For The Land and The Lord: Present Trends and Future Implications, by Ian S. Lustick

VI. Present Trends and Future Implications

The worldview of Jewish fundamentalism is based on myths of Jewish chosenness, mission, and territorial sovereignty similar to those that shaped Jewish politics before the Roman expulsion. Now, as then, establishment of Jewish political Sovereignty over the Land of Israel constitutes the vital focus of zealous action; now, as then, the territorial issue is but the most concrete expression of a highly parochial brand of Jewish redemptionism-a worldview that stands in as sharp a contradiction to Western liberal/democratic values today as it did to Greco-Roman civilization in ancient times. In contemporary Israel the new role of these particular motifs and values, drawn out of the vast mythic repertoire of Jewish religion, Jewish history, and Jewish culture, is explained by a combination of several factors. First, and most basic, was the historic success of Zionism in recreating a dynamic Jewish political presence in the Land of Israel. Second were the manifold consequences of the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War' which reawakened irredentist sentiments and set the stage for the effective mobilization of new political and social forces inside of Israel. Third was the dedication of well-placed and ambitious elites. By linking ultimate Jewish and redemptive values to traditionally Zionist political objectives of settlement and sovereignty, these elites were able to attract a substantial number of enthusiastic activists; to draw upon the political, administrative, and economic Support of leading political parties; and to capture the imagination of wide sectors of Israeli society.

In the first chapters of this study I presented some evidence for the influence that Jewish fundamentalism has had on the attitudes, commitments, and votes of large numbers of Israelis. Since the rise of Gush Emunim in the mid-1970s, thousands of Israelis have been involved in militant political activity on behalf of fundamentalist objectives. The movement has repeatedly proven its capacity to generate well organized political action simultaneously over a variety of issues, sustained in terms consistent with, if not corresponding to, consensual Israeli political opinions. An actively messianic interpretation of Jewish imperatives remains dominant within the national religious sector, from which Gush Emunim continues to attract settlers, and among youthful cadre. 1 Israel's chief rabbinate, the basis and limits of whose authority have never been clearly delineated, has virtually embraced the fundamentalist credo. 2 In the 1984 elections Tehiya, the party most closely associated with Gush Emunim, attracted the third-largest number of votes (after Labor and the Likud). In 1987 most polls showed that Tehiya/Tzomet, Kach, and the National Religious Party can expect to command from thirteen to sixteen seats in the next Knesset in 1988. 3

Given the extent to which fundamentalist activists and supporters staff educational institutions in the religious sector, and the extraordinarily high birthrate among key fundamentalist groups, such as Gush Emunim settlers, it is fairly certain that the number of Israelis whose thinking is governed by these myths, and whose lives are dedicated to the achievement of fundamentalist objectives, will slowly increase. 4 But to anticipate the eventual impact of any revolutionary doctrine, the key question is how saliently and with what effect the images, goals, symbols, and attitudes its adherents have legitimized percolate through the wider society. From this perspective, how Jewish fundamentalism affects the trajectory of Israeli politics will depend largely on how relevant and useful Israelis find its messages in the context of the predicaments they are likely to face. Will fundamentalist ideas-and the assumptions, categories, attitudes, and slogans associated with them-appear irrelevant and dangerous to increasing numbers of Israelis? Or, having been injected into the mainstream of Israeli politics, will they provide a convenient, authenticated vocabulary for competing elites and groups in need of inspiring formulas to advance or consolidate their own interests? It is, of course, impossible to provide a definitive answer to this question, but it is worthwhile considering the different directions of current trends.

Settlement Issues. While settlement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip has been the main vehicle of fundamentalist political success, it has also presented the movement with problems and disappointments. Since 1984 Israel's severely straitened economic circumstances have led to sharp reductions in expenditures on settlement and infrastructure. For both economic and psychological reasons, this has hampered the achievement of Gush objectives regarding the number and distribution of new settlements and settlers. In response to what it regards as a freeze on settlement-related expenditures, Gush Emunim has sponsored the formation of a parliamentary lobby. As noted in chapter 1, the lobby is composed of members of parliament with strong political and ideological connections to the fundamentalist movement. Its purpose is to act as advocate and watchdog for the interests of the settlers. As several Gush leaders have noted, however, this effort contradicts the larger purpose of the movement to be accepted in the eyes of the Israeli public not as a separate interest group like any other, but as the self-sacrificing representative of the nation as a whole. 5 This difficulty is accentuated by the highly focused program of the movement, stressing territorial, political, and spiritual-ideological issues above all others. As Charles Liebman, a leading analyst of Israeli culture, has pointed out, the fundamentalist movement has not yet offered Israeli Jews convincing responses to problems of economic inequality and social injustice. 6 To the extent, then, and as long as such issues are prominent on the Israeli political agenda, the movement's competitive position suffers.

Another practical problem to which Gush Emunim has not responded effectively, which is aggravated by economic crisis, is the task of increasing the proportion of Jewish settlers employed inside the West Bank. Only 21 percent of employed settlers work inside their settlements. 7 Of the commuters, the decisive majority travel to metropolitan areas inside the green line. Of those settlers who do work inside their own locality, the vast majority are employed, directly or indirectly, in public service (schools, administration, religious councils, zoning boards, and so forth). While this pattern gives strong impetus and plentiful resources for sustained settler political activity, it also means that the livelihood of many Gush activists is dangerously dependent on government generosity.

An additional difficulty pertains to relations between religious and nonreligious settlers. As I have stressed, the fundamentalist movement is composed of a religious majority and an important nonreligious minority. In general, Gush Emunim settlements have been established either as religious or as nonreligious. Although one mixed Gush settlement earned national recognition for its success in achieving mutual cooperation and tolerance among its religious and nonreligious members, other attempts have mostly failed. 8 Along with differences over the extent to which veteran settlers should be allowed to screen newcomers for social, cultural, and economic compatibility, conflicts in the educational and recreational spheres over religious issues have interfered with Gush efforts to attract and absorb additional settlers. 9

One problem that has proven far more serious than most fundamentalists originally anticipated has been that of attracting large numbers of settlers to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The expectation that the Yeshivot Hesder located in the West Bank would produce steady streams of dedicated young settlers has not been fulfilled. Since 1982 the majority of these graduates have left the West Bank to pursue educational and career opportunities inside the green line. 10 In 1983 both Gush Emunim and the Likud adopted a new strategy to accelerate the settlement of the occupied territories. According to this plan, heavily subsidized settlement of the West Bank and Gaza by scores of thousands of upwardly mobile suburbanites was intended to make up for the shortage of pioneering, self-sacrificing ideologues. The campaign was based on the notion that new ideas are absorbed more readily after circumstances have been created to make them appear appropriate. Put another way, this was and is the view that the West Bank and Gaza can be turned into a kind of hothouse for the cultivation of sentiments supportive of Likud or fundamentalist perspectives. Meron Benvenisti, Israel's most prominent analyst of the de facto annexation process, has laid bare the theory behind this expensive and ambitious policy more effectively than anyone else. Writing in 1984, Benvenisti stated:

The aggressive Gush-Drobles plan [to settle 100,000 Jews in the West Bank by the end of 1986]. . . has not been a spectacular success. The planners were the first to realize that it had failed and to identify the reason: the shortage of ideologically motivated settlers. . consequently a new strategy was developed. 11

According to Benvenisti, the first objective of this new strategy, initiated by the Likud government and implemented in close cooperation with Gush Emunim, was

rapid creation of a strong constituency of Israelis who, while they may not necessarily hold with Likud ideology, can be relied upon to fight any scheme involving territorial compromise in order to protect their newly acquired "quality of life" in the territories. 12

Once established in the occupied territories, Benvenisti continues, these non-ideological Israelis would be thrust into circumstances that would strongly encourage them to adopt perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs espoused by both the Likud and the fundamentalist movement.

