Truth II: Abstraction
I. Introduction 183
1. To add explanation. 183
2. Plasticity of the schema. 184
3. The futility of the explanations: (1) inert ontologies; (2) failure to respond to the plasticity of the schema; (3) repeating the problem. 186
(a) Misdirected causation. 188
(b) Inheritance. 190
(c) Truths according to a paradigm. 191
(d) Consider the inert, excess ontologies. 192
(e) We cannot get along with facts, either. 192
(f) Missing the point about what is false. 193
4. Breaking the barrier. 194
II. Conception and Commitment 194
1. No perceived object is present to a human without generality coincident with
its particularity. 199
(a) Presence. 208
(b) Inchoate conceptions. 210
2. Our cortex-states are a medium with-which, not in-which for thoughts. 214
Explanatory order? 216
3. Abstraction is something we do. 220
4. Things can be thought-parts through various conceptions. 222
Chapter 5: Outline Page 2
5. No generality outside thought. 224
(a) So what is the story about truth? 226
(b) We live in nominal abstractions. 226
(c) Let's turn to money. Is money real? 229
(d) Many kinds of truths. 232
(e) Transition. 234
6. Disposing of the "cognitive access" and "fact of the matter" issues. 234
(a) What about the paradoxes? 237
Chapter 5
Truth II: Abstraction
I. Introduction
1. To add explanation.
We need a non-trivial account of "When what I think is true, what I think
is what is so" -- one that adapts along with the notions of truth and reality
to diverse contexts. The recently prominent disputes about realism, bifurcation,
modes of cognitive access, degrees of warrant or justification and even the
paradoxes arise from the peculiarities of particular sorts of discourse and
are to be resolved as outcomes of the explanation, not parts of it.
What sort of an explanation do we want then? We want pieces of philosophical
psychology and of ontology to make transparent what has to happen for what I
think to be something that is so, beginning with what is at hand to be perceived
and extending all the way to imperceptible, inaccessible historical events and
periods (the Industrial Revolution, British Colonialism) and to purely intelligible
situations (musical structures, set theory). We have to avoid the implausible
ontologies, the failure to reflect the analogous phenomena, and to provide a
description of our abstractive activity that closes the gap between reality
and thought so that, obviously, real things and happenings become the contents
of thought without undergoing any change.
A.N. Prior [1971, pp. 21-22] put it, "To say that X's belief that P is
true is to say X believes that p and (it is the case that) p." That's similar
to Austin's and Chisholm's more technical schemata [see Chapter 4], and like
them lacks an explanatory element, while raising questions about the status
of its elements. How can what I believe be what is happening? How can what is
happening become what I am thinking?
2. Plasticity of the schema.
What is involved depends on what we are talking about; for it is quite different
for the reality I believe to be the day's being sunny, and for it to be that
odd and even numbers alternate and that in chess bishops move diagonally on
their colors, or that E=mc2.
In Prior's schema what is the status, ontologically, of p? Is it something that
exists independently of X's believing (as Chisholm's states of affairs do) and
does it obtain or not independently of X's thinking? The latter cannot always
be so: if X is thinking "I am thinking," that situation cannot obtain
unless X is thinking; yet if X is thinking, "The earth existed before there
were any humans," for the thought to be true, that situation has to obtain
independently of whether any human thinks it or ever came to think it. Yet if
X is thinking "The Queen moves in straight lines and diagonals," whether
that is so or not, though not dependent on X's thinking, is not independent
of human thinking any more than is "Adverse possession is open notorious,
continuous occupation of land under claim of right for the statutory or common
law period of years"; and some of us, at least, think "A Euclidean
plane triangle has interior angles whose sum equals a straight line" is
true because it is a product of a certain kind of human thinking, not because
there really are any. So there is not a single answer as to whether what is
thought has to be a reality (univocally) or "obtain" independently
of X's thinking or even as to what that means.
The idea that all such thoughts are states of affairs that exist no matter what,
has many defects, not the least being that had I never existed there could have
been no such a state of affairs as "I am (or am not) thinking" nor
even "Ross is (or is not) thinking," to obtain or not obtain, because
the name and indexical pronoun would be empty, there being no subject constituent
for such a state of affairs.
When we consider the particularities of various kinds of thinking, we find that
"is true" and "is false" adapt so that sometimes "is
true" has "is false" as its opposite in a bifurcated contrast,
and sometimes not. Sometimes nothing is counted as true (or false) that is not
cognitively accessible in a discipline-specific way (so, "constructive
proof" for certain mathematicians). Sometimes we are willing to assign
status as true or false by inheritance through a rule (for instance, "conditionals
with necessarily false antecedents are true"), and sometimes we assign
"true" and "false" as values to propositional variables
without any content, "pv-p." Very frequently the existence and features
of things we talk about are a causal consequence of what we authorize to be
said, as is the case with musical entities, like scales, intervals, keys, clefs,
rests, rhythms, meters [see Ross, 1993, pp. 90-102 and Chapter 7, below]. "Authorization"
varies with the discipline, too. Thus, authorized arithmetical and set-theoretical
assertions have to be decidable in a way quite different from claims as to what
the civil law on a matter is. Furthermore, sometimes we use "it is true
that" and "it is false that" in a way that asserts something
and also indicates that the affirmation or negation is as expressed; for instance,
the "filioque" doctrinal definition. We also use "it is true..."
concessively: "It's true that he took the money, but he did not rob her
unless he used or threatened bodily force." Further, "it is true that"
is used as a double affirmation and when that is not properly distinguished,
paradoxes arise. That connects with Quine's notion of "semantic ascent,"
that sometimes we talk about what is so, or is supposed to be so, by saying
something about what is said, by applying a predicate to the statement, namely,
that it is true or false, and similarly, for brevity, we use indirect discourse,
"What Quine said about semantic ascent is true." Some paradoxes that
arise when the notions of truth and falsity are made part of the expressed judgment
can be dissolved, for instance, Kirkham's example [1995, p. 306] "The is
the last falsehood in this Chapter," because there is an implicit affirmation
of the expressed statement that conflicts with what the statement expresses
and, therefore, a pragmatic conflict that cannot occur in judgment. Thus, despite
the appearance of expressing a thought, there is no such thought to be expressed.
Similarly, "This statement is true" is vacuous, though some say it
is "trivially true" because there is an implicit affirmation of a
statement without further content than that affirmation, whereas the structure
requires affirmed content affirmed. No such judgment is possible. How many sorts
of reality count to make (in what sense) a judgment true or false, and what
sort of thing p is, vary with the discourse.
3. The futility of the explanations: (1) inert ontologies; (2) failure to respond
to the plasticity of the schema; (3) repeating the problem.
An implicit or explicit ontology that has "all" states of affairs
or facts, or whatever, existing in all possible worlds, with some obtaining
in all worlds, some in none and some in some and not others [Ross, 1989], is
excessive and unpersuasive because it implicitly uses empty names (Homer never
existed), and fails to tell us what states of affairs are made out of or constituted
by (e.g., real physical things or verbal surrogates), and has paradoxes about
empty kinds. What is "obtaining" and especially "obtaining in
a world that is not actual" in contrast to obtaining in the actual world?
Necessary states of affairs are both said to exist and obtain in all possible
worlds. The notions cannot be univocal because the first involves a counterfactual
(that it would have obtained had its world been the actual world) that the second
does not. It is also impossible that when I think you misunderstand me what
I think is some abstract entity, existing no matter what, but happening to obtain
(or not) in the actual world. Where is the explanation for how that reality,
the abstract necessarily existing state of affairs, comes to be the content
of my judgment? The problem is just repeated.
Inventing a realm of propositions to be the content of thoughts, paralleling
the states of affairs as Plantinga did [1974], only doubles the technical questions
as to how a proposition can be identical with a state of affairs, and come to
be the content of a thought. It will not explain anything to say "a proposition
is a state of affairs-thought-of."
Anyway, what does "X's believing that-p" consist in? Is the reality
(say, your reading this) the content of X's believing? If so how does it get
to be the content? And suppose X believes everyone is insane, how does what
is not the case, get to be the content of his believing? To answer that, some
postulate that we believe sentences which are true just in case they refer to
a reality that is meant by the sentence [J. Austin, 1950]. Of course, there
is no account of how a sentence can mean or express a reality or refer to one,
either. Even less is there an account of how I can believe a sentence. Let it
suffice that on any such account, if it were given, the reality would have to
be the content of the judgment since that is what we judge to obtain, and no
explanation of how that happens is even considered. That is exactly what is
missing from these accounts of truth and what I propose to provide.
Next, look at the semantic sinuousness of "believe." Does X's believing
have to be conscious? Expressed verbally by X, even subvocally? Can it be subconscious
and unarticulated (like your belief, up to now, that you are not falling, or
that you are standing, sitting or whatever your posture)? Can it be unconscious
but present even if we cannot identify it as a principle of any overt action
or any feeling detectable to you (say, that you fear strangers)? Can it be inaccessible
to X, say, an unconscious belief in the reality of Satan, to which X cannot
advert, but which, to a psychiatrist, explains why X feels uncomfortable when
saying he thinks there are no other spirits than God? What about a belief that
there are an infinity of unprovable truths of arithmetic? Is that about each
and every member of an infinite domain? Or is it about what one thinks can be
proved, without there even having to be such a domain? What about the belief
that there are an infinite number of English sentences? Is that a metabelief
about what the grammar of English is capable of, rather than like the belief
that all the French are contemptuous, which, silly as it is, seems to be about
each actual and potential French person. And what about beliefs like "Vermonters
are taciturn"? How many reticent Vermonters past, present and future does
it take to make that true? Believing can be any of those things, and more. Believing
is not one thing but a family, and what is believed is a family as well.
How is one going to make sense out of, and also defend the claim that what makes
a belief true or false is the actuality of things? If the actual is not the
productive cause of truth (and how could it be if it is not the cause of our
thinking), then philosophers are acknowledging another kind of causation entirely
-- something like Aristotelian formal causation, when they say that the reality
believed is the cause of the truth of the belief by causing the content of the
belief. Why don't they tell us how? If your understanding what I am saying is
the cause of the truth of my belief that you do understand what I am saying,
then how does it do so? This is certainly not event-causation, nor is it occasional-causation,
and it is certainly not productive causation. So what kind of metaphysical animal
have we here?
Michael Dummett muddied the waters by saying that whatever is true is true in
virtue of something. In a sense what he says is obvious: whatever is true is
true because of something or another. But what kind of "because" is
involved, and what kind of "something or another" depends on what
sense of "is true" is appropriate for that sort of thinking (and talking):
logic, arithmetic, musical composition, philosophy. In virtue of what is Dummett's
statement true? Relations of ideas? Meaning? Some necessity of nature? In any
of those cases how does "in virtue of" work beyond being sine qua
non?
(a) Misdirected causation.
Although philosophers lately talk as if reality is the truthmaker for thoughts
(usually they talk of sentences), the claim does not comport well with their
other convictions. For instance, most of the same philosophers think that for
any C that causes E, it is possible that some C' might obtain, instead, causing
E. That is, in general, cause and effect are supposed to be logically independent,
even if they are connected by natural necessity. One is not supposed logically
to entail the other or to be the same as the other. But there could not be such
a contingent relationship between P and the true belief that P. For in that
case the belief could be true without P!
Though I do not believe it possible that whatever occurs on account of a cause
could have occurred on account of some other cause, that conviction of the others
who talk about truth shows that they cannot explain how reality makes true judgments
true. For they lack a proper category of making.
The obvious rejoinder is to say the sense in which the reality is truthmaker
for the thought is that the reality logically entails the truth of the thought.
That is, if I think something and reality is as I think it is, then given my
thought, the reality entails that the thought is true. But it does not. The
idea that there are logical relations between realities and thoughts -- other
than sameness and difference and trivial necessities -- has no basis. Reality's
being as it is is not sufficient, but only necessary, for my thinking to be
true (except in a case like "I think I am thinking"). What about "If
someone thinks that p, then p's being the case is sufficient and necessary for
truth?" That's a start. The reality's being as I think, is sufficient for
my thinking to be true. But how? One way, of course, is for the reality and
the thought to be the same. But if they are not the same, some other explanation
is needed. None is offered at an appropriate level of detail. You cannot just
assume the contents of thoughts are propositions and that true propositions
express realities, without offering any explanation of the status of propositions,
of how they express anything, and of how they get to be the content of thought.
