value is accelerated by increased competition for land resulting from crowding into villages (p. 40).

The Emberá, having had sustained contact since colonial times with Spanish speakers, and now able to move to the cities for education, seem to have communicated with the author chiefly in Spanish or through Spanish-speaking interpreters (though there is no explicit statement about this). While there are references in the book to the colonial past, as well as to more recent political events in Panama, hardly any historical orientation is given to the reader regarding the Emberá themselves. For example, how people came to celebrate Easter as a sacred feast, an event to which a whole chapter is devoted, is left unclear. Overall, the processes by which incorporation of essentially Spanish colonial meanings into Emberá practice occurs remain mysterious. The character of relations between Emberá and other local groups is sketched out rather than closely observed. A chapter on the "political economy of race and gender" deals with issues of class, friendship, exchange, trust, and political affiliation surrounding race, but the reader will not find detailed descriptions of what goes on in the trading towns or of specific relations between Emberá and others. Although we have occasional glimpses into Emberá reactions to life in the rest of Panama, and second-hand accounts of particular libres, most of the ethnographic material is taken from Kane's observations and experiences in Emberá settlements. We read about politicians who fly in by helicopter and about gringo missionaries, but there is little about actual responses of real Emberá to these outsiders, the apostles of development capitalism.

Yet Stephanie Kane writes well, often quite poignantly, about her stay among the Emberá, juxtaposing a variety of interesting narratives with short summaries of stories people told her, recorded interviews, and longer (apparently tape-recorded) texts of stories. There are also theoretical declarations and interpretations of meaning that seem to reflect her own exploration of ways to present this material and the nature of ethnographic understanding. The result is a book worth reading for its description of an indigenous people who are partially integrated within a developing nation-state, as well as for the occasional discussions of Panamanian development practices and their depressing consequences. As the author writes, "A promise of health, wealth, and happiness rides a phantom gringo boat that is always just beyond reach—like progress and development" (p. 200).


Reviewed by Asif Agha, University of California, Los Angeles

This volume comprises an editor's introduction and eight papers in which different aspects of framing in discourse are discussed. The notion of framing used in the book derives from the work of Gregory Bateson and Erving Goffman, and involves the following reflexive property of utterances: a stretch of discourse is said to "frame" a contiguous stretch of discourse if it highlights the latter's boundaries and clarifies its significance as a recognizable type of activity. Even a bare-bones definition such as this raises a number of questions regarding the reflexive character of framing: What is the role of perspective in framing (i.e., is a frame invariant from all perspectives)? What are the varieties of such reflexive significance? (Is such reflexivity semantic/code-based or pragmatic/indexical?) To what extent is frame a psychological concept (e.g., what is the role of memory and expectation in shaping such significance)? To what extent is framing a way of actively doing something? (Conversely, to what extent is it based on static cultural schemas?) It is a measure of the partial success of this book that it
raises many of these questions—sometimes in the course of compelling analyses of actual data—without being able to offer systematic answers to them.

In "What's in a Frame? Surface Evidence for Underlying Expectations" (pp. 14–56), Deborah Tannen undertakes a comparative discussion of notions such as frame, script, and schema, and attempts to anchor them in an extended and broadened notion of expectation. For Tannen, the occurrence of a form marks the violated expectation of its contrary: "a negative statement is made only when its affirmative was expected" (p. 44; but see Lawrence R. Horn, A Natural History of Negation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, for difficulties with this view); a modal verb of ability (e.g., can, could) "indicates" a prior expectation of the actor's inability (p. 45); the use of behavioral adverbs (e.g., carelessly, indifferently) "measures" the behavior of particular people "against expected behavior for people in their position" (p. 48); similarly, inferential statements are said to reflect the expectations of those who make inferences (p. 47). It is not so much that these views about expectation are untrue; it is rather that if all of them are true together, the word expectation becomes mysterious. The notion of expectation cannot be used to clarify the notion of frame without an account of how such expectation can be both conscious and unconscious, structure-driven yet context-dependent, psychological yet social; in Tannen's account, the explanation is more paradoxical than what it seeks to explain.

