa* 禮 as a pictograph of the *xiezi* 獬豸/獬廌, i.e. the legendary caprid that would supposedly butt the guilty party in a lawsuit. Since the word did not originally mean “law” in the first place, there is little reason to suppose that the corresponding graph would include a depiction of the famed Goat of Justice. As Heiner Roetz explains in “A Comment on Victor H. Mair’s ‘Religious Formations and Intercultural Contacts in Early China,’” *ibid.*, 113ff., the most plausible explanation is that the graph was borrowed for its sound.


When Sima Tan used the name *fajia* for this school, apparently for the first time, he may not have intended *fa* to mean merely “law.” He was clearly aware that the school had two emphases, and may have availed himself of the fact that *fa* means both “law” and “method.” It has both of these senses (sometimes simultaneously) in *fajia* literature, and even in the *Shangjun shu* 商君書. “Method” seems to be the sense in which Shen Buhai used *fa*, in all of the quotations of his words known to me. The *Han Feizi* 韓非子 quotes Shen as saying: “What is called ‘method’ (*fa*) is to examine achievement [as the ground for] giving rewards, and to use ability as the basis upon which to bestow office.”

Obviously, “law” would not work very well for *fa* in this line from *Han Feizi*, since the issue is administrative recruitment and management. But this passage is not as decisive as Creel represented it to be, for there is no way to be sure that Han Fei (d. 233 B.C.) quoted Shen Buhai 申不害 (d. 337 B.C.) accurately. Creel did not offer any other example of Shen Buhai’s use of *fa* that might corroborate this usage, and although his later study of the extant fragments of that thinker includes a helpful concordance listing eight uses over four separate passages, none of these is dispositive.

Creel need only have turned, however, to the fragments of Shen Dao 慎到 (b. ca. 360 B.C.), which were being collated and analyzed at the very same time by P.M. Thompson. For here there are unmistakable examples of *fa* in the same sense that Han Fei attributed to Shen Buhai: as an impersonal administrative technique of determining rewards and punishments in accordance with a subject’s true merit. And if anyone deserves to be recognized as a member of *fajia*, it is Shen Dao, who was criticized by Xunzi for being “beclouded by *fa*” 蔽於法.

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24 Creel, *What Is Taoism?*, 93. The *Han Feizi* passage is from the “Wai chushuo zuo shang” 外儲說左上 chapter; text in Chen Qiyou, *Han Feizi xin jiaozhu* 韓非子新校注 (Shanghai: Guji, 2000), 11.32.708: 法者見功而與賞,因能而受官.


26 *The Shen Tzu Fragments*, London Oriental Series 29 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), which was based on his Ph.D. dissertation (University of Washington, 1970). Creel was aware of Thompson’s work (see, e.g., *Shen Pu-hai*, 311), but does not seem to have studied the *Shenzi* fragments.

If the lord of men abandons *fa* and governs with his own person, then penalties and rewards, seizures and grants, will all emerge from the lord’s mind. If this is the case, then those who receive rewards, even if these are commensurate, will ceaselessly expect more; those who receive punishment, even if these are commensurate, will endlessly expect more lenient treatment. If the lord of men abandons *fa* and decides between lenient and harsh treatment on the basis of his own mind, then people will be rewarded differently for the same merit and punished differently for the same fault. Resentment arises from this. Thus the reason why those who apportion horses use *ce*-lots, and those who apportion fields use *gou*-lots, is not that they take *ce* and *gou*-lots to be superior to human wisdom, but that one may eliminate private interest and stop resentment by these means.29 Thus it is said: “When the great lord relies on *fa* and does not act personally, affairs are judged in accordance with *fa*.” The benefit of *fa* is that each person meets his reward or punishment according to his due, and there are no further expectations of the lord. Thus resentment does not arise and superiors and inferiors are in harmony.

Just as in Creel’s quote from *Han Feizi*, it would be inappropriate to confine *fa* here to the meaning of “law.” Shen Dao is talking about administrative methods, notably those of reward and punishment, serving primarily to keep inferiors docile and gratified. Where specific laws may be conducive to these ends, it would naturally be acceptable to incorporate them into one’s *fa*—and Shen Dao freely uses the term *fa* in a sense akin to “law” when the circumstances warrant.30 But it would be a serious misunderstanding of

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28 From the lost chapter entitled “Junren”君人; the source-text is *Qunshu zhiyao*群書治要 (Guoxue jiben congshu), 37.639. This corresponds to Thompson’s fragments nos. 61-65 (267-69).

