Vani Krishnamurthy

May 11, 2001

PPE Senior Honors Research

‘Good Government’ –

A Convenient Answer to the Politics of Hindutva

ABSTRACT

Without discounting prevailing interpretations, it is feasible to see the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) rapid rise to popularity in India through a perspective that underlines the party’s projection of itself as the embodiment of ‘good government.’ This outlook brings together the BJP’s populist, Hindu-nationalist, and coalition-dependent strategies so that they can be viewed under a rational and judicious lens. The writings of the Rashtriya Swayemsevak Sangh (RSS), a member of the Sangh Parivar, appear to be the root of the ‘good government’ image that the BJP has so successfully used for its electoral benefit. However, a subsequent analysis of the BJP’s philosophy displays the party’s superficial departure from the ultra-Hindu RSS idea in order to expand its vote-bank. An assessment of the BJP and Congress party election manifestos displays the extent to which the BJP uses its image; its policies are coated with morality just by association with the ‘good government’ idea. Analyzing the party’s actions through such a framework shows the advantageous effect of such a noble image – the party is able to justify many of its practices because it is backed by a corruption-free and honorable reputation brought about by its own creative and strategic mind.

 

Introduction

Why is the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) electorally successful and in power today? Scholars such as Thomas Hansen, Christophe Jaffrelot, and Amrita Basu have given significant attention to this question. Their works propose numerous circumstances and strategies that might have caused at least a portion of the BJP’s popularity. For example, one reason for the party’s success could be its connections and alliances with other parties and organizations; its formulation of a type of coalition government allows the party to appeal to many. It also presents an alternative to a declining Congress party, which refuses to structure its own party in the way that has proved successful for the BJP. The party’s success can also be linked to its populist strategy; its opportunistic mindset has allowed the leaders of the BJP to tackle issues that its constituency deems most important and to fight for the position that its constituency supports at a particular time. Another proposition is that the BJP’s idea of cultural nationalism, which is distinctively Hindu in appearance, appeals to that religious majority present in India – a religious group which is searching for a voice to protect its diverse community from the spread of minority religions and continuing conflicts with those religious groups (mainly Muslims and Christians). The party’s use of Hindu symbols combined with its high-tech media campaigns might kindle the frustrations that this Hindu majority has with other religions, allowing Hindus to support the BJP’s vague cause.

While political scientists have created numerous frameworks to analyze the reasons for the BJP’s popularity, significant attention has not been given to a framework that focuses entirely on the BJP constructed image of ‘good government.’ This framework views underlying strategies and circumstances (those that political theorists have explored) as being covered by or enclosed in an overlying ‘good government’ image. Encompassing the initial propositions in a framework that emanates an honorable and credible aura to the Indian people might shed light on at least a portion of the popularity that the BJP has acquired. For this image, acting as a backdrop for the totality of the party, allows the BJP to justify many of its actions, stances, and policies, just by their subtle association with the moral connotations of ‘good government.’

Further exploration of the moral façade that the BJP has adopted reveals much more about the origins of such an idea and its complex evolution, and also discloses the party’s alliance with an organization and the flexible nature of that alliance. A close look at early and recent writings of the Rashtriya Swayemsevak Sangh (RSS) displays the idea of ‘good government’ in its root form. A comparison of these writings to BJP texts (the official BJP philosophy – ‘Integral Humanism’) shows the party’s adaptation of such an idea to suit its electoral needs. From this observation alone, it is apparent that the BJP-RSS relationship is one in which the BJP may extract and utilize the concepts of the RSS without being restrained by them; it can, in fact, opportunistically contract or extend the RSS principles in order to fulfill its constituency’s interests. The root of the initial proposition, that the BJP is able to gain a portion of its popularity through the image of ‘good government,’ is due to the way in which it develops the RSS concept of virtuosity and good character.

The BJP election manifesto displays the extent to which the party applies this ‘good government’ image as well as the way in which its actions are automatically justified, simply by the credible and honorable reputation that it has created for itself. A moral backdrop exists behind all of the BJP’s proposals, and in this way, gives the BJP a universal appeal. The carefully crafted image and strategy of association is even more apparent after an analysis of the Congress party’s manifesto, which reveals only a simple rebuttal to the BJP’s claims and promises.

The ethical and virtuous public face that the BJP paints for itself only recently has been challenged by the defense scandal that has caused the resignation of BJP President Bangaru Laxman. Otherwise, the party’s presentation of itself as the embodiment of integrity and hence the provider of a sort of moral order, leaps all religious and cultural boundaries and appeals to India’s diverse population. The people of India have witnessed increasingly disorderly surroundings; in effect, "the state’s capacity to govern…has declined" in the face of poverty and corruption in the last few decades (Kohli 1990: 3-5). The BJP is able to play upon the persistent frustration that the average Indian has had with the Congress party’s dishonest and inadequate past as well as the increasing political disorder that has engulfed the nation, and it has opportunistically used these circumstances to its electoral advantage.