In "Interactive Frames and Knowledge Schemas in Interaction" (pp. 57–76), Deborah Tannen and Cynthia Wallat discuss the difference between what they call "interactive frames" and "knowledge schemas." Participants' interactive frames are essentially models of what is going on in the interaction; their knowledge schemas are "expectations about people, objects, events and settings in the world" (p. 60). The paper focuses on a medical examination in which the doctor switches between different frames in talking to her eight-year-old patient and to the patient's mother, who is also present. Insofar as the doctor and the mother have different views of what "health" is, or what terms for different ailments (e.g., "cerebral palsy" and "skin eruptions") refer to and how those referents relate to each other, such differences are said to be differences in expectations about things. The authors do not sufficiently emphasize, however, that such differences in expectation emerge from differences in beliefs about the referents of certain words, what Hilary Putnam (Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 215–71) has termed the referential "stereotypes" associated with words and expressions. Mother and doctor differ in the referential stereotypes they associate with certain lexemes, and consequently they exhibit differences of expectation regarding their referents. Thus, "expectations about things" are not elementary psychological primitives; they appear to be mediated by socially distributed beliefs, or stereotypes, about words and their referents.

In "Framing in Psychotic Discourse" (pp. 77–113), Branca T. Ribeiro analyses medical interviews of a Brazilian woman under treatment for psychotic episodes. The interviews are marked by incoherence in the doctor-patient interaction (noticeable at several levels, e.g., turn-taking behavior, action-sequences, propositional content, etc.). Although the patient's talk rarely constitutes an appropriate response to the doctor's questions (thus, incoherent with respect to the psychiatric interview frame), Ribeiro argues that such talk appears coherent to a much greater degree from the standpoint of a second frame that is relevant to this interaction. Ribeiro calls this the frame of the "psychotic crisis." The psychotic crisis frame is constituted by role shifting by the individual who is the patient in the psychiatric interview frame: frequently, the "patient" speaks not as herself but as a close relative (mother, grandmother, or sister); frequently she speaks to these individuals as well, rather than to the doctor. Since these individuals are not physically present, the patient's verbal behavior superimposes an imaginary frame onto the actual frame of the psychiatric interview. The overall
overall effect of incoherence is, therefore, a consequence of the globally irreconcilable character of locally coherent frames, not a consequence of the absence of coherence in toto.

In “Participation Frameworks in Sportscasting Play: Imaginary and Literal Footings” (pp. 114–45), Susan M. Hoyle investigates the behavior of two young boys (eight and nine years of age) who spontaneously use sportscasting talk as a framing device for their own game-playing activities. When playing games together (e.g., ping-pong, basketball, etc.), the boys frequently switch to the register of sports-announcer talk, thus taking on the imagined identities of sports announcers while simultaneously retaining their actual identities as game players. The sportscaster frame thus becomes a way of commenting on the simultaneously unfolding sports-competition frame. Hoyle notes that a number of devices cue the sportscaster frame: the use of imaginary names for each other, the third person narration of first person acts, and the use of devices conventionally belonging to the register of sports-announcer talk. The boys tend to switch from the sportscasting frame to the competition frame when problems arise in the game itself, e.g., scorekeeping disputes, arguments about the rules, unexpected contingencies, or externalities that interfere with the game. These data show that even young children are extremely adept at constructing and switching frameworks in ordinary discourse activities.

In “The Pulpit and Woman’s Place: Gender and the Framing of the ‘Exegetical Self’ in Sermon Performances” (pp. 146–75), Frances L. Smith investigates the range of exegetical strategies used in sermons by male and female seminary students. Seminary education has traditionally favored male over female students, and even today Smith finds considerable ideological bias within her sample population of students regarding the appropriateness of a seminary education for women. Men and women differ also in exegetical style: male preachers tend to favor a more authoritative exegetical stance than women do; female preachers, on the other hand, employ a greater variety of exegetical styles.