The whole traditional framework is empty and the recent sentential framework
is even worse.
Then we meet the plasticity of "being the case." For when I think,
"I am thinking," is what I think one of Chrisholm's states-of-affairs,
or a sentence, or a proposition, or the reality itself? And if I think "7
+ 5 = 12," is what I think a mathematical reality? Are there any mathematical
realities in the sense in which there are physical realities? Is a mathematical
reality different from a monetary one? How about my thinking, "The French
Revolution of 1789 was not as successful as the American Revolution of 1776."
Suppose that is true, what reality is required, some historical, some evaluative
reality? Can there be logical relations, say, conjunction or implication, between
physical realities and thoughts (except sameness and difference and trivial
necessitation)?
There may be some truths where there is no objective measure for the evaluations
involved: "That's not loud enough." "That does not match."
Reality comes in flavors and colors like quarks. But the proponents I have in
mind have no patience with the idea that "being" is analogous and
that "exists" and "there is" are semantically captured by
their contexts and completion expressions. So, "there's a crisis here"
is supposed to be univocal with "there's a leak in a pipe here" or,
"there's a fire here" as well as "there's a mistake here,"
and "there's nothing here." Existence commitments outside formal logic
are not univocal. And when even logicians misuse quantification for physical
individuals, numbers, and second-order quantification over abstractions, the
existential quanitifier is used equivocally.
"Reality makes true judgments true" has to adapt and cannot involve
causation. For instance,the rule, "The Queen moves on straight lines and
diagonals," makes the fact, not vice versa. There's no way, in general
that facts or realities can be truthmakers except by identity with the true
thought. Consider some other cases that invite the same conclusion: (i) truths
by inheritance, (ii) truths by simulation of inflation, (iii) truths according
to a paradigm and (iv) truths by fiat, whether about fictional or real things.
(b) Inheritance.
By rules of derivation -- "conditionals with impossible antecedents are
true" and "a contradiction implies everything" vs. "indirect
proof is not permissible." In these cases no independent facts or realities
are relevant. Truth is settled by a rule. What follows from what is settled
by the rules of inference, whether of classical, intuitionistic, or quantum
logic.
As mentioned frequently, there are truths by inflation, by our constructing
entia rationis: Zermelo-Frankel set theory that constructs all the truths, even
the unknown and underivable ones, and thereby constructs the denotata, the objects,
that completely verify all the relevant theorems. Furthermore, inflation is
simulated with the invention of games, fictions and the like, where we don't
need realities for truth but, in a sense, make realities in consequence of what
we authorize to be thought: so Mickey Mouse is male and married.
(c) Truths according to a paradigm.
For example, what to say or not to say about the Roman gods is regulated by
the myths. To an extent historical fiction is like that: it has to fit into
the interstices of known events and figures when such figures and events are
involved, and has to be consonant with the time (no artillery for the Romans,
no airplanes for Hannibal, etc.), otherwise it lacks craftsmanship and may even
fail to qualify.
Perhaps most impressive as an inflationary system is the monetary system where
the elements are products of exchange conventions made over time, by legal and
trade systems, into a system so elaborately connected with human action, belief
and coercion, that there is real causation that affects the whole planet (.e.g.,
ozone depletion and global warming). [I return to the monetary system in III.2,
below.]
There are also looser kinds of truth, made by fiat: a character in a novel says,
"She was as noble as she could be within the limits of her imagination."
How could that be accessible for anyone's knowledge? What would make it false,
information inaccessible from the text? How about, "He was the noblest
Roman of them all"? "The industrialized West has created a culture
of death." Whether those are true or false does not depend on whether what
is thought is the same as some reality but upon their success at interpreting
human characteristics, society and history. I will return to truth as success
at interpretation or diagnosis later on.
Not all truths have to be analyzed according to the template for basic truths
with real things and happenings as their constituents where what we think is
the very same thing, under abstraction, that is actually so. Analogous variations
are more than common and so are remote simulations. The principle "reality
makes true judgments true" can be a general truth only if regarded as so
plastic that its conceptions fit every kind of assertoric judgment and every
kind of fact/happening/situation as well, and "makes" has so little
content as to be indefinite among identity, causation, production and virtually
any other "because" you like.
(d) Consider the inert, excess ontologies.
Consider the inert, excess ontologies, whether Chisholm's or Austin's, or Plantinga's,
or any other that you choose. They explain nothing and duplicate the problems
by leaving unexplained how their elements can be the elements of thought and
how their elements are related to the physical things and happenings. These
ontologies have no psychology of how a fact or happening could be truthmaking,
and certainly no account of how a fact or happening could become the content
of a belief. But that, in fact, is what the problem is, to provide an explanatory
account of truth.
How can what I believe be a state of affairs which is not a belief, e.g., that
someone will read this? How can referents that are the same differ in qualities?
When I believe there are still some leaves on that maple tree, what I believe
is what I just said. The state of the maple was in some way different before
I believed it. You might believe the same thing. Yet your thought is not my
thought. Besides, the happening in nature is entirely particular, whereas my
thought is general as well. My thought, as content, is not some abstract entity/state-of-affairs
but that particular physical happening. So is yours. So we still have the question:
how did the content of my true belief come to be what is the case? Especially,
given the plasticity of "being the case." And worse, how does the
content of my false belief come to be what is not the case, since what is not
the case, e.g., that there are roses on my desk, does not even exist?
(e) We cannot get along with facts, either.
Facts are obtuse abstractions [Ross, 1989], made up scrapings from reality to
match the linguistic elements of expressed thoughts, not the basic reality we
believe in. If you happen to misunderstand me, and I happen to believe that,
the constituents of my thought are you and your misunderstanding me, not some
abstract entity but a very particular happening, more particular and definite
than anything I can think about it [see a "lakeful of reality to make one
drop of truth," Chapter 1]; the so-called "fact" is a conventional
scraping off the definite reality, the same whether you are standing up or sitting
down, though what I believe, the whole reality of it, including the unnoticed
overflow, is not thus indifferent. [See also Strawson, 1950 and Davidson, 1990,
pp. 302-5.]
(f) Missing the point about what is false.
What do these interpreted schemata have to say about the false? Not much. They
seem to suppose falsity is failure at truth without explaining how. Simon believes
there are ghosts. Suppose you say the belief is false; nothing is a ghost. How
does the belief get to be false? The trouble here is that what nothing is, is
indefinite. Empty names and empty predicates are referentially unanchored, and
thus, have incomplete overflow conditions. Although everything that exists is
not a ghost, "being a ghost" lacks determinate content, determinate
overflow necessities. There isn't anything definite that everything that exists
is not. So there is not some reality, "there are no ghosts." Rather,
there is no reality," there are ghosts." Thus, perhaps unknown to
the believer whose belief is true (that there are no ghosts), there is no fact
or situation that is the reality, "there are no ghosts." So, not in
every case where a judgment is true is there some reality that is the same as
what is thought? That belief seems to be "made" true by the absence
of any things that satisfy the notion as far as it has semantic content. The
same is true for the Greek and Roman gods: there are no such things; yet we
certainly do not want to "pack" reality with infinities of indeterminate
negative facts or states of affairs or propositions. Negative true judgments
and false judgments have something in common that does not fit comfortably into
"'p' is true just in case p." What is missing in reality is determined
by our thought, as far as content goes, and not the reverse. There is nothing
false apart from our false believing [more in Chapter 8].
Now someone will say the contraries of all the theorems of arithmetic are false,
just as are the contraries of all the entries in a phone book. But that is using
"false" in another sense because such things would be false if anyone
believed them, but if no one ever does, there is nothing that is actually false
among them. Nor are the correct telephone numbers true unless believed or relied
upon en block by our relying on selected cases. Thus, we have derivative notions
of truth and falsity. We do use "is false" in the sense "would
be false to believe." We also use "false" as the trailing opposite
of "true" so that the written contraries of arithmetic truths are
called false, even though no one believes them. In other contexts, when something
is not true because it is unsuitable for belief, we may not count its opposite
as true, but rather as inappropriate for belief as well: "If I'd been born
in 1040, I'd have joined the Norman Conquest." None of the "sameness"
accounts, like Austin's, Prior's or Chisholm's, address the vexing issues about
bifurcation, negations, and falsity; and none responds to the contextual adaptation
of all the notions we have been discussing.
4. Breaking the barrier.
What is the barrier? It is the apparent gap between judgments sorted by content
and what is, in various senses, really so. Stuffing infinities of necessarily
existing states of affairs or propositions, or both, into the space cannot fill
the gap between my true judgment that it is sunny and the sunny day, which is
particular, not abstract. We have to close the gap: by recognizing that the
physical happening I perceive is the content of my true judgment. And what I
see is not there on the desk gets its content from my thought. To advance that,
we have to consider the constant activity of an intelligent perceiver and agent:
abstraction.
II. Conception and Commitment
What do we do to things perceived to make the basic elements of thought that
is true or false? We constantly transform animal awareness. I do not mean there
is a completed activity of animal perception to which another activity is added,
or a perception which is made the subject of another activity. Rather, in humans,
although the animal activities of sensation and perception are present and are
in their physical components the same as in animals with similar organs, they
are from a principle (psyche) that exercises those abilities eminently [see
Chapter 6], and whose specific activities are abstraction and judgment, activities
that are always "on" even when the sensory medium is blank as in some
sleep states, anaesthetic states and injury states. In the latter cases, there
is no new content to abstraction or judgment as far as we know. Abstraction,
judgment, and the concomitant commitment -- existential commitment -- are the
transformation of animal awareness by intelligence. We do not have animal perception
and then understanding; understanding and reality commitment are the manner
of our animal perception.
Even when perception has no noticed content, as happens when one is absorbed
in thinking about thinking, say, while looking out a window at a Russian Olive
without consciously judging it to be one or to be a tree/bush or to be green
with yellow patches or to be in the foreground, still the perception is intelligent
and includes the habitual reality-commitment and the habitual classification.
We can tell that by the way expectations fail when our habitual reliances desert
us. The human mind is like a window through which we understand the world, the
glass being the limits of moment by moment sense perception.
Abstraction, like the perception of animals, is an operation upon real things,
that makes real things and their conditions, the elements of our basic thoughts,
and generates (potentially) the series of further transformations by which anything,
judged to be the condition of any real thing, can itself become a constituent
of judgments about its conditions, and so on, indefinitely, like making shapes
subjects of comparison and then making transformational features of shapes what
we think about. Generally, anything you think about something can be made something
you think something about. The ability that can turn real objects and happenings
into the components of thought can turn anything we think into the subject of
further thought, even thinking itself, and can even make up things to think,
and make up things to think them about, as we do in inventing the propositional
calculus, card games, flight simulators and stories.
So many things are presented to me visually, tactually, etc., all at once and
continuously when I am awake or dreaming that I have to focus attention to conceptualize
my occurrent beliefs, though a good deal of conceptual recognition is habitual
and merely part of awareness. Suppose I am idly looking at 10 or 15 acres of
landscape two thousand feet away; unless I focus attention and conceptualise,
I may not notice that I see a whole field of dried cornstalks, and thus may
not have any belief on that point at all, even though that situation is right
before my eyes, and I would not have to relook to know I was seeing such a field.
So the details of judgment flood outside the focus of attention.
Now there may be a problem here: if I cannot see it unless I can conceptualise
it, then the conceptions apparently cannot come from the seeing; so where do
they come from? Are they innate, like computer graphics? Are they given by divine
illumination as Augustine supposed? Do we make them up, as some conceptualists
suppose? Do we make the physical phenomena through our conceptions and perceptions?
Not very likely, given the notorious gaps in critical idealism.
In a sense that there is a field of cornstalks is perceptually present; but
in another sense, it is not actually present, qua field of cornstalks, until
I notice it. Of course, I might notice it as of a different color from hay fields
and wonder "what?" before I recognize it. And, lacking the concept,
might not recognize it. Yet the whole visual presentation of the real landscape,
even though not segmented conceptually into such a sub-unit, is intelligently
present, whether I attend to fields, trees, stone walls, the hillside, or not.