The spread of Jewish localities will expand points of friction and will make alienation more noticeable to increasing numbers of Jews and Arabs. Interaction will be tenuous. The deep-seated animosity and mutual sense of insecurity will create a very high level of perceived threat, resulting in total dichotomization. Encounters . . . will be characterized by the clear hierarchy that prevails where the Jews are dominant and the Arabs subservient. . . . Imbued with nationalistic pathos, (the new Jewish settlers) will monopolize the environment. 13

At the beginning of the subsidized settlement campaign, fundamentalist leaders' admonitions to make welcome the new settlers despite their apolitical stance reflected a clear-eyed understanding of the role to be played by the non-ideological settlers.

We must shake off the image that settlement in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is intended for certain chosen individuals and that it is not so desirable for "the people" to live among us. We must remember' and constantly remind ourselves, that our future is dependent on the identification of wide strata of ordinary people with our enterprise. This identification, which exists potentially, must find channels for its activation-that is, in settlement among us. Otherwise, what identification exists will not be deep-rooted and will be liable, God forbid, to evaporate with time or during a period of stress such as the state is likely to experience in the future. 14

Eventually, with the intransigent hostility of the Arabs increasingly apparent with the repeated failure of efforts by dovishly inclined groups to move the country toward territorial compromise, and with de facto annexation turned into a network of "routine" processes, the overwhelming majority of Israelis will accept the new contours of the state as both unchangeable and, finally, correct. This is the logic of facts creating interests that then require ideas to enshrine and protect those interests. If most Israelis cannot be convinced, intellectually, to act on behalf of redemption or the whole Land of Israel as driving forces in their lives, fundamentalists believe, many can be placed in circumstances under which their own interests and fears will lead them, if not force them, in the right direction.

The lures of massive public subsidies and luxury housing had increased the number of Jews living in the West Bank, outside of expanded East Jerusalem, to nearly 70,000 by the end of 1987. On the other hand, even this increase did not correspond to that anticipated by Gush Emunim and government planners in 1983. 15 Still, these new settlers now outnumber the Gush veterans, who live primarily in the "rural" settlements established in the 1970s and in l980-and 1981. More than 70 percent of Jewish residents of the West Bank now live in "urban" areas. 16 Consequently, for example, Yesha, which was founded as an association of local councils of rural settlements and often functions as a formal arm of Gush Emunim, finds itself unable to speak with confidence on behalf of the majority of West Bank settlers. Although the bulk of their votes did go to annexationist parties in 1984, a significant proportion of the inhabitants of the new townships neither share the worldview of Jewish fundamentalism as outlined in this study nor automatically follow Gush Emunim's lead in political disputes. This was particularly evident during the controversy over Yesha's 1985 resolution characterizing any Israeli government ready to compromise on the West Bank issue as traitorous. 17

If current trends do not warrant a prediction that fundamentalist sentiments will eventually prevail among many or most of the new settlers, available evidence can demonstrate the plausibility of this long term strategy. According to one study of settler opinion, 63 percent of those interviewed moved across the green line for social and economic reasons, but many of these developed "ex post facto ideologies once they (had) made the move." 18 Support for this judgment can also be drawn from a poll comparing the opinions of residents of Maale Adumim, the largest suburban settlement in the West Bank, with those of residents of Kiryat Arba, the largest Gush Emunim town. Although the attitudes of Maale Adumim residents were found to differ from those registered in Kiryat Arba, they were much closer to fundamentalist attitudes than to those shared by the cross section of Israelis from which the Maale Adumim population is often said to be drawn. In Kiryat Arba, for example, 99 percent of respondents answered no to the question "Do you believe a real peace can be achieved through territorial compromise?" In Maale Adumim, 80 percent answered likewise. Responding to a question about their reaction to a government decision to evacuate the settlement in the context of a peace agreement, 65 percent of those polled in Kiryat Arba said they would resist (nonviolently) until forcibly evacuated, while 30 percent indicated they would take up arms. In Maale Adumim, the proportions were 60 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 19

The voting record of Israelis living in the territories at the time of the 1981 and 1984 elections is also instructive. Elections held in the spring of 1981 preceded the l983-l984 rush of subsidized settlers into the West Bank and Gaza (during which the number of settlers in these areas doubled). In the 1981 elections, the voice of the ideologically motivated Gush Emunim settlers predominated. Together' the Likud, Tehiya, and the National Religious Party, all of which favored permanent absorption of the occupied areas into Israel, received 78 percent of the votes cast in the West Bank, through only 44 percent of the total Israeli vote. 20 In 1984, despite the influx of so many new settlers, political support for the annexationist camp appeared, if anything, to have increased. In that election, 86 percent of West Bank and Gaza Strip settlers voted for the Likud, Tehiya, the National Religious Party, or Morasha; by contrast, 41 percent of the total Israeli vote went to these parties. 21 Even in the large, urban-style settlements, in 1984 residents voted for parties supportive of key fundamentalist objectives in much larger proportions than did voters within Israel itself. According to Benvenisti, what he calls "the Likud bloc" received 77 percent of the vote in Maale Adumim, whereas "the Labor bloc," received 23 percent; in Ariel support for the annexationist parties reached 98 percent. 22

Ariel's development is instructive in this context in one other respect. Its current mayor, Ron Nahman, is an active and articulate booster of his city, both in Israel and to groups of potential Jewish immigrants abroad. In personal presentations, and in a specially prepared slide presentation about Ariel, Nahman explicitly describes it as Israel's "yuppie" community par excellence, complete with aerobic exercise classes, fashionably designed homes, high-technology industries, and state-of-the-art recreational facilities. He makes no political or ideological appeals. Nahman himself would appear to epitomize the young, upwardly mobile, nonreligious, suburban Israeli whom subsidized settlement was designed to attract to the territories. In fact, however, he was active in Gush Emunim circles before the massive subsidization campaign began. In a Gush symposium before the 1981 elections he suggested that Yesha organize a list for the Knesset. When this suggestion was not accepted, he endorsed the strategy of creating circumstances in which each party would find enough of its members living in the West Bank and Gaza to force it to support the annexation process. 23

Political Competition. The interaction between the positive symbols of settlement, pioneering, and dedication to the Land of Israel that fundamentalist action has revitalized, and the new interests the process of de facto annexation has created, has been apparent in vigorous competition for the political support of both new and old settlers. Even during the 1984 campaign, according to Benvenisti, the Labor party "emphasized that it was a Labor government that decided in 1974-76 on the establishment of the two largest West Bank urban centers, namely Ariel and Maale Adumim." Benvenisti has characterized the Labor party as stung by its failure to attract votes in the new suburban settlements during the 1984 elections. Since then, he says, it has gone further, "bowing to the inevitable."