Chronology of the BJP’s Electoral Success

The history of the party’s formation and electoral performance explains political scientists’ interest in examining the reasons for the party’s success. The organization’s incipient party began modestly in 1951. After the formation of the BJP (as it is known today) in 1977, the party gradually made its presence known, and then rapidly and mysteriously seized an increasing number of votes after 1996.

A brief look at the history of the BJP party and its formation shows a slow beginning, with initial electoral wins comprising just a few states. Shyama Prasad Mookherji formed a political party known as the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS) in 1951. The BJS made its long-awaited mark in 1967; in that year the party was successful in securing votes in certain Hindi Belt states – such as Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, and even somewhat in Rajasthan.

The party experienced roller-coaster outcomes until 1996, when its wins were significant enough to secure control; from that year on, the BJP experienced rapid and increasing success. In 1977, the BJS merged with the Janata Party; however, it designated itself as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980, after the Janata Party experienced a failure. Though the BJP’s performance in the 1984 election was discouraging, it promptly emerged in 1989 with 85 seats in the Lok Sabha and 119 seats in 1991. Quickly, the BJP was becoming an established party that was well recognized throughout the country. 1996 marked the BJP’s position in the Lok Sabha as the largest party, which included an invitation to lead the government center as well. However, unable to capture a majority and with an immediate resignation by Prime Minister Atal Bihari, only 13 days marked the length of the BJP’s power. 1998 signified the first big win for the BJP. It was able to muster 179 seats in the Lok Sabha as it adopted a strategy of forming alliances with many regional parties. Despite its ups and downs, the party has moved to a position of popularity quite rapidly within its overall life span as Figure 1 and Table 1 show.

 

 

Prevailing Interpretations of the BJP’s Electoral Success

Scholars have attributed the rise of the party and its electoral success to diverse reasons that include not only multi-faceted strategies and policies, but also external circumstances and situations that have indirectly favored the BJP. A brief look at the works of Thomas Hansen, Christoffe Jaffrelot, and Amrita Basu displays the ideas that are most prevalent in these interpretations. All three scholars hint of the BJP’s use of the ‘good government’ image to extend its popularity. However, none of the scholars analyze the image in enough detail to realize the extent to which it aids the BJP’s electoral quest. They do not interpret the ‘good government’ image as a lens through which the party’s constituents can view all of its actions or a framework under which its sub-strategies can be positioned.

In his analysis of the Hindu nationalist movement in India and its rising success at the polls, Thomas Hansen primarily attributes the emergence of Hindutva, the Hindu nationalism movement to which the BJP is linked, to three key issues. Hansen claims that Hindu nationalism has emerged out of democracy though it is not a result of failed democracy; India has maintained the longest post-colonial exhibition of democracy, and Hindu nationalism arose from the pluralism that this democracy has allowed (Hansen 1999: 5). Due to its provision of expanded horizons, Hansen explains, democracy tends to produce a sense of instability and lack of order, allowing its institutions to be contested by the general public – "The Hindu nationalist movement is both an expression of this politicization of Indian public culture and a reaction against it" (Hansen 1998: 9). While democratic principles and a democratic environment can produce tolerance and equality, Hindu nationalism has shown otherwise; it represents almost a backlash to "excessive liberalism" (Hansen 1998: 6).

Hansen also claims that much of the BJP’s success lies in its play upon insecurities of its constituents. Hindu fears of the stereotyped Muslim are emphasized here; some Hindu nationalists argue that Muslims represent impurity and restrain India from having any cultural unity, two qualities that they propose must exist before India modernizes fully (Hansen 1998: 12-13). These insecurities also include the wealthier classes’ anxiety towards the lower classes. Hindu nationalism arose in the 80s as a "conservative populism" that included wealthier groups who did not want lower classes infringing on their status. However, the movement also indirectly included lower class groups that wanted to be a part of a majoritarian stance that involved "cultural pride, order, and national strength" – allowing for the party to appeal to both groups (Hansen 1998: 8-9).

From the wealthier groups’ support arose a perception of politics as a "virtuous vocation," which has come to aid the BJP in its electoral pursuits: "…upper class notions of selfless duty and purity were inscribed into the construction of an ideal citizen. Politics and the affairs of state were constructed as the realm of enlightened men of superior moral fiber" (Hansen 1998: 7). Hansen bridges this concept with the BJP’s representation of itself as an alternative to the immoral Congress party; the Hindu nationalist movement presents itself as "the natural, inevitable, completely unpolitical reaction of ordinary, pious Hindus against a culturally insensitive, westernized, and corrupted state" (Hansen 1998: 10). This platform allows many Indians to compare the reputation of the Congress party with the reputation that the BJP is striving to create, allowing for those that have doubted the Congress to side with the BJP.

