

Plato: *Laws*, Books I and II

Translated with commentary

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(penultimate draft)

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Preface/Foreward

Why the present volume? Students of Plato's *Laws* already have the benefit of a several excellent commentaries and translations produced in the last century. England's magisterial commentary on the Greek text (1922) continues to be a valuable resource to readers in English, as is the more limited set of notes on the text in Saunders 1972. Neither, however, offers much guidance on points of philosophical, as opposed to philological, interpretation. On many fronts both have been superseded by the excellent commentary in German, with accompanying translation, recently completed by Schöpsdau (1994-2011). The latter contains considerably more historical material than England, and is an indispensable resource for any serious scholarship on the *Laws*. Readers of Spanish or French have the benefit of up-to-date scholarly translations with accompanying notes by Lisi 1999 and Brisson/Pradeua (2006), respectively. The closest that readers in English have to a philosophical commentary on the *Laws* are the notes and long interpretive essay that accompany the 1980 translation by Pangle, and the detailed analysis by Strauss 1975, but the aggressively "Straussian" orientation of these works makes them less helpful to readers of other philosophical persuasions. Of course, no philosophical commentary can plausibly claim to be without theoretical presuppositions, and the orientation of the present work reflects presuppositions characteristic of scholarship on Plato by so-called "analytic" philosophers in the English-speaking world over the last four or five decades. The translation aims to be more idiomatic than Pangle's, and is heavily indebted to the very elegant and readable translation by Saunders 1972. The latter translation reflects a detailed and nuanced appreciation of Plato's Greek text that it would be a formidable task to match, but it is often less precise in its rendering of that text, on points crucial to the interpretation of the philosophical issues and arguments in the work, than is optimal for the Greekless reader. It is to the needs of such a reader that the present translation is addressed. The main concern of the commentary is to understand how the work is structured as a complex piece of argumentation, and to appreciate the theories (legal, ethical, and psychological) expounded and criticized within it. For the most part, it pays attention to textual or philological issue only when these have implications for these philosophical issues.

While preparing the translation and commentary I have benefitted from the generosity and advice of many colleagues, friends, and correspondents: Elizabeth Asmis, Chris Bobonich, Anna Cremaldi, Radcliffe Edmonds III, Margaret Graver, Brad Inwood, Charles Kahn, Grace Ledbetter, Ralph Rosen, Krisanna Scheiter, Peter Struck, Christian Wildberg, and Emily Wilson, as well as an anonymous referee for Oxford University Press. I learned much from the students in my graduate seminar on the *Laws* in 2008 and have profited greatly from the research assistance provided by Nora Donovan, Jesse Dubois, and Jan Maximillian Robitzsch. Grants from School of Arts and Science and from the University Research Foundation of the University of Pennsylvania supported the

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THE LAWS OF PLATO

Persons in the Dialogue:

An Athenian, Clinias of Crete, Megillus of Sparta

BOOK I

624a ATH: Is it a god or a human being, Strangers, who gets the credit for establishing your laws?

CL: A god, Stranger, most assuredly a god! Here, we say it is Zeus while among the Spartans, where this man comes from, I believe they say it is Apollo. Isn't that so?

MEG: Yes.

b ATH: Isn't your story the one in Homer, that Minos established the laws for your cities by making pilgrimage to his father every nine years and following the oracles he received from him?

CL: That is exactly what we say here, and also that his brother Rhadamanthus—you've heard the name, I'm sure—
625a was a paragon of justice. We Cretans would say he deserves this accolade from the excellent way he meted out justice in legal disputes.

ATH: A fine reputation indeed, most appropriate to a son of Zeus. Now since you and our friend here have been raised under such distinguished laws, I expect you would not find it unpleasant if we spent our journey together in conversation about constitutions and laws.

b In any case, the road from Knossos to the sacred cave of Zeus is fairly long, we are told, with shady places to rest along the way under tall trees. As the day is likely to be very hot, those at our stage of life would do well to take frequent breaks there and refresh ourselves with conversation. That way the distance will pass quite easily.

CL: In fact, Stranger, there are cypress trees of wondrous

c height and beauty up ahead in the sacred groves, as well as meadows in which we might spend our time when resting along the way.

ATH: A very good idea.

CL: Indeed. When we see for ourselves, we shall think so all the more. So let us be off, and may good fortune go with us.

