
METAPHOR

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33.1 WHAT IS METAPHOR?: A TENTATIVE CHARACTERIZATION

METAPHOR has traditionally been construed as a linguistic phenomenon: as something produced and understood by speakers of natural language. So understood, metaphors are naturally viewed as linguistic expressions of a particular type, or as linguistic expressions used in a particular type of way. We adopt this linguistic conception of metaphor in what follows. In doing so, we do not intend to rule out the possibility of non-linguistic forms of metaphor. Many theorists think that non-linguistic objects (such as paintings or dance performances) or conceptual structures (like *love as a journey* or *argument as war*)¹ should also be treated as metaphors. Indeed, the idea that metaphors are in the first instance conceptual phenomena, and linguistic devices only derivatively, is the dominant view in what is now the dominant area of metaphor research: cognitive science.² In construing metaphor as linguistic, we merely intend to impose appropriate constraints on a discussion whose focus is the understanding and analysis of metaphor within contemporary philosophy of language.

Given this starting point, what can be said about metaphor that is not controversial? Very little, as it turns out. Metaphor is a trope or figure of speech, where a 'figure

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¹ For an extensive discussion of these and other 'conceptual metaphors', see Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) and Lakoff (1993).

² See e.g. the *Center for the Cognitive Science of Metaphor Online*: (<http://philosophy.uoregon.edu/metaphor/metaphor.htm>)

of speech' is a *non-literal* use of language. This class also includes irony, metonymy, synecdoche, hyperbole, and meiosis.³ What distinguishes metaphor from these other tropes? One standard definition of metaphor is as a *figure of speech in which one thing is represented (or spoken of) as something else*. This construal of metaphor comports well with many examples of metaphor drawn from classic literary works. Consider, for instance, "Juliet is the sun" (Shakespeare), "Time is the devourer of all things" (Ovid), or "Poverty is the sister of beggary" (Aristophanes). In the first, a girl, Juliet, is spoken of as the sun; in the second, time is spoken of as a ferocious beast; in the third, poverty is spoken of as a sister (and thus as a person).

Some philosophers, in an effort to explain metaphor's characteristic rhetorical force, have elaborated on this standard construal in terms of "representing-as." Thus, Monroe Beardsley (1967) identifies two features working in tandem within a metaphor. On the one hand, a metaphor produces a *conceptual tension* between the concept that is expressed by the metaphorical term and the concept(s) that we normally and intuitively apply to the subject. So, for example, there is a 'tension' or mismatch between representing Juliet as the sun and as a girl, or between representing poverty as a sibling and as an economic state. Often (though, as we will see, not always) this 'tension' renders the metaphorical sentence logically absurd if construed literally. For this reason, Nelson Goodman (1968) characterizes the conceptual tension to which Beardsley refers as involving a kind of "calculated category mistake." A metaphor, he says, "projects" a set of "labels" belonging to one realm of objects (e.g. celestial bodies) upon another realm to which those labels do not ordinarily apply (e.g. human beings).

On the other hand, Beardsley points out, in spite of their apparent absurdity metaphors are generally quite *intelligible* and even profound. So, for example, Romeo's metaphor seems to serve as an effective means for communicating his feelings about Juliet (such as being dazzled by her), to evoke similar attitudes in others, and to claim that she possesses certain properties (such as being beautiful and life-giving). Beardsley (1962) claims that metaphors are able to do this because the sentence's inherent conceptual tension imposes a "metaphorical twist" on the relevant term, forcing it to refer to features with which it is normally merely associated.

These characterizations of metaphor do have a certain intuitive appeal, but they themselves employ metaphorical language ("conceptual tension", "label", "projection") in crucial explanatory roles, and so fail to provide fully explicit and satisfactory theories of metaphor. As we will see in what follows, this is quite typical. But it may also be unavoidable: as will also become clear, metaphor is itself a vague and elusive phenomenon.

³ In irony, the intended meaning is in some sense the 'contrary' of the words uttered, as when one says of a job that has clearly been poorly done, 'Good job!' In metonymy, a single characteristic or entity is used to identify a more complex, related entity, as when 'The White House' is used to refer to the President. Synecdoche is a kind of metonymy in which part of something is used to represent the whole, as in 'All hands on deck.' Hyperbole involves exaggeration, meiosis understatement. When I say 'These Tucson summers are killing me', I am engaging in hyperbole; when I say of a wild party that things 'got just a bit out of hand', I am engaging in meiosis.

33.2 METAPHOR AND CONTEMPORARY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Armed with this intuitive idea of what metaphor involves, let's consider metaphor's place within analytic philosophy, broadly construed. We will then sharpen our focus and consider how it has been treated by contemporary philosophers of language.

Although the last thirty years have seen an explosion of interest in metaphor within analytic philosophy, the topic had previously been eschewed by analytic philosophers. Indeed, until Max Black's seminal (1962) paper "Metaphor", it was virtually ignored. This was due largely to the dominance of logical positivism during the preceding decades. Logical positivists viewed metaphor as without cognitive significance, because they assumed that metaphors lacked the crucial criterion for meaningfulness: *verification conditions*. Thus, consider Shakespeare's famous line from *MacBeth* (V.v. 24–26): "Life's but a walking Shadow, a poor player that struts and frets his hour upon the stage, and then is heard no more." It seems that nothing could possibly count as observational evidence for (or against) this claim, because life, as an abstract entity, cannot in principle cast a shadow, let alone a shadow that walks. We therefore have no idea what sort of situation, if observed, would demonstrate that the sentence was true. From the fact that metaphors apparently fail to specify verification conditions, logical positivists concluded that metaphorical speech lacks cognitive content altogether; instead, it merely serves to arouse feelings and images in its hearers.