 

Christophe Jaffrelot’s observations of the BJP’s popularity identify a particular pattern in its tactics. Jaffrelot claims that from its inception, the BJP has oscillated between two unique approaches to gain votes. He categorizes one group of strategies as a ‘moderate combination’ that includes mobilizing on social and economic issues that falls under the division of populism; the other, he says, is a ‘radical combination’ that includes building a concrete entity by emulating the ‘Other’ (Muslims and Christians, mostly) as well as mobilizing on ethno-religious issues (Jaffrelot 1996: 10). While ethno-religious mobilization includes bringing a large population together by exploiting Hindu symbols that have a history of Hindu-Muslim agitation behind them (examples include cow protection or Lord Ram trapped in the mosque at Ayodhya), emulation of other religious groups plays on the insecurities Hindus have against non-Hindus (Jaffrelot 1996: 522-523).

Since the ‘radical combination’ was constraining its vote bank, the BJP reacted by acting in less militant ways and by pursuing a populist approach that would appeal to its diverse constituency (Jaffrelot 1996: 529). After 1993, the BJP began to narrow in on more social and economic issues that OBCs (Other Backward Castes) often faced, focusing its energy toward a populist platform. In fact, the BJP election manifesto in 1994 included chapter titles such as "Priority to agriculture, irrigation and electricity," "Special schemes for employment opportunities to youth," "Establishment of social justice and amity," and "Integrated schemes for scheduled groups and women welfare" (Jaffrelot 1996: 539).

Jaffrelot addresses the issue of corruption, but he does not consider it to be a significant cause for the BJP’s win. Though disapproval of corruption was used to gain an edge over the Congress Party, Jaffrelot attributes the BJP’s win over Congress to something outside of the BJP’s realm of control. He says that the BJP, at that time, did not really represent a full alternative to the Congress, since it had not gained much approval in areas of the South or East. The Congress party was already declining in popularity, and any win that the BJP might incur in the future would solely be due to default (Jaffrelot 1996: 529).

 Amrita Basu’s explanations for the BJP’s rise to power overlap with the other scholars’ and are equally interesting. Basu attributes a portion of the BJP’s success to the way the party itself has been constructed. The BJP has a strong central apparatus (with respect to its ideology, cohesive national leadership, and well-connected party units at all levels) perpetrated by ideas spread through a good use of media and inter-allegiances with the RSS; all of the BJP’s top leaders have an RSS membership (Basu 1996: 63-64). Its alliances with the RSS as well as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) let the BJP pursue a social movement by initiating mobilization on non-political issues while its concern for electoral success keeps its end objective political (Basu 1996: 57). Flexibility, however, is the key to this electoral success. Its alliances do not preclude that it only pursues Hindu nationalism; by maintaining its separate identity, the BJP is able to secure a larger electoral base (Basu 1996: 60). This unique situation allows the BJP to gain a Hindu and non-Hindu vote bank, even though its allied institutions are starkly Hindu-based.

This large electoral base, Basu claims, is also the result of the BJP’s convoluted and interesting populist tactics. The BJP has portrayed contradictory images in order to gain support at the national level as well as the local level, appealing to Hindus nationally and then gauging the local population to determine its particular stance; people of different regions support the BJP for different (and sometimes conflicting) reasons (Basu 1996: 59). In many cases, the BJP’s populist strategies involve determining its stances after observing what is of interest to the public as expressed by the daily newspaper (Basu 1996: 66). Basu notices that the party’s contradictory appeals and images are absolutely essential for electoral success – the BJP cannot afford to alienate the Muslim population, a substantial portion of its constituents (Basu 1996: 61).

A strand of the BJP’s populist platform which has proved successful, Basu claims, involves expressing its dismay at the unjust ways of the Congress party: "…consider how the BJP projects itself as a deeply moralistic party that is preoccupied with restoring ethical values to the conduct of political life. Its position strikes a chord among an electorate that is deeply dissatisfied with the existing political system" (Basu 1996: 78-79). While the BJP supports political centralization and strong government, it is also aware of anti-Congress and anti-state attitudes of its constituencies. It consequently denounces the Congress for its electoral motivations. As Basu observes, "The fact that the BJP can credibly denounce other political parties for communal calculations in electoral politics constitutes an extraordinary irony. Perhaps it can feign a posture of moral superiority because it has not yet been tainted by the exercise of power at the center" (Basu 1996: 62).

 While all of the scholars show some appreciation of the ‘good government’ idea and the BJP popularity that has arisen from it, none focus their energy entirely on this ‘good government’ framework – a framework that unifies the diverse causes attributed to the BJP’s success. The creation of a moral image allows the party to integrate and consolidate its contradictory appeals by bringing them under one universal theme that inherently cannot be challenged. The vague but universally understood idea of ‘good government’ allows the BJP to be viewed as providing the order that the emergence of democracy has destroyed in India, championing morality in the context of a corrupt Congress Party legacy, mobilizing for the needs of the neglected, allying with organizations that are by association morally sound as well, following the ethical principles preferred by the Hindu majority, and also integrating minorities by adopting a non-religious yet universally acceptable code of conduct. While scholars discuss each of these popular appeals individually, they do not elaborate on the positive synergy that is created out of unifying them under a ‘good government’ image.

