Truth
I. Introduction 118
1. Some background reflections. 120
2. Some general ideas aimed at in the explorations to follow. 123
3. Now we have to dislodge some metaphors. 128
(a) The first: The matterless mirror. 128
(b) The second: The structure of the mind. 129
(c) The third: The invisible subject. 130
II. How Can Things Be Parts of Thoughts? 136
1. We do not live in representations. 137
2. Some remarks on representationalism. 139
3. Internal to external awareness. No. 143
4. Aristotle and Descartes: Nothing physical becomes mental. 145
III. Two Defeating Models 155
1. First defeating model. 155
2. Second defeating model: Attributional-intentionality. 159
3. Now what can we conclude from all this? 161
IV. Bad Global Theories of Truth 162
1. No correspondence. 163
2. Coherence. 171
Chapter 4: Outline Page 2
IV. Bad Global Theories of Truth (cont.)
3. Pragmatism. Historical vs. empirical pregnancy. 173
4. A transition. 175
5. Somethimes the truth is what counts as so. 176
6. What about "eliminative," "redundancy," and "disquotational" analyses of truth? 177
7. Local roles. 178
8. Emotivism and other add-on theories of truth. 180
9. Parasitic locality. 180
V. What Does the Failure of All Those Theories of Truth Tell Us? 181
Chapter 4
Truth
"...proud man,
Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
His glassy essence."
I. Introduction
The trouble about "truth" comes from mistakes about thinking, especially
from construing features of sentences to be features of thought, and vice versa,
and from expecting a single basic analysis of all propositional uses of "it
is true that" and "it is false that." There is a family of general
notions of truth and falsity, but the expressions "is true" and "is
false" are so entrenched in diverse particular practices, like arithmetic,
logic, sciences, legal processes, and even sub-processes like various forms
of contrary-to-fact speculation, that (i) there can be no single correct analysis
to cover all the cases; and (ii) there is no "core" notion with only
"accidental" differential features [see C. Wright, 1992] because the
meanings in different practices are genuinely different and sometimes have different
"overflow" conditions. For instance, sometimes bifurcation is required,
sometimes a commitment to no gaps, and sometimes one or another form of cognitive
accessibility. (iii) In a variety of discourses, cognitive accessibility requirements
range from "warranted assertability" to "constructive provability"
"pragmatic verifiability," varying in whether such a requirement is
part of the linguistic meaning of "is true" or part of the "overflow"
signification. (iv) The standard theories of truth, (e.g., correspondence, coherence,
pragmatic, redundancy, disquotational, etc.) either fail to be generalizable
into a global theory, or fail to explain what they purport to. For instance,
the so-called "correspondence" theories, that are "same thing"
theories, fail to explain how there is a truthmaking identification of what
is said with what is so. On that point I intend to supply the missing explanatory
feature [see Chapter 5].
Thus this chapter is designed to require an account of how real things and real
situations become constituents of our judgments (provided in the next chapter).
The notions of "the false" diverge enough from the notions of "the
true" and have been so little and so unsuccessfully addressed in prior
theories that I need a separate chapter for that [Chapter 8].
The overall outcome is that "true" is analogous in meaning, subject
to semantic contagion, is not always eliminable even as a word, much less as
a relation, and is a genuine predicate (without any platonic abstracta). Sometimes
the notion involves cognitive elements; sometimes, it applies with gaps; sometimes
with "not true" not being equivalent to "false." Most importantly,
when we take the problem of explaining truth and falsity to concern intelligent
human judgment transforming animal awareness, the locus of what is to be explained
shifts, with issues about how real things belong to thoughts becoming central,
and issues concerning whether "is true" is eliminable by disquotation,
and issues about the liar paradoxes becoming secondary and resolved as consequences.
Moreover, we are forced to reconceive physical reality and animal perception
so as to account for the presence of real things and real conditions of things
in animal and human awareness.
1. Some background reflections.
The 17th century adjustments to accommodate the deterministic, mechanical and
corpuscular reconception of the physical world mutated and endured to become
background certainties even now: representationalism, evidentialism, a mind-external-world
gap, phenomenalism, the idea that sentences bear truth or falsity, even that
"is true" and "is false" are redundant or not genuine predicates,
that language is indispensable to understanding, and eventually, materialist
idealism.
The notions of truth were affected when the rejection of intrinsic forms and
multiple real natures in favor of a single mechanistic universal res extensa
obviated abstraction as the basic and constant operation of human understanding
and changed what was meant by "idea." For a mechanism that holds all
matter is deterministic and governed by mathematizable mechanical principles
(Descartes) and is all of one nature obviates the constant abstraction of physical
forms into concepts. Secondly, rejecting a "dematerializing" understanding
that operates on phantasms (sense appearances) to apprehend forms as held by
Aristotle, Aquinas, and later scholastics, encouraged a retreat from regarding
human understanding as a transformation of animal awareness toward Cartesian-Augustinian
duality of a separate immaterial soul, all of whose ideas are innate (as to
content), with an inner theater of experience, and gradually tended to treat
"ideas" not as conceptions but as sensory contents, impressions, and
images (e.g., Berkeley, then Hume). Further, the denial of animal awareness
by Descartes, and its subsequently being treated peripherally, disregarded the
continuity of cognition among animals and emphasized the truths and falsities
of human judgment, with the result that animal perception (e.g., of sounds)
became funged with intelligent perception (e.g., of tunes) and with the notions
of truth and justification. Further, the notion of truth became associated with
expressed truths, statements, and, then, with the (re)invention of sentential
logic, became associated with the expressions themselves, sentences.
The "linguistic turn's" overemphasis on language encouraged convictions
about truth and meaning that have now assumed the role of certainties. For example,
most philosophers think "truth" is a semantic notion, a feature of
sentences, or at best, of statements or propositions, and treat formal necessities,
like "3 times 5 is fifteen" and "the bisector of the angle at
the apex of an isosceles plane triangle perpendicularly bisects the base"
-- which do not have any real cases -- as "the real thing" as far
a necessities go, even more real because more precise than "necessities
of nature," like "iron is magnetizable", "people can't digest
stones" and "all integral mammals have seven cervical vertebrae, whether
they are giraffes, humans or mice" -- which are paradoxically, denied to
be necessary and considered only firm probabilities, or left without explanation
or said to be conceptual or linguistic inclusions (as if the reason people can't
digest stones is because of how we think or talk or as if the number of vertebrae
in the neck were just a matter of how we count them).
Truth is an intrinsic feature of (some) thinking. It does not consist in a match-up
or working-out or hanging-together of sentences or even of thoughts, but in
the sameness of what we think and the being of things, as will be shown later.
The content of true judgment is how things are. It will only mislead to think
of the sameness as a kind of isomorphism, or a kind of congruence where what
we think or say coincides with what is so; I am going to explain a content-identity
account instead.
To get to that outcome, I (1) criticize prevailing metaphors and models of human
perception and (2) show that no parallelism of thought and reality can allow
an acceptable analysis of truth regardless of how we deal with the alleged "cognitive
access" elements of truth and with the supposed requirement that there
be an independent fact of the matter; and (3) give a positive account of abstraction
by which real things become constituents of thought, just as real things are
present perceptually to animals. The third step occurs partly in this and the
next chapter and leads on to further discussion of the nature of intelligent
animal thought [Chapter 6] and of the structures of the material world [Chapter
7].
Do we say there are no brain states that are representations? Not at all. There
must be such states in all complex animals. But they, and functions among them,
are not constituents of thoughts (or even of animal cognition), no matter how
hard identity theorists try to make that come out. They are not even productive
causes of thought or human perceptive action; and, one by one may not be necessarily
connected with thought, perception or feeling, either. Rather, just as you cannot
have a written message without writing and just as that requires a distribution
of ink or other molecules on a page, you cannot explain the content of the message
from the ink molecules on the page, but only the reverse; so the brain states
are to be explained downward from the cognitive states, even though some changes,
defects and deficiencies in brain states cause cognitive deficits, just as my
erasing a word and putting new ink marks in its place may change the message.
Whether certain sorts of brain states are part of the "overflow" de
re necessities of human thoughts is another matter, to be considered as we return
to the status of brain states from time to time, though it should be obvious
that the optical brain system is de re necessary for human intelligent seeing
even though not conceptually contained in the notion.
2. Some general ideas aimed at in the explorations to follow:
(a) Though the platform of human cognition is animal awareness, (i) human cognition
is a constant transformation of it by abstraction of what it makes present,
and (ii) the principle of human awareness is not the same, but contains the
abilities of animal awareness eminently.
(b) Nothing in nature knows what it is, but only humans are mistaken on the
matter. Every answer the philosophers have offered is wrong except at the very
trivial generality that we are a zoon logicon. That's because of man's glassy
essence: we are animals, but more. But how much more? So the question of whether
the principle of animality (the organization of carbon-based molecules by which
we are able to sense, perceive, feel and act as unities) is really distinct
from the principle of rationality (of understanding, willing and pursuing the
goals of a rational creature) or is contained eminently by the latter (which
is of an entirely different order from that of animals in general) is of paramount
importance. Humans are capable of activities that cannot be performed physically
[Chapter 6], and exercise animal powers from an immaterial psyche.
(c) Truth, globally, is right thinking, detectable as right to thought alone,
as to what is or is not [cf. Anselm, De Veritate]. What I think is true when
what I think is what is. "True" is a plastic notion, adopting distinct
meaning elements in diverse discourses and requiring diverse analyses to articulate
those diversities of meaning. Moreover, there are "overflow" differences
in what is involved in truth or falsity that do not show up as differences of
meaning, though they show up in differences of usage: thus sometimes every proposition
is assumed to be true or false; other times, nothing is regarded as true that
is not cognitively accessible (e.g., constructively provable mathematically),
and there are truth-value gaps where verification is not in principle possible,
or where there are no accepted rational standards for comparison: "The
industrial revolution was more destructive than Colonialism." Sometimes
there can be truths and falsities even when we do not acknowledge any independent
fact of the matter and other times not. Thus, I think M. Dummett was right to
say "meaning is entirely determined by use"; but that has to balanced
off with "but use is not entirely reflected in linguistic meaning"
because there are additional practices of reference and additional overflow
conditions for applicability (signification) and there are ways expressions
are used to modify actions that belong to the pragmatic traction between discourse
and action rather than the linguistic meaning.
(d) Judgment flows as seamlessly in content as sensible awareness does. We scab
it over with sentences to match it up with pairings from reality that we call
facts. So generally, I prefer to speak of commitment rather than belief, because
"belief" has become too readily associated with sentential expression,
and, thus, with discrete packaging, whereas judgments can be simultaneous, overlapping
and continuous, and mixed between reality commitments (existential judgment),
characterizations (predications), and identifications. As will become clear,
real things and their conditions are elements of both animal awareness and human
intelligent awareness and constituents of our judgments. Yet only intelligent
awareness involves truth or falsity.
(e) No matter what the domain of discourse, as Michael Dummett [1991] said,
whatever is true is true "in virtue of something." But that is a plastic
notion too. We have to distinguish "that in virtue of which" when
we are talking about mathematics, logic, card games, and anything else you like,
where the productive cause is our form of active thinking. In other cases, that
in virtue of which our judgment is true is something other than the form of
thinking, though the productive cause of truth is still our thinking. When "that
in virtue of which" a judgment is true is an independent compliant reality,
like the number of people on a bus, that is quite a different "in virtue
of which" than, say, the invention by which I make up the features of a
game or make an axiomatization of topology. The moral for now is: "whatever
is true is true in virtue of something" requires decoding to fit the context
and appears to offer explanation when none is provided.
(f) Truth does not require replicating things or matching things, or even things'
fitting or working out; instead, truth starts with our wholly particular animal
awareness and our coincident dematerialization of the components of judgment.
That "start" is not an event but a continuous origin, even before
birth. To understand is to be, for an intelligent animal. Cognition is not a
match but an identification, for instance, I realize that someone does not understand
what I am saying. What I realize is the very thing that is so. How that comes
about might take a long story; but it is the only outcome that will hold up.
When we know, we realize things, for instance, that "he does not believe
me." In a true singular perceptual judgment our commitment is coincident
with and has its content from animal awareness: "that guitar is still playing."
(g) Inquiries into truth have become separated from inquiries into animal cognition,
and associated too closely with language, as if humans need not have had knowledge
and true judgment in order to invent their languages. Truth, in non-cognitive
systems -- whether encyclopedias or even sentences, is merely extrinsically
attributional from the thinking expressed. There is no intrinsic truth or falsity
to anything but a thought; all other truth or falsity is derivative or equivocal.
