“Development in South Asia”
for the International Encyclopedia of Social
and Behavioral Sciences
David Ludden
University of Pennsylvania
2/19/01
ABSTRACT
As a
collection of institutional activities to employ public and private assets for
public benefit, development articulates the ideas and the powers of its
effective participants. The history of
modern development in South
Asia began in the 1840s,
when government began investing in infrastructure to increase capital
accumulation in the British
Empire. After 1880, nationalists organized public
pressure to make development serve the nation.
In 1947, national governments attained supremacy in development for
about thirty years, when state planning prevailed. After 1980, national autonomy and state capacities
for leadership in development declined as its effective participants multiplied
and global investors expanded their role.
Today, development has no one guiding vision or dominant logic. Disparate institutions pursue disparate goals
including free market globalization, economic growth, ending poverty, and
empowering the poor majority of citizens who have never had their own strong
voice in development.
ARTICLE
Development
can be understood as an activity, a condition, an event, or a process. In social science, development is most often
studied as a complex of institutional activities that employ both public and
private assets for public benefit. It takes many forms according to ideas and
environments that guide its conduct and condition its results. Policies, institutions, outcomes, and
analysis together constitute development as a process that is distinct from the
related processes of economic growth and social progress, because development
explicitly includes the activities of state authorities who establish public
priorities and implement policy, includes official relationships among people
inside and outside the state, includes public assessments of policy, and
includes political efforts to change policy.
Objects and
trajectories of development are defined and measured variously. There is thus a vast literature on economic,
political, social, cultural, industrial, agricultural, technological, moral,
and human development. Even economic
development can be assessed by different yardsticks: aggregate increases in
national wealth and productivity are common measures; but national autonomy,
food security, and social stability are often important priorities; and a
particular state regime's stability, revenue, military might, and cultural
legitimacy often preoccupy policy makers.
Primary, secondary, explicit, and implicit priorities typically jostle
in policy making and various measures of success are typically used by various
participants in development debates.
Economic
development is the subject of this essay.
Though "the economy" as studied by economics consists
primarily of markets, "an economy" is a more complex environment that
includes natural endowments, social power relations, and political
history. Economic development embraces
all the institutional and material conditions that constitute specific
economies. Because development requires
the self-conscious use of power by particular groups in specific contexts,
development regimes represent formations of organized power that define the history
of development.
In South Asia, pre-modern regimes developed regional economies before 1800. A modern development regime emerged under
British rule after 1800. National
regimes took over development after 1945.
Since 1970, the leadership capacities of national regimes have declined
as international trends have favored global investors and struggles to
represent the poor and previously marginal peoples have favored local movements
and non-governmental organizations.
In 1929, an
erudite British agricultural officer, William Moreland, concluded from his
research that the "idea of agricultural development was already present in
the fourteenth century.” His conclusion
can now be extended much further back in time, because now we know that ancient
and medieval rulers in South
Asia invested to increase
productivity, most prominently by organizing irrigation. By the fourteenth century, royal finance and
protection were also expanding markets and manufacturing by building
transportation infrastructure. By the
eighteenth century, state activities that developed agriculture, commerce, and
manufacturing flourished around capital cities in Bengal,
Gujarat, Punjab, the Indo-Gangetic plains,
and the peninsular river basins.
Pre-modern
regimes increased state revenue and enriched bankers, farmers, and
manufacturers. But they worked in what
Moreland called a “political and social environment …unfavourable
to [modern goals of development],” because, he said, military and political
struggles undermined investments in farming, manufacturing, and banking, as
pillage and plunder fed destructive armies and rapacious taxation fattened
unproductive ruling elites.
The British
imperial development regime was built upon a pre-modern legacy but introduced
new ideas, institutions, and priorities.
In 1776, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations became Britain's first modern treatise on economic development. Smith attacked Crown support for monopolies
like the East India Company and promoted the expansion of commerce as the
nation's top development priority.
British conquest in South
Asia proceeded from the
mid-eighteenth to the late nineteenth century as Britain became the world's foremost industrial nation. Industrialization helped to sustain the
imperial enterprise and vice versa.
Modern imperialism defined the first institutional framework for modern
economic development in the United Kingdom, British India, Ceylon, and other colonial territories.
Until the
1840s, Indian tax revenues were assigned primarily to meet the cost of
conquest, administration, and imperial finance.
