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Published or Forthcoming Papers
Abstract: This paper uses discontinuities imposed by voting-age restrictions to identify
the effect of past participation on subsequent participation decisionsand partisan identification. It compares participation decisions and partisan
affiliations of individuals who turned eighteen just before past elections with those who turned eighteen just after. It presents three main
findings. First, past presidential election eligibility increases the probability of subsequent participation. For example, I find that 2000
presidential election eligibility increased participation in the 2004 presidential election by 3.0 to 4.5 percent, which suggests that 2000
presidential election participation increased the probability of 2004 election participation by 4.9 to 7.3 percentage points. Second, participation
in past presidential elections affects partisan identification. Third, these effects continue to persist for several election cycles after a voter
first becomes eligible.
Abstract: Although there are compelling theoretical reasons to believe that unequal
political representation in a legislature leads to an unequal distribution of funds, testing such theories empirically is challenging
because it is difficult to separate the effects of representation from the effects of either population levels or changes. We leverage the
natural experiment generated by infrequent and discrete Census apportionment cycles to estimate the distributional effects of malapportionment
in the U.S. House of Representatives. We find that changes in representation cause changes in the distribution of federal outlays to the states.
Our method is exportable to any democratic system in which reapportionments are regular, infrequent, and non-strategic.
Abstract: This paper focuses on the strategic timing of elections by agenda-setters in direct
democracy settings. Because concurrent elections affect turnout, scheduling referenda
for different elections will produce different median voters. I hypothesize that agendasetters
with power over the timing of a referendum will schedule the referendum in
conjunction with the other set of races that produce a policy closest to their preferred
outcome. Consistent with the theory, I show that Wisconsin school boards’ use of special
elections for school referenda are related to differences in the revealed preferences of
voters in low and high turnout elections.
Abstract: American voters are assigned to vote at a particular polling
location (e.g., a church, school, etc.). We show these assigned
polling locations can influence how people vote. Analysis of a
recent general election demonstrates that people who were assigned
to vote in schools were more likely to support a school
funding initiative. This effect persisted even when controlling for
voters’ political views, demographics, and unobservable characteristics
of individuals living near schools. A follow-up experiment
using random assignment suggests that priming underlies these
effects, and that they can occur outside of conscious awareness.
These findings underscore the subtle power of situational context
to shape important real-world decisions.
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