So, if anything says anything, someone must have said it. Moreover, without
understanding, there is no function for truth. We have to go back to the natural
order of things, to rely upon the platform for judgment in animal awareness,
including the presence of real things in animal perception.
(h) Judgment uses sensation the way gestures use movements, pictures use color
or lines, and statements use words, as a medium; there are other media for thought
as well, including bodily actions. Human experience has coincident animal and
intelligent aspects, each involving distinct abilities. For humans, animal awareness,
involving memory, imagination, desire, dreaming, perceiving, and feeling, is
congruently conceptual and judgmental. Understanding is two constant activities,
dematerialization and judgment (according to the operations "what?"
and "is so?"), with a locked-on, but defeasible, reality commitment
that is a continuous existential commitment. I will say more about these elements
later. Additionally, there is the progression of judgment that we call reasoning.
Reasoning supplies for an imperfection of human understanding, its incompleteness,
and that imperfection gives rise to the "space" for logic and other
formal systems, for you do not need transformations if everything is apparent
to you.
Truth starts with our wholly particular animal awareness dematerialized and
being focused on features within animal awareness. Conception is a constant
activity along with our, as it were, causing the objects of animal awareness
to emit light, to fluoresce, so that we can distinguish shapes, or color, or
bones, or natures, or being alive, or objects, or "whats," as we happen
to conceptualize. Certain native American peoples said everything has two forms,
the outer behavior and appearance and the inner spirit-like form that makes
the thing do and appear as it does. Analogously, physical things have appearances
and looks, as objects of animal awareness, but concurrently transformed, they
glow with structures, with generality for humans. We humans transform animal
awareness, but we typically do that directly to things seen, heard, felt, smelled,
moving and moved, etc. They have generality for us, though they get that generality
by what we do and do not have it in themselves. As Avicenna said: intellectus
fit universalitatem in re. Real things and their conditions, e.g., actual sunshine,
are present in animal perception and present, conceptualized, in judgment. Abstraction
as an operation on mere appearances is untypical and derivative, though we do
it on sunrises, sunsets, the motion of the moon behind moving clouds, and trains
passing in a station.
3. Now we have to dislodge some metaphors.
(a) The first: The matterless mirror.
The mind is not a matterless mirror, a scene for the mind's eye, displaying
things in colors, sounds, feels, tastes and smells, and in shapes, sizes and
dimensions produced on the mirror (i) by sensory transmission from the world,
or (ii) by electrochemical sensory reaction to the world, or (iii) by some mind-initiated
response to such reactions. The "inner scene" hypothesis is as if
our experience were a Heads-Up-Holographic-Display, mostly computer-generated,
by which we fly our planes over terrain we have no way of comparing, directly,
to the display because we cannot see out. We have an inner display that we take
to be close enough to outer appearance, and from which we infer outer conditions.
That is "representationalism" sketched broadly, from which "the
veil of perception" is instantly evident: if we do not know, independently,
that the HHUD is designed to be reliable, how do we know things are as they
seem? One obvious option was, as Berkeley did, to take the elements of the HHUD
to be the real things themselves. Many varieties of phenomenalism were invented
and elaborated only to founder because they could explain neither counterfactual
truth (as required for what we might have seen/heard had we observed from a
different position) nor law-likeness nor escape the inevitable nominalism they
required of the same name for different sensory modalities (e.g., "square"
as seen and "square" as felt).
(b) The second: The structure of the mind.
The mind is not a surface with its own reflective-geometry, like a lens, that
patterns sense qualities into "whats," like mirrors in a Fun House
making "thin man"/"fat man"/"sausage man"/"dwarf
man" out of the light they refract--the patterns either (i) being the structure
of "the mind-itself" (Kant) or (ii) arising transiently, from innate
ideas -- whose fidelity, as a reflector and in each reflection, has to be justified.
Ideas are, in such schemes, chiefly presentations of something else, thus, representations;
so, there is a "veil of perception," and a general doubt about whether
things are as we conceive them. (Of course, Kant's version in which phenomena
are constituted from such structures and the existence of such structures is
transcendentally deducible, is designed to escape the veil of perception, just
as Berkeley's phenomenalism was).
(c) The third: The invisible subject.
There is no "fleshless eye," no "interior man," no spectator
in the theater of inner experience, no homunculus, to "see," combine
and "affirm" the presentations of sense, memory and imagination (the
representations), thereby making judgments and reasonings that are true or false.
There is no bodiless inner self "watching" an inner display, like
a captured princess bemused by the forest/cliffs/sea-appearance that fills her
whole tower window (which fills the whole field of vision). Dualist representationalism
made an implicit two-selves story that doubles the problems without resolving
any.
Further, no one, not even dedicated associationists like Hume, has ever come
up with a natural-history of impression-combining that would amount to judgment.
One cannot build assent entirely out of associations; for one thing, denial
becomes inexplicable. Just as putting words together into a complete sentence,
as a type-setter does, is not saying anything, so associating the impression
of flame with the impression of heat is not believing anything, either. Neither
is associating the verbal sound "devil" with a visual image of a horned,
reddish, tailed male with a pitchfork, surrounded by flames.
Rather, judgment uses sensation the way gestures use movements, pictures use
color or lines, and statements use words. Sensation is the basic medium, within
which there are a variety of sensuous media, from images to actions, for thought.
Still, understanding requires animal awareness (memory, imagination, desire,
dreaming, perceiving, and the like); and understanding both makes and uses a
constant, concurrent and coincident dematerialization of animal awareness resulting
in conceptions, according to the operations, "what," and "how,"
with a "default," "is so," existential commitment.
The match-up (correspondence), fit-together (coherence) and work-out (pragmatic),
notions of truth are all outcomes of the 17th century way of ideas, the representationalism
that requires an account of representational accuracy, both individually (as
images) and as complexes (judgments). As we will see, this was a completely
manufactured problem, made up by the mistake that real things were not to be
counted as constituents of animal perception or of human thought. It evaporates
when sameness of perception and things perceived is properly premised and motivated.
Knowledge, from the 17th century on, was thought to require true believing (true
judgment), where a true judgment is a faithful replication of reality, present
to awareness and affirmed (assented) to be so (i.e., a faithful representation).
Moreover, Descartes and all the major philosophers since, endorsed the "immediate
awareness principle," that "what we are immediately aware of are our
own ideas." That created the "veil of perception" and invited
the more general "representational skepticism" (Hume's later formulation),
to which the most prominent solutions were the phenomenalisms of Berkeley, Leibniz,
Kant [Wilson, 1987 and 1995], 19th century idealisms that I bypass, and the
twentieth century "scientific" phenomenalisms, like Russell's [1948],
C.I. Lewis's [1946], and the latest versions of "materialistic phenomenalism"
to be found in Carnap, Quine, Sellars, Goodman and Putnam. None of the phenomenalisms
can surmount the technical objections concerning merely possible experience,
counterfactuals, law-likeness, the impossibility of analyzing physical object
statements into finite conjunctions of sense data statements (with resulting
unverifiability), and more. More importantly, none can say anything informative
about the origins and nature of animal cognition.
To reframe the traditional questions about truth, truth-gaps and cognitive access,
I redeploy some positions defended elsewhere, most of which have been argued
by other philosophers as well: that there are no empty names, no empty kinds,
no merely possible individuals, no natures without cases (no empty universals
or empty laws of nature], no subsistent abstracta, and no articulate domains
of exemplar ideas or of other real abstracta. Physicalists should not want any
of those things, either. We should, then, be able to agree that there are no
truths about unrooted possibilities and no empty necessities with content. Thus,
there will be semantically well-formed expressions that have no truth values,
and others that do not satisfy bifurcation; consequently various discourses
will not be suitable for "indirect proof," so the principles of validity
will not be the same for all sorts of discourse. Michael Dummett [1991, p. 11]
was, in my opinion, too hasty in saying the principles of valid reasoning cannot
be a matter of taste. To an extent they can, for instance, depending on how
luxuriant a mathematics you want to tolerate; and anyway, there can be different
principles of validity for different sorts of discourse as he acknowledges:
the principles are determined as much by usage as are the meanings of the words.
In unbound discourse we do not use the principle that "a conditional with
an impossible antecedent is true"; but sometimes we say "if he's a
millionaire, I'm a monkey's uncle"; and there is the Irish phrase, "if
he's a saint, there aren't any." And also, sometimes we say "impossibility
of the antecedent yields falsity of the whole," and apply it to "if
I'd been at Agincourt, I would have been king." What rules we use depends
upon our discourse.
Human experience is not sensation or understanding or judgment presented to
a subject, anymore than animal perception is. It is a subject's seeing, understanding,
smelling, hearing, raging, loving, enjoying, etc. Just as for a plant, to be
is to live, and to live is to feed, grow, reproduce, etc., so for a human to
be is to "animal-rationalize." It is to do what a human does. The
self, the subject, is the zoon logicon (and more). Whether there is a transcendental
ego, lying beyond the horizon of experience that includes the experienced self,
is not germane here.
An ever growing literature, from Rorty to Putnam, is converging toward the opinion
that the projects of modern and of analytic philosophy failed, and indeed, some
think the analytic movement rebounded to the idealism it began by repudiating.
So it should not surprise us that the implicit dualism of materialism is gradually
becoming obvious, not merely because abstract entities like numbers, logic,
and laws are postulated, or because there is an uninvited "inner spectator"
to every physicalist account of knowing, or even because crude behaviorism and
mere information processing cannot explain the "display" element of
the representationalism they are committed to, or the animal subjectivity they
have to deny, but chiefly because the cognitive states are logically independent
of the external physical states that cause them. It is a wry twist that physicalism,
dedicated to repudiating the fleshless eye and all abstracta, becomes dualist
in both respects. And, further, falls prey to the "veil of perception"
in a way that parallels its archenemy, dualism. For it allows the possibility
that we could be having all our present experiences when there is no "external"
world at all or at least, none like what we experience. I take it to be Putnam's
point in "Brains in a Vat" that such a supposition is absurd because
the words of such brains would not mean the same as our words because the referents
would either be lacking or different, and, thus, if such a situation were possible,
meaning skepticism about our own discourse would be inevitable.
So I develop another standpoint, counseled from a larger span of history, to
restrict the role of representations in cognition, chiefly to that of material-states-with-which,
the way the chemical changes on film exposed through a camera are material states
with-which an image is made on the film, though there are many functionally
equivalent processes, just as there are several functionally equivalent processes
of automatic focussing of a camera, too, and to say real things are continuously
but not exclusively, or always prominently, the constituents of our thought.
This is a return to realism. For example, it is your house I see, your car that
I think to be blue; you I take to be here; you I understand or love -- not by
inference from some image or representation that depicts or represents your
being here, as if I were seeing your video-picture and thinking that you move
gracefully -- but because what I see is what is. That viewpoint also counsels
saying the content of our (and all animal) experience is naturally necessitated
by our physical environment and our own species-specific physical constitution,
and could not occur in its absence. Hypotheses to the contrary have no basis
in observation or speculation, as I demonstrated above [Chapter 2]. To philosophize
from such supposed possibilities is to build in mud.
I deny that what we are immediately aware of are our own ideas (things made
by the mind) except in unusual cases. Even the cases you would think most obvious,
say, pain or extreme pleasure, are not really cases of absorption in something
we make that only represents the real, but rather cases of narrowly focussed
perception of the real. To be entranced is not the same as to be absorbed in
our fabrications or daydreams (though it can be), but more often to have awareness
full of some real object, say, a person, or a song, or some real condition,
say, an earache. Normally, what we are aware of are the components in the (underivative)
situations we think of; but we can be totally absorbed, say, in stating our
view, and not aware of the component gestures, words, surroundings or even the
light. We can be so absorbed that we are not aware that we are self-aware. Another
kind of thinking is speculation where an imagined or conjectured situation is
the subject whose components are judged: e.g., we imagine tomorrow's confrontation
with a tax auditor. That is quite different from the thinking-to-be that is
habitual and has things and the features of things as components: the day to
be gray; the tea to be cold; the hand to hurt or to be tangled in a seat belt.
Such thinking, with imagined situations, invented images, and other creations
of thought is parasitic upon our ability to think with real things and conditions
as the constituents.
II. How Can Things Be Parts of Thoughts?
There are two ways: by representation and by transformation. Transformation
is fundamental and has two modes, animal awareness and human judgment. We are
concerned primarily with the transformation of animal awareness by which objects
of animal awareness become components of judgment. But we will not wholly ignore
the physical transformation by which an animal perceives its food, mates, habitat,
etc. However, explaining how animals perceive things is "the great problem"
I mentioned in the Preface. Representations, as parts of thoughts, are consequential,
incidental and arbitrary; as parts of the psycho-physical system (brain states),
they are a medium with-which but not, except in special cases, elements of awareness
or judgment.