The whole is abstractly, as well as particularly present to me and is ready
for sub-conceptualization. We don't have a name for the whole conception. (Maybe,
landscape, scene or view?)
Suppose I am sitting so that I see out one window, and turning my head, see
out another. The whole view changes. But in both cases, even without a name,
it is all there, understood, ready for sub-conception according to my interests,
instincts, training, etc. Which conceptions will segment or reframe what I see
depends in part on my interests, directing my attention, and my experience and
learning as sources of my conceptions. So I can look at stone walls along fields
and, if I had not the experience of some building, I might lack the conceptions
to distinguish whether I am seeing a single-course wall held up by its loops
and counter-loops, or a double-course wall with rubble filling and large cross-stone
tie-ins and deliberate patterns of stone shapes and colors. Similarly, most
people cannot tell the difference between the original walls thrown up as stones
were cleared from the fields and the rebuilt walls that have order in the courses
and flat capstones. The same could be said about most of us concerning typefaces
beyond a few obvious ones. Now I am emphasizing that the detail of conceptualization,
though limiting or expanding the arena of true judgment, is a refinement of
intelligent perception. Even without the detail, even without any delineable
conception at all, human perception is always intelligent, always general [see
"Inchoate Conceptions" below]. Humans have to learn language, they
do not have to learn conception but only conceptions.
In sensation, material objects do something to us by acting in their environment
in ways to which we are sensitive. Sensation is responsive, though active: it
is our activity causally initiated by physical signals from objects, the way
a motion detector may turn on a camera (though that is only a detection system,
not a sensing one). But sensation cannot be just a response, like chemical changes
in exposed film. The sensation, and perception it constitutes, wholly or partly,
are something the animal does, not just something that happens to it that leaves
a trace that converts into action, like a fire-detector that turns sprinklers
on.
More than a response-activity is needed to make thought-parts. We make realities
into constituents of our thoughts by something we do to things, something that
leaves things unchanged but changes us from potentially understanding to actually
understanding form, structures, patterns, as the case may be. It is analogous
to animal sight; what is seen is unchanged but the seeing animal is changed.
People mistakenly think abstraction has to yield a definite (and correct) "what"
for whatever is sensed or even perceived; but it does not. Finding out what
a thing is is comparative and judgmental, as F. Suarez said. Understanding material
things in a way that explains their behavior is understanding their real natures.
Articulating and applying that kind of understanding is part of science. But
at a less sophisticated level, it is part of every craft from hunting to flying.
I think what Aristotle and Aquinas intended by "the proper object of (embodied)
understanding is the essences of material things" was not on a par with
"the proper object of sight is color" -- namely, what turns sight
active, but what is the natural target of abstraction as an ability: it is aimed
at our finding out what things really are as originators of their behavior,
by our distinguishing the forms, patterns and generalities of things, whether
it be a snake, copper or a wave. Conception names things what they are.
Abstraction follows needs and interests, some instinctive, others from natural
talent and others learned. I abstract whatever I notice among the fields, see
or feel or hear or touch. Not only is W.V.O. Quine something I think of if I
happen to think "Quine wrote a 1987 Journal of Philosophy paper."
My thought has him (as a element) and his having written the printed paper as
a constituent [see J. Almog, 1986, for the same position]. This is not done
by reference -- a logical act -- but by intention and commitment. Reference
is another family of thought activities -- mainly linguistic acts -- done through
perception, memory, and piggy-backed often on our trust in the experience and
reports of others. When I think of the number 10, that it is even, or of God
that He is invisible, I am not referring to these things, I am thinking of them.
When I tell you about them, then I refer to them. Now, when I say "Quine
wrote that paper," someone might ask whether I am referring to W.V.O. Quine;
and I might say yes. But I could just as well have been asked: "Whom are
you thinking of?" And I could have said, "Oh, W.V.O. Quine."
In a word, for humans, perception, as well as recognition of things, requires
abstraction (notionalization). For other mammals, and undoubtedly birds and
reptiles too, perception requires real constituents too, but not notionalized.
We abstract perceived particulars without any change in the things. Similarly,
perception is mostly an activity of animals upon things with no significant
change in things. Of course we have to acknowledge the physical reactions of
things perceived, very slight in the case of distant things heard or seen, and
much greater with things smelled, and greater still with things touched or tasted.
But abstraction involves no further change in things perceived at all. Undergoing
abstraction is "a rational relation" in scholastic parlance -- what
Peter Geach called a "Cambridge Change" in the real object, by which
the object is present to me, involving a real change in me and a real relation
on my part to the object, but only a conceptually consequential relation or
change in the object, as when I walk away from you, you get further from me.
So the question of how the condition of the maple tree can be both particular,
as physical, and both particular and abstract, as intelligently perceived, is
easily answered. Similarly, your thought, as an event, is yours alone. But your
judgment, as the intelligent sensible presence of something, can be exactly
the same as mine.
Now someone will say about these observations and others to come," do they
have any basis other than my saying so?" Yes they do: they can be confirmed
in your own experience and can then be compared to what other philosophers and
psychologists say and subjected to the question "which generalizations
give us a more satisfying and revealing description of human thought"?
I am not suggesting that you test these claims by mere imaginings, but by repetition
and inspection of similar experiences of your own. Your not getting the same
outcomes, the same convictions, say, that all our perception is abstract as
well as particular, is, unfortunate, but not decisive. For we then have to find
out whether you are observing the phenomena minutely enough and without disabling
convictions, like a person who doesn't notice what marksmen know, that if you
stare at a small object it will move (apparently). It takes experience for discernment.
1. No perceived object is present to a human without generality coincident with
its particularity.
Whatever we experience presents itself as "being," "something,"
"something or another" (res), even if it is only a "?".
The particularity/generality of perceived and noticed things is a foreground/background
polarity, with one aspect foregrounded for one person or at one time, and backgrounded
for another, but always coincident even if that duality is not noticed. You
strike a key, without even thinking "that's a key" or even what letter-key
it is; but once interest is aroused, you know. You can look at the clouds without
noticing their motion or color or shape or distance from you or from one another;
but to notice, you need a conception, yet the conception can be so complex for
a three-dimensional cloud shape that we have no name for it. With storm clouds
tornado watchers have names for some parts like "the anvil," though
each cloud is particular and distinct in its details. Being present in thought
for a real thing is being dematerialized enough for generality to be coincident
with its particularity. I make the generality by what I do to physical things:
I departicularize what is present perceptually (or imaginatively or in memory).
I do that to the objects whether they appear by sound, smell, taste, touch,
or sight, or even memory, or all together. The understanding makes the universality
in things [Averroes: intellectus est qui agit universatem in rebus. In De Anima,
I, comm.8. So says Avicenna, as well. Metaph. V.c.1-2].
As I said, perception does not occur before understanding in humans. It is by
the encompassing abstraction that I can perceive the color of the tree, as a
color, and the grey or yellow fog, the weight of a pen as a weight, the texture
of paper as a texture. It is not as if we are completed animals to which understanding
has been added. The two are blended; that's how we can, by perception involving
conception and prior knowledge, see a tugboat's pulling a barge even when the
towline can be glimpsed only at one sloping end or even not at all, so that
it is from the regularity of their procession, and from our habitual other beliefs,
that we recognize the situation. For all of what we see, hear, taste, smell
or perceive of our movements and actions, animal perception is intermingled
with abstraction and structured from prior families of beliefs we do not notice.
In almost all perception we are also aware of the mode of perception (seeing,
hearing), though later we may not be sure whether we heard or saw something.
As Aristotle observed, it is by sight that we know we are seeing. When we are
falling, we not only feel it, we think it. Of course it can come so suddenly
we do not think it, and are astonished.
In perception, say, seeing a landscape or hearing a symphony, what we notice,
and so, attentatively conceptualize, can be changing while the perception is
unchanged. For notice can move, as it were, across or down the visual or sound
panorama with reality-commitment encompassing the whole, while the conceptions
and judgements change. With sight, there are usually slight eye-movement changes,
whereas with hearing and feeling, you do not have to move for perception to
change.
Generality is the manner in which perception is experienced by humans, solid
with its particularity. Serious human pain not only hurts, it is recognized
to hurt. That is also why seeing, smelling, tasting, and touching can be such
delights: they not only please bodily, they are recognized for the activity
they are, and for the content perceived as well. Similarly, for an animal to
see is pleasant (even if what is seen is frightful); for a human to see is enjoyment
(not just a pleasure) because we understand we are seeing, even though one might
see things for which one would tear out one's eyes, if that would stop them.
Thus, every sense is a mode of loving. So we say, "just seeing her is a
joy" and "the hawthorn delights the eye" and "seeing is
a pleasure." Supervening on that, each is a mode of loathing as well, sometimes
at once: "The very sight of him disgusts me." "I hate that sound."
We continue seeing, hearing, balancing, feeling, tasting, because we like to.
There are very serious psychological disorders in which a sense, say, smell
or hearing, is permanently turned off, the person no longer smells or hears,
without any physical organ damage or brain damage at all, but because, it is
said, s/he doesn't want to anymore; perhaps from an unconscious guilt, revulsion,
false belief or previous horror.
The typical object of abstraction is not a subjective condition like a color
flash or a pure tone, though it can be, as I mentioned, but something shareably
perceived like "streetlight" or "talking," "someone's
singing" or a public surrounding like a room or a street. Of course you
might perceive angina pains that no one else can, and that is still perception
not just sensation. And that goes on with how you feel constantly. Still, whatever
is a perceived and particular reality, that barge's being towed, that cat's
not trusting my approaching, your experiencing a twisted ankle, even your feeling
an unnameable disquiet or trembling as if there were a "slightly varying
electrical current" in the midriff, is abstracted.
For that to happen, we do something constantly to everything we perceive, whether
we notice it or not. We departicularize, actually dematerialize physical things
and their features (shape, texture, color, position, etc.) into abstract forms.
It is as if we could remove or black out the molecules of a shape leaving only
an arrangement for molecules to take up. I do not think that is done, as Aristotle
and Aquinas thought, by "abstraction of the phantasm," the complete
sensory appearance, with all its supplementation from memory, imagination, habit,
instinct, and feeling, through which things are perceived (signum formale quo).
I think abstraction is an activity directly upon what is perceived, done through
transformed and supplemented perception, as above. Nor, as I said, do I think
abstraction is primarily of the real "what-it-is" of things, like
success at intuiting essences or real natures. Rather we notionalize any aspect
of things that interests us, even aspects that things suggest or which we distinguish
in them by association. Our interest may be from instinct, animal desire, intellectual
bias, curiosity or other habits or from our temperament or talent, and even
from our disorders of thought, character and of mind. Of course we have an intellectual
bias toward the real natures of things, namely, what originates and explains
their characteristic behavior, for that is what is most useful for us to know
as intelligent animals. But abstraction is not limited to real natures, because
it separates things perceived and aspects noticed from their individuation,
thus giving rise to conceptions without regard for whether the things or aspects
are essential or accidental, substances or happenings.
An earlier question comes up again: do we have to have the conception in order
to notice the aspects of a thing or do we get the conceptions from noticing
the aspects of things? Obviously the latter, though once having the conception,
which is an habitual ability to distinguish, it is through the conception that
we notice the aspects of later things and are enabled to form further, even
more elaborate conceptions. So, when someone noticed an analogy between a landscape
and the feel of a street, the conception of a streetscape formed and began generating
other concepts.
Abstraction, considered as something done to things that changes the agent,
not the things, is the condition of things in which aspects may be distinguished
and noticed according to our interests, with a basic level of conceptions arising
from instinctive emotion and more elaborate conceptions arising from our need
and enjoyment to predict experience and from our enjoyment in understanding,
and, of course, from endless refinement through education and experience.