29 Shen Dao repeats this strange example of casting lots for horses and fields in *Qunshu zhiyao* 37.636. *Xunzi* refers to casting *gou*-lots in “Jundao”君道, *Xunzi jijie* 8.12.230f.; he also mentions *chou*籌 lots, which are apparently strips or chips of bamboo, and might be similar to what Shen Dao means by *ce*-lots. I am not aware of further information about these practices.

30 Most famously, “Even if a law is not good, it is still better than having no law” 法雖不善，猶愈於無法 (*Qunshu zhiyao* 37.636, i.e. Thompson’s fragment no. 23 [242])—the strongest basis for supposing that he was, in our parlance, a legal positivist. Cf. Goldin, 120n.57. See also Thompson, 271n.1: “Master Shen said: ‘Law does not come down from Heaven, nor out of the Earth; it merely emerges in human society, and accords with people’s minds’.” 慎子曰：「法非從天下，非從地出，發於人間，合乎人心而已」.
this philosophy to infer that only laws count as *fa*. Creel rightly emphasized that Shen Buhai’s most important administrative recommendation was *xingming* 刑/形名, or comparing an official’s “performance” (*xing*) to the duties implied by his “title” (*ming*), and then rewarding or punishing him accordingly.\(^{31}\) This idea does not presuppose a legal code—or any legal consciousness whatsoever.

Han Fei himself frequently used *fa* in the same sense, as in the following:

> 故明主使法擇人，不自舉也；使法量功，不自度也。能者不可弊，敗者不可飾，譽者不能進，非者弗能退，則君臣之間明辨而易治，故主讎法則可也。\(^{32}\)

Thus an enlightened ruler employs *fa* to pick his men; he does not select them himself. He employs *fa* to weigh their merit; he does not fathom it himself. Thus ability cannot be obscured nor failure prettified. If those who are [falsely] glorified cannot advance, and likewise those who are maligned cannot be set back, then there will be clear distinctions between lord and subject, and order will be easily [attained]. Thus the ruler can only use\(^{33}\) *fa*.\(^{34}\)

Once again, *fa* does not fit any ordinary understanding of the word “law.”

A final example: the ancient essay entitled “The Seven Kinds of Standards” ("Qifa" 七法), now included in the *Guanzi* 管子, where *fa* is defined as: (1) principles of nature, or *ze* 則; (2) models, or *xiang* 象; (3) mensuration, or *fa* 法; (4) tutelage, or *hua* 化; (5) incentives and deterrents, or *juesai* 決塞; (6) *xinshu* 心術, the hardest of the seven to translate—literally “techniques of the heart-mind,” though here it has an effective meaning of virtue and moral reasoning;\(^{35}\) and (7) units of calculation, or *jishu* 計數.

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\(^{31}\) Creel, *Shen Pu-hai*, 119-24; and *What Is Taoism?*, 79-91. See also Makeham, “The Legalist Concept of *hsing-ming*."

\(^{32}\) “Youdu” 有度, *Han Feizi xin jiao* 2.6.92.

\(^{33}\) Following the commentary of Sun Kaidi 孫楷第 (cited by his courtesy name, Sun Zishu 孫子書).


\(^{35}\) The *Guanzi* contains two chapters using this term as their title ("Xinshu shang" 上 and "Xinshu xia" 下), and though they both address governance as well, their focus is attaining mental clarity through
Then we read:

不明於則，而欲出號令，猶立朝夕於運均之上，擔 [==搖] 竭而欲定其末。不明於象，而欲論材審用，猶絕長以為短，續短以為長。不明於法，而欲治一眾，猶朝揉輪而夕欲乘車。不明於決塞，而欲敺眾移民，猶使水逆流。不明於心術，而欲行令於人，猶倍招而必拘之。不明於計數，而欲舉大事，猶無舟楫而欲經於水險也。37

Trying to issue proclamations and commands while being unenlightened with respect to 亁 is like establishing sunrise and sunset on the basis of a spinning wheel or trying to stabilize the tip of a stick while shaking it. Trying to select materials38 and investigate their uses while being unenlightened with respect to 享 is like cutting something that is long in order to make it short or extending something that is short in order to make it long. Trying to govern and unite the multitude while being unenlightened with respect to 仏 is like writing with your left hand while stopping it with your right. Trying to change customs and improve education while being unenlightened with respect to 话 is like bending a wheel in the morning and trying to ride a carriage with it that evening. Trying to incite the multitude and move the people while being unenlightened with respect to 栽 is like making water flow backwards. Trying to have your commands carried out by your people while being unenlightened with respect to 信 is like standing with your back to the target and being cocksure of controlling [the arrow?]. Trying to organize great undertakings while being unenlightened with respect to 职 is like trying to travel through a river gorge without boat or oars.39