Policy priorities shifted over decades onto laissez faire lines
to open India for Britain's commercial interests. In 1813, Parliament renewed the Company
charter but ended its trading monopoly and allowed private merchants freer
access to British territories overseas.
In 1833, Parliament made the Company an administrative institution and
made English the official language of state law, administration, and education. British India became
a territory for imperial development inside a world empire; and in 1833, the abolition of slavery triggered petitions
from Caribbean planters that spurred the Indian government to send
shiploads of indentured workers from Calcutta to keep English sugar plantations running in the West Indies.
British
industrial interests were prominent in imperial development policy. As early as 1793, public debates ensued on
how to best manage of "Asiatic possessions" in the national interest. Increasingly prohibitive tariffs against
Indian cloth protected Lancashire, and after 1815, Lancashire sent cloth virtually free of tariffs to India. As Smith
predicted, British consumers benefited from commercial imperialism. English merchants sold Bengal
opium in China to buy tea and porcelain for English households;
sugar from Caribbean plantations sweetened English tea. Monetary policy kept relative prices of the
Indian rupee and English pound favourable for English
investors, importers, exporters, and consumers.
In 1818, James Mill's History of British India composed a British
national history, justification, and ideology for British governance in India; and English businessmen were soon cutting Indians
out of commercial partnerships to garner national benefits from the imperial
trades.
The real
value of taxes in India rose rapidly as prices dropped from 1823 to 1854. During this long price depression, it became
more cost effective to invest Indian taxes in India. At the same
time, outlets for British industrial capital were being sought in London and supply systems for industrial raw materials were
being developed. In the 1840s, London launched plans for building infrastructure in India to cheapen English supplies of commodities and raw
materials, to expand military operations, to increase revenue, and to extend
British capital investments in plantations, railways, cities, roads, ports,
shipping, irrigation, and other ventures.
In the
1840s, an irrigation engineer, Arthur Cotton, argued forcefully that Indian
crop production and could be advanced by state irrigation investments that
would pay for themselves with higher taxes on more productive land. At the same time, a commission of Parliament
met to consider ways to improve supplies of raw cotton to Lancashire mills. Bombay Presidency
attracted special attention, along with Egypt. Measures were sought to expand cotton exports
from these regions to counter-balance England's dependence on cotton supplies from the American
South. When the US Civil War broke out, Egypt and India filled a void in cotton supplies created by the Union
blockade of Confederate ports.
A transition
to a modern development regime consumed the decades 1840-1880. In 1853, Governor General Dalhousie announced
a plan to build an Indian railway with state contracts that guaranteed English
companies a minimum five percent return; and to secure that return, government
kept control of railway construction and management. In 1871, the Government of India obtained
authority to raise loans for productive purposes, and large irrigation projects
began, following earlier success raising revenues from smaller projects. Development projects were all government endeavours that employed many native contractors and their
benefits also filtered down to native owners of land receiving new irrigation
and producing commodity crops.
By 1880,
regions of specialized production for world markets had been developed in South Asia. Ceylon was a plantation economy. Coffee plantations expanded from fifty to
eighty thousand acres between 1847 and 1857, and peasants devoted another
forty-eight thousand acres to coffee for export. Coffee acreage expanded another 35,000 acres
in the 1860s. In the 1880s, leaf disease
killed coffee cultivation, which was rapidly replaced by tea, rubber, cocoanut,
and cinchona plantations. Ceylon and India replaced China as the major suppliers of English tea. British plantation investors drove out
peasant producers and controlled export markets. Labour supplies
posed the major constraint for tea planters, and the solution was found in the
institution of (eventually permanent) labour
migration from southern Tamil districts in British India. British
plantations in Malay colonies also depended on migrating Tamil workers.
British
Burma and East Africa also developed in circuits of capital accumulation
anchored in India. In Burma, Tamil Chettiyar bankers
became prime financiers for agricultural expansion in the Irrawaddy River delta, which generated huge exports of rice for world
markets, including India, where urbanization increased demand for imported
rice. In East and South Africa, merchants from Gujarat and emigrant workers from Bombay, Calcutta,
and Madras provided both labour and
capital for railway construction and formed urban nuclei for the colonial economy. Between 1896 and 1928, seventy-five percent
of emigrants from Indian ports went to Ceylon and Malaya; ten percent, to Africa;
nine percent, to the Caribbean; and the remaining six percent, to Fiji and Mauritius, which also became island plantation economies.