To an intelligent being nothing is just particular, with no "what?"
or "how?" or "what sort?" or "which one?" even
when we have no interest in the generality and don't advert to it, as we do
not advert to the individual sips of coffee that are automatically registered
as "not too hot," "sweet enough," "fresh enough,"
or the like, without such judgments arising to notice unless there is a discrepancy
from expectation. There just is no perception without judgment for a human,
and very little judgment requires language. That's true of every gesture, posture
shift, every non-reflex eye-blink, face twist, smile, glance and movement. Glances
are excellent examples of the way habitual beliefs or interests direct action:
e.g., many men follow women with their eyes, without being aware of their own
interest, habit, or pleasure. Heads turn rapidly from side to side at a tennis
match; who remembers turning? That's another reason why judgment and linguistic
expression diverge: diverse judgments can be simultaneous and instantaneous
as well, and can be of vastly different types, gender interest, say, along with
philosophical argument; interest in the contest of tennis, along with interest
in seeing what happens. Abstraction, and judgment too, is an activity we do
by being at all. And it is something we do, first to things perceived, then
to anything we think of by way of doing that.
Cognition is constant animal activity, part of what it is for an animal to live,
just as is its breathing, and naturally necessary too. Human cognition is constant,
too; it is a locked-on commitment to reality conceived qua-what and qua-how,
suffused with emotion and evaluation. Judgment is specific to what it is for
us to be, to live at all.
Abstraction is like a constant light that causes perceived things to emit light
in other wavelengths, to fluoresce their designs, patterns and forms to activate
conception, changing as attention moves from thing to thing or aspect to aspect.
Now you might say, "what is this, magic?" But do you seriously think
understanding reduces to some other process? Or even that perception does? Everything
in nature is in a way finally magic because there is either an end to reductions
or no end ever and, in either case, the explanation, if any, has to lie beyond
the cosmos. Why does one thing cause whatever it does, and not just any old
thing, or randomly shift its effects? Why do like charges repel? Why does the
gravitational constant (G) have the value it has? In the end, as I said, causation
does not reduce to anything else, unless you think of a kind of dance of things
that are what they do and of causation as the pattern of what they do. But even
in that case, there are the final questions: why do they do that, and why are
they at all? So the fact that there is a specific constant human abstraction
is no stranger than anything else and certainly cannot be reduced to anything
else.
By conception, suffusing perception, real things and their conditions, automatically
the content of existential commitment, are constituents in predicative and identity
judgments that may become parts of more complex conditional, causal, counterfactual,
and other judgments. The sorts of judgments we make are the manifestation of
our interests, both innate and acquired. When you reach sexual awakening you
make judgments not made before, not even possible before. These considerations
eliminate the gap between true judgment and the relevant reality while also
providing an explanatory account of truth: what I think is true, just in case
and only because what I think is what is so. One and the same reality is particular
and physical, as cause of sensation and presence in sensation, and univeral
and immaterial as content of commitment. As perceived, it is both particular
and univeral for humans.
Conceptions are the outcomes of discernment. Discernment varies with age, nurture,
natural endowment, interest, instinct and temperament, experience, education,
happenstance, desire, metal health (and undoubtedly more). Conservation of quantity
over change of shape is not understood by children as early as continuation
of objects passing out of sight and reappearing. The leverage of a hammer is
unintelligible to a baby; the principles of a zipper and flush toilet elude
most adults, and the principle of a gravity pump is as unimaginable to most
as the principles of differential calculus. We cannot form judgments involving
shape, color, size, weight, distance, and all the others, without having conceptions
which are discernments.
If we come equipped with a stock of such abilities, whether innate or from eternal
exemplars or by illumination, there will always remain a question as to whether
things are really that way. Yet it seems we cannot discern the features of things
without such conceptions. Which comes from what? Should we say the conceptions
ARE the structures, materialized in things, dematerialized in understanding?
To a large extent, we should.
Once acquired, discernment is habitual. In addition to conception arising from
our needs, interests and learning, there is the creative configuration of features
that we make to form conceptions like "streetscape" or even "architrave"
or "cornice." A conception, as it gets more definite in its contrasts,
differentiates into concepts. In sum, by discerning a structure, say, "square,"
one understands "being square" and thereby has a habit of discernment
that can be further refined until one grasps a definition. We can also loosen
conceptions, so many people call rectangles "squares." Thus, forming
the conceptions "shape" and "color" one can form the judgment
"What is shaped is colored" and "What is colored is shaped"
and "Shapes are not colors" and "Shapes do not cause colors,"
etc. -- all known to be so by perception, but not perceptible to non-intelligent
animals.
How conception is to be explained is all the more controversial because so few
theories have been considered in recent philosophy and the ones left over from
medieval philosophy seem suggestive but wrong: for instance, they concentrate
(as do recent scientists) on the transmission by a signal from the features
of things to the receptive organ (brain area as well, nowadays). The whole project
of forms transmitted through a material medium which they do not inform (because
it lacks the obediential potency), thus, colors through air that they do not
color (though sometimes they do, as with distant fires), and of intelligible
forms being transmitted along with and by the material forms and included in
the phantasm from which they are abstracted, while admirably inventive, is unnecessary.
Nowadays, we can better explain the mechanics of sensory stimulation for each
of the senses than they could before the 17th century. Yet we have to stop at
the same spot the medievals did: how is sensation/perception activated and given
content by signals from distant objects that produce physical changes in the
organs (including brain sectors)?
Late scholastics had the senses responding to the transmitted form by producing
an immaterial likeness (species) through which, like a lens, the animal is aware
of the color of the thing, or, like a telephone, of the sound of the thing.
In effect, they were doing something analogous to physics/physiology-neurology,
filling in the space between the stimulating object and the animal response,
but at the last minute leaping over the gap between the organ change that activates
the ability and the production of the content of the sensory response, namely,
the subjective quality through which the objective color, say, is perceived.
Nowadays we can trace the process of seeing from its origin, even in a star,
to a sector of the brain, but not onward to the subjective content and not back
from there to the traits of objects, because the same gap seems to be there.
So we are still stopped at the same place, though it looks as if we have a superior
account of organ stimulation up to the cerebral cortex. But when both medieval
and recent accounts reach the gap between neural processes and subjectivity,
they simply jump.
It really makes no difference whether the sensory stimulation produces awareness
of the very quality that is in the things, or whether the stimulation produces
a representation, replica, likeness, or whatever. The question is the same.
Are we going to say about the subjective experience, produced from sensory excitation,
in answer to "How and why does it do that?," that that's what a sense
is? Or is there supposed to be another story, say an inner mechanism or an encompassing
generality about matter, or neural matter, that explains why and how the quality
of the object is sensed or a representation is presented? Both accounts are
going to have to accept the first form of answer. And then representationalists,
are going to have to answer, "Then, why say what is produced by sensation
is a representation, species, simulacrum, likeness, of an objective quality
rather than the quality itself?" That will turn the inquiry in the direction
of disputing which view will better explain the defective cases of perception,
perceptual memory, and imagination. Though I doubt that representations as content
of subjectivity will explain defective perception better, I think it quite irrelevant
what explains the cases gone wrong when what we need is to explain the cases
that go right. And representations, simulacra, and the like, cannot do that
at all.
Perceptual realism both for humans and animals is a better account of successful
perception and is a better answer to "why do animals perceive at all rather
than just detect?". It must be because subjectivity and direct realism,
which is surely harder for nature to attain than the detection systems that
are to be found everywhere in living things and virtually everywhere in complex
non-living systems, is much more efficient for animal well-being. Besides, if
you were designing something that could see trees and hear the wind, why would
you pick a design in which you had to sub-design awareness of replicas or likenesses
as well, when you could pick a sub-design that yields direct awareness and requires
no further effects of things for the activity of thought?
Humans suffuse their perception with understanding and intelligent feeling,
which for now can be considered abstraction and judgment, where real things,
individuals like me and you and real conditions like being annoyed or bored,
are elements of thought, so that a true judgment that you are becoming annoyed
by my repetition has as its content that very fact. That must be even more efficient
for living than animal perception. As indeed it is, as we can see from the lethal
superiority it is so easy, once humans have sufficient numbers, to exercise
over other animals, as well as the high degrees of comfort, certainty and enjoyment
humans can attain. But still, mind the mindless viruses, bacteria, and the like,
for whom higher forms of animal life are just food. Against them, and their
adaptations, the superiority of human intelligence remains undecided. Yet I
suppose that given long enough without a surprise successful attack to destroy
mankind, the viruses and bacteria will be defeated by intelligence.
Now some remarks about perceptual presence and about inchoate concepts.
(a) Presence.
A thing or event is potentially present wherever and whenever it can be differentially
perceived by some animal species. It might even be discontinuously present,
even discontinuously potentially present, as are the people on a beach over
the hill who can be heard and then not, as the sound is blown about. Are these
people potentially present all over the sky from which they could be seen? What
about all over the stratosphere from which they could be seen through a telescope?
What about in outer space where, perchance, their noises are transmitted on
a long-wave radio? Why not? It's stretching our notion a bit but not straining
it beyond intelligibility.
What about a star, say, 100 light years from earth, receding at 100,000 miles
per hour? It is never anywhere near where it seems to be to us, relatively.
Would it be present wherever it can be seen from? Yes, for by "present"
all we mean is "perceived and noticed." We say we can see the star
now even though all the light we'll ever see it by is "old light,"
100 years behind it, and more as the star recedes. How do we get across the
gap to see the star now? Strictly, we cannot jump the gap. Our seeing is now.
But the star is always 100+ years behind us perceptually. That's little different
from the radio lapse we all heard from the moon explorers, about a second, or
experience on some transoceanic telephone calls and radio transmissions. In
fact all seeing and hearing is leaning back in time and even smell and touch
despite contact involve time for the neural signals even though we don't notice
the lags, though one could be vaporized before a kiss reached the brain.
What looks to be a grand and stationary land, sea and sky scape, say, twenty
miles deep, twenty miles across and eight miles high (where we can just make
out the silver glint of a 500-seat airplane), is temporally spread out with
the foreground maybe a nano-nanosecond away, the middle distance a nano-microsecond,
the skytop a nano-microsecond away from all the sea level, and the sun that
lights it all eight minutes away! It is all present to sight, even to some other
sorts of animals, but it is more like visual music than a small photograph.
All that wondering concerns how far and how long the signals have to travel
to create perceptual presence. There is no philosophical problem except perhaps
to explain, as I did, that the whole gestalt of present perception may be made
of elements distant temporally from one another but arriving together in our
experience. After all, what difference does it make that the light of the whole
scene and that by which I see the sun left the sun eight minutes ago and is
a millionth of a second earlier lighting the stratosphere than lighting the
horizon, and a ten-billionth of a second later lighting the field in the foreground?
The mystery is to explain how anything is seen at all.
Anything perceived by a human is conceived as well. The simplest presence in
thought is by perception, proprioception and selfawareness. Most modes of thought-presence
are far more complex. For instance, I can think of Betelgeuse, an enormous red
giant that I cannot identify in the sky but know from reading is just barely
visible, and similarly, in the looseness of the conception, I can think Andromeda
is a star I can see in a constellation, though it is a galaxy of billions of
stars. Those very things, Betelgeuse and Andromeda, are elements of my existential
commitment and of my judgment that they are stars even in daytime when not presented
to me by perception. So although perception is the original presenter of things
for thought, it is only one way, the one that grounds all others in reality.
Perception is the basis of reference, and thus, of naming the absent. Perception
is the base of cognition since all the sensory powers, including imagination,
memory, and sensation are for perception. If there were no perception there
would be no such powers because nature would not need them. Mere detection systems,
no matter how complicated, do not need sensation, imagination, memory or the
like. Perhaps, though, there may be some intermediate cases where animals, without
central brains or mouths, need sensation without perception, responding to the
qualities around by nutrition, reproduction, change of shape, that does not
require perception.
"Nature does nothing in vain" is an old rule of thumb, but useful.
Imagination, memory, language, construction of concepts -- and other things
besides, can present things to thought. For instance, my reading about the Punic
Wars (264-146 B.C.), and the Carthaginian expansion into the Iberian Penninsula
(238-211 B.C.) can present them now, even though sketchily because we cannot
furnish them with details the way Cecill DeMille filmed the story of Moses.
I leave for separate inquiries the details of how past events, distant geography,
future events, cosmological realities, abstract beliefs like "The cosmos
will end (or never end) in entropic death," and "There is (or is not)
an unperceivable spiritual creator of all other things," present realities,
because the basic pattern that we need for now is clear. It really is not different
in kind for me to think of Quine, whom I have met, and Hasdrubal, brother of
Hannibal, of whom I have only heard. I think of either is not just to refer
but to have intentionally present, even though Hasdrubal's presence is a lot
smokier and wraithlike than Quine's.