Metaphor was thus mentioned by mid-century analytic philosophers only in order to be set aside as irrelevant because unimportant to truth and knowledge. However, with the publication of Black's paper advocating an "interaction" theory of metaphor's irreducible "cognitive content", analytic philosophers began to turn their attention to metaphor in earnest. In the 1970s and 1980s a flood of scholarly papers on metaphor were published, along with many anthologies devoted to metaphor. Several of the latter contained contributions not only by philosophers of language, but also by literary theorists, philosophers of science, linguists, psychologists, and cognitive scientists.⁴ The interest in metaphor among contemporary analytic philosophers, and philosophers of language in particular, remains strong today. This is no doubt due to a continued interest in natural, as opposed to formal or artificial, languages.

Philosophers of language have traditionally been interested in issues concerning meaning and truth. And so, when they have turned their attention to metaphor, they have naturally focused on these same issues. Before we turn to these particular topics, though, we should note that virtually every area of analytic philosophy, broadly construed, has paid at least some serious (if relatively limited) attention to metaphor.

Thus, within aesthetics, theorists have endeavored to understand the special sort of 'aptness' and beauty that certain metaphors exhibit: the way in which a good

⁴ See, for instance, Sacks (1978); Ortony (1979 a); and Johnson (1981).

⁵ See Hills (1997); Hills cites the phrase from Stevens (1950). See also Isenberg (1973).

metaphor can be, as Wallace Stevens writes, “the cry of its occasion”.⁵ This feat is particularly palpable when metaphors are used to capture aspects of subject experience that elude expression in literal terms.⁶ In philosophy of religion, this interest in the appropriate principles for interpreting religious texts, such as the Bible, metaphorically.⁷ Some theologians and philosophers of religion believe that the nature of religious truth is such that it can only be conveyed metaphorically. Epistemologists have considered the nature and utility of analogical reasoning, which many cognitive psychologists believe to be crucially involved in the interpretation of metaphor.⁹ Metaphysicians have been interested in the possibly metaphorical status of crucial but theoretically troublesome terms, such as “existence” and “possible worlds.”¹⁰ Similarly, in philosophy of mathematics, there is talk of the metaphorical status of mathematical concepts and truths.¹¹ Finally, within philosophy of science, questions about the epistemic status of scientific models have been linked to the status of metaphors, which seem to bear important structural similarities to models

33.3 FOUR CENTRAL QUESTIONS

Let us now turn our attention to the understanding and treatment of metaphor within contemporary philosophy of language. Of the many questions concerning metaphor that have been addressed within this area of philosophy, four stand out as especially central. These are: (i) what are metaphors? (ii) what is the nature of metaphorical meaning? (iii) how do metaphors work? and (iv) what is the nature of metaphorical truth? While these questions can be formulated independently, they are logically connected insofar as the response given to any one constrains possible responses to at least some of the others.

In addressing these questions, many philosophers have followed Black's (1962) methodological lead by first isolating a few uncontroversial cases of metaphor.¹ These examples in effect provide an extensional definition of “metaphor”, from which, it is hoped, an explicit definition can eventually be derived. The benefit of this approach is that it gives us an intuitive, if vague, sense for how metaphor differs both from literal language and from other figures of speech. The drawback is that not all theorists begin with the same sorts of examples. Some focus on relatively familiar, conversational metaphors like “You are the cream in my coffee”, or “I destroyed my opponent's argument”, while others attend to more novel, poetic metaphors such as “A geometrical proof is a mousetrap”, or “Christ was a chronometer.” Employing

⁶ See Camp (forthcoming a). ⁷ See Tracy (1978)

⁸ See Soskice (1987), McFague (1982).

⁹ See Gentner (1989); Gentner *et al.* (2001); Holyoak and Thagard (1995).

¹⁰ See Yablo (1996, 1998); and Walton (2000).

¹¹ See Yablo (forthcoming, 2003, 2002) and Lakoff and Nunez (1997).

¹² See Hesse (1966, 1993); Kuhn (1979); Boyd (1979); Brown (2003); see also Godfrey-Smith (2002) for an analysis of the role played by the metaphor of genetic ‘coding’ in scientific investigation and theory.

¹³ This group includes both Davidson (1978) and Searle (1979); see Hills (1997) for some discussion of how one might attempt to reconcile extensional and theoretical definitions.

such different examples as paradigm cases raises the risk that the different parties will simply talk past one another. The alternative, which is to provide a theoretical definition at the outset, is equally problematic, simply because there are so few uncontroversial assumptions about metaphor.

We now spell out our four central questions in more detail. In the next section, we'll examine how various theories of metaphor have attempted to answer them.

(i) What are Metaphors?

