

# The COPS Program and the Spread of Community Policing Practices, 1995-2000

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# CONTENTS

<b>1. INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1-1</b>
<b>2. THE PREVIOUS FINDINGS .....</b>	<b>2-1</b>
2.1. COPS and Community Policing Practices: 1995-1998 .....	2-1
2.2. “Ground Truth” on Site .....	2-2
<b>3. COPS AND COMMUNITY POLICING IN JURISDICTIONS OVER 50,000: 1998-2000 .....</b>	<b>3-1</b>
3.1. Community Partnership-building .....	3-2
3.1.1. 1995-2000 Trends .....	3-2
3.1.2. Year 2000 Grantee/Non-Grantee Comparison .....	3-3
3.1.3. Comparative Adoption of Partnership-building Tactics, 1998-2000.....	3-3
3.2. Problem-solving .....	3-4
3.2.1. 1995-2000 Trends .....	3-4
3.2.2. Year 2000 Grantee/Non-Grantee Comparison .....	3-4
3.2.3. Comparative Adoption of Problem-Solving Tactics, 1998-2000 .....	3-4
3.3. Prevention Programs .....	3-5
3.3.1. 1995-2000 Trends .....	3-5
3.3.2. Year 2000 Grantee/Non-Grantee Comparison .....	3-5
3.3.3. Comparative Adoption of Prevention Tactics, 1998-2000 .....	3-5
3.4. Organizational Changes to Support Community Policing .....	3-6
3.4.1. Trends, 1995-2000 .....	3-6
3.4.2. Year 2000 Grantee/Non-Grantee Comparison .....	3-7
3.4.3. Comparative Adoption of Organizational Change Tactics, 1998-2000.....	3-7
<b>4. COPS AND REPORTED COMMUNITY POLICING IN SMALL AGENCIES: 1995-2000 .....</b>	<b>4-1</b>
4.1. COPS and Community Partnership-building .....	4-3
4.1.1. Spread of Community Partnership-building Tactics .....	4-3
4.1.2. Pre-1995 Grantee/Non-grantee Comparison .....	4-4
4.1.3. Comparative Adoption of Partnership-building Tactics, 1995-1998 and 1998-2000.....	4-4
4.1.4. Innovations Attributed to COPS Grants .....	4-5
4.1.5. Grant Impacts on pre-COPS Partnership-Building Tactics .....	4-5
4.2. COPS and Problem-solving .....	4-6
4.2.1. Spread of Problem-solving Tactics .....	4-6
4.2.2. Pre-1995 Grantee/Non-grantee Comparison .....	4-6
4.2.3. Comparative Adoption of Problem-solving Tactics, 1995-1998 and 1998-2000 .....	4-7
4.2.4. Innovations Attributed to COPS Grants .....	4-7
4.2.5. Grant Impacts on pre-COPS Problem-solving Tactics .....	4-7



4.3.	COPS and Prevention Programs.....	4-8
4.3.1.	Spread of Prevention Programs.....	4-8
4.3.2.	Pre-1995 Grantee/Non-grantee Comparison .....	4-9
4.3.3.	Comparative Adoption of Prevention Programs, 1995-1998 and 1998-2000.....	4-9
4.3.4.	Innovations Attributed to COPS Grants .....	4-10
4.3.5.	Grant Effects on Pre-COPS Prevention Practices .....	4-10
4.4.	COPS and Supportive Organizational Changes .....	4-10
4.4.1.	Spread of Organizational Change.....	4-11
4.4.2.	Pre-1995 Grantee/Non-grantee Comparison .....	4-11
4.4.3.	Comparative Adoption of Prevention Program Tactics, 1995-1998 and 1998-2000.....	4-12
4.4.4.	Innovations Attributed to COPS Grants .....	4-12
4.4.5.	Grant Impacts on Pre-COPS Organizational Practices.....	4-13
<b>5.</b>	<b>SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.....</b>	<b>5-1</b>
5.1.	Adoption of Community Policing Practices.....	5-1
5.2.	Implications.....	5-2
5.2.1.	The COPS Program.....	5-2
5.2.2.	Community Policing Innovations.....	5-3
5.3.	Future Questions .....	5-4
5.3.1.	Defining Community Policing .....	5-4
5.3.2.	Policing Practices, Levels, and Crime.....	5-5
	<b>Appendix A. Policing Tactics Checklist.....</b>	<b>A-1</b>
	<b>Appendix B. The Survey Design.....</b>	<b>B-1</b>
	<b>References.....</b>	<b>Ref-1</b>

## TABLES

Table 1.	Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Partnership Building Tactics Implementation, Large Municipal and County Agencies (N=382) .....	Table-1
Table 2.	Partnership Building Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000 and Net percent change), Large Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=276], Non-funded [n=106]) .....	Table-2
Table 3.	Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Problem-Solving Tactics Implementation, Large Municipal and County Agencies (N=382) .....	Table-3
Table 4.	Problem-Solving Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000, and Net percent change), Large Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=276], Non-funded [n=106]) .....	Table-4
Table 5.	Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Prevention Program Tactics Implementation, Large Municipal and County Agencies (N=382).....	Table-5
Table 6.	Prevention Program Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000 and Net percent change), Large Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=276], Non-funded [n=106]) .....	Table-6
Table 7.	Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Supportive Organizational Changes, Large Municipal and County Agencies (N=382).....	Table-7
Table 8.	Supportive Organizational Change Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000 and Net percent change), Large Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=276], Non-funded [n=106]).....	Table-8
Table 9.	Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Partnership Building Tactics Implementation, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589) .....	Table-9
Table 10.	Partnership Building Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000 and Net percent change), Small Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=505], Non-funded [n=84]).....	Table-10
Table 11.	COPS Impact on “New” (1995-96 and 1998-2000) Partnership-building Practices, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589).....	Table-11
Table 12.	COPS Impact on “Old” (pre-1995) Partnership-building Practices, Small Municipal and County Agencies, 1996 Survey Wave (N=589) .....	Table-12
Table 13.	Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Problem-Solving Tactics Implementation, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589) .....	Table-13
Table 14.	Problem-Solving Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000, and Net percent change), Small Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=505], Non-funded [n=84]) .....	Table-14
Table 15.	COPS Impact on “New” (1995-6 and 1998-2000) Problem-solving Practices, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589).....	Table-15
Table 16.	COPS Impact on “Old” (pre-1995) Problem-solving Practices, Small Municipal and County Agencies, 1996 Survey Wave (N=589) .....	Table-16
Table 17.	Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Prevention Program Tactics Implementation, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589) .....	Table-17
Table 18.	Prevention Program Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000 and Net percent change), Small Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=505], Non-funded [n=84]).....	Table-18
Table 19.	COPS Impact on “New” (1995-6 and 1998-2000) Prevention Practices, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589) .....	Table-19
Table 20.	COPS Impact on “Old” (pre-1995) Prevention Practices, Small Municipal and County	

Agencies, 1996 Survey Wave (N=589) .....	Table-21
Table 21. Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Supportive Organizational Changes, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589).....	Table-22
Table 22. Supportive Organizational Change Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000 and Net percent change), Small Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=505], Non-funded [n=84]).....	Table-23
Table 23. COPS Impact on “New” (1995-6 and 1998-2000) Organizational Changes, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589) .....	Table-24
Table 24. COPS Impact on “Old” (pre-1995) Organizational Practices, Small Municipal and County Agencies, 1996 Survey Wave (N=589) .....	Table-26

## **Appendix B. The Survey Design**

Table B.1. Sampling Frame by Funding/Program Status and Population Category For 1996 COPS Survey*.....	B-1
Table B.2. Designed Sampling Fraction By Funding-Program Status and Population Category for 1996 COPS Survey .....	B-2
Table B.3. Survey Response Rates By Funding-Program Status and Population Category (In Percentages) For 1996 COPS Survey .....	B-2
Table B.4. Completed Interviews and Response Rates (In Parentheses) By Funding-Program Status and Population Category For 2000 COPS-H&R Survey* .....	B-3

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

The Clinton administration's Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program is most visibly associated with the goal of placing 100,000 police officers on the streets of the U.S. However, the program had a second goal: encouraging law enforcement agencies to adopt the operating principles of community policing. Early in his tenure as the first appointed director of the COPS Office, Joseph Brann alluded to this goal in Congressional testimony (Brann, 1995). Although community policing was an ambiguous concept at the time and remains so today, Brann's testimony took a step toward operationalizing it by specifying four principal goals of community policing: building police-community partnerships, problem-solving, crime prevention, and organizational support for these programmatic objectives.

Because the COPS program required grantees to implement community policing as a condition of award, achieving these four goals became at least a nominal objective of COPS grantees. In turn, this obligated the team evaluating the COPS program to measure progress toward those objectives and to contrast COPS grantees with non-grantees. Given the purposes of the grant, our research design was not intended to test organizational explanations of innovation, nor to examine the evolution of the term "community policing" during the period we studied. Instead, we conclude this evaluation report with a discussion of such questions, which we plan to explore in future research.

As explained more fully in the national COPS evaluation report (Roth et al., 2000), we used three approaches to measure progress toward the implementation of community policing. First, in repeated surveys of a nationally representative sample containing grantee and non-grantee law enforcement agencies, we measured agency officials' statements at multiple points in time about the implementation status of 8 practices that are commonly associated with partnership-building, 11 problem-solving tactics, 11 crime prevention programs and tactics, and 10 supportive organizational changes. Second, recognizing the limitations of survey measures of law enforcement agency practices, we assigned teams of police practitioners and researchers to visit 30 grantee agencies, many twice. Third, a team from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government conducted 10 case studies of organizational change in grantee agencies.

Drawing on the survey data collected in these three efforts, the national evaluation report (Roehl et al., 2000) described changes between 1995 and 1998 in the self-reported use of community policing practices by law enforcement agencies serving medium and large cities and counties (i.e., jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more). We supplemented these quantitative findings with the 30 programmatic site assessments of the "ground truth" underlying agencies' statements about their use of community policing tactics. Finally, we used the 10 case studies to explore the roles of local leadership and COPS resources in stimulating and institutionalizing community policing innovations.

The present report begins by summarizing findings from the national report about medium and large agencies' implementation of community policing practices between 1995 and 1998. It then updates the previous survey findings for medium and large agencies, extending the analysis of change through July 2000, the field period of our Wave 4 survey. It also presents findings from a similar analysis of change for small agencies, covering the entire period 1995-2000.

## **2. THE PREVIOUS FINDINGS**

Findings of the national evaluation report were based on Waves 1 (Autumn 1996) and 3 (Summer 1998) of a survey of a nationally representative sample of 1,471 municipal and county law enforcement agencies serving jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or larger. In one module of the survey, chief executives or their designees were presented a list of 40 tactics that are commonly associated with the community policing objectives listed above and asked to describe the implementation status of each tactic: whether or not the agency was using it in 1998 and whether it was adopted before or after 1995, the first full year of the COPS program. For each tactic in use, the respondent was asked about possible effects of the COPS grant: whether it started or expanded use of the tactic, helped the agency sustain it, or had no effect. Appendix A provides the precise wording of the community policing practices, the implementation status response choices, and the COPS attribution response choices.

### **2.1. COPS and Community Policing Practices: 1995-1998**

Because the COPS program placed such great emphasis on community policing, we had expected medium-sized and large agencies that requested and received COPS grants to be somewhat more committed to community policing than non-grantees at the outset of the program. Contrary to our expectations, most of the 40 tactics were reportedly about equally likely to have been implemented by grantees and non-grantees alike.

Between 1995 and 1998, according to survey responses, a number of tactics commonly labeled as community policing swept the country in jurisdictions of 50,000 or larger, whether or not they were COPS grantees. We estimate that during that period, agencies in this category adopted an average of 3.3 new problem-solving tactics, 1.8 partnership-building practices, 2.1 prevention programs, and 2.5 organizational changes. Among the practices that reportedly spread most rapidly were citizen police academies; cooperative truancy programs with schools; problem-solving structured as Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment (SARA, see Eck and Spelman, 1987); and patrolling on foot, bike, or other transportation modes that offered more potential than patrol cars for interacting with citizens. COPS fundees and non-fundees alike reported revising their employee evaluation measures and their mission, vision, and values statements to codify their versions of community policing. Packaged prevention programs such as Neighborhood Watch and Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) in schools, which in 1995 were already among the most widespread tactics commonly described as community policing, became almost universal by 1998.

With a few exceptions, medium and large agencies' reported use of community policing tactics grew more rapidly between 1995 and 1998 among fundees than non-fundees. Therefore, by 1998, grantees were using means of 9.6 problem-solving tactics compared to non-fundees' 8.6; 8.6 prevention programs compared to non-fundees' 8.2; and 7.0 organizational supports for community policing compared to non-fundees' 6.0. At that time, we did not observe any statistically distinguishable difference between grantees and non-grantees on partnership building.

We have no measure of the extent to which various features of the COPS program may have indirectly encouraged non-fundees to adopt these tactics. Possible mechanisms include training and technical assistance programs and materials, publicizing fundees' community policing successes, and acting as a catalyst that encouraged fundees to demand more community policing training from regional and state academies.

For whatever reason, the differences between fundees' and nonfundees' reported adoption rates were statistically significant for relatively few tactics. As of 1998, fundees were significantly more likely than nonfundees to be using joint crime prevention projects with businesses, citizen surveys, techniques for bringing the community more fully into problem-solving, problem-solving partnerships with probation officers, late-night recreation programs, and victim assistance programs. Fundees were also significantly more likely than non-fundees to report adopting late-night recreation programs and victim assistance programs. Finally, fundees were significantly more likely than non-fundees to report instituting three organizational changes in support of community policing: new dispatch rules to increase officers' time in their beats, new rules to increase beat officers' discretion, and revised employee evaluation measures.

## **2.2. "Ground Truth" on Site**

Because the community policing vocabulary was well known at the time of our surveys, and Federal funding rewarded departments that professed adherence to community policing principles, these survey findings could merely reflect socially desirable responses, i.e., respondents' views of what community policing *should* mean in their agencies. Our site visits were intended to learn the "ground truth" behind the survey reports of 30 agencies and to shed light on the different meanings that law enforcement agencies assign to strategies and tactics that are commonly labeled community policing. Indeed, we detected enormous variation across sites in the operational meanings of key community policing concepts (See Roehl et al., 2000, for further discussion of this variation.).

Partnerships among governmental and community-based agencies that deliver a variety of resources were commonplace in many of the agencies visited. Yet all too often, partnerships were in name only, or were simply standard temporary working arrangements. Some partnerships were merely short term, to launch crackdowns, celebrate National Night Out, or complete other short-term objectives. Even in more permanent relationships, sharing non-sensitive information was the most common partnership activity as of 1997. Actual coordination of activities was far less common; at that time few of the partnerships we observed rose to the level of collaboration in Bruner's sense (i.e., multiple organizations sharing a common agenda) (Bruner, 1991). Some jurisdictions had begun to lay foundations for closer, more coequal partnerships, however, and it seemed likely that the trust needed for power-sharing and joint decision-making might emerge as police-community problem-solving matured and evolved.

Most of the agencies that had told survey interviewers they were doing problem-solving showed signs of some activity on site. However, the visibility and nature of "problem-solving" varied widely from agency to agency. The strongest programs that we observed showed signs that problem-solving had evolved from a code word for special operations to more complex activities that attacked disorder and fear and required officers to search for interventions other than arrest. They had administrative systems to document and recognize problem-solving at

multiple scales and multiple levels, to distribute broadly the authority to initiate problem-solving “projects,” to assess the impact of specific projects and to learn from them, and to engage other government agencies in defining and solving community problems.

In contrast, some other jurisdictions still applied the problem-solving label to traditional enforcement and investigative activities, on the basis that they addressed “problems the community was concerned about.” Such activities were sometimes said to encourage residents to re-enter public spaces and make them safer; however, agencies differed in the extent to which they monitored whether such follow-up occurred and how long the gains from tactical operations lasted.

Other forms of reported “problem-solving” turned out to be “zero tolerance” or “quality of life” policing, other terms with fuzzy definitions. Some of these were clearly short-term operations focused on specific problems, such as crackdowns on street drug dealing or public drinking on the 4th of July within a circumscribed area. Elsewhere, what might have been called a crackdown five years ago is now routinely implemented under zero tolerance or order maintenance policies and classified as part of community policing. While some of these do indeed address community concerns, there were rarely well-defined channels for the community being policed to regulate either the launch or the end of such programs. Still other forms of “problem-solving” turned out to resemble long-term primary prevention programs, or to take some idiosyncratic form that would be unrecognizable to the individuals and organizations that promulgate traditional problem-solving (See, e.g., Goldstein, 1979; Eck and Spelman, 1987).