Presence to an animal perceiver is analogous to intellegent perception. In both
cases to be present is to be the content perceived, but for intelligent perceivers
perception is encompassed by conception and reality commitment (unless defeated
by exhaustion, shock, illness, confusion or error). The conception has the content
of some structure, pattern, design or form in something, whether or not a predicative
judgment is made. One and the same shape of a certain tree that is seen is the
shape understood (and, perhaps, judged to be the shape of the tree, as in the
simple thought "That shape"). The transition from conception to predicative
judgment is typically instantaneous, that is, as far as we can tell, without
an interval. When you understand Picasso's Bull, made of a bicycle handle and
a seat, seeing it, is seeing that is so. Similarly, seeing "antelope"
in the handles of a garden cultivator, is coincident with the judgment, "antelope-shaped."
It takes a while to see the movement of a tree-trunk's shadow as the hour hand
on a clock face, but when you do, the judgment is complete all at once.
(b) Inchoate conceptions.
I am returning to an aspect of the origin of conceptions. We need not further
distinguish conceptions from concepts than to say concepts are more filled out,
less loose in their contours, more usually associated with paradigm cases or
instances to indicate, and more often there are names with linguistic meanings
or even definitions involving the concepts.
Humans who are not specialists in some art or craft, often have inchoate knowledge
of nature's secrets, though their conceptions do not contain the explanatory
elements or any rigid structure, the way "of-my-family" might in some
societies. That holds not only for fields, forests, streams, waves, flowers
and crops, but for languages, history, psychology and even one's self. Conceptions
are founded in the forms of things, though only simple ones are first found
in experience of things and rapidly elaborated. The baby has no conception of
continuity of shape, though soon it does, but then not yet of the conservation
of volume. And, of course, no names for such phenomena. Some things cannot be
conceived, before physical maturation. In addition many conceptions are refined
and elaborated in the course of intelligent practices, whether canoeing, sailing,
fishing, farming, herding, engineering, sewerage, mathematics, music, sports
and history.
Folks commonly understand flexibility, as in a willow wand, and the elasticity
of a rubber band. Refining the notions into elastic distortion and attaching
a method of measuring, we can find out that all solids are, differently, elastic;
that's why we prefer standing on wood floors instead of concrete; resiliance.
Grasping that, one can notice reversibility and guess at Hooke's law, that the
strain in a solid is proportional to the stress (up to its elastic limit), so
that the mechanical work expended is completely recovered by removing the stress,
like a spring. Modern engineers use formulae to calculate stress; I don't know
how Roman and medieval master builders did it. Maxwell [1865, p. 89] showed
there is an analogous property "dielectric polarization" in insulators
(of which every solid, not super-cooled, is one to an extent). In fact, elastic
distortion, dielectric polarization and heat capacity are all reversible, analogous
properties, each of which can in cases produce the other [see below].
In contrast there is heat conduction -- a hot object heats its surrounding and
cools, like electrical conduction it is a "transport property," moving
energy from one place to another. There is plastic flow -- an unintuitive name,
namely, tin's or aluminum's bending without breaking under stress that exceeds
the elastic limit, like an aluminum can's deforming in the drinker's grip. Now
people have sketchy conceptions of these features, displayed in their own experience
as bathwater cools and heats the room, cans bend, bridges stick in the heat,
but not refined quantitative concepts or interrelated conceptions, as I mentioned,
for the reversible and transport properties. But what they are thinking is the
same reality as the scientist measures, only it is far more particular in nature
and hides all sorts of generalities like those I mentioned. There is an inchoate
grasp that heating a solid expands it (e.g., a drawbridge's jamming on a hot
day), and that that is producing a mechanical effect with heat (e.g., heating
a rusted nut to loosen it from the screw). Some people know that heating tourmaline
(a gem stone) produces an electrical charge (the pyroelectric effect), a reversible
effect. People get the idea of liquid crystal displays, and LED, but vaguely.
In some solids an electric current will produce a mechanical effect, a slight
change of shape that reverses if the charge is removed. So you could make a
bomb that fuses when the current goes off (not on), so a circuit closes.
Understanding these things and the nature of light resulted in thermometers,
polaroid lenses, polaroid photography, liquid crystal displays, cathode ray
tubes, color television and thousands of other things. The general idea is that
in solids, electrical causes can have mechanical and thermal effects; heat can
have electrical and mechanical effects; and stress (bending or pressure) can
have heat and electrical effects. Those are structures in nature ready for conception,
even for refined concepts, once interest and refined observation focus on them.
From simple observation, refined thought and observation can reveal more and
more of the real structures of things.
For someone to say this is all a construction of thought without the same thing
in reality is to ignore the natural history of our inquiries and their basis
in demonstrable effects. My point, however, is not to argue epistemology as
justification right now, but to illustrate the progression by reflection and
experiment from direct perceptual observation with inchoate conceptions toward
elaborate general understanding involving precisely shaped concepts. I skip
the role of idealized models like ideal elasticity and the pure theory of gasses,
etc., for now because their function is just more abstractly the same. One of
the most useful outcomes of purely theoretical modelling is that the model may
indicate something that would have to be real in order for the general theory
to be true, and how it would manifest itself. That was how the w-2 particle
was found experimentally. Analogously, black holes were theoretical postulates,
then indirectly observed from the sink-drain behavior of stars. And one of the
continuing challenges to intelligent ingenuity is to establish or dethrone superstring
theory -- or any other theory of quantum gravity, given that "the clash
between quantum theory and general relativity occurs only at energies a million
billion times higher than those achievable in present-day accelerators"
[Alan Sokal, 1996]. Sokal goes on to remark that superstring theories, and others,
may have observable consequences at lower energies on fundamental particles
that will be revealed by further theoretical elaboration. We might then be able
to get somewhere experimentally. That illustrates what I said about purely theoretical
models, above. Nevertheless, it does seem that eventually we will come to places
in physical science where there are experimental gaps requiring times, spaces
and energies that humans simply cannot manipulate or evade; then basic science
will have to change its character. John Hogan [1996] has some interesting observations
and fancies involving physics, cosmology, biology and the whole enterprise of
science, though the philosophy throughout is superficial.
Notice, explaining all the above examples from innate ideas or platonic archetypes
would only raise questions as to how we are certain that the physical world
is known through such ideas. Do we also have another access to reality that
circumvents such ideas, letting us peek beyond the "veil of perception"?
One proposal, critical idealism, was that experienced reality is constituted
from our conceptions and intuitions. That turned out to have too many anomalies
and to conflict with the "feel" of experience. Not to mention that
there is no way to explain how or why minds acquire their structure or why there
are many minds with the same structure or even how we would know whether another
mind had the same structure as our own. The account sketched here, though it
requires interests and instincts of ours to explain what we do and do not notice,
and what we do and do not conceptualize, has the base of all our conceptions
being the same as the structures, designs, patterns and forms of things and
happenings. The humming that you do, which is a kind of thinking in sound, making
a tune, may be the Dies Irae that Berlioz adapted, the same reality recognizable
in all the transformations: a real structure, though in this case, an abstract
particular [see Chapter 7] rather than just a form.
A last point before moving on. Some people wonder how the content of a true
judgment can be the very same thing as what is really so, when what is so is
particular, unrepeatable and has endless overflow features and transcendant
determinacy, while the thought can be repeated, can be the same as another person's,
though numerically distinct from it, and is not transcendently determinate.
One way of thinking of the sameness is that the reality has a new feature when
understood, intentional being as well as physical being, and whenever thought
of, has a numerically distinct feature, intentional being for so-and-so at t-t'.
Thus, though the thought lacks physical determinateness, what is thought perceptually
is something physically determinate. Similarly when a ball is seen by a pair
of cats, what they see, as seen, lacks the overflow and the hidden necessities
of what they see; but the two perceptions are still the same. If what an animal
sees, when it sees a bird, is not the same as the bird that is seen, then the
supposition that the animal sees the bird has been denied. The same holds for
a true perceptual judgment and for ones rooted in perception, e.g., that heat
makes a solid expand and that pressure solidifies gasses.
2. Our cortex-states are a medium with-which, not in-which for thoughts.
Neural-cortical states are not related to thought the way a natural language
is to what I say, or as water-color is to a painting, as a medium of expression,
but more the way ink marks, or radio waves, relate to a message. Such states
are a medium-with-which rather than a material-out-of-which. They are like the
internal electronic states of my computer. Sensations, words, feelings, memories,
imagination and gestures (writings, facial expressions, postures, inflections,
etc.) and other doings are media for thinking; that is especially obvious for
musical thinking. But they are not material-out-of-which, either.
The distinctions among thoughts are limited by the contrastive capacities of
the medium: but not to them because the same media contrasts can be used for
many thought contrasts, just as nodding can communicate many thoughts and feelings
and can be the medium in which the thinking is done. The media-in-which are
part of the thought the way water-color or egg-tempera is part of a painting.
Not so for what is only a medium-with-which. Ink marks, and pencil, too, can
be media-with-which I express judgments, not part of the thought. Gestures,
statements, even feelings are media in which, and are part of the thought. I
do not mean to suggest that all our thinking is expressed or performed in some
medium: for example, our unexpressed, unreflective self-awareness and our enjoyment
of understanding and being, and knowing we are saying what we want to say, are
not, usually, expressed at all, though one might say they are performed by our
thinking in some medium or other.
Brain-states (electrochemical energy fluctuations and transitions) are not "material
out-of-which" for thoughts, either. They are only material "with-which,"
like electronic machine states. You can no more speak when the speech center
of the brain is destroyed than you can word-process after the current is off.
Sound impressions are not made out-of anything but sound; so too for colors
and tastes, touches and smells. Color can be seen. The microstructure of materials
cannot be seen (without instruments). Colors can't be the microstructure; besides,
because "red" can be caused in dozens of ways, it cannot be identical
with any of its varied causes. Cause and effect cannot be identical anyway.
Are neural-states the material "with-which" animals have sensation?
No animal can have any feeling except "with" its neural-cerebral system.
Animals do not perceive sensations (outside laboratories and some unlikely extremes),
but perceive environments, food, predators, victims, paths, water, in conditions
of curiosity, comfort, pain, hunger, fear, fury, flight, approach (etc.). Thus
an animal uses its functioning sensorium as a whole for action -- and while
sight, smell, taste, sound can be cut off by brain lesions, that does not show
those stimuli are ever the object of animal awareness (that is, no non-intelligent
animal ever hears sound, just sounds) or hears that it is hearing. Surely the
animal neither senses its brain states nor senses changes in its brain states,
but senses by means of both. I cannot taste the tea without tea-tasting neural
responses with which I have tea-tastes. But the neural responses are the means,
not the outcome. The outcome is the presence of things, even of parts of the
animal itself. Sensation is more remote from collections of brain states than
changes of vehicular and pedestrian traffic in New York's garment district are
from changes in clothes preferences in San Francisco.
A unit, like a mark, can belong to a system of shapes. It can also belong to
a system of words for which shapes are differently classified -- as handwriting
illustrates, with each crabbed and deformed item also classifiable as an allograph
of standard printing in Times Roman. It has to be contrastive functional equivalence
for meaning that determines the printed allographs for such inscriptions.
Physical marks are the with-which for writing, but words are the medium, the
in-which for the message. Notice, too, the physical items (the marks) used in
creating the message need not survive transmission, and usually do not; even
a medieval copyist made new marks, and the received message nowadays has a material
medium in which the writer has no hand. Electrochemical neural states are neither
thought of, nor thought-in as feelings, words and images may be, but only states
thought-with, for which others of the same sort would do as well. That has to
be because otherwise our judgments could not persist from day to day.
Explanatory order?
Contrasts of marks are for (potential) contrasts of message. Contrasts of message
explain contrasts of marks in the sense of explaining why there are such contrasts
among marks we use. Perceptual performance explains perceptual ability of this
rather than that sort. And apparently the eco-advantages for the animal explain
why it has these perceptual abilities. So too, contrasts of thought explain
contrasts of brain states at a certain level. If there are distinct brain states
for thinking mathematically, in contrast to thinking musically, then their occurrence
is explained by the thinking, not vice versa. Similarly, if I use a Casio synthesizer
to make songs, the sounds it makes are, along with my fingering, the medium
for my songing, a kind of thought. The electronic states are just a "with-which,"
caused to happen by the thinking, not an out-of-which for my thoughts or an
in-which (like the heard sounds).