Of these seven types of 仏, only the fifth, or incentives and deterrents, corresponds in any meditation—i.e. psychological rather than moral self-cultivation—and they are usually not regarded as part of the same tradition as “Qifa.” See, e.g., Harold D. Roth, “Psychology and Self-Cultivation in Early Taoistic Thought,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 51.2 (1991), esp. 620-28. However, 信 is a peculiar phrase (despite Rickett, II, 21n.20, it is attested more abundantly in Han than in pre-Han literature), and I doubt it can be accidental that the “Xinshu” chapters are found today in a collection alongside other texts with a more moralistic conception of 信. Perhaps what we read in the received Guanzi is the work of thinkers who agreed on the necessity of incorporating 信 into political philosophy, but did not agree as to precisely what 信 should entail?

36 Following the commentary of Wang Yinzhi 王引之.


38 This can also mean “trying to select talented men.”

39 Compare the translation in Rickett, I, 130.
way to “law,” and it too has a wider semantic field. (We shall return to *xinshu* and “The Seven Kinds of Standards” below.)

If “legalism” is such a misleading translation of *fajia*, where did it come from? I can offer two conjectures. First, as mentioned above, “law” is the prepotent sense of *fa* in the modern language, and early Sinologists, who were not always sensitive to the distinctions between ancient and modern usage, may have assumed all too hastily that *fa* meant something like “law” in classical times as well. (The inadequate rendering of “sincerity” for *cheng* 誠 can be attributed to the same kind of diachronic confusion.)

Second, the history of the word “legalism” in Western culture before the discovery of Chinese philosophy is surely relevant. In Christian theology, “legalism” refers to the misguided belief that salvation can be attained solely by adhering to laws. (It is sometimes explained as the opposite of antinomianism, or the belief that obeying laws is unnecessary, as salvation is attained by God’s grace alone.) The word is, of course, invoked less frequently today in this pejorative and theological sense than in previous centuries. An early example is *The Marrow of Modern Divinity*, by Edward Fisher (fl. 1627-1655), a theological dialogue that includes a character named Nomista, who is introduced simply as “a Legalist.” This is all the information the reader needs in order to understand that Nomista will be bested before the book is finished.

Further research will be required to determine when and how the term “legalism” was first used with reference to China, but it seems likely that the first Sinologists, many of whom, as missionaries, were sympathetic to Confucianism and may have shared its suspicion of man-made laws, would have applied “legalism” as a theological term to the Chinese context. Scholars of the past tried to find Western analogues for every aspect of

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40 For the more reasonable translation of “integrity,” see Michael Nylan and Thomas Wilson, *Lives of Confucius: Civilization’s Greatest Sage through the Ages* (New York: Doubleday, 2010), 102. I have argued elsewhere (*Rituals of the Way*, 19f.) that *cheng* 誠—which is manifestly cognate with *cheng* 成—has a meaning along the lines of “self-perfection.”

Chinese culture that they could;\textsuperscript{42} if Mozi was China’s utilitarian, and Sima Qian China’s Herodotus, then it would only have seemed fitting for Han Fei to be China’s legalist.  

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To review: as a technical term in the study of Chinese philosophy, “Legalism” is doubly misleading. First, as a translation of \textit{fajia}, it is inaccurate in that \textit{fa} can include more than simply “law.” Second, the concept of \textit{fajia} is itself partisan and anachronistic; it was invented retrospectively by Sima Tan for his own discursive purposes, which had less to do with even-handedly surveying the various Warring States philosophers than with urging his particular brand of syncretism as the most versatile world view for his time.\textsuperscript{43} However, it is not enough simply to dismiss “legalism” as an inaccurate translation of a partisan and anachronistic concept, for these can sometimes be useful as heuristic devices. (“China” might be one such example; so might “Europe.”)\textsuperscript{44} Thus the most important obligation of this essay is to show that, in addition to all its other problems, “legalism” is not useful as a heuristic device.

Offhand comments by scholars who continue to use the term suggest that they do so because they believe it can serve as a convenient shorthand for a coherent and readily recognizable philosophy. Take this recent disclaimer by Scott Cook in his essay, “The Use and Abuse of History in Early China from \textit{Xun Zi} to \textit{Lüshi chunqiu}” (2005):

The term “Legalist” (always given in quotation marks) I use in the conventional manner for such thinkers as Shang Yang, Han Fei, and Sima Tan.