Specifically, how does metaphorical language differ from literal language and from other figures of speech? Philosophers have traditionally assumed that there is an important in-principle difference between literal and figurative language, that figurative language is essentially "marked" or distinctive, and that the figurative is in some sense a "deviant" exploitation of the literal. These assumptions have recently come under scrutiny. Thus, for instance, Sadock (1979) and Rumelhart (1979) have questioned whether there is a genuine difference in kind between literal and metaphorical language. Those working in the tradition of Relevance Theory (e.g. Carston and Powell (this volume), Carston (2002), Beznidenhout (2001), Recanati (2004, 2001) Sperber and Wilson (1986);) treat metaphor as a form of 'loose talk', in which the speaker's intended meaning more or less closely resembles semantically encoded meaning;¹⁴ on this view, the difference between literal and metaphorical meaning is merely a matter of degree not a difference in kind. Finally, theorists like Goodman (1968); Searle (1979); and Nunberg (2002) have rejected or at least downplayed the classical distinctions among different forms of figurative language. Instead, they treat metaphor, simile, metonymy, synecdoche (and sometimes other forms of figurative and non-literal language as well) as a single unified phenomenon.

(ii) What is the Nature of Metaphorical Meaning?

Answers to this question are tied to assumptions about what counts as "meaning" more generally. Many philosophers believe that metaphorical meaning is of the same propositional kind as literal meaning; the difference between literal and metaphorical meaning (if any) lies in how that propositional content is expressed. Thus, Grice (1975) and Searle (1979), argue that metaphor is like other forms of indirect speech in expressing a distinctive *speaker* meaning while contextualists claim that metaphorical meaning is a form of *utterance* meaning or "what is said", and semanticists, such as Starn (2000) and Hills (1997) maintain that metaphorical meaning is a form of semantic meaning *per se*. Other philosophers, such as Black (1962) and Kittay (1987), reject the assumption that metaphorical meaning is fundamentally of the same kind as literal meaning: they argue that metaphors have a special, irreducible and essentially non-propositional cognitive "meaning" or "significance". Still others, like Davidson (1978) and Rorty (1987), agree that metaphors' effects are

¹⁴ In the Continental tradition, philosophers from Nietzsche (1886/1966) to Jacques Derrida (1988) have also challenged the idea that an in-principle distinction can be drawn between literal and metaphorical language.

non-propositional, but they conclude from this that metaphors have no distinctive meaning at all (apart from any literal meaning), on the grounds that the only genuine candidates for "meaning" are truth-conditional, propositional contents.

(iii) How do Metaphors Work?

That is, how do metaphors manage to mean what they do? This is perhaps the central 'problem' of metaphor, for the ease with which we are often able to interpret metaphors, even subtle and complex ones, is rather puzzling on its face. In the case of literal utterances, the interpretative process is presumably compositional. The hearer computes the utterance meaning on the basis of his or her grasp of individual word meanings (where this includes fixing the values of any contextually-sensitive terms) and syntax. Presumably something more is needed in the interpretation of metaphor, or else metaphorical meaning would just *be* literal meaning. What 'more' could this be?

Some have thought that the words themselves have special metaphorical meanings which combine compositionally in the usual fashion, or that metaphorical meaning results from some alteration in the process of composition itself. Thus, Beardsley (1962). Cohen and Margalit (1972), and Levin (1977) all argued that the process of attempted composition somehow "twists" the literal meaning into a metaphorical one. More recently, Stern (2000) argues that metaphor is represented by a contextually-sensitive operator at the level of logical form, while contextualists argue that metaphorical meaning involves the same sort of pragmatic adjustment of word meaning as we find with 'enrichment' and 'loosening'; on these latter views, composition proceeds in the usual way, albeit with non-literal inputs. Those who treat metaphorical meaning as a form of indirect speech, like Grice (1975) and Searle (1979), tend to assume that metaphorical meaning is computed by employing global pragmatic conversational principles *after* the process of literal composition is completed. Finally, those who reject the notion that metaphorical meaning is propositional assume that metaphorical interpretation and meaning have little to do with composition at all, and point to other sorts of cognitive processes instead.

(iv) What is the Nature of Metaphorical Truth?

Are metaphors associated with a distinctive brand of truth? Here, the logical connection with the earlier questions is perhaps most obvious. If the meaning of a metaphor is simply the proposition(s) the speaker intends to communicate, and if these propositions can be given literal expression, then presumably literal and metaphorical truth are presumably identical in kind. If, on the other hand, metaphors are not in the business of communicating propositions at all, but rather serve to evoke certain distinctive responses to certain sorts of situations, then the relevant brand of truth, if any, must be quite different: perhaps something more akin to "revealingness", "compartment", nor "insight."¹⁵ Finally, it might be the case that metaphors do serve to communicate contents which can be true or false in the usual sense, but that for one reason or another these contents are not capable of literal expression.¹⁶

¹⁵ See Heidegger (1975), Cooper (1993).

¹⁶ See Camp (forthcoming a).

33.4 FOUR INFLUENTIAL THEORIES

Many theories of metaphor have been proposed and defended by philosophers of language since the publication of Black's "interaction" theory. Most attempt to answer questions (i) through (iv), even if only indirectly. In this section, we survey four influential theories; this survey is intended to be representative rather than exhaustive.

(i) Simile Theories

Simile theories are the oldest and, until fairly recently, the most widely held theories of metaphor.¹⁷ Aristotle seems to have been the first to suggest¹⁸ that metaphors are 'compressed' or 'abbreviated' similes. On any such theory, the meaning of a metaphor is identified with that of the corresponding simile: where "A is B" is the metaphor (e.g. "Love is a journey"), its meaning is given by the sentence "A is like B" (e.g. "Love is like a journey"). On such a view, the interpretation of a metaphor is a matter of interpreting the corresponding simile, and the truth of the metaphor is thus reduced to that of the simile.