 

Origins of ‘Good Government’ – the RSS

Understanding the creation of the BJP ‘good government’ image requires looking back to early RSS writings and even recent RSS publications, both of which emphasize the need for values such as senses of duty, purity, honesty, and charity in the political realm. The BJP’s alliance with the RSS as well as the two organizations’ overlapping members both point to a connection between the party’s construction of a moral image and the RSS virtuous philosophy. The RSS writings, however, are based on the fundamental morality of Hinduism and the Hindu people, which cannot hold true for the BJP if it wishes for its image to be broadly appealing and to translate into significant electoral wins in a religiously diverse country.

A close look at the writings of M.S. Golwalkar, one of the primary RSS theorists in its early stages and the author of Bunch of Thoughts, manifests the organization’s stress on a distinctly Hindu morality in its founding philosophy. According to Golwalkar, "The ultimate vision of our work, which has been the living inspiration for all our organisational state of our society wherein each individual has been moulded into a model of ideal Hindu manhood and made into a living limb of the corporate personality of society" (Golwalkar 1966: 61). The RSS proposes to shape individuals into ideal citizens through inculcating in them its conception of a Hindu ethical code. Consequently, it claims to produce a group of individuals that can provide moral leadership in many different realms of society, one of which is the political realm.

To emphasize the morality and virtuosity of the RSS vision, Golwalkar justifies the inherent morality in Hinduism and in the unification of Hindu people, since much of the RSS philosophy is dependent upon this assumption. He uses the four stages of life in Hinduism (artha, kama, dharma, moksha) and emphasizes the latter two stages, which represent duty and salvation, more than the former. Golwalkar says, "We are therefore called a highly moral, spiritual and philosophical people, who have kept as their ultimate goal nothing short of direct communion with God Himself, i.e. moksha" (Golwalkar 1966: 34). This statement is an attempt to justify the cultural (or rather religious) unity that is necessary for morality to exist. Golwalkar’s definition of dharma, accordingly, is focused and narrowed such that it indicates a duty for an individual to blend in with society and for all to participate in a type of giving that would perpetuate the RSS Hindu philosophy, which hints of the ‘virtuous vocation’ of which Hansen spoke:

 

Emphasizing the positive and social nature of the movement, the RSS philosopher is careful to hide the political subtleties that are inherent in the act of encouraging religious unity among individuals being trained to lead the country in the future.

Along these political lines, Golwalkar discusses the type of organization that should be pursued for positive effects. He says that organization is only useful if it unites moral and upright people (most likely referring to Hindus here or those who abide by a Hindu code of morality); this is the only type of organization that can gain strength to accomplish great objectives (Golwalkar 1966: 39-40). He contrasts this model idea of organization with political groups that are composed of people who serve for selfish reasons, comparing it to a flock of birds eagerly organized around meat: "In order to satisfy their selfish interests they are even prepared to destroy the sanctity and unity of our national life. Such persons come together very easily. That is the lowest stratum of organised life" (Golwalkar 1966: 40). It is apparent that Golwalkar is referring to the Congress Party when he speaks of the party being polluted by political ambition – "The present leaders of Congress were at one time men of great sacrifice and patriotism…But what is their fate today? Corruption, nepotism, and lust for power have become rampant in their ranks" (Golwalkar 1966: 69).

Golwalkar then justifies the efficacy of the RSS vision to construct the ideal citizen for national leadership in the future. He compares the effect of ideal men on political power as a "radiance of culture, integrity and power of the organised society that we want to build up – just as the moon reflects the radiance of the sun," and he relates this radiance to a story in the Upanishads (text of Hindu stories) that illustrates the almighty God radiating himself through different channels – wind, fire, and Indra. (Golwalkar 1966: 74-75). Unknowingly validating the BJP leaders who are members of the RSS themselves, he says that when morality characterizes the top leadership, it will only ‘trickle down’ to the rest of society, producing good character for all, an objective that the RSS claims to achieve (Golwalkar 1966: 289).

A glance at more recent RSS publications displays no less a concern for morality and good character with a distinctly Hindu flavor, well-advertised through the organization’s colorful website. The site’s "The Story of the Sangh by a Swayemsevak" explains the significance of the RSS initials in these terms: "Bharat is our nation. Self-inspired people who have volunteered to serve Her cause selflessly are called ‘Swayemsevaks.’ The coming together in an organized manner of such inspired men is the ‘Sangh’" (RSS 2001). Added to the group’s list of moral credentials is the existence of Hindu values and pride – "honour[ing] and protect[ing] temples, cows, women and such other sacred things in their area and imbib[ing] a spirit of equality with the rest of Hindus," as well as a lack of vices such as "liquor, gambling,…[and] quarrels" (RSS 2001).

