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EPW
Special Articles |
November 29, 2003 |
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Investing in Nature around
Sylhet |
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An Excursion into Geographical
History |
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Geographical
histories around the region of Sylhet, in north-east
Bangladesh, indicate that transactions between mobility and
territoriality, which typify globalisation, have long operated
in diverse spatial and temporal registers – ecological,
religious, demographic, economic, and political – to
transform the social and cultural spaces where people invest
in nature. Scholars, policy-makers and activists would
thus do well to abandon the idea that national maps alone
constitute the geography of modernity.
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| David Ludden
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Nature may exist
outside society, but natural resources are social phenomena,
composed of social investments that give nature social
life.1 Modernity has so invested nature with
national identity that national maps now often appear to contain
nature the way a Petrie Dish contains amoeba.2 But
national maps do not describe nature’s social geography; they rather
represent modern territorialism impressing itself on nature; and
territorialism is not the only social force invested in nature:
mobility is equally important. Focusing more attention on mobility’s
investment in nature is critical as globalisation increases the
power of mobility over natural elements, which begin their social
life in national territory but may not stay there for long. Using
only national maps to imagine geographies of natural resource
environments blinds analysis in one eye.
To imagine better maps, we need to put geography in motion, to
keep temporal as well as spatial dimensions in view. When we do, we
see that natural resources live in social geographies defined
simultaneously by mobility and territorialism. Natural things become
natural resources in any one place only because social assets that
make nature productive move in time and space. Globalisation expands
the geographical scale of an old fact of life for natural resources,
which begin their social life in places where people make
territorial claims to nature, but live mostly in the realm of
mobility, where all the social resources that combine to make nature
productive move from hand to hand, place to place, and from one
social identity to another.
Intersections of territorialism and mobility have shaped natural
resource environments in south Asia since prehistoric times, and
their conflicting cultural attachments animate old village
communities and agrarian regions as well as modern cities and
national states.3 The basic source of their conflict is
this: people who live inside each enclosed territory enjoy
proprietary authority over resources in that territory, which they
invest to accumulate resources inside their own territory, while
mobile folk move resources from one territory to another, to combine
with local assets and to carry the proceeds away, back into the
realm of mobility.
Over the centuries, transactions between mobile and territorial
interests have expanded product chains and social wealth, but have
also typically pitted mobile and territorial claims to resources
against one another, as in classically fraught relations between
nomads and farmers, between shifting and sedentary cultivators, and
between merchants and artisans. A more complex but critical example
of creative tension appears in histories of nationalism and
globalisation: that is, in fraught interactions between mobile folk
who bring separate territories under expansive, encompassing
territorial authority, and local territorial folk who covet assets
that move across wide spaces but also fight to maintain their own
territorial order so they can put assets from the wider world to
work on their own ground.
Combining productive powers and reconciling conflicting interests
of territorialism and mobility became the specialty of elites who
produced most historical records, who typically live in central
territorial sites, spread their influence across networks of
mobility, enrich themselves at intersections of territorialism and
mobility, and endeavour to accommodate conflicting claims to
resources with various combinations of coercion, adjudication,
patronage, and persuasion. The geographical reach and provenance of
resource elites has changed countless times, over centuries, and
thus, their territorial domains have acquired many shifting, mobile
geographies. In this light, we can say that in the long span of
history, mobility has had the upper hand, overall, in transactions
with territorialism.
From Mauryan times onward, mobile folk have repeatedly reshaped
natural resource environments in southern Asia. In the second
millennium of the Common Era, the spatial scale of mobility
increased, as Turks, Afghans, Mongols, and Persians reshaped
territories across Asia, as Europeans reshaped territories across
the Americas, Africa, and Asia, and as mobile folk in south Asia
reshaped territories across the subcontinent. By the 18th century,
mobility made the fixing of boundaries in India quite imaginary, for
as much as half the population may have then comprised mobile
artisans and workers, peasants colonising new land, itinerant
merchants, nomads, pilgrims, shifting cultivators, hunters,
migratory service workers and literati, herders, transporters,
soldiers, people fleeing war, drought, and flood, and camp followers
supplying troops on the move. All this mobility entailed widespread
conflict and a huge expansion of commercial activity, commodity
production, and global interconnections.
In the 19th century, territorialism began its long march to
modern dominance, and in south Asia, it marched with and against the
British Empire.4 National state boundaries only
covered the globe after 1950, however, and only then did all the
histories of all peoples in the world, for all times, begin to
appear inside our cookie-cutter world of national geography.
The force of mobility did not decline in the world of national
maps, however. Declining transport costs, bigger populations, and
increasing spatial inequality rather expanded its scale of
operation. National boundaries now represent legal and cultural
norms, but they do not contain mobility; they rather constitute
modern instruments of power over mobility. Today, the new complexity
of old tensions between mobility and territorialism appears most
poignantly inside national territories, where people strive
simultaneously to enforce the closure of their own territories, to
control nature inside their own boundaries, to exclude and subdue
aliens, to move in and out of territories, to bring in and take out
resources, to move and settle in resource-rich places, to change and
mix territorial identities, and to expand claims to resources in
mobile territories like those defined by metropolitan regions,
multinational corporations, and the US military.
To imagine more realistic geographies of natural resource
environments than national maps provide, we can begin by abandoning
the idea that territorialism could ever contain mobility.
Territorial wealth and national development depend on mobility that
territorialism cannot control, and mobility is always at work
transforming territory in ways that territorialism does not
comprehend. Thus it makes sense to locate studies of natural
resource environments at geographical intersections of mobility and
territorialism.
Locating Sylhet
Within a hundred mile radius of the city of Sylhet,
in north-east Bangladesh, many territorial transformations have
occurred over the centuries, in expansive geographies of mobility
where people and resources have travelled widely and also combined
locally in the social process of investing in nature. Sylhet city
inhabits a mound of land in the floodplain of the Surma
River.5 The city’s immediate surroundings are as
densely populated as any part of Bangladesh, but overall, the Sylhet
region is much less densely populated than Bangladesh, at about 70
per cent the national figure,6 because it includes thinly
populated mountains and lowlands that flood deeply and extensively
for half of every year.
Sylhet inhabits nature-on-the-move. Tectonic shifts
continue to lift the highlands and depress the deepest-flooding
‘haor’ basins.7 Natural gas moves underground in tectonic
folds.8 Thumping earthquakes periodically destabilise
water’s established pathways.9 The Surma and the
Kushiara define the Sylhet lowlands but are but the biggest of many
moveable rivers descending from the mountains of Meghalaya, Tripura,
Manipur, and Assam.10 Forty miles upstream from Sylhet
town, the Surma and Kushiara split from the Barak. A hundred miles
downstream, the Surma and Kushiara meander, split, and recombine
before joining the Meghna, which then joins the Brahmaputra, whose
main course shifted in the 1780s to send its confluence with the
Meghna a hundred miles south.11
All the lands around Sylhet were originally covered with dense
jungle, broken only by rivers. Amidst massive annual flooding and
the highest rainfall in south Asia, lowland societies have navigated
this overflowing geography at strategic elevated sites, where
inundated fields meet habitable land hacked out forests, above the
flood.12 Nature’s topography is thus a natural resource
of enduring significance. Sylhet’s town site typifies the lowlands
by being partly natural and partly constructed. Eighteenth century
District Records indicate that embankments that protected Sylhet
town and farms around it were built, rebuilt, strengthened, and
lengthened repeatedly to prevent the land washing away.13
Sanctity marks many old sites of social investments on the land
around Sylhet.14 Upriver in Cachar, a cult site for
Kapilasram (or Siddheswar) retains the memory of an ancient river
goddess who was eventually overshadowed by Siva. Such overlays
occurred as migratory settlers transformed local territory, in the
case of Kapilasram, as Bengali brahmans established Siva’s local
authority.15 In the Dimasa language of people in Cachar,
‘Dimasa’ means ‘sons of the river’,16 and Khasi people in
nearby hills worship many river gods, among whom, goddess Kupli
reigns supreme.17 Kapileswar perhaps came to life at an
old Kupli cult site, where a social stratification of cult practices
emerged as high caste settlers worshiped Siva, while other locals
venerated the site but not Siva.18
Kapilasram seems to encode the incorporation of an old Khasi
locality by immigrant Siva-worshiping Bengalis. This cultural change
would have been part of a very long, complex set of transformations.