The simile theory has both intuitive and methodological motivations. First, it often seems as though some sort of comparison is made, or at least adumbrated, in metaphor. Consider Hermann Melville's (1856) "I had somehow slept off the fumes of vanity." Although no comparison is made explicitly here, it is nonetheless clear that Melville is drawing our attention to similarities between the toxicity of fumes and the personality flaw of vanity. Second, the simile theory appears to account for our conflicting intuitions about metaphors' truth values. "Juliet is the sun" is false if interpreted literally: Juliet is clearly not a gaseous ball of fire ninety-three million miles from earth. But the simile that gives the sentence's metaphorical meaning—"Juliet is *like* the sun"—is arguably true.

The most obvious methodological motivation for the theory lies in the reductive nature of its central claim, that metaphor is a form of simile. At a minimum, the theory reduces two problems to one: we now need only to explain how similes themselves work. Further, if the meanings of similes are unproblematic because literal, then the 'problem' of metaphor has been resolved altogether: we have analyzed metaphorical meaning and truth in terms of literal meaning and truth.

Despite these virtues, the simile theory has been criticized on a number of counts.¹⁹ First, not all metaphors are so readily translatable into simile form, if at all. William Lycan (1999) makes the point nicely with the Shakespearean metaphor "When the

¹⁷ We should also mention the so-called 'substitution theory' of metaphor, according to which a metaphor is merely a substitute for some other expression which, used literally, would have expressed the same content. This view is no longer widely held, if it is held at all. For some criticisms, see Black (1962).

¹⁸ We use 'suggest' here advisedly, as not all theorists agree that Aristotle actually endorsed this theory; see Johnson (1981).

¹⁹ See Black (1962); Beardsley (1967); Davidson (1978); Searle (1979); and Tirrell (1991).

blood burns, how prodigal the soul/Lends the tongue vows.”²⁰ Concerning the simile that this metaphor is alleged to abbreviate, Lycan (1999, p. 217) writes:

A first pass might be: When *x*, which is like a person's blood, does something that resembles burning, how prodigally *y*, which is like a person's soul, does something similar to lending some things that are vowel-like to *z*, which resembles a person's tongue.

He then remarks dryly, “We are not much wiser.”

Second, the simile analysis appears to represent metaphor as superficial and uninformative. Many philosophers have claimed that similes themselves are trivial, on the grounds that everything is like everything else in some respect or other.²¹ Yet metaphors often appear to be informative and even profound. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the similarities that we most naturally cite in explaining what a metaphor's corresponding simile means are often themselves figurative. Consider the opening lines of Sylvia Plath's (1961) poem “Mirror”: “I am silver and exact/I have no preconceptions.” Presumably the protagonist is here describing herself metaphorically as a mirror; on the simile theory she thus means that she is like a mirror. One natural elaboration of what this simile means is that she *reflects* the world around her, but the key word “reflects” here is itself obviously metaphorical. We seem to have fallen into a vicious explanatory circle.

In response to the second and third of these worries, Robert Fogelin (1988) has proposed a figurative version of the simile theory. According to Fogelin, statements of similarity should be understood in terms of the notion of “salience”: the respect(s) in which *A* is said to be like *B* depend on which of *B*'s features are salient in that context of utterance.²² What is distinctive about similes as *figurative* statements of similarity, and in turn about the metaphors that abbreviate them, is how those salient features are determined. Consider the metaphor “Churchill was a bulldog.” According to Fogelin, in using this metaphor we compare Churchill to a bulldog; but in order to understand this comparison we must “trim the feature space” of bulldogs in terms of Churchill's salient features.²³ More specifically: the hearer rules out a literal interpretation of the implicit simile on the grounds that Churchill shares none of the usual and obviously salient features of bulldogs. The hearer nonetheless charitably assumes that the alleged similarity does obtain, and so he ignores the salient features of bulldogs that render the literal comparison false, such as having floppy ears and wet noses. He searches instead for features of bulldogs that match up with the salient features of Churchill. Presumably, these include ‘character traits’ like resoluteness and stubbornness; they might also include physical traits like having a thick neck and jowly face. The metaphor “Churchill was a bulldog” claims that Churchill is like a bulldog in these respects.

²⁰ Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, I.iii.116–17.

²¹ See e.g. Goodman (1972); Davidson (1978); and Searle (1979).

²² In this Fogelin follows Tversky's influential theory of similarity; see also Ortony (1979b). Those who reject the claim that metaphors just are elliptical similes can also appeal to a process of comparison in order to determine how the metaphor's meaning, or cognitive effects, are produced.

²³ Fogelin (1988), p. 91.

²⁴ See Ortony (1979 b); Searle (1979).