Labor activists have launched a political campaign to lure the suburban settlers to their banner. Central to their political message is the Likud-Labor coalition agreement of September 1984 which stipulates that "existing settlements will be developed without interruption.". . . The United Kibbutzim Movement decided in mid-1985 to settle the southern Mount Hebron area, claiming it was part of the Allon Plan. Histadrut firms, controlled by Labor, are actively engaged in construction on the West Bank. One company, Even Vasid, has formed a partnership with a settlers' "development corporation." 24

At a November 1987 meeting of what is known as the Labor party mainstream, held in Maale Ephraim, a large township on the West Bank, most speakers condemned Shimon Peres for moving too far toward a generous territorial compromise and accommodation with the Palestinian Arabs. 25 Similar sentiments expressed by the chief of the Labor Party branch in Maale Adumim elicited a declaration from Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin that "there is no controversy with regard to the fact that Jerusalem and its environs, as well as Maale Adumim, will remain under Israeli sovereignty. " 26

On the right, the competition is even more intense-not so much for settler votes as for the favor and implicit endorsement of leading Gush Emunim personalities. Ambitious politicians who had previously shown little ideological commitment to the whole Land of Israel or interest in the settlement of the territories have taken every possible opportunity to portray themselves as dedicated above all else to the settlement and permanent absorption of the West Bank and Gaza. Among these is Housing and Construction Minister David Levy, who regularly attends the inauguration of new settlements. Through speeches, rush projects, unprecedentedly large resource allocations, and close consultation with Gush Emunim activists, he has sought to strengthen his claim to lead the Likud in the post-Begin era by associating himself with Jewish fundamentalism's primary objective. In June 1987 he reacted furiously to the inclusion in the official Israel Atlas of a passage he considered critical of Gush Emunim. He suspended the book's publication and its editorial staff, and commissioned a substitute chapter from a well-known Gush sympathizer. 27

Levy's efforts in this area have been matched by those of other ambitious Likud leaders, including, before his elevation to the premiership, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir (mainly through his loyal supporter, former Deputy Minister of Agriculture Mikhael Dekel) and Arid Sharon, who at various times since 1977 has headed the agriculture, defense, and trade and industry ministries. 28 In November 1987, Yigal Cohen-Orgad, a resident of Ariel who served as finance minister in the second Likud government, published a detailed article in Nekuda defending himself against Gush Emunim charges that he was unsupportive of settlement in the West Bank. Regretting that in "our camp" insufficient attention is paid to facts in the course of public debate, he provides comprehensive statistical data to prove that the settlement of the West Bank proceeded at a faster pace while he was finance minister than during any other period. 29

Essentially the same dynamic is apparent in the recent history of the National Religious Party. Many observers have traced its relatively dismal showing in the 1984 elections to indications after the Lebanon War that some of its key leaders-Zevulon Hammer and Yehuda Ben-Meir-were having second thoughts about the wisdom of de facto annexation. A storm of protest erupted within the fundamentalist movement. Hammer himself was banned from visiting Gush settlements, but his successful intraparty maneuvering in 1986 suggests that whatever his private feelings, he feels compelled to honor the movement's efforts. Chosen to lead the National Religious Party at its convention in the summer of 1986, Hammer developed a position that relied upon an alliance between his Young Guard faction, Druckman's Matzad movement, and another Gush-associated group from Merkaz HaRav. He rejected talk of an effective "takeover" of the party by Matzad, emphasizing the party's tolerance of many religious points of view. But party moderates were repeatedly defeated in their bid for high position by Matzad and hawkish Young Guard candidates. In a personal interview, Hammer declared his opposition to the evacuation of any settlements and his support for new ones. Citing "all the beautiful things it represents," he welcomed Matzad "back to the fold" as "flesh of our flesh, separated from us only very briefly. " 30 Among the personalities prominent in Gush Emunim who had left the National Religious Party but have since returned to take important positions within it are Druckman himself, Hanan Porat, Uri Elitzur' and Yosef Shapira. Shapira, who has long been identified with the Bnei Akiva movement and with Gush Emunim, joined Hammer as the party's second cabinet minister. 31

From a broader political perspective, the continuation of the national unity government has tended to obscure the vitality of the fundamentalist movement and the leverage it is in a position to exercise over the Likud. The 1984 elections produced a virtual dead heat between the Likud and its religious and ultranationalist allies on one side and the Labor Party and its liberal/dovish allies on the other. Indeed, the total votes received by the parties most closely associated with the Likud and with Labor are nearly equal. Likud, Tehiya, the National Religious Party, Morasha, and Ometz together received 875,001 votes. The Labor Party, Yahad, Shinui, and the Civil Rights Movement together received 874,821. Only 180 votes separated these two blocs, so radically opposed on so many issues. 32 It is not surprising, then, that neither party could manage to form a government and that to avoid new elections from which neither side was confident it would emerge in a stronger position, the Likud and Labor were forced into the uncomfortable but convenient arrangement of a national unity government. Under the terms of the coalition, each bloc agreed to defer decisive action toward resolution of the main problem facing the country, in regard to which they are in such fundamental disagreement-the ultimate disposition of the West Bank and Strip.

Once political maneuvering or new elections (which must be held by the end of 1988) bring an end to this state of affairs, the visibility and influence of Gush Emunim and its allies is almost certain to increase. If the Labor Party manages to form a government, the fundamentalists, in common cause with the Likud, will spearhead a vigorous parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition. If, on the other hand, the Likud organizes the new government, it will once again turn to Gush Emunim to legitimize and help implement the rapid changes it will deem necessary to suppress both Arab and Jewish dissent and effectively to annex the Bank and Gaza. Indeed, if it does not do this, the Likud is unlikely to be able to form a government and maintain itself in power. With the society as evenly and deeply divided as it is on the very issue of greatest importance to the fundamentalist movement, the Likud would have nowhere to go for allies but to the right, and the fundamentalists would have no reason to avoid exacting the strongest commitments possible. A presentiment of this alliance was available in the World Zionist Organization elections held in the spring of 1987. Herut and Tehiya appeared in those elections on a joint list that featured Eleazar Waldman in the fifth position. Geula Cohen of Tehiya, a fervent admirer of the movement, was eighth. Arid Sharon and David Levy, ministerial patrons who, as noted, have vied with one another for the approval of Gush Emunim settlers, occupied the second and third places. 33

The Implications of Palestinian Violence. Among the most important circumstances associated with settlement in the West Bank are the threat of Arab violence against the inhabitants of large bedroom communities and harassment of Jewish commuters. As explained in chapter 5, some fundamentalists fear that overemphasizing the threat that local Arab hostility poses to the lives and equanimity of Jewish settlers undermines the effort to incorporate the occupied territories into what Israelis consider their country. They can point to substantial reductions in the price of building plots on the West Bank and the wariness with which increasing numbers of Israelis treat travel to or through the territories as evidence of the negative impact of Palestinian violence. On the other hand, many fundamentalists believe that the fear and hostility that waves of Arab rioting, as well as firebombing attacks and stone throwing, engender among the new settlers can dramatically enhance the appeal of their tough anti-Arab rhetoric and of their insistence that the full power of the state be used to make Judea, Samaria, and Gaza as safe for Jews as any other part of Israel.

On April 11, 1987, a molotov cocktail was thrown at the car of a Jewish family as they passed a small Arab village on their way home to Alfei Menashe, a suburban settlement located just over the green line northeast of Tel Aviv. The wife, five months pregnant, was burned to death. Her husband and four children escaped with burns, though one of the children subsequently died of his injuries. The incident triggered a riot by 300 enraged settlers in the nearby Arab town of Kalkilia. Scores of shops and cars were destroyed, and orchards and fields burned. Though some of the rioters were from Alfei Menashe, most appear to have come from nearby settlements more closely associated with Gush Emunim. The next day Gush Emunim convened a meeting of its secretariat in the sports arena at Alfei Menashe. Moshe Levinger, Daniella Weiss, and Eliyakim Haetzni were among those who accused the government of apathy and ineffectiveness in dealing with the personal security issue. Calling for strict and comprehensive steps to be taken against local Arabs, they blamed the violence on the leniency of the authorities and on Foreign Minister Peres's attempts to bring about an international peace conference. Ministers closely associated with Gush Emunim, such as Haim Corfu and Arid Sharon, visited Alfei Menashe to make similar points. Al-though many residents reacted with fear rather than hostility to the incident, and others appeared to resent the political use to which their personal tragedy was being put, one prominent member of the settlement, a lieutenant colonel in the army, did speak at the Gush meeting. He declared that he and all the people of the settlement would act in the surrounding villages "with the means at our disposal." "We will act in those places in the tradition of Unit 101, of Deir Yasin, Kibya, and Kfar Kassem." 34

On balance, although Arab unrest in the occupied territories will reduce the number of Israelis moving into them and even encourage some to leave, it will also provide the fundamentalist movement with specific opportunities to increase its base of sup-