Like many other groups now called ‘tribes’, Khasis once occupied
many sites in the lowlands, 19 in their case, up the
Ganga basin into Bihar and down to the old Ganga delta. Khasis
settled there as specialists in shifting rice cultivation. Ancient
Khasis pioneered rice farming in Vietnam’s Red River delta, and when
conquered by Vietnamese, moved up the Red River, to Yunnan, China,
and across northern Burma, into Assam and the Ganga basin. As
Gangetic agrarian societies expanded their territorial domains
eastward, from Mauryan times, people like the Khasis enriched Hindu
cultures, but Gangetic territorialism also rested on the expansion
of permanent farmland that forced all the Munda language speakers,
including Khasis, to submit, assimilate, or move.20
Over the centuries, lowland territorialism compelled and informed
tribal territorialism in the uplands. In 1600, Koch, Khasi, Garo,
and others still occupied many places in the lowlands, but facing
unprecedented pressure to submit to the Mughals, most retreated to
the mountains.21 After 1600 and again after 1800, the
accelerated expansion of sedentary agriculture drove shifting
cultivators out of the plains;22 it also increased
violence between contending interests on the land, confined tribal
societies to the hills, and produced new political forms in the
mountains. All these connected trends continue today.23
Siva’s overshadowing of the river goddess in Cachar represents
one local moment in the advance of lowland territorialism, which
produced Bengali societies on moving eastern frontiers of Gangetic
cultures, by pushing permanent farms into places inhabited by
shifting cultivators, who lived in the highlands and lowlands, who
moved freely among forest and field, mountains and plains, and who
hunted and fished without settling down permanently
anywhere.24 Though mobile lifestyles remained well
adapted to the environment’s watery uncertainty, animist cults and
non-Aryan practices, including matrilineal kinship, marked shifting
cultivators as primitive aliens for the Hindu, Muslim, and European
lowlanders who invested in nature inside expansive territories of
sedentary agriculture, urbanism, state revenue, and permanent
territorial authority.
Sylhet town (Srihatta) became a major centre of lowland
territorialism after the 10th century CE. Before then, copper plate
inscriptions indicate that land around the Kushiara was more densely
populated, because Kamarupa kings had granted large tracts of land
to immigrant brahmans and their supporting castes, to make this
region part of Assam (Khanda Kamarupa).25 In the 13th
century, Afghans conquered Sena rajas, inducing more Hindus to move
east into Sylhet, 26 and Sylhet town’s site on the Surma
became a fortified centre for local rajas. In the 14th century, the
town received the sanctity of Shah Jalal, who arrived from Turkestan
with 300 ‘darvish’, conquered local rajas, and introduced Islam. Ibn
Batuta met Shah Jalal, in 1346, and described his commanding
stature, ascetic celibacy, yogic discipline, and miraculous deeds.
The first Arabic inscription to mention Shah Jalal, dated 1506,
comes from a ‘blessed building’ that perhaps housed Sufis visiting
his tomb, which soon became a pilgrimage site. 27 Shah
Jalal’s spirit still pervades Sylhet, where some say it makes the
land the richest in Bangladesh.28
Ibn Batuta boated down the Meghna, in 1345, and saw “water
wheels, gardens and villages such as those along the banks of the
Nile in Egypt”. He wrote that, “For 15 days we sailed down the river
passing through villages and orchards as though we were going
through a mart”.29 He did not describe market towns, as
he did routinely elsewhere.30 Thus, 14th century Sylhet
seems to have no big market towns, but its saint from Turkestan and
visitor from Morocco show it did have wide connections, and mobility
changed the land in centuries to come.
Mughals brought unprecedented force.31 Sylhet became a
Mughal frontier town on river highways to the lands of unconquered
opponents, Khasis, Dimasas, Ahoms, and others. When Mughals
conquered Orissa and Bengal, Afghans fled up the Meghna and became
powerful around Sylhet. A Mughal fleet sailed to Sylhet, and in
1612, Mughals conquered Afghans, but highland peoples, including
Khasis, Garos, Ahoms, and Dimasas, did not succumb.32
Conquest invested nature with cultural politics. Afghans escaped
Mughals into forested hills and haor depressions, where high caste
Hindus had escaped Afghans, three centuries earlier.33
Myriad escape routes made most land around Sylhet impossible to
conquer, until 1830, when the British finally succeeded. Until then,
highbrow lowlanders considered Sylhet a wild frontier, and rulers
supported settlers who would use the weight of demography to
civilise the land. A seventh century inscription described Sylhet as
‘outside the pale of human habitation, where there is no distinction
between natural and artificial; infested by wild animals and
poisonous reptiles, and covered with forest
out-growths’.34 Kamarupa kings gave tracts of forest to
brahmans to civilise. A millennium later, Mughals gave forests to
Muslims and Hindus. In the 18th century, Nawabi Faujdars and forest
grants brought Sylhet firmly into the ambit of Bengali Muslim
culture.35 Meanwhile, Rajas in Cachar and Jaintia
embraced Hinduism and patronised Brahmans who expanded mixed
Hindu-tribal polities and mixed tribe-and-caste societies around
the Barak valley. In Cachar, Hindu rituals elevated Bodo rulers
over Dimasa subjects and enabled high caste Bengalis to mix among
tribal masters, neighbours, and servants, in the manner of oil on
water.36
Natural Economy
Over the centuries, local territories of natural resource
utilisation diversified along a topographical continuum running from
the highest highlands, where shifting ‘jhum’ cultivation prevailed,
to the lowest lowlands, where farmers grew ‘boro’ rice, planted in
December-January, when fields dry out enough to plant, and harvested
before the floods arrived in May-July. In 1800, forest still covered
much of the land, roughly in proportion to altitude. Permanent
agriculture expanded and contracted, in fits and starts; and
expansion only gained a firm upper hand in the 19th
century.37 Farmers facing recurring flood calamities
routinely abandoned old farm sites, allowing forest to return as
they colonised new land. The 1780s brought the worst floods in
memory, which destroyed farm investments in the years when the Tista
River shifted its course, joined the Brahmaputra, and changed its
course as well.38 The 1790s brought floods and
earthquakes that demolished the lowest farmland behind the 18th
century market town of Ajmiriganj, spawning endemic malaria, which
stymied new colonisation until 1900.39
Nature’s topography defined economic geography. In the late 18th
century, farming communities in the lowland floodplains grew almost
nothing but ‘boro’ rice, which they consumed with locally abundant
fish. There were no large market centres, let alone major cities, by
the standards of lower Bengal, no weavers exporting cloth, and no
locally resident rich merchants, let alone portfolio-capitalists.40
‘Hundis’ were so hard to find that early Company Collectors had to
ship revenues on armed boats to Dhaka.41 No European Company ever
made a major commercial investment in the Surma basin. Yet markets
thrived, as supply and demand met in countless small transactions
with little input from urban commercial networks.42 Rulers received
taxation only in cash. Specialists in fishing, horticulture,
hunting, mining, trade, transportation, crafts, finance, and
administration all bought rice in local lowland markets that thrived
amidst the flood-induced uncertainty of local rice output. In 1790,
Sylhet District had over 600 named market places (hat, ganj,
and bazaar).43 Long-distance commodity chains
passed through them, up and down the Meghna, to and from Dhaka,
Narayanganj, and Bakarganj (near Barisal), and up and down the Barak
valley, to and from Manipur, Assam, and Burma.44 As the
number of market centres increased in Bengal generally,45
Sylhet town became a more active regional market, to which the
Manipur and Tripura rajahs built a new jungle road from Manipur, in
the 1790s.46
Many commodities in the lowlands carried Khasi social identities.
Khasi merchants brought goods from Assam through mountain river
ports at Pandua and Jaintia.47 Khasis sold mountain
‘jhum’ rice in Jaintia. In high valleys and on low
slopes, Khasis grew areca nut, betel, turmeric, and fruits to
sell in the plains, along with wax, ivory, and cloth. Mountain
Khasis also specialised in iron mining and smelting, and they would
denude whole forest tracts to stoke their blow-bag iron furnaces,
with cowhide bellows, before moving on to exploit new fuel wood
sites. Khasi iron,48 steel, and metal tools travelled
lowland rivers routes, along with their gold, silver, other metals,
and ornaments.49 Khasi mountain quarries behind Sunamganj
provided the finest quality limestone.