The Deccan plateau in India's peninsula became cotton country. In 1876, cotton duties were abolished in England to further cheapen supplies from India, and a year later, the biggest famine ever recorded
struck Deccan cotton-growing districts. Under laissez faire economic policy
and imperial bureaucracy, little was done to alleviate famine suffering, but
famine sharpened government attention to investments in protective irrigation.
Famine commissions and policies were implemented.
By 1914,
most goods arriving at South
Asia ports were destined for
export: cotton, wheat, rice, coal, coke, jute, gunny bags, hides and skins,
tea, ores, and wool. Most cotton came to
Bombay from Maharashtra. All tea came
to Calcutta and Colombo from British-owned plantations in Assam, Darjeeling,
and hills around Kandy. Most export
rice came to Rangoon. Wheat came
primarily from fields under state irrigation in Punjab
(60%) and the western United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh) (26%). Oilseeds came to Bombay from Hyderabad territory (Andhra Pradesh), the Central Provinces (Madhya Pradesh), and Bombay Presidency (Maharashtra). Coal, coke,
and ores came from mines around Jharkhand into Calcutta and Bombay, where they stoked local industry as well as
exports. Eastern Bengal (Bangladesh) produced almost all the world's jute, which went to Scotland and then to Calcutta, where jute cloth output surpassed Dundee
by 1908.
Between 1880
and 1914, industrial development in India took off during decades of low prices in Europe
and America when rising prices in South Asia encouraged investments in India by firms producing for Indian markets and for
diversified world markets. Commodity
prices in India rose with export commodity production until
1929. Imported industrial machinery was
domesticated in new Indian factory towns.
It 1853, the first Indian cotton mill appeared in Bombay, and the
Factory Act (1881) imposed rules on Indian factories to reduce their
comparative advantage in virtue of low labour costs
and cheap access to raw materials in India.
In 1887, J.N.Tata's
Empress Mill arose at Nagpur, in the heart of cotton country, in 1887. The Tatas became India's industrial dynasty. Tata
Iron and Steel Works at Jamshedpur consumed increasing supplies of ore and coal, which
by the 1920s rivalled exports from Calcutta. In 1914,
India was the world's fourth largest industrial cotton textile producer: cotton
mills numbered 271 and employed 260,000 people, 42% in Bombay city, 26%
elsewhere in Bombay Presidency (mostly Nagpur), and
32% elsewhere in British India, at major railway junctures. Coal, iron, steel,
jute and other industries were developed at the same time, producing
specialized regional concentrations of heavy industrial production around Bombay, Ahmedabad, Nagpur, Kanpur, Calcutta,
Jamshedpur, and Madras. Jute mills around Calcutta multiplied from 1 to 64, between 1854 and 1914; the
number of looms and scale of employment increased twice as fast. In 1913, manufactured goods comprised twenty
percent of Indian exports that were valued at ten percent of national income,
figures never since surpassed.
World War
One stimulated policies to enhance India's industrialization to make India less dependent on imports; and the Great Depression,
1929-1933, again boosted incentives for industrial growth by reducing prices
for farm output compared to manufactures.
As a result, industrial output in British India grew steadily from 1913 to 1938 and was 58% higher at
the end of the Depression than at the start of World War One; compared to
slower and more uneven rates of growth in the UK and Germany. By contrast, plantations languished from the
early 1900s to the 1940s, the major exception being rubber, which benefited
from war booms. Native States and non-British firms participated in the industrial
trend. In 1902, Mysore government installed an electric generator built by
General Electric with techniques and equipment pioneered at Niagara Falls. Bangalore was the first South Asian city lighted with
electricity. In 1921, a third of India's industrial production was driven by electricity and
Mysore had a higher proportion of electrified industry (33%)
than British Indian provinces of Madras (13%) or Bengal (22%).