\textsuperscript{42} Cf. Russell Kirkland, “Hermeneutics and Pedagogy: Methodological Issues in Teaching the \textit{Daode jing},” in \textit{Teaching the Daode jing}, ed. Gary D. DeAngelis and Warren G. Frisina, AAR Teaching Religious Studies Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 150: “When Westerners encountered the religious and intellectual traditions of Asia, they went about making sense of those traditions by comparing and contrasting what they saw in them with what they ‘knew’ from their own tradition.” Similarly, Ku Hung-ming—who was educated in Europe, not China—referred to Zichan as “the Colbert of his time” and Yan Pingzhong as “the Sir William Temple of his time” in \textit{The Discourses and Sayings of Confucius: A New Special Translation, Illustrated with Quotations from Goethe and Other Writers} (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1898), 32 and 33, respectively.

\textsuperscript{43} Cf. Ren Jiyu, \textit{Zhongguo zhexueshi lun} 中国哲学史論 (Shanghai: Renmin, 1981), 431-35 (who makes an important point underneath all the Marxist verbiage).

\textsuperscript{44} Cf. Eric Hobsbawm, \textit{On History} (London: Abacus, 1998), 287-301. (This Abacus edition of the book is larger than the original, which was published in London by Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997.) Before Hobsbawm, the indeterminacy of the name “Europe” was not widely acknowledged. Historians today might be surprised that Henri Pirenne (1862-1935), for example, never explained what he meant by it in his monumental \textit{Histoire de l’Europe} (Brussels: La Renaissance du Livre, 1958).
韓非, who, according to historical sources and works attributed to their names, held a similar set of tenets concerning the rule of law and strict application of rewards and punishments; I do not intend it to refer to any sort of coherent “school.” Whether Shang Yang held precisely such views as purported in the speeches attributed to him is debatable, but given the nature of his reforms, it is certainly plausible that he did, and it is clear at any rate that someone of his time was proffering such views.⁴⁵

It should be emphasized that this apology is not essential to Cook’s otherwise judicious study—and Cook might complain that by singling it out, I am caviling at a passing remark in a footnote. But the train of thought is revealing. “Legalism,” Cook tells us, can be usefully applied “in the conventional manner” as a reference to such thinkers as Shang Yang and Han Fei—and though we do not know precisely what Shang Yang (i.e. Gongsun Yang 公孫鞅, d. 338 B.C.) said, it is clear at any rate that someone proffered the views that we conventionally attribute to Shang Yang. “Someone” living when? Evidently, we think we know what “Legalism” means, but we cannot specify it perspicuously (“a similar set of tenets concerning the rule of law and strict application of rewards and punishments”), and we have an even harder time trying to identify the figures who advocated it. Han Fei—and we are not sure of whom else.

What I think most people have in mind when they say “Legalism” is the “amoral science of statecraft” that A.C. Graham reconstructed in his Disputers of the Tao.⁴⁶ Legalism, in Graham’s view, consists of adapting institutions to changing situations and overruling precedent where necessary; concentrating power in the hands of the ruler; and, above all, maintaining control of the factious bureaucracy. Morality is irrelevant to government because most people are close to the middle of the pack in the virtue-vice continuum, and methods of establishing order must consequently be practicable by mediocre rulers with mediocre subjects.⁴⁷ Graham associated several texts with this “science”: *Han Feizi*, the Shen Dao fragments, *Guanzi*, the lost *Lizi* 李子, the *Book of

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⁴⁶ Graham was preceded by Arthur Waley (1889-1966), *Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1939), 199, who had referred to the fajia as “the Amoralists.”

⁴⁷ Graham, 267-85.
Lord Shang (Shangjun shu 商君書), and the fragments of Shen Buhai. To Graham’s credit, he read the extant portions of these documents and incorporated them into his discussion (though the content of the original Lizi is anybody’s guess). But then he dubbed Han Fei “the great synthesiser of Legalism”\(^\text{48}\)—old-fashioned intellectual history had a lot of synthesizers\(^\text{49}\)—and proceeded to sketch the fundamentals of the “amoral science” largely on the basis of the Han Feizi.

