The main focus of my research is the notion of social convention. A social convention is a behavioral pattern resulting from the interdependency of actions of different agents. Moreover, the analysis of a social convention may reveal that an alternative behavioral pattern is also possible. Consider the simple example of the regularity of keeping to the right in US drivers. Such behavioral pattern results from the expectation of each driver that all other drivers will keep to the right. However, the alternative pattern of keeping to the right is also possible. The relevant feature is that the agents coordinate over a recurrent profile of actions, and that unilateral deviation from such profile is detrimental.

Social conventions are ubiquitous. Traffic flows, rules of etiquette, social norms in general, exchanging goods using certain coinage, fashions, gentrification patterns, the semantics of natural or artificial languages can be—and have been—analyzed according to the idea of convention as coordination described above. Although social convention differ under important respects (some are carefully planned and strictly enforced, others emerge spontaneously; some regulate minute behavior, others codify vital social interactions; some become deeply entrenched in society, others are ephemeral etc.), they constitute the tissue of social life and institutions.

Thus, the study of convention touches upon different fields of inquiry and is best carried on through an interdisciplinary stance. Since conventions are regularities in the solutions of strategically interactive coordination problems, their nature is investigated through a game-theoretical approach. Since conventions are social processes changing over time, their dynamics can be captured through the use of evolutionary models. Since mutual expectations of the agents are crucial for determining solutions of the coordination problems, the study of conventions needs to be accompanied by a formal characterization of what agents know and believe, as the one offered by philosophical logicians.

In my published work I investigate the role that the inductive reasoning of the agents plays in both the origin and the perpetuation of social conventions (“A Logical Framework for Convention”, *Synthese* 2005); the nature of the epistemic characteristics of the agents (“Common Knowledge”, in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2005, with Peter Vanderschraaf); a more realistic version of the traditional logical accounts of knowledge and belief of agents (“Models of Awareness”, in *Proceedings of the 7th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game Theory*, 2006). I am currently studying the impact of the game-theoretical account of convention on the broader areas of moral and political philosophy. During this coming term, I expect to receive input on such topics from PPE students in my seminar *Natural Justice*. Also, I try to involve PPE undergraduates in my research in logic. For example, one of the students in my *Nature of Reasoning* course will likely attend a summer school in formal epistemology at Carnegie Mellon University.