In “Cultural Differences in Framing: American and Japanese Group Discussion” (pp. 176–209), Suwako Watanabe analyzes discussions among two groups of college students. The goal is to compare group discussions among Japanese students with those among American students. Watanabe points out that the Japanese students begin and end their discussion in a much more socially structured way, including an initial group discussion about who will speak and in what order, and a careful marking off of discussion closure at the end. The Americans are found to begin and end their discussions much more summarily, without much collective orchestration. As for argument strategies, the Americans prefer single account argument structures, with one argument per speaker per turn; the Japanese, however, intercalate several arguments into a multiple account structure, consistent with Zen theories of rhetoric, which includes arguments that are supportive as well as those that are contrary to the speaker’s own conclusions. The Japanese accounts give a chronological ordering to events, with much detail about past contexts, thus forming entire stories; the Americans generally give much less context, tending to formulate briefer reports.

In “‘Samuel’ Yes, Dear?: Teasing and Conversational Rapport” (pp. 210–30), Carolyn A. Strachle examines a fifteen-minute stretch of teasing activity involving three individuals. The discussion focuses on the types of contextualization cues that signal that teasing is now going on, as well as the participant alignments that emerge during the course of the conversation. The paper suggests that the potentially threatening activity of teasing occurs most felicitously when a relationship of intimacy is already presupposed. The kinds of cues that contextualize teasing in the data include inclusive vs. exclusive usage of pronouns; the use of formulae; prosodic phenomena such as loudness, speech tempo, stress, vowel quality, rising-falling intonation, and
laughter. The paper focuses more on the local devices that cue teasing effects; it does not explore the phase-and-perspective-bound character of the interpretation of teasing effects in a comparably explicit manner. The data suggest, however, that the activity understood as "teasing" is not triggered by any single cue whose meaning is teasing; such construal appears to depend on a configuration of cues cooccurring together at some point in the flow of discourse and illuminating earlier stretches of talk. The paper discusses a number of teasing episodes in an insightful way, but it offers no general account of how teasing is recognizable as such.

In "Speaking for Another" in Sociolinguistic Interviews: Alignment, Identities, and Frames (pp. 231–63), Deborah Schiffrin uses a more explicitly dynamic notion of frame than is used in any of the other studies. Schiffrin’s frame consists of "what people think they are doing when they talk to each other" (p. 233) including what they construe as "an interpretation of the setting" (p. 256). The article illustrates how two individuals, Zelda and Henry, speak for a third individual, Irene, who is also present. Zelda "speaks for" Irene in a collaborative manner, whereas Henry is more controlling. Schiffrin shows that speaking for another involves particular kinds of participant alignments during discursive micro-time; at the same time, it reflects the macrosocial (e.g., gender-based) identities of the interactants.

This volume is quite successful in renewing the study of framing in discourse, particularly since the papers it contains are rich in empirical detail and utilize a number of methods for gathering and analyzing data. However, the volume raises, without resolving, a number of issues regarding the status of frame as a theoretical construct. If frames have parts, how do the parts relate to the whole? How unitary is a frame? What makes some frames more coherent than others? How many frames can cooccur simultaneously in discourse? What is the role of perspective in the construal of a frame? The reader will not find these questions answered in the present volume; yet the empirical studies collected here will doubtless remain influential in sustaining research on these issues for some time to come. And it appears likely, at least to this reviewer, that when these questions are answered, the notion of frame will be seen to be complex rather than simple, and heterogeneous in its elements rather than itself elementary.


Reviewed by Petr Sgall, Charles University, Prague

Illustrating the effects of suprasentential context on the use of grammatical items in Romanian (with some comparison to cognate languages), this book will be of interest to those who investigate interrelations between sentence structure and discourse patterns. Its nine chapters comprise three major parts and a concluding section.

The Part One, "Topicality and Centrality" (chapters 1–4), begins with a characterization of the Romanian direct object construction as influenced by pragmatic factors: whether it is expressed by the simple accusative case or by the preposition pe depends, among other factors, on the degree of discourse activation (p. 22). The author discusses its treatment in traditional and transformational grammars of Romanian, concluding that they do not pay due attention to contextual factors. Pointing out that the preposition is used in cases of intermediate or higher discourse salience (especially if the noun denotes a person), she does not, however, state explicit conditions under which either the presence or the absence of the preposition would be obligatory. If a common