Elephants and ivory also travelled down the
mountains,50 as salt and rice moved up.51 Aloe
wood and China-root appear as Sylhet products in the
Ain-i-Akbari.52 Timber, sandalwood, cane, ivory,
rubber, cotton, and silk came from Cachar and Manipur.53
Cotton came from Tripura.54 Sylhet’s first resident
Collector, Robert Lindsay, dramatised the commercial value of the
mountains by buying limestone and burnt lime to sell in Dhaka,
Calcutta, and elsewhere. He even once had built four sea-going ships
on mountain tops, using local forest timber; and then had the ships
filled with mountain products and to sail on the flood to Bakarganj,
where his agents sold forest products and bought rice to sell in
Madras.55
These ships perhaps returned to Calcutta or Chittagong with cowry
shells, Sylhet’s only coin.56 Each part of 18th century
Bengal had its own monetary identity, acquired in mobile geographies
of commodity exchange. In 1787, for example, most coins in Rangpur
were French Arcot Rupees, minted in Pondichery, and Narainy Rupees,
minted by rajas in Cooch Behar; while in nearby Mymensingh, English
Arcot Rupees prevailed; because Rangpur did heavy trade with Cooch
Behar and Chandranagore, while Mymensingh sold its rice in Calcutta.
Specific coins also attached to individual commodities, as in
Dinajpur, where merchants used Sonaut Rupees to buy rice and other
grains, while they used French and English Arcots to buy ghee and
oil, and used only French Arcots to buy hemp and gunny. Locally
dominant metal coins came from far away, most of all, from Arcot and
Pondicherry,57 and cowries came from the Maldives.
Sylhet depended entirely on cowries, tiny shells from the
Maldives58 that served as the cheapest coin all around
the Indian Ocean and in south-east Asia, and Africa.59
Bengal was a major cowry market, and there was virtually no metal
coin to be found in Sylhet in the late 18th century, when people
imported almost nothing from downstream, except the cowries that
merchants brought from the Maldives, stored in Dhaka and Calcutta,
and carried to Sylhet in boats that returned with rice and upland
products.60
The only political force at work shaping Sylhet cowry country was
a negative one: that is, the weakness of regional states. English
observers believed that cowries reigned in Sylhet because the people
could only afford the cheapest coin. But because barter trades
flourished alongside cowry exchange, it can be said that cowries
also functioned to bridge the gap between barter and commerce in
local markets. Cowry country had a south-western borderland, around
Habiganj,61 where silver rupees circulated, indicating
that cowry country coincided with the spatial dispersion of markets
connecting hills and plains around Sylhet. The repeated depiction of
Sylhet as a ‘mountain region’, from the 14th century
onward,62 also reinforces the idea that mountains and
lowlands comprised a diverse yet coherent economic space of mobility
where cowries articulated a distinctive market territory around 18th
century Sylhet.63
Expansive Territorialism
In 1765, Sylhet – till then a ‘faujdari’ (military district) of
Bengal Nawabs 64 – became a frontier district of Bengal
Presidency. Despite its large area and population, Sylhet was poor
revenue territory.65 In 1783, the Dinajpur zamindar spent
more on religious events than Sylhet district paid
revenue.66 In 1785, the Rajshahi zamindar’s monthly tax
(‘kist’) exceeded Sylhet’s annual tax assessment (‘jamma’).
67 Yet the Company increased Sylhet taxation as much as
possible. The Nawab’s regime had collected 3,50,000 kahans of
cowries in Sylhet, all spent locally, mostly on the army, which
remained the standard until 1776, when Sylhet’s ‘jamma’ rose to
8,00,101 kahans. By 1783, it had risen to 9,36,000
kahans.68 State tax demands thus tripled in eight years
after 1775, a much higher increase than in Bengal Presidency as a
whole.69
But revenue collections stagnated below 70 per cent of jamma
until 1788, when they began a steep climb, approaching 100 per cent
by 1790.70 This increase came with expansion of Company
authority over farms that became tax-paying private property. In
1784, “upwards of 4,000 independent proprietors of the soil” paid
land taxes;71 in 1795, 26,000;72 and in 1798,
27,000.73 In 1785, remittances to Calcutta began a steady
climb,74 and in the 1790s, with the addition of the
region around Habiganj, Sylhet district began to look like a
money-maker for the Raj, though a small one compared to other Bengal
districts.75
In Sylhet (as in Chittagong76), Company revenue came
from small village landlords, not big zamindars, merchant magnates,
or big ‘jotedar’ tenants who dominate the agrarian history of
Bengal.77 Even the smallest Sylheti landowners rarely
tilled their land, but rather employed tenants and labourers. To
secure assets against calamity, locally dominant families held land
in several places and combined various sources of income, including
commerce, which made them central figures in local markets and
revenue operations. For tenants and labourers, mobility remained an
always-open option. Most tenants were ‘paikasht’ or non-resident
tenants, who received no occupancy rights but did receive
agricultural and subsistence inputs from landowners who needed to
attract them to clear and cultivate land.78 Landless
workers also lived mobile lives. Some would have come from tribal
societies that moved among hills and plains and merged with lowland
societies at the lowest ranks. Seasonal migrant workers often came
from far away to bring in the harvest and return home with boatloads
of rice.79
In 1798, a statistically average Sylhet village would have held a
tiny population of about 70 people and four landed estates
(‘taluks’), each estate representing one extended family, it
dependents and servants.80 Local farming territory
expanded in compact areas scattered across the land, as dominant
families spread their influence and vied for land and labour. Many
such families held the title of Chaudhuri, which Mughals used to
denote sub-zamindari authority and which spread among Sylhet gentry
to become a family name. 81 Mughal governors anointed few
if any major zamindars, one of whom an early Collector called the
‘only true zamindar’ in the Sylhet District, because he had received
a Mughal jaghir for protecting Mughal territory against Khasi
incursions.82
Unconquered Mughal opponents still exercised power in Sylhet in
the early Company decades. Khasis ruled the northern mountains,
Jaintia Khasi rajas held land in the north and east, Cachar rajas
held the Barak Valley, and Tripura rajas ruled southern uplands. The
Mughals had kept them all at bay with arms and land grants, but the
main source of Mughal strength locally seems to have been several
thousand local landed patriarchs who acquired the title of Chaudhuri
as they bowed to the Mughals.
By 1778, when the first English Collector arrived and the
District Records begin, the titular name, Chaudhuri, was a purely
local asset in Sylhet, where local patriarchs expanded their reach
as rulers in the hills also extended their powers in the plains.
Like Mughals and Nawabs, the English lacked power in the mountains
and focused their attention on the lowlands, from which they
eventually extended lowland power farther into uplands than any
predecessor. Here as elsewhere in British India, the
19th century conquest of mountains by lowland territorialism
became a topographical signature of modernity.
The Company’s early steps set the modern trajectory, by
separating Company lowlands from the highlands. Collectors settled
borders with Cachar, Jaintia, Tripura by transacting with
established Rajas,83 who had long experience with lowland
rulers. Khasis in northern mountains posed a more difficult problem,
because they had never submitted to Mughal or Nawabi authority and
their people still scattered across the land north of the
Surma,84 while some distant relatives – frontier settlers
below the mountains, called Bengali Khasis – emerged from alliances
between Khasis and Bengalis and defied the authority of Company and
Khasi rulers alike.85
Agrarian lowlanders and Khasi peoples conceived territorialism
quite differently. For the Company, as for the Mughals, territory
was land; but for Khasis, territory was Khasi people. As the English
sought to fix boundaries of state territory, Khasi territory moved
and scattered with Khasi settlements. Khasi rulers in the hills
presumed authority over Khasi communities living in territory where
the Company claimed exclusive authority over all the land and
inhabitants. These conflicting visions of territory produced serious
conflict in the 1780s.
In 1789, following many skirmishes, mountain Khasis and Bengali
Khasis attacked Company settlements, and the Collector summoned
troops to push Khasis into the hills.86 This
accomplished, in 1790, he declared an absolute boundary at the base
of the hills and prohibited Khasis from owning land in the plains,
to vitiate future claims by Khasi rulers to Company land. Hill
trades hence came under strict regulation. A modern border came into
being, which would eventually separate Indian Meghalaya from
Bangladeshi Sylhet.87
Khasi hills thus acquired an official ethnic identity, as hill
Khasis became official aliens in the plains. By 1797, Bengali
farmers paying Company revenue had colonised land formerly held by
Bengali Khasis,88 whose land the Company expropriated and
who faded from history with the separation of Bengali and Khasi
ethnic territories. This same border also confirmed Khasi authority,
however, in what eventually became Meghalaya, as Cachar, Jaintia,
and Tripura remained open frontiers for lowland settlers, who
swarmed into the frontiers after 1800, while few lowlanders ever
settled in Khasi mountains.