My musical expression is limited by the contrastive sound abilities of the synthesizer;
but not exactly, because the machine-contrasts can be used to express many distinct
musical contrasts, potentially infinite, so the same intervals differently ordered
can express different feelings, though the component sounds are "the same."
Moreover, if the synthesized sounds are written out, then my musical expression
can expand to the capacities of any instrument that can play the score.
The sensorium of higher mammals, some birds and many aquatic species is remarkably
similar in construction and function to that of humans. One thing we can be
sure of: all these systems were organized for the species' eco-place and for
life far longer than individual reproductive maturity, and in so far as there
is interiority -- as there must be if we have sensation and not mere detection
and servo-mechanism -- it is for exterior action, for feeding, reproduction
and sociality. It is even likely that adaptation so that individuals outlast
their own reproductive success is "for" (in the sense of being a real,
physical explanatory component in) the success of the species by reproduction.
In brief, old lion males frighten predators of reproducing females.
To anthropomorphize higher apes (for instance, to say they can "learn language"
and "use language," thereby treating abilities that are final in them,
as if they were stages of our understanding), may block our seeing that their
preconscious cognition is, in fact, not the path evolution took to our understanding.
However, to compare apes to the cognition of a dog, say, or a horse, and consider
how they differ from one another and contrast dramatically with the emotionless
cognition of some insects and how spiders seem emotionally complex, seems more
fruitful.
Philosophers savage human cognition by underestimates, with naive claims like
(1) the illicit contrast of rational understanding with irrational feeling (that
implicitly denies any fundamental cognitive role for feeling and desire); (2)
the idea that our general knowledge comes by Humean enumerative induction (as
if we could even explain a bird's nest-building out of "like" parts
that way); and (3) the idea that we are machines limited by our machine-states
[see C. Cherniak, 1986; Paul Churchland, 1981, 1984, 1989 and 1995; and Patricia
Churchland, 1986].
Humans are nature's successful experiment in how material things can be thinking
things. They transcend their material states by making some of them the "material
with-which" (the chemical, electronic-biotic "with- which") to
do what no material system can do "on its own" [See Chaper 6]. They
use sensory states, cognitive and emotional, as media-in-which to do what cannot
be done otherwise: abstract thought. Our cognition is not an information-processing
system of the kind F. Dretske [1981] imagined. An information system, no matter
how complex, needs no display of the external to originate action that is external.
But for us the displayed external is essential. Besides, any state of ours can
be one we are in either simply or in transparently by our coincidently being
in the state of being in the state.
In brief, our understanding requires (1) a sensory medium "in-which"
because it requires (2) a medium of (a) presentation (images, feelings, appearances),
(b) a medium "out-of-which" (words, feelings, images, sensations,
sounds, tastes, colors, etc.) and (c) a medium for storage (as memories in various
media), that, in turn, requires material states as medium "with-which":
the whole complex of bodily states (of which brain states are just a part).
Yet, the ability to understand transcends all media and all matter. We can understand
and think things about everything of any sort whatever. And we can observe,
imagine and conjecture about anything, "what-is-it?", though not assuredly
correctly as our own case illustrates so well: man's glassy essence [Chapter
4].
How does a real object become a constituent of thought (not animal perception
alone)? We cannot just bilocate a tree in the world and shrunken up, as Lucretius
imagined, a skin of it, inside the atoms in the head; for what good would that
do? It could not make a true thought. A true thought has to be the exercise
of the ability to think, just as a bird song has to be the exercise of the bird's
ability to make sounds. The only way an object in the world can be part of a
thought is by a transformation of it that makes it the exercise of the ability
to understand, that makes it the content of a change in us, analogously to the
way a tree seen thereby becomes the content of my seeing. And your voice, heard,
becomes the content of my hearing so that I can say "I heard you."
There is only one way that can happen. We have to do something to it. We have
to
dematerialize it, departicularize it. As I said above [p. 204], it is as if we radiate a light frequency that makes crystal molecules, say, give off light of a different frequency, their own, to fluoresce so that the atoms disappear and the geometric relations among the atoms are the actuality of our conception. Thus the arrangements of atoms in one molecule would turn out to be exactly the same (geometrically indistinguishable from) the arrangement in another of the same material, although under ordinary light they would be different because the actual molecules differ and the structures would not be displayed. So too with the stresses in beams, the compression of water or air.
But for a real object to be a constituent of an animal's awareness no dematerialization
is required. Then how is perceptual presence accomplished? By engagement with
reality from the beginning. The most primitive awareness is objective, is of
objects, in animal contact. Understanding has to go beyond that: to make the
dead matter, the en soi, glow with "whatness" (for us to fill in)
and "thereness" for our perception has to be "locked on"
to being. Our constant condition (defeasible by drugs, sleep, fatigue, dreams)
is locked-on existentiality: reality commitment (that is why the sense of unreality
is so disconcerting and, persisting, so serious a disorder).
3. Abstraction is something we do.
Understanding is our condition of being. We do not have conscious nonabstract
experiences. Immanuel Kant held the same position as an outcome of his own theories:
"thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind"
[1929, B 75:1781, 1787]. For us, to be is to think. Particularity may be in
the foreground of what we perceive, but understanding provides a luminous generality
even when not well-delineated.
We cannot tell what makes an object that one, except in terms of features that
can be shared or by individuating reference ("born of so-and-so, over there,
at the end") that only repeats the question. Everything one can both perceive
about a thing and understand could also belong to something else. Its difference
from everything else by which a thing is individuated is not directly intelligible
because it is negative and comparative. Some recent philosophers have tried
to avoid that outcome by saying there are individual essences, others, that
there are haecceities (not quite as technically elaborate as Scotus worked the
idea out), and others still insist that only individuals exist, every generality
reducing to a nominalistic class or other extension for a word. Some of those
philosophers try to find something that makes a thing the same-thing across
all the possible worlds it exists in; that's the transworld heir-lines misconception.
Obviously, if an individual exists actually, what makes it the same in any condition
in which it might have been, is what makes it that-thing actually, even though,
in some other condition, it would have had different accidental traits. And
that feature is negative: its real (not Cambridge) differences from every other
thing that is actual. So the individuation of a thing consists entirely in differences,
and thus has no intelligible content of its own. And it is the unintelligible
differences that are left out of perceived particulars by abstraction.
The intelligible is general qua intelligible, as Aristotle and a long line of
philosophers recognized. The particular, qua unintelligible, as such, frames
the intelligible and lies beyond it. What we can conceive by abstraction, is
in principle, neither "this" nor "that," but a "something."
Our unpolarized awareness (and that of other animals, too) is of objects and
happenings (presented by sensation, sorted by its needs): of pens, tables, sunshine,
and of their conditions and differences. We are not aware of representations,
of appearances, of seeming, unless we need to be, e.g., when a person takes
a suitcoat outside a store to see its color in natural light, or acquires such
habits for other ends, e.g., craft, science, art or commerce. We come upon seeming
as distinct from being when we find we've made a mistake or feel dizzy or find
an anomaly in our experience. Or, when, as in the case of the stary night or
the sun, our scientific understanding provides an interpretation that makes
the visible only the apparent. That can happen with every mode of sensing. Nevertheless,
through the apparent, because of its input alignment, we perceive the real.
The input alignment of the appearance of things with real things, as well as
the phenomena of afterimages, apparent colors and shapes, and even the perceptual
illusions, are causally consequences of perception. We distinguish items in
alignment (like you, your voice, the telephone sound and what I hear) and on
suitable occasions attend to the mirror-image in a reflecting telescope, as
distinct from the moon perceived, or to the broken image in cracked glass, as
distinct from a tree seen through it, and more rarely, but sometimes, mistakenly
we attribute features of how things look, sound, taste, etc., to the things
themselves, but more often we attribute features to the appearances of things
that we would not attribute to the things. You may sound tinny or faint on a
poor phone connection. Sometimes the atmosphere does reflect light from things
below so that we can see them upside down from a distance; and sometimes the
atmosphere reflects light that we construe to be mountains, lakes and trees
in the distance, though it is a mirage. Similarly I once saw in a daylight/morning
fog an impossibly enormous sailboat hundreds of feet in the air, in full color,
that, as the fog and appearance dissipated, I saw to have come from light refracted
from a real sailboat that was in full sunlight beyond the narrow bank of fog
that blew away. I did not take the boat in the sky to be real but to be an amazing
appearance. That was an appearance perceived. At the time I did not treat the
appearance transitively, as we usually do, and so did not think I was seeing
the boat I later saw when the fog cleared. But if the same phenomenon happened
again, I'd know I was seeing a boat.
We cannot even in principle yet explain the production of experience from neural
fluctuations, whether in a worm, nematode, squirrel, clam or mammal, neural
states that are no more like what is perceived than the light fluctuations of
a city (seen at night from the air) are like what the people do that causes
the light patterns. None of these phenomena argue against the naturally necessary
coincidence of particular and abstract in everything humans perceive, remark
or imagine.
4. Things can be thought-parts through various conceptions.
The feel of a fabric, the quality of a voice, the timbre of the wind around
the trees, the railroad sound of the ocean, the vulgar roar of a "gunned
car," the snarl of a motorbike, the smell of rubber boots, the taste of
red onion, the texture of baked potato -- these are all perceptions through
conceptions. The same things can be felt, seen, or heard under other "aspects":
the nubbiness of the fabric, the gender of the voice, the pitch of the wind,
the millrace sound of the ocean, the whine of an engine.
There is not just one explanation of why we conceptualize things as we do, rather
than otherwise as we are able to. There are too many factors, ranging from instinct
to socialization, to habit, to learning and to sheer intelligence, good habits,
bad habits, disorders of understanding, false beliefs, pathological interests,
and more, that prompt our conceptions. There are endless patterns, structures,
forms, and designs to be discerned in things and to be made out of what we discern.
In general, we should conclude: (1) there is no innate treasury of conceptions
to be produced as a precondition or "on the occasion" of perceptual
states; (2) abstraction is the activity that both leads to and is guided by
conceptualization, making content out-of-things; and (3) abstraction, and the
conceptions we make, are neither true nor false, right nor wrong, apart from
our judgments (which are analogous to expressed affirmations), although normally
abstraction is attended with a habitual judgment that is a reality commitment
to what we perceive.
As mentioned before, there can be various conceptions of things, for example,the
shapes: chair shapes, house shapes, table shapes, boat shapes, that need not
be judged to be the shapes of things but are understood as shapes for things,
made subjects of judgment as to which shapes transform smoothly into which others,
etc. Notice there are no names for most such shapes. To think of "sound,"
of what all sounds or many, at least, have in common, is to think of "being
a sound" which is itself not a sound. Sounds like pings and bangs and yelps
and screeches and voices exist, but "is a sound" is predicable of
every sound but not a sound at all; it exists as such only as understood, but
never by itself in physical things.
To recapitulate points made before: things can be parts of thoughts under different,
and even indeterminate, abstractions. The aspects of things, as well as the
things abstracted, can become the objects of judgment, and so elements, of thought.
Situations, happenings, relationships, etc. are all equally contents of judgment.
The ancient image of the "composing and dividing judgment" is too
closely related to Indo-European sentences to be representative of judgment
in general. To capture a bit more of the analogous multitude, think of the activities
of a composer, a painter, a surgeon. There is no time for verbalized thought
("this is a note"), and no need either. Intelligent commitment is
in the doing. The substance/attribute image of judgment is deeply unfaithful
to our commitments in intelligent, not necessarily reasonable, action. Besides,
the abstractions and even the things and situations abstracted, can be transformed
by obtuse abstraction into made-up objects and happenings, the objects of formal
thinking, or into idealized happenings (with madeup features, like ideal gasses),
or into imaginary objects or into imaginary environments, like made-up animals.