ATH: Amen. Now tell me, on what principle has the law ordained your common meals, your regime of athletic training, and your style of arms?

d CL: I think our ways are pretty easy for anyone to understand, Stranger. The nature of the terrain all over Crete, you may observe,
 is unlike the flat land of the Thessalians, which is why they train mainly on horseback and we on foot, our uneven terrain being well suited to foot racing. Our arms must accordingly be lightweight, so that we aren't burdened down while we run. The lightness of bows and arrows, then, makes them the perfect weapons for us to use. All this equips us well for war,
 e and it is with the same end in view, I believe, that the lawgiver devised all our institutions—even our common meals. He organized these, I would venture, based on the observation that an army on the battlefield is compelled to eat together in order to maintain a proper guard. He had contempt for the folly of most people, who fail to grasp that everyone is engaged in a continuous life-long war against all other cities. If we must eat together in order to be on our guard during times of war,
 626a with a roster of sentinels and their officers to keep watch, we should do likewise in peacetime—for what most people call peace is nothing but a name, while in fact every city is by nature always in an undeclared war against every other. If you look at it this way, you will discover, I submit, that it is with war in mind that the Cretan lawgiver established all the institutions that govern our public and private life. He
 b endowed us with laws to stand guard on the understanding that those who fail to prevail in war derive no benefit from anything else, whether possession or practice, since all the goods of the vanquished go to the victors.

ATH: You evidently have a well trained understanding, Stranger, of Cretan institutions. But please clarify one point for me about the criterion you gave for a well governed city.

c You are saying, I gather, that its affairs must be arranged to make it victorious in war over other cities. Isn't that so?

CL: Absolutely, and I think that our friend here agrees with me.

MEG: How, sir, could a Spartan answer any differently?

ATH: Do you think that this is correct about the relations between cities, but that between villages it is different?

CL: Not at all.

ATH: So is it the same there?

CL: Yes.

ATH: What about relations between households within villages and between individual men? Is it still the same?

CL: It is the same.

d ATH: And a man in relation to himself— should we think of him as one enemy pitted against another? What is our position here?

CL: Well done, Stranger from Athens—for I would not want to address you, as hailing from Attica, when are evidently more deserving of an appellation invoking the goddess! You invoke quite correctly the fundamental principle that clarifies the matter and will enable you to discover the truth of our present contention. Everyone is the enemy of everyone else in public life, and in private each person is pitted against himself.

e ATH: My goodness! What do you mean?

CL: In the latter contest, Stranger, victory over oneself is the highest and most excellent of all victories, whereas being “worsted by oneself” is the most shameful and wretched of defeats. These ways of speaking indicates that each of us is engaged in an internal war against himself.

ATH: Well, let’s apply this thesis back to the previous cases. Since each of us as a single individual is either master of or worsted by himself,
627a should we say that the same thing happens in households, villages, and cities? Or should we deny it?

CL: You are asking whether some of them are masters of themselves and others worsted by themselves?

ATH: Yes.

CL: Another good question. This sort of thing most emphatically does occur, especially within cities. In cases where the better people are victorious over the inferior mob, the city might correctly be said to be

“master of itself” and this kind of victory would be most rightly praised, while the opposite holds in the opposite cases.

b ATH: As to whether we should ever accept that it is possible for the inferior to be master over the superior— that would take too long to discuss — but what I take you to be saying is the following. It sometimes happens that a large number of unjust citizens collectively undertake to force their will on the just minority and enslave them — even though they are all members of the same people and born into the same city. When the former prevail you say the city would rightly be called “worsted by itself” and bad, and when they are defeated, “master of itself” and good.

c CL: While this way of speaking is decidedly odd, Stranger, it is undeniable that these things do happen.

ATH: Now, let’s stay with that point. Presumably there could be many brothers born to a single man and wife and it would not be unheard of if the majority of them turned out to be unjust and the minority just?

CL: Not at all.

ATH: Now it wouldn’t be proper for you and me to insist that when the wicked brothers win the household and entire family be called “worsted by itself”, and that it be called “master of itself”

d when they are defeated. Our concern in examining this common locution is not with the felicity or awkwardness of modes of speech, but rather to identify what is naturally correct and mistaken about laws.

CL: What you say is most true, Stranger.

MEG: And very fine, in my view, so far.

ATH: Now let us consider the following. These brothers we spoke of might find themselves before a judge?

CL: Certainly.

e ATH: Now which sort of judge would be better — one who ordered the wicked brothers put to death and set up the better ones to rule themselves, or a judge who lets the inferior brothers live but makes the better ones rule and the inferior ones agree to be ruled? Even better is a third judge—the sort who is able to take in hand this family at odds with itself and, without killing

628a any of its members, reconcile them by establishing laws that will secure their friendship with each other for the future.