By 1920, South Asia had institutionalized national economies dominated by agriculture but
also including large public sectors and major industries. Indian investors and nationalist politicians
were by this time vocal advocates for increasing state development efforts. By 1920, British India was also a land of opportunity for global
investors. In 1914, the US Consul at Bombay, Henry Baker, had called it "one of the few
large countries of the world where there is an 'open door' for the trade of all
countries." England was still India's dominant trading partner, but it was losing
ground. In 1914, the UK sent 63% of British India's
imports and received 25% of its exports; and by 1926, these figures stood at
51% and 21%, respectively. By 1926,
total trade with the UK averaged 32% for the five major ports (Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Karachi,
and Rangoon). Bombay and Rangoon did 43% of their overseas business with Asia
and the Middle East. Calcutta did a quarter of its business with America.
South Asia's early globalization also appears in migration
data. In 1911, the British in British India numbered only 62% of all resident
Europeans (54% in Native States and Agencies). Four times more immigrants came into India from Asia than from Europe and seven of ten came overland from Nepal (54%) and Afghanistan (16%).
In 1911, Nepalis entering British India (280,248) exceeded the resident British
population by fifty percent; Asian immigrants were three times as many. By 1921, emigration far exceeded
immigration. Between 1896 and 1928, 83%
of 1,206,000 emigrants left British India from Madras (which accounted for only 10% of total
overseas trade), and they mostly went to work in Ceylon (54%) and Malaya (39%). Bombay emigrants went mostly to East and South Africa; Calcutta emigrants, to Fiji and the West Indies.
In 1920, Britain still controlled the highest echelons of South Asia's political economy, but process of
capital accumulation inside South Asia had escaped British control. Before the war, London's political position in South Asia seemed secure. After the war, London declined visibly in relation to other
metropolitan powers and also to cosmopolitan powers in South Asia that were mobilizing for national control
of development. A national development
regime emerged inside the British Empire. In 1920, the Indian government
obtained financial autonomy from Britain.
Indian nationalists focused sharply on economic issues. The Indian
National Congress first met in Bombay, in 1885, and then met every year in late
December in a different city of British India.
Following the Deccan famines, in1879, Dadabhai Naoroji published his influential The
Poverty of India to
document the negative economic impact of imperial policies on India, and he presided at Congress meetings in
1886, 1893, and 1906, where delegates from all the provinces discussed
government policy and argued for lower taxes and increased state development
expenditure. In 1905, the Congress
launched a Swadeshi Movement to induce Indian
consumers to buy Indian made cloth rather than British imports.
The Great Depression dramatized the social cost of India's open imperial economy: it sparked
peasant and worker's movements demanding economic security and spurred
nationalist efforts to make government more responsible for public well-being
in India. By this time,
government had long experience as an economic manager and investor in
infrastructure. Government owned and
managed most mineral and forest resources.
Government agricultural departments, colleges, and experiment stations
supported scientists and engineers who worked on state-funded development
projects. The vast state sector of the
imperial economy was managed, however, within a laissez faire policy framework that favoured foreign
investors.
In 1930, the new Congress president, Jawaharlal Nehru, announced new
ambitions for national development. He
took nationalist economic thought in a new direction when he said, "the
great poverty and misery of the Indian People are due, not only to foreign
exploitation in India but also to the economic structure of society, which the
alien rulers support so that their exploitation may continue," and he went
on to proclaim that "In order therefore to remove this poverty and misery
and to ameliorate the condition of the masses, it is essential to make revolutionary
changes in the present economic and social structure of society and to remove
the gross inequalities."
Bitter experience of state failure, social disruption,
and mass death during the Great Depression, the Great Bengal Famine (1943-4),
and the Partition of British India (1947) laid the groundwork for national
planning that stressed national autonomy, security, and economic integration
under strong state leadership. In 1951,
Prime Minister Nehru chaired India's Planning Commission, and in the 1950s,
all South Asian countries wrote national plans stressing self-sufficiency and
addressing problems of national economic growth, poverty, and inequality.
Three decades from the start of India's first Five Year Plan in 1952 to the end
of its Sixth Plan in 1985 were the heyday of nationally planned development in South Asia.
This was also the most creative period for development theory, a
practical strain of economic thought devoted to increasing the productivity and
well-being in nations emerging from European imperial control.
National planning required the institutional enclosure
of national economies. Around the world,
national economies were more self-contained in the 1950s and 1960s than they
had been in the heyday of European imperialism.
Foreign direct investment declined globally from roughly ten percent of
world output in 1913 to less than five percent in the 1960s, when the rate of
increase in world merchandise exports was well below the 1.7 percent that
pertained from 1870 to 1914.
