A table of biases

This table will be revised continuously. Suggestions for revision are welcome. It is intended as an aid to thinking about the material in Psychology 153/600, which is most of the field of judgment and decision making. Perhaps the categories run into each other. But this may still help.

Bias Normative model Explanation
I. ATTENTION
I. A. Availability, attention to here and now, easy, and compatible
errors in syllogisms logic limited search
four-card problem logic limited search
anchoring and underadjustment right answer underadjustment
availability in causes of death right answer availability
fault tree effect probability additivity availability
asymmetric dominance independence of irrelevant alternatives neglect of difficult
evaluability effect invariance neglect of difficult
dynamic inconsistency consistent discounting attention to short-term
preference reversal for gambles invariance compatibility
identifiable victim utilitarianism proportionality
planning fallacy regression individuating information
I. B. Heuristics based on imperfect correlations
gambler's fallacy independence representativeness
hindsight bias right answer availability
outcome bias right answer availability
information bias value of information information heuristic
congruence bias value of information congruence heuristic
status-quo bias invariance principle status-quo heuristic
ambiguity effect EU theory (sure-thing) missing information heuristic
omission bias EU or utilitarianism do-no-harm heuristic
punishment without deterrence utilitarianism reciprocity heuristic
natural bias utility theory naturalness heuristic
proportionality bias EU theory (linear in p) proportionality heuristic
zero-risk bias EU theory proportionality heuristic
sunk cost effect utility theory no-waste heuristic
ex-ante equality utilitarianism (and invariance) equality heuristic
voter's illusion cause-effect cause-correlation confusion
I. C. Focus on one attribute with unawareness of others
neglect of priors Bayes's theorem representativeness
nonregressiveness in prediction regression representativeness
conjunction effect logic and probability representativeness
illusion of control contingency attention to outcome
prominence effect invariance importance heuristic
neglect of ranges multi-attribute utility theory importance heuristic
single mindedness multi-attribute utility theory limited attention
failure to integrate utility maximization isolation
fixed-pie assumption multi-attribute utility theory failure to see trade-offs
parochialism effect utilitarianism self-interest illusion
II. MOTIVATED BIAS - MYSIDE BIAS AND WISHFUL THINKING
inappropriate extreme confidence calibration myside bias in search
wishful thinking independence of belief and value effect of desire on belief
selective exposure fairness toward evidence selective exposure
biased assimilation neutral evidence principle biased assimilation
polarization neutral evidence principle biased assimilation
belief overkill uncorrelated beliefs myside bias
illusory correlation true correlation biased assimilation
primacy effect order principle biased assimilation
distortion of fairness by self-interest universalizability of morality wishful thinking
morality as self-interest illusion self-other distinction belief overkill
III. PSYCHOPHYSICAL DISTORTIONS
certainty effect EU theory (linear probability) diminishing sensitivity
overweighting low probabilities EU theory (linear probability) diminishing sensitivity
declining marginal disutility declining marginal utility diminishing sensitivity
framing effect for gains and losses invariance principle diminishing sensitivity
dynamic inconsistency consistent discounting diminishing sensitivity to time