Prevention efforts in the sites we observed were primarily manifested as traditional prevention programs now subsumed under the community policing label. Neighborhood Watch, DARE, and a wide variety of youth programs remain the mainstays of prevention efforts. Beyond the standardized programs, examples were rare of systemic prevention efforts based on resolution of the underlying causes of crime.

### 3. COPS AND COMMUNITY POLICING IN JURISDICTIONS OVER 50,000: 1998-2000

The preceding discussion highlights limitations of surveys in measuring changes in policing. Nevertheless, given the prohibitive cost of site visits to a statistically meaningful sample of agencies, sample surveys remain the only feasible approach for developing a national picture of change. In designing the Wave 4 survey, we were interested in updating previous answers to two program evaluation questions about medium and large county and municipal law enforcement agencies:

- 1) **Did medium and large agencies' use of community policing tactics continue to grow between 1998 and 2000?** We hypothesized that the use of community policing tactics would continue to grow between 1998 and 2000, though perhaps at a slower rate than during the 1995-98 period, because many agencies had already designed their community policing strategies and adopted the relevant tactics by 1998.
- 2) **Between 1998 and 2000, did COPS grantees expand their use of community policing tactics more rapidly than non-grantees?** We hypothesized that even at the lower overall adoption rate, COPS grants would continue to encourage grantees to adopt community policing tactics more rapidly than nongrantees, for at least three reasons. The grants provided a financial incentive to do so. They provided resources that grantee police executives could use to introduce resource-intensive components of their visions of community policing without cutting back other services. Also the COPS Office expanded its compliance activities, which were intended to encourage lagging agencies to fulfill the commitments made in their grant applications.

We tested these hypotheses by applying a common methodology to the four community policing objectives: partnership building, problem-solving, prevention programs, and organizational changes in support of community policing. For each objective, respondents were presented with a list of practices associated with that objective (See Appendix A for the precise wording of each tactic, and See Roehl et al., 2000, for an explanation of the choice of tactics). We then asked them to describe the implementation status of each tactic in one of the following ways:

1. We have not done this since 1998, and have no plans to start.
2. We began doing this before 1998, and we have continued or expanded it since then.
3. We began doing this before 1998, but we've dropped it since then.
4. We began doing this after 1998, and we plan to continue or expand it.
5. We tried this for a while after 1998, but we dropped it.
6. This topic is not applicable in our jurisdiction.

We computed the percentage of agencies using the tactic in 1998 as the percentage responding with either choice 2 or 3. Then, starting with the 1998 percentage, we calculated the percentage using the tactic in 2000 by adding the percentage responding with choice 4 and subtracting the percentage choosing item 3. Because we interpreted response 6 as a socially desirable alternative to response 1, we used the count of all agencies as the base for each percentage — not merely the count of agencies in which the respondent considered the tactic applicable.<sup>1</sup>

We tested the first hypothesis by subtracting the pre-1995 percent — computed from our Wave 1 survey and reported by Roth et al. (2000) — from the 1998 percentage computed as described above. We used a t-statistic to test whether the change was significantly different from 0.

We tested the second hypothesis in two ways. First, we computed the fundee–nonfundee difference in percentages reportedly using the tactic in 2000 and used a t-statistic to test whether the difference was statistically non-zero. Second, we computed net changes between the 1998 and 2000 utilization percentages for grantees and non-grantees, then used a z-statistic to test whether the two change statistics were statistically different. We tested both hypotheses in two ways: first using an index of all tactics associated with each objective, and second on an item-by-item basis.

### **3.1. Community Partnership-building**

We measured an agency’s community partnership-building activities using a list of 8 tactics in the Wave 4 survey. The bottom of Table 1 reports the mean number and percentage of tactics in use as of 1995, 1998, and 2000, which we used as an implementation index for each agency. The inter-item reliability (KR alpha=0.65) for the index based on 2000 implementation status was smaller than in previous survey waves but still provided some assurance that our partnership-building construct had internal consistency.

#### **3.1.1. 1995-2000 Trends**

Table 1 shows that overall use of partnership-building tactics grew between 1995 and 1998 from an average of 4.6 tactics (57.9% of all 8 tactics) to 6.4 tactics, an increase of 1.8 additional tactics. Between 1998 and 2000, in contrast, these agencies reported virtually no change in the total number of tactics implemented.

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1. Because resources requested and received for the Wave 3 (1998) survey were not intended to cover the small agencies, our design posed slightly different recall problems for respondents from small and large agencies. Large-agency respondents were asked: (in 1996) whether a given practice was in use before 1995; (in 1998) whether a given practice had been initiated between 1995 and 1998; and (in 2000) whether a given tactic had been implemented between 1998 and 2000. Small-agency respondents were asked only the first and third questions. Therefore, while small-agency and large-agency respondents were confronted with similar reference periods for dating the launch of a new practice, small-agency respondents in 2000 faced a longer recall period on the question whether a given practice was in use in 1998.

The tactic-specific percentages in Table 1 show that the apparent stagnation of overall partnership building actually resulted from the evolution of a more selective approach. Between 1995 and 1998, the growth in use of all 8 tactics was statistically significant. Between 1998 and 2000, in contrast, the percentages of agencies conducting citizen police academies and carrying out crime prevention projects with businesses continued to grow slowly, while the percentages of agencies working side-by-side with citizens – to prevent crime, to remove signs of disorder, and to clean-up neighborhoods – actually declined. The declines are consistent with comments heard in some of the site visits to COPS grantees that were conducted as part of the national evaluation. These comments were to the effect that such efforts often had only temporary effects, that they offered no basis for developing long-term collaborative strategies, and that they jeopardized officers' morale (Roehl et al., 2000).

### **3.1.2. Year 2000 Grantee/Non-Grantee Comparison**

As shown in Table 2, by 2000 COPS grantees reported significantly wider use of partnership-building tactics than did non-grantees. Grantees reported having an average 82.1 percent (i.e., 6.6) of the tactics in use as of 2000, somewhat ahead of the 73.8 percent (i.e., 5.9) for non-grantees. This difference was statistically significant at the p-level 0.01.

The analysis by tactics indicates that grantee agencies were statistically more likely than non-grantees to have most partnership-building activities in use by 2000. Grantee agencies were significantly more likely than non-grantees to report having implemented all but two of the partnership-building tactics, joint crime prevention activities with residents and citizen police academies.

### **3.1.3. Comparative Adoption of Partnership-building Tactics, 1998-2000**

While there was essentially no change between 1998 and 2000 in the total number of partnership-building tactics adopted by either grantees or non-grantees, there were some interesting item-specific trends. The fastest-growing practice during that period was citizen-police academies, which were launched by 4 % of both grantee and non-grantee agencies.

Another pattern shown in Table 2, while statistically non-significant, suggests that between 1998 and 2000, while at least a few grantees were abandoning the tactics that they disparaged in on-site interviews (See discussion above), non-grantees were following their earlier innovation paths. In 1998, grantees were farthest ahead of non-grantees (in terms of absolute difference and statistical significance) in adopting three tactics: projects with residents to remove signs of disorder, citizen surveys, and clean-up projects (See Column B of Table 2). Between 1998 and 2000, the percentage of grantee agencies using these tactics dropped, while non-grantees continued to adopt them. In fact, two of them — clean up projects and joint projects to remove signs of disorder — were among the three tactics most rapidly adopted by non-grantees. Only for the disorder projects was the grantee/non-grantee difference statistically significant.

## **3.2. Problem-solving**

We measured an agency's problem-solving activities using a list of 11 tactics. The inter-item reliability (KR alpha=0.78) for the entire list was higher than for partnership building, providing greater assurance that our problem-solving construct had internal consistency.

### **3.2.1. 1995-2000 Trends**

The bottom of Table 3 shows that problem-solving activities in our list proliferated considerably between 1995 and 1998 among medium and large municipal and county police agencies. During that period, our combined sample of COPS grantees and non-grantees reported adopting an average of 3.3 new problem-solving tactics, so that by 1998 their use had become nearly universal. On average, they were using 9.4 tactics, or 85.5% of the 11 in our list by 1998.

Because problem-solving was so widespread by 1998, it is not surprising that the adoption rate slowed dramatically thereafter, so that by 2000 the mean number of tactics implemented had climbed by only 0.1, to 9.5. However, the tactic-specific trends in Table 3 show increases of about 6 percentage points in the fraction of agencies adopting the two practices that were not already nearly universal: analyzing crime problems with Geographic Information System (GIS) software and working with probation officers on problem-solving projects. These increases were statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

### **3.2.2. Year 2000 Grantee/Non-Grantee Comparison**

As shown in Column C of Table 4, grantees reported greater problem-solving implementation than non-grantees. Grantees reported having an average 88.5 percent (i.e., 9.7) of the tactics in use as of 2000, ahead of the 80.4 percent (i.e., 8.8) for non-grantees. This difference was statistically significant at p-level 0.01.

The analysis by tactics suggests that grantee agencies were statistically more likely to have problem-solving activities in use by 2000. Grantee agencies reported being more likely than non-grantees to have implemented all but two of the problem-solving tactics: the basic data analysis to identify recurring problems and systematic post-response monitoring of the problem.

### **3.2.3. Comparative Adoption of Problem-Solving Tactics, 1998-2000**

As the preceding discussion would suggest, neither grantees nor non-grantees significantly increased their total numbers of problem-solving tactics between 1998 and 2000. However, of the two specific tactics that had not become nearly universal by 1998, the adoption rate for GIS analysis was over twice as high for non-grantee agencies (9.3%) as it was for grantees (4.4%). An identical percentage, 5.3%, of grantees and non-grantees initiated problem-solving partnerships with probation officers.

### **3.3. Prevention Programs**

We measured agencies' prevention activities in terms of 11 tactics (See Appendix A for prevention tactics list). The inter-item reliability (KR alpha=0.57) was considerably lower than in previous years and lower than for the other three objectives, providing fairly low assurance that our prevention program construct had internal consistency.

#### **3.3.1. 1995-2000 Trends**

Table 5 shows that prevention activities in our list proliferated moderately between 1995 and 1998 among municipal and county police agencies serving jurisdictions larger than 50,000. On average, our combined sample of COPS grantees and non-grantees reported adopting 2.1 additional prevention programs during that period, so that an average of 8.5, or 77.4% of the items or our list, were in use by 1998. Between 1998 and 2000, in contrast, these agencies reported essentially no change in the total number of tactics implemented.

The tactic-specific percentages in Table 5 show that the percent of agencies using every tactic on our list grew significantly between 1995 and 1998. In contrast, between 1998 and 2000, only participation in cooperative anti-truancy programs with schools expanded significantly ( $p < 0.1$ ), from 74.0% of agencies to 78.0%. Participation in victim assistance programs dropped significantly ( $p < .05$ ), from 82.8% of agencies to 78.5%. There were also smaller non-significant decreases in drug education programs in schools (from 95.8% to 92.8%), in late-night recreation programs (from 25.7% to 23.8%), and battered women's programs (from 81.5% to 79.2%).

#### **3.3.2. Year 2000 Grantee/Non-Grantee Comparison**

As shown in Table 6, grantees reported using a significantly ( $p < .01$ ) greater total number of prevention program than non-grantees, 8.6 tactics (i.e., 78.2 percent) compared to 8.0 (i.e., 72.9 percent). The analysis by tactics suggests that grantee agencies were statistically more likely to have 6 of 11 prevention program activities in use by 2000. The six were varying styles of preventive patrol (93.3 percent compared to 88.2 percent), late-night recreation programs (26.1 percent compared to 16.7 percent), code enforcement to combat disorder (92.4 percent compared to 83.6 percent), victim assistance programs (80.5 percent compared to 72.5 percent), battered women's programs (80.9 percent compared to 74.1 percent), and graffiti eradication programs (73.3 percent compared to 58.3 percent).

#### **3.3.3. Comparative Adoption of Prevention Tactics, 1998-2000**

Between 1998 and 2000, the mean number and percentage of tactics in use remained essentially unchanged for both grantees and non-grantees. However, this stable total conceals some interesting tactic-specific comparative trends. As shown in Column E of Table 6, grantees outpaced non-grantees in adoption of anti-truancy programs, 5.1% to 1.1%. The percentage using four tactics dropped for grantees while increasing for non-grantees: drug education in schools, varying styles of preventive patrol (e.g., bike and foot patrols,  $p < .10$ ), and mediation to

resolve conflicts. Non-grantees were nearly five times as likely (10.5%) as grantees (2.2%) to discontinue their participation in victim assistance programs.

### **3.4. Organizational Changes to Support Community Policing**

Various commentators have argued that mere adoption of “signature” community policing tactics cannot change the nature of an agency’s policing without certain organizational changes to support it. Such changes include, for example, revising the organization’s mission statement to reflect the change in orientation; revising personnel performance criteria to reward officers who implement the chief executive’s vision of community policing; changing personnel rotation, resource allocation, and dispatch rules to expand officers’ ability to know the neighborhood they police; and giving officers the discretion they need to prevent or repair community problems they encounter. In the Wave 4 survey, we measured organizational support in terms of 10 practices that are more or less commonly cited as necessary supports for community policing (See Appendix A for the precise wording). The inter-item reliability (KR alpha=0.67) was moderate, providing some assurance that our organizational change construct had internal consistency.

#### **3.4.1. Trends, 1995-2000**

Table 7 reports that organizational changes in support of community policing proliferated between 1995 and 1998 among municipal and county police departments serving jurisdictions larger than 50,000. We estimate that agencies in this category, including COPS grantees and non-grantees, made an average of 2.5 of these changes, so that 6.7 were in place as of 1998. By 2000, however, the average number of organizational supports in place reportedly dropped by an average of 0.1, to 6.6.

The practice-specific percentages in Table 7 show that all 10 of the organizational practices in our list had become significantly more widespread between 1995 and 1998. Between 1998 and 2000, however, the trend reversed for several organizational practices. Providing the community a voice in nominating problems and setting priorities was significantly less common in 2000 (59.8%) than in 1998 (66.7%). There were also small, statistically insignificant drops in the percentages of agencies reporting that they participated in multi-agency task forces, used alternative response modes to calls, set patrol area boundaries to coincide with community boundaries, used a team approach instead of the chain of command, or took other steps to expand beat officers’ discretion. Even after the drops, the percentages of agencies that had adopted these organizational practices remained upwards of 20% higher in 2000 than they had been in 1995.

Only one supportive organizational practice continued to spread between 1998 and 2000. The percent of agencies that had revised their personnel evaluation measures continued to grow, from 54.5% of agencies in 1998 to 58.5% in 2000. This increase was not statistically significant. The prevalences of three other practices — revised mission statements, dispatch rules to strengthen beat integrity, and setting beat boundaries to coincide with other agencies’ service area boundaries — remained roughly constant.

### **3.4.2. Year 2000 Grantee/Non-Grantee Comparison**

As shown in Column C of Table 8, COPS grantees reported making more supportive organizational changes by 2000 than non-grantees. Grantees reported having an average of 6.8 of the 10 practices in use as of 2000, compared to 6.1 for non-grantees. This difference was statistically significant at the p-level 0.10.

The analysis by tactics further suggests that grantee agencies were statistically more likely than non-grantees to have 5 of the 10 supportive organizational changes in place by 2000. Grantee agencies reported being significantly more likely than non-grantees to have participated in multi-agency crime reduction task forces (80.2 percent compared to 77.1 percent), to be using alternative response methods for calls (79.7 percent compared to 69.5 percent), to have set beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood and community boundaries (76.5 percent compared to 68.8 percent), to be providing their communities a voice in nominating and prioritizing problems (62.6 percent compared to 51.5 percent), and to have expanded beat officers' discretion (57.4 percent compared to 47.8 percent).

### **3.4.3. Comparative Adoption of Organizational Change Tactics, 1998-2000**

Between 1998 and 2000, the implementation gap between non-grantees and COPS grantees narrowed slightly, as non-grantees reported adopting an average of 0.2 of the 10 changes, while grantees reported dropping 0.2. Neither change was statistically significant.