South Asia's national plans focused on national
markets. National planners formulated
priorities for allocating state resources acquired both internally and
externally. External funds came in
grants and loans from countries involved in the Cold War as well as from the Bretton Woods institutions sponsored by the richest
capitalist countries. National plan
allocations for agriculture and industry
were intended to enhance private investment.
Planning instituted a new public-and-private apparatus for monitoring
national economies. Planning agencies
organized regional and local initiatives like cooperative societies and
community development programs. National
governments set up public food procurement and distribution systems to
establish a ceiling on food costs for the poor.
National health and education expanded.
State ownership expanded to basic industries, public utilities, banks,
and insurance.
Economic progress became a central feature of national
discourse. Public intellectuals and
organizations representing farmer, worker, business, and other interests became
intensely involved in planning debates as the national public was mobilized
politically under the universal adult franchise. In order to address national needs, however,
deficit spending increased demands for external funding; and national economic
growth depended on private capital rather than on poor voters. Finance and politics pushed national planning
in opposing directions. Popular
participation favoured citizen groups while financial pressures favoured major
investors.
Plans initially focused on industrial import
substitution and on producing basic goods in public sector enterprises. Even so, eight-percent of India's industrial production remained in the
private sector, where public sector output lowered input prices. Protective controls on imports, exports, and
operations inside national markets were stricter than ever before and spawned a
regulatory bureaucracy as well as black and grey markets. Plan allocations were in practice mixed in with
political patronage. By the late 1960s,
foreign exchange shortages began to put private and public sector companies
into direct competition for funding.
Nehru died in 1964. Drought and
famine struck India in 1965-1967 and the food distribution
system relied on US foreign aid. As a result, planners thrust new energy into
the Green Revolution, which combined irrigation, pesticides, and high-yielding
hybrid wheat and rice seeds. Plans concentrated
on extending the Green Revolution by investing in sites of intensive
cultivation where well endowed landowners controlled local labour, finance, and
political institutions. Critics called
this strategy "betting on the rich."
Defenders saw the Green Revolution as the foundation of national food
security.
During the 1970s, state planning began to lose its
grip on development. Policy makers in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal were first to shift priorities away from
national autonomy as they sought to meet demands from the urban middle class
and rural landowners by using massive external assistance for large development
projects, epitomized by the Mahaveli scheme in Sri Lanka, then the largest irrigation project in
the world. New external debt came with
new conditions. From 1973, rising oil
prices brought recession along with inflation to rich countries in Europe and North America, as it drove up the cost of South Asia's industrial growth, middle class
consumption, and the Green Revolution.
The effects were most drastic in smaller South Asian countries, which
began borrowing on a much higher scale and soon came under structural
adjustment policies introduced by the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund, where development theory had shifted to focus on government policy reform
in borrowing countries. Among
economists, critics of national state control of development became more
influential.
In 1981, India also began to rely more heavily on foreign
debt. By 1990, internal pressure from
middle class consumers and major industrial concerns combined with conditions
imposed by external lenders to force the liberalization of economic policies in
favour of freer market operations. State
policy shifted away from regulated planning toward institutional reforms, which
have preoccupied government since 1991 and opened India's economy substantially.
The eighties and nineties witnessed a profound shift
in relationships among participants in development. Dismantling central government controls,
opening governments to public scrutiny and popular participation, and making
the state more accountable and transparent for private citizens became the
order of the day. In India, private capital and state governments
gained more independence from a central government that is today composed of
shifting coalitions of regionally-based parties, rather than being dominated by
a single national party. State
governments gained powers to make contracts with foreign countries and
businesses. State Chief Ministers now
compete to attract investors. In Nepal, electoral democracy was established in
1991, opening development to wide public debate at the same time as foreign
investments grew. In Pakistan, a national government threatened by
struggles for regional autonomy also had to absorb disruptions from two decades
of war in Afghanistan, leading to more stringent
authoritarianism. Since 1981, Sri Lanka has been wracked by war with Tamil
regional separatists; and like Bangladesh, it depends on foreign investors while it
struggles to resist reforms that undermine national sovereignty.