The tendency to extol Han Fei as the great synthesizer and focus on the Han Feizi at the expense of other ancient Chinese political philosophers can be traced to Han Fei’s self-serving depiction of Shen Dao, Shen Buhai, and Gongsun Yang as the authors of single political concepts, which only Han Fei himself combined into a coherent philosophy. (This pretense was, in its way, akin to Sima Tan’s syncretic argument for daojia: my rivals each understand one thing, but only I understand everything.) Thus if we err in regarding Han Fei as the one legalist who supersedes all the others, it is because we have uncritically accepted his own account of the development of legalism.\(^\text{50}\)

問者曰：「申不害、公孫鞅，此二家之言孰急於國？」
應之曰：「是不可程也。人不食，十日則死；大寒之隆，不衣亦死。謂之衣食孰急於人，則是不可一無也，皆養生之具也。今申不害言術，而公孫鞅為法。術者，因任而授官，循名而責實，操殺生之柄，課群臣之能者也，此人主之所執也。法者，憲令著於官府，刑罰必於民心，賞存乎慎法，而罰加乎姦令者也，此臣之所師也。君無術，則無術。」

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\(^{49}\) For example, Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, eds., *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, vol. I: *From Earliest Times to 1600*, 2nd edition, Introduction to Asian Civilizations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 295: “while striving to secure exclusive patronage for the Confucian canon, Dong [Zhongshu 董仲舒, fl. 152-119 B.C.] endeavored to synthesize many intellectual trends that had historically stood beyond the purview of the Confucian tradition”; also 298: “Dong synthesized Daoist ideals that emphasized quietude and passivity of the ruler with the more active orientation of the Confucian ideal.” In Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) they find another “synthesis” (697). See also Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, tr. Derk Bodde, 2nd edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952-53), II, 533: Zhu Xi was “the man who synthesized the ideas of all these predecessors into one all-embracing system and who, indeed, is probably the greatest synthesizer in the history of Chinese thought.”

\(^{50}\) For one of many recent examples, see Yang Yi 楊義, *Han Feizi huanyuan 韓非子還原* (Beijing: Zhonghua, 2011), 32-36.
則弊於上，臣無法則亂於下，此不可一無，皆帝王之具也。」

Someone asked: “Of the sayings of Shen Buhai and Gongsun Yang, which are the more urgent for the state?”

I responded: “They cannot be measured against each other. If people do not eat, they will die within ten days; at the height of a great cold snap, without wearing clothes one will also die. This is to say that [if one were to ask] whether clothing or food are more urgent for people, [the answer would be] that neither one can be done away with; they are both implements for sustaining life. Now Shen Buhai speaks of ‘technique’ and Gongsun Yang speaks of ‘standards.’ ‘Technique’ is to bestow offices corresponding to [people’s] abilities; to hold them responsible for their real achievements in accordance with their titles; to grasp the handles of life and death; and to supervise the abilities of the thronging ministers. This is what the lord of men wields. ‘Standards’ means that ordinances and commands are manifest in the administrative bureaux; laws and punishments are certain in the people’s minds; rewards are generated for those who are careful about standards; and penalties accrue to those who defy commands. These are what subjects take as their preceptor. If the lord is without technique, then he will be beclouded above; if subjects are without standards, they will be disorderly below. Neither one can be done away with; they are both implements of emperors and kings.”

To say that “Shen Buhai speaks of ‘technique’ and Gongsun Yang speaks of ‘standards,’” as though these were the only topics they discussed, is a sophisticated falsification, for Shen Buhai referred to fa quite often (as we have seen), and, if the received text of The Book of Lord Shang can be trusted, Gongsun Yang addressed many other administrative questions. “Agriculture and war” (nong zhan 农战) may have been his single most important slogan. As a policy, this meant forcing the populace to attend solely to agriculture, which was reckoned as one of the least pleasurable human activities, so that in wartime they would only relish the prospect of leaving their ploughshares and

51 “Dingfa” 定法, Han Feizi xin jiaozhu 17.43.957f.

52 Following the commentary of Ōta Tadashi 太田方 (1759-1829).

53 Compare the translation in Liao, II, 212.

fighting for the state. Moreover, the first accomplishment that Sima Qian lists in his account of Gongsun Yang’s reforms is dividing the populace into groups of five and ten (which were called shiwu 什伍 and modeled after military command structure) and instituting a principle of mutual responsibility such that each member of the group would be liable for the misconduct of any other. This was part of a comprehensive plan to eliminate the hereditary aristocracy, with its claims of inalienable privileges, and institute a rigidly stratified society in which one’s status was tied entirely to one’s service to the state.

According to Mark Edward Lewis, Gongsun Yang’s reorganization of the military went so far as to redraw the map of Qin:

The final major reform associated with the extension of military service throughout the state of Qin was the construction of qian [阡] and mo [陌]. As the cumulative research of modern scholars has shown, these were a network of paths built under Shang Yang as part of his reforms in Qin, and they formed a rectangular grid over the agricultural fields. Because they were evenly spaced, they divided the countryside into equal-sized blocks of land.