In the 19th century, Sylhet territorialism also moved into its
southern mountain frontiers, behind Maulvi Bazar and Habiganj, where
English-owned tea estates took the land of forest peoples. These
mountains and their inhabitants fanned out into plains east of the
Meghna, and extended across Tripura, Manipur, Chittagong and Burma.
Mountain societies remained mobile, as their land fell to the steady
influx of lowland colonisers. Ethnic conflict over land ensued,
along with complex cultural mixing and tense ambiguities of
political authority.89 Like Khasis in the north, Tripuri
people in the south continued to live, settle, work, and move across
the uplands and lowlands, as they became official aliens in the
plains; but unlike the Meghalaya mountains, Tripura frontiers in
southern Sylhet remained open for lowland territorial expansion,
like Cachar and Jaintia.
The uphill march of lowland territorialism accelerated after
1800, 1880 and 1947.90 More and more Hindus, Muslims, and
Christians made mountains their private property. Hill peoples
became minorities in the hills.91 After 1947, mobility
among peoples variously invested in mountain resources fell into but
also afoul of territorial strictures imposed by national states. As
a result, we have, on the one hand, this placid imagery from the
‘Visit Bangladesh’ website:92
Nestled in the picturesque Surma Valley amidst scenic
tea plantations and lush green tropical forests, Sylhet is a prime
attraction for all tourists visiting Bangladesh. Lying between the
Khasia and the Jaintia hills on the north, and the Tripura hills
on the south, Sylhet breaks the monotony of the flatness of this
land by a multitude of terraced tea gardens, rolling countryside
and exotic flora and fauna. Here the thick tropical forests abound
with many species of wild life, scented orange groves and
luxuriant pineapple plantations spread their aroma around the
typical hearth and homes of the Manipuri Tribal maidens famous for
their dance.
And on the other hand, we have news about violence. On August 5,
2002, the Daily Star reported that Bangladesh forest
department officials and ‘bands of local miscreants’ had forcefully
evicted from forests in Moulvibazar Zila 20 of 1,000 Khasi families
growing betel there for generations. This one eviction drive (among
many) had killed one person and injured several others, as part of
an effort to create an eco-park as a tourist
attraction.93 On February 2, 2002, Frontline
reported much worse violence on the Indian side of the border:
Ethnic violence in…Tripura and Assam claimed 56 lives with a span
of 10 days in mid-January. The victims were Bengalis and
Hindi-speaking Biharis and the killers were tribal extremists
belonging to the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)…The tribal militants in
Tripura, who belong to either the NLFT or the All Tripura Tiger
Force (ATTF), have persistently followed a policy of ethnic
cleansing. They want Bengalis to move out of the state where the
tribal people once formed the majority community. Militant tribal
leaders know that they cannot achieve this objective, as Bengalis
now constitute over 60 per cent of the state’s population…Extremists
in Tripura enjoy an operational advantage as the State is surrounded
on three sides by Bangladesh. They have their hideouts in Bangladesh
where they find easy shelter when under pressure from the security
forces.94
Sylheti Territory
Human mobility changed the cultural mix of societies in the
region as Sylhet district moved – four times – among state
jurisdictions. During a century in Bengal Presidency (1765-1874),
Sylhet inhabited moving frontiers of British imperialism, which
spread to borders of Burma and China and, for the first time,
surrounded Sylhet with state boundaries on all sides. In this
context, a mixed flow of immigrants arrived, including tea
plantation workers, whose English employers captured Sylhet’s
southern hills and led Sylhet district into an Assam ‘Planters’
Raj’.95 In 1871, people classified as Hindu and Muslim in
the census each comprised half the district population, and brahmans
were 6 per cent of Hindus,96 more than in most predominantly Hindu
regions of British India.97 In 1900, Sylhet’s cultural mix included
a Sylheti literary movement, led by Moulvi Abdul Karim, who printed
books in his Siloti Nagri font, at his Islamia Press,98
and flourishing traditions of Sanskrit scholarship.99
The Muslim population apparently began its proportionate rise
after 1808, when an estimate of a 2:3 ratio of Muslims to Hindus
implies a Muslim increase by one-third in the next six decades, to
generate a 1:1 ratio in 1871.100 After the move to Assam,
the proportion of Muslims rose in each census.101
Immigration was clearly the cause. In 1911, people reportedly born
in Mymensingh composed 31 per cent of the population of the Assam
valley (including Sylhet), and they numbered 63 per cent in
1931.102 This mobility then acquired new territorial
meaning. In 1931, the Assam Census Report called Muslim
Bengalis ‘invaders’ and the Assam Congress resolved to move Sylhet
out of Assam.103 The Partition Plan produced a Sylhet
referendum, after which, a truncated Sylhet district entered East
Pakistan,104 as the region acquired its current
perimeter. After Partition, immigration radically transformed
Sylhet: in the decade after 1961, the population grew 37 per cent;
and in the decade after 1971, it grew 22 per cent.105 A
hundred thousand Muslim Bengalis moved out of Assam into Sylhet’s
haor basin, where land still lay open for
colonisation.106 In 1951, the proportion of Muslims
reached 68 per cent, and then rose faster.107
The Sylhet region today has a distinct territorial identity, and
‘Sylheti’ merits designation as a regional ethnicity in Bangladesh.
Historically, Sylheti identity includes a long association with
Assam.108 Sylheti language differs markedly from standard
Bengali.109 The Sylheti literary movement that began in
1860 has been revived in recent decades.110 Socially,
Sylhetis seem ‘clannish’, the word I hear most often when Sylhetis
in Dhaka describe their marriage strategies and business
networks.111 Sylhetis have a reputation for conservative
gender relations, manifest publicly by pardah, as in haor
communities, where Muslim women from other districts work in
agriculture, but Sylhetis do not.112 Shah Jalal
represents a spiritual centre for regional piety in Sylhet, where
people identify most intensely with his legacy.
Sylheti identity is also invested in nature. Alongside the
Bangladeshi nationality of nature in Bangladesh, we find a Sylheti
identity of nature in Sylhet. Tourist advertisements, like the one
above, represent a unique Sylhet landscape, where plans for an eco
park on a national forest land brought the expulsion of Khasi
residents, and where the exotic image of ‘Manipuri maidens’ mingles
with the smell of pineapple plantations. In Sylhet, international
conflicts on the border with Meghalaya have a definite local
flavour, harking back to 1791.113
Local Territory
In 19th century Sylhet, local landed families held local
authority. Recording, adjudicating, and protecting private property
rights became the main function of government. Government never
meddled in local estates. The Rent Act of 1859 had no impact. When
Sylhet moved into Assam, it escaped later Bengal tenancy reforms.
Local Sylhet territorialism became a constituent of modern
governance and of Sylhet regional identity, which however
distinctive, reflects a broader pattern, because all across the land
that became Bangladesh, British authority attached itself to the
local gentry.114 Trends after 1947 nationalised this
pattern. In 1951, Zamindari Abolition in east Pakistan multiplied
private property rights and produced new forms of
tenancy.115 At the same time, the 1945 Famine Inquiry
Commission’s conclusion that requisitioning rice for public
distribution lay beyond the state’s capacity in Bengal proved
prophetic,116 when Pakistan state requisitions produced
intense local opposition, stoked violence against Hindu traders, and
helped to kill the Muslim League in east Pakistan, in the 1954
elections.117 In the Pakistan context, Bengali visions of
Bangladesh developed inside local traditions of local authority.
Sylhetis nonetheless constitute locality in their own distinctive
cultural terms, as a place of belonging; and also, in standard
political and economic terms, as a spatial domain for local
investments. Being well placed in local society provides key people
with privileged access to networks of connectivity that expand their
opportunities in wider worlds of mobility.118 In Sylhet,
intersections of mobility and territorialism assume a distinctive
regional form inside social spaces composed of Sylheti ‘gushti’
(patrilineages).