The Hindu moral qualities of RSS members are substantiated and justified through advertising the numerous service projects that the group as a whole has undertaken. The orientation towards social service emphasizes the a-political but virtuous aura that the RSS hopes to radiate. From running large hospitals to donating large sums of money, the organization’s numerous service activities are adequately discussed in the site (RSS 2001). Listing the multiple rural development programs in states from Madhya Pradesh to Karnataka, disapproving of caste inequality by discussing the way they have trained non-brahmins to perform Hindu services, and portraying themselves as saviors in times of natural disasters, all subsequently lead into the discussion of a type of service that is particularly Hindu – a campaign for the protection of cows (RSS 2001). While fighting for Hindu issues, however, the RSS maintains that its interests are fundamentally a-political and for the nation’s society as a whole. In doing so, the group is able to subtly transform the concept of cultural unity into religious nationalism.

Regardless of the fact that the RSS fights for Hindu nationalism, it still maintains that it has no involvement in politics – "Therein, in fact, lies the uniqueness of our national life. It has never centered around politics or political power" (RSS 2001). Political power is seen as a vice and described in terms of present situations in which political leaders, blinded by the appeal of national power, deform India’s diversity of castes, languages, and communities, into an avenue for electoral success. The RSS publicly states, therefore, that it would rather stay away from politics as a whole (RSS 2001). However, it is difficult to accept fully that the RSS campaigns for good character and national unity (and religious unity, indirectly) are not for purposeful and targeted political results, especially since its earlier writings spend a significant amount of time pointing to the Congress party’s defects. The RSS accordingly addresses this doubt by overtly stating that it has no involvement in the decisions that the BJP makes, and that the political world is only one realm out of many that is affected by the values that the RSS inculcates into society as a whole (RSS 2001).

Integral Humanism – the BJP Philosophy

Golwalkar’s theory and the RSS website provide a foundational glimpse of the organization’s principles and image, but more importantly they provide a basis to which the BJP image of ‘good government’ can be connected. Since the nature of the BJP-RSS alliance is unclear and openly denied, the correlation between the two organizations’ consciously constructed and publicized virtuous images as well as the organizations’ overlapping members broaches a contradiction. The possible convergence of the RSS’ and BJP’s goals may exist on the idea of Hindu religious nationalism, but the BJP carefully extends its image of ‘good government’ far enough away from the distinctively Hindu, RSS notion of morality so that the party can enjoy a broad appeal. This broad appeal accommodates the diverse Indian population and in that way, produces favorable electoral results. It is through the complex development of ‘Integral Humanism,’ the BJP philosophy, that the party creates this RSS extended image of ‘good government’ and subsequently justifies the morality and purity behind its actions. The BJP’s image of ‘good government’ gathers its momentum and meaning by the philosophy’s focus on integration, a universal definition of the Hindu term ‘dharma,’ and disapproval of the Congress party’s corrupt past. The vague and open-ended nature of the image that has been created allows the BJP to justify a degree of political centralization and freedom in its political maneuvers.

The philosophy of ‘Integral Humanism,’ as explained in four chapters on the BJP website, begins by constructing the concept of a Bharatiya culture that is characterized by the unity among a diverse population and the joy that such unification has produced. It claims that the Bharatiya culture "looks upon life as an integrated whole…there is diversity and plurality in life but we have always attempted to discover the unity behind them" (Upadhyaya 2001: Ch. 2). This type of ‘integral’ thinking is used to justify the BJP’s stance on a diverse cultural unity, referring to different castes and at times, even various religions. The writer recounts the notion of purusha, explained as the Brahmin embodying the head, the Kshatriya as the hands, the Vaishya as the abdomen, and the Shudra as the legs. Though each has a different function, all are necessary for a functioning whole (Upadhyaya 2001: Ch. 3). This stance allows the BJP to use a Hindu class system to explain the need for unity while accepting diversity. It strengthens the party’s Hindu vote bank (which recognizes the religious connotation of the caste system) but also lets minority groups have a place in their underlying message of the need for integration.

Most importantly, the BJP uses its concept of Dharma to construct an image of morality, responsibility, and honesty – all of which the Hindu word ‘Dharma’ connotes. The BJP concept of Dharma is developed in a way that portrays those that lack it as being corrupt or greedy – "Dharma helps in restraining the natural tendencies of man, whereby he is able to determine what is beneficial to him apart from what is pleasurable. Hence Dharma is given the foremost place in our culture" (Upadhyaya 2001: Ch. 2). The BJP claims that all true laws fall under the greater, general, and infinite law of Dharma; these particular laws can vary according to situation, yet they can never violate the overriding Dharma behind them. Thus, laws cannot be decided arbitrarily, but only with relation to Dharma (Upadhyaya 2001: Ch. 3). By establishing its view of laws and the construction of government as abiding by the higher and absolute law of Dharma (which restrains man and unites all), the BJP tries to verify itself as a moral government that will practice the time-tested values that it assumes all Indians believe and wish to restore.