One is forced into representationalism, (taken as the view that the immediate
objects of awareness are at most representations of the qualities of things)
by (i) the immediate awareness principle, (ii) the principle that some sensations
bear no resemblance to the distal features of objects that cause them, but are
species-specific reactions, while others do resemble features of the distal
causes (like shapes, sizes and distances), but not by replication or presentation
of those features, but by surrogates that are like them. Those principles were
generated by our supposing that all or almost all our cognitive states might
be defective in the ways some can be: by illusion, dreaming, madness, deception,
etc. We are then, like Descartes, supposed to find a firm footing from which
to construct the non-defective cognitive states. Instead, I propose to deny
the immediate awareness principle, and premise instead, that it is naturally
necessary that our experiences have the distal causes they present to us, even
though some of the features we perceive are species-specific as far as detection
goes, and many features of things that may be sensible to other animals may
be insensible (directly) to us: like the ultra-violet colors of flowers, to
which bees are sensitive, or the electro-magnetic field disturbances by which
some fish are aware of prey and predators, or high-pitched sounds audible to
dogs but not to us. Moreover, I emphasize the question: what is the natural
function for this sort of animal sensation (presentation, say, smells), as distinct
from detection (litmus paper, smoke detector) in perception?
1. We do not live in representations.
We do not live in representations (copies, videos) of things, probing the world
by habitual inference, like guards in an apartment house scanning floor-monitors.
Neither do animals. Nor do we live in a permanent Holographic-Heads-Up-Display
with innate graphics and sounds, etc. Representations, especially brain-state
encodings may be necessary to explain perception and feeling but they are not
sufficient and are not present to us.
Cartesian and Lockean representationalism are unconvincing; as Hume adroitly
showed, they lead to skepticism. If all you can directly experience are simulacra,
how can reason assure you that things are as science proposes? One way is by
Descartes' appeal to divine veracity, a route almost no one would take now.
Another way is idealism-phenomenalism: to say the material world is caused or
constituted by ideas -- in effect, to deny representationalism by denying that
there is anything replicated in the process of knowing but only presented. Phenomenalisms
were attempted and foundered repeatedly, as I mentioned. Yet representa-tionalism
keeps resurfacing, because it seems the only alternative to postulating magic
and perhaps because it seems the best basis for making machines that think.
Apparently machine cognition would require a device that converts inputs (that
are detection-responses to features of things), first into a replication and
then into appropriate actions. A mechanical player-piano is a simple detection-output
device like a thermostatic furnace, though there is no "inner display."
And, of course, there is no cognition either.
There is an ambiguity between "representation" as "replication
of information" (as the perforations in the piano-roll are turned into
mechanical leverage on the keys) and as "display that has to be 'read',"
as J. Fodor pointed out. The Dretske information/transformation plan (e.g.,
an electronic player piano) is simply not complex enough to explain an amoeba,
while the "display/read" plan implicitly reintroduces the inner seer
or "little mind" to read the displays, something we can be pretty
sure worms and computers do not have. Because neither disambiguation leads to
a plausible plan, it is no surprise that machine cognition fares so badly, while
robotics flourishes. The underlying notion of a cognitive system is defective
and no amount of supplementation with computational and connectivist hypotheses
will supply the key piece that is missing: the "display" requirement
that demands subjectivity. If the perceiver has to read the display to experience
the world, why not just have the perceiver read the world? That is my proposal.
There is simply no way that the behavior of a squirrel or a trout can be just
a software sequence of responses to environment, like a heliotrope or even the
leaf curling of a hydrangea during drought. Now that does not mean cognitive
science cannot succeed at elaborate information processing to do things we thought
impossible to do without subjectivity (like simulating master chess playing
with Big Blue), and also to make prosthetic-neural devices for humans and animals.
But cognitive science cannot convert information processing into cognition.
It is as if philosophers had agreed that there are two main models: Either the
material world, that includes our bodies, causes sensory states that are representations
of other material states, or the material world is somehow constituted by conscious
states. Looking at the bare bones of the options, neither seems remotely plausible,
and most of the field of relevant options seems to be ignored. I follow a realist
option in which there has to be a naturalistic account of animal consciousness
of its world, and of the animal basis of human awareness, even though we have
no more than promises from science so far, but an entirely different account
of intelligent thought [Chapter 6].
2. Some remarks on representationalism.
Where do appearances come from? For Descartes, sensory impressions are not the
"first state of awareness" caused by the last physical effect (the
brain state). Descartes was particularly clear that ideas are furnished by the
mind on the appropriate physical occasion, "by a special act of the mind"
[see his Conversation with Burman], acting within a correspondence of physical
states and soul-supplied qualities set up at entirely God's will, but for man's
benefit. The mind's sensing is its experiencing a quality that interprets some
brain state. Further, for Descartes, nothing but an intellectual soul senses,
so that animals are just robots, without interiority.
There is something to be learned from this, to which we will return: that nothing
physical is made-mental. We can also anticipate that whatever connection there
is between brain states (very probably as types) and impressions is naturally
necessary; and consequently, to suppose we might have had the same subjective
states in the absence of our brain states (as Descartes supposed) or even in
the absence of the necessary distal causes of such brain states (the physical
world) is to suppose an impossibility. Now I do not mean that direct electrical
or chemical stimulation of the brain cannot cause experiences that are indistinguishable
from distally caused experiences; but in the absence of natural distal causes,
brain states could not replicate or construct these experiences. That I might
be a brain in a vat is simply impossible. And we can also note that animals
must have interiority (what T. Nagel calls "subjectivity") though
that does not require a focussed, reflexive awareness or a subjectivity capable
of our feelings of hunger, grief, joy, etc. But it does require that a thing
lacking "res cognitans" can be made of micro-particles so arranged
that it is actively conscious and has its own (by type) subjectivity, e.g.,
"golden retriever-ness." Dogs and eagles can see. The contentedness
of grooming chimps, and the sadness of a widowed elephant is observable from
the behavior. That subjectivity can be very limited, as I conjecture it is with
worms, mites and robot-like insects. We have to avoid claiming that some physical
state turns into impressions; rather some physical states -- as part of a system
of such states -- are the medium of impressions, perceptions, emotions and actions.
And, apparently, there can be a vast variety among the brain-state media. Now
how do any physical states get to be the medium of sensation?
The traditional representational accounts, mainly applied to humans, just beg
the question. How would it explain a street-scene's being seen by me, to say
there is a street scene/appearance, made up of minimal (threshold) units of
appearance (something like an pointillist painting or a mosaic), of which units
I am immediately aware and from which I infer (or somehow construct) the street-scene?
First that entirely sidesteps the question of how the electro-chemical brain
states (or fluctuations among them) produce the elements of the appearance.
Secondly, the external perception problem is resolved by postulating an inner
seer, hearer, etc., of impressions, for which (homunculus) there is no account,
and from which the homunculus has to infer or construct, with doubtful accuracy,
the external scene. How? There should thus be two experiences, one of the combined
units and the other of external awareness along with an explanation of how the
second is made out of the first. But we have only the latter.
Further, there is no way to explain how the units can appear to the homunculus.
The "inner theater of experience" doubles the problems: who is in
the theater having the experience, why does its experience have distinct but
unified sensory modes, and how does that spectator know the inner theater presents
the external reality? Would we really suppose there are fish-personae behind
fish eyes, and mice-personae behind mice ears, etc.? Materialist representatonalists
are implicit dualists, as David Braine claimed [1993]. Even Dennett backs into
dualism by making intentionality of a system attributional; that is, a feature
of a system resultant from what counts as the "best explanation of its
behavior" by another (intentional) system -- an external homunculus. No
gain. Physicalists, and materialists generally, are dualists, supposing that
even animals have a theater of experience with an unmentioned inner subject,
whose experience is logically independent of its distal causes, and, these,
might have happened without them. Among idealists, the "subject of human
experience" gradually became a "transcendental ego" lying beyond
experience but "having" it; thus, a second kind of dualism came into
fashion and is to be found, I think, even in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, as well
as in later writers.
One thing a nondualist has to share with the most dedicated physicalist is that
the animal's fears, rage, hunger, desire and hurt -- not all of them have all
of those, of course -- by which they act in their econiches according to their
kinds, are real. So also is their perception, whether by smell, taste, touch,
sight, hearing or otherwise, real. How that can be must not remain unexplained.
Four key points in representationalist stories are inexplicable: (1) how brain
states become (or are the medium for) representations that are displayed; (2)
who the inner seer of the displayed representations is; (3) how the self, that
has experiences that representations display for it, finds out that the world
is as displayed; and (4) how the animal might have had the same experiences
absent any distal causes at all.
Another difficulty with representational accounts of cognition is that representations
are far more arbitrary than is usually suggested. People who draw badly readily
recognize how arbitrary representation-relations may be, and how dependent upon
internal contrasts among one another:
=happy?
(sad?) (person?) (learned person strutting?)
You encounter a form of skepticism: that, of course, the representations present something, but how closely does that replicate the world?
Some won't want to reconsider the direct realism options because, like Putnam
[Nussbaum and A. Rorty, 1992], they can't see how to solve the problems they
find, particularly about the status of real natures and the identity of the
understanding with what is understood (though they don't seem to doubt that
my piano playing can be the same as the scale played). Theirs are justified
hesitancies. Yet, there is a lot to learn just from the fact that Aristotle's
limitations on some points lie exactly where the Modern and Post-Modern philosophers
have been stumped too.
For instance, Aristotle did not offer any explanation of how sensory appearances
are made at all; he just postulated, on observation, that matter, the elements,
can be arranged to form a sensitive substance. That seems obvious with birds,
bees, fish, and animals generally, even though we cannot explain how it is accomplished.
In fact, in De Sensu et Sensibile [1984 edition, 438(a), 13], arguing that the
eye is transparent, Aristotle seems to think the appearances of things (the
color) passes through the colorless eye on inside us so that the sense ability
becomes the color. In another passage from De Anima Aristotle seems to say the
sense organ is not colored by the color it responds to, but the actuality of
the sense-power is the actuality of the sensible object qua thus sensible, that
is, the actuality of the color-sensory power is the color of the object (that
is what I think Aristotle means). But Aristotle does not provide a physiology
for such a process or even show how there could be any physiology to explain
it. And, on that point, he was stumped right where we still are.
Still, Aristotle makes persuasive that the sensory consciousness of humans is
analogous to that of other animals. The reason it is analogous, rather than
exactly the same, is that in humans there is never "just" animal awareness;
it is always suffused with understanding (even if very limited or infantile)
because the intellectus agens, the "making intellect" is always "on."
Animals perceive, not just sense; animal cognition is a continuing part of human
cognition, though transformed by intelligence. Understanding is a constant transformation
of animal awareness (for humans); it is not understanding that makes perception
because unintelligent animals can perceive; rather, intelligence makes perceptual
judgments that are true or false. Animals do something like judging; they perceive,
but not with content that is true or false but only accurate or erroneous (measured
by payoff). And, of course, as I elaborate that basic position, it also turns
out that the vital principle in humans that is the principle of both intelligence
and sentience is not a material principle, as it is in animals. It is not material
software at all.
3. Internal to external awareness. No.
Rationalist and empiricist accounts of human knowledge have another defect.
They explain knowing as if we progress from internal objects of cognition --
our ideas and impressions -- to external objects and situations. In fact even
recent and analytically acute accounts, e.g., R. Chisholm's accounts of the
immediately evident, follow that order. So do Lockean representationalism and
all the forms of sense-data phenomenalism. But, go back a step. Suppose we do
not (individually, or philogenetically) develop from a state of "internal"
awareness (say, of the immediately evident, the phenomenal) to "external"
awareness, say, from a state of impression-awareness to a state of object awareness.
Suppose, instead, we mature individually from chaotic infantile "well-being"
awareness, unpolarized, neither internal nor external, with motor responses
(cries, movements), propelled by contentment, hunger, pain, rage and fear and
abandonment, that gradually become refined external awareness of people, objects,
conditions and ourselves, that are in a dream-like externality that gradually
"clears" of haziness to crisp external consciousness. Suppose we are
eventually or concomitantly socialized to internal "awareness and centeredness,"
to a self-awareness organized by a self-conception that we learn, and suppose
we mature as we grow toward adolescence by "knitting together islands of
consciousness" [cf. C. Jung], so that portions of our experience are not
dissociated from one another -- though for most people there will always be
gaps, sometimes surprising ones. Suppose inner life is not the progenitor of
the external life, but is its offspring. Suppose only higher animals have "knitted
together islands of consciousness" amounting to a continent of organized
self-awareness that includes will directed to what we understand (personhood);
suppose that other animals, to various degrees, have blank unconnection between
hunger and mating, or imagining and acting (though they may be related and ordered
by instinct). Then we can start the explanation of knowledge in a different
place: Externality is first, even for intelligent animals.