CL: This sort of judge and lawgiver would be better by far.

ATH: And yet it would not be with a view to war but to its opposite that he establishes their laws.

CL: That is true.

b ATH: Now what about the person who sets up a city? Is it more with a view to war against external foes that he arranges its life, or with a view to the type of war that from time to time arises within cities, and is called faction? No one would ever want to have this in his own city and, should it ever arise there, he would want to be rid of it as quickly as possible.

CL: He will clearly be concerned with the latter.

c ATH: Now would it be preferable that faction to be resolved with one side destroyed and the other victorious, or with friendship and peace achieved through reconciliation, and in this condition the city be forced to direct its attention toward external foes?

CL: Anyone would prefer the latter for his own city.

ATH: And the lawgiver would be of like mind?

CL: Certainly.

ATH: Now isn't it for the sake of what is best that any lawgiver will establish his institutions?

CL: Of course.

d ATH: The best, however, is neither war nor faction (one should pray to be spared the necessity of either) but peace and mutual goodwill. Victory of a city over itself, it would seem, is not one of the best things, but a necessary evil. To think otherwise is like supposing that a disease ridden body, after being flushed out by a purgative, is then performing at its best—ignoring the case of a body with no need for such a treatment. For the same reasons, no proper statesman will assess the happiness of either a city or an individual solely and primarily with a view to war against external enemies, and no lawgiver is any good unless he regulates military matters for the sake of peace, rather
e than regulating peacetime for the sake of war.

CL: Your argument appears to be sound, Stranger, but unless I am much mistaken, our own institutions, and those of the Spartans too, are

fashioned entirely and emphatically with this goal in view.

629a ATH: That may well be. However, there is no need for us to be combative on the present point. Rather, we should maintain a civil tone in our inquiry, on the assumption that we and they alike take these matters most seriously. Let us follow up the argument together, taking as our authority Tyrtaeus, who was of Athenian stock but became a fellow citizen of our friend here. He of all men takes these matters most seriously, for he said:

“I would not memorialize a man nor take any account of him” –

b not even, he says, the richest of all men, or one who possessed good things in abundance—he enumerates practically all of these—who did not always prove to be best in war. Presumably you are familiar with his poems. Our friend here, I expect, knows them by heart.

MEG: I do indeed.

CL: They have made their way from Sparta to our shores as well.

ATH: Well then. Let’s join forces and ask our poet here something like this: “O Tyrtaeus, most divine poet, we think you are
c wise and good to have praised so highly those who distinguish themselves in war. Now, this man and I, along with Clinias here from Knossos, are emphatically in agreement with you on this point, we think. But we’d like to make sure we are talking about the same men. So please tell us: do you agree with us in making a clear distinction between two kinds of war? Or what is your view?” I gather that even a poet far inferior
d to Tyrtaeus would give the correct answer, that there are two. One, which everyone calls faction, is the hardest conflict, as we were saying just now. The other type of war we all posit, I believe, the kind we deploy against external enemies and foreigners, is far milder.

CL: To be sure.

ATH: “Well then, which kind of men and which kind of war do you have in mind when you praise some men so highly and censure others? It seems to be the external kind, inasmuch as you said in your
e poems that you have no tolerance for those who fail to be emboldened by the sight of “bloody slaughter” and do not

“lay waste the enemy, assailing him at close quarters.”

So then next we’d say: “It seems your praise, Tyrtaeus, is particularly directed at those who have distinguished themselves in battle against

external and foreign enemies.” Presumably he would say yes and agree with us?

CL: No doubt.

630a ATH: “We, on the other hand, hold that while these men are good, better still by far are those who, in the most important battle, prove clearly to be the best. We too can invoke a poet as our witness, Theognis, citizen of Megara in Sicily, who says:

A trustworthy man is worth his weight in silver and gold,
O Kernus, in times of hard faction.

This man, we say, is far better than the other in the harder conflict—
insofar as a blend of justice,
b moderation and wisdom, along with courage, is better than courage on its own. For no one would be trustworthy and dependable in the face of faction without virtue as a whole. While plenty of mercenaries are willing to march forth and die fighting in the kind of battle Tyrtaeus mentions, the vast majority of these are rash, unjust, insolent, and utterly mindless, with very few exceptions. Now, what’s the point of this line of argument? What
c is it trying to make clear? Above all else it is that the legislator from Zeus in this country, and any legislator who is any good, will set his primary sights on nothing other than the greatest virtue when he is devising laws. This, according to Theognis, is trustworthiness in a crisis, which one might call complete justice. By contrast, the virtue that Tyrtaeus singles out for praise, although it is fine and appropriately celebrated by the poet, nonetheless comes fourth in rank and
d merit, strictly speaking.