According to one source, this grid covered the state of Qin, and a recent study using large-scale topographical maps to examine the patterns of fields in China has shown that throughout much of the north, particularly in the former areas of Qin and Jin [晉], roads and footpaths form a striking pattern of rectilinear layouts, everywhere oriented north-south and east-west. Regularity on this scale would be impossible without state intervention, so this evidence offers dramatic, visual testimony to the

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57 “Shangjun liezhuan” 商君列傳, Shiji 68.2230.

impact of the reforms of Shang Yang and earlier Warring States reformers on the Chinese countryside. 59

While it may be farfetched to identify Gongsun Yang personally as the architect of the orderly plan of roads and fields throughout north China, Lewis’s basic point stands: Gongsun Yang was as much a military reformer as a legal one. Han Fei, who served (and died) in Qin, could hardly have been ignorant of the full scope of Gongsun Yang’s program. Thus Han Fei could portray himself as the “great synthesizer” of previous political philosophers only by misrepresenting their breadth and complexity. 60

Graham’s “amoral science of statecraft” may be adequate for the philosophy of Han Fei, but it fails for some of the texts that he himself placed within the legalist camp. Consider the “Four Cords” (siwei 四維) of the Guanzi:

國有四維，一維絕則傾，二維絕則危，三維絕則覆，四維絕則滅。傾可正也，危可安也，覆可起也，滅不可復錯也。何謂四維？一曰禮、二曰義、三曰廉、四曰恥。禮不踰節，義不自進，廉不蔽惡，恥不從枉。故不踰節則上位安，不自進則民無巧詐，不蔽惡則行自全，不從枉則邪事不生。61

In the state, there are Four Cords. If one cord is removed, [the state] will careen; if two cords are removed, it will be imperiled; if three cords are removed, it will be overthrown; if four cords are removed, it will be annihilated. What careens can be stabilized; what is imperiled can be secured; what is overthrown can be raised up; but what is annihilated

59 Sanctioned Violence in Early China, SUNY Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture (Albany, 1990), 63, citing Frank Leeming, “Official Landscapes in Traditional China.” Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient 23 (1980), 153-204. Leeming himself did not attribute these patterns to Gongsun Yang’s policies. For different views of qian and mo, see Zhang Jinguang, esp. 157-86; Ōta Yukio, “On Paths for Agriculture (qian mo 阡陌),” Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko 57 (1999), 14-32; and Li Ling 李零, Li Ling zixuan ji 李零自選集, Ku shiji xueren wencun (Guilin: Guangxi Shifan Daxue, 1998), 169-83. There is no doubt that qian and mo were real, as they are mentioned in various Qin laws.

60 Han Fei engages in a similar sort of reductionism vis-à-vis Shen Dao in “Nan shi” 難勢, Han Feizi xin jiaozhu 17.40.939-40, where he argues as though the doctrine of shi (namely, that the ruler should rely on his positional advantage rather than his virtue or wisdom) were Shen Dao’s sole intellectual innovation. We know from the Shenzi fragments that this is not the case.

cannot be restored. What are the Four Cords? The first is ritual; the second is righteousness; the third is probity; the fourth is shame. Ritual is not to overstep the right measure; righteousness is not to promote oneself [at the expense of others]; probity is not to conceal one’s vices; shame is not to pursue deviance. Thus if people do not overstep the right measure, the superiors’ position is secure; if they do not promote themselves, there will be no craftiness or deceit among the populace; if they do not conceal their vices, they will act with self-engendered integrity; if they do not pursue deviance, perverse things will not come into being.

The text goes on to make a remarkable claim that Shen Dao, Shen Buhai, Han Fei, and the like might never accept: “Laws and punishments are not sufficient to terrify [the people’s] intellects” 故刑罰不足以畏其意. Clearly we are dealing with a very different sort of political philosophy, one that values social stability no less than Han Fei and his peers, but pursues this goal through the inculcation of honesty and good behavior rather than law and punishments—and couches its arguments in undisguised moral language. This sounds very much like xinshu, “the techniques of the heart-mind,” or the sixth of the seven kinds of fa defined elsewhere in the Guanzi, namely in “The Seven Kinds of Standard”: “To be true, sincere, generous, giving, temperate, and compassionate—these are called xinshu” 實也，誠也，厚也，施也，度也，恕也，謂

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62 Following the commentary of Li Xiangfeng.