So, there are parts, elements, constituents and whole contents of intelligent
perception that are realities. On these all judgments are founded. The further
contents of thought (like ideas, concepts, conceptions, meanings, aspects, situations,
facts and relations), are made by thought out of things intentionalized, and,
derivatively, out of one another, without end. The thought-parts made by thoughts
can themselves be the objects of formal abstraction, as mathematical abstraction,
logical abstraction and physical idealization. Just as anything we say can be
something we say something about, anything we think, whether commitment or conception,
can be something we think something about. So our judgments can be at any "remove"
from the basic perceptual judgments, from which all our thinking arises.
5. No generality outside thought.
There is no generality actually in things. The rectangularity of a door is molecularly
realized and is a physical feature at a dimension where the spaces among molecules
and atoms and molecular motion are irrelevant. Generality belongs to science
but there is nothing common and separable, except in thought, between two Intel
chips. The chips can be interchanged but the structures cannot be separated.
Each does everything and only what the other does, yet, everything about each
is individuated, begins to be and ceases to be with it. Multitude is real apart
from thought. So is similarity of behavior. That one chip does everything and
only what the other chip does is real in particular events but not as a generality.
Generality is extracted. The same among many, is entirely embedded in matter,
accessible only to the dematerializing mind, like a perfume embedded in molecules
and accessible only to the nervous system that can smell.
Universals are conditions of things that more than one thing can have or be,
say, an Intel chip, black, with prongs. Such a condition is not physically separable
or distinct. For if you took away the behavioral structure from the chip, you
would destroy it. Even though we speak of the common humanity of Smith and Jones,
there is not some physically separable common nature that they share. It is
only conceptually separate, and, as such, one and the same. What each is, under
abstraction, is indistinguishable from what the other is, individuation being
irrelevant.
The only generality that a thing has is its generality as a constituent of thought.
The thing is not repeatable. It does not have a separable repeatable "what,"
only an intelligible "what." It is the intelligible "what"
and "what sort" that is physically repeatable. Nor are there two things,
Smith and his being human. Rather it is Smith's being human that is understood
when I judge that Smith is a human. When I notice I can't see the ocean because
of the fog, the generality, "the ocean," ceases with the cessation
of the thought, the way being understood ceases to be the condition of the words
"veni creator" when thought moves on. Meaning something as an actual
condition of words is analogous to being-a-such-and-such for a person. Thus
the universal as universal has being only as an exercise of understanding.
If we have not found out exactly how abstraction works to make the forms and
features of things and events into exercises of the ability to understand --
if there is anything further to find out about the "how" -- that does
not impair this return to realism. For all the other theories of perception
and of truth run into analogous difficulties or outright anomalies of their
own. Besides, as remarked earlier, there is nothing to reduce abstraction or
judgment to. They are not made up of other activities, and, even if they were,
either such component activities would be irreducible or not, and so on, until
we reach what is fundamental. What would be gained? All other theories leave
a sensation/physical object gap as well as an idea/physical thing gap and a
true belief/reality gap. This account eliminates them by indicating that animals,
by nature, perceive realities and that humans, specifically, abstract and judge
realities perceived, and that it is a necessity of nature that animal perception
and human thought originate in the realities.
(a) So what is the story about truth?
In animal perception real things and their conditions (relevant to the instinctual
and general interests of the animal, limited by its sense powers) are present
to the animal and are that on which it acts and to which it responds. Humans
transform that awareness by generalizing the objects and conditions perceived,
making things-conceived and conditions-conceived into judgments (e.g., "it
is about to rain") where the true judgment, as content, is the reality
that is grasped, recognized, or expected, etc. The schema, "what I think
is true just when what I think is what is so" adapts analogically to whatever
we talk about, whether or not the supposed "what-is-so" is made by
thinking (geometry), is dependent on thinking (I was thinking), is wholly independent
of thinking, or variously mixed with some requiring no "fact of the matter"
at all, and others requiring some definite form of access or ascertainment:
he was safe (baseball). "Such-and-such is really so" is obviously
analogous as the differentiation of "are" and "is" display:
(1) There are no cats on that shelf; (2) Six and five are really eleven; (3)
The Queen moves in straight lines and on the diagonals; (4) There are nine innings
in a baseball game; (5) There are non-euclidean geometries; (6) What each dinosaur
did each hour of each day is determinate, even if we cannot know it; (7) Some
people are more popular than most others.
(b) We live in nominal abstractions.
Besides the truths that obviously have real constituents such as my opinion
about whether my car will start, even businessmen think in terms of abstractions
with names: markets, financing, return rates, flow of goods and capital, the
time value of money. Paint manufacturers think in terms of pigments, packaging,
shipping, storage, blending, matching and other conventionalized abstractions
which are often fully grounded physically because they can be repeated, as pigments
can be made of chemicals; still, the sales force is concerned with colors and
finishes, not physical components. An executive does not even notice the enormous
change in thought quality when he drifts from concentrating upon identifying
an income loss to responding to the sandwich on his desk.
Adults can think in parallel processes. So I can be playing a piano piece by
reading it (thus requiring judgmental perception, transition into muscle output
with visual awareness of hand positions and proprioception as well as judgmental
hearing and feedback adjustments of volume, speed, staccato, etc.) while thinking
about the way to repair a garden tiller. Often one listens to music, watches
television, and reads a book, while adjusting one's position for comfort and
perhaps smoking and drinking intermittently, all at once in parallel processing.
All involve judgment, awareness and understanding. It is as if the awareness
of one or another activity (which involves perception, judgment, understanding
and response) can be adjusted upward or downward like volume, relatively to
the others. The awareness I have in mind is not intermittent; awareness is concomitant,
as if subject to an awareness equalizer. Furthermore the time of judgments as
Geach pointed out is not the time of utterances or subvocalizations. The judgments
are instantaneous in that they are made all at once and persist, though how
long depends on what sort of judgment it is and on the utility of persistence.
That the played note is right is instantaneous and cancelled, that the music
continued, lasts for a while; that I played the piece might be remembered for
years.
By "nominal abstractions" I mean abstract entities that are entia
rationis, even though quite typically they are well or fully grounded physically
or socially, and are treated as subject-realities in business, manufacturing,
transportation, law, finance, banking, architecture, engineering, and other
activities that involve managing and moving and changing things physically:
thus, "loads" of gravel, tonnage of shipments, colors and shades of
paint, and textures of stone and terrazo. Some abstractions are nominalistic
and some conventional- nominalistic. Many have natural units like people combined
in social arrangements, like marriage, family, tribe, and nation. Other abstractions
have real components unified by a legal superstructure: states, sales, torts.
Cultures are clustered commitments that amount to systematic evaluations that
affect behavior, usually by what is permitted, encouraged and forbidden, with
a superstructure of organizing beliefs, among humans who are usually organized
geographically or connected ethnically or religiously or politically. A culture
orders in importance the values and general beliefs that guide human lives.
So one can see why a critic might say "Western industrialized nations are
developing a culture of death: rampant violence even by law enforcers, abortion,
suicide, euthanasia, pornography, degradation of women, depersonalization of
business, governmental and social interactions." The whole diagnosis is
full of abstractions. It is a long way from such judgments to the spatio-temporal
events of human lives. More abstractly still, we think of civilizations, e.g.,
ancient Egyptian, Greek, Roman, ancient Chinese, modern Chinese. For some, the
delineations may be symptomatically definite; for most of us, we have images
and perhaps words that are emblematic. But people often make judgments in such
broad categories: "Western scientific, individualistic, rational, discoursing,
egalitarian, materialistic, popularist civilization is challenged by the out
of control world population, though its commercialism and materialism seem to
have corrupted both the continent of India and large parts of Asia and South
America." "Within western Greco-Roman civilization, materialistic
cultures may be in conflict and threaten its survival, just as consumerism may
threaten the Indian Hindu civilization of detachment." Are we going to
say those utterances are not capable of truth? They aren't just incoherent.
But they are quite different from judgments like "AIDS is until 1997 pretty
rare in the USA heterosexual community." Though even in that case, what
counts as "pretty rare"? Is this truth by preference? In fact, truth
or falsity for those interpretive judgments may have more to do on the one hand
with a base in observable behavior and attitudes, like consumerism and, on the
other, with revelatory success. That is, if the judgment is well-based in acknowledged
social phenomena (commercial behavior, social preferences, proclivities to violence,
etc.), then its truth is its revelatory power, its ability to organize and make
intelligible large group behavior. In brief, sometimes truth is being in accord
with the evidential base and being either rich or superior in revelatory effect,
or superior diagnostically, and thus, predictively. In these case "thinking
to be so, what is so," is only analogous to a case like "He has exhausted
his bank account."
(c) Let's turn to money. Is money real?
I do not mean currency because the coins and bills are obviously real, though
many coins and bills have ceased to be money in the sense of acceptable for
exchange with goods or services. So retired Belgian coins are valueless, as
are Confederate bills except as collector's items.
No, I am talking of real money. Is real money real? That brings us to various
tests for reality. One test is whether something has a physical effect. In some
cases money, as physical items with fixed relative values in a general system
of exchange, has weight; in fact, we have machines for counting money by weight.
It also takes up space, determinate amounts. So, half a million dollars in new
twenties takes up exactly x space. We ship currency by the truck-load. But those
are not effects qua money, but effects qua currency. Money is a more abstract
and powerful thing.
Some people, perhaps the English Crown and the Sultan of Brunai, are reputed
to have (converted into American dollars) one dollar for every year the universe
has existed -- and that on a large estimate of 18 billion years. Is that a lot
of money? Not compared to the USA national debt of over 3,000 billion dollars,
perhaps 4,000. By another measure the national debt, which comes to $15,000
per person, say, is not very large given the amount of private wealth and the
goods received in the way of public services and amenities. And, of course,
money is not the same as wealth.
But if these billionaires have it, apparently they can do things with it, the
way I can buy a pair of shoes by an account transfer or by handing over currency.
Something real happens, exactly in proportion to the value attributed to my
accounts and to the things I acquire. Moreover a lot of intermediate human and
machine events occur. Does that make money real? Not the way tree leaves are.
When there were no humans there was no money, but there were leaves. Money does
not take up space or change with the weather or die, though it can be devalued
or more-valued, or annihilated as well as multiplied.
Thus in extreme inflation, as Argentina experienced not long ago, money, not
just currency, can become worthless: at inflation of a thousand percent in a
month a hundred dollars at outset is worth ten cents at the end. The rest of
the value is gone. And, in the U.S., when local banks have a deposit of $1,000.00
and the multiplier of money is 5, by depositing the thousand with the Federal
Reserve bank, the local bank can now lend $5,000, which at a rate of 8% will
earn the bank (skipping expenses and simplifying somewhat) $400 for itself per
year, so that in two-and-one-half years the bank earns an entire $1,000 (less
interest paid to the depositor), the depositor still has the $1,000 in his account,
plus his earned interest (say, 3% per year), and the bank's borrowers have $5,000
that they presumably have used to buy houses, stores, or goods, and perhaps
even things that earn them money. So money can come into being by the legal
device of a multiplier of deposits with a central bank, and various interest
rates. The question is whether it is real. It is certainly real in a way that
neither Mcbeth nor Mickey Mouse is. Is money more real than numbers?
Note that money, even in its most abstract forms as accounting entries, exerts
causation, though the medium of human intentionality, over physical things,
even over some of the earth's vital resources, like oil, atmospheric ozone,
forests and fish, and lack of it causes illness and death. For the reasons forests
are cut down include selling the lumber or selling the crops grown on the cleared
land; the reason oil is drilled and pumped is to sell it for fuels and manufacturing,
i.e., to turn it into money which is used to cause more changes in nature (like
people's houses, cars and clothes), not to mention momentous changes in human
relationships, as says the adage: "A man who marries a woman for her money
earns every penny of it." If physical beauty is real, even if culturally
relative, if divine grace is real, if it exists at all, if the immaterial psyche
is real, that is, exists at all, then all exert causation on physical events.
So does money even though it depends upon human intelligence. Mere numbers,
as such, are not real. They are causally inert. Monetary amounts, however, have
enormous leverage on social behavior and, upon humans and animals, physically.
Money facts are not independent of human beliefs and practices, of course. Were
all humans annihilated tomorrow, so would all money, all wealth of any kind.
