Spring 2017 Lectures and Seminars
Thursday, February 23rd @1:30 PM, 392 Cohen Hall: David Hawkes, Special Litigation Unit at the World Bank will give a talk on “Development Aid and the Transnational Fight Against Corruption” for PPE’s Crime and Corruption Capstone. Anyone welcome. Add to calendar
Thursday, February 23rd @ 4:30 PM, 203 Cohen Hall: Wei Zhan, Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the Department of Economics at Texas A&M University, will give a talk on Does How We Measure Altruism Matter?: Playing Both Roles in Dictator Games. Add to calendar
Abstract: Altruism has been measured in the lab with dictator games, sometimes with single decisions and sometimes with subjects making multiple decisions that vary both the endowment and the relative price of transferring resources. In single-decision games, subjects typically are paid for one role, either as dictator or recipient. But in most multi-decision experiments, subjects are matched and paid twice: once in a dictator role, and again as a recipient. In one-game experiments, results show a strong preference for equality. However, in multi-decision, dual-role designs, the results indicate a strong preference for efficiency over equality. In this paper we unpack this result by conducting multi-decision experiments with two payment schemes. In the single role treatment (SR), subjects are assigned as either dictators or recipients, and paid for one randomly-selected decision in one role; in the dual role treatment (DR) all subjects make decisions in the dictator role, and are matched twice and paid for two decisions, once in each role. While preferences for giving in both treatments are rational in the sense of being consistent with GARP, we find subjects in DR display greater sensitivity to the price of giving compared to subjects in SR, where equal division is more prevalent. When estimating individual CES utility functions, we find that the distributions of preference types are quite different between the two treatments: Subjects in DR are substantially more efficiency-focused and more likely to be selfish than the SR subjects. In an additional study we show that the differences in distributions of preferences are not due to the differences in total payoffs between the two treatments. Our results suggest that the DR design distorts elicited preferences, exaggerating the preference for efficiency over equality.
Thursday, March 16th @4:30 PM, 203 Cohen Hall: Kyle Hyndman, Associate Professor at the Naveen Jindal school of Management at the University of Texas at Dallas, will give a talk as a part of PPE's BeLab Speaker Series. Add to calendar
Thursday, March 30th @1:30 PM, 392 Cohen Hall: Richard Barrett, Supervisory Assistant United States Attorney Chief will give a talk for PPE’s Crime and Corruption Capstone. Anyone welcome. Add to calendar
Thursday, April 13th @ 4:30 PM, 203 Cohen Hall: Melinda Ford, Doctoral Candidate in Accounting, Katz Graduate School of Business at the University of Pittsburgh, will give a talk as a part of PPE's BeLab Speaker Series. Add to calendar
Thursday, April 20th @ 4:30 PM, 203 Cohen Hall: C. Mónica Capra, Professor in the Department of Economics at Claremont Graduate University, will give a talk as a part of PPE's BeLab Speaker Series. Add to calendar