63 Compare the translation in Rickett, I, 54 (who curiously omits the line bu bi e ze xing zi quan 不蔽惡則行自全).

64 “Mumin,” Guanzi jiaozhu 1.1.13.

65 Hu Jiacong 胡家聰, Guanzi xintan 管子新探 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1995), esp. 26-76, characterizes the political philosophy of Guanzi as “Qi legalism” (Qi fajia 齊法家), which he distinguishes from the “Qin legalism” (Qin fajia 秦法家) of Shang Yang and Han Fei. He explains the concern for morality among the “Qi legalists” of the Guanzi as their “adoption of Confucian doctrine” 採納儒家學説 (26). See also Kanaya, Kanaya Osamu Chūgoku shisō ronshū, II, 445; and Xiang Zicheng 相自成, “Guanzi fa sixiang chutan” 《管子》法思想初探, in Guanzi yanjiu 《管子》研究 1 (1987), 205. (To my knowledge, only one issue of Guanzi yanjiu ever appeared.) This sort of rationalization, though conventional in East Asian scholarship, always fails to explain why the thinkers in question would have adopted other people’s doctrines.

On moral governance in Guanzi generally, see, e.g., Zhang Lianwei 張連偉, Guanzi zhexue sixiang yanjiu 《管子》哲學思想研究, Ru Dao Shi boshi lunwen congshu (Chengdu: Ba-Shu, 2008), 122-50.
To Han Fei, these are precisely the sort of unreliable virtues that fa is supposed to ferret out, yet here we read that they constitute one type of fa in themselves!

One way to resolve the problem that not all ancient theorists spoke of fa as an “amoral science” would be to define legalism in such a way as to eliminate the entire tradition of xinshu. And this was the route that Graham took in defending his rubric: xinshu, he says, “is one of the elements in the Guanzi statecraft which is foreign to classic Legalism, and we shall not be meeting it again.” Indeed, we never meet it again because Graham carefully steers us away from it. This raises yet another problem with the category of “legalism”: it leads us to ignore usages in other textual traditions that do not square with our preconceptions of what fa should denote. The Master of the Pheasant Cap (Heguanzi 鶡冠子), for example, uses the word fa dozens of times, in senses that include “natural model,” “organizational principle,” and “human law.” This range is not very different from what we have seen in the Guanzi, and is also reflected in the silk manuscripts from Mawangdui 馬王堆. Yet these are not usually considered legalist documents.

What, then, did Graham mean by “classic Legalism”? First Graham told us that legalism was represented by a handful of specific texts; then one of these texts turned out to offer political ideals that were incompatible with “amoral science”; so he promptly excised it, leaving Han Fei—and, once again, we are not sure of whom else. Would it not be clearer (and more accurate), when we wish to refer to the philosophy of Han Fei,

66 “Qifa,” Guanzi jiaozhu 2.6.106.
67 Graham, 275, with Romanization converted.
merely to say “the philosophy of Han Fei” and leave all the –isms out of it? By using “legalism” to mean little more than “the philosophy of Han Fei and those parts of any other philosophy that we deem comparable to it” scholars only perpetuate the current regrettable state of affairs in which we overemphasize Han Fei and neglect all the other political philosophers. To be sure, he was incontestably the finest writer among them, but we may not be so certain that he was the most original thinker. It is astounding, as well as profoundly disappointing, that there has not been a single English publication on Shen Dao and Shen Buhai since the work of Thompson and Creel.

Even in Chinese, the situation is little better.

One final criticism of Graham’s “amoral science of statecraft”: this characterization is not wholly satisfactory even when restricted to the Han Feizi, for Han Fei does not always deal with statecraft. One of the most basic interpretive mistakes of Western readers, who are accustomed to the philosophical style of Hobbes, Locke, and so on, is to approach Chinese material with the presumption that Chinese thinkers must have addressed the same questions and problems. I find no evidence that Han Fei was trying to work out anything like a general theory of the state. Often, he is most interested in how to save one’s hide:

且萬乘之主, 千乘之君, 后妃、夫人、適子為太子者, 或有欲其君之蚤死者。何以知其然？夫妻者，非有骨肉之恩也，愛則親，不愛則疏。語曰：「其母好者其子抱。」然則其為之反也，其母惡者其子釋。丈夫年五十而好色未解也，婦人年三十而美色衰矣。以衰美之婦人事好色之丈夫，則身死見疏賤，而子疑不為後，此后妃、夫人之所以冀其君之死者也。唯母為後而子為主，則令無不行，禁無不止，男女之樂不減於先君，而擅萬乘不疑，此鸩毒扼害之所以用也。故桃左春秋曰：「人主之疾死者不能處半。」人主弗知則亂多資，故曰：利君死者眾則人主危。

Whether one is the ruler of a state of ten thousand chariots or the

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70 Cf. Yang Yi, 75-84.