There would be no money for the bugs to inherit. But there wouldn't be any pianos
or computers, either. Yet that has no effect on whether statements about money
are true or not. So it is not adequate to characterize realism as requiring
that there be facts of the matter that are independent of whether humans have
beliefs about them. That's only one paradigm of realism. Another is the range
over which one cannot change the facts by changing one's beliefs. Another still
is the range over which one cannot change things by willing it. And still another
is the range of truths that, though constituted by thought, cannot be altered
by anyone's thinking otherwise, e.g., the truths of arithmetic or Euclidean
plain geometry -- any range of judgments to which one must conform one's beliefs
in order to be right. Money is paradigmatically objective and real, independent
of individual belief and individual will, but to which behavior responds as
to a real means of change. So sometimes "is real" has near its center,
the notions "independent from any belief" and "is causally active"
and sometimes, more formally, "imperviousness to individual belief,"
and sometimes other features. That should be no surprise by now because "is
real" is as much subject to semantic contagion as any other word, and the
notion is as plastic as any. Besides, the reality, "is real" is analogous,
just as "to be" is. The whole discussion of realism, in terms of "facts
of the matter," has been misconceived and so has the discussion of meaning-skepticism
when it is framed as to whether there is a fact of the matter as to what I meant
by a word yesterday. What kind of a fact is there supposed to be, over and beyond
what I did?
All those points taken as made, I think money is real, as real as any discipline
of thought or disorder of the understanding is. The disciplines of mathematical
thinking are real; the numbers are not. But to say "money is real"
is not to speak univocally with "electrons are real."
(d) Many kinds of truths.
So intimately do our beliefs order our lives that we do not see differences
among them in ordinary living. And so, the very particular beliefs about which
city we live in (which is certainly not independent of what some humans believe
about it), and the rarely articulated general beliefs that reflect the collective
consciousness (e.g., that money is a means of power and independence; that racial
difference is threatening; that being sexually attractive is more important
for women than for men) and even the collective unconscious (e.g., that women
and men have conflicting personal interests, that power is desirable) affect
us actively, but, differently according to the kinds of realities involved,
e.g., some physical, some psychological, etc. There is not a single principled
answer to "is there a fact of the matter?" That depends on what you
are talking about and has no direct connection to whether what you are saying
is true or not [e.g., see truth as revelatory and diagnostic, above], and even
where there are such facts (e.g., money facts), that tells us nothing directly
about the reality of what we are talking about. So, most of the considerations
philosophers have appealed to to settle the reality of what we think when what
we think is so, are indecisive and irrelevant. It is better simply to recognize
the many modes of being so and not, foolishly, to act as if there is only one
manner of being real.
The many kinds of truth (and error) we live in can be variously classified according
to the diversity of compliant realities, diverse conditions of certification,
or according to the status of thought elements. By elements I distinguish truths
that have as constituents realities-under- abstraction, where other realities
under abstraction are (or can coherently be said to be) present in and predicable
of them. At the other extreme there are thoughts whose constituents are abstract
objects that cannot be real things because all their traits are determined by
what under some form of thought it is right for us to say of them. Between these
extremes are thoughts whose constituents are neither entirely determined by
what is true to say of them, nor entirely dependent on the properties of real
things, like judgments about plays in baseball. Sometimes such judgments depend
upon our ordering phenomena by evaluation, for instance, that honesty is more
basic than industry, and sometimes they depend on our ordering things by abstractions,
or by functions. For example, furniture: it may appear arbitrary what counts
and what does not count, but there are limits: you cannot furnish a highway,
though you might an overpass or a scenic overlook. Among abstractions that are
physically based are "peoples," where real but no particular humans
are needed, in arrangements that are cultural, racial, historical, religious
and geopolitical. Then there are "hands at cards" or "games of
chess" which involve real objects only for convenience and do not require
physical events except for ease of communication and so, may be either physically
realized or purely logically or even mathematically realized. In fact hands
at cards and games of chess, in one respect can be particular events, provided
they happen, but in another, need never happen at all because they are abstract
objects that can be conceived by abstractly considering real events, if they
happen, but can also be conceived by considering arrangements of positions permitted
under the rules, whether or not they ever happen.
Abstract particulars present an interesting case. Mahler's Eighth Symphony is
abstract in that it can have many materializations, and of many kinds, all at
once; yet it is particular in that it is a single sequence of compositional
components. It is as real as anything can be, though perhaps not as real as
money. It is entirely to product of Mahler's thinking and, of course, perception,
since he had to write it out.
Again, there are historical truths, whose constituents are real people and happenings,
but construed in a transtemporal story of cause and effect, accident and coincidence.
"The Western university system was begun in the first few decades of the
13th century" has among its truth conditions what happened afterward: the
practice's having lasted long enough to amount to a university system.
Between real objects and formal objects there are innumberable combinations
of "what-there-is-independently" of finite thinkers and "what
has its features from what is right to think." Since we can explain truthmaking
at both extremes (empirical truth and formal truth), and since we can explain
how any given candidate in between has its truth determined, we can explain
truthmaking in general, as thinking that what is, is. But we have to acknowledge
explicitly that the notion is plastic, where sometimes thinking a certain way
will explain truth all by itself by constructing the situations or objects that
verify, satisfy, or comply with what is thought or authorized; and other times,
where a wholly independent reality has to be the very thing we think. And in
between there are the other notions of truth, like what works, what is revelatory,
what is predictively rich, and even what is conceptually footstamping to begin
a thought process, by fiat, that as a whole will be revelatory, or verified
or satisfactory in other ways, to conduct our thought.
(e) Transition.
I have been concentrating on truth based in direct perception, not just because
it is the basis of all truth and falsity, and originates from knowledge, but
chiefly because abstraction makes perceived realities into thought-parts and
because, though there is no generality as such in things, there is in things
an adequate basis for abstraction (whose thought content is conception). The
key to a better analysis for notions of truth, is to premise that knowledge
begins in experience, not as a subjective, internal state, but as externalized
animal experience transformed into generality by abstraction. Human perception
is knowledge, not just true belief. When we start this way, the rest of the
problems fall into order according to the kinds of discourse involved.
6. Disposing of the "cognitive access" and "fact of the matter"
issues.
(i) Not all truth and falsity depends upon there being some thought-independent
reality or "fact of the matter," as has been shown.
(ii) Objectivity, as interpersonal accessibility of the truth at least within
a community of experts (craftspeople) does not also require realities existing
independently of the craft (or art, or science), as is clear in case of true
and false judgment about music and musical compositions where the units of composition
are constructions of the craft [Ross, 1993].
(iii) Some of the most important bodies of truth are in no way dependent upon
there being some independently existing reality that they describe -- pure Newtonian
theory of mechanics, ideal gasses, etc.; such truths are man-made, made to fit
physical reality with wonderful revelatory and explanatory power.
(iv) Some of our practices of truthmaking suppose that we have practices of
ascertainment, ranging from constructive proof, empirical verification and experimental
difference-making, that track authorized judgments closely. Other practices
do not require a close correlation between assertion and ascertainment for us
to regard assertions as true or false, as, for instance, historical evaluations,
and doctrinal religious pronouncements for which community authority is sufficient
within the community.
(v) Even where our judgmental practices require some sort of ascertainment in
order for the products to be regarded as true or false, it is still, I think,
usually incorrect to say that there is a "cognitive accessibility"
element in the notions of truth and falsity. Sometimes there is. More commonly,
in some discourse sectors one or another form of ascertainment is an overflow
condition of the applicability of "true" or "false," incorporated
by the practice of some art or craft. Thus there are discourse neighborhoods
in which neither "true" nor "false" applies to certain statements
because a condition of applicability, not contained in the meaning or notion,
is not satisfied. That can happen, as intuitionists think, to what appear to
be well-formed mathematical and logical judgments. It can happen when an apprentice
carpenter wants lengths given in 10,000dths of an inch. Similarly, a lot of
contrary-to-fact assertions are passed by, sometimes as jokes: A cowboy's children
say, "We'd have been happier if you'd stayed a cowboy and never had children
at all." Someone says, "He'd have been happier if he'd been born in
the 18th century." That's not ascertainable. It may pass as a character
reading, but not as historical conjecture. We are certainly not going to say,
"It is false because there is no compliant reality," for what would
count as a compliant reality?
So, overall, although "true" and "false" and "not true"
undergo semantic contagion as does "is so" and "is not so,"
the adaptations do not usually make cognitive access part of the linguistic
meaning of these words but, instead, frequently discourse includes such conditions
of applicability among the overflow for "true" or "false."
Thus, "true" and "false" are not used univocally among diverse
discourses and, further, can differ in conditions of applicability. None of
those features can tell us anything to resolve disputes about ontological realism.
So the project M. Dummett [1991] comtemplated is doomed. Moreover, there is
no better prospect for Putnam's analysis of truth as "ideally warranted
assertability" or any other analysis that is formulated in terms of some
epistemic state, regardless of whether it is one's own or an ideal state. For
the notions of warrant [Plantinga, 1993] have to be explained in terms of notions
involving truth.
(vi) For a judgment to be true, does there have to be an appropriate fact of
the matter? First, what a "fact of the matter" is varies with what
we are talking about (e.g., is the grass long? Is his hair long? What is the
distance from here (where?) to the edge (where?) of the Milky Way? Was that
pitch a strike? Will that stone fit? Secondly, when we are talking about assertions
of fact, are we talking about conditions in which we can certainly settle the
truth of the matter or just conditions of "warranted assertion" or
"justified assertion" or "ideally warranted assertability"
and the like? Again the answer is "all of those and more, depending upon
the discourse, the context and the particular situation," without any of
them being more than conditions of applicability, enforced by the practice of
discourse, but not, usually, becoming part of what is meant by "true,"
or "false." Another reason why truth cannot be the same as warranted
assertability is that falsity is not the same as not-being-warrantedly-assertable,
because of the many cases where cognitive access is lacking. We cannot in general
hold that what we cannot know is not so. Someone recommending a usage for "true"
and "false" as did Wm. James ("what is true is what is in our
interest in the way of believing") and C.S. Peirce ("what the ideal
scientific community will agree upon"), and H. Putnam ("truth is ideally
warranted assertability") might be proposing such a linguistic inclusion.
They are certainly not successfully describing what we do mean. Such proposals
tend to fail because it is not one's intention that determines meaning but the
pragmatic traction between discourse and the modifying of action. What gets
included in linguistic meaning is what practice among the discoursing community
finds efficient for that end.
One can be proposing a usage even as one honestly reports what is taken to be
what we really mean by a word. Even if such reports or proposals gain currency
among philosophers, that does not have the effect of introducing another or
a new meaning-element into the previously unbound discourse for the word, or
even into craft-bound usage, unless the usage is controlled by an establishment
as sometimes happens in philosophy. Thus a person who judges that the cosmos
will never end or will end in entropic death, need not grant that his judgment
falls short of a truth value just because he is (a) not able to verify or falsify
it; (b) is not able to provide "justification" for it; (c) not able
to display a position of warranted assertion, and has no interest in what the
ideally warranted assertion might be or what the ideal community of scientists
would agree upon for the very good reason that none of those types will be around
when the reality comes to pass, and what is ideally warranted or agreed to by
some ideal community may very well be false or without a truth value.
What about the paradoxes?
Most of the paradoxes can be constructed only with sentences and statements
and, thus, have nothing to do with the primary truth-bearers, judgments. There
are not self-referential judgments, e.g., of the form, "this judgment is
true." There are indeed self-inclusive judgments, e.g., "All judgments
are assents or denials" and "All judgments are either true or false."
The latter's being false is not on account of the form of the judgment. As I
pointed out above, the most serious of the paradoxes concern sentences and,
sometimes, statements. The primary truths and falsities, judgments, are not
paradoxical even when in the form, "Some of my beliefs are false."
When we allow the questions to apply to statements and to sentences, the best
approach is the one suggested by A.N. Prior, with a small addition by Kirkham
[1995, p. 295]: every statement and sentence regarded as assertoric, implicity
predicates truth of itself. That on my account requires further content than
a mere repetition. But if the content is opposed to the implicit predication
or identification, a contradiction appears, and thus, an apparent paradox, that
is, however not real. That is a consequence of judgments' being (even when they
are denials in content) assents. As a result the liar paradox and the strengthened
liar paradox cannot even be formulated for judgments alone.
Now we turn to the physical basis of human conception and judgment.