For grantees, these statistically insignificant drops occurred for all tactics except revised employee evaluation measures, which continued to spread. As with partnership building, there were hints that between 1998 and 2000 non-grantees were "catching up" to grantees' earlier innovations. Of the 5 organizational innovations that grantees adopted most rapidly between 1995 and 1998, non-grantees increased their use of 4 between 1998 and 2000. Meanwhile, the percentage of grantees using 4 of those tactics dropped during the latter period. None of the 1998-2000 increases or decreases was significant, however.

#### **4. COPS AND REPORTED COMMUNITY POLICING IN SMALL AGENCIES: 1995-2000**

Wave 3 of the national law enforcement agency survey, which was conducted in 1998 as part of the national evaluation of COPS, was not designed to include small agencies — those serving jurisdictions smaller than 50,000 population. Therefore, the national evaluation report (Roth et al., 2000) did not report findings about COPS program effects on small agencies' use of community policing practices between 1995 and 1998. The Wave 1 (1996) survey did ask small agencies about their pre-1995 use of checklist tactics, and the Wave 4 (2000) survey reinterviewed the Wave 1 small-agency sample about their 1998 and 2000 implementation status, using the same instrument administered to medium and large agencies (See Appendix A). Therefore, this section is the first report of findings about COPS program effects on community policing practices in small jurisdictions, and it covers the entire 1995-2000 period.

We combined the Wave 1 and Wave 4 survey data to address six questions:

- 1) **Did the number of small agencies using community policing tactics grow between 1995 and 1998?** We hypothesized that during that period several forces would encourage law enforcement agencies to report adopting community policing practices regardless of their COPS grant status during that period. As reported in the national evaluation of COPS (Gaffigan et al., 2000), the community policing movement was already under way when the COPS program was launched. Some agency executives would want to emulate visible national leaders in the policing profession, some of whom were introducing community policing. And publicity about community policing would make it socially desirable to describe one's agency as "doing community policing" whether or not the agency was actually changing, both in response to public demand and because the community policing philosophy was becoming more visible and accepted. We tested that hypothesis by comparing the 1995 and 1998 fractions of small agencies nationwide that reported using each tactic.
- 2) **Did small agencies adopt community policing practices as larger agencies?** We also expected that small agencies would be less likely than medium and large agencies to be using community policing tactics at both points in time. We believed that social distance between the police agency and the community being policed would be smaller in small jurisdictions than in large, which would reduce the motivation to adopt community policing objectives as fully. For example, some community policing objectives such as gathering residents' input about priorities could be accomplished informally through chance social encounters, without formal tactics such as citizen surveys, community action/advisory boards, and community meetings.
- 3) **Were early COPS grantees more likely than non-grantees to be using community policing tactics when the program began?** We hypothesized that among small agencies, COPS grantees and non-grantees would tend to have

similar pre-1995 patterns of use for community policing tactics. This pattern would be consistent with previously reported findings for medium and large jurisdictions, and also consistent with survey findings that attitudes about community policing were not a major influence on agencies' decisions to apply for COPS grants.

- 4) **Between 1995 and 1998, did COPS grantees expand their use of community policing tactics more rapidly than non-grantees?** We hypothesized that COPS grants would encourage adoption of community policing tactics between 1995 and 1998, by providing a financial incentive to do so, by providing resources needed to implement existing local community policing plans without cutting back other services, or both. We tested this hypothesis by comparing 1995-1998 net changes in the fractions of grantee and non-grantee agencies that reported using each tactic.
- 5) **Between 1998 and 2000, did COPS grantees continue to expand their use of community policing tactics more rapidly than non-grantees?** We hypothesized that COPS grants would continue to encourage adoption of community policing tactics between 1998 and 2000. We tested this hypothesis by comparing 1998-2000 net changes in the fractions of grantee and non-grantee agencies that reported using each tactic.
- 6) **Did COPS grantees attribute their adoption of new community policing tactics to their grants?** Instead of automatically crediting COPS grants with every grantee's adoption of a new community policing tactic, we asked respondents to assess the role of the grant in use of the tactic.<sup>2</sup> We then computed the fractions of COPS grantees reporting that the grant started or expanded the use of each "new" tactic it adopted, sustained its use despite budget cuts, or had no effect. We asked the question for practices adopted between 1995 and 1996, and also between 1998 and 2000. We hypothesized that COPS grants would receive less credit for the adoption of new practices in later years because grantees would have made the innovations that required funds first, then adopted practices whose importance became evident during the early transition to community policing.
- 7) **Did COPS grantees attribute their continuation of "old" (i.e., pre-1995) community policing tactics to their grants?** Instead of crediting COPS grants with all 1995-1998 continuation of community policing tactics adopted before 1995, we computed the fractions of COPS grantees reporting that the grant started or expanded the use of each "old" tactic, sustained its use despite budget cuts, or had no effect.

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2. The precise attribution response options and recodes differed slightly between Waves 1 and 4. Wave 1 responses were: 1. no effect; 2. got it started; 3. maintained it at previous levels; 4. expanded it; and 5. diminished it. Options 2 and 4 were recoded into a single category, and the others were left distinct. The Wave 4 responses were: 1. no effect; 2. instrumental in starting or expanding it; 3. allowed us to continue it in spite of agency budget cuts; and 4. caused us to reduce or eliminate this tactic by shifting our priorities somewhere else. All were left distinct.

## **4.1. COPS and Community Partnership-building**

We measured small agencies' community partnership-building activities using the same 8 tactics we used for medium and large agencies. For small agencies, an index of Wave 1 survey data on the pre-1995 implementation status of all 8 tactics had a moderate inter-item reliability (KR alpha=0.69), which provided reasonable assurance that our community partnership-building construct had internal consistency.

The Wave 4 survey provided the responses from which we calculated tactic-specific implementation in 1998 and 2000. To measure the 1998 tactic-specific implementation, we computed the percent of all small municipal and county agencies claiming pre-1998 implementation of each tactic. By 1998, these tactics had a somewhat higher inter-item reliability (KR alpha=0.74). To measure the 2000 tactic-specific implementation status, we added the pre-1998 figure to the percentage of agencies responding that they started using the tactic between 1998 and 2000. The inter-item reliability (KR alpha=0.75) improved only slightly, but was higher than we found for medium and large agencies.

### **4.1.1. Spread of Community Partnership-building Tactics**

To describe the extent of growth in the use of partnership-building tactics, the bottom of Table 9 reports the 1995, 1998, and 2000 means of agencies' reports of tactics implemented, as both a count and percentage of all tactics listed. Reported partnership-building activities in our list proliferated slightly during the 1995-2000 period among small municipal and county police agencies. On average, our combined sample of COPS grantees and non-grantees reported pre-1995 implementation of 28 percent (i.e., 2.2) of the partnership building tactics. By 1998, implementation increased slightly, 33 percent or 2.7 tactics, a small change that was statistically significant at the p-level of 0.01. Between 1998 and 2000, reported adoption of these tactics continued among the small agencies, to an average of 43 percent or 3.4 tactics, also statistically significant at the p-level of 0.01. As expected, in both 1995 and 2000 the counts and percentages of tactics implemented were smaller than for larger agencies — about half the values reported in Table 1.

The tactic-specific percentages in Table 9 show that in 1998, small agencies were using all tactics except neighborhood clean-ups at significantly greater percentages than in 1995. The largest net gains between 1995 and 1998 were on the implementation of resident surveys (+12.0 percentage points) and regular community meetings (+10.8 percentage points). All other partnership-building tactics experienced net gains between 3 and 5 percentage points.

Table 9 also shows that the small agencies continued to adopt all 8 partnership-building tactics between 1998 and 2000. The greatest net gains (10 percentage points or more) were made on projects with residents to remove signs of disorder, joint projects with businesses, clean-up projects, and citizen police academies. Nevertheless, between 1998 and 2000 the adoption rate accelerated over the 1995-98 period for all tactics except regular community meetings and citizen surveys.

#### **4.1.2. Pre-1995 Grantee/Non-grantee Comparison**

Column A of Table 10 indicates that as with large agencies, grantees and non-grantees began the COPS era with nearly the same numbers of partnership-building tactics in use. Grantees reported using an average of 26 percent of the tactics in use as of 1995, just slightly behind the 30 percent reported by non-grantees.

This overall similarity, however, conceals the fact that non-grantees were significantly more likely than grantees to be using 6 of the 8 tactics in 1995. The largest difference existed for joint projects with businesses (42.7 percent of non-grantees compared to 32.0 percent of grantees) and clean-up projects (28.5 percent compared to 19.5 percent). Non-grantees also reported higher pre-1995 implementation of joint crime prevention projects (50.3 percent compared to 45.9 percent), survey of citizens (24.5 percent compared to 20.7 percent), citizen police academy (10.9 percent compared to 8.5 percent), and regular community meetings (38.2 percent compared to 36.3 percent).

#### **4.1.3. Comparative Adoption of Partnership-building Tactics, 1995-1998 and 1998-2000**

As shown in column D of Table 10, grantee agencies adopted an average of nearly one additional partnership-building tactic between 1995 and 1998, compared to essentially no change among non-grantee agencies. Therefore, despite starting behind non-grantees in 1998, grantees had surpassed them in reported implementation of all 8 partnership-building tactics by 1998. As shown in Column B of Table 10, grantee agencies reported having adopted 38.1 percent of partnership-tactics (a net gain of 12.1 percentage points), compared to 28.0 percent for non-grantee agencies (a net loss of 2.0 percentage points).

Columns B and D indicate that each specific partnership-building tactic was adopted by between 7 and 22 percent of COPS grantees between 1995 and 1998, while non-grantees took a more selective approach. Specifically, fewer non-grantees were doing clean-up projects and joint projects with businesses in 1998 than in 1995, while more were holding regular community meetings. Non-grantees' reported utilization of all the other tactics remained roughly constant during the first three years of the COPS program.

Between 1998 and 2000, grantee and non-grantee agencies adopted nearly equal numbers of community partnership-building tactics (i.e., 0.8 and 0.7 respectively). Therefore, by 2000, grantee agencies reported having adopted 3.8, or 48.2 percent, of partnership-building tactics; in contrast, non-grantees reported using only 2.9, or 36.5 percent of the tactics. Between 1998 and 2000, grantees' adoption rates accelerated compared to the earlier period for joint crime prevention projects with residents, joint projects with businesses, and clean-up projects; non-grantees also gravitated toward these tactics (See Column E of Table 10).

By 2000, as a result of their innovations, small-agency grantees had more than overcome any "partnership-building gap" compared to non-grantees. Grantees were reportedly using 3.8 or 48.2% of the 8 tactics, compared to only 2.9 or 36.5% for non-grantees. These numbers represent 5-year increases of 1.7 tactics for grantees, compared to 0.5 for non-grantees.

During the 5-year period, small-agency COPS grantees increased their utilization of all tactics, and the increases were greatest for joint projects with businesses, citizen surveys, and joint projects to remove signs of disorder. By 2000, grantees' use of these partnership-building activities exceeded non-grantees' for all the listed tactics by statistically significant amounts.

#### **4.1.4. Innovations Attributed to COPS Grants**

The fact that COPS grantees outpaced non-grantees in their rates of adoption of partnership-building tactics does not necessarily imply that the COPS grants account for the difference. It could be, for example, that agencies led by more entrepreneurial chief executives were more likely both to apply for COPS grants and to adopt new innovations, including those that help build partnerships.

Therefore, we asked COPS grantees that reported adopting partnership-building tactics how their COPS grants affected their innovations. Favorable impacts included being instrumental in starting or expanding the practice, or helping the agency sustain the practice through a budget cut. Other impacts included causing the agency to eliminate the tactic, or having no effect. We asked this question in both the Wave 1 survey (covering practices adopted during 1995 or the first 9 months of 1996) and the Wave 4 survey (covering practices adopted between 1998 and 2000).

Overall, grantee agencies reported that the COPS program positively affected 74 percent of the partnership-building activities that they adopted during 1995 and early 1996, compared to 56 percent of the practices adopted between 1998 and 2000 (See Table 11). Except for citizen-police academies, 70 to 80 percent of the grantee agencies that had adopted each tactic during the Wave 1 reference period described the funds as "instrumental" in starting or expanding its use, while less than 16 percent stated that the funds had had no effect. By the time of the Wave 4 survey, only 40-60% of the adopters of each tactic between 1998 and 2000 credited their COPS grants, with 24 to 36% claiming that the grants had had no effect.

#### **4.1.5. Grant Impacts on pre-COPS Partnership-Building Tactics**

In the Wave 1 survey, COPS grantees were also asked how these new funds affected their use of "old" partnership-building tactics that were in place when the COPS program began. Not surprisingly, the agencies were only about half as likely to credit COPS funds with starting or expanding their use of old tactics, compared to new ones. Overall, agencies reported the COPS program allowed them to start, expand, or sustain 57 percent of their "old" partnership-building tactics. For all the tactics except clean-up projects, citizen surveys, and citizen police academies, 40 to 50 percent of agencies reported their COPS grants were "instrumental" in starting or expanding use of the tactic (see Table 12). This is about 30 percentage points less than for "new" tactics implemented after 1995. Between 12 and 30 percent of the agencies said that their COPS grants had no effect on their adoption of the tactics.

## **4.2. COPS and Problem-solving**

We measured small agencies' problem-solving activities using the same 11 tactics we used for large agencies and used those measures to ask the same questions we had regarding partnership building in small agencies. For the small agencies, an index of the pre-1995 implementation status of all 11 tactics according to the Wave 1 survey had a fairly high inter-item reliability (KR alpha=0.85), substantially higher than the problem-solving index in the large agencies. The reliability coefficient remained essentially unchanged through the subsequent survey waves.

### **4.2.1. Spread of Problem-solving Tactics**

To describe the extent of growth in the use of problem-solving tactics, the bottom of Table 13 reports the 1995, 1998, and 2000 means of agencies' reports of tactics implemented, as both a count and percentage of all tactics listed. As shown there, small agencies' use of the problem-solving activities in our list remained stable between 1995 and 1998, but adoption proliferated thereafter. On average, our combined sample of COPS grantees and non-grantees reported pre-1995 implementation of 43 percent (i.e., 4.7) of the problem-solving tactics. Implementation remained virtually unchanged through 1998, at 44 percent or 4.8 tactics, but grew to 60 percent or 6.5 tactics between 1998 and 2000 — about 70 percent of large agencies' implementation level. This net gain was statistically significant at the p-level of 0.01.

The tactic-specific percentages in Table 13 show that in 1998, 4 of the 11 tactics were less widely used in 1998 than in 1995: considering neighborhood values in planning responses, using agency data to measure response effect, analyzing problems with probation officers, and documenting problem and projects in writing. These losses were offset by increases in the percentages reporting use of all the other problem-solving tactics except analyzing crime data.

Table 13 also shows that the small agencies continued to adopt all 11 problem-solving tactics between 1998 and 2000. For all 11, there was a statistically significant increase in use between 1998 and 2000. By 2000, all but one of the problem-solving tactics was reportedly in use by 50-80 percent of the small agencies. Use of the exception, analyzing crime problems using GIS software, more than doubled between 1995 and 1998, to 27 percent of all small municipal and county police agencies.

### **4.2.2. Pre-1995 Grantee/Non-grantee Comparison**

As shown in Column A of Table 14, non-grantees began the COPS era ahead of grantees in problem-solving. Non-grantees reported having an average of 48 percent (i.e., 5.2) of the tactics in use as of 1995, ahead of the 39 percent (i.e., 4.3) reported by grantees. This pre-1995 difference was statistically significant at the p-level of 0.01.

Column A also shows that at the start of the COPS era in 1995, non-grantees were significantly ahead of grantees in adoption of all 11 of the problem-solving tactics. The largest difference was in considering neighborhood values (69.1 percent compared to 52.1 percent) and analyzing problems with the community (61.2 percent compared to 44.6 percent).

### **4.2.3. Comparative Adoption of Problem-solving Tactics, 1995-1998 and 1998-2000**

As shown in Column D of Table 14, grantees adopted an average of nearly one additional tactic between 1995 and 1998, compared to nearly a one-tactic decrease among non-grantee agencies. Therefore, by 1998, grantee agencies reported utilizing an average of 5.2 (i.e., 47.7 percent) problem-solving tactics, compared to 4.4 (39.6 percent) for non-grantee agencies.