72 “Beinei” 備內, Han Feizi xin jiaozhu 5.17.322.
lord of a state of a thousand, among one’s consort, ladies, and the son chosen to be Crown Prince, there are those who desire the early death of their lord. How do I know this to be so? Between husband and wife, there is not the kindness of a relationship of flesh and bone. If he loves her, she is intimate with him; if he does not love her, she is estranged. There is a saying: “If the mother is favored, her son will be embraced.” This being the case, the reverse is: if the mother is disliked, her son will be disowned. The lust of a man of fifty has not yet dissipated, whereas the beauty and allure of a woman of thirty have faded. If a woman whose beauty has faded serves a man who still lusts, she will be estranged and disesteemed until her death; her son will be viewed with suspicion and will not succeed to the throne. This is why consorts and ladies hope for their lord’s death.

But if the mother becomes a dowager and her son becomes the ruler, then all of her commands will be carried out, all of her prohibitions observed. Her sexual pleasure will be no less than with her former lord, and she may arrogate to herself power over the ten thousand chariots without suspicion. Such is the use of poison, strangling, and knifing. Thus it is said in the Springs and Autumns of Tao Zuo: “Less than half of all rulers die of illness.” If the ruler of men is unaware of this, disorders will be manifold and unrestrained. Thus it is said: If those who benefit from a lord’s death are many, the ruler will be imperiled.

One might respond that seeing to the ruler’s safety can still be regarded as a matter of statecraft, inasmuch as threats to his person could also destabilize the state. But the interests of the ruler and the state need not coincide; and, in any case, in the above scenario Han Fei does not seem to envision much turmoil resulting from the sovereign’s assassination. All proceeds more or less as before, only now there is a new ruler on the throne—and a new dowager pulling strings behind him.

More importantly, in other chapters Han Fei offers brazen counsel to ministers about protecting their welfare, and his advice is often antithetic to the interests of the ruler.

73 Following the commentary of Chen Qiyou.

74 A synecdoche for the state.

75 Following the commentary of Hong Yixuan 洪頤煊 (1765-1833).

76 Reading zi 資 in the attested sense of zi 態.

77 Compare the translation in Watson, 86f.
Eulogize other people who act in the same manner [as the ruler]; take as a model those affairs of others that are similar to his plans. If there is someone as vile as he, you must use [that person’s] greatness to prettify him, as though he were harmless. If there is someone who has had the same failures as he, you must use [that person’s] brilliance to prettify him, as though there were no real loss. If he considers his own strengths manifold, do not cause him to regret his [past] difficulties. If he considers his decisions brave, do not anger him by reprimanding him. If he considers his plans wise, do not diminish him [by citing] his failures. Only if there is nothing contrary in your general import and nothing stringent in your speech will your wisdom and rhetoric gallop forward to the ultimate. This is the way of attaining both intimacy without suspicion and effectual speech.

Such advice, however, is limited to this one chapter, which is openly addressed to other ministers; elsewhere, ministers who try to gauge the king’s mind in order to further their careers are called “treacherous” (jian 論):

凡姦臣皆欲順人主之心以取信幸之勢者也。是以主有所善，臣從而譽之；主有所憎，臣因而毀之。81

Treacherous ministers all want to accord with the ruler’s mind in order to attain a position of trust and favor. Therefore, if the ruler likes something, the ministers will duly praise it; if the ruler hates something, the ministers will accordingly disparage it.

The fact that Han Fei endorses the calculated pursuit of self-interest, even if it means speaking disingenuously before the king, is not easily reconcilable with the notion that he was advancing a science of statecraft. But I have stated my view of this issue in a
prior publication, and need not repeat the details here.\textsuperscript{82}

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In sum, the foregoing has attempted to demonstrate that “legalism” is an adequate translation of \textit{fajia}; that \textit{fajia} is itself a partisan and anachronistic term; and that the conventional understanding of “legalism” as “an amoral science of statecraft” results in a diminution of our perspective on ancient Chinese political philosophy and an unproductive fixation on Han Fei. Intellectual categories are like social institutions in one respect: when the cost of maintaining them has come to outweigh the benefits that they provide, it is time to abolish them.