4. Aristotle and Descartes: Nothing physical becomes mental.
It's an old principle found in Plato, employed by Aristotle and Descartes, that
no material cause has an immaterial effect. Formulated more particularly, nothing
physical becomes mental. Consciousness, even animal consciousness is not a condition
of material being, qua material, otherwise all of matter would be conscious.
So, philosophy that claims there is only undifferentiated basic matter under
one set of universal organizing laws and no inherent structures to things, no
specialized software in things, has to be mistaken because all of matter is
not alive, nor is it aware. Another step is needed in this reasoning because
not all matter is machinery either. But no one doubts, now, that classical mechanical
principles are not the whole of basic physics. So, why not a supplemented physics
as the explanation of life and sensation? Especially physics that includes chemistry?
The organization by which some matter is alive is as real (and variegated) as
is the arrangements by which field-stones can be made into walls; in fact, there
seem to be between 100,000 and two million basic molecular arrangements sufficient
for a living thing. There is no single software for life. Nor is there for sensation,
perception or animal action. To say that the arrangement or organization that
uses the obediential ability of the components is not as real as the components
and their passive capacities is to leave a complete pile of radio parts and
a functioning radio without an explanatory difference or a pile of squared stones
and a buttress or arch as no different. Whether the organization is reducible
to or a consequence from universal physical law has nothing to do with its reality
in the organized thing. The organization of the stones is just as real and effective
as the buttress.
Nevertheless, the principle that nothing physical becomes mental operates differently
for Aristotle than for Augustine (sentire non est corporis) and Descartes. For
Aristotle sensation, feeling, memory, imagination, imperfect will and action
(a kind of agency) are within the ability of some physical things, animals,
and do not originate in an immaterial soul, whereas both Augustine and Descartes
thought action, sensation, perception, and feeling, like understanding, originate
only from an immaterial, intelligent soul.
Moreover we get nowhere, to say that the very same thing that is the last physical
effect, a brain state, is also the first thought-unit, a sensation, without
explaining the cause of (and the quality of) the subjectivity. Whether the last
effect is an electro-chemical charge-pattern or a fluctuation (function) among
them makes no difference: what makes it "a content of sensory awareness,"
something felt, seen, heard, smelled, tasted, a touch, or feeling? Is there
emergence? It was never widely believed that something has the effect of turning
the physical into the mental. Instead, there was prevalent Augustinean/Cartesian
talk of "the mind's attending to" the states of the body, and Descartes
talks of the soul's attending to states of the brain -- what I have called "scanning"
the body, apparently by some super-awareness that precedes, and is not, sensation
or perception. But that tradition just seems to repeat what is to be explained.
For such talk supposes the body and its states appear as contents within the
scanning mind, like parts of a mountain within the scanning binoculars. If the
mind provides the contents of the scan (as Descartes says it does because all
ideas are innate), then, strictly, how is it "attending to the states of
the body"? By producing the sensory correlates (by divine decree) of the
bodily condition? But how does it know when to produce a correlate? And, thus,
how can the soul know the bodily condition? The soul's loving vigilance seems
vacant. If it could know the bodily condition directly, there would be no need
to produce a correlated impression. Failure of that sort of account invited
the psycho-physical parallelism (ideas/material mode identity) of Spinoza and
the pre-established harmony of Leibniz, though neither of those views explains
the presence of ideas to the soul.
Aristotle did not succeed either. Abstraction from phantasms (unified sensory
appearances that contain forms), might explain conception; but no explanation
was offered for how the cause (a bell's ringing) of the unappearing stimuli
(say, sound waves) becomes an appearance (sound) which is the same as the condition
of the active bell heard, except to postulate an organ whose function is to
hear and whose response to the signal is the same as what causally originated
the signal. Some of the late medieval Aristoteleans developed theories as to
how the form of the physical trait (light) could be transmitted materially without
informing the medium, to become the form of the sense power [Simmons, 1994].
Sound and smell do, of course, inform the atmosphere. Hearing is not like a
radio broadcast of a concert, where the sound is turned into the broadcast signal,
received as radio waves, amplified, converted into magnetic impulses and reproduced
(on speakers) as sound. For the sound heard in that case is not the original
sound but another sound, as much like the first as technology can make it. That
is not Aristotle's idea: the sound perceived is the same sound the bell makes.
So, too, the color perceived is the color of the brick, the smell is the smell
of the rose.
Aristotle may have been on to something. The telephone presents mechanically
the same structure as a radio, though the transmittal signal is low voltage
electricity, except that because of the phenomenon George Mavrodes [1970] called
"input alignment," we can hear and talk to the person calling even
though the sound by which we do it is a high-quality effect of the sound the
speaker is making. Yet the statements, questions and feelings we hear, via high
quality replicas of the speaker's sounds are what the speaker says, etc. So
Aristotle's basic idea is one we can illustrate in human perception and understanding.
Nevertheless, it seems to me now that perception is not done by a reconstitution
of the features by which something is perceived, not even by digitally perfect
reconstitution that would leave no physical difference between the originating
quality and the qualities sensed. For that would still leave us with two kinds
of hearing: the hearing that senses sounds and the hearing that hears things,
bells, voices and people. No, the best account, even if it deviates from Aristotle's
intention is that, normally, the animal perceives things or the features of
things. How the brain accomplishes that is, admittedly, a mystery so far. But
how the brain accomplishes any reconstitution, as described above, is an even
greater mystery because it requires an additional awareness of sensation besides
awareness by sensation.
Aristotle's idea, I think, is that a sensory system is one whose response to
the transmitting signal (e.g., to certain shaped molecules fitting into places
in the nasal system and triggering a neural-brain response electro-chemically,
as we describe smell today) is the feature transmitted: the original smell and
not just an effect of it as the red color of blue litmus paper is an effect
of acid, or even a perfect reconstitution of the original. That is, it is not
by way of input alignment, as we can see the moon through a reflecting telescope
presenting a moon-image on the mirror [Mavrodes, 1970], that we see a person.
Rather a sensory ability is made actually to sense (hear, see, smell, taste,
feel with a certain content) by the very feature whose signal-effect is transmitted
through the medium physically to affect the sense organ including the neural
system and what we now know are the responsive areas of the brain. The sense
organ undergoes physical changes from the signal, but sensation is the activity
whose content is the feature of the object sensed that distinguishes a sense
from a detecting device (light meter or litmus paper) whose response is caused
by a feature of things that is neither the same as, nor is any mode of experience.
Now sensation is not ipso facto perception; organization is needed for perception,
even for perception that falls below direct attention. Thus perception is complex
sensation that instinctively (and from learning) presents something to the animal,
eliciting action that is proprioceptive as well. That was the idea. But how
such a system can actually exist physically has to be explained and so far,
cannot be, though, as my telephone example illustrates, we certainly do experience
the very statements and questions and the real presence of another person, and
actually have heard the person speaking to us. There really is not that much
difference, as far as perception goes, between seeing something by way of a
mirror and seeing it by way of a video camera. But that is unlike visual perception
generally because both cases require one kind of seeing (the image) for seeing
the other (the original). The right account of normal perception is not by input
alignment of a feature transmitted by a signal and reconstituted as a sensation.
Rather, the perception is a mode of direct awareness.
Moreover, all other accounts of sensation that proceed by causation of a signal
from a distal source stimulating the signal-sensitive organ and neural path
to a sensitive brain sector, end in the proposal that an inner sensory effect,
like the voice-sound on a telephone, is produced in the animal and that in response
to that, the animal detects a distal feature of the thing, apparently having
learned to recognize things from their appearances. But that adds a stage to
what the Aristotelians could not explain: for now we have the "presentation
of a representation to awareness," inner seeings, hearings, etc., and some
kind of process by which the animal adjusts its actions to its impressions,
as if it were an HHUD-system: two more physically unexplainable steps. And the
inner subject now has a new task: to reason (or act by instinct in animals?)
from the HHUD display to the features of the world that may not even resemble
the features of the display [cf. Descartes, quoted above; Sellars, 1963; P.M.
Churchland, 1979 and 1995]. There is even less explanation of how to realize
that situation physically than there is for the my supplemented Aristotelian
view. In fact whatever physics/biology/neurology would explain the latter representationalist
story can be adapted to explain the direct perception story. After all, if I
can hear you when the sound I hear is a reconstruction by magnetic impulses
of the sound you make, then in principle, if you were in the room, I could hear
you directly.
Aristotle as I present and supplement him may appear to require magic; but the
representationalists require magic twice: (i) about conscious response from
a physical change in the brain and (ii) about how the animal gets from the subjective
to the objective world. The only magic required for animal perception on my
account is how the brain can digitally present the very qualities of the object.
The heart of the issue, which also divides the interpreters of Aristotle, is
whether (1) sensation is by a transformation from physical signal to sensing
response, where the originating physical reality is replicated (duplicated =
species) in a sensory response (phantasm), though the real object or its quality
is what is perceived, or (2) whether the sensation that is the response is the
very feature of the thing (present intentionally) that initiates the chain of
causation. I favor the latter, regardless of which is the better reading of
Aristotle. In either case, the higher animal's perceived world is considerably
like ours, absent all the "whatness" of it, and adjusted species-wise
as to what features are perceived in things (e.g., ultraviolet color for bees
and black and white from low-angled wide-scan for the visual world of dogs).
Another limitation of that general outline, in addition to the mystery as to
how to realize it physically, is that it does not explain exactly how the eye
presents colored things, rather than just detects them, the way a smoke detector
detects but does not smell smoke. For it is the intention of the Aristoteleans
from the beginning that perception is awareness of the real features of things
(colors, tastes, textures, odors and sounds) and though them, of the common
sensibles (shape, size, weight, etc.) and through them, of things as behavioral
entities, substances and, for humans, coincident pre-scientific grasp of the
natures of things (e.g., of potatoes vs. tomatoes).
Detection, unlike sensation, produces no cognition unless attached to an interpreter,
and usually, like a thermostat, has no cognitive role, but only serves in a
system, that is arranged to start, stop and modulate activities. Thus the automatic
landing system on airplanes links altitudes speed/pitch, attitude, and other
detectors through a computer to position the hydraulic systems that control
the plane and, by constant feedback, to land it. The entire system is just an
elaborate version of an automatic pilot for a sailboat, the whole being a servo-mechanism
with a target. Sensation is quite unlike that. Its function is to contribute
to a species-specific presence of other things which elicits instinctive (and
learned) action. The intervening presence (which can be very primitive) is what
needs explaining, even admitting borderline cases (e.g., one-celled animals
and certain plants that do not sense, or if they do, do not perceive). What
is the function of presence and feeling in nature, that could not be performed
by detection systems without subjectivity?
For Aristotelians, the function of sensation is perception which in turn has
as its function action for animal-well-being. Sensation is the means of perception
which is the presence of things to animals. Animals don't just detect predators
and prey; they see them, hear, smell, taste, and touch them. But the presence
of things-understood to humans requires an activity peculiar to humans, not
using a material organ but transforming the product of material organs, phases
of animal consciousness, into universality (conception) that in the atmosphere
of desire and consent, prompts judgment. The basic activity is dematerialization
by which form is separated from its matter (like fluorescence that makes bone
emit white light) so as to be content for understanding. Aristotle explicitly
describes abstraction as an operation upon the phantasm [De An. III and Aquinas'
Summa Theologica, I, q.84, a.6], that is, upon the sensus communis-product of
animal sensation. On my account, the normal object of abstraction is the thing-perceived,
not its appearance alone. So animal cognition is the base, the platform, for
human understanding. In fact, without a sensory medium there can be no new experience
at all. Normally it is by appearances that we perceive things and only rarely
do we perceive the appearances; but we can do that with an effort if we want
and by happenstance when we realize we seem to be moving but really are not
because something else is.
Lest the idea of internested emergent systems seem a mere promise, here are
some brief observations. First, there is a simple notion of active form: take
stones, not actually able to pile themselves into a stable wall, and assemble
them according to their balance, shape, angle, etc., into patterns where they
hold one another in place, form a straight line, slope inward from the bottom,
etc., where no forces beyond general physical forces (gravity, push and heave
from frost, vibration, from traffic, freezing water, etc.), operate, but where
the arrangement, which is obviously real and from the hands of the wall-builder,
orders those parts and takes advantage of all those forces to hold the stones
in place, the sides vertical and the top level and all the supporting courses
in place. The complex arrangement is an active form, so complicated we can only
describe it schematically yet all it does is channel otherwise existing forces.