CL: Dear Stranger, we are casting our own legislator in a very poor light.

ATH: Not at all. It is we who are doing poorly by supposing that Lycurgus and Minos had war in view when establishing the institutions here and in Sparta.

CL: So what should we be saying instead?

e ATH: What is only right and true to say on behalf of a divine lawgiver: that when he made the laws he was looking not to a part of virtue, and the most trifling one at that, but to virtue in its entirety; and that the kinds under which he sought to devise laws were different than those used by legislators today. When any of these finds himself in need of a new one, he sets it up along with the rest, one seeking out laws about “inheritance and heiresses”, another under the heading “assault,” and

others under myriad other headings. We, on the other hand, maintain that the

631a proper way to inquire into laws is to start from the point where our present inquiry began. I am altogether impressed, in fact, at your own first stab at explaining the laws, for you were correct to begin with virtue, saying that it is for its sake that the legislator framed his laws. But in supposing that it was only to a part of virtue, and the smallest one at that, that he referred all his laws, you were clearly incorrect, in my view—which is why I’ve added all my subsequent remarks. Now, shall I explain the sort of

b divisions I would have hoped to hear in your speech?

CL: Certainly.

ATH: “Stranger,” you should have said, “it is for good reason that Cretan laws are held in such high repute among the Greeks. They are correct laws and bring happiness to those who live by them, since they provide them with every good. Now goods are twofold – some of them human, others divine, and the former depend on the divine. A city that acquires the greater ones

c receives the lesser ones as well; otherwise, it is bereft of both. Chief among the lesser goods is health, second beauty, and third prowess at running and other bodily activities. Fourth is wealth that is not blind but clear-sighted, which comes from following wisdom. Wisdom itself is first and leader of the divine goods. Second is a moderate disposition of the soul involving intelligence. Third would be justice, which arises when these two are combined with courage, and fourth

d would be courage. By nature the latter goods are ordered above the former, and the lawgiver must order them thus as well.

“Next, he must instruct the citizens that all his directives to them have these goods in view, the human goods directed at the divine, and the divine ones at intelligence, their leader. When the citizens join together in marriage, when they beget and

e raise children, male or female, when they are young, and as they mature and reach old age, he must take care to mete out honour and censure correctly. He must scrutinize carefully the citizens’ pains, pleasures,

632a desires, and the general intensity of their passions as they associate with one another, and he must use the laws themselves as instruments of correct praise and blame. As for feelings of anger and fear that disturb the soul on account of misfortune, and of relief in good fortune—the sorts of feelings people have in illness, war, poverty and their opposites—he must define and teach what is fine and what is not in each person’s condition.

b “Next, the lawgiver must guard the ways the citizens acquire and dispose of property. He must inspect their joint enterprises and the dissolution of these, whether voluntary or involuntary, indicating where justice is to be found and where it is lacking in the ways they deal with each other in such matters. He must distribute honours to those who are

receptive to the laws, and ordain penalties for those who prove difficult to persuade.

c Thus he shall proceed, until he puts the finishing touches on his constitution by seeing to the burial rites and honours that are appropriate for those who have died. Surveying the laws he has created, he will station guards to watch over them – some of them proceeding with wisdom, others via correct opinion – so that intelligence will bind all this together to follow moderation and justice, rather than wealth and ambition.”

d This, Strangers, is the sort of exposition I wanted (and indeed still want) to hear from you: how all this present in the laws attributed to Zeus and to Pythian Apollo that were written down by Minos, and how it is clear to those experienced about laws (whether through skill or through being trained) that they adhere to a certain order, although this is in no way evident to the rest of us.

CL: And what should one say after that, Stranger?

e ATH: I think we need to return to our original starting point, and examine first the practices that cultivate courage. After that, if you two are willing, we will go through the other kinds of virtue one by one. Once we have done a proper job on the first case, it can serve as a model for our treatment of the others, so that we will have plenty of discussion to lighten our journey. After treating virtue in its entirety, we will make it clear that the matters we were just now discussing are directed towards it—provided the god is willing.

633a MEG: An excellent proposal. Let our admirer of Zeus here be the first one you set out to examine.

ATH: I shall, but I'll be examining you and myself at the same time, since our discussion is a group effort. So tell me: We say that the legislator devised your common meals and your regime of athletic training with a view to war?

MEG: Yes.