These intersections appear in various geographical domains, where
territorialism meets mobility. One is the Haor Basin. A haor is a
deep radial depression that fills up to the brim and often overflows
with the monsoon, and dry up sufficiently for boro rice cultivation
between January and May. Farming communities occupy natural ridges
and built-up land around the lakes, lapped by deep waters that cover
haors from June to December. There are countless haors in Sylhet,
but the western Haor Basin is entirely covered with haors and deeply
flooded annually by meandering branches of the Surma and Kushiara.
In this area, investments in agriculture have been hard to secure
and large tracts remained open for new colonisation as late as 1950.
Compact enclaves (‘bari’) of related families (‘gushti’) form
settlements on haor lands, where local Sylheti landlords held sway,
before 1950, and locals reproduced landlordism thereafter, as the
land filled up with immigrant settlers. Communities establish
residential sites based on their common place of origin;
occupational and religious groups also formed mini-territories on
haor ridges. As in most of agrarian south Asia, micro-ethnic
partitions of local agrarian territory occurred as the region
attained an over-arching ethnic identity defined by the cultural
affinities of the major landowning groups.119 Today, the
regional identity is Bengali Muslim, in the frame of Bangladesh, and
Sylheti, in the frame of Sylhet.
Topography articulates inequality among families on haor land.
Higher, wider ridges are wealthier and more populous. Lower lands
that extend across deeper, wider hoar lakes host more precarious,
poorer communities, filled with seasonal migrants who still come to
harvest boro crops. On the widest, richest hoar ridges, wealthier
families live on higher land, less vulnerable to flooding. Upwardly
mobile families buy higher, more profitable farmland, just below the
hoar ridge; and they live in higher, drier residential sites, atop
the ridge. Poorer and downwardly mobile families can buy more land
at lower prices for housing at the lowest edge of ridge, nearest the
lake, where their homes feel the lapping of floods; and they can
also buy farmland more cheaply farther out in the haor lakes, where
floods come sooner, lands produce less, and work is harder and less
profitable.120
We find a different but also typically Sylheti intersection of
mobility and territorialism in and around the towns of Sylhet,
Sunamganj, Moulvibazar, and Habiganj, which provide sites for local
investments by Sylheti families most visibly marked big, fancy,
brightly painted houses. These houses belong to families in gushti
whose men went to London, generations ago – some as early as
the late 18th century – originally as workers on ships, who
eventually opened restaurants.121 British immigration
laws of the 20th century restricted Sylheti immigration to the
relatives of earlier Sylheti settlers in London, and fostered a
Sylheti monopoly of the London ‘Indian restaurant’ business. Today,
Sylheti Londoni families have created a mobile territory
of business activity, anchored in Sylhet and London, composed
of Bangladesh and UK citizens.122 In recent decades,
these transnational locals have been most active in
organisations devoted to making Sylheti language, literature, and
regional identity more publicly visible.123
Like others who have built family business domains in south Asia,
Londoni Sylhetis invest meticulously in marriage, religion, and
other social activities to enhance their family status, cultural
capital, and business assets (which include dependable partners,
financiers, and employees). Young Sylheti women, born and raised in
London, travel to their family’s home village in Sylhet to marry
selected men from appropriate families. When immigration officials
allow, the husband joins his wife in London to work in his
father-in-law’s restaurant, while his wife, typically more educated
and always more westernised, follows other suitable occupations. In
time, sons-in-law can attain UK citizenship and thus the basis for a
break with the family, but the independence of Londoni brides can
cause more difficult problems. Should daughters marry men not of
their parents’ choice in Sylhet, family struggles might ensue in
which parents seek redress for the loss of honour and prospects, and
as UK citizens, dissident Londoni brides can enlist the help of the
British High Commission in Dhaka to return independently to
England.124
Londoni families seem to address their family legal dilemmas
mostly by using local police and state courts, but less well-endowed
Sylhetis often resort to informal mediation hearings, called
‘shalish’, a distinctive local institution in Bangladesh. Conflicts
over land and other property preoccupy about half of all ‘shalish’
mediations,125 where local men of authority, convened ad
hoc and case-by-case, sit to hear the troubles and make a judgment.
Its informality makes the shalish difficult to historicise, but a
new historical phase clearly began in 1993, when one Sylheti shalish
issued a fatwa to punish a woman and her father for her ‘illicit’
marital union, by caning him and stoning her, after which, she
committed suicide.126 Similar events elsewhere have
spurred public campaigns to reform the local shalish in conformity
with Bangladesh national law.
Conclusion
Investments in nature in Sylhet operate in local, regional, and
national territories that mobility has been reshaping for a very
long time. Mobility is still reshaping Bangladesh. Activists,
researchers, and officials travel the country to bring localities
into the national project of development. Packed planes fly to and
from London and Sylhet. Villagers flock to cities and to Persian
Gulf economies that send funds back to support Islamic endeavours.
International capital and commodity flows sustain a Bangladesh
readymade garments industry to benefit consumers in American. The US
government tries to force Bangladesh to export natural gas from
Sylhet to India, to profit the US oil companies. Goods and people
move massively across international borders. The Indian government
decries Bangladeshi ‘infiltrators’. The Indian military pushes
Bengali Muslims into Bangladesh. Tripura rebels find refuge in
mobile spaces that defy national maps.
Ideas and information that we use typically to comprehend such
transactions between mobility and territorialism etch the
black-and-white lines of national geography. History in Sylhet
indicates a rather more complex, diverse spatial reality, composed
of many grey areas and shifting, overlapping social spaces. By
exploring the grey areas of history, we can better analyse modern
structural transformations and discontinuities, which take shape at
shifting intersections of mobility and territorialism.
The practical lesson is this: the mobility that characterises
globalisation today operates simultaneously in many spatial and
temporal registers, and forms many geographies, which coexist,
conflict, and complicate one another, and have done for a very long
time. In the modern world of capitalism, where investments move to
places that provide the best returns, and dividends move into the
hands of people ‘in the loop’ of capital
accumulation;127 the biggest winners are the
richest folks in rich countries and rich urban neighbourhoods; but
local families constitute ‘the loop’ in countless localities, where
the mobility of people, assets, and state power intersect in
territories of capital accumulation. National politicians and
intellectuals who work in shifting spatial domains that span local
and global geographies would thus do well to abandon the idea that
static national maps represent the basic facts of modern geography.
Address for correspondence: davidludden@hotmail.com
Notes
[I
presented an earlier version of this paper at the SSRC Conference on
‘Resources: Conceptions and Contestations’ Kathmandu, January 3-12,
2003. For this work, I depended on sabbatical research funding from
the American Institute of Bangladesh Studies, American Council of
Learned Societies, John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, and
University of Pennsylvania. For research assistance, I thank Brooke
Newborn and Richard Mo. For essential material, I owe special thanks
to Sirajul Islam, M Mufakkarul Islam, and the staff at the
Bangladesh National Archives, particularly its director, Sharif
Uddin Ahmed. For ideas, I thank Bela Malik, Thomas Mathew, Taj I
Hashmi, Manzurul Mannan, Samia Huq, and Jukhruf Binth Junaid. For
useful comments and stimulating papers, I thank participants at the
SSRC conference, particularly Amita Baviskar, Bina Agarwal, Michael
Watts, Tania Li, and Anna Tsing. For help with all aspects of this
work, I thank Dina Mahnaz Siddiqi.]
1 See
essays in The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural
Perspective, edited by Arjun Appadurai, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1986. 2 For example, Madhav Gadgil and
Ramachandra Guha, This Fissured Land: An Ecological History
of India, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1992. 3 For
broad view of the Asian context, see David Ludden, ‘Maps in the Mind
and the Mobility of Asia’, Journal of Asian Studies
(forthcoming) November 2003. For a long-term comparative view of
regional formations in South Asia, see David Ludden, An Agrarian
History of South Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.