Fogelin's theory nicely defuses one of the main objections against the literal simile theory: that it could not explain the informativeness and profundity of metaphor. While "Juliet is like the sun" is literally false, according to Fogelin, it is true and even profound when interpreted figuratively, because it raises to salience certain features that Juliet does share with the sun, and that we might not otherwise notice. It also goes some way toward addressing the third worry—that appealing to similes to analyze metaphor is unhelpful, because the similes are themselves figurative—by giving an analysis of figurative similes. However, it is doubtful that all figurative similes can be adequately analyzed in terms of features which the two objects in question are believed to actually share, as Fogelin assumes.²⁴ So, for instance, "Sally is a block of ice" is intuitively true just in case Sally is like ice in being cold. But there's no obvious single property, of coldness, which applies to both frozen water and personal temperaments in the same way, and so it's not clear how to analyze the simile further into features that are in fact shared. Similarly, the sense in which Juliet is like the sun intuitively depends in part on a higher-order analogy between the properties of being bright and being beautiful, rather than upon a concrete feature possessed by both Juliet and the sun.²⁵ Finally, Fogelin's view is clearly still vulnerable to the first objection above, that not all metaphors can be translated into simile form.

(ii) Interaction Theories

As we mentioned, one of the earliest modern alternatives to the simile theory was the "interaction" view. This view was first advocated by the literary theorist I.A. Richards (1936), and was subsequently developed by the philosopher Max Black (1962). Such theories have two central claims: (i) that metaphors have an irreducible "cognitive content", and (ii) that this cognitive content (or "meaning") is produced by the "interaction" of different cognitive systems. Interactionists generally claim that the "cognitive contents" of metaphors can be true, even though they are not amenable to literal expression.

According to Black, in a metaphor of the form "A is B", the "system of associated commonplaces" for B "interacts with" or "filters" our thoughts about the 'system' associated with A, thereby generating a metaphorical meaning for the whole sentence. Consider one of Black's examples: "Man is a wolf." The properties of being a predator, traveling in packs, and being fierce and ruthless are all commonplaces associated with "wolf." These properties are therefore instrumental to comprehending the metaphor: they serve as the "filter" for thinking about mankind, by emphasizing just those commonplaces associated with "man" that fit with them. The metaphor's "cognitive content" or meaning is the distinctive way of thinking about mankind that this filtering produces. Notice here that "commonplaces" need not be true. For instance, the commonplace that wolves are ruthless is part of the relevant system even though wolves, as creatures, non-moral arguably cannot be ruthless. Likewise, the other commonplaces

²⁵ In this case, we can construct a higher-order property which Juliet and the sun do share: the property of possessing a property which bears a certain relation *R* to other properties. But then we seem to be back in the situation of postulating uninformative analyses of the sort criticized by Lycan above.

mentioned above would remain relevant even if it turned out that wolves are in fact docile herbivores who tend to travel in pairs. What matters is not the actual properties of the objects denoted, or even the properties that speakers and hearers *believe* those objects to possess, but rather what the denoting expressions “call to mind.”²⁶

The interaction theory’s central motivation is to account for the fact that metaphorical, powerful cognitive tools: can be such devices that enable us to better understand the world in which we live. It thus coheres nicely with the view, advocated by Thomas Kuhn (1979) and Richard Boyd (1979) among others, that scientific models appear to increase scientists’ understanding of the universe. The interaction theory also comports well with the view, popular among certain cognitive scientists, that ordinary thought and reason are largely, and irreducibly, metaphorical.²⁷ For the interactionist regards any attempt to reduce metaphorical meaning to literal meaning as misguided.

Perhaps not surprisingly, though, the interaction theory as presented by Black has seemed too vague to be of great theoretical value. Part of the problem is, once again, that Black analyzes metaphor itself in terms of other metaphors like “association”, “interaction”, and “filtering”. Nevertheless, some theorists have managed to develop Black’s central claim—that metaphors have an irreducible cognitive content—in more theoretically tractable terms. Kittay (1987), for instance, appeals to “semantic field” theory to flesh out the contents of the two interacting systems’.

Rather different criticisms have been launched by Donald Davidson (1978) and Fogelin (1988). Davidson claims that there is no clear theoretical value to posit special metaphorical “meanings” or “cognitive contents”.²⁸ As he puts it, to say that metaphorical meaning explains how metaphor works is “like explaining why a pi puts you to sleep by saying it has a dormative power”²⁹: we have simply found a new, fancier way to describe the phenomenon under investigation, but we have made no real explanatory progress. A second objection of Davidson’s concerns Black’s claim that metaphors are not amenable to precise literal paraphrase. If so, asks Davidson, why should we suppose that there is any meaning there to begin with? If metaphors have a “cognitive content” beyond the literal, then why should it be so difficult, even impossible, to capture that content in literal language? Finally, Fogelin points out that not all cases of metaphor are so easily explained in terms of conceptual “interaction”. Consider John Keats’s (1819) metaphor: “O for a beaker full of the warren south.” One would be hard pressed to specify the “cognitive systems” whose “interaction” makes this such an effective use of language. More generally, Black’s view works best for metaphors that consist of a general kind term predicated of an individual or kind, but not all metaphors take this form.³⁰

²⁶ “Commonplaces” can still call features to mind even if they are not believed to be true of the object denoted by the relevant term. For instance, even if both the speaker and hearer know that gorillas are in fact gentle creatures, the stereotype that gorillas are nasty and violent can play a role in determining the metaphor’s “cognitive content”.

²⁷ See Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) and Lakoff (1993).

²⁸ For Black’s reply to Davidson, see his (1978); see also Kittay (1987).

²⁹ Davidson (1978), p. 31.

³⁰ See White (1996) for criticism of ‘predicational’ models of metaphor, like Black’s, and presentation of an alternative view on which metaphor involves interaction between two sentence-frames.