A more elaborate version of such real structures is the Roman aqueducts and
the Roman highways that stand after 2,000 years. That is structure entirely
realized materially, but involving no active forces other than physical, gravitational,
mechanical (and in some cases hydraulic) forces, but ordering the effects of
such forces into structures that have long-term stability, etc. We cannot analyze
the success of such building without notions like "thrust," "balance,"
"support," all active characterizations of what the design does. Design,
in such structures, and in buildings and in ships, is real, intrinsic and active
form. It is entirely material.
I will not go into other kinds of arrangements, such as inner mechanisms in
mechanical clocks, internal combustion engines, a toilet, a stone sewer system,
the structure of buildings and the like until Chapter 7, beyond noting that
they are all examples of active design. There are many more elaborate real designs
and forms that are arrangements of the material propensities of things to achieve
certain effects, some of which come about by the general course of nature, like
tectonic plate movement, glacier movement, river bends, mountain ranges, and
many others by intellectual fashioning, the way flint knives and arrow tips
were made, as well as rifles, assault weapons and drones.
That loose family of forms -- all involving organization of "passive"
elements under general natural forces -- contrasts with various other kinds
of composition in which the forces operate differently, in effect, under regularities
they could not initiate on their own. That is the basic notion of an emergent-system:
regularity of behavior achieved by structurally ordering the active natural
capacities of things toward effects attributable to the structural ordering,
which the separate capacities could not achieve on their own. The evolution
of vision and hearing are examples. A forest fire has to be ignited by chance
or intent or necessity (from an adjacent one), but what happens after ignition
is determined by a mixture of the active and passive dispositions of components,
prevailing winds, moisture, etc., until a level of ferocity is reached where
the individual components and large groups of them are irrelevant to the fury.
The whole forest fire forms a unity that progresses under laws that are not
laws of the components, as is also true of ocean waves.
Such, in rough outline to be refined later, are "emergent systems,"
where the system behavior is beyond the active ability of the components, and
where the active and passive abilities of the components are "ordered"
to behavioral outcomes that, however, employ no forces other than universal
physical forces, as particularized to mechanical, hydraulic, heat, electrical,
magnetic, wind, moisture, gravity, atmospheric disturbance, and the like. So
the emergent form is entirely in the successful arrangement of natural forces
in appropriate materials to achieve the outcome (a forest fire, or a larva flow,
or a volcanic eruption). Bending sharp metal strips and hinging them is enough
for a scissors.
That contrasts dramatically with the second phylum of emergent systems: where
the system-behavior is beyond the active and passive abilities of the components,
for instance, sensation or activity from desire.
Now I suspect that the explanatory principles of plant and animal life belong
to the universal causal principles of nature but are conceptually underivable
from the ideally perfect universal physics, even if we could ever get one. Thus,
even though the ultimate components of animals and plants are all nothing but
cases of the universal particles, fields and forces, the organizing principles
by which they can be arranged into individual living and sentient things are,
in principle, underivable from the universal cosmic physics, though they are
principles of physical organization just as the jet stream laws and atmospheric
laws are as well. Thus, I consider such designs to be emergent, rather than
resultant or consequential.
For now, distinguish the subject of explaining animal cognition from that of
explaining intelligent consciousness because the latter involves abstraction
that is coincident with animal awareness and, if Chapter 6 is right, cannot
be physically realized.
Physicalists are right up to a point: sensation, which is definitive of animals,
has to be a feature of suitably organized material systems: of birds and dogs.
You do not need an immaterial soul or mind for sensation, or perception. But
physicalists are wrong to suppose there is no subjectivity peculiar to the various
animal species and fail, thereby, to carry their share of the burden: to show
how perceptual subjectivity and the perceptual presence of real things can be
physically realized and why it is an evolutionary outcome, instead of mere detection
systems. We need something more than the universal principles of physical organization,
and, as we know now, more than the electro-chemical arrangement of matter which
occurs in a radio or camera. That is, the system, or as I call it "software"
realized physically, has to be intrinsic to the animal (not extrinsic as in
printing or in a painting) and has to be more than the general principles of
physics and electronics and chemistry and biology, yet realizable in the physical-chemical-biological
systems as operating systems, just as WordPerfect and Lotus Spreadsheet can
be realized in DOS, or OS2 or Unix, which in turn require certain machine languages
and eventually, certain physical hardware and electron behavior, and in the
end, the same physical particles, forces and fields that make up the cosmos.
The principles of percipient organization have to be additional to the universal
principles of matter and of plant life because only some physical things are
sentient, percipient, or even living things. As Aristotle said, "For living
things it is living that is existing" [De An., II, 415.b, 14].
There seems to be no option but for all disputants to agree that the physical
realization of percipient subjectivity and action has to be explained, even
if that requires a whole new inquiry into emergent systems, or even an evolution
in the notion of scientific explanation. Secondly, we are not trying to figure
out how in nature matter organizes to produce an inner-theater of experience
in a physical thing, but rather an "outer-experience" of other things
and of itself with a species-peculiar subjectivity to it.
If we eliminate two defeating models for dealing with the mental, we can make
it pretty obvious, first that other animals, too, have to have real things as
components of their awareness, and that human thought begins the same way, but
involves additional activities that eventuate in judgments for whose truth and
falsity we need explanations. We can then evaluate standard theories of truth
and prepare for another one.
III. Two Defeating Models
1. First defeating model.
It has been proposed that the last cerebral state (in the chain of causation
from a distal stimulus) is a sensation. We know it cannot be a token-token identity,
because other people have the same sensations. It cannot be a human type-token
identity because things of other kinds have the same sensations (both cats and
dogs have "milk-taste"). And in general we can conclude there are
resembling subjective states in many species from the anatomical and functional
similarity of the perceptual organs, and from their differences, too, e.g.,
the different construction of the eyes of certain fish that see above and below
water, and birds that have a telescopic center of otherwise wide-vision, with
the result that there is not one type organ-cerebral state that is identical
with any given sensation-type.
Functionalism was supposed to get around such limitations because one could
suppose the same function among widely variant cerebral states, just as one
function "auto focus" is done in cameras by three different physical
systems. But functionalism has turned out to be empty. Although the hypothesis
would escape the token and type identity problems, input-output correlations
cannot determine the content of such a function tightly enough to determine
a perception, sensation, or thought, any more than a mapping of inputs to outputs
can determine a mathematical function uniquely [see Chapter 6 for the argument
and the consequences].
In one way, content-failure may be the best news in a long time. For the "content"
of the function is the story that gives the best explanation of the succession
of input (which is determined by organ stimuli) to output (in the animal's behavior).
That is, the precise content of the "inner state of awareness" cannot
be uniquely determined by any input (physical stimulus) to output (animal action)
"best explanation," because there are always competitors, mutually
incompatible. The result is that the content of the subjective state is not
determined by the best explanation of the causal regularity of input (stimulus)
to output (action), and thus, the content of the inner state cannot be the same
as "the" function of input to output, for there is no such thing as
"the" function. So identity of brain state (or functions among them)
with the subjective sensory states of animals turns out to be a defeating model
of the mental-state relationship. That at least draws attention back to our
main objective: to explain how an animal (without an immaterial soul) can experience
itself and other real things and actions.
Many philosophers by varying paths got to saying matter can't cause knowledge,
and that the mind must either transform the material to make it intelligible
(Aristotle) or somehow constitute the objects (Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, and
later Idealism and phenomenalism) or get its objects elsewhere (Plato's recollection,
Augustine's illumination, and Descartes' innatism). But notice, the Aristotelians
did not regard animal cognition as from an immaterial soul, but from a material
form destroyed with the animal. And they thought there is animal cognition.
Later medieval Aristotelians who followed Aquinas on the unity of the substantial
form in a human (denying the Bonaventurian proposal of an addition forma corporeatatis)
did hold that even the animal portion of human consciousness is from an immaterial
indestructible principle, as is the being of the composite itself, though because
the matter is corruptible, so are the animal powers. The human is able to sense
by the immaterial soul but can be made unable to sense by indisposition of the
flesh. They did not regard animal cognition, feeling and volition as "mental"
in the sense in which Augustine, Descartes and Berkeley did. That first impediment
that supposed all mentality to require an immaterial soul, can simply be ignored
now. We can re-instate an Aristotelian realism that animal cognition is from
a material design (form), but that means we have to take seriously the idea
that there are real, causally active structures (forms) in nature [the point
of Chapter 7], that are the suitable objects of intelligent understanding [Chapter
5].
A second impediment from the "way of ideas" is the corollary that
cognition proceeds from subjective awareness (of sensation, feeling and volition)
to outer, external awareness of things and action, (as the section "Internal
to External" above observed); we reject that because its explanatory gap,
"the veil of perception," invites skepticism. Instead, we ought to
give more weight to our limited observations that suggest that in higher animals
(horses, apes, dogs and birds), sensation configures the external (e.g., the
bodily and the surrounding), but not qua external, because it is not presented
in contrast with anything. The species-determinate subjectivity of animals is
not in what they focus on internally, but is the sensory and emotional modality
by which the external, including their own bodies, is presented and manipulated.
Understanding requires our doing something to whatever perception presents.
What we do is treated separately [Chapter 5]. For that to happen, something
makes the physical appear, by colors, sounds, shapes, smells, feels, with shape,
weight, velocity, location and distance (not as we see or smell them consciously
with concomitant conception), but as they can be to us when entranced, and are
in animals. It is the latter that matter is passively capable of and in suitable
conditions, emergently able to achieve. Human awareness adds a constant transformation
of animal awareness by coincident removal of particularity in one or another
respect -- what I call dematerialization -- with preservation of particular
awareness.
The best working stance is that the "last physical" effect in the
appropriate cerebral area is not identical with or turned into a sensory state,
but that the entire system of brain states at the appropriate level, is material-in-which
a further real material structure (which organizes the whole animal body and
makes it alive as well as sentient) is realized, the way WordPerfect can be
realized electronically in a computer. In animals, the specific form has to
be intrinsic and throughout the whole animal right down to the cells. "Being
a rabbit" is a form, an organization by which certain organic matter is
made into a rabbit; it is what disappears with death.
In addition to the explanatory relation having to hold among systems (for defects
in a brain area defeat sensation or action of that kind, unless the activity
is reassigned), the explanatory order has to parallel that between meaning and
marks: the explanation has to go downward from the perception and action of
the whole animal to its brain states (or fluctuations among them) and behavior.
For an animal, perception and action as a whole has to explain the cerebral
function as a whole. Thus the principle has to be a material structure, a form,
of which the physical elements are obedientially capable, the way silicon and
metal parts can be made into a radio. It is as if there were a formula that
the animal cell-parts have to satisfy the way there can be a radio-plan that
the parts have to satisfy for the radio to function. Perception is for the animal;
the brain and organ states are for the perception.
When we reject the "way of ideas" and the resulting "veil of
perception" for animals, and say sensations are not produced by an immaterial
soul and that animal perception and action is not the same as an internal cerebral
state and that the external causes are naturally necessary for the animal perceptions
and actions (so that animals could not have the same experiences absent their
material external causes), then we are ready to recognize that even for animals,
real things are components of animal awareness. That provides a fluid transition
to the idea that natural human cognition is always a transformation (by dematerialization)
of the platform animal cognition and action.
2. Second defeating model: Attributional-intentionality.
This can be disposed of quickly since it has already been described. D. Dennett
[1978] said the intentionality of a system is equivalent to whether the best
explanation of its behavior requires ascription of mental states to it. Hydrangeas
wilt in hot weather to reduce the area exposed to the sun's evaporation, so
they can survive long heat and drought. We might say, "the hydrangea knows
how to conserve its water supply by reducing the evaporation area of its leaves."
This is an example of treating a material system as an intentional system, with
attributed intentionality. But that attribution is not required for the best
explanation. So we do not say literally that the plant knows what to do. Similarly,
we use metaphors in talking about computers: "it stores it," "it
recalls it," "it spells it right." We say of cars, "that
car wants to pull to the right." We say the stock market reacted with fear
to rising prices of consumer goods. These are metaphors for easy description
but not part of the best explanation, so no mentality is literally attributed.