Columns B and D of Table 14 indicate that as with partnership building, use of problem-solving tactics proliferated among grantee agencies more than among non-grantees. Use of all but one practice grew among grantees, while non-grantees either adopted them more slowly or, on balance, discontinued their use. Use of the exception, considering neighborhood values in planning responses, dropped among fundees by 8.3%, more slowly than among non-fundees (36.6%).

Between 1998 and 2000, grantee and non-grantee agencies adopted equal numbers of problem-solving practices, an average of 1.7 (See Column E of Table 14). Therefore, by 2000, grantee agencies reported having adopted 62.5 percent of problem-solving tactics (a net gain of 14.8 percentage points), compared to 55.6 (a net gain of 16.0 percentage points) for non-grantees. Both grantees and non-grantees adopted every problem-solving practice in substantial numbers between 1998 and 2000. However, because grantees were starting from higher levels in 1998, they were significantly more likely than non-grantees to be using all but two of the practices by 2000. The exceptions were systematic post-response monitoring of the problem, which about 88% of both grantees and non-grantees claimed to be doing, and analyzing problems with probation officers, which was reported by 52% of grantees and 53% of non-grantees.

### **4.2.4. Innovations Attributed to COPS Grants**

As with partnership-building, we asked COPS grantees that reported adopting a problem-solving practice during either our Wave 1 (1995-6) or Wave 4 (1998-2000) reference period what role their COPS grant played in that adoption. As shown in Table 15, however, a different pattern emerged for problem-solving tactics. In both reference periods approximately equal percentages of grantees — generally on the order of 50 to 60% — described their grants as instrumental in starting or expanding the practice. However, for most tactics the percentage reporting that their COPS grants sustained each tactic during a budget cut dropped from the range of 15% - 33% in the 1996 survey to less than 10% in 2000, while the percentages reporting “no effect” were growing in almost a mirror image.

### **4.2.5. Grant Impacts on pre-COPS Problem-solving Tactics**

COPS grantees were also asked how these new funds affected their use of old problem-solving tactics that were in place in 1995, the first full year of the COPS program. Overall, agencies reported the COPS program positively affected 62 percent of their old problem-solving tactics by helping either to expand use of the tactic or to sustain it in the face of a budget cut. On a tactic-by-tactic basis as shown in Table 16, 80 to 90 percent of agencies found their COPS grants helpful in sustaining or expanding their problem-solving activities. The exception was

analyzing crime patterns using GIS. About 40% of the agencies that were using GIS before 1995 described their COPS grants as having no effect on post-1995 GIS use, presumably because they were simply continuing to use hardware and software they had purchased before the COPS program began.

### **4.3. COPS and Prevention Programs**

We measured small agencies' prevention practices using the same 11 tactics we used for large agencies, and addressed the same methods as for partnership building and problem-solving in small agencies. For the small agencies, an index of the pre-1995 implementation status of these 11 practices had an inter-item reliability (KR alpha) of 0.75, providing reasonable assurance that our problem-solving construct had internal consistency. Unlike the declining wave-to-wave trend in large agencies, the index retained its reliability in small agencies. Reliability of the index based on pre-1998 implementation rose to KR alpha of 0.80, then dropped back to 0.73 in 2000 — near its Wave 1 level and continuing to describe a moderate level of internal consistency.

#### **4.3.1. Spread of Prevention Programs**

To describe the extent of growth in the use of prevention programs, the bottom of Table 17 reports the 1995, 1998, and 2000 means of agencies' reports of tactics implemented, as both a count and percentage of all 11 prevention practices. The table shows that in terms of the number and percent of prevention programs on our list, the extent of prevention remained stable between 1995 and 1998, then proliferated modestly between 1998 and 2000. On average, our combined sample of COPS grantees and non-grantees reported pre-1995 and 1998 implementation of 39 percent (i.e., 4.2) of the prevention programs. Between 1998 and 2000, these agencies reported a modest net gain to 50 percent or 5.4 of the programs. This net gain was statistically significant at the p-level of 0.01. In both 1995 and 2000, these average small-agency counts were about 66% of the counts in large agencies.

The tactic-specific figures in Table 17 show that in 1998, agencies were using 7 of the 11 tactics in lower percentages than in 1995. The decreases were small but statistically significant. They occurred for drug education programs in schools, mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts, code enforcement to combat disorder, cooperative programs with schools to reduce truancy, confidential hotlines for reporting drugs and guns on the street, and victim assistance programs. There were substantial increases in the use of varying styles of preventive patrol (e.g., bike and foot), police/youth programs, graffiti eradication programs, and late-night recreation programs.

Table 17 also shows that by 2000, the small agencies made significant increases in their utilization rates for prevention programs. Between 1998 and 2000, the utilization rate increased significantly for all the programs, including those for which use had dropped during the preceding three years. Consequently, 10 of the 11 tactics were in significantly wider use in 2000 than in 1995, and the exception, confidential drug and gun hotlines, had returned to its 1995 level after a drop in 1998.

### **4.3.2. Pre-1995 Grantee/Non-grantee Comparison**

As shown in Table 18, Column A, grantees began the COPS era slightly behind non-grantees in terms of the total number of prevention programs in use in 1995. Grantees reported having an average of 37 percent of the tactics in use as of 1995, just slightly behind the 40 percent reported by non-grantees. Although this difference is too small to have policy significance, it was statistically significant at the p-level of 0.10.

Non-grantees' slight edge cut across all three program categories: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Only police/youth programs and battered women's programs were at essentially the same level of use in 1995 by grantees and non-grantees. Non-grantees were more likely to report operating 7 of the 9 remaining programs. Of the 7, the greatest differences favoring non-grantees were for drug education programs in schools (67.7 percent compared to 58.1 percent) and cooperative programs with schools to reduce truancy (45.4 percent compared to 32.7 percent). In contrast, grantees were more likely to report having implemented code enforcement to combat disorder (47.3 percent compared to 43.8 percent) and graffiti eradication programs (16.5 percent compared to 15.4 percent).

### **4.3.3. Comparative Adoption of Prevention Programs, 1995-1998 and 1998-2000**

As shown in Column D of Table 18, grantees adopted an average of 0.6 additional tactics between 1995 and 1998, while non-grantee agencies were dropping the same number. Therefore, by 1998, grantee agencies reported having adopted 41.9 percent of prevention practices (a net gain of 5.2 percentage points), compared to 34.8 percent for non-grantee agencies (a net loss of 5.6 percentage points). Smaller percentages of non-grantees than grantees reported using every practice except graffiti eradication and varying styles of preventive patrol (e.g., bike and foot).

Between 1995 and 1998, grantees and non-grantees both cut back on mediation programs to resolve disputes and conflicts, programs for battered women, and, in contrast to large agencies, code enforcement to combat disorder. During that period, grantees were significantly more likely than non-grantees to report adopting 6 of the 11 prevention practices: drug education programs in schools, police/youth programs, varying styles of preventive patrol, cooperative programs with schools to combat truancy, confidential hotlines for reporting drugs and guns, and victim assistance programs.

Between 1998 and 2000, grantee and non-grantee agencies adopted nearly identical numbers of prevention practices on average (i.e., 1.2 and 1.3 respectively). Therefore, by 2000 grantees reported having adopted 52.5 percent of prevention practices (a net gain of 10.6 percentage points), compared to non-grantees' 46.1 percent (a net gain of 11.3 percentage points).

Grantee agencies continued to adopt all the prevention practices on our list except late-night recreational programs. Therefore, by 2000, they were more likely than non-grantees to report using all but three of the programs: late-night recreation, battered women's programs, and graffiti eradication. Of these three, non-grantee agencies were statistically more likely than

grantees to report operating late-night recreation programs but were statistically indistinguishable on use of the other two.

#### **4.3.4. Innovations Attributed to COPS Grants**

As shown in Table 19, COPS grantees were more likely to attribute new prevention practices to their grants than they were for either partnership-building or problem-solving practices. For most of the prevention practices they adopted in 1995 or 1996, 60-85 percent of the agencies described their grants as instrumental in starting or expanding use of the practice. Smaller percentages attributed their adoption of low-cost confidential hotlines or participation in victim assistance programs, for which Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) grants were available. For most prevention practices, lower percentages of 1996-8 adopters credited their COPS grants with the innovation; for the most part, the percentages stating that their grants had no effect grew from single digits to the 10-40 percent range.

#### **4.3.5. Grant Effects on Pre-COPS Prevention Practices**

In Wave 1 (1996), COPS grantees were also asked how these new funds affected their use of “old” prevention practices that were already in place when the COPS program began. Overall, agencies reported the COPS program positively affected 57 percent of those practices, by starting or expanding them or by sustaining them through budget cuts. For the most popular primary prevention practices, 30 to 60 percent of grantee adopters described their COPS grants as “instrumental” in starting or expanding use of the tactic; the percentages were lower for secondary and tertiary prevention programs such as confidential hotlines, victim assistance programs, and graffiti eradication (See Table 20). Another 25 to 40 percent stated that COPS funds helped them sustain use of most tactics despite budget cuts. The percentage of grantee adopters that reported their COPS grants had no effect on their innovation ranged from 8 percent for varying styles of preventive patrol (e.g., bike and foot) to 38 percent for confidential hotlines.

#### **4.4. COPS and Supportive Organizational Changes**

In the Wave 1 survey (conducted in the fall of 1996) and the Wave 4 survey (conducted in summer 2000), we measured the extent of agencies’ organizational change using the same 10 organizational practices that we used in Section 2.4 for large agencies. We used these data to ask the same questions about small agencies that we had with respect to partnership building, problem-solving, and prevention. Based on Wave 1 implementation status, an index combining the 10 practices had a moderate inter-item reliability (KR alpha=0.73), which was about the same as for larger agencies and provided reasonable assurance that our organizational change construct had internal consistency. Unlike the large agencies, the alpha coefficient grew slightly over later survey waves.

#### **4.4.1. Spread of Organizational Change**

To describe the extent of growth in the use of organizational change, Table 21 reports the 1995, 1998, and 2000 means of agencies' reports of practices implemented, as both a count and percentage of all practices listed. The table shows that these organizational changes spread modestly between 1995 and 1998 and accelerated between 1998 and 2000. On average, our combined sample of COPS grantees and non-grantees reported having 2.5 of the 10 changes in place before 1995. The count grew to 3.1 in 1998 and 4.5 by 2000. Both wave-to-wave increases were statistically significant at the p-level of 0.01. Not surprisingly, these counts were lower than those reported for large agencies (See Table 7), but over time they grew as a percentage of the large-agency counts, from 60 percent in 1995 to 68 percent in 2000.

The tactic-specific implementation percentages in Table 21 generally reflect the overall pattern of modest change between 1995 and 1998, followed by greater change between 1998 and 2000. During the first reference period, reported use of 7 of the 10 organizational practices increased by less than 10 percentage points. The exceptions were: coordination of beat boundaries with other agencies' administrative boundaries, which decreased by a small but statistically significant percentage, from 25.5 to 23.8 percent; increasing reliance on team policing instead of chain of command, which spread from 26 to 45 percent of small agencies; and expanded beat officers' discretion, which spread from 13 to 25 percent of agencies.

Between 1998 and 2000, reported organizational change accelerated rapidly. The percentage of agencies that reported making a change grew significantly (at the p-level of 0.01) for all 10 practices. More importantly, every 1998-2000 increase exceeded the corresponding 1995-1998 increase.

#### **4.4.2. Pre-1995 Grantee/Non-grantee Comparison**

As shown in Column A of Table 22, small-agency grantees began the COPS era slightly behind the non-grantees as measured by the number of supportive organizational changes already made. Grantees reported made an average of 2.3 of the 10 changes before 1995, compared to the 2.6 reported by non-grantees. While these two starting points were qualitatively indistinguishable, it was statistically significant at the p-level of 0.05.

The tactic-by-tactic percentages, however, suggest a difference between grantees and non-grantees in pre-1995 organizational priorities. Before 1995, grantees were more likely than non-grantees to have made changes intended to increase communication between officers and the community; in contrast, non-grantees were more likely to have made internal administrative changes. Before 1995, grantees were more likely to have set beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood and community boundaries (28.9 percent compared to 26.8 percent) and to be providing communities a voice in nominating and prioritizing problems (11.0 percent compared to 7.2 percent). In contrast, non-grantees were more likely to report having implemented alternative response methods for calls (34.8 percent compared to 28.5 percent), revised mission, vision, or values statements (35.6 percent compared to 25.9 percent), dispatch rules structured to maximize officers' time within their beats (32.7 percent compared to 23.1 percent), team approaches instead of chain-of-command (30.1 percent compared to 22.3 percent), beat boundaries that coincide with other agencies' boundaries (27.9 percent compared

to 23.2 percent), and revised employee evaluation measures (17.9 percent compared to 14.6 percent).

#### **4.4.3. Comparative Adoption of Prevention Program Tactics, 1995-1998 and 1998-2000**

As shown in Column D of Table 22, grantees reported making an average of 1.1 of the organizational changes on our list between 1995 and 1998, compared to just 0.2 for non-grantees agencies. Therefore, by 1998, more grantees than non-grantees reported having implemented every organizational change on our list except alternative response methods for calls and expanded beat officers' discretion. All but one of the grantee/non-grantee differences was statistically significant, and the differences were greatest for team approaches to policing, multi-agency task forces, revised employee evaluation measures, and revised mission, vision, and values statements.

Between 1998 and 2000, both grantee and non-grantee agencies adopted more organizational changes than during the preceding period, and grantees adopted an average of 1.5 changes compared to grantees' 1.2. Therefore, by 2000, grantee agencies had implemented an average of 4.9 changes. While this was less than the corresponding number for large agencies (6.8), it reflected more than a doubling over 1995 levels, and exceeded non-grantees' level by 0.9 tactics. By 2000, grantee agencies were more likely than non-grantees to adopt all but one of the organizational changes, alternative response methods for calls. By 2000, the largest grantee/non-grantee differences were for team policing approaches, patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood boundaries, and revised employee evaluation measures.

#### **4.4.4. Innovations Attributed to COPS Grants**

We asked COPS grantees that reported adopting an organizational change during either our Wave 1 (1995-6) or Wave 4 (1998-2000) reference period what role their COPS grant played in that adoption. As shown in Table 23, 54 percent of the grantees that reported revising their employee evaluation measures by 1996 and 50 percent of those that shifted their patrol boundaries to match other agencies' administrative boundaries described their COPS grants as instrumental in starting or expanding those changes. The corresponding percentages were only 28 for changing dispatch rules to increase beat integrity and 25 for providing the community a voice in nominating and prioritizing problems. For 9 of the 10 tactics, the percentages of grantees crediting their COPS grants for organizational changes grew for the 1998-2000 reference period.

Between 12 and 26 percent of the grantees that made each organizational change in 1995 or 1996 said their COPS grants had no effect on their making the change. For the 1998-2000 reference period, these percentages increased for 8 of the 10 changes, so that between 14 and 38 percent of the grantees making changes said their COPS grants had no effect.

#### **4.4.5. Grant Impacts on Pre-COPS Organizational Practices**

COPS grantees were also asked how their grants affected organizational practices that were in place when the COPS program began. Overall, agencies reported the COPS program positively affected 52 percent of their pre-COPS organizational practices, either by starting or expanding them, or by sustaining them through budget cuts. As shown in Table 24, roughly 30 to 40 percent of agencies reported their COPS grants were “instrumental” in starting or expanding most practices; exceptions were coordinating patrol boundaries with other agencies’ administrative boundaries (23 percent) and providing the community a voice in nominating and prioritizing problems (57 percent). Another 35 to 45 percent stated that COPS funds helped them sustain most organizational practices despite budget cuts; notable exceptions were providing the community a voice (25 percent), dispatch rules to promote beat integrity (28 percent), and revised employee evaluation measures (54 percent). The percentages reporting that COPS grants had no role in their organizational practices ranged from about 12 percent for the community voice and employee evaluation measures to 25-26 percent for coordinating patrol boundaries with other agencies and participating in multi-agency task forces.

## 5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This report concludes by summarizing the adoption of community policing practices between 1995 and 2000, explaining implications of the findings for the COPS program and the understanding of policing innovation, and pointing out additional questions that should be addressed using these data.