Relations Between Jewish Fundamentalists and the Haredim. As noted, the Yeshivot Hesder, inspired and largely staffed by Gush Emunim rabbis, have not recently been a source of large numbers of pioneering settlers. This is just one aspect of a more general recruitment problem that has surfaced for the movement in precisely that sector within which its greatest successes have been registered, religious youth. There is increasing evidence that within Merkaz HaRav, and other yeshivas that have served as channels for the development of Gush elites and cadre, a trend toward ultrareligiosity and otherworldly concerns has replaced the national religious ethos associated with Gush Emunim. Alluding to the black garb worn by ultra-Orthodox Jews, fundamentalists refer to this trend as "blackening." It seems associated, in part, with the natural thrust toward increasing rigidity and purity of observance entailed in the religious fundamentalists' acceptance of the absolute authority of Jewish law. The trend is reflected in increasing opposition among rabbis in these yeshivas to the participation of their students in the armed forces or in any other activity that reduces the time and energy they can devote to ritual observance and the study of sacred texts. 35

Within Bnei Akiva, the national religious youth movement that has been the largest recruitment pool for Gush Emunim leaders and activists, increasing sensitivity to criticism by ultra-Orthodox Jews is apparent. Compromises with secularists, contends Agudat Yisrael, contradict Jewish law and lead to sin. Gush Emunim also comes under attack in these circles for cultivating a form of idolatry in its attitude toward the special sanctity of the Land of Israel. Although the struggle for the permanent absorption of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza was still the top-priority item at the most recent national convention of Bnei Akiva, the range of viewpoints on other issues was unprecedentedly wide. And a distinct shift was also noted toward an emphasis within the youth movement on social, cultural, and religious issues not directly connected to annexation and settlement of the territories. This shift was interpreted as a response partly to the outcome of the Lebanon War, in which for the first time significant numbers of yeshiva graduates and students were killed in combat, and partly to the shock of the arrest and trial of the Jewish terrorist underground for acts that many religious leaders condemned as directly contrary to Jewish law. 36

In the future, segments of the ultra-Orthodox population may prove to be another important source of support for the fundamentalist movement. As explained in chapter 1, Agudat Yisrael and the various groups that make up the Haredi community have tended to act politically only on issues that involve maintaining or enhancing the economic resources at the disposal of their educational, religious, and social institutions, or to protect their isolation from the mainstream of secular and sinful Israeli society. As I have noted above, the attraction that the extreme, nonpolitical pietism espoused by these groups holds for many yeshiva students in the national religious sector poses a significant challenge to the recruitment efforts of the Jewish fundamentalist movement. Nevertheless, past patterns and these rivalries should not obscure the real potential for an alliance, should key rabbis within the Haredi subcultures decide that wars or struggles over the Land of Israel or the Temple Mount do herald the approaching climax of the redemption process. 37 According to one study of 375 baalei tshuvah (repentants) who have entered the Haredi community, 70 percent "said they felt they were living in the beginning of a messianic process." 38 In institutions such as the Ateret Cohanim (Crown of the Priests) Yeshiva in the Old City of Jerusalem, sacred texts dealing with sacrifices and other details of Temple service are studied. Members of one Hasidic sect are weaving vestments to be worn by the priests. Such activity is undertaken in explicit anticipation of the rebuilding of the Temple. 39 The single-mindedness and discipline with which ultra-Orthodox leaders can mobilize their followers, the demographic weight of these communities in Jerusalem, and the six Knesset seats they usually control could make significant contributions to both legal and extralegal fundamentalist efforts.

Aside from widely cited trends within this community toward militant forms of political action on issues deemed important by their leaders, evidence exists for the plausibility of an alliance between fundamentalist and pietistic Jews. This includes the attempt, implemented so far with mixed success because of the financial scandals associated with it, to build a large ultra-Orthodox city-Immanuel-in the middle of the West Bank. 40 In addition, as explained in chapter 3, Morasha presented itself in the 1984 elections as a list led by a prominent ultra-Orthodox politician-Abraham Verdiger-and a leader of Gush Emunim, Haim Druckman. The Shas (Sephardi Torah Guardians Association) party, which split from Agudat Yisrael in an effort to increase parliamentary representation for Sephardic ultra-Orthodox Jews, gained four seats in the 1984 elections. Although some of its representatives have been relatively dovish in regard to foreign policy, most have echoed the ultranationalist and extreme anti-Arab sentiments commonly heard in Gush Emunim circles. Nor is it likely that even the nonreligious elements within the fundamentalist movement would balk at satisfying demands by the ultra-Orthodox for state enforcement of many religious laws, if such an alliance could establish their own political supremacy.

In this context, disputes over key aspects of the religious status quo, which isolates the Haredim from the contaminating influences of modern Israeli society, could trigger an alliance between these groups and the fundamentalists. Such a development is partly implicit in the warning offered by Member of Knesset Menachem Porush of Agudat Yisrael. If the exemption of yeshiva students from army service is rescinded, he declared, "we will go underground, and in the underground (machteret) we shall continue to study." 41 Ariel Sharon's energetic solicitousness of ultra-Orthodox demands with respect to the exemption of yeshiva students suggests that he, at least, perceives the possibility of such an alliance.

There are sufficient reasons, in short, to warrant expectations that Jewish fundamentalism will remain a vital force in Israeli politics and enjoy new opportunities to move toward its ultimate objectives. But despite the factors and trends upon which this judgment is based, other evidence suggests that the future success of the movement is not guaranteed. Certainly Jewish fundamentalism cannot be viewed as a political juggernaut gathering strength from year to year and threatening soon to achieve a dominant position in Israeli society. The very success of the movement in expanding settlement in the occupied territories, attracting different types of Israelis to those settlements, and moving its agenda toward the center of Israeli politics has created a variety of serious practical problems. Nor' in facing those problems, can the movement be seen as ideologically and programmatically united. To be sure, the differences I analyzed in chapter 5 exist within the framework of a distinct, coherent, and potent worldview. But they are substantial enough to have complicated efforts to build a united organizational framework for political action.

The Leadership Problem and the Struggle for Jewish Control of the Temple Mount. The most substantial threat to the accomplishment of fundamentalist objectives is the difficulty that a large proportion of Gush Emunim activists have in modulating their actions and the expression of their beliefs, and especially accepting and implementing a consensus-building strategy toward the wider Israeli public. Actions are liable to be taken and positions articulated that, though tactically unwise, cannot be fully renounced. The movement as a whole is made vulnerable because the excesses, or "purity," of some can be used by its opponents to portray Gush Emunim not as "authentic," but as "insane."

In this respect, Jewish fundamentalism in Israel illustrates a broader problem that must confront any such movement. The element that gives fundamentalism its vitality-the unshakable belief that a supreme authority requires immediate and sustained action toward political goals-contains within it a dangerous tendency toward extremism. Since the world can never reproduce the pure form of a utopian vision, the ambitions of fundamentalists must be compromised in order to be consolidated. But compromise of transcendental imperatives can be legitimized only by the decisions of charismatic leaders who can impose their own interpretation of the practical meaning of those imperatives. In the absence of such leadership it is to be expected that severe tensions will arise between fundamentalists willing to compromise in order to consolidate political gains and those for whom pure and absolute imperatives permit no compromise.

In this context it is possible to appreciate just how serious a blow Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook's death was to the political development of Gush Emunim. No leader with his charisma or moral authority, acceptable to both the religious majority and the secular ultranationalist minority of the movement, has emerged to replace him. Moshe Levinger has neither the temperament, the scholarly reputation, nor the broad following necessary to play this role. And no candidates for such a leadership position appear to be on the horizon.