But with humans and animals we do attribute mental states, both at the thought-level
for humans and at the sensation/perception and limited-volition and action level
for animals: e.g., The dog wants to go out; the dog won't walk that way. It
is a long and unjustified reductive step, of course, for Dennett [1978 and 1987]
to say that such an attribution's being needed for the best explanation of the
behavior is what, and only what, the mentality consists in. That also revises
of what we mean, and thus commits a key error in philosophy: telling people
who know the language that they really mean something other than what they think
they mean.
Sometimes we talk mentalistically of groups, "the crowd panicked,"
"the stock market tried again to maintain the week's averages", "the
cars moved so close together they forced the average speed down"; and we
even attribute common consciousness to groups "the mob went wild, tried
to trample the soldiers, retreated a few blocks, reorganized and rushed to burn
the palace." The fact that we attribute intentional states is not sufficient
for mentality; also required by Dennett is that such attributions be needed
for the best explanation of the behavior. But even where that condition is satisfied,
we have justified only the attribution of mentality, not the predication of
it. The problem with the view comes, not because unnatural entities, e.g., utility
power systems, the flow of traffic, and the Dow Jones average would as well
as animals have to be regarded as intentional, bad as that is, but from something
else.
The rock bottom objection is that the ascriptive-intentionality of systems,
say of a utility's power distribution system, conceptually presupposes that
there are systems that are inherently intentional. But such notions of (non-attributive)
intentionality have not been explained or allowed for by Dennett at all. In
fact, they were supposed to be displaced. But some things have to think, really
(and non-denominatively), in order for the description of other things, as if
they think (the attribution of intentionality), to be part of the best explanation
of their behavior. For if nothing really thought at all, then descriptions of
things as thinking systems would not be part of the best explanation of any
behavior at all. In fact, such descriptions would not exist. The form of Dennett's
explanation precludes its own success.
How scientifically to explain animal consciousness requires a reconception.
The problem has to be formulated as to how to design a system that responds
to its environment with actions it originates, for the success of which a presentation
of parts of its environment and of itself is indispensable. There is obviously
no advantage in an automatic sprinkler system's smelling, rather than detecting
smoke. What is the advantage of smell to dogs? Some animals get by with sensation
without perception; the ones in classes close to mammals have perception as
well. For them, what is presented is presented as a feature of a distant or
ambient object, or of the animal itself.
3. Now what can we conclude from all this?
First, that although the models and metaphors we looked at are faulty and misleading,
still, the explanation of animal cognition is largely a matter for physical
and biological sciences, since sensory cognition has to be a power (very probably
an emergent one) of physical systems. But the manner of explanation will have
to be in terms of real, dynamic material structures (forms) that can be physically
realized, and can organize organic matter "from the top down" into
percipient entities, aware of other real entities and of some of their own bodily
parts and states, not by replication, simulation, simulacra or representation.
Secondly, the "way of ideas" will have no function in our explaining
basic cognition, whether for humans or animals. Just the opposite at the basic
level of cognition, the constituents of awareness have to be real things and
their conditions, without generality for other animals and concomitantly particular
and generalized for humans. Rejecting parallelisms of the mental (whether of
thought, ideas, sensation or volition) and of an external reality for animal
cognition, I can now turn to specific reasons for rejecting parallelisms of
judgment and reality to account for truth. That will include any sort of "matchup,"
"work out," "hang-together" account of human truth offered
as a global account of truth. Thus, I do not begin by asking whether bifurcation
for all truth-bearers is to be supposed, or whether there is one or more cognitive
element(s) in the notion of truth (like cognitive accessibility, warranted assertability,
in principle verifiability, pragmatic success, fulfillment of expectation, etc.)
or even whether truth, globally, requires "a fact of the matter" and
whether such "facts of the matter" have to be independent of our conceptions
and judgments.
One can already anticipate from the plasticity of the notion "true"
that the phenomena are an analogous multitude, with local phenomena exhibiting
the above mentioned features variously according to the discourse. As a result,
one cannot follow the recipe that M. Dummett sketched [1991] for determining
from the logic applicable in various sectors of discourse whether the phenomena
purportedly discussed are real or not. For he did not make it persuasive that
non-classical logic assures any irrealism at all. Nor can we accept Crispin
Wright's proposal [1992] that there is a "core notion of truth" with
accidental variants by context. Instead, we have to acknowledge that "true"
means different things and has different conditions of applicability in diverse
discourses [see Wiggins, 1980, for similar claims], and then concentrate upon
providing some real content for what otherwise comes out to be a truism, but
the only survivor for a global notion: that what I think is true just in case
what I think is what is so.
IV. Bad Global Theories of Truth
In sum: The worst is a match-up, correspondence theory, because it is naively
attractive yet no match will explain truth, as we will see. "Coherence"
and "pragmatic" theories are sometimes locally useful, but are circular
and self-destructive as global theories. The others, like the emotive, redundancy,
and the disquotational theories do nothing to explain truth or falsity and cannot
accommodate a large part of our usage of the notions. Does anyone seriously
think that none of our judgments would be true if we simply dispensed with any
metajudgmental predicate like "true" except where we need it in indirect
discourse? I want to explain the relationship between my judgment that it is
raining and it's actually raining, without any concern for the word "true."
1. No correspondence.
No correspondence of pairs with different components assures or explains any
kind of truth: not sentence-parts corresponding with fact-parts; not thought-parts
corresponding with reality-parts. Correspondence of pairs of things, like truthbearing
sentences with truthmaking facts, is not like meshing the gears so as to make
the sentence true. Such a "meshing the gears" is just what no philosopher
has been able to describe. Similarly, to say some thoughts, statements or even
sentences are somehow copies of pieces of reality, and thereby true, has turned
out an empty promise: no one can show how any such thing could be a copy of
reality and, even if it could be, why that would make it true.
Philosophers recently tried to explain the truth of what we say by way of features
of what we say it with, treating "is true" as a semantic notion. Sometimes
it is sentences whose assembly is supposed to key into the world. Sometimes
it is abstractions smoked out of utterances: namely, statements, or propositions,
whose internal assembly is supposed to match or fit the facts. They all meet
the same fate. What makes what we say true or false is not features of the expression
of judgment, or of abstractions from it, like propositions, but thought.
Part by part metaphysics, like "scale modelings," "mechanical
drawings," or "pictures" [Wittgenstein, 1922] will not explain
any truth: not formal truth, natural necessities, empirical generalizations,
empirical conclusions, empirical inferences, abstract generalizations or simple
observations. Basically there are two reasons.
The double decomposition into ultimate component parts, parts of reality and
parts of thought (or parts of sentences) pair by pair, has never been delivered.
B. Russell and L. Wittgenstein proposed such parallel decompositions for atomic
propositions and atomic facts, so that for Wittgenstein the true atomic proposition
is a picture of an atomic fact. But their ontic accounts of the "parts"
were unconvincing. Besides, a parallel decomposition into ultimate semantic
components is not even coherent. Unless there is a universal semantics for all
3,000+ extant natural languages, why should some ultimate analysis of "I
have two jobs" in each, match up with the "ultimate ontological components"
of the situation? Yet if the match is not of ultimate decompositions, what matches
what? Had the "semantic marker" idea panned out and held up throughout
contextual adaptation that causes polsemy, one side of the decomposition might
have been plausible. But the ontic decomposition would fail anyway. Russell's
"complete complexes of compresence" was a disappointing candidate
for the latter.
No match-up, one by one, of parts of a truthbearer and compliant reality will
make a truthbearer true, anyway. The parallel assemblies would have to gear
together to do something we could see to be "being true." The picture
theory that Wittgenstein suggested was supposed to be a way of being the same.
We were supposed to see that "being a picture of" is "being true,"
especially by noticing how a mechanical drawing displays a machine, or an accident-sketch
shows the scene. Our not being able to say what picturing consists in was supposed
to be an advantage, by blocking a further question as to why picturing is truthmaking.
We were just supposed to see that. But now we know that in several senses "being
a picture of" involves no "truth" at all (e.g., see Goodman [1968],
on "representation"). We know that picturing always involves construal
and that there can be endlessly variant pictures of the same situation and pictures
made up to show what never happened at all. Similarly, I think Wittgenstein,
who was rightly impressed by good mechanical drawing, probably never considered
the endless beautiful drawings submitted to patent offices for machines that
cannot be made or which are wholly arbitrary (like the secret weapon drawing
based on a vacuum cleaner in Graham Greene's Our Man in Havana). In another
sense, picturing presupposes truth, rather than making it. For to describe the
accident (a success notion), the picture has to be correct (true), so the whole
project was circular.
Why should any kind of a matchup, no matter what it is, be truthmaking? Something
else will always be required. No matter how successful our match-making, we
need something to explain why that gives truth. And since there are various
notions of truth in diverse subject areas, there could not be one kind of matching
that is the same thing as truth; as a result, we'd have to explain why a certain
particular kind of matchup would cause (or be) truth in one discourse and not
in another.
It is easy to see why the idea of a representational matchup occurred to so
many philosophers after the way of ideas became accepted. Elements of inner
thought (particularly ideas of sense that are components of beliefs, judgments,
etc.) were thought to represent outer reality and in true judgment, to replicate
reality to the inner eye, and so, be true. So when I judge things to be as they
are, my thinking or saying, matches, corresponds with, reality. How else could
the "inner theater" display "outer reality"? It has to be
like a good photograph or a good movie scene. But what is "good" if
not "true"? That seemed much more plausible than saying what I think
or say IS the reality because what I am immediately aware of are my own ideas,
and I can think what no longer exists or does not exist yet. So a correspondence
must be brought about by some "line-up" of the parts of thought with
the parts of reality, roughly that the idea of the subject is related to the
idea of the predicate in the same way that the denoted thing is related to the
denoted predicate.
And so there comes an invitation, becoming more urgent with the re-invention
of sentential logic and formal semantics, to provide the parts of both thoughts
and facts, whose fit makes truth. Moreover in the background, even of modern
analyses of statements, there are echoes of an older "two-name" theory
of predication, which had various forms from Plato to Frege, and a particular
medieval form in which variables are replaced systematically with proper names,
and predicates are taken to be names of concepts (and by others to be names
for extensions of particulars), so that a singular statement is true just in
case what is named by the subject is a thing in the domain of the predicate,
that is, "just in case what is named by the subject is one of the things
named by the predicate," to use Ockham's version for the moment; on that
pattern it is easy to map the rest of categorical statements.
For Ockham that is supposed to explain how a particular sentence is made true,
and since judgments are made up of the natural signs attached to words, it is
supposed to explain their truth as well. The judgment "Socrates is an animal"
is true just in case Socrates is one of the animals. But "personal supposition,"
the medieval analogue of reference, but in reverse as "standing for,"
that holds between the natural sign "Socrates" and the person, is
an intentional relation and without an explanation of that sort of thought state,
there really is no explanation of truth at all. Similarly, Austin's account
involving referential conventions and descriptive conventions simply smuggles
in enough thought states to appear to explain something when it is the thought-content
of statements that has to be explained; for that alone can be true. The same
holds for another semantic account, "the statement s is true just in case
the situation s expresses is a situation that is actual." How does a statement
express a situation? It must be by our thinking. It is the true thinking that
needs to be explained.
Consider an example. Suppose we attach a simple computer to the heating-air
conditioning system in a house so that whenever the heat is off, the screen
reads "the heat is off," and so forth, for each state of the system,
including the temperature, humidity, and even when the system breaks down there
is a diagnostic sentence. Now under Austin's analysis, as well as Chisholm's
and Ockham's, every one of the sentences, the reports, will be true, and they
will tell us what is going on. But, of course, there really is no saying at
all; there is no judgment at all; there is just a simulation of saying and,
thus, a simulation of truth. In brief, the reason the analyses I mentioned cannot
explain truth is that all their conditions can be satisfied by a system that
simulates truth, where there is no thought and thus no truth at all. Now of
course, we interpret such readings as if they were assertions and, thus get
knowledge from them. But that is only because we have built a system that is
parasitic on our system for expressing statements in print. The problem remains:
how to explain genuine truth that has not been confused with simulations and
derivative and attributional forms of truth.
And who would think that the truth of the message could be explained by a matchup
of the assembly of the signal (the uttered or written sentence) with the assembly
of the reality? Even the best semantic accounts have a giant gap. And what about
truths for which there is no independent external reality: say, of arithmetic,
chess, poker, baseball and law? Are there such states of affairs that exist
necessarily, for instance, that a regulation chess board has 64 squares? Suppose
I think there are no Roman gods. How could there be a matchup of the assembly
of the signal with the assembly of such a reality? Is the state of affairs,
"there are no Roman gods," part of the necessarily existing furniture
of the universe, rather than a content invented by our thinking? The ontology
is grotesque: the marquee of infinite light bulbs some always "on"
(the necessary states of affairs), some always "off" (the impossible
states of affairs) and some "on" sometimes, and "off" others
(the contingent states of affairs) -- the array forming state descriptions or
possible worlds, with the actual world consisting of all lights that are "on":
our world.