### 5.1. Adoption of Community Policing Practices

For “large” agencies (i.e., those serving jurisdictions larger than 50,000), this update to previous reports was designed to address two questions. The first is whether the spread of community policing practices between 1995 and 1998 reported in previous volumes of the national COPS evaluation (Roehl et al., 2000) continued between 1998 and 2000. The second is whether COPS grantees continued to adopt community policing practices more rapidly than non-grantees and to credit their COPS grants for doing so.

Our findings for problem-solving differed from those for the other community policing objectives. For large agencies, all the problem-solving practices we examined except analysis using geographic information systems (GIS) and police/probation partnerships were already widespread by 1995, were reportedly in use by more than 85% of grantee agencies by 1998, and were only slightly (but significantly) less widespread among non-grantees. Therefore, it is not surprising that except for those two practices, virtually no large grantee or non-grantee agencies reported adopting problem-solving tactics for the first time between 1998 and 2000.

As measured by total number of practices, trends in the use of partnership-building, prevention, and supportive organizational practices were also flat between 1998 and 2000. However, the flatness of trends in total number of practices reflects the net effect of increased use of some tactics offset by decreased use of others. For example, only 4 of the 8 partnership-building practices we surveyed were reportedly in use by more than 80% of agencies. In the two years that followed, net initiation of new citizen-police academies by grantees and non-grantees offset grantees’ net discarding of “side-by-side” projects with residents to prevent crime, reduce social disorder, and clean up neighborhoods. Among preventive practices, grantees’ reported discontinuation of in-school drug education programs offset their greater use of confidential hotlines to report illegal drug or gun activity. Both grantees and non-grantees increased their net participation in joint truancy prevention programs with schools but discontinued victim assistance programs. Among supportive organizational practices, both grantees and non-grantees adopted new employee performance criteria to emphasize community policing and instituted new procedures to enhance beat integrity, but decreased efforts to make administrative patrol boundaries coincide with neighborhood social boundaries. In addition, non-grantees abandoned efforts to give community residents a voice in setting priorities.

For “small” agencies serving populations fewer than 50,000, findings were more consistent across the four community policing objectives. In 1995, the small agencies reported using only half to 2/3 as many partnership-building, problem-solving, prevention, and supportive

organizational practices as large agencies. More surprisingly, COPS grantees lagged behind non-grantees in their reported use at that time; depending on community policing objective, grantees were using only 83% to 88% as many of the practices as non-grantees.

For indices of partnership-building, problem-solving, and prevention objectives, small grantee agencies reported increasing values between 1995 and 1998, while small non-grantees reported decreasing values. The index for supportive organizational changes increased for both groups, by 11% for grantees and 2% for non-grantees. Between 1998 and 2000, the average rate of increase in all the indices except partnership-building accelerated for grantees, and the rate of change either became positive or accelerated for non-grantees.

More than 90% of the agencies that adopted most partnership-building, problem-solving, or prevention practices between 1995 and 1998 credited their COPS grants with starting them, expanding them, or maintaining them through a budget decrease. By the 1998-2000 period, these percentages had dropped to a range between 46% and 88% — the range for agencies that adopted supportive organizational practices during both those periods.

## **5.2. Implications**

The findings summarized above have implications for both the success of the COPS program and the understanding of how policing innovations diffuse throughout the law enforcement community.

### **5.2.1. The COPS Program**

The findings summarized above make clear that at a minimum, the vision of community policing measured by our 40 tactical indicators spread between 1995 and 2000, and that the COPS program was one of the catalysts for this diffusion. For large and small agencies alike, the number of tactics reportedly in use for partnership-building, problem-solving, crime prevention, and organizational support of community policing grew between 33 and 80 percent, depending on community policing objective and agency size. For all of the four objectives, COPS grantees reported using significantly more tactics in 2000 than non-grantees, even though large grantees were at about the same point as large non-grantees in their reported status of community policing in 1995, and small grantees lagged behind small non-grantees at that time. And over 90% of the grantee agencies that reported adopting or expanding community policing practices between 1995 and 1998 credited their COPS grants, though these percentages fell for the 1998-2000 period.

At least two reservations should be noted. Although statistically significant, the differences between grantees and non-grantees are small in absolute terms. In general, the differences between grantees and non-grantees amount to no more than 1 practice out of 8-11 measured for each of the 4 objectives.

There are also important questions about the validity of survey responses as a description of agencies' actual policing practices. First, the respondent may not know the true state of affairs or share the researcher's vocabulary for describing it. For example, we believe that the

decrease in problem-solving reported by small non-grantee agencies between 1995 and 1998 indicates that those agencies' understanding of problem-solving became more accurate, not that they abandoned problem-oriented policing during the period. Second, Maguire and Mastrofski's (2000) criticism applies in this case, that our survey items were not designed to measure "dosage." Therefore, a response that an agency holds regular community meetings could refer to one annual presentation to a community audience, monthly working meetings with community representatives in every patrol area, or nearly anything in between. Third, the responses may be intended to present an ideal to which the chief aspires, or a standard with which the chief believes the agency should comply to retain COPS funding, achieve accreditation, or satisfy some other requirement. Indeed, site teams that visited 30 agencies as part of the national evaluation of COPS discovered that many reported community-policing practices – especially those related to partnership-building, problem-solving, and organizational change – turned out to have wide ranges of meanings in actual practice (Roehl, et al., 2000). The high cost of site visits, of course, precluded visiting a statistically meaningful sample of agencies as part of the national evaluation.

Despite these shortcomings, the survey data utilized in this report have two important advantages for describing 1995-2000 trends in community policing practices. The data pertain to a national probability sample of agencies, stratified to over-represent agencies serving jurisdictions larger than 50,000. And, for all chiefs who claim that their agencies are doing community policing, even inaccurate responses seem likely to describe what they believe CP *should* mean in their jurisdictions. Therefore, at a minimum the data are useful for describing trends in police chiefs' definitions of CP.

### **5.2.2. Community Policing Innovations**

Although the findings reported here establish an association between requesting and receiving COPS grants and the adoption of community policing practices, large-sample agency surveys are not well-suited to discovering just *how* the COPS program facilitated the process. However, other components of the national COPS evaluation suggest certain patterns. In 30 programmatic site assessments, researcher-practitioner teams reported no situations in which the COPS grant served purely as an incentive to undertake community policing. However, in such agencies as the San Diego Police Department, agency executives reported using COPS hiring grants to introduce new community policing programs without cutting resources for traditional programs already in place — a means of overcoming a common objection to community policing. Based on 10 case studies conducted by the Criminal Justice Management Program of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, Moore et al. (2000) highlighted the key role of local leadership, and identified various ways in which chiefs of innovative agencies used COPS funds strategically to encourage implementation of their visions of community policing. Consistently with those findings, Cunniff (2002, forthcoming) found in a survey of the 100 largest (by number of officers) COPS grantee agencies, that over 80 percent of the respondents indicated that their agencies "had a clear vision of where they were going" and "were able to interpret grant requirements to support that agency vision."

The survey data indicate that the community policing practices we examined varied substantially in the extent of their adoption between 1995 and 2000, and the extent of their use as

of 2000. Although we did not conduct formal tests, we noticed partial consistency with Weiss' (2000) model of innovation, which explains police agencies' adoption of innovations in terms of *risk mediation* (minimizing vulnerability to civil lawsuits), *cosmopolitanism* (i.e., participation in elite national policing organizations and activities), and *peer emulation* (i.e., tendency to imitate other agencies). The wide adoption of problem-solving and GIS analysis seem consistent with cosmopolitanism, given the extent to which those technologies are promoted by elite organizations such as the Police Executive Research Forum and the Police Foundation, respectively. The time lags in partnership-building and supportive organizational changes suggest that between 1998 and 2000, large non-grantee agencies and small grantees and non-grantees were emulating large grantees in their adoption of practices such as community clean-ups and school-based drug education, which the large grantees had adopted between 1995 and 1998. In turn, large grantees' discarding of those practices suggests that they may have been taking a utilitarian approach, in light of accumulating evidence on the ineffectiveness of DARE (Rosenbaum and Hansen, 1998) and complaints heard by our site teams that clean-ups jeopardize officer morale for no long-term purpose. The lower prevalence of all community policing practices in small agencies than in large ones suggests that small agencies may need fewer special tactics to overcome social distance between police officers and the communities they police, that some organizational supports involving patrol district boundaries and dispatch rules may be irrelevant in small jurisdictions, or that the vocabulary of community policing practices is not commonly used in small jurisdictions. Additional research using these data could address more systematically the factors and process that influence law enforcement agencies' choices among innovations to adopt.

### **5.3. Future Questions**

Within the scope of the national process evaluation of COPS, we did not address at least two key questions that could be studied using these survey data: 1995-2000 trends in the overall shape of community policing in U.S. law enforcement agencies, and the relationships among policing levels, practices, and crime.

#### **5.3.1. Defining Community Policing**

Maguire and Mastrofski (hereafter M&M, 2000) recently reviewed 11 studies that applied factor analysis to survey data regarding CP practices; they then performed the most sophisticated study of CP definition to date. They began by noting that there is widespread (though not universal) agreement that "community policing" exists as a viable concept but relatively little agreement on just what that concept is.

M&M explain the apparent paradox in terms of two categories of influences: *isomorphic* (e.g., imitation of other agencies), which bring about uniformity; and *refractory* (e.g., varying local contexts), which introduce interagency variation. They hypothesize that for several reasons, the importance of refractive influences wanes as an innovation ages, so that over time CP should become more isomorphic (i.e., homogeneous). Arguing that greater isomorphism should reduce the number of CP dimensions, M&M report that findings from the lone study that

tested that hypothesis using data collected at multiple points in time (Maguire et al, 1999) ran contrary to the hypothesis.

M&M explored the dimensionality of CP by applying exploratory factor analysis to four national databases containing agencies' reports of the implementation status of various tactics: Wycoff (1994) and three collections of required reports submitted by applicants or grantees to the COPS Office between 1994 and 1997. M&M found evidence consistent with their hypothesis, but concluded with a call for future research involving multi-wave surveys of a single representative agency sample, with various improvements in future survey instruments. The data analyzed in this report would provide an opportunity not only to replicate the M&M (2000) test on a new database but also to conduct the analysis in terms of "packages" of community policing practices and to disaggregate the analysis by agency size, indicators of community support in 1995, and other relevant characteristics.

### **5.3.2. Policing Practices, Levels, and Crime**

The data analyzed here would also support an analysis of how COPS-related changes in the size of sworn and civilian forces and in the use of community policing and other innovative practices have affected crime levels. The nature of the COPS program and evaluation data make it a valuable resource for disentangling the simultaneous relationships between crime and law enforcement strength that have plagued research on that question (Blumstein, et al., 1978; Eck and Maguire, 2000).

The question whether COPS expenditures reduced crime was recently analyzed in a preliminary way by Zhao and Thurman (hereafter Z&T, 2000). They analyzed COPS expenditures and crime data for the 1994-1999 period and found that COPS hiring and innovative grants had substantial crime reduction effects in larger jurisdictions containing the majority of the U.S. population.<sup>3</sup> They did not find such effects for COPS MORE (i.e., technology and civilian) grants.

The data analyzed here could be used to build on the work of the Z&T study in several ways. Most importantly, Z&T measured COPS resources only in terms of dollars awarded. The national COPS evaluation data could be used to examine the utilization and impact of COPS resources within police agencies and relate these specific organizational and practice changes to changes in crime. The exogenous COPS intervention created a new opportunity to identify the causal relationship from policing levels to crime. The full survey database could be used to measure the crime control effectiveness of various technologies, several varieties of community policing, and several specific policing practices. It could be used to examine *interactions* between officer counts and policing tactics in determining crime rates. By identifying "outlier" agencies in which specific community policing strategies performed remarkably better or worse than expected, future analyses of these data may lay the groundwork for subsequent qualitative

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3. COPS Innovative grants fund specialized programs targeted at specific crime and disorder problems in selected jurisdictions. Because others have evaluated the Innovative programs, the national COPS evaluation did not study their implementation. However, Innovative grant awards are recorded in COPS Office databases, and jurisdictions' implementation features are described in the evaluations.

study of contextual factors that mediate the crime impact of changes in policing levels and community policing strategies.

## **TABLES**

Table 1. Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Partnership Building Tactics Implementation, Large Municipal and County Agencies (N=382)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>Pre-1995 Percent</i>	<i>1998 Percent (rank)</i>	<i>2000 Percent (rank)</i>
Joint crime prevention	90.1	97.2*** (1)	95.8
Regular community meetings	75.0	93.6*** (2)	93.8
Joint projects with businesses	65.3	88.6*** (4)	89.4
Projects with residents to remove signs of disorder	62.4	89.1*** (3)	87.3
Survey of citizens	53.0	76.6*** (5)	75.9
Clean-up projects	49.6	73.3*** (6)	71.5
Citizen action/advisory boards	37.1	57.0*** (8)	56.2
Citizen police academy	30.4	66.6*** (7)	70.6
Mean Implementation (% of tactics)	57.9	80.2***	80.1
Mean Implementation (# of tactics)	4.6	6.4	6.4

KR Alpha (1995=0.76) (1998=0.66) (2000=0.65)

Note: Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1995 and 1998 is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01                      \*\*p-value <.05                      \*p-value<.10

Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1998 and 2000 is as follows:

###p-value <.01                      ##p-value <.05                      #p-value<.10

**Table 2. Partnership Building Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000 and Net percent change), Large Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=276], Non-funded [n=106])**

Tactic	A		B		C		D		E	
	% Using pre-1995		% Using by 1998		% Using by 2000		Net % Change (1995-1998)		Net % Change (1998-2000)	
	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded
Joint crime prevention	90.0	90.4	97.6	96.1	95.6	96.3	7.6	5.7	-2.0	0.2
Regular community meetings	75.6	73.1	94.9**	89.6	95.9***	87.3	19.3	16.5	1.0	-2.3
Joint projects with businesses	62.5	74.0**	90.1*	83.8	92.2***	80.9	27.6###	9.8	2.1	-2.9
Projects with residents to remove signs of disorder	64.6	55.9	92.2***	79.7	88.6*	83.4	27.6	23.8	-3.6	3.7#
Survey of citizens	53.9	50.1	80.3***	65.2	79.2***	66.0	26.4#	15.1	-1.1	0.8
Clean up projects	52.8**	39.7	78.1***	58.6	75.0***	60.8	25.3	18.9	-3.1	2.2
Citizen action/advisory boards	40.4**	27.1	59.9**	47.9	59.5***	46.2	19.5	20.8	-0.4	-1.7
Citizen police academy	31.7	26.2	67.0	65.4	71.0	69.4	35.3	39.2	4.0	4.0
Mean Implementation (percent of tactics)	58.9	54.6	82.5***	73.3	82.1***	73.8	23.6	18.7	-0.4	0.5
Mean Implementation (number of tactics)	4.7	4.4	6.6***	5.9	6.6***	5.9	1.9	1.5	0.0	0.0

Note: Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the odds of adopting specific tactic (columns A, B, and C) is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01      \*\*p-value <.05      \*p-value <.10

Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the rate of specific tactic adoption from Time 1 to Time 2 (columns D and E) is as follows:

###p-value <.01      ##p-value <.05      #p-value <.10

Table 3. Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Problem-Solving Tactics Implementation, Large Municipal and County Agencies (N=382)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>Pre-1995 Percent</i>	<i>1998 Percent (rank)</i>	<i>2000 Percent (rank)</i>
Analyze problems with Community	64.9	96.4*** (1)	95.8
Use agency data to measure response effect	62.8	88.5*** (6)	89.1
Systematic monitoring of the problem	62.5	91.2*** (3)	89.1
Use residents' input to measure response effect	60.00	90.5*** (4)	90.5
Officer analyze residents' comments to identify recurring patterns	58.4	89.0*** (5)	89.2
Designate patterns for non-traditional response	58.3	93.3*** (2)	92.7
Officer analyze crime data to identify recurring patterns	56.7	87.4*** (7)	88.3
Consider neighborhood values	55.9	84.3*** (8)	84.9
Written documentation of problems/projects	55.2	83.2*** (9)	83.7
Analyze crime patterns with GIS	37.5	70.4*** (10)	76.0
Analyze problems with PO's	37.0	66.5*** (11)	71.8
Mean Implementation (% of tactics)	55.4	85.5***	86.5
Mean Implementation (# of tactics)	6.1	9.4	9.5