Philosophers suspicious of the special, irreducible "cognitive contents" posited by interactionists have developed several alternatives, the best known of which are Gricean and non-cognitivist theories. We'll consider these in turn.

(iii) Gricean Theories

Gricean theories of metaphor are in the first instance theories of metaphorical *interpretation*. Their central claim is that a metaphor just is understanding what a speaker intends to communicate by means of it, where communication is analyzed in Gricean terms.³¹ Roughly, successful communication consists in the hearer's recognizing the speaker's intention to get the hearer to recognize what she is trying to communicate to him. Insofar as a metaphor can be said to have a meaning, this is identified with what the speaker intends to communicate; the sentence uttered has only its literal meaning. A metaphor's truth value is reduced to that of what the speaker intends to communicate.

Since John Searle is the best-known advocate of a broadly Gricean theory of metaphor,³² we will consider his view. According to Searle (1979, pp. 76–8):

The problem of explaining how metaphors work is a special case of the general problem of explaining how speaker meaning and sentence or word meaning come apart . . . Our task in constructing a theory of metaphor is to try to state the principles which relate literal sentence meaning to metaphorical [speaker's] utterance meaning.

Searle divides the interpretative process into three stages. First, the hearer must decide whether to look for a non-literal, and specifically for a metaphorical, interpretation. Such a search is typically undertaken because a literal interpretation would render the utterance in some sense defective. Second, once the hearer decides to interpret the utterance metaphorically, she employs a set of principles to generate meanings that the speaker might intend by her utterance. Searle offers eight principles by which the uttered phrase can "call to mind" a different meaning "in ways that are specific to metaphor,"³³ focusing on the simple case in which the speaker says something of the form '*S* is *P*' and means something of the form '*S* is *R*'. The principles include *R*s being a salient feature of *P*-things, either by definition or by contingent fact; *P*-things may also be typically believed to be *R*, although both speaker and hearer know them not in fact to be *R*; or it may be a "fact about our sensibility", whether culturally or naturally determined, that we just do perceive a connection between being *P* and being *R*; or the condition of being *P* may be like the condition of being *R*. Third, having generated a set of possible meanings by these principles, the hearer must identify which element in that set is most likely to be the speaker's intended meaning. Thus, the fact that pigs are stereotypically thought to be dirty, sloppy, and willing to eat anything that's placed before them seems more

³¹ For more on the Gricean account of meaning, see the papers in this volume by Borg and Gendler Szabo.

³² See Grice (1975) for a brief sketch of such a view; see also Martinich (1984).

³³ Searle (1979), p. 85.

likely to be relevant to interpreting “Sam is a pig” than the facts that pigs have hoofs, that they are non-ruminants, or that they are intelligent, social animals. The hearer therefore concludes that the speaker meant that Sam is dirty, sloppy, and gluttonous.

The motivation for a Gricean account is three-fold. First, it captures the idea that metaphors are meaningful, that they have a “cognitive content” other than their literal content. Second, it does this without violating what Grice (1975) called “Occam’s Razor.” This methodological principle is simply Occam’s Razor applied to linguistic meanings: *Don’t multiply senses beyond necessity*. The Gricean account respects this principle because it explains metaphors’ meanings by appealing to literal sentence meaning plus general interpretive principles. And third, a Gricean theory embeds the explanation of metaphor within a well-developed and independently motivated theory of linguistic communication that accommodates a wide range of cases where sentence meaning and speaker meaning come apart.

Criticisms of Gricean theories of metaphor are varied. First, on many accounts, the hearer must first identify the utterance as somehow defective before it is interpreted literally: only then is the search for an alternative, non-literal interpretation triggered.³⁴ However, not all utterances used metaphorically are defective. A sentence like “No man is an island” exhibits no obvious semantic deviance; it is literally true, albeit trivially so. Utterances of sentences like “The rock is becoming brittle with age” or “Anchorage is a cold city” could be true and informative when construed literally, given an appropriate context. And a “twice true” metaphor like “Jesus was a carpenter” could be true as both literally and metaphorically true and informative within a single context. It seems that a speaker could even plausibly intend to communicate both literal and metaphorical contents simultaneously, and that both interpretations could be conversely relevant.³⁵ So there need be no deviance either in the sentence itself or in the interpretation of it.

Second, some empirical evidence suggests that the literal meaning of a sentence used metaphorically needn’t actually be processed in order for the metaphor to be understood.³⁷ If this is correct, then it seems that a Gricean theory could serve as a rational reconstruction, rather than a factual description, of the interpretive process.³⁸ Third, even considered as rational reconstructions, Gricean accounts typically say so little about the process by which hearers could have arrived at an intended interpretation that they both lack empirical predictive power, and fail even to identify any theoretically distinctive feature of metaphor. For although Searle’s stated aim is to specify the distinctive principles by which metaphorical utterances “call to mind” the speaker’s meaning, his eight principles

³⁴ However, Searle explicitly allows that metaphorical interpretations may be triggered by the perceived defectiveness, for instance when we are on the lookout for them while reading a Romantic poem.

³⁵ See Reddy (1969); Cohen (1975); and Tirrell (1991).

³⁶ See Hills (1997) for discussion of such metaphors, which he calls “twice apt.”

³⁷ See Rumelhart (1979); Gibbs (1994); Giora (2002); but see Blasko and Connine (1993) and Gentner (2005) for evidence that novel metaphors do take longer to process than literal ones.