Now each of these bulbs is an abstract entity, a state of affairs; so the actual
world consists of abstract entities! Where does matter come in? Can matter and
contingent individuals be constituents of necessarily existing states of affairs?
Next, there are apparently no truths that lack compliant realities, so if there
are any truths of arithmetic there are necessarily existing, necessarily obtaining
numerical states of affairs. So, too, for chess. But I say there are no such
realities. We make the truth by composition, construction and invention of entia
rationis. Such things have being only intentionally, and because of what is
true of them, not vice versa. "Mathematics is the free invention of human
thought." And with imaginary entities and abstract particulars (fictions,
symphonies, operas), "being follows truth." There are no independent
states of affairs for such truths. Similarly for "Quine never existed,"
had that been true! The above general formula for correspondence theories makes
any theory that conforms to it ontologically false, and without explanatory
force.
Correspondence theories that involve a matchup to make truth have not been held
by many philosophers before Russell's and Wittgenstein's logical atomism. "Correspondence"
has so long been offered as an interpretation of the phrase "adequatio
mentis et rei" used by Thomas Aquinas, that it is often said that Aquinas,
following Aristotle, held a correspondence theory of truth. Although Aquinas
uses the word "correspondence" once in De Veritate, both his and Aristotle's
understanding of truth (of judgment) was a sameness account: the knower becomes
what is known.
If you had to match diverse things with distinct parts, say, judgments (made
of ideas) and facts (made of atomic objects and universals), what relation other
than a "same assembly," a congruence relation (as in picturing, mirroring,
or modeling) could be truthmaking? Yet, paradoxically, why would parallel assembly
or congruence be truthmaking, unless, of course the parts we use are the very
parts of reality, and what is achieved is sameness? For, otherwise how could
one assert or assent to what is so by asserting to or assenting to something
that is only congruent with what is so -- and presumably, contingently congruent
since the same thoughts are supposedly possible without the physical reality
thought of. Of course, the latter supposition is absurd: you could not have
thought Quine existed had Quine never existed at all.
What about John Austin's account of truth that he himself called a correspondence
theory? Whether to count his four-place relation as a correspondence theory
is disputable. Austin said "a statement is said to be true when the historic
state of affairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions
(the one to which it "refers") is of a type which the sentence used
in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions" [Austin, 1950,
pp. 121-122]. My problems here are (i) the excess ontology of "states of
affairs," especially of ones that do not obtain (but must exist somehow),
(ii) the assumption that truth-valued judgment is linguistic, (iii) the implicit
identification of truth as a property of statements rather than of thoughts
(judgments); and (iv) the fact, described above, that all Austin's conditions
can be met by simulations of statements.
Even if Austin's theory is considered a "same thing" theory, because
the situation referred to is "of a type" with situations the statement
correlates with descriptively, still, that won't escape the simulation. Besides,
to extract the account of falsity is awkward: is a statement false either "when
the historic state of affairs with which it is correlated by the demonstrative
conventions is not of a type..., or when there is no state of affairs of the
type to which it is correlated descriptively? I suspect we could neaten that
up enough. But that would only expose the broken bones of a theory that assumes
true judgments and sententially expressed, when most of our true and false judgments
are not linguistically expressed at all. Some well known philosophers, like
Donald Davidson and Marcia Cavell [1993] have committed themselves to claims
that there is no truth or falsity without the use of language. But the many
examples, ranging from reading words and music, to building, sculpting, painting
and ordinary walking, as well as the invention of language, seem decisive to
the contrary.
At first Austin's story looks better than a part-by-part replication; but then
we see there is no reason why we should not go right through all the words to
say: what he says is true just in case what he says is so! All the rest is just
machinery that can be simulated by systems with no thought at all.
The same sorts of objections apply to R. Chisholm's [1977, p. 138] "correspondence"
theory, which stripped of its technicalities [see Kirkham, 1995, p, 133 for
a fuller statement] comes to saying: A particular sentence is true just in case
the state of affairs that it expresses, obtains. That has the defects I mentioned:
sentences are treated as underived truthbearers; it introduces a platonic ontology
of states of affairs, and supposes that a sentence-token can express something
definite apart from a judgment. But sentences don't: "The sun turns faces
black." Without a context that sentence expresses nothing at all. Attempts
to explain truth and falsity as semantic features of sentences are doomed; there
is no truthmaking relation between words and the world. Sentences are vehicles
for judgment. But not the only one. And above all, this so-called correspondence
theory has no explanatory element in it. It passes by as something more than
trivial because we have a background insight (needing a suitable psychology
to explain it) that what I think is true when what I think is what is so. That's
what needs to be explained. Moreover, Chisholm leaves out of account the plurality
of our judgments that are not expressed verbally [see the discussions in Chapter
8, below]. If Chisholm or Austin had gotten the account of truth right, there
would be no truth or falsity to my perception of the words I write or to your
perception of written words.
Look again at the general formula Kirkham [1995, p. 132] proposed as a summary
for both Chrisholm and Austin, and a general pattern for correspondence theories:
"(t) {t is true if [(Ex)(tRx) & (x obtains)]}." Here "t"
could be a judgment, a statement, a proposition, even a sentence. "R"
could be "asserts that," "says that," "expresses that,"
but not simply, as Chisholm thinks, "means x" or expresses x in L"
[Chisholm 1977, p. 138], because, outside formal languages, there is no such
determinate relation. Chisholm thinks a sentence is true just in case what it
means, obtains. That would make the simulations I described be true. But if
no one uses a sentence to say anything, it is not true. The reason is that the
"R" relation that connects truthbearer to compliant reality has to
involve commitment, believing or saying. But skipping that, the whole scheme
boils down to a claim that for a judgment to be true there has to exist a state
of affairs that actually obtains -- an ontological necessary condition. I have
already criticized that.
So to summarize. In one form, the match-up form, correspondence theories are
just incoherent, empty promises of what no one can deliver; and in their more
straightforward forms, whether Austin's or Chisholm's, they elaborately state
what we already know without an explanatory advance, and are most unsatisfactory
on the notion of falsity, all the while introducing ontologies, whether of infinite
actual facts or states of affairs, or the like, that there is no reasonable
basis for postulating at all.
2. Coherence.
Coherence has its uses in explaining truth. First, sharp notions of coherence
involve bifurcation and a preference for affirmative over negative statements
along with a background or base to begin with. Coherence cannot, however, in
general, explain truth because it presupposes it. "Truth can't be coherence
because we know the false can cohere" is a standard objection [e.g., C.J.
Ducasse, 1944] that requires one to situate coherence against a base.
The originating illusion is formal thinking. Formal thinking fosters the idea
that a certain kind of coherence assures truth, namely, the kind of coherence
that makes every statement that is authorized by a certain form of thinking
turn out to be fully satisfied by everything of which it is authorized to be
said. But there can be that sort of coherence only if the objects, the designata
of the generalized statements, are themselves formally generated by the sort
of thinking used to manufacture the statements: e.g., numbers, geometrical objects,
games, compositions, diatonic musical elements (notes, rests, meters, etc.).
So while there are situations in which coherence, as logical consistency, can
be sufficient as well as necessary for truth, given a certain base for starting
the thinking, those are conditions that can be satisfied only in the case of
formal and quasi-formal objects, including "mixed" objects like the
elements of baseball in their "rules-aspect," but, of course, it is
not coherence that makes the originating statements or base true. Moreover,
whether a given assertion is authorized or not, e.g., a rule of chess, is not
settled by coherence alone; after all, we could add a rule that a game is a
draw after 158 moves.
Brand Blandsard [1941, p. 206], though he did not acknowledge the origination
of the coherence idea in formal thinking, was a thorough idealist who thought
that if the "physical world" is the product of thinking in certain
ways, then consistency with the basic form of thought and non-contradiction
would be what truth was. He did not seem to be sensitive to defining consistency.
Nor did he examine whether the basic form of thought consisted of statements
-- though I think he took it to be categories -- or whether more than one notion
of consistency was being used.
As C.J. Ducasse [1944, p. 325] observed, "no coherent set of propositions
can be comprehensive of all propositions," from which Ducasse concluded
that for any coherent (consistent) group A there is an equally coherent but
logically opposed group B. Ducasse was attempting to show that coherence as
mere logical co-consistency cannot be sufficient for truth because groups A
and B are both internally coherent and each is opposed to the other, so if one
is true, the other must be false. Ducasse's assumed bifurcation might not be
so welcome to an idealist today. And the role of a non-propositional basis,
especially in sensation ordered by the refractive geometry of thought (e.g.,
Kantian categories, forms of intuition, etc.) was not properly recognized by
the critics of idealism. For such a base for truth need not be a base of truths,
but only what generates certain kinds of thinking. The new problem for coherence
theory is to specify what coherence with a non-propositional, non-judgmental
base is and how it can be violated. I think that can be done in an interesting
way, but whether the limitation of supposing another notion of truth can be
evaded, I am unsure. In any case, I think it unpersuasive to construct a vast
refractive geometry of the mind without any explanation of the plurality of
minds, the sameness of their refractive powers, the status of sensation -- all
to avoid an identity account of knowing.
Coherence, as "being consistent with the basic structures, or basic postulates
of thought" may have a place to explain the truth of some thought-systems
with idealized objects. But "consistency," whether relativized to
a base or not, cannot be defined without our using the notions of truth and
non-contradiction; therefore, coherence cannot be a global account of truth.
Nor can we be satisfied to use the anemic and contentless notion of "truth"
we find in propositional logic for a general definition of consistency and a
more robust "entailment" is a disputed and variously analyzed notion,
not even part of propositional logic, and involves the notion of truth as well
[see Ralph Walker, 1989, pp. 39, 144-45 and 192-93].
3. Pragmatism. Historical vs. empirical pregnancy.
Pragmatism, broadly, "what is true is what holds up in experience,"
has its uses. Pragmatism, that the truth of a belief (or a theory) is its working
out in experience, or, in its epistemic form, its being approved by some (ideal?)
community of appraisers, or fulfilling the expectations of some group, cannot
be a global account just because "the final experience" in which approval
is earned or expectation is fulfilled has to be the product of judgment that
does not depend on some further working out, in order for the grounding of the
truth to come to an end. It has to be true that the belief works out or is approved
by its appraisers or expectation is fulfilled, and that cannot always depend
on a further approval or authentication. Pragmatic truth has to wind down into
truth by identity. Thus, it is a subsidiary notion.
There are kinds of "working out" that can be truth-making for limited
domains, such as eschatological truth [Ross, 1988] and construction measurements;
but only parasitically on its being true tout court, that expectation is fulfilled.
Pragmatic fulfillment is a truthmaker for certain kinds of historical statements
where the truth conditions for what is said are not complete at the time for
which the description is offered, except in broad outline that allows, even
requires, a cultural fleshing-out (and where in fact the conditions of fulfillment
are not contained in the then present facts); e.g., "He founded the Roman
Empire." "Christ will come again in glory."
I do not mean only that historical statements have a predictive element, as
if that were not found in ordinary physical object statements. An ordinary physical
object statement that a certain pencil is green, is as predictive as a general
hypothesis that emeralds are green. Most people don't notice the elaborate conditions
of fulfillment, natural regularity, and the large class of observational hypotheticals
that, if formulated, would have to turn out to be true in order for the pencil
to be green [see Chapter 1, "Packed Virtuality"].
The range of things that is relevant to the truth or falsity of "the pencil
is green" is by one test much narrower than the range of things relevant
to the confirmation of "Julius Caesar was the first Roman emperor."
For one thing what counts as "Rome" is itself a matter determined
later on by history, as well as whether there was an empire, and later emperors.
So it is no surprise that the conditions for historical truth are different
from those for other kinds of statements.
Eschatological pragmatism is concerned with a certain kind of projective historical
statement, and I do not mean by this just technical statements made by historians,
but interpretative statements made by ordinary persons, that concern future
human history, where the truth does not depend on what happens directly, but
upon what happens mediated cognitively, that is, on the fulfillment of expectations,
either for the predictors or for some group of successors or by some ideal observer.
If I believe humans will colonize space (or, Leonardo, that humans would make
flying machines), the fact that the physical conditions eventually to be realized
are unimaginable to me, or only schematically (as to Jules Verne) makes no difference
if the later event would fulfill my expectations. My belief, in such a case,
would have been true, otherwise not. We often cannot tell, as observers looking
backward, whether expectation would have been fulfilled because there is a subjective
element in expectation. Especially that is so with fulfillments that exceed
all expectations. So the truth or falsity of earlier predictions and expectations
is sometimes cognitively inaccessible to us. For many eschatological statements
there are no determinate truth-conditions independent of variant expectations:
"The Messiah will come and will establish the Kingdom of God here on Earth."