The implications of Rav Tzvi Yehuda's absence are apparent in Jewish fundamentalist efforts since 1983 to assert Jewish rights over the Temple Mount in Jerusalem as a prelude to the removal of the Muslim shrines and the reconstruction of the Temple. While he lived, Tzvi Yehuda's opposition to activity related to the Temple Mount evidently was enough to keep it off Gush Emunim's agenda. But in terms of the fundamentalist worldview, the logic of doing something to express Jewish attachment to and aspirations for the Temple Mount is impossible to ignore. This is all the more the site's location in "united Jerusalem," its centrality in Jewish history and Jewish law, and its current status as a zone of virtual Arab/Muslim autonomy. In recent years discussion of the tactical advantages of creating an Israeli consensus for rejecting the status quo on the Temple Mount, as a way to foil various proposals to advance negotiations by including the formula "Muslim rule over Muslim holy places," has helped increase the intensity of fundamentalist demands for change. Others argue that redemptionist Zionism requires a dramatic change in the status of the Temple Mount and wish to prepare the way for the building of the Third Temple. Those who make the most radical demands, for the destruction of the Muslim shrines and the immediate construction of the Temple, openly reject what they consider the mistaken inclination of Tzvi Yehuda to wait for a mass spiritual revival or miraculous divine intervention before acting to rebuild the Temple. 42

Some leading rabbis have used recent archeological finds to eliminate religious restrictions against Jewish entry onto the Temple Mount. The most influential of these has been former Army Chief Rabbi and Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren. He has been supported in his efforts by Eleazar Waldman, Sephardic Chief Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu, and the chief rabbis of Tel Aviv, Netanya, and Haifa. 43 Thus has ended a situation in which fundamentalists eager to avoid the political explosiveness of the Temple Mount issue could unchallengeably do so by referring to universally recognized halachic restrictions against Jews' entering the area (see chapter 3). Partly as a result of these developments, partly as a result of the desire by many in Gush Emunim to do something so decisively repugnant to the Arab world that peace negotiations would forever be prevented, and partly as a result of the very logic of fundamentalist ideology, the Temple Mount issue has emerged from the realm of crackpot utopianism to occupy a central place in the political activity of the mainstream of Gush Emunim. Al-though until the early 1980s very few articles, letters, and editorials in Nekuda even mentioned the Temple Mount, from 1983 to 1986 dozens of such items, virtually all advocating Judaization of the area in one way or another, were published. 44 Early in 1986 a series of demonstrative visits to the Temple Mount by sympathetic members of Knesset (including prayers, photographers, and challenges to the Muslim authorities) ignited furious Arab reaction. In June 1986, on the anniversary of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, 12,000 fundamentalists marched in protest from Merkaz HaRav to the Mount of Olives to view a sound-and-light show entitled "The Temple Mount is the Heart of the People." Amid violent clashes, a detachment of soldiers and policemen succeeded in preventing 100 of these demonstrators from forcing their way onto the Temple Mount itself. 45

Within a Jewish fundamentalist frame of reference, the argument of those demanding a change in the status quo is difficult to refute. Why, they ask, should Jews consider the Western Wall, which was nothing but a retaining wall for Herod's Temple, a particularly holy place? What sort of authentic redemptionist Zionism is it whose adherents stand at the very edge of the Temple Mount itself and hypocritically commemorate the Temple's destruction by fasting and bemoaning the plight of Jews "unable" to "return to the Mountain of the Lord and rebuild the Temple?" If Jerusalem is truly the united sovereign capital of Israel, then why in the very holy center of Jerusalem, on the Temple Mount, do Arab Muslims hold sway, preventing Jews from raising their flag, building a synagogue, or even praying publicly? 46

Yesha and the mainstream of Gush Emunim do indeed appear to have responded positively to such criticism. While Israel Eldad, Moshe Levinger' and Shlomo Aviner have warned of the dangers of moving too far and too fast toward these objectives, 47 Nekuda published two editorials in late 1985 and early 1986 warning of radical and violent steps likely to be taken by Jewish fundamentalists if the government did not act swiftly to change the status quo.

Today only a relatively small number are active in the struggle to implement Jewish rights on the dearest and holiest place of all. It is clear, however, that the people will be unable to tolerate the anomaly and that the struggle will unavoidably expand. It is the responsibility of the government of Israel, with the help of the Chief Rabbinate, to give special attention to dealing with this holy and emotion laden matter before it explodes. 48 Those in the Government and the Chief Rabbinate who pay only lip service to the basic rights of the people of Israel to the Temple Mount' . . . must bear responsibility for the fire liable to erupt from the burning fuse and which, God forbid, may ignite a terrible religious war, whose echoes would reverberate from one end of the earth to the other. . . . The public in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza has spoken of these matters for two years. . . . We warn those whose errors determine, even if unintentionally5 that day after day the Temple Mount remains in Muslim hands. We warn them that Jewish eyes and souls yearn for the Temple Mount and that they with their own hands, are stoking the fires which will erupt to solve the problem, and not by normal, natural, or legal means. We issue this warning to all the organs of the Government of Israel and also to the Chief Rabbinate of the Land oflsrael. 49

These editorials evince what had become, by the mid-1980s, an escalating commitment by the mainstream of the fundamentalist movement to alter the status quo on the Temple Mount in some dramatic fashion-by either replacing Muslim guards with Israeli police, organizing public Jewish prayer services on the site, building a large synagogue there, treating it as a settlement area, or preparing it for the reconstruction of the Temple. A September 1986 Nekuda editorial read as follows:

What is proper regarding the whole Land of Israel must also be proper regarding the Temple Mount. . . if for returning to the whole Land of Israel, and for the establishment of the state, we have pushed the end, by the same token we must now build the Temple. 50

The sensitivity of the site is accented every Friday by the 50,000 Muslim worshipers who gather there for prayer. In October 1987, fearful that Jewish fundamentalists would attempt to demonstrate on the site during Succoth, one of Judaism's three pilgrimage holidays, 2,000 Muslims waged a three-hour battle with police using tear gas and live ammunition to drive them from the cornpound. 51 Nonetheless, according to prominent Israeli newspaper columnist Doron Rosenblum, the destruction of the Muslim shrines on the Temple Mount is "only a matter of time." The aftermath, he predicts, will be horrible:

. . .the immediate cancellation of the peace agreement with Egypt; . . spontaneous demonstrations in every Arab country; news bulletins on American networks announcing declarations of war by the entire Arab world; . . . mobilization of the reserves amidst. reports of tensions on all four fronts; the flow of Egyptian forces into Sinai; firing in the Golan and the Jordan Valley; dogfights with Iranian, Saudi, Libyan, Iraqi, and Syrian planes; . . . rumors of the massacre of Syrian Jews; . . . guerrilla war in the occupied territories between Arabs and settlers; "massacres" that will be called total anarchy; intervention by the superpowers and war that will go on for months or even years. 52

In May 1987 one army reserve general called for the immediate implementation of a plan to defend the Muslim shrines:

I personally know of fighters from elite [army] units, graduates of the finest yeshivas in Jerusalem and Judea, who are imbued with messianic fervor: "May the Temple be rebuilt speedily in our own days." These irresponsible people could get hold of a ton of explosives, and, under cover of a foggy dawn, approach the Temple Mount in a couple of armored personnel carriers...and plant the explosives at the Dome of the Rock. If they managed to plant a few hundred kilos, they could bring the dome crashing down onto the rock, thereby visiting disaster on themselves and on us. 53

The Temple Mount issue represents a terrible dilemma for Gush Emunim as a fundamentalist movement lacking effective and charismatic leadership. On the one hand, no single trend within the movement contains more potential for effecting rapid and radical change consistent with its overall worldview. No event is more likely than a government-supported fundamentalist initiative aimed at Judaizing the Temple Mount to achieve a profound realignment of public attitudes within Israel, to precipitate an eminently crushable armed revolt in the occupied territories, to disrupt the Egyptian-Israeli relationship, and to distance Israel, politically and culturally, from the entire gentile world. And no issue contains greater potential than the strong and growing fundamentalist commitment toward the Judaization of the Temple Mount to destroy the unity of the movement, to deflect it from politically productive activities vis-a-vis the majority of Israelis, or to provide its enemies with the means to isolate, discredit, and defeat it. In the absence of a charismatic source of legitimacy for decisions to postpone action on this issue, the danger is very great that "purist" vanguardist elements within the movement will regularly expose it to political attacks of "mysticism, " "apocalypticism," and "insanity"-attacks that at the very least interrupt consensus-building efforts, but that also can support more devastating legal and political attacks against it.