³⁸ This seems to be how both Grice and Searle intend their views to be understood.

broad that they threaten to encompass nearly every instance of non-literal meaning. The main interpretive burden therefore shifts to the third stage, at which the set of possible metaphorical meanings is narrowed to the intended one. But the operative interpretive principles at this stage are supposed to be those that govern pragmatic reasoning generally, and so they cannot be used to distinguish metaphor from other sorts of non-literal and indirect meaning. (In a similar fashion, Relevance theorists claim that metaphorical meanings “interpretively resemble” the literal meaning of the uttered sentence, so that words get used to express “*ad hoc*” concepts; but they don’t say anything more about *how* the metaphorical meaning must resemble the literal meaning. Without such a specification, though, nearly any utterance will count as metaphorical.)³⁹

Fourth, on a Gricean theory, the speaker’s communicative intentions exhaust the metaphor’s meaning. Yet a metaphor’s import often seems to go beyond what the speaker explicitly anticipated, especially for novel, poetic metaphors. Finally, Griceans generally assume that metaphorical meaning, like speaker meaning more generally, is fully propositional in form and fully capable of literal expression. The Gricean theory thus seems doomed to leave out what is most interesting about metaphor: its complex cognitive and affective “import”, which seems to be inherently inexpressible in literal terms.⁴⁰

(iv) Non-cognitivist Theories

In light of the difficulties we’ve encountered so far, some contemporary philosophers of language have questioned the widely-held view that metaphors are, in any substantive sense, meaningful. These philosophers—“non-cognitivists”—do not question metaphor’s *effectiveness*, only the means by which its effects are achieved. The central claim of such theorists is that a sentence used metaphorically has no distinctive cognitive content aside from its literal content. Non-cognitivists thus resemble Griceans in denying that the words uttered themselves have any special meaning. They depart from Griceans, though, in also denying that there is any determinate propositional thought which the speaker intends to communicate by means of those words. These negative claims are typically coupled with a positive view about how metaphor does manage to “work its wonders” after all. Thus, Davidson (1978) offers what might be termed a “causal theory” of metaphor.⁴¹ On his view, “a metaphor

³⁹ Contextualists, especially those in the tradition of Relevance Theory, are also committed to an account along the lines sketched by Grice: they too treat metaphor as a pragmatic phenomenon, where metaphorical meaning is a function of the speaker’s communicative intentions. However, they differ from Grice and Searle in at least two important respects. First, they do intend their theory as an empirical hypothesis about actual processing. And second, they reject the three-stage model of interpretation, arguing instead that comprehension proceeds directly to the intended interpretation. In this respect metaphor is taken to be quite different from implicature, and is thought to belong within ‘what is said’ instead. See e.g. Bezuidenhout (2001) and Recanati (2001); see also Camp (2006) for criticism.

⁴⁰ See Camp (2003) for defense of a broadly Gricean theory on which at least some metaphorical utterances can be intended to communicate complex representations which are not fully and explicitly appreciated by the speaker, and which may not be expressible in literal terms.

⁴¹ See Rorty (1987) for discussion of metaphor’s merely causal status on this view.

makes us attend to some likeness, often a novel or surprising likeness, between two or more things”, by making us “see one thing as another”.⁴²

Despite its undeniable counter-intuitiveness, non-cognitivism is not without motivation. First, it accounts for the facts that many metaphors don't easily admit of literal paraphrase, and that their “import” seems to be different in kind from that of typical literal utterances. Second, it is remarkably economical: it purports to explain how metaphor works without appealing to special word meanings or even Gricean speaker meanings. According to Davidson, a metaphor is like a bump on the head, or a drug: one can employ it to cause certain effects in one's audience, including noticing surprising similarities between objects, but this should not lead us to suppose that the metaphor, the bump or the drug itself *means* those effects, or even that the agent meant that effect *by* her action. Third, Davidson argues, the analogy with similes actually supports non-cognitivism. We are much less tempted to suppose that similes have a special meaning beyond their literal meaning: “Juliet is like the sun” means that Juliet is like the sun, nothing more, nothing less. Of course, the *point* of uttering the simile would not be merely to express that proposition, but rather to draw the hearer's attention to similarities between Juliet and the sun. But we needn't then suppose that the speaker means to claim *that* those similarities are there to be noticed.⁴³

The non-cognitivist theory has been criticized on a variety of grounds.⁴⁴ Most obviously, the theory flies in the face of the intuition that metaphors are cognitively significant: that they can be understood or misunderstood, that they figure in our reasoning and thought, and that they can be true or false. Moreover, as Merrie Bergmann (1982) and others have pointed out, a non-cognitivist view misses the role that metaphors play in assertion and counter-assertion. If I call Bill a vulture, and you deny this, then it seems clear that *something* has been asserted and denied, and that this ‘something’ is not the claim that Bill is a certain kind of bird.⁴⁵

Finally, as several philosophers⁴⁶ have pointed out, the non-cognitivist view appears to be incompatible with the phenomenon of dead metaphors. Dead metaphors are expressions which have lost their metaphorical import through frequent use and so no longer invite creative interpretation. Their former metaphorical import has ‘hardened’ into a new literal meaning. Thus, the expression “burned up”, as in “He was all burned up about his impending divorce”, is a dead metaphor, whose second literal meaning is just *extremely angry*. As Davidson puts it, the expression no longer conjures up “fire in the eyes or smoke coming out of the ears”.⁴⁷ This poses a difficulty for the non-cognitivist because it seems as if dead metaphors could only acquire their secondary literal meanings if they were previously used to communicate those very meanings. And this would seem to conflict with the basic non-cognitivist commitment: that speakers do not mean anything by metaphors.⁴⁸

⁴² Davidson (1978), pp. 31, 45.