The problem of governance became increasingly central
in debates about development. Since
1980, active institutional participants in development have multiplied in all
the countries as global investors have increased their power inside national economies. Together, these two trends have weakened the
capacities of national governments to maintain strong leadership. At the same time, government reform and
privatization of public enterprise has become a policy priority in
international funding agencies.
Effective governance in development has scattered and fragmented, while
the responsibility of the national state for macro-economic management,
property and human rights protection, and political stability has become more
demanding.
Development today has no one guiding vision or
dominant logic and several contradictory trends are prominent. National economies are more global as are
the cultural communications that shape national politics. In the 1990s, television media owned by
multinational corporations flooded public information systems. The growth of exports from South Asian
countries measured 13.5% annually in the 1990s, almost four times the rate of
the 1970s. Foreign direct investment
(FDI) grew, though it remains a small proportion of India's GDP at 0.1 percent before 1991 and 0.5
percent in 1992-6. In 1990-1996, FDI
increased (in millions of US dollars) from under 100 to over 5,000 in India,
from under 250 to over 650 in Pakistan, from under 60 to over 600 in
Bangladesh, and from under 60 to over 2,400 in Sri Lanka. In the first six months of 1996 alone, Korean
companies made nine technical and twenty-five financial agreements in India.
Forging alliances between national and international
business now preoccupies national policy makers and linkages between FDI and
national investors are increasing the pool of investment capital inside
national economies. A repeat of the
nineteenth century trend that created specialized economic regions is underway. In Nepal, tourism and hydro-electricity attract
foreign and domestic partnerships. In Bangladesh, the garment industry has been the fastest
growing employer, relying on imports for all material inputs and exporting all
its output. Sri Lanka is a free-trade zone. The South Indian cities of Bangalore and Hyderabad are growth nodes for high technology and
business collaboration. The Sylhet region of Bangladesh specializes in labour exports to Britain.
Globalization has not fostered much cooperation among
South Asian countries; rather, national governments and business compete in
world markets. More market activity
crossing national borders escapes regulation and monitoring. External labour migration has reached
staggering proportions but is impossible to assess empirically. The largest overseas flow is to the Persian Gulf, where Bangladesh alone sent 1,600,000 workers in 1995. Available data indicate that only a fraction
of remittances are recorded and that most flow through informal channels to
finance domestic consumption, investment and foreign trade in the migrants'
home country. Illegal trades also
flourish in drugs and arms; organized crime has gone beyond its old interest in
black market radios and videos to trafficking in women and child sex-workers.
More citizen groups have become vocal critics of state
leadership, priorities, and administrative practice in development. Popular movements against the Narmada Dam in India and against the Arun
Three hydro-electric project in Nepal represent many mobilizations to make
development more respectful of the environment and responsible to people
marginalized and displaced by state development projects.
Countless grassroots movements now seek to wrest
control of development from national states.
These include regional and local democratic movements fighting for the
interests of farmers, workers, industrialists, women, and the poor; they also
include the Maoist insurgency that has spread like wildfire in Nepal, Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka, and militant struggles for autonomy among
tribal peoples in several mountain regions.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become
prominent development institutions. NGOs number in the hundreds of
thousands. Most are small and locally
financed but some have grown huge by combining local initiatives with
government funding, international finance, and business activity. In 1976, the Grameen
Bank was established by Muhammad Yunnus in Bangladesh to make small loans to poor women and
today it counts its clients in the millions and values its loans in billions of
dollars. Despite its size, however, Grameen still reaches a tiny proportion of the rural poor
in Bangladesh.
Contemporary
development includes contradictory tendencies that do not form one dominant
trend. Globalization, regionalism, and
localization are progressing at the same time.
The conventional use of national statistics to study development has
become inadequate as economic conditions have become more disparately local,
regional, national and global in their form and content. Overall economic growth accelerated in the
1990s, but there were also a series of good monsoons, poverty did not decline
significantly, and inequalities as well as instability and conflict over
development increased.
Who is
leading development, who is benefiting, and where today's trends are moving
remain debatable. Some analysts have
said that development itself is dead. It
is more accurate to say that development entered a new phase in the last
decades of the twentieth century when increasingly numerous, vocal, and
contentious participants organized effectively to pursue disparate, perhaps
contradictory goals, including free market globalization, economic growth,
ending poverty, and empowering the poor majority of citizens in South Asia who
have never had their own effective institutional voice.
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