With Yitzhak Shamir's assumption of the premiership in 1985, and the disappearance of concrete negotiating opportunities with Jordan, the impetus toward changing the status quo on the Haram el-Sharif and even toward "cleansing the Temple Mount of the abominations" (the Dome of the Rock and el-Aksa Mosque) slowed. Relying heavily on quotations from Tzvi Yehuda, Shlomo Aviner has constructed a tortured argument for continuing the halachic ban on entry into the Temple Mount area and "achieving closeness to it by keeping distance from it." Only when the whole Jewish people is united in its dedication to rebuilding the Temple, he contends, should anything be done to Judaize the site. 54

Should a Labor Party victory appear imminent, or even possible, however, the vanguardists within Gush Emunim will again seek to preempt the political process by raising the banner of the Temple Mount. Such developments will be very dangerous. But they may also provide adroit politicians with opportunities to divide Gush Emunim, portray its leadership as either insincere or terrifying, dramatize the risks run by Israelis who entertain the visions of glory advanced by Gush, and sharply reduce, if not destroy, the movement's near-term political potential.

The Temple Mount issue is one of several that gave rise to the most serious internal crisis in the history of contemporary Jewish fundamentalism. In late 1986, Daniella Weiss became a focus of bitter dispute within the movement. Her vigorous activities on behalf of amnesty for participants in the terrorist underground, her televised attacks on the historical contribution of Labor kibbutzim to the Zionist enterprise, and her intensely vanguardist sentiments have led many veterans of the movement to call for her dismissal as Gush Emunim's general secretary. Some leading rabbis, including Yoel Ben-Nun and Menachem Frumin, publicly separated themselves from Gush Emunim as led and organized in late 1986 and early 1987. This split precipitated harsh rebukes by vanguardists who insist that Gush Emunim must be true to the immediacy of its redemptive mission. These attacks, in turn, led some fundamentalists to suggest that the time of Gush Emunim as a relatively informal, pioneering organization, reliant on a spontaneously generated internal consensus and noncalculated political programs, had passed. They advocated creation of a new organization with an elected leadership, able to mobilize wider sectors of Israeli society around a new consensus. 55 In May 1987, following a threat by Ben-Nun to stage a sit-down strike in front of Gush offices in Jerusalem, a meeting was held between representatives of the different points of view. The result was an agreement under which Moshe Levinger was identified as the overall ideological guide of the movement, Weiss was permitted to remain as general secretary, Ben-Nun agreed to res developments will be very dangerous.ume active participation in Gush Emunim's secretariat, Hanan Porat was given responsibility for propaganda, and Beni Katzover was named to head the political committee. 56 As of this writing, it is still too early to know how effective these arrangements will be, but they are unlikely to provide a permanent solution to the problems raised by the combination of Tzvi Yehuda's death and the choices and opportunities faced by the fundamentalist movement as a result of its partial success.

The divisions within Gush Emunim, especially between vanguardists and consensus builders and between religious and nonreligious fundamentalists, can help explain much about the dynamics of the movement, the problems it faces, and the mix of political strategies it is likely to pursue. It is a commonplace of Israeli affairs that without the Arab-Israeli conflict, the cleavages within Jewish society would present substantially graver threats to the country's political fabric than they have until now. The same basic point applies with even greater force to Gush Emunim. Rav Abraham Isaac Kook's formula for merging the devotion and authenticity of religious Jews with the energy, technical skills, and political savvy of secular ultranationalist and activist secular Zionists requires an ongoing, increasingly "luminous" and challenging redemption process. As long as that process is moving forward, difficulties that religious Jews cannot help having in working side by side secular Jews can be put aside. But Rav Kook's dialectical and mystical rationalizations for cooperation are far less satisfying for ordering the routines of daily life and of institutionalized political, social, educational, and economic activity. Thus, to preserve the unity of the movement, both religious and nonreligious fundamentalists have a strong interest in maintaining a sense of crisis, of the need for extraordinary effort, and of the imminence of great danger or great opportunity. 57

These structural requirements of the movement, combined with the absence of charismatic leadership, may make Jewish fundamentalism in Israel a less effective political player in the long run, but a more explosive and dangerous element in Israeli and Middle Eastern affairs in the short and medium term. Despite the political caution and consolidation that many of Gush Emunim's most sophisticated personalities advocate, it is far more likely that contemporary Jewish fundamentalism will imitate the self-destructive extremism of the first-century Zealots and the second century followers of Bar Kochba than that it will be able to build a new and stable consensus. For Israelis, and indeed for the rest of the world, a larger question is whether the catastrophic consequences of the fundamentalist politics of the Second Temple's time will also be recapitulated.


Note 1: Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Religion and Politics in Israel (Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1984) p.78. Back.

Note 2: In 1979 the chief rabbi issued a formal ruling that "according to our holy Torah and the clear and authoritative law, there is a strict ban on transferring ownership to the gentiles of any part of the Land of Israel, because it is sanctified by the sacredness of the biblical Covenant between the pieces." The reference is to Genesis 15: 9-17, in which Abraham receives God's promise of future greatness while a smoking furnace is seen to pass between the divided carcasses of three animals. See Uriel Tal, "Foundations of a Political Messianic Trend in Israel," Jerusalem Quarterly, no.35 (Spring 1985) p.41. Back.

Note 3: See, for example, polls by Modi'in Extahi, in Maariv, January27, 1987, and April 21, 1987; and by Dahal, in Yediot Acharonot June 19, 1987. Back.

Note 4: In this regard, see David Grossman's confident prediction that the education and upbringing of the thousands of children now in Gush Emunim settlements guarantees the emergence of several more Jewish terrorist undergrounds in the future. David Grossman, "Don't Have So Much Mercy on Them," Koteret Rashit, no.230, April29, 1987, p.26. See also an editorial in Nekuda, no.112, July 31, 1987, p.6, on the subject of the children of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza as a "settler reserve." Back.

Note 5: Yehuda Hazani, "A 'Lobby' for the Glory of God," Nekuda no.84, March 1,1985, p.24; "Blessings for the Lobby," Nekuda, no.85, May 4, 1985, p.7; interview with Member of Knesset Uzi Landau, Nekuda, no.85, May 4, 1985, pp.8-9; Menachem Friedinan, "Yesha for Our Guys," Nekuda, no.88, June 24, 1985, pp.19-20; and Eliezer Schweid, "From National Movement to Pressure Group," Nekuda, no.89, July 26, 1985, pp.16-17. Back.

Note 6: Charles S. Liebman, "The Religious Component in Israeli Ultra-Nationalism," Jerusalem Quarterly, no.41 (Winter 1987) p.136. Back.

Note 7: Meron Benvenisti, 1986 Report: Demographic, Economic, Legal, Social and Political Developments in the West Bank (Jerusalem: West Bank Data Base Project, 1986) p.60. Back.

Note 8: For the success story of Kfat Adumim, see Ofra Amitai, "Bridge over Wadi Kelt," Nekuda, no.106, January 9, 1987, by pp.8-9, 13; and "A Holiday for Kfar Adumim,"Nekuda, no.107, February 13, 1987, p.6. For discussions of failure in this sphere, see Bembi Erlich, "Mixed Samaria," Nekuda, no.108, March 13, 1987, p.18; letters to the editor, Nekuda, no.109, April 14, 1987, p.1; and Yehoshua Zohar, "The Hidden Future of Secular Settlement," Nekuda, no. 109, April 14, 1987, p.4. Back.