For case studies, see David Ludden, ‘Spectres of Agrarian Territory
in South India’, Indian Economic and Social History Review,
39, April-September 2 and 3, 2002, 233-58. 4 Dirk H A
Kolff, ‘The End of an Ancien Regime: Colonial War in India,
1798-1818’ in Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia
and Africa, edited by J A de Moor and H L Wesseling, E J Brill,
Leiden, 1989, pp 22-49. 5 See Sayeed-ur-Rahman, ‘River
Surma’ in Sylhet: History and Heritage, edited by Sharif
Uddin Ahmed, Bangladesh Itihas Samiti, Dhaka, 1999, pp
91-101. 6 Haroun er Rashid, Geography of Bangladesh,
The University Press Dhaka, 1991, pp 431-32. 7 Md Shamsul
Alam, et al, ‘Sylhet and its Evolving Geographical Environment’ in
Sylhet: History and Heritage, pp 73-83. 8 Nasser
Ejazul Huq, ‘Mineral Resources of Sylhet’ in Sylhet: History and
Heritage, pp 421-29. 9 Haroun er Rashid, Geography, pp
24. River action also depresses the haor. Sirajul Islam, Villages in
the Haor Basin of Bangladesh. (Studies in Socio-Cultural Change
in Rural Villages in Bangladesh, No 4.) Institute for the Study
of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo, 1985, pp
1-4. 10 Dilip K Chakrabarti, Ancient Bangladesh: A Study of
the Archaeological Sources with an Update on Bangladesh Archaeology,
1990-2000, The University Press Limited, Dhaka, 2001, pp 17-21.
K Bagchi, The Ganges Delta (Calcutta, 1944). C Strickland,
Deltaic Formation with Special Reference to the Hydraulic
Processes of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra (Calcutta, 1940).
11 Haroun er Rashid, Geography of Bangladesh, pp 55.
12 In the 1784 Gomati floods, vegetation could be seen only on
the highest banks of tanks and ‘upon the boarder of the hills’.
Comilla District Records, edited by Sirajul Islam, The
Institute of Liberation Bangabandhu and Bangladesh Studies, Dhaka,
2000, p 98. 13 Bangladesh National Archives. Sylhet District
Records, volume 293, pp 145-46, December 12, 1784. (Reference
format hereafter SDR293.145-6:12Dec84). SDR293.155:8Apr85 reports
expense of Rs 2,000 for renewing banks of the rivers ‘Surma,
Coosearah, and Munnoo’, saying, ‘These banks have received no
repairs for these last 15 years and were totally swept away in
different places for the extent of many miles’. Similar events
occurred along the Gomati, where river embankments built around 1710
broke in 1783. Comilla District Records, pp 62, 94-95, 97-99. The
Sylhet District Records, edited by Walter K Firminger, Assam
Secretariat Printing Office, Shillong, 1917, contains reprints of
many SDR texts. 14 On the sanctification of sites for
investment, see David Ludden, An Agrarian History, pp 66-76 and
Peasant History in South India, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1985; Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1990, pp
15-41. 15 Hamlet Bareh, ‘Khasi-Jaintia State Formation’ in edited
by Surajit Sinha, Tribal Polities and State Systems in
Pre-Colonial Eastern and Northeastern India, KP Bagchi,
Calcutta, 1987, pp 261-306. 16 J B Bhattacharjee, ‘Dimasa State
Formation in Cachar’ in Sinha, Tribal Polities and State Systems,
p 177. 17 The Kupli (or Kapili) River drains Manipur,
running north into the Brahmaputra. See B Pakem, ‘State Formation in
Pre-colonial Jaintia’ in Sinha, Tribal Polities and State
Systems, facing p 244. 18 Sujit Choudhury, Folklore and
History: A Study of Hindu Folkcults of the Barak Valley of Northeast
India, KK Publishers, New Delhi, nd (1985?), pp 31-46. 19 For
similarities around Chittagong, see Raja Devasish Roy, ‘Land Rights,
Land Use and Indigenous Peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts’ in
edited by Philip Gain, Bangladesh: Land, Forest, and Forest
People, Society for Environment and Human Development, Dhaka,
1995, pp 55-56; and Francis Hamilton Buchanan in Southeast Bengal
(1798), edited by Willem van Schendel, University Press Limited,
Dhaka, 1992. 20 Bareh, ‘Khasi-Jaintia State Formation’, pp
263ff. 21 Islam, Haor Basin, pp 6-9. 22 Ludden,
Agrarian History, pp 133-40. 23 Binay Bhushan Chaudhuri,
‘Tribal Society in Transition: Eastern India 1757-1920’ in
India’s Colonial Encounter: Essays in Memory of Eric Stokes,
edited by Mushirul Hasan and Narayani Gupta, Oxford University
Press, Delhi, 1993, pp 65-120 and V Raghavaiah, ‘Tribal Revolts in
Chronological Order: 1778 to 1991’ in edited by A R Desai,
Peasant Struggles in India, Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1979, pp 23-27. 24 Lowland fishing tribes included Kaivartas.
Richard M Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier,
1204-1760, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993,
p 258, n 78, citing K N Gupta, ‘On Some Castes and Caste-
Origins in Sylhet’, Indian Historical Quarterly, 7, 1931, pp
725-26ff. 25 See especially Abu Imam, ‘Ancient Sylhet: History
and Tradition’ in Sylhet: History and Heritage, pp 173-202;
also Chakrabarti, Ancient Bangladesh, pp 158-59. Kamalakanta Gupta,
Copper-Plates of Sylhet, Lipika Enterprises, Sylhet,
1967. 26 Islam, Villages in the Haor Basin, p 9. 27
Abdul Karim, Corpus of the Arabic and Persian Inscriptions of
Bengal, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Dhaka, 1992, 8, 58, 270-73,
and Social History of the Muslims of Bengal, Chittagong:
Baitush Sharif Islamic Research Institute, 1985, pp 129-33. Eaton,
The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, pp 73-77.
Abdul Karim, ‘Advent of Islam in Sylhet and Hazrat Shah Jalal
(R)’, and Dewan Nurul Anward Hussain Choudhury, ‘Hazrat Shal
Jalal (R) and His Life – A Source Study’ in Sylhet History
and Heritage, pp 129-72. 28 Katy Gardner, Global
Migrants, Local Lives: Travel and Transformation in Rural
Bangladesh, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, pp 75-76. 29
Eaton, The Rise of Islam, p 258. 30 Market places had
thrived a thousand years earlier at the confluence of Meghna and the
old Brahmaputra, in Wari-Bateswar and Bhairav Bazar, north-east of
Dhaka, where archaeological data suggest trade with Gangetic and
Indian Ocean ports. Chakrabarti, Ancient Bangladesh, pp
62-66. 31 Abdul Karim, ‘Suba Bangla: Government and Politics’ in
History of Bangladesh, 1704-1971, Volume 1, Political History,
edited by Sirajul Islam, Asiatic Society of Bengal, second edition,
Dhaka, 1997, p 35. 32 Bararistan-I-Ghaybi (A History of
the Mughal Wars in Assam, Cooch Behar, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa
during the Reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan, by Mir, Nathan)
translated by M I Borah, Government of Assam, Gauhati, 1936, pp
110-11, 158-66, 171-33ff. 33 Islam, Villages in the Haor Basin, p
8. 34 Puspa Niyogi, Brahman Settlements in Different
Subdivisions of Ancient Bengal, RK Maitra, Calcutta, 1967, p
258 42 Quoted in Eaton, Rise of Islam, p 258. 35 Eaton, Rise
of Islam, pp 259-65. 36 J B Bhattacharjee, ‘Dimasa State
Formation’, pp 177-211. 37 Areas completely out of cultivation
in 1800 and substantially under cultivation by 1900 covered most of
Chittagong and Noakhali, all the Sunderbans, most of the Barind, and
all the Haor basin. See Sirajul Islam, ‘Economic History in
Perspective’ in History of Bangladesh, II, p 19. For similar ups and
downs in Dinajpur, see Montgomery Martin, The History,
Antiquities, Topography, and Statistics of Eastern India (comprising
the Districts of Behar, Shahabad, Bhagulpoor, Goruckpoor,
Dinajepoor, Puraniya, Ronggopoor, and Assam) Reprinted Cosmo
Publications, Delhi, 1976, p 815. 38 M Ataharul Islam,
‘Population and Environment’, History of Bangladesh II,
p 706. 39 Islam, Villages in the Haor Basin, pp
6-21. 40 By contrast, in 1789, for example, the collector at
Murshidabad borrowed Rs 41,192 from seven Indian bankers to make
good his revenue payment to Calcutta. K M Mohsin, ‘Mughal Banking
System’ in History of Bangladesh, II, p 217. 41
SDR294.112:15Nov85. Comilla District Records, p 71. 42 On
the urban-centred commercialism, see Rajat Datta, Society,
Economy, and the Market: Commercialisation in Rural Bengal, c
1760-1800, Manohar Publishers, Delhi, 2000; also Rajat Datta,
‘Merchants and peasants: A Study of the Structure of Local Trade in
Grain in Late 18th Century Bengal’ in edited by Sanjay Subrahmanyam,
Merchants, Markets, and the State in Early Modern India,
Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1990, pp 146-51. 43 Datta,
Society, Economy, and the Market, p 208. 44 James Rennell
describes the natural basis of this trading environment: ‘The
Kingdom of Bengal, particularly its Eastern Tract, is naturally the
most convenient for trade within itself of any country in the world;
for its rivers divide into just a number of branches that the people
have the convenience of water carriage to and from every principal
places [sic]’. ‘An Unpublished letter of Mr Rennell’, Bengal Past
and Present, September 1933, quoted in Sushil Chaudhuri, ‘General
Economic Conditions’, History of Bangladesh, p 36. 45
Datta, Society, Economy, and the Market, p 207. 46
Francis Buchanan in Southeast Bengal (1798), p 135-37. 47
SDR293.126-129: 24Sept84. SDR297.48:29May88. SDR297.54.12 May 88.