KR Alpha (1995= 0.87) (1998=0.79) (2000=0.78)

Note: Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1995 and 1998 is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01                      \*\*p-value <.05                      \*p-value<.10

Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1998 and 2000 is as follows:

###p-value <.01                      ##p-value <.05                      #p-value<.10

**Table 4. Problem-Solving Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000, and Net percent change), Large Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=276], Non-funded [n=106])**

Tactic	A		B		C		D		E	
	% Using pre-1995		% Using by 1998		% Using by 2000		Net % Change (1995-1998)		Net % Change (1998-2000)	
	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded
Analyze problems with Community	64.6	65.7	97.4*	93.4	96.8**	92.6	32.8	27.7	-0.6	-0.8
Use agency data to measure response effect	64.2	58.6	90.8***	81.6	91.3***	82.4	26.6	23.00	0.5	0.8
Systematic monitoring of the problem	62.1	63.5	92.1	88.5	89.1	88.9	30.00	25.00	-3.0	0.4
Use residents' input to measure response effect	60.8	57.5	92.2**	85.2	91.9**	86.1	31.4	27.7	-0.3	0.9
Officer analyze residents' comments to identify recurring patterns	59.0	56.7	92.9***	77.2	92.3***	79.9	33.9###	20.5	-0.6	2.7
Designate patterns for non-traditional response	59.2	55.5	95.8***	86.0	95.4***	84.5	36.6	30.5	-0.4	-2.5
Officer analyze crime data to identify recurring patterns	55.9	59.4	88.5	84.0	89.3	85.4	32.6	24.6	0.8	1.4
Consider neighborhood values	56.8	52.8	87.9***	73.4	88.9***	72.5	31.1##	20.6	1.0	-0.9
Written documentation of problems/projects	55.4	54.7	85.2*	77.2	85.6**	78.0	29.8	22.5	0.4	0.8
Analyze crime patterns with GIS	38.7	33.7	73.6***	60.7	78.0*	70.0	34.9	27.0	4.4	9.3
Analyze problems with PO's	37.4	35.9	69.1**	58.6	74.4**	63.9	31.7#	22.7	5.3	5.3
Mean Implementation (% of tactics)	55.8	54.0	87.8***	78.7	88.5***	80.4	32.00#	24.7	0.7	1.7
Mean Implementation (# of tactics)	6.1	5.9	9.6***	8.6	9.7***	8.8	3.5#	2.7	0.1	0.2

Note: Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the odds of adopting specific tactic (columns A, B, and C) is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01      \*\*p-value <.05      \*p-value <.10

Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the rate of specific tactic adoption from Time 1 to Time 2 (columns D and E) is as follows:

###p-value <.01      ##p-value <.05      #p-value <.10

Table 5. Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Prevention Program Tactics Implementation, Large Municipal and County Agencies (N=382)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>Pre-1995 Percent</i>	<i>1998 Percent (rank)</i>	<i>2000 Percent (rank)</i>
Primary Prevention: Officers Assigned to-Drug education programs in schools	91.4	95.8*** (1)	92.8
Police/Youth programs	70.0	91.6*** (3)	91.3
Varying styles of preventive patrol	64.4	92.5*** (2)	92.1
Late-night recreation programs	17.7	25.7*** (4)	23.8
Secondary Prevention: Agency encourages use of Code enforcement to combat disorder	68.7	91.0*** (1)	90.2
Confidential hotline for reporting drugs and guns	67.7	78.6*** (2)	81.1
Mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts	48.7	69.0*** (4)	68.8
Cooperative programs with schools to reduce truancy	47.2	74.0*** (3)	78.0#
Tertiary Prevention: Law enforcement agency participation in – Victim assistance programs	61.3	82.8*** (1)	78.5##
Battered women’s programs	57.2	81.5*** (2)	79.2
Graffiti eradication programs	43.9	69.2*** (3)	69.6
Mean Implementation (% of tactics)	58.0	77.4***	76.9
Mean Implementation (# of tactics)	6.4	8.5	8.5

KR Alpha (1995=0.77) (1998=0.64) (2000=0.57)

Note: Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1995 and 1998 is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01                      \*\*p-value <.05                      \*p-value<.10

Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1998 and 2000 is as follows:

###p-value <.01                      ##p-value <.05                      #p-value<.10

Table 6. Prevention Program Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000 and Net percent change), Large Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=276], Non-funded [n=106])

Tactic	A		B		C		D		E	
	% Using pre-1995		% Using by 1998		% Using by 2000		Net % Change (1995-1998)		Net % Change (1998-2000)	
	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded
Primary Prevention: Officers Assigned to-Drug education programs in schools	90.4	94.5	95.0	98.3	92.2	94.5	4.6	3.8	-2.8	3.8
Police/Youth programs	70.9	67.0	91.6	91.4	92.0	89.4	20.7	24.4	0.4	-2.0
Varying styles of preventive patrol	66.6*	57.8	95.3***	83.8	93.3**	88.2	28.7	26.0	-2.0	4.4#
Late-night recreation programs	18.6	14.8	28.5**	17.2	26.1**	16.7	9.9##	2.4	-2.5	-0.5
Secondary Prevention: Agency encourages use of Code enforcement to combat disorder	68.5	69.3	92.3*	87.1	92.4***	83.6	23.8	17.8	0.1	-3.5
Confidential hotline for reporting drugs and guns	66.2	72.3	77.3	82.8	81.6	79.6	11.0	10.5	4.3	-3.2
Mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts	48.9	48.2	70.7	63.5	68.2	70.7	21.8	15.3	-2.5	7.2
Cooperative programs with schools to reduce truancy	46.8	48.4	74.4	72.6	79.5	73.7	27.6	24.2	5.1	1.1
Tertiary Prevention: Law enforcement agency participation in-Victim assistance programs	58.1	70.9**	82.7	83.0	80.5**	72.5	24.6###	12.1	-2.2	-10.5
Battered women's programs	58.4	53.7	83.7**	74.8	80.9*	74.1	25.3	21.1	-2.8	-0.7
Graffiti eradication programs	44.3	42.7	71.0	63.5	73.3***	58.3	26.7	20.8	2.3	-5.2
Mean Implementation (% of tactics)	58.0	58.1	78.4**	74.4	78.2***	72.9	20.4	16.3	-0.2	-1.5
Mean Implementation (# of tactics)	6.4	6.4	8.6**	8.2	8.6***	8.0	2.2	1.8	0.0	-0.2

Note: Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the odds of adopting specific tactic (columns A, B, and C) is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01      \*\*p-value <.05      \*p-value<.10

Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the rate of specific tactic adoption from Time 1 to Time 2 (columns D and E) is as follows:

##p-value <.05      #p-value<.10

Table 7. *Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Supportive Organizational Changes, Large Municipal and County Agencies (N=382)*

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>Pre-1995 Percent</i>	<i>1998 Percent (rank)</i>	<i>2000 Percent (rank)</i>
Joint crime/violence reduction task force involving multiple government agencies	58.7	81.5*** (2)	79.5
Alternative response methods for calls	56.1	79.4*** (3)	77.1
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood/community boundaries	55.2	77.1*** (4)	74.6
Revised mission, vision, or values statements	44.9	82.6*** (1)	83.0
Dispatch rules structured to maximize officers' time preventing crimes on their beats	43.9	64.5*** (7)	65.6
Team approach instead of chain of command for prevention, problem-solving, and law enforcement	41.1	72.2*** (5)	70.3
Provide community a voice in nominating and prioritizing problems	37.0	66.7*** (6)	59.8###
Expanded beat officers' discretion	30.6	58.9*** (8)	55.0
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with other agencies' boundaries	29.3	36.7*** (10)	37.0
Revised employee evaluation measures	19.7	54.5*** (9)	58.5
Mean Implementation (% of tactics)	41.7	67.4***	66.0
Mean Implementation (# of tactics)	4.2	6.7	6.6

KR Alpha (1995=0.77) (1998=0.68) (2000=0.67)

Note: Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1995 and 1998 is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01                      \*\*p-value <.05                      \*p-value<.10

Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1998 and 2000 is as follows:

###p-value <.01                      ##p-value <.05                      #p-value<.10

*Table 8. Supportive Organizational Change Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000 and Net percent change), Large Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=276], Non-funded [n=106])*

<i>Tactic</i>	<b>A</b>		<b>B</b>		<b>C</b>		<b>D</b>		<b>E</b>	
	% Using pre-1995		% Using by 1998		% Using by 2000		Net % Change (1995-1998)		Net % Change (1998-2000)	
	<i>Funded</i>	<i>Non-funded</i>	<i>Funded</i>	<i>Non-funded</i>	<i>Funded</i>	<i>Non-funded</i>	<i>Funded</i>	<i>Non-funded</i>	<i>Funded</i>	<i>Non-funded</i>
Joint crime/violence reduction task force involving multiple government agencies	58.2	60.2	82.4	78.6	80.2*	77.1	24.2	18.4	-2.2	-1.5
Alternative response methods for calls	57.2	52.5	82.2**	70.9	79.7***	69.5	25.0	18.4	-2.5	-1.4
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood/community boundaries	56.3	51.7	78.2	73.6	76.5*	68.8	21.9	21.9	-1.7	-4.8
Revised mission, vision, or values statements	44.6	45.9	84.1	78.1	83.9	80.2	39.5	32.2	-0.2	2.1
Dispatch rules structured to maximize officers' time preventing crimes on their beats	43.8	44.3	67.3**	56.1	65.9	64.5	23.5###	11.8	-1.4	8.4
Team approach instead of chain of command for prevention, problem-solving, and law enforcement	43.9**	32.6	75.9***	61.1	71.8	65.7	32.0	28.5	-4.1	4.6
Provide community a voice in nominating and prioritizing problems	39.3*	30.1	70.0**	56.7	62.6**	51.5	30.7	26.6	-7.4	-5.2
Expanded beat officers' discretion	31.8	27.1	63.3***	45.7	57.4**	47.8	31.5##	18.6	-5.9	2.1
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with other agencies' boundaries	29.4	28.7	37.00	35.9	36.8	37.7	7.6	7.2	-0.2	2.2
Revised employee evaluation measures	20.0	18.9	59.7***	38.9	62.6	46.0	39.7###	20.0	2.9	7.1
Mean Implementation (% of tactics)	42.5	39.2	70.0***	59.6	68.0*	61.0	27.5	20.4	-2.0	1.4
Mean Implementation (# of tactics)	4.2	3.9	7.0***	5.9	6.8*	6.1	2.8*	2.0	-0.2	0.2

Note: Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the odds of adopting specific tactic (columns A, B, and C) is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01      \*\*p-value <.05      \*p-value <.10  
 Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the rate of specific tactic adoption from Time 1 to Time 2 (columns D and E) is as follows:  
 ###p-value <.01      ##p-value <.05      #p-value <.10

Table 9. Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Partnership Building Tactics Implementation, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>Pre-1995 Percent</i>	<i>1998 Percent (rank)</i>	<i>2000 Percent (rank)</i>
Joint crime prevention	48.1	53.9*** (1)	60.4### (1)
Joint projects with businesses	37.3	41.5*** (3)	55.3### (3)
Regular community meetings	37.2	48.0*** (2)	55.6### (2)
Projects with residents to remove signs of disorder	32.1	37.5*** (4)	51.6### (4)
Clean-up projects	23.9	21.9*** (6)	32.2### (6)
Survey of citizens	22.6	34.6*** (5)	43.2### (5)
Citizen action/advisory boards	13.4	16.9*** (7)	20.9### (8)
Citizen police academy	9.7	12.7*** (8)	22.3### (7)
Mean Implementation (% of tactics)	28.0	33.4***	42.7###
Mean Implementation (# of tactics)	2.2	2.7***	3.4###

KR Alpha (1995=0.69) (1998=0.74) (2000=0.75)

Note: Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1995 and 1998 is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01                      \*\*p-value <.05                      \*p-value<.10

Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1998 and 2000 is as follows:

###p-value <.01                      ##p-value <.05                      #p-value<.10

*Table 10. Partnership Building Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000 and Net percent change), Small Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=505], Non-funded [n=84])*

Tactic	A		B		C		D		E	
	% Using pre-1995		% Using by 1998		% Using by 2000		Net % Change (1995-1998)		Net % Change (1998-2000)	
	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded
Joint crime prevention	45.9	50.3***	57.3***	50.0	70.6***	48.8	11.4##	-0.3	13.3##	-1.2
Joint project with businesses	32.0	42.7***	45.2***	37.3	61.0***	48.8	13.2##	-5.4	15.8	11.5
Regular community meetings	36.3	38.2**	51.6***	43.9	60.7***	49.9	15.3	5.7	9.1	6.0
Projects with residents to remove signs of disorder	32.0	32.2	44.2***	29.9	57.7***	44.6	12.2##	-2.3	13.5	14.7
Clean-up projects	19.5	28.5***	26.2***	17.0	35.5***	28.5	6.7###	-11.5	9.3	11.5
Survey of citizens	20.7	24.5***	42.5***	25.6	47.0***	38.9	21.8##	1.1	4.5	13.3
Citizen action/advisory boards	13.6	13.1	21.7***	11.4	26.4***	14.8	8.1#	-1.7	4.7	3.4
Citizen police academy	8.5	10.9***	16.2***	8.7	26.4***	17.6	7.7#	-2.2	10.2	8.9
Mean Implementation (percent of tactics)	26.0	30.0***	38.1***	28.0	48.2***	36.5	12.1###	-2.0	10.1	8.5
Mean Implementation (number of tactics)	2.1	2.4***	3.0***	2.2	3.8***	2.9	0.9###	-0.2	0.8	0.7

Note: Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the odds of adopting specific tactic (columns A, B, and C) is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01      \*\*p-value <.05      \*p-value <.10

Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the rate of specific tactic adoption from Time 1 to Time 2 (columns D and E) is as follows:

###p-value <.01      ##p-value <.05      #p-value <.10

Table 11. COPS Impact on “New” (1995-96 and 1998-2000) Partnership-building Practices, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>No Effect</i>	<i>Started/ Expanded</i>	<i>Sustained</i>	<i>Eliminated/ Changed Priority</i>
<b>Joint crime prevention</b>				
(1995-6)	3.4	80.2	16.4	0.0
(1998-2000)	29.1	59.7	10.5	0.8
<b>Joint projects with businesses</b>				
(1995-6)	3.1	78.9	17.9	0.0
(1998-2000)	26.4	56.8	16.7	0.1
<b>Regular community meetings</b>				
(1995-6)	12.3	73.4	14.3	0.0
(1998-2000)	35.3	48.3	15.8	0.6
<b>Projects with residents to remove signs of disorder</b>				
(1995-6)	2.6	77.0	20.4	0.0
(1998-2000)	24.1	52.8	19.6	1.1
<b>Clean-up projects</b>				
(1995-6)	15.6	70.5	13.9	0.0
(1998-2000)	34.8	42.9	16.4	5.9
<b>Survey of citizens</b>				
(1995-6)	7.3	78.8	13.9	0.0
(1998-2000)	34.6	49.6	11.1	4.6
<b>Citizen action/advisory boards</b>				
(1995-6)	5.0	75.8	18.7	0.5
(1998-2000)	36.1	45.1	9.4	9.4
<b>Citizen police academy</b>				
(1995-6)	24.2	67.4	8.4	0.0
(1998-2000)	35.3	48.9	13.0	0.0

Table 12. COPS Impact on “Old” (pre-1995) Partnership-building Practices, Small Municipal and County Agencies, 1996 Survey Wave (N=589)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>No Effect</i>	<i>Started/ Expanded</i>	<i>Sustained</i>	<i>Eliminated/ Changed Priority</i>
Joint crime prevention	11.9	46.1	36.8	0.0
Joint projects with businesses	11.9	42.3	39.2	0.4
Regular community meetings	12.6	56.8	26.5	0.0
Projects with residents to remove signs of disorder	13.8	47.9	33.6	0.2
Clean-up projects	19.7	31.5	39.4	0.0
Survey of citizens	28.9	34.1	34.5	0.0
Citizen action/advisory boards	20.9	46.3	27.6	0.0
Citizen police academy	31.0	27.2	35.7	0.0