Note 9: See, for example, "The Collectivized System," Nekuda, no.76, August 10, 1984, p.5; Rafi Vakuin, "With Our Own Hands We Prevent Massive Settlement of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza," Nekuda, no.89, October 23, -85, pp. 26-27; and Moshe Amir, "The Mistakes of Rafi Vaknin," Nekuda, no.92, October23, 1985, pp.27, 29. Back.

Note 10: Yair Sheleg, "Yeshivot Hesder: Between Vision and Reality," Nekuda; no. 86, April 26, 1985, pp.12-13; and Yair Sheleg, "Wanted: Settlers and Educators," Nekuda, no. 87, May 24, 1985, pp.12-14. Back.

Note 11: Meron Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1984) pp.54-55 Not surprisingly, Gush Emunim spokesmen disagree with the judgment that the reservoir of ideologically motivated settlers has been exhausted. See Yisrael Harel's remarks in this regard, quoted in Hagai Segel, "What Happened to the Hundred Plan?" Nekuda, no.105, December 9, 1986, p.38. Back.

Note 12: Benvenisti, 1986 Report, p. 50. See also Benvenisti, West Bank Data Project, p.59. Back.

Note 13: Benvenisti, West Bank Data Project, p. 62. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between large-scale subsidized settlement and changes in Israelis' concepts of the relationship of the West Bank and Gaza to their state, see Ian Lustick, "Israeli State-Building in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Theory and Practice," International Organization, vol. 41, no. I (Winter 1987) pp.l51-171. Back.

Note 14: "Good Luck to Project Absorption," Nekuda, no. 58, May 5 1983, p.3. Back.

Note 15: Lustick, "Israeli State-Building.". Back.

Note 16: Benvenisti, 1986 Report, p. 47. Back.

Note 17: See Yitzhak Shilat (head of the Maale Adumim Yeshiva), "Without Hysteria," Nekuda, no.93, November22, 1985, pp.10-11; Chava Pinchas-Cohen, "The Eli Story: Today They Are the Majority," Nekuda, no. 96, February 21, 1986, pp. 20-21, 28. Back.

Note 18: Findings of a study conducted by Chaim Waxman, reported in Yaakov Warren, Counterpoint, vol. 2, no. 13 (July 1985) p.2. Back.

Note 19: "Citizens Won't Leave," Counterpoint, vol. 4, no.l (October-November 1986) - p.10. Back.

Note 20: Giora Goldberg and Efraim Ben-Zadok, "Gush Emunim in the West Bank," Middle Eastern Studies, vol.22, no.l (January 1986) p.67. Data available for votes by Jewish (mainly Gush Emunim-oriented) residents of the Gaza Strip in that election are pooled with those cast by the many more residents of Yamit, of whom relatively few identified with the fundamentalist movement. Of votes cast in the Gaza Strip and Sinai, 64.5 percent went to those same parties. Back.

Note 21: Benvenisti, 1986 Report, p. 50; and Peter Grose, A Changing Israel (New York Vintage, 1985) pp.14-15. Back.

Note 22: Benvenisti, 1986 Report, p. 50. Back.

Note 23: Ron Nahman, remarks at "To Influence the Results of the Elections," Gush Emunim symposium, reported in Nekuda, no. 26, April 3, 1981, p.5; and Ron Naliman, lecture and audiovisual presentation, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts, March 1, 1987. Back.

Note 24: Benvenisti, 1986 Report, pp.50-51. Back.

Note 25: Haaretz, November 6, 1982. Back.

Note 26: Maariv, August 4, 1987 (translated in FBIS, August 5, 1987, p. L4). Back.

Note 27: Davar; June 10, 1986. See also Levy's militant speech to 3,000 settlers gathered in Ariel, reported in Jerusalem Post, May 5, 1987. Back.

Note 28: Though clearly exaggerating, in the last months of the second Likud government, Yisrael Harel characterized Gush Emunim settler opinion on matters pertaining to the West Bank as "almost a diktat" in the view of responsible ministers. Personal interview, Ofra, April 15, 1984. Back.

Note 29: Yigal Cohen-Orgad, "1984," Nekuda, no.115, November 1987, pp.32-35. Back.

Note 30: Jerusalem Post, September 26, 1986. Back.

Note 31: SeeJerusalem Post, July21, 22, and 25; and Hatzofe, July 17, 1987 (translated in FBIS, July 20, 1987, p. L6). See also the biography of Un Elitzur in appendix 3. Back.

Note 32: As the 1986 and 1987 polls reported in appendix 2 indicate, the deep division between the two political blocs mirrors an equally deep and wide division on the issue within the Jewish public. Not only are Israeli Jews virtually equally split on a clear choice regarding a momentous issue-neatly half favor territorial compromise and half refuse to countenance withdrawal from any part of the areas-but only a negligible proportion report themselves as undecided or indifferent. Back.

Note 33: Concerning Tehiya's extraction of a commitment from Prime Minister Shamir to reach the target of 100,000 Jews on the West Bank by the end of 1988, in return for its abandoning efforts to bring down the government, seeJerusalem Post, July 20, 1987. Back.

Note 34: David Grossman, "At Night There Was a Burning Here," Koteret Rashit, no. 230, April29, 1987, p.69. Each village named was the scene of a massacre, by Jews, of Arab civilians. Unit 101 was a secret group of commandos used in the 1950s for retaliation raids against villages in the West Bank; the Israeli government at the time blamed these raids on civilian vigilantes. Ariel Sharon is one of Unit 101's best-known veterans. Back.

Note 35: Orit Shohat, "Blackening the Skull Cap," Haaretz, June 28, 1985 (translated in JPRS, no. NFA-85-127, October 4, 1985, pp.42-48); Yaakov Rodan and Rachel Katsman, "Israel's Religious Revival: A Return to Which Orthodoxy?" Counterpoint, vol.3, no.3 (January 1986) pp.6-10; Daniel Ben-Simon, "Metkaz Harav: Here Gush Emunim Was Born," Huaret', April 4, 1986; Dan Beeri, "Zionism, More than Ever," Nekuda, no. 95, January 21, 1986, pp.8-9; Israel Rosenson, "Who Will Rein In the Fighters of Extremism," Nekuda, no. 104, November 7, 1986, pp.19, 27; and Avraham Neuriel, "The Hareidization of Religious Zionism," Nekuda) no.lO5, December 9, 1986, pp.18-19. For a general treatment of this topic, see Janet Aviad, Return to Judaism: Religious Renewal in Israel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) especially pp. 63-70, 112-114. Back.

Note 36: Yair Sheleg, "From Burg to Gush Emunim and Back Again," Bamachane, September 18, 1985 (translated in JPRS, no. NEA-85-150, December23, 1985, pp. 37-41); and Uri Orbach, "Bnei Akiva: To Benefit from An the Worlds," Nekuda, no.99, May 30, 1986 pp.20-23. Back.

Note 37: For the potential overlap of Haredi and ultranationalist political objectives, see Charles S. Liebman, "The Religious Component in Israeli Ultra-Nationalism," Jerusalem Quarterly) no. 41 (Winter 1987) p.l31 Concerning the common antidemocratic basis of Agudat Yisrael and Gush Emunim, see Liebman and Don-Yehiya, Religion and Politics, pp.135-136 Regarding the ultranationalist and annexationist positions advocated by the Lubavitch Hasidim, see Allan L. Nadler, "Piety and Politics: The Case of the Satmar Rebbe," Judaism vol.31, no. 2 (Spring 1982) pp.150-151. Back.