The fourth chapter of the philosophy openly addresses the existence of corruption and malpractice in the executive branch of government, which prefaces the BJP’s disapproval of the Congress party’s questionable integrity. It carefully constructs an argument, one which ultimately yet subtly concludes that it is morally sound to remove the present executive (at the time that this text was written, the executive was the Congress party). Referring back to the Hindu epic Mahabharata (without mentioning the word ‘Hindu’ itself), it corrects the prevailing interpretation of one of Bhishma’s statements. When Bhisma says, "the king shapes the circumstances," he does not mean that the king has the highest word; rather, Bhishma believes that Dharma has the highest word and the king acts as the "protector of Dharma" by executing laws pertaining to Dharma (Upadhyaya 2001: Ch. 4). Relating the statement to the executive body at the time that this philosophy was written, the author claims, "In the present State, the executive has the responsibility to execute the laws properly, but does not enact laws. When the executive does not function with honesty and efficiency, the laws are entirely disregarded, as we see very well around us" (Upadhyaya 2001: Ch. 4). Citing examples of ‘evils’ in the country, with special reference to the failure of prohibition, the BJP claims that the present leadership has failed to carry out the successful enforcement of law for which it is fundamentally responsible (Upadhyaya 2001: Ch. 4). Combining Bhishma’s statement as well as the present situation, the author claims, "Thus if a King does not act according to Dharma, it becomes the duty of everyone to remove him" (Upadhyaya 2001: Ch. 4). The statement justifies the righteousness behind removing the Congress leadership because it does not abide by Dharma, or to be precise, because it does not publicize that it abides by the BJP definition of Dharma.

The BJP’s philosophy of ‘Integral Humanism’ exceeds the RSS notion of ‘virtuous politics’ by extending its appeal beyond Hindus (which allows it to secure a larger vote bank). While the RSS explicitly states in its writings that it accepts the diverse religions in India, it also claims that Hindu values should be adopted for cultural unity – a cultural unity which seems to resemble religious nationalism. However, the BJP, in its discussion of Dharma, convolutes the RSS notion to secure a larger electoral base. ‘Integral Humanism’ uses the concept of Dharma in a way that separates it from religion, which aids the party in constructing a universally ‘good’ image that can appeal to non-Hindus. Dharma is explained and defined generally as the "laws of life. All those principles which bring about harmony, peace and progress in the life of mankind" (Upadhyaya 2001: Ch. 2). This type of definition allows the BJP to break away from the traditional connotation of the word "Dharma" that would indicate a Hindu sense of duty based on caste. It allows the party to expand the definition of ‘dharma’ to include basic values to which all people, regardless of religion, simply cannot be opposed (namely "harmony, peace and progress"). The convenient usage of a Hindu term without losing a broad appeal is apparent elsewhere in the text as well. For example, the philosophy states that a Dharma Rajya is not defined as a theocratic state. "Rather there is freedom to worship according to one’s religion…Dharma Rajya accepts the importance of religion in peace, happiness and progress of an individual" (Upadhyaya 2001: Ch. 3). By stating the importance of the freedom of religion, the BJP is able to extend its appeal beyond Hindus. However, the use of the Hindu term Dharma, though it is redefined here, keeps its philosophy distinctly Hindu. Thus, Hindus are able to recognize the term Dharma and embrace the BJP due to the term’s importance in their own religion. At the same time, non-Hindus are able to adopt the new definition of Dharma that the BJP has created and accept the BJP as a moral party, regardless of its use of a Hindu term. In fact, the philosophy constantly refers to Hindu stories, Hindu concepts, and Hindu castes throughout the text, yet it rarely mentions the words ‘Hindu’ or ‘Hinduism’, which allows it to downplay these concepts’ Hinduness and rather make them relate to India as a whole. If not that effect, then this strategy allows India’s Hinduness to be a ‘given;’ all of India is equated with being Hindu just by the assumption and not open acknowledgement of the Hinduism in these concepts. The BJP effectively prevents there to be a religious divide in its writings and allows for a larger number of people to accept its ‘good government’ platform. This strategy can be compared to Gandhi’s use of the term ahimsa (non-violence) as a unifying stance against the British; a universally accepted value like non-violence was key to preventing further internal conflicts and rather joining individuals across the firmest of boundaries for one cause (Sarkar 1996: 274).