Table 13. Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Problem-Solving Tactics Implementation, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>Pre-1995 Percent</i>	<i>1998 Percent (rank)</i>	<i>2000 Percent (rank)</i>
Consider neighborhood values	60.5	38.5*** (8)	49.6### (10)
Use residents' input to measure response effect	53.5	56.3*** (3)	71.3### (3)
Analyze problems with Community	52.8	58.7*** (2)	77.9### (2)
Use agency data to measure response effect	47.9	45.1*** (5)	58.8### (5)
Systematic monitoring of the problem	47.9	62.2*** (1)	81.3### (1)
Officer analyze residents' comments to identify recurring patterns	43.9	54.0*** (4)	71.1### (4)
Analyze problems with PO's	40.9	35.2*** (10)	52.5### (8)
Officer analyze crime data to identify recurring patterns	38.4	39.0 (7)	54.3### (7)
Written documentation of problems/projects	37.6	35.4*** (9)	50.2### (9)
Designate patterns for non-traditional response	37.1	44.0*** (6)	57.8### (6)
Analyze crime patterns with GIS	13.4	14.4** (11)	27.1### (11)
Mean Implementation (% of tactics)	43.1	43.9	59.7###
Mean Implementation (# of tactics)	4.7	4.8	6.5###

KR Alpha (1995=0.85) (1998=0.88) (2000=0.84)

Note: Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1995 and 1998 is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01                      \*\*p-value <.05                      \*p-value <.10

Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1998 and 2000 is as follows:

###p-value <.01                      ##p-value <.05                      #p-value <.10

*Table 14. Problem-Solving Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000, and Net percent change), Small Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=505], Non-funded [n=84])*

Tactic	A		B		C		D		E	
	% Using pre-1995		% Using by 1998		% Using by 2000		Net % Change (1995-1998)		Net % Change (1998-2000)	
	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded
Consider neighborhood values	52.1	69.1***	43.8***	32.5	57.6***	40.5	-8.3###	13.8	8.0	
Use residents' input to measure response effect	48.2	58.9***	57.0*	55.6	69.8***	73.0	8.8#	12.8	17.4	
Analyze problems with Community	44.6	61.2***	61.5***	55.4	82.3***	73.0	16.9###	20.8	17.6	
Use agency data to measure response effect	44.0	51.9***	46.7***	43.4	60.4***	56.9	2.7#	13.7	13.5	
Systematic monitoring of the problem	43.2	52.7***	64.5***	59.6	81.5	81.1	21.3	17.0	21.5	
Officer analyze residents' comments to identify recurring patterns	41.0	46.9***	61.5***	45.5	74.8***	67.0	20.5###	13.3	21.5	
Analyze problems with PO's	34.3	47.6***	38.6***	31.3	52.9	52.1	4.3###	14.3	20.8	
Officer analyze crime data to identify recurring patterns	37.6	39.3**	44.7***	32.5	60.5***	47.2	7.1##	15.8	14.7	
Written documentation of problems/projects	34.6	40.6***	40.6***	29.6	51.8***	48.4	6.0##	11.2	18.8	
Designate patterns for non-traditional response	33.5	40.9***	46.3***	41.3	63.5***	51.3	12.8	17.2	10.0	
Analyze crime patterns with GIS	12.7	14.2***	19.2***	9.0	32.5***	21.0	6.5###	13.3	12.0	
Mean Implementation (% of tactics)	38.7	47.6***	47.7***	39.6	62.5***	55.6	9.0###	14.8	16.0	
Mean Implementation (# of tactics)	4.3	5.2***	5.2***	4.4	6.9***	6.1	0.9###	1.7	1.7	

Note: Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the odds of adopting specific tactic (columns A, B, and C) is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01      \*\*p-value <.05      \*p-value <.10

Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the rate of specific tactic adoption from Time 1 to Time 2 (columns D and E) is as follows:

###p-value <.01      ##p-value <.05      #p-value <.10

Table 15. COPS Impact on “New” (1995-6 and 1998-2000) Problem-solving Practices, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>No Effect</i>	<i>Started/ Expanded</i>	<i>Sustained</i>	<i>Eliminated/ Changed Priority</i>
Consider neighborhood values				
(1995-6)	5.5	60.6	33.9	0.0
(1998-2000)	31.9	61.3	5.9	0.9
Use residents’ input to measure response effect				
(1995-6)	7.2	68.6	24.3	0.0
(1998-2000)	31.1	64.6	1.0	0.8
Analyze problems with Community				
(1995-6)	9.4	75.4	15.1	0.0
(1998-2000)	17.3	67.4	9.8	3.8
Use agency data to measure response effect				
(1995-6)	9.6	58.1	32.2	0.0
(1998-2000)	29.8	60.1	7.6	2.5
Systematic monitoring of the problem				
(1995-6)	9.4	63.6	26.7	0.3
(1998-2000)	20.2	60.1	16.9	0.6
Officer analyze residents’ comments to identify recurring patterns				
(1995-6)	6.2	60.7	33.1	0.0
(1998-2000)	33.1	55.0	8.7	3.2
Analyze problems with PO’s				
(1995-6)	17.0	53.5	29.5	0.0
(1998-2000)	30.0	57.1	5.2	5.2
Officer analyze crime data to identify recurring patterns				
(1995-6)	9.2	63.3	27.2	0.3
(1998-2000)	22.2	60.2	15.3	2.3
Written documentation of problems/projects				
(1995-6)	7.2	65.7	27.1	0.0
(1998-2000)	35.4	56.4	4.6	0.8
Designate patterns for non-traditional response				
(1995-6)	8.1	72.6	19.3	0.0
(1998-2000)	18.2	64.4	13.2	4.2
Analyze crime patterns with GIS				
(1995-6)	23.5	64.8	11.7	0.0
(1998-2000)	38.2	45.5	13.5	2.8

Table 16. COPS Impact on “Old” (pre-1995) Problem-solving Practices, Small Municipal and County Agencies, 1996 Survey Wave (N=589)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>No Effect</i>	<i>Started/ Expanded</i>	<i>Sustained</i>	<i>Eliminated/ Changed Priority</i>
Consider neighborhood values	15.1	44.6	40.1	0.0
Use residents’ input to measure response effect	17.4	46.0	36.1	0.0
Analyze problems with Community	14.4	57.8	27.6	0.2
Use agency data to measure response effect	16.2	32.7	50.6	0.0
Systematic monitoring of the problem	15.0	42.6	41.8	0.0
Officer analyze residents’ comments to identify recurring patterns	16.5	50.5	32.5	0.0
Analyze problems with PO’s	25.2	31.5	43.3	0.0
Officer analyze crime data to identify recurring patterns	20.8	37.1	40.3	0.0
Written documentation of problems/projects	16.4	31.3	52.1	0.0
Designate patterns for non-traditional response	11.8	54.8	32.7	0.4
Analyze crime patterns with GIS	39.6	18.4	33.4	0.0

Table 17. Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Prevention Program Tactics Implementation, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>Pre-1995 Percent</i>	<i>1998 Percent (rank)</i>	<i>2000 Percent (rank)</i>
Primary Prevention: Officers Assigned to-Drug education programs in schools	62.8	61.9* (1)	69.3#### (2)
Police/Youth programs	39.5	40.7** (3)	56.8#### (3)
Varying styles of preventive patrol	36.5	53.8*** (2)	72.1#### (1)
Late-night recreation programs	6.7	8.2*** (4)	10.2#### (4)
Secondary Prevention: Agency encourages use of Mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts	48.4	42.8*** (1)	54.6#### (2)
Code enforcement to combat disorder	45.5	41.2*** (2)	54.8#### (1)
Cooperative programs with schools to reduce truancy	39.0	37.4*** (3)	52.3#### (3)
Confidential hotline for reporting drugs and guns	36.5	34.0*** (4)	36.5#### (4)
Tertiary Prevention: Law enforcement agency participation in-Victim assistance programs	48.6	44.5*** (1)	56.6#### (1)
Battered women's programs	44.7	41.1*** (2)	53.4#### (2)
Graffiti eradication programs	15.9	18.7*** (3)	22.1#### (3)
Mean Implementation (% of tactics)	38.6	38.6	49.5####
Mean Implementation (# of tactics)	4.2	4.2	5.4####

KR Alpha (1995=0.75) (1998=0.80) (2000=0.73)

Note: Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1995 and 1998 is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01                      \*\*p-value <.05                      \*p-value<.10

Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1998 and 2000 is as follows:

###p-value <.01                      ##p-value <.05                      #p-value<.1

*Table 18. Prevention Program Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000 and Net percent change), Small Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=505], Non-funded [n=84])*

<i>Tactic</i>	<b>A</b>		<b>B</b>		<b>C</b>		<b>D</b>		<b>E</b>	
	% Using pre-1995		% Using by 1998		% Using by 2000		Net % Change (1995-1998)		Net % Change (1998-2000)	
	<i>Funded</i>	<i>Non-funded</i>	<i>Funded</i>	<i>Non-funded</i>	<i>Funded</i>	<i>Non-funded</i>	<i>Funded</i>	<i>Non-funded</i>	<i>Funded</i>	<i>Non-funded</i>
Primary Prevention: Officers Assigned to-Drug education programs in schools	58.1	67.7***	67.4***	55.6	71.8***	66.4	9.3###	-12.1	4.4	10.8
Police/Youth programs	39.9	39.0	46.1***	34.5	62.7***	50.1	6.2#	-4.5	16.6	15.6
Varying styles of preventive patrol	33.6	39.4***	57.2***	49.9	78.4***	64.9	23.6##	10.5	21.2	15.0
Late-night recreation programs	4.2	9.3***	8.4	8.0	7.9	12.7***	4.2	-1.3	-0.5	4.7
Secondary Prevention: Agency encourages use of Mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts	47.6	49.1*	44.8***	40.5	57.4***	51.4	-2.8	-8.6	12.6	10.9
Code enforcement to combat disorder	47.3***	43.8	45.2***	36.6	58.5***	50.7	-2.1	-7.2	13.3	14.1
Cooperative programs with schools to reduce truancy	32.7	45.4***	44.1***	29.9	62.0***	41.3	11.4###	-15.5	17.9	11.4
Confidential hotline for reporting drugs and guns	32.6	40.5***	37.2***	30.4	45.5***	39.3	4.6##	-10.1	8.3	8.9
Tertiary Prevention: Law enforcement agency participation in-Victim assistance programs	46.7	50.4***	48.1***	40.4	57.7***	55.3	1.4##	-10.0	9.6	14.9
Battered women's programs	44.4	45.0	44.0***	37.8	54.0	52.6	-0.4	-7.2	10.0	14.8
Graffiti eradication programs	16.5*	15.4	17.9	19.5**	21.9	22.2	1.4	4.1	4.0	2.7
Mean Implementation (% of tactics)	36.7	40.4*	41.9***	34.8	52.5***	46.1	5.2###	-5.6	10.6	11.3
Mean Implementation (# of tactics)	4.0	4.4*	4.6***	3.8	5.8***	5.1	0.6###	-0.6	1.2	1.3

Note: Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the odds of adopting specific tactic (columns A, B, and C) is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01      \*\*p-value <.05      \*p-value<.10

Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the rate of specific tactic adoption from Time 1 to Time 2 (columns D and E) is as follows:

###p-value <.01      ##p-value <.05      #p-value<.10

Table 19. COPS Impact on “New” (1995-6 and 1998-2000) Prevention Practices, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>No Effect</i>	<i>Started/ Expanded</i>	<i>Sustained</i>	<i>Eliminated/ Changed Priority</i>
<b>Primary Prevention: Officers Assigned to-Drug education programs in schools</b>				
(1995-6)	7.2	68.7	24.0	0.0
(1998-2000)	12.3	73.3	9.1	5.3
<b>Police/Youth programs</b>				
(1995-6)	6.7	79.3	14.1	0.0
(1998-2000)	15.1	72.2	10.7	2.0
<b>Varying styles of preventive patrol</b>				
(1995-6)	1.9	84.5	13.6	0.0
(1998-2000)	21.6	61.8	12.3	4.2
<b>Late-night recreation programs</b>				
(1995-6)	12.8	60.2	27.0	0.0
(1998-2000)	24.8	68.7	3.3	3.2
<b>Secondary Prevention: Agency encourages use of Mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts</b>				
(1995-6)	15.7	61.7	22.6	0.0
(1998-2000)	38.2	35.5	20.5	2.9
<b>Code enforcement to combat disorder</b>				
(1995-6)	6.3	61.3	32.4	0.0
(1998-2000)	30.5	52.3	14.4	0.0
<b>Cooperative programs with schools to reduce truancy</b>				
(1995-6)	4.9	70.2	25.0	0.0
(1998-2000)	18.7	66.9	10.2	2.1
<b>Confidential hotline for reporting drugs and guns</b>				
(1995-6)	28.0	39.9	32.2	0.0
(1998-2000)	54.3	35.0	7.5	0.0

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>No Effect</i>	<i>Started/ Expanded</i>	<i>Sustained</i>	<i>Eliminated/ Changed Priority</i>
Tertiary Prevention: Law enforcement agency participation in-Victim assistance programs				
(1995-6)	14.5	51.7	33.9	0.0
(1998-2000)	38.7	41.5	15.5	4.3
Battered women's programs <sup>4</sup>				
(1995-6)	---	---	---	---
(1998-2000)	40.0	39.0	17.1	3.9
Graffiti eradication programs				
(1995-6)	7.0	75.2	17.8	0.0
(1998-2000)	45.9	48.2	5.9	0.0

4. Data missing due to CATI programming error.

Table 20. COPS Impact on “Old” (pre-1995) Prevention Practices, Small Municipal and County Agencies, 1996 Survey Wave (N=589)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>No Effect</i>	<i>Started/ Expanded</i>	<i>Sustained</i>	<i>Eliminated/ Changed Priority</i>
Primary Prevention: Officers Assigned to-Drug education programs in schools	18.6	50.4	29.4	0.1
Police/Youth programs	11.3	63.3	25.0	0.0
Varying styles of preventive patrol	8.0	61.8	25.3	0.0
Late-night recreation programs	35.2	37.9	25.1	0.0
Secondary Prevention: Agency encourages use of Mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts	16.2	33.9	47.6	0.0
Code enforcement to combat disorder	18.6	39.7	37.0	0.0
Cooperative programs with schools to reduce truancy	22.8	39.6	36.7	0.2
Confidential hotline for reporting drugs and guns	37.6	26.3	35.2	0.7
Tertiary Prevention: Law enforcement agency participation in-Victim assistance programs	32.5	26.2	38.2	0.7
Battered women’s programs	—	—	—	—
Graffiti eradication programs	29.5	27.6	38.2	0.4

Table 21. Pre-1995, 1998, and 2000 Supportive Organizational Changes, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>Pre-1995 Percent</i>	<i>1998 Percent (rank)</i>	<i>2000 Percent (rank)</i>
Joint crime/violence reduction task force involving multiple government agencies	38.9	41.5*** (2)	54.3### (3)
Alternative response methods for calls	31.6	33.6*** (5)	42.6### (6)
Revised mission, vision, or values statements	30.7	39.0*** (3)	61.5### (2)
Dispatch rules structured to maximize officers' time preventing crimes on their beats	27.9	31.3*** (6)	45.0### (4)
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood/community boundaries	27.8	35.3*** (4)	43.8### (5)
Team approach instead of chain of command for prevention, problem-solving, and law enforcement	26.2	45.1*** (1)	64.5### (1)
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with other agencies' boundaries	25.5	23.8*** (8)	29.4### (10)
Revised employee evaluation measures	16.2	20.3*** (9)	41.8### (7)
Expanded beat officers' discretion	12.6	25.2*** (7)	38.7### (8)
Provide community a voice in nominating and prioritizing problems	9.1	18.3*** (10)	30.3### (9)
Mean Implementation (% of tactics)	24.7	31.4***	45.2###
Mean Implementation (# of tactics)	2.5	3.1***	4.5###

KR Alpha (1995=0.73) (1998=0.76) (2000=0.76)

Note: Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1995 and 1998 is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01                      \*\*p-value <.05                      \*p-value<.10

Significance level of the change in the odds of adopting a specific tactic between 1998 and 2000 is as follows:

###p-value <.01                      ##p-value <.05                      #p-value<.10

Table 22. Supportive Organizational Change Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, by 2000 and Net percent change), Small Municipal and County Agencies (Funded [n=505], Non-funded [n=84])