⁴³ Here, there is clear disagreement with Fogelin (1988).

⁴⁴ See Moran (1989, and 1997) for these and other objections.

⁴⁵ See Hills (1997) and Bezuidenhout (2001) for further discussion of this point.

⁴⁶ See Goodman (1978); Moran (1989); and Reimer (1996).

⁴⁷ Davidson (1978), p. 36.

⁴⁸ But see Reimer (2001) for a defense of Davidson.

33.5 CURRENT AND FUTURE TRENDS

The most active research into metaphor is currently located in cognitive science.⁴⁹ The focus here is typically on issues such as metaphor's influence on thought and action, and the role of metaphor in cognitive development and linguistic competence.⁵⁰ There is generally less emphasis on metaphor as a form of expression in natural language. Thus, for instance, George Lakoff and his colleagues are most interested in metaphor as a cognitive tool for extending concepts' initial applications to new realms. They argue that we metaphorically transfer basic physical concepts like *up* and *over* to other domains: to the social, emotional, scientific, and even mathematical domains. These metaphorical mappings render certain ways of speaking and acting natural (e.g. "He's moving *up* in the world", "I'm feeling quite *up* today"). What we would normally classify as metaphorical language should, on this view, be analyzed instead as a direct, explicit representation of a metaphorical way of thinking.⁵¹

The future of metaphor research within the philosophy of language itself is less clear. One hope is that philosophers of language will work with, or at least alongside, researchers in other disciplines, so that their theories can be informed and even shaped by the varied observations garnered from these other disciplines. In particular, many of the theories discussed above invoke the notions of "salience" and "similarity" in one way or another, but have little to say about what these involve. Researchers in linguistics, cognitive science, psychology, and neurobiology are developing such notions, in work on metaphor and on other areas.⁵²

To see how philosophical theories of metaphor could be informed by other disciplines, we need only return to the four questions we discussed above as central concerns for philosophers of language:

- (i) What are metaphors?
- (ii) What is the nature of metaphorical meaning?
- (iii) How do metaphors work?
- (iv) What is the nature of metaphorical truth?

Interest in these questions is by no means confined to philosophy of language. Literary theorists are interested, among other things, in distinguishing metaphor from other figures, such as simile and irony, and thereby address (i). Cognitive scientists do so as well, by proposing that metaphors be viewed primarily as mental representations and only derivatively as linguistic phenomena. Philosophers and historians of science argue, along with cognitive scientists, that metaphors are significant cognitive tools, and in this way they address (ii). Cognitive psychologists and psycholinguists have done empirical research on the processing of metaphor and of language generally, thus shedding light on (iii). Interest in (iv) is perhaps more fully limited to philosophy *per se*, but metaphysicians, philosophers of mathematics, and even some historians of science have been concerned to explore the possibility of a substantive sort of truth

⁵¹ See Lakoff (1993); Lakoff and Turner (1989).

⁴⁹ See e.g. Gibbs and Steen (1999). ⁵⁰ See e.g. Happé (1995); Langdon *et al.* (2001).

⁵² See e.g. Gentner *et al.* (2001), Barsalou (1993, 1983), Holyoak and Thagard (1995), Fauconnier and Turner (1998).

which is not literal. It should thus be clear that philosophers of language can learn much about metaphor from the research efforts of those outside of their own area.

At the same time, an increasing focus on various forms of context-sensitivity within philosophy of language and linguistics has led to the development of new explanatory tools and strategies. “Hidden indexicals” (Stanley, 2000), “unarticulated constituents” (Perry, 1986), and “free enrichment” (Recanati, 1995) have all been postulated as mechanisms for bridging the gap between what might seem to be a sentence’s semantically encoded content and the content that is expressed by an utterance of it on a given occasion (see Carston and Powell, this volume, for discussion). These same mechanisms have recently begun to be deployed in explaining metaphor as well. Josef Stern (2000) has argued that metaphors function like demonstrative terms.⁵³ Kendall Walton (1993) and David Hills (1997) have argued that metaphorical meaning crucially depends upon “pretense” or “make-believe”, both about word use and about the schema of objects invoked.⁵⁴ And Anne Bezuidenhout (2001), François Recanati (2001), and Carston (2002) have all advocated treating metaphor as a form of pragmatic “direct expression”.⁵⁵ Perhaps this influx of new ideas will lead to a fruitful reconfiguration of the established options, much as occurred around the time of Davidson’s and Searle’s seminal publications in the late 1970s.

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⁵³ See Camp (2005) for criticism of Stern’s analysis. See also Leezenberg (2001) for an alternative semantic view which, like Stern’s, employs a Kaplanian logic of indexical terms.

⁵⁴ See also Nogales (1999) for a semantic view of metaphor on which interpretation proceeds through “reconceptualization” based on prototypical features rather than through pretense.

⁵⁵ See Camp (2006) for one response to arguments for treating metaphor as a form of “direct expression.”

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