The BJP use of Dharma and its moral connotation also allows the party to justify a degree of political centralization. While the party states that it cannot enact laws that do not abide by Dharma and that the government cannot create Dharma, its vague definition of the term fails to shed light on how Dharma can practically be determined. This ambiguity at times leads one to believe that the BJP’s definition of Dharma can give the party the power to improvise, which leaves much room for the BJP act. The party, once in power, can justify any of its actions by saying that it abides by Dharma, which feeds into its inherent justification for its actions through the construction of a moral image. The party also speaks of the "soul of the society," which represents the center of government; it claims that all the institutions must be united to prevent deterioration, so that the branches of society will stay alive (Upadhyaya 2001: Ch. 3). These statements use the concept of integration, which is a part of the BJP’s notion of Dharma, to hint of the need for political centralization through unification of different institutions, claiming that this type of unification is only for the good of society. By establishing itself as a moral party that adheres to Dharma and by using a moral twist on all of its reasoning, the BJP is able to secure a superficially moral justification for any of its actions and an acceptance from the Indian public.

 

BJP Election Manifestos – an Appeal to Morality

Application of the BJP’s ‘good government’ image is evident in its election manifesto and is indisputably apparent with an eye to the Congress party’s election manifesto. The Congress party’s simple stance against the BJP involves an insignificant portion of the text spent emphasizing its long-standing experience in politics, assurance of secular policies, and promise of democratic procedures. The BJP, in contrast, has crafted its ‘good government’ image in such a manner that allows the totality of its platform to be viewed through a universally accepted lens of morality. Thus, discussion of benefits for neglected individuals (in a typically populist manner), corruption in the Congress party, and religious causes incorporates moral ‘buzz’ words. The presentation of these different issues (which each have their own individual appeal) in this manner consequently allows the BJP’s platform to have a certain credibility – a credibility that is only strengthened by its persistent reiteration of the broadly appealing ‘good government’ image, again in a form that exceeds the RSS notion.

The Congress party’s platform against the BJP mainly lies in emphasizing its own experience and durability in politics as well as stressing the emptiness of the BJP promise and appeal:

 The Congress Party specifically addresses its opponents, and implies that the BJP only serves as a default to the Congress. Its success can only be attributed to "blind anti-Congressism" (Congress Manifesto 1998: 3). The manifesto even explicitly states that the BJP has a fraudulent image and tries to appeal to its constituents in that way: "That the public face of the BJP is not its real face is becoming evident everyday" (Congress Manifesto 1998: 15). Mentioned in the manifesto along with the accusation is the BJP’s use of media and its alliance with the RSS (Congress Manifesto 1998: 14-15), which serves to uncover the catch-all façade on which the BJP’s image depends.

What the Congress wishes to highlight about its own party is its achievements, its commitment to secularism, and its pledge to democratic principles and parliamentary procedure. The manifesto goes back in time to emphasize positive achievements that have advanced the cause of the scheduled castes – amendments to the constitution benefiting that group, the establishment of the Dr. Ambedkar Foundation, and the construction of irrigation for farmers that belonged to scheduled castes (Congress Manifesto 1998: 25). It defines its commitment to secularism as "equal respect for all religions" and "the rejection of the use of religion for political ends," refuting claims that it is anti-religious (Congress Manifesto 1998: 17). Instead of focusing on ‘good-government’ in the way that the BJP does, the Congress rather focuses on its ‘good’ political system, claiming that it is "the Congress’s commitment to parliamentary democracy and sensitive federalism that has kept the nation together" (Congress Manifesto 1998: 23). All three of these strategies that the Congress uses seem deliberate in combating the claims that the BJP has made about the Congress. The Congress seems intent on fighting the appeal of a fresh party in power and rebutting the accusation that it has practiced bad politics.

The BJP manifesto uses ‘buzz’ words, phrases, and people to establish and maintain its credible image while it simultaneously discusses its policies concerning the corruption and the disregarded scheduled castes. The Sanskrit opening of the BJP manifesto sets a tone of purity right from the beginning, wishing for the peace and well-being of all. This tone of morality and well-wishing continues forth to the description of the BJP leader – Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The manifesto characterizes Vajpayee with an eye to the Congress party, validating his integrity and meriting his leadership to his service rather than to his family legacy:

In Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the people see a leader who combines ability with integrity, charisma with character and experience with universal acceptability. He is not a person who claims leadership by birth in, or relationship with, any dynasty. He is a leader by virtue of his long and dedicated service of the nation. (BJP Manifesto 1998: 3)

Furthering the BJP’s dedication to morality and long-standing principles, the manifesto directly addresses the corruption in the executive branch of the government, which it believes has crumbled the faith of the Indian people. Thus, the BJP claims, "The primary task is to restore to the State-and thus to Government-its honour and prestige. The BJP will thus restore to Government its moral authority to rule" (BJP Manifesto 1998: 5). It says that it will achieve this goal by not only making amendments to the election process, but it will also make open to public knowledge the income and assets of all elected officials (BJP Manifesto 1998: 8). The manifesto devotes a section to "Our Agriculture, Our Farmers, Our Villages," and appeals to the frustrations of the scheduled castes by blaming their plight on the "corruption and wrong policies by successive and quasi-Congress Governments" (BJP Manifesto 1998: 24). It displays its concern for these particular people by quoting from Mahatma Gandhi: "Villager is the salt of Indian earth," and by claiming to amend the lack of attention and respect they receive in the government center (BJP Manifesto 1998: 24). The BJP justifies its concern for corruption by noting that its State Governments have provided individuals with a "clean" administration; any "Complaints of corruption have been vigorously followed up with impartial inquiries. Prompt action was taken wherever it was called for without fear or favor" (BJP Manifesto 1998: 50). This type of efficient, credible, and moral administration is exactly what the public is seeking. The party’s ‘good government’ image allows the constituency to overlook the fact that the BJP fails to substantiate its statement with any evidence of this favorable practice, and instead allows the constituency to accept whatever the party claims because of its credible background.