SDR300.56-7:2Sept90. Robert Lindsay, ‘Anecdotes of an Indian life’,
circa 1823. See Lives of the Lindsays; or, A Memoir of the Houses
of Crawford and Balcarres by Lord Lindsay [his brother], second
edition, John Murray, London, 1858, III, pp 174-5ff. 48
SDR312.141:7April00: Loads of iron ore in ‘immense quantity…is
extracted and brought down by [Khasis] for sale and compose a
principal article of their traffic with the natives in
Sylhet’. 49 Bareh, ‘Khasi-Jaintia State Formation’, pp 264-67.
SDR297.48:29May88. SDR297.54.12May88. 50 Lindsay reported that,
‘at least five hundred elephants were caught annually’, in the
decade he lived in Sylhet (1778-1788). ‘Anecdotes’, p 190. Lindsay
describes ‘khedah’ hunting techniques in ‘Anecdotes’, pp 190-97.
Elephants suffered about 50 per cent mortality in captivity.
SDR291.24-5:15Oct78 reports that of 217 elephants caught that year,
only 112 survived. SDR291.18Jul78 reports that 106 elephants died of
221 caught in the months from Kartik to Baishak. Abul Fazl
Allami, Ain-i-Akbari. Translated by H Blochman, Low Price
Publications, Delhi, 1927, I, p 295, describes hunting elephants in
khedah. 51 SDR291.8-9:2Dec77. SDR291.18Jul78. 52
Irfan Habib, Atlas of Mughal India: Political and Economic Maps
with Notes, Bibliography and Index, Oxford University Press,
Delhi, 1982, Map, 11B. 53 Francis Buchanan in Southeast
Bengal, pp 137. Bhattacharjee, ‘Dimasa State Formation’, pp 186,
194. 54 Comilla District Records, pp 49-52. 55
SDR292.57: 29 Mar 83 56 SDR295.108: 30 Oct 87: ‘ …there are not
500 Rupees in circulation throughout the district and the few that
make their appearance are bad Arcots …’ SDR297.44: 17 May 88: ‘
…there is not above 6 or 700 Rupees to be found in Sylhet and these
are bad Arcots … no copper coins of any Species passes through the
District. The Revenues are paid in Cowries and all mercantile
transactions are carried on through the same currency’. 57
Debendra Bijoy Mitra, Monetary System in the Bengal Presidency,
1735-1835, KP Bagchi, Calcutta, 1991, pp 70-90. 58 See
Clarence Maloney, People of the Maldive Islands, Orient
Longman, Bombay, 1980, pp 112, 126, 137, 417. 59 Frank Perlin,
Monetary, Administrative, and Popular Infrastructures in Asia and
Europe, 1500-1900, Ashgate, Brookfield VT, 1993, pp 152-163,
270. Jan Hogendorn and Marion Johnson, The Shell Money of the
Slave Trade, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1986. Robert
S Wicks, Money, Markets and Trade in Early Southeast Asia,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1992, pp 28-72. 60
SDR293.126-131: 24 Sept 84. 61 SDR300.106: 30 Dec 90. SDR301.64:
29 July 91. SRD301.82. 11 Oct 91. 62 Abul Fazl treats Sylhet only
as a mountain region. Ain-I-Akbari, I, p 136-7: ‘In the
Sarkar of Sylhet there are nine ranges of hills. It furnished many
eunuchs’. He goes on to list only mountain products of Sylhet:
Suntarah, orange, China Root, Aloe-wood, Bhangraj, and tamed birds.
63 The financial integration of this territory into the
political economy of Bengal Presidency involved Company efforts to
convert Sylhet cowry revenues into Sicca Rupees, which necessitated
large cowry exports to Dhaka and Calcutta until the 1790s. These
efforts began when collector Lindsay took the entire Sylhet cowry
revenue into his own hands to finance commercial ventures that made
him rich and reduced Sylhet cowry exports somewhat in the 1780s.
SDR293.126-131: 24 Sept 84. ‘Anecdotes’, pp 176-80, 198. 64
The Fifth Report From the Select Committee of the House of Commons
on the Affairs of the East India Company (Dated July 28, 1812),
edited with notes and introduction by Walter K Firminger, R Cambray,
Calcutta, 1917 [Reprinted Augustus M Kelley, New York, 1969], Volume
I, pp cxii. 65 1783 area and revenue figures for Bengal
districts are in Fifth Report, II, 403. 1822 area and population
figures are in Census of India, 1961, Report on the Population
Estimates of India, Government of India, Delhi, 1962, pp 71,
‘Statement of the extent and Population of British India, Bengal
Presidency: Lower Provinces’. 66 Datta, Society, Economy, and
the Market, pp 171. 67 A B M Mahmood, The Revenue
Administration of Northern Bengal, 1765-1793, Pakistan National
Institute of Public Administration, Dacca, 1970, pp 28. 68
SDR295.122-30:(nd) Nov 87. SDR299.34: 5 Nov 89. 69 SDR294.53: 31
May 84. SDR293: 24 Sept 84. SDR293.156: 1 May 85. SDR295.122-30(nd)
Nov 1787. Index values for Bengal Presidency jamma are 100 in 1767,
137 in 1776, and 164 in 1784. Datta, Society, Economy, and the
Market, pp 334. Revenue demand on Rajshahi Zamindari increased
only 18 per cent from 1765 to 1784. Mahmood, The Revenue
Administration of Northern Bengal, pp 28, 32, 34, 42. 70
SDR293.156: 1 May 85. SDR306.21-5: 19 Aug 94. 71 SDR293.99-100: 4
Apr 84. SDR294.143: 27 Jun 86 says the number is 5,000. 72
SDR306.126-7: 8 Sept 95. 73 SDR294.143: 27 Jun 86 and
SDR309.51-5: 12 May 98. 74 SDR304.9: 20 Apr 93. 75 The first
available district budget, in 1794, shows a total annual expense of
Rs 1,31,144, and a total jamma of Rs 2,90,554, leaving a balance of
Rs 1,59,410, which at current exchange rate, translates into
8,36,900 Kahans, more than the Sylhet jamma in 1776, now available
for remission. SDR306.21-5: 19 Aug 94. 76 A M Serajud-din, ‘The
Revenue Administration of Chittagong, from 1761 to 1785’,
unpublished PhD dissertation, University of London, 1964. 77 See
Ratna Ray, Change in Bengal Agrarian Society, 1760-1850,
Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1979; Sugata Bose, Peasant
Labour and Colonial Capital: Rural Bengal Since 1770, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1993. Rajat Datta, Society, Economy,
and the Market. Shinkichi Taniguchi, ‘The Peasantry of Northern
Bengal in the Late Eighteenth Century’, in Local Agrarian Society
in Colonial India: Japanese Perspectives, edited by Peter Robb,
Kaoru Sugihara, and Haruka Yanagisawa, Manohar, Delhi, 1997. 78
Datta, Society, Economy, and the Market, pp 93-99. 79
Migrant workers still travel today by boat to harvest Sylhet haors
and return home with loads of boro rice. Islam, Villages of the
Haor Basin, pp 31-2. 80 Collectors often asserted the
typically Sylhet landholding represented a single joint family.