Note that such statements do involve a particular form of cognitive accessibility,
namely, fulfillment of expectations, as a condition of truth and disappointment
of expectational for falsity. H. Putnam developed a similar theory about science
that E. Soza explains and criticizes [1993]. This is a different sense of "true,"
from, say, "It is true that we are humans," because crucial elements
of what we mean by "being so" are different. For one thing, here "thinking
what is so" is "expecting what is going to be experienced." It
is clear that nothing can be true as fulfillments of cognitive expectations,
unless there are things true in other ways. Thus, fulfilling cognitive states
have to root, eventually, in realities. The final fulfillment of expectation
cannot be a further cognitive state (except for trivialities: "In immortal
life, our knowledge expands forever"). Pragmatic truth cannot be the basic
kind of truth, but it can be a kind, not entirely reducible to sameness of thought
and reality but rooted in it.
4. A transition.
"True believing is believing what is so" is analogous. What is rightness
of understanding depends on what we are thinking about and the uses of thought.
So also, is being so. A certain disposition of chess pieces is to be regarded
as "check"; a certain hand of cards as a "straight"; a certain
baseball situation as an "out"; those are distinct conditions for
right understanding of situations. Far more subtle are the conditions for understanding
human realities involving love, deception, support, abandonment, faith, and
comprehension. Distinct, again, are the conditions of right understanding (right
conception and judgment) for doing arithmetic, proving number-theoretic theorems,
reading a musical score, weighing the force of circumstantial evidence, discovering
analogies, and making deep metaphors.
Rightness of understanding is not one thing but a family of things, bearing
marked resemblances in the predicates appropriate (true, false, erroneous, mistaken,
correct, right, wrong, etc.). The different senses of "right" are
not like "painted," applied to a painting and to the trim of a house;
they are more like "collected," applied to debts and donations, shading
off to be like "enjoyed" applied to classical music and a long life.
"Is true" is not univocal; there are distinct families and, as I mentioned,
distinct ways in which thought and reality can be brought to the same earned
and inherited truth, and the most important case, inflationary truth (the truth
of formal and quasi formal thinking).
The condition that explains a statement's (or other truth-bearer's) having a
compliant reality varies with the area of discourse. The condition that is the
"being so" also varies with our thinking, and, of course, with the
analogy of being (analogia entis). No single analysis of "is true"
will do for science, law, mathematics, logic, or, a fortiori, for theology,
and certainly not for all parts of all; not, that is, if an explanatory objective
is in view. All the same, analogous definitions, "truth is rightness of
understanding perceptible to the understanding alone" (Anselm) or veritas
est adequatio mentis et rei (Aquinas), "truth is thinking what is really
so," whose meanings adjust to the context, can be useful. Such definitions
are, as I said, linguistically as well as notionally analogous; their value
is measured, in part, by their adaptability to what we see to be similar (and
what some, unfortunately, find to be the same). Further, they focus what might
otherwise appear to be unrelated things. There really is a range of right understanding,
measurable by the mind alone, that is truth.
5. Sometimes the truth is what counts as so.
So, pragmatism is a viable subsidiary account of truth, for a limited domain:
that the truth of judgment is the fulfillment of certain (historically conditioned)
expectations by later cognitive states regarded as cognitively successful.
There is another analogue in scientific and ordinary judgments that are, implicitly
of the form "that's good enough" or "that's what counts."
So people measure a beam: "Exactly 12 feet," one reports. The other
does not say "within how many millimeters?" because it does not apply
as a test, where those intervals would apply in cylinder clearance for an engine.
"Good enough" is "true" for practical purposes with adjustments
all the time to the subjects and disciplines, neither denying that there could
ideally in most cases be a more "refined" measure, nor denying that
after one goes far enough, physical reality is indeterminate. So there are,
practically, a lot of cases where "coming out close enough to expectations,"
governed by the practice, is what counts as true, and falling short (also practice-determined),
is what counts as false. Piano tuning is a good case because perfect intervals
are excluded from even-temperament, and beautiful tuning requires artistic adjustment
of the middle octave and of the octaves, successively.
Finally, as mentioned, there are multiple families of judgments where "what
is so" is the same as "what counts as so." So sometimes, the
measure of truth is the measure of what is so, where that is determined by the
requirements of the practice in settling what counts as so.
6. What about "eliminative," "redundancy" and "disquotational"
analyses of truth?
Kirkham [1995] describes these views adequately I think, along with their difficulties.
Basically, even if you could paraphrase away all uses of "is true"
and "is false" you would not have torn out the problem. We are saying
something with such predicates. "What?" and "with what justification?"
remain. As I remarked earlier, if we simply dropped "true" and "false"
and all their paraphrases as well, the problem would still remain to explain
what is the truthmaking relationship (or sameness) between judgment and reality
and how it can be lacking in false judgments.
The disquotational option is a triviality. Even skipping purported and contested
counterexamples for now, "(p) is true" cannot always be reduced to
or replaced by simply asserting P. Isn't "semantic ascent" a way of
talking about the world by talking about what we say about the world, as Quine
suggested [1970, pp. 11-12], see Kirkham [1995, p. 319]? And there are cases
where object-language expansion would not do at all. Secondly, in law and religion
and elsewhere, we use "is true," etc., to elicit or express commitment
not only to what is said but to the words in which it is said, and, as mentioned,
to affirm the veracity of what is said, sometimes without commitment to facticity.
Thirdly, the correlate "(p) is false" cannot decompose into not-P
because if Quine never existed there would be no not-Q. And that holds for judgments
involving a proper name or a real kind word in general.
Quine was right to say (of sentences), that we need the "is true"
and "is false" as predicates to make certain claims about infinite
lots of them, and even finite lots of them. Another point Kirkham [1995, p.
320] makes about typical uses of "it's true that" is that the pragmatic
force includes, frequently, an acknowledgement that the "proposition has
already been uttered"; that is certainly so when the "it is true that"
is part of a concessive introduction to an ensuing disagreement: "what
my colleague says is true, but...." To boil this all down, there is something
predicated of a judgment when we say it is true and that is that what is thought
is the same as what is so, adjusted for discourse and reality. No semantic device
for eliminating the need to use the word, will eliminate the need to provide
the explanations. Just the fact that thinking and saying can diverge from what
is so requires an explanation of what a thought's being so consists in.
7. Local roles.
I will explain in Chapter 5 that there is a basic knowing and believing in which
the constituents of thought are real things and real conditions present to intelligent
awareness, made thus present by abstraction, transforming animal awareness.
But that does not mean that all judgment has to be of that sort. There are families
of representational knowing, parasitic for success upon the existence and priority
of the basic judgments described. A diverse multitude of experimental judgments
involve representational knowing: for instance, that we are presented with an
appearance which we know, for one reason or another, is not "the real appearance"
of what we are to judge, and yet, from that appearance we can make, and check,
reliable judgments. How that happens is varied. From an overhead photograph
of a crowd, with known dimensions for the area, specialists can make accurate
judgments of the number of persons. From photographs of the night sky, where
none of the apparent positions are the "true" positions of the stars
(including planets, galaxies, gas clouds, etc.), experts can construct the "true"
positions which would look quite wrong to star gazers.
Sonograms use a different process, producing an image by sending sound signals
through external flesh and muscles to internal organs. The detection of a kidney
stone or a blockage is not really by seeing the organ, but by seeing an effect
(the image), features of which reliably correlate with features of the organ
to a trained reader. That is established by pathology. In general, knowing by
probing, whether the sense be visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory or with instruments
by touch, in which an effect is observed to reveal features of its cause is
a perfectly intelligible means of knowing through representations. Yet all such
knowing is subsidiary to knowing by direct presentation [to be partly explained
in Chapter 5], without which there would be no such thing as knowing causes
through their effects.
Similarly, there are neighborhoods of discourse in which "working out in
experience," e.g., yielding close to the predicted values in measurement,
is not only sufficient for warranted assertion, it is sufficient for truth.
What we say when talking about engines, pumps, pipes, heating systems, and the
like, involves notions of "true" where "work out" or "count"
is what we mean. Now of course that sort of truth presupposes a more general
notion, close to "is really so," but for practical purposes the more
immediate "yielding the required measurements" not only will do, but
is what counts. The effectiveness of such practices depends on prior notions
where the realities judged are the elements of the judgments.
Again, we sometimes employ contextual notions of coherence for what counts.
Suppose we are checking testimony from an expert's deposition: if we grant at
the outset that certain claims are so, we can scan the rest for coherence, using
a consistency test first, then thickening the test, to include "does the
same explanation apply throughout" and adding additional subject-specific
tests for coherence, e.g., "Does that fit the building practice,"
etc. When all are satisfied we can reasonably conclude that the rest is true,
too. That's just a rough and ready example of situations in which, given grounded
initial convictions, we can proceed to others by tests for coherence or tests
of satisfied expectation (which are subject-specific). But even used that way,
coherence and pragmatic effectiveness is at most another meaning of "true,"
subsidiary and ancillary.
8. Emotivism and other add-on theories of truth.
Emotivism can be dismissed, as well as redundancy accounts that implicitly deny
that "is true" is a predicate. "Is true" is not a mere intensifier
applied to a claim, nor an implicit "I know that" or "I am certain
that" operator, nor any of the other "add on," explanations,
though it can be used in those ways. These are among the incidental functions
of "is true," not a general analysis of it.
9. Parasitic locality.
Notions of truth, e.g., "working out in experience" or "what
counts," that cannot be global notions of truth, can and do function in
various practices, like, engineering, medicine,and building. That is another
reason to consider the notion "what is really so" to be analogous
and not to require that "what is really so" has to be independent
in its existence or its features from what we, or some of us, think, or has
to involve some reality that is complete apart from human thinking. Now that
could not be true in general, but it has to be for entia rationis. Similarly,
that there are 64 squares on a regulation chessboard is really so, though there
is no such reality apart from human thinking, and in this case, agreement. There
is objectivity without independent reality; the same is true for arithmetic,
set theory, logic, checkers, and even the game, baseball.
Similarly, mathematics is as much the product of human thinking, inventing the
conditions of authorized assertion and satisfying internal requirements, as
are musical composition, poetry, and science fiction. Yet we still say, "what
is true to think and say about whether every number that has a cube-root also
has a square-root is what is really so." The reason is that the right answer
is independent of individual opinion and the same for all who do the thinking
properly. So, "what is really" so has to apply analogously, and, thus,
so does "what is true to think and say."
V. What Does the Failure of All Those Theories of Truth Tell Us?
Some philosophers, like Russell, Wittgenstein, and Frege, took "what is
the general truthmaker for our thinking?" to involve a thought/reality
match, instead of a thought/reality identification. Also they had an unanalyzed
notion of causation in mind, one for which they could provide no analysis. How
can reality make a representation of it true? Further, many speak of sentences
as true or false, of the truth conditions for sentences, and as if truth conditions
were the same as the meaning. They ignore the endless overflow of truth conditions
that are determinate only by referential practices. And many talk as if sentences
or utterances were somehow capable of truth or falsity apart from the judgments
expressed, so that a computer, programmed to make sentences, could produce an
endless supply of both true and false ones. Some thought there might be a semantic
feature of true sentences to distinguish them from the false, and looked for
some relationship between words and the world that would account for truth.
Those attempts met frustration and defeat.
With the failure of matchup theories obvious to everyone, and people still convinced
that thoughts are made up of representations of things (whether that be images,
linguistic elements, impressions of sense, or whatever, as long as the components
are not the things themselves and their conditions), the strategies for explaining
truth became severely limited. If thoughts are made up of thought parts that
are never real things or the conditions of things, then either truth-making
is a relation among thoughts themselves, or reality has to be somehow the product
of thinking or truth has to be some kind of confirmation of imagination by later
experience. Worse, if you are a materialist then you want the story to go full
circle and in its second stage to explain how thought is nothing more than the
matter which the earlier stage says is made by thought. This is tailbiting.
So, we have to rethink the matter. We have to reconsider that (i) in thinking
we transform the physical, by making it present in thought and subject of judgment;
and that (ii) the basic, but not the only, constituents of thought are real
things and the conditions and the changes of things. And, secondly we have to
abandon the futile conviction that truth and falsity are semantic features of
elements of language. And, also, the idea that truth is ideally warranted assertability
because the analysis will not pass its own test.