As in its philosophy of "Integral Humanism," the election manifesto adopts once again the RSS qualities of ‘virtuous politics’ in some instances and goes beyond the RSS notion in others, particularly to achieve a larger electoral base. Its statements exceed the RSS’ interests in its discussion of India’s national identity. It mentions Hindutva and discusses its ability to "strengthen and discipline" the nation, and justifies the party’s involvement in the Shri Ram Mandir construction in Ayodhya for these reasons. While this temple is distinctly Hindu, being located in the birthplace of the Hindu Lord Ram, the BJP fails to mention the term Hindu or the relevance of religion amongst the use of language that connotes morality, once again. Instead it claims that the construction of the temple was a mass movement that strengthened India’s cultural nationalism (BJP Manifesto 1998: 4). Denying the religious significance of this movement and emphasizing universal values of ‘strength’ and ‘discipline’ helps the BJP keep its party open to non-Hindus. At the same time, highlighting the cultural significance of the movement and indirectly equating India with Hinduism allows this tactic to appeal to Hindus. Once again, the BJP is able to secure a broad electoral appeal through using vague terminology and endowing a sense of inherent and undeniable ‘Hinduness’ to all of India. Ironically, however, the BJP’s manifesto displays the party’s frustration with the Congress Party’s use of a type of secularism, which the BJP claims is actually for the sake of communalism "vote-bank politics" (BJP Manifesto 1998: 36). Mentioning this frustration and disgust with the other party’s strategies only allows the BJP to indirectly deny its own vote-bank tactics to secure and maintain the trust of the nation.

 

Conclusion

The BJP election manifestos and philosophy indicate strongly the party’s choice to use ‘good government’ as a platform for election and as a reputation to build in the public eye. For the image allows the BJP to give any of its practices, stances, and strategies a moral backdrop and grants the party a certain convenience in justifying its actions. The ‘good government’ framework erases the party’s individual strategies of coalition-building, Hindu nationalism, and populism so that they can be fused into one greater strategy – the strategy of creating a reputation for itself as a moral party so that its doings are always morally justifiable.

Interestingly enough, the BJP’s aura of providing a sort of moral order answers the dilemma proposed not only by the Congress party’s corrupt past but also by the Hindu concept of the Kali Yuga – "the last and most degenerate of eras that is always imagined as the present" (Sarkar 1996: 277). The disorder perceived in this case is that of eroding boundaries and duties among castes and between genders. The BJP has observed the Indian public’s frustration with the change occurring within social hierarchies, the swelling political disorder that surrounds them, and the corruption that has plagued the history of Indian government. The party opportunistically has adopted a ‘good government’ image that conveniently creates a sense of order as well as a dichotomy between the moral BJP and its corrupt Congress party rival. While this tactic might have been successful in the elections of 1998 and 1999, the party’s reliance on such a strategy also indicates that an acute or an obtuse scandal would crumble its honorable image and all of the sub-strategies and practices that are positioned under the image. A threat to the party’s image could mean a threat to the party’s existence as a whole. This thought broaches the possible consequences of the recent defense expose with which prominent BJP leaders have been charged.

March 13, 2001, marked the date of the first scandal involving the BJP that has been exposed to the country. The BJP President, Bangaru Laxman, resigned after being caught accepting money from a fraudulent ‘defense manufacturer’ (Khare 2001a). At least 34 people are guilty of the same; all proven by an investigation secretly carried out by Tehelka.com (Khare 2001a). Not only does this scandal present the perfect opportunity for the Congress party to aid in the dismantling of the moral reputation the BJP has built for itself, but also "[t]he Tehelka has managed to deprive the BJP and the Sangh Parivar of their pretensions of being above corruption" (Khare 2001a). However, it seems that neither "are in a mood to give in to the Opposition argument of ‘moral’ culpability" (Khare 2001b). Admitting such a thing would only force the break down of a carefully constructed formula of campaigns, texts, and philosophies that would lead to a destruction of a public face that has given rise to a portion of its public support. The consequence of this event, whether the BJP admits to its moral culpability or not, will involve a severely skeptical response from the party’s constituency and perhaps a re-thinking of what exists at the party’s core. The question, however, is what the BJP will do to amend the situation and restore its reputation as an established, stable, and moral party in control of the government and as providing the sense of order that its constituency desires.

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