Note 38: Janet Aviad, Return to Judaism, pp. 131-132. Concerning beliefs within the Haredi community that the Messiah's arrival may be imminent, see Yaakov Rodan, "Struggle Behind the Walls," Counterpoint; vol.3, no.6 (August 1986) p. 9. Back.

Note 39: See F. Offenbacher, "Prayer on the Temple Mount,"Jerusalem Quarterly- no.36 (Summer 1985) pp. 133-134; and Robert J. Rosenthal, "God, Terror and the Rock," Philadelphia Inquirer, April 8, 1984, pp. 19, 31. Back.

Note 40: In March 1986 Immanuel was reported to have 4,000 residents. See Counterpoint; vol.4, no.1 (October-November 1986) p.12. Back.

Note 41: Erex Yisrael, "They Are Killing Themselves in the Tent of the Torah," Hashanua (weekly supplement to Davar), no.51, December 18, 1987, p.8. Back.

Note 42: Yehuda Etzion, "From the Banner of Jerusalem to the Movement of Redemption," Nekuda, no.94, December 20, 1985, pp.9, 28. Back.

Note 43: For background on the issue and information on the specific halachic positions of these rabbis, see "Target: Temple Mount," Jerusalem Post International Edition, week ending October 15, 1983; "Dispute over Chief Rabbi's comment on Mount," Jerusalem Post International Edition, week ending February 8, 1986; and a number of articles in Counterpoint; vol. 3, no.3 (February 1986), especially Yisrael Medad, "Battle on the Temple Mount," pp. 8-9. Rabbi Goren's most recent action has been the construction of a sculpture overlooking the Temple Mount consisting of six Jewish stars atop flames burning in fountains. Though officially the monument was built as a Holocaust memorial, he acknowledges that the fire and water do recall the libations and offerings on the altar of the Temple. See Koteret Rashit, no.230, April 29, 1987, p.7. Back.

Note 44: See appendix 5 for the picture that accompanied a 1984 article on the Temple Mount by Yehuda Etzion, "From the Laws of Existence to the Laws of Destiny," Nekuda- no.75;, July 6, 1984, p.26. The picture shows the Old City of Jerusalem with a rebuilt Temple in the place of the Dome of the Rock and the el-Aksa Mosque. The same photomontage or similar ones reportedly have been prominently displayed in public rooms and in private homes in Gush Emunim settlements, including the home of Yoel Ben-Nun. See David Grossman, "Don't Have So Much Mercy On Them," Koteret Rashit, no.230, April 24, 1987, p.26. Back.

Note 45: See the official Gush Emunim advertisement for the rally, signed by the four most important organizations whose activities are related to the Temple Mount, Nekuda, no.99, May 30, 1986, back cover; and Israel Domestic Service, in FBIS, June 6, 1986, P.11. Back.

Note 46: Baruch Lior, "To Prepare the Generations for Prayer and Wat," Nekuda, no.85, April 5, 1985, pp. 12-13. For similar arguments, see Motti Naclimani, "What Is Going On with the Temple Mount," Nekuda, no.47, September 3, 1982, p.7; Yigal Arid, "The Temple Mount as Waqf Property," Nekuda, no.58, May 17, 1983, pp.18-19; Shabatai Ben Dov, "Fasts of the Temple Destruction," Nekuda, no.61, July 18, 1983, pp.8-9; interview with David Rotem, lawyer for the Gush Emunim underground, Nekuda- no.75, July 6, 1984, pp.10-11; Moshe BenYosef, "Prelude to the Mount," Nekuda, no.96, February 21, 1986, p.19. For the most sophisticated discussion of how best to conduct the struggle for the Temple Mount, see Israel Medad, "The Mountain before the Temple," Nekuda, no.89, July 26, 1985, pp.10-11 (translated in JPRS, no. NEA-85-148, December 18, 1985, pp.56-59). Back.

Note 47: Israel Eldad, "In the Den of the Numerologists,"Nekuda, no.78, September 21, 1984, p.14; Moshe Levinger, "We Must Not Discard the Old Banners," Nekuda, no.97, March 25, 1986, p.8; and Shlomo Aviner, Let Us Not Go Up to the Mount (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Aturei Kahanim, no.3, n.d.). Back.

Note 48: "The Temple Mount Is Not in Our Hands," Nekuda, no.87, May 24, 1985, p.4. Back.

Note 49: "The Fuse," Nekuda, no.95, January 21, 1986, p.4. Back.

Note 50: "Messiah Now," Nekuda, no.105, September 5, 1986, p.S. Back.

Note 51: New York Times, October 12 and 13, 1987; and Jerusalem Domestic Service, December 18, 1987 (translated in FBIS, December 18, 1987, p.31). For a recent discussion of the status of the Temple Mount issue for fundamentalist activists who focus on this question, see Yisrael Medad, "Court of the Lord in Court of the Law," Counterpoint, vol.5, no.1 (November 1987) pp.4-5. Back.

Note 52: Doron Rosenblum, "The Temple Mount Will Be Blown Up," Koteret Rashit, no 131, June 5, 1985, pp.20-21. Back.

Note 53: Yoel Ben-Porat, "The Messiah Brigades Must Be Stopped," Maariv, May 10, 1987 (translated in Israel Press Briefs, no.53, May-June 1987 p.14). Back.

Note 54: Shlomo Aviner, Let Us Not Go Up, pp. 1-2, 4. Back.

Note 55: Concerning the furor within Gush Emunim over Weiss's leadership and its relationship to the deeper division between vanguardists and consensus builders, see the following: In Nekuda, no.104. Menachem Froumin, "I Am Splitting," (November 7, 1986) pp. 10-11, 31; and Daniella Weiss, "The Wicked Ones," pp.10-11, 31. In Nekuda, no.105, December 9, 1987, Amiel Unger, "The 'Machteret' as a Stage Set," pp. 24-25; Meir Harnoi, "No Reason for a Split," pp. 25-26; Yonah Sieff, "Demanding a Framework for New Ideas," pp. 26-27; and Dan Tor, "A Grain of Fakery," pp. 28-30. In Nekuda, no.106, January 9, 1987, Beni Katzover, "There Will Be No Hope in Political Parties," pp. 10-12. In Nekuda, no. 107, February 13, 1987, "Coordination Is Needed," p.7. In Nekuda, no. 108, March 13, 1987, Hannah Gopher, "All Must Remain Inside the Family," p.4; Bembi Erlich, "To Draw Conclusions," p.4; Tzvi Maoz, "And Now for a Professional, Institutionalized Leadership," pp. 20-21; Menachem Froumin, "To Conquer the Source of Disrespect," pp. 22-23; Yitzhak Armoni, "Return to the Source: The Way of Faith," pp. 24-25; and Daniella Weiss, "I Never Said the Kibbutzim Were Failures," pp. 26-27, 33. In Nekuda, no.109, April 14, 1987, Eyal Katkafi, "The Parting of the Ways," pp.24-25, 36; and Yossi Tzuriel, "A Movement in Place of Gush," pp. 26-27. This debate, alloted considerable space by Nekuda, became so intense that vanguardists raised an unprecedented number of questions about the editorial direction and value of Nekuda itself. See in Nekuda, no.109, April 14, 1987, Alexander Axariah, "Is There Not One Righteous Man in Sodom?" p.3; "The Lies and Grievances Cry Out to Heaven," open letter on behalf of Daniella Weiss from forty-four settlers in Kedumim, pp. 34-35; and Eliyakim Haetzni, "Nekuda: Come Down off the Roof," pp. 35, 50. Back.

Note 56: Aviva Shabi, "Splits in Gush," Yediot Acharonot; May 15, 1987; and Jerusalem Domestic Service, May 15, 1987 (translated in FBIS, May 15, 1987, p.16). Back.

Note 57: For self-perceptions of malaise within Gush circles, see "The March Was No Party," Nekuda, no.99, May 30, 1986, p.7. Back.

For the Land and the Lord