Tactic	A		B		C		D		E	
	% Using pre-1995		% Using by 1998		% Using by 2000		Net % Change (1995-1998)		Net % Change (1998-2000)	
	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded	Funded	Non-funded
Joint crime/violence reduction task force involving multiple government agencies	39.0	38.7	45.2***	37.2	56.3***	52.1	6.2	-1.5	11.1	14.9
Alternative response methods for calls	28.5	34.8***	31.7	35.9***	43.1	41.9	3.2	1.1	11.4	6.0
Revised mission, vision, or values statements	25.9	35.6***	42.5***	35.1	65.2***	57.2	16.6##	-0.5	22.7	22.1
Dispatch rules structured to maximize officers' time preventing crimes on their beats	23.1	32.7***	34.5***	27.8	50.0***	39.2	11.4#	-4.9	15.5	11.4
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood/community boundaries	28.9***	26.8	38.0***	32.2	50.9***	35.6	9.1	5.4	12.9###	3.4
Team approach instead of chain of command for prevention, problem-solving, and law enforcement	22.3	30.1***	49.6***	40.0	71.9***	56.1	27.3##	9.9	22.3	16.1
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with other agencies' boundaries	23.2	27.9***	27.1***	20.2	34.0***	24.2	3.9#	-7.7	6.9	4.0
Revised employee evaluation measures	14.6	17.9***	24.0***	16.2	47.2***	35.7	9.4	-1.7	23.2	19.5
Expanded beat officers' discretion	12.7	12.5	25.6	24.9	41.4***	35.6	12.9	12.4	15.8	10.7
Provide community a voice in nominating and prioritizing problems	11.0***	7.2	21.4***	14.8	35.1***	24.9	10.4	7.6	13.7	10.1
Mean Implementation (% of tactics)	22.9	26.4**	33.9***	28.4	49.5***	40.3	11.0###	2.0	15.6	11.9
Mean Implementation (# of tactics)	2.3	2.6**	3.4***	2.8	4.9***	4.0	1.1###	0.2	1.5	1.2

Note: Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the odds of adopting specific tactic (columns A, B, and C) is as follows:

\*\*\*p-value <.01      \*\*p-value <.05      \*p-value <.10  
 Significance level of the difference between Funded and Nonfunded agencies on the rate of specific tactic adoption from Time 1 to Time 2 (columns D and E) is as follows:  
 ###p-value <.01      ##p-value <.05      #p-value <.10

Table 23. COPS Impact on “New” (1995-6 and 1998-2000) Organizational Changes, Small Municipal and County Agencies (N=589)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>No Effect</i>	<i>Started/ Expanded</i>	<i>Sustained</i>	<i>Eliminated/ Changed Priority</i>
Joint crime/violence reduction task force involving multiple government agencies				
(1995-6)	25.4	40.7	30.4	1.8
(1998-2000)	23.6	63.2	12.7	0.6
Alternative response methods for calls				
(1995-6)	18.3	46.9	28.6	0.0
(1998-2000)	14.4	70.8	11.1	0.7
Revised mission, vision, or values statements				
(1995-6)	19.1	37.5	39.4	0.0
(1998-2000)	34.0	54.4	11.3	0.4
Dispatch rules structured to maximize officers’ time preventing crimes on their beats				
(1995-6)	21.6	28.5	49.0	0.0
(1998-2000)	24.2	64.6	8.2	0.0
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood/community boundaries				
(1995-6)	23.4	37.7	37.0	0.0
(1998-2000)	37.7	50.9	8.4	3.0

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>No Effect</i>	<i>Started/ Expanded</i>	<i>Sustained</i>	<i>Eliminated/ Changed Priority</i>
Team approach instead of chain of command for prevention, problem-solving, and law enforcement				
(1995-6)	17.0	38.7	42.5	0.0
(1998-2000)	22.8	59.4	12.1	4.0
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with other agencies' boundaries				
(1995-6)	25.6	49.8	23.0	1.7
(1998-2000)	27.1	71.5	1.4	0.0
Revised employee evaluation measures				
(1995-6)	11.7	54.2	29.3	2.2
(1998-2000)	29.4	51.4	10.7	6.8
Expanded beat officers' discretion				
(1995-6)	16.1	31.6	43.7	0.0
(1998-2000)	30.4	58.6	8.6	2.4
Providing community a voice in nominating and prioritizing problems				
(1995-6)	12.0	25.1	57.1	0.0
(1998-2000)	22.6	67.7	6.9	2.8

Table 24. COPS Impact on “Old” (pre-1995) Organizational Practices, Small Municipal and County Agencies, 1996 Survey Wave (N=589)

<i>Tactic</i>	<i>No Effect</i>	<i>Started/ Expanded</i>	<i>Sustained</i>	<i>Eliminated/ Changed Priority</i>
Joint crime/violence reduction task force involving multiple government agencies	25.4	30.4	40.7	1.8
Alternative response methods for calls	18.3	28.6	46.9	0.0
Revised mission, vision, or values statements	19.1	39.4	37.5	0.0
Dispatch rules structured to maximize officers’ time preventing crimes on their beats	21.6	49.0	28.5	0.0
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood/community boundaries	23.4	37.0	37.7	0.0
Team approach instead of chain of command for prevention, problem-solving, and law enforcement	17.0	42.5	38.7	0.0
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with other agencies’ boundaries	25.6	23.0	49.8	1.7
Revised employee evaluation measures	11.7	29.3	54.2	2.2
Expanded beat officers’ discretion	16.1	43.7	31.6	0.0
Providing community a voice in nominating and prioritizing problems	12.0	57.1	25.1	0.0

## APPENDIX A POLICING TACTICS CHECKLIST

**W4TAC\_** Now I need to ask you about some other specific tactics that may or may not be part of community policing in your jurisdiction. These tactics all appear on a checklist we sent your agency several weeks ago. Do you have the checklist handy? If so, it might help this section of the interview go more quickly if you have it in front of you while I ask the questions.

**INTERVIEWER: IF R HAS THE CHECKLIST, ENCOURAGE R TO GET IT, AND SAY YOU'LL REMAIN ON THE LINE WHILE R RETRIEVES IT.**

We understand that different tactics are appropriate for different agencies, so feel free to tell me if I ask about a tactic that is not being used, or is not applicable to your agency.

**First** I'll ask about your use of a policing tactic or organizational change and ask you to choose one of the answers printed on your checklist (OR IF R DOESN'T HAVE CHECKLIST, READ RESPONSES ON NEXT SCREEN).

**EXTRA** If you don't have the checklist, you may want to write these six responses down for Column A.

1. We have not done this since 1998, and have no plans to start.
2. We began doing this before 1998, and we have continued or expanded it since then.
3. We began doing this before 1998, but we've dropped it since then.
4. We began doing this after 1998, and we plan to continue or expand it.
5. We tried this for a while after 1998, but we dropped it.
6. This topic is not applicable in our jurisdiction.

**Second**, for each tactic that your agency uses, I'll ask you about how your COPS grant(s) affected the use of that tactic in your agency.

**[ASK COLUMN B ONLY IF THE AGENCY HAS COPS GRANTS]**

**IF R DOESN'T HAVE THE CHECKLIST:** you may want to write these down too for column B. I'll ask you to tell me if the COPS grant had:

1. No effect.
2. Instrumental in starting or expanding it.
3. Allowed us to continue it in spite of budget cuts.
4. Caused us to cut this tactic by shifting our priorities somewhere else.

	<i>ITEM</i>	<i>PROGRAM STATUS*</i>	<i>COPS FUNDING**</i>
<b>A. Building Partnerships with Community</b>			
	1. Regular community meetings to discuss crime		
	2. Surveys of citizens to determine general community needs and satisfaction with your agency		
	3. Citizen Action/Advisory Councils in precincts or districts		
	4. Citizen/police academy		
	5. Clean up/fix up projects with community residents		
	6. Joint projects with community residents to reduce disorder such as loitering, public drinking, etc.		
	7. Joint community crime prevention program Neighborhood Watch		
	8. Joint projects with local businesses to reduce disorder or petty crime		
	9. Have there been other efforts to build partnerships with community (specify) _____ _____		
<b>B. Solving Crime and Disorder Problems</b>		<b>Column A</b>	<b>Column B</b>
	1. Analyzing crime patterns using a computerized geographic information system		
	2. Officers analyze and use crime data to identify recurring patterns of crime and disorder on their beats		
	3. Officers analyze and use community resident's comments to identify recurring patterns of crime and disorder on their beats		
	4. Designating certain recurring patterns as "problems" or "projects" requiring non-traditional responses		
	5. Analyzing problems or projects with business or property owners, school principals, or property managers or occupants		
	6. Analyzing problems or projects with probation/parole officers or others who monitor offenders		
	7. Considering neighborhood values in creating solutions or planning projects		
	8. Using agency data to measure the effects of responses to problems		
	9. Using citizen's input to measure the effects of responses to problems		
	10. Documenting problems, projects, analyses, responses, failures, and successes in writing		
	11. Making sure that solved problems stay solved		

	<i>ITEM</i>	<i>PROGRAM STATUS*</i>	<i>COPS FUNDING**</i>
	<b>C. Prevention Programs</b>		
	<b>Officers assigned to:</b>	<b>Column A</b>	<b>Column B</b>
	1. Varying styles of preventive patrol (e.g., bikes, walk and talk)		
	2. Police/youth programs (e.g. PAL program, school liaison program, mentoring program)		
	3. Drug education programs in schools		
	4. Late-night recreation programs (e.g., midnight basketball)		
	5. Other programs to prevent youth from becoming offenders (specify): _____ _____		
	<b>Agency encourages use of:</b>	<b>Column A</b>	<b>Column B</b>
	6. Alcohol, housing or other code enforcement to combat crime and disorder		
	7. Mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts		
	8. Confidential hot lines for reporting illegal drugs or guns		
	9. Cooperative programs with schools to reduce truancy		
	10. Other prevention programs for high-risk places or situations (specify): _____ _____		
	<b>Law enforcement agency participation in:</b>	<b>Column A</b>	<b>Column B</b>
	11. Graffiti eradication programs		
	12. Victim assistance program		
	13. Battered women's programs		
	14. Other programs to repair harm from crime (specify): _____ _____		
	<b>D. Organizational Changes</b>	<b>Column A</b>	<b>Column B</b>
	1. Revised mission, vision, or values statements to emphasize community voice, officer discretion, or both		
	2. Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood/ community boundaries		
	3. Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with other city agencies' administrative boundaries.		
	4. Dispatch rules structured to maximize officers' time <u>preventing crimes on their beats</u>		
	5. Team approach instead of chain of command for prevention, problem-solving, and law enforcement		
	6. Giving beat officers new decision-making authority (specify):		

	<b>ITEM</b>	<b>PROGRAM STATUS*</b>	<b>COPS FUNDING**</b>
	_____		
	<b>7.</b> Revised employee evaluation measures for officers doing community policing		
	<b>8.</b> Provide community a voice in nominating and prioritizing problems for community police officers to work on: (specify) _____		
	<b>9.</b> Alternative response methods for calls (e.g., telephone reports, mail-in reports, scheduled appointments for selected calls)		
	<b>10.</b> Joint crime/violence reduction task force involving multiple 5government agency heads		
	<b>11.</b> Other organizational support for community policing (specify): _____		

## APPENDIX B THE SURVEY DESIGN

This study is based on a national survey of 1,270 randomly selected police agencies. The sample design is based on that developed in 1996 for the Urban Institute's (UI) evaluation of the federal COPS program (Roth et al. 2000). To create the 1996 sample, UI staff utilized records from the federal Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), the Uniform Crime Reports, and the National Crime Information Center to develop a national list of nearly 21,000 law enforcement agencies eligible for COPS funding. These agencies were stratified according to COPS grant status and jurisdiction size as follows (see Table B.1).

*Table B.1. Sampling Frame by Funding/Program Status and Population Category For 1996 COPS Survey\**

<b>Population Group</b>	<b>Agencies Not Funded Through COPS</b>	<b>COPS FAST-AHEAD Grantees</b>	<b>COPS UHP Grantees</b>	<b>COPS MORE Grantees</b>	<b>Total</b>
Less than 50,000	8,373	5,845	1,186	1,136	16,540
50,000 or more	267	546	159	349	1,321
Missing	4,208			79	4,287
<b>Total</b>	<b>12,848</b>	<b>6,391</b>	<b>1,345</b>	<b>1,564</b>	<b>22,148</b>

\* Some agencies are counted more than once due to participation in multiple COPS grant programs.

The FAST/AHEAD strata refer to administrative grant categories used during the first year of the COPS program. The UHP strata refer to the Universal Hiring Program, which absorbed the FAST and AHEAD programs in 1996. The MORE strata contain agencies that were funded to acquire technology or civilians and/or to pay overtime to officers.<sup>5</sup>

UI staff sampled over 2,000 of these agencies for a first-wave interview in the fall of 1996. The designed sampling fractions are shown below (Table B.2). Based on substantive and statistical considerations, project staff sampled disproportionately from among COPS grantees

5. The size stratification point of 50,000 population was based in part on administrative distinctions established for early COPS grants. In late 1994, OCOPS established the Funding Accelerated for Small Towns (FAST) program for agencies serving populations of 50,000 or less. The program had simplified application procedures to speed processing. At the same time, OCOPS established the Accelerated Hiring, Education, and Deployment (AHEAD) program, which had more stringent application procedures, for agencies serving larger jurisdictions. These early programs were later replaced by the Universal Hiring Program, which applies to agencies of all sizes.

and large agencies. Nonetheless, the sample is a nationally representative sample weighted to produce national estimates.

*Table B.2. Designed Sampling Fraction By Funding-Program Status and Population Category for 1996 COPS Survey*

<b>Population Group</b>	<b>Agencies Not Funded Through COPS</b>	<b>COPS FAST/AHEAD Grantees</b>	<b>COPS UHP Grantees</b>	<b>COPS MORE Grantees</b>	<b>Total</b>
Less than 50,000	0.013	0.048	0.236	0.248	0.057
50,000 or more	1.0	0.498	1.0	0.777	0.734
Missing	0.044				0.044
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.044</b>	<b>0.086</b>	<b>0.326</b>	<b>0.354</b>	<b>0.095</b>

Table B.3 presents the response rates for the 1996 COPS survey.

*Table B.3. Survey Response Rates By Funding-Program Status and Population Category (In Percentages) For 1996 COPS Survey*

<b>Population Group</b>	<b>Agencies Not Funded Through COPS</b>	<b>COPS FAST/AHEAD Grantees</b>	<b>COPS Unihire Grantees</b>	<b>COPS MORE Grantees</b>	<b>Total</b>
Less than 50,000	61	84	78	75	77
50,000 or more	67	78	99	84	80
Missing	61				61
<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>77</b>

For the COPS Wave 4 survey in the summer of 2000, we sought to re-interview all 1,471 agencies that participated in the 1996 survey. Telephone interviewers from the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) completed interviews with 1,270, or 86%, of the target agencies. Table B.4 presents the response rates by stratum for the H&R survey. Interviewers achieved a response rate of 83% or higher for each cell.

*Table B.4. Completed Interviews and Response Rates (In Parentheses) By Funding-Program Status and Population Category For 2000 COPS-H&R Survey\**

<b>Population Group</b>	<b>Agencies Not Funded Through COPS</b>	<b>COPS FAST/AHEAD Grantees</b>	<b>COPS UHP Grantees</b>	<b>COPS MORE Grantees</b>	<b>Total</b>
Less than 50,000	146 (.830)	199 (.865)	183 (.851)	189 (.896)	717 (.862)
50,000 or more	147 (.855)	187 (.886)	132 (.880)	201 (.910)	667 (.885)
Total	293 (.842)	386 (.875)	315 (.863)	390 (.903)	1384 (.873)

\* Some agencies are counted more than once due to participation in multiple COPS grant programs

Based on work subsequent to the 1996 survey, we collapsed the non-COPS agencies with missing population into the small non-COPS group for the Wave 4 survey. Note also that the interview numbers sum across the cells to 1,384 rather than to 1,270, the actual number interviewed. This is because some agencies had multiple grants as of 1996 and were thus eligible to be sampled more than once (consequently, some agencies are counted more than once in the table above). UI staff developed a weighting scheme to adjust for the agencies' multiple selection probabilities in the 1996 survey, and that weighting scheme was employed for this study as well. Further details of the original survey design and weighting scheme are provided in Roth et al. (2000, pp. 275-287)

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