1. Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets, Review of Economic Studies, Volume 84, Issue 1, January 2017 [PDF] (Supplemental Appendix)
  2. Plea Bargaining: On the Selection of Jury Trials, Economic Theory, Volume 57, Issue 1, Page 59-88, September 2014 [PDF]
  3. Partial Identification in Two-sided Matching Models (with Federico Echenique and Matthew Shum), Advances in Econometrics, Volume 31, 2013, Pages 117-139 [PDF]
  4. The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings (with Federico Echenique, Matthew Shum, and M. Bumin Yenmez), Econometrica, Vol. 81, No. 1, January 2013, 153-171 [PDF] (Supplemental Materials)
  5. The Testable Implications of Zero-sum Games, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 48, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 39-46 [PDF]
  6. The Money Pump As a Measure of Revealed Preference Violations (with Federico Echenique and Matthew Shum), Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 119, No. 6, December 2011, pp. 1201-1223 [PDF]

Working Papers

  1. On the Efficiency of Stable Matchings in Large Markets (with Leeat Yariv) [PDF] (Supplemental Appendix)
  2. Optimal Dynamic Matching (with Mariagiovanna Baccara and Leeat Yariv) [PDF] (Supplemental Appendix)
  3. Single-Crossing Differences on Distributions (with Navin Kartik and Daniel Rappoport) [PDF]