SDR297.126: 5 Sept 88. SDR300.141-44: 24 Oct 91. Statistical
averages are calculated from data on population in 1789 and 1808 in
M M Rahman, ‘Population of Sylhet’, pp 115, 117; and on villages in
SDR300.141-44: 24 Oct 91; and taluks (estates) SDR309.51-5: 12 May
98. 81 In Mughal sanad texts from Chittagong, shaikh and
chaudhuri were the most common titular names. Eaton, Rise of Islam,
pp 249. 82 SDR299.72-4: 15 Jan 90. 83 All these borders were
fuzzy in practice: ‘…the lands of the Rajahs of Chachar and
Jointah are blended with those of this District; indeed, the Rajah
of Jointah possesses lands adjacent to the town of Sylhet’.
SDR308.150: 22 Feb 98. For Tripura, see Comilla District
Records, pp 1-30. 84 B Pakem, ‘State Formation in
Pre-colonial Jaintia’, facing p 244, also pp 261-306. 85
SDR297.164: 18 Dec 88. SDR298.7: 20 Dec 88. 86 The Collector,
John Willes, saw a foreign French hand in machinations leading up to
this climactic confrontation. SDR 297.48: 29 Mar 88. 87 35th
Battallion sepoys arrived in Sylhet on April 17 and 13 June 1789
[SDR298.98: 17 April 89 and SDR298.116-18: 13 Jun 89] and left in
November 1791 [SDR305.55: 6 Jan 94]. Most warfare ended in February
1790 [SDR299.80: 21 Jan 99 and SDR299.104: 5 Mar 90]. Correspondence
on the Khasi wars occupies much of SDR volumes 85, 298 and 299.
88 SDR308.27-8: 15 Sept 97. 89 East Pakistan District
Gazetteers, Sylhet, Pakistan Government Press, Dhaka, 1970, pp
328-31. 90 Ludden, Agrarian History, pp 130-40. 91 Raja
Devasish Ray, ‘Land Rights, Land Use and Indigenous Peoples’. 92
http://www.betelco.com/bd/sylhet/sylhet.html 93 Daily Star, July
25 and August 5, 2002, omits mention of the eco-park, which appears
in Human Rights in Bangladesh, 2000, edited by Hameeda
Hossain. Dhaka: Ain o Shalish Kendro, 2001, pp 147. 94 As I
write, the Daily Star reports (May 8, 2003) that Tripura
rebels yesterday killed 21 Bengalis on the Tripura borders of
Comilla district, Bangladesh, where ‘tribal militants charge that
Bangalee settlers have changed the demographic makeup of Tripura,
turning the indigenous population into a minority’. 95 Amalendu
Guha, Planter Raj to Swaraj: Freedom Movement and Electoral
Politics in Assam, 1826-1947, Manohar, Delhi, 1977. 96 M M
Rahman, ‘Population of Sylhet’, pp 105-7. 97 In 1931, Brahmans
comprised 3 per cent of the census population in Madras
Presidency and 5 per cent in Bombay Presidency. Census of India,
1931. General Tables XVII, ‘Race. Tribe, or Caste’. In the
Tinnevelly District of Madras Presidency – about the same size
as Sylhet and 98 per cent Hindu – Brahmans were 3.5 per cent of the
1881 population. David Ludden, Peasant History in South
India, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1989, p 25. 98
For biography, see Atful Hye Shiby, ‘Moulvi Abdul Karim and His
Contributions to Muslim Education in Bengal’, Sylhet: History and
Heritage, pp 517-33. 99 Paresh Chandra Mandal,
‘Sanskrit Language and Literature in Sylhet’, in Sylhet: History
and Heritage, pp 542-60. 100 M M Rahman, ‘Population of
Sylhet’, p 115. 101 M M Rahman, ‘Population of Sylhet’, p 108.
For 1931 census maps, see Historical Atlas of South Asia,
edited by Joseph E Schwartzberg, Oxford University Press, NewYork,
1992, pp 93-4. 102 M Ataharul Islam, ‘Population and
Environment’, p 706. 103 Sujit Chaudhuri, ‘A ‘god-sent
opportunity’, Seminar, online edition,
http://www.india-seminar.com/2002/510/510%20sujit%20chaudhuri.htm. 104
K Z Islam, ‘The Sylhet Award’,
http://www.bangla.net/holiday/inret.html. In 1947, Ratabari,
Patherkandi, Badarpur and half of Karimganj thana left the former
Karimganj sub-division of Sylhet to join the Cachar District of
Assam; and in 1983, they became the Karimganj District. In 1951, the
North Cachar sub-division of Cachar District joined the new district
of United Mikir and North Cachar Hills. In 1989, Hailakandi
sub-division of Cachar became a separate district. See East
Pakistan District Gazetteers, Sylhet, Pakistan Government Press,
Dhaka, 1970. 105 Bangladesh Population Census, 1991.
Community Series, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Dhaka,
1996. Community volumes for Zilas Sylhet, Habiganj, Sunamganj, and
Maulvi Bazar. 106 Islam, Haor Basin, pp 16, citing Sushanta
Krishna Dass, ‘Immigration and Demographic Transformation of Assam,
1891-1980’, Economic and Political Weekly, May 10, 1980, pp
852. 107 Md Mahbubar Rahman, ‘Population of Sylhet’, p 108.
108 Abu Imam, ‘Ancient Sylhet’, pp 186ff. 109 Abul Kalam
Manzur Morshed, ‘Sylhet Dialect’, in Sylhet: History and
Heritage, pp 533-51. 110 See http://sylheti.org.uk and
http://www.sylhetcity.net. 111 For Sylheti marriage
advertisements, see http://www.sylhetcity.net. Here are two
examples: ‘Bride wanted for a Muslim male. He has a good job,
business and lives in his own house. Bride should be attractive,
educated and religious. Must be from a Sylheti Sunni family
background’. ‘A bride required for an attractive Sylheti Muslim
male. Groom is post graduate from Bangladesh. Elder brother is
willing to pay for the return fare and other necessary expense’.
112 Islam, Haor Basin, p 26. 113 See for instance, Daily
Star, August 20, 2002, front page story: “Two Bangladeshis were
kidnapped and shot dead by Indian Khasia (tribesmen) aided by the
BSF near Bichhakandi border under Gowainghat upzila Sunday night….
[when] two Bangladeshis …were returning home after working in the
Bichhakandi stone quarry near the border…” 114 Sirajul Islam
argues this point strongly for rural east Bengal as a whole in
Rent and Raiyat: Society and Economy of Eastern Bengal,
1859-1928, Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 1989, pp
10-11. 115 Kamal Siddiqui, ‘Land Reforms Since 1950’, History
of Bangladesh, II, pp 708-722. 116 Famine Inquiry
Commission. Final Report, Government Press, Madras, 1945, reprinted
Usha Press, Delhi, 1985, p 32, citing its Report on Bengal, p
156. 117 A H Ahmed Kamal, ‘The Decline of the Muslim League and
the Ascendancy of the Bureaucracy in East Pakistan’, unpublished
dissertation, Australian National University, 1988. 118 On local
connections that make development projects work, see Amita Baviskar,
‘The Dream Machine: The Model Development Project and The Remaking
of the State’, in Waterscapes: The Cultural Politics of a Natural
Resource, Oxford University Press, Delhi, (forthcoming). 119
Ludden, Agrarian History, pp 140-5, 190-216. 120 Sirajul
Islam, Haor Basin. 121 One early Sylheti overseas migrant,
Syedullah, described his travels and displayed his cooking skill
when he arrived at former Collector Lindsay’s home in Scotland,
some time before 1825. Lindsay, ‘Anecdotes’, pp 215-17. 122 Katy
Gardner, Global Migrants, Local Lives. 123 See
http://sylheti.org.uk. 124 Dina Siddiqi, ‘Of Consent and
Contradiction: A Report on the Law and Practice of Forced Marriages
in Bangladesh’. Unpublished paper, Ain o Shalish Kendro, Dhaka,
2002. 125 Most others concern family disputes and ‘deviant
behaviour’. Hossain Zillur Rahman and S Aminul Islam, Local
Governance and Community Capacities: Search for New Frontiers,
University Press Limited, Dhaka, 2002, p 146. 126 Hameeda
Hossain and Dina Siddiqi, personal communication. For more on
fatwas, see Dina M Siddiqi, ‘Taslima Nasreen and Others: The contest
Over Gender in Bangladesh’, in Women in Muslim Societies:
Diversity within Unity, edited by Herbet L Bodman and Nayereh
Tohibi, Lynne Reiner, London, 1998, pp 205-229. 127 Neil Smith,
Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of
Space, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984.
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