ATH: And what shall we list third and fourth? Presumably we will need make a similar enumeration for the parts of the rest of virtue—or whatever one should call them; it doesn't matter so long as the meaning is clear.

b MEG: Well third, like any other Spartan, I would say that he invented the hunt.

ATH: Let's try to list a fourth, and if possible a fifth.

MEG: Now fourth, I would venture to say, is our large set of practices that involve endurance of pain. For example, we have our boxing matches and the raids that regularly involve a severe beating. Furthermore, our so-called “secret service” involves amazingly

c heavy practice in endurance – going barefoot and sleeping without bedding during the winter, ministering to one’s own needs without the help of servants, and ranging over the whole countryside night and day. Our “naked games” are also grueling exercises of endurance as we compete in the worst heat of the summer – not to mention a great many additional examples too numerous to go through individually.

ATH: Well done, Spartan Stranger. But let’s consider what we take courage to be. Does it amount quite simply to a battle against

d fears and pains alone? Or does it also oppose yearnings and pleasures, those powerfully seductive flatterers that can melt the resolve even of those who consider themselves very dignified?

MEG: That’s what I think. It is against all these things.

ATH: Now, if I recall our previous discussion correctly, our friend here spoke of a city being “worsted by itself”, and likewise a man. Isn’t that so, Stranger from Knossos?

CL: Quite true.

e ATH: So now, is it the person worsted by pains whom we call bad, or also the one worsted by pleasures?

CL: Even more so, I think, in the case of pleasures. Pretty well everyone has in mind the person dominated by pleasures when we talk of being “worsted by oneself” in the most reprehensible sense, rather than the person dominated by pains.

634a ATH: But surely Zeus and the Pythian lawgiver did not legislate for a courage lame in one foot, able to attack only on the left and incapable of doing battle against the insidious pleasures ranged to its right? Didn’t they equip it to fight in both directions?

CL: Yes, in both, I think.

ATH: So let’s go back and identify the practices in your two cities that partake of pleasures rather than flee them—just as where pains are concerned they don’t avoid them but thrust a person into their midst, and use compulsion and persuasion by honours to get him to

b master them. What arrangement is there in your laws to do the same thing about pleasures? Please tell me what you have that makes the

same people courageous in the face of pains and pleasures alike, so that they defeat the ones they should and are never worsted by the enemy that is hardest and closest at hand.

ME: Well Stranger, I was able to mention a large number of laws directed against pains, but
 c I don't think I could as easily come up with large scale and striking examples in the case of pleasures, although perhaps I might succeed at finding some small ones.

CL: Nor would I find it any easier to identify a clear case among Cretan laws.

ATH: My good Strangers, that's not in fact surprising. Now, if one of us should criticize something in the home laws of the others, when his intent is to discover what is true and best, let us not take it hard but accept the criticism in a civil manner.

CL: What you say is right, Athenian Stranger. It should persuade us.

d ATH: To act otherwise, Clinias, would not be fitting for men at our stage of life.

CL: Not at all.

ATH: Well, whether anyone is right to criticize the Spartan and Cretan constitutions is the topic for another discussion, although I would probably find it easier than either of you to voice what is generally said. That's because, in your case, however soundly based your legal arrangements are in fact, one of your finest laws forbids the young to investigate what is fine and
 e what is not among those arrangements. Instead, with one voice and from a single mouth everyone must sing out their agreement that all those arrangements are fine, since they are given by the gods. And if anyone says otherwise, they must utterly refuse to listen. An old man, however, may communicate any second thoughts he has about your institutions to an official, or to someone else his own age, as long as he is out of hearing of the young.

CL: Absolutely correct, Stranger, and spoken like a diviner.
 635a Even at this great remove, you have hit upon exactly what the legislator was thinking and articulated it most truly.

ATH: Well, there are no young men now present, and we are at an advanced age, so your legislator will allow us to discuss these matters among ourselves without striking a discordant note?

- CL: That's right – and don't hold back at all in your criticism of our laws. There's no dishonour in learning of something that is not fine. Indeed, it gives one the opportunity to correct it,
- b provided one receives the criticism with goodwill rather than resentment.

- ATH: Very good. Now, I won't be speaking in criticism of your laws – not before first subjecting them to the most thorough possible examination. Rather, I express my puzzlement. For your peoples are unique among the Greeks and among the foreigners known to us in that your lawgiver ordered you to abstain from the greatest pleasures and recreations. On the subject of pains and fears, however, which we were just discussing, he thought that if someone consistently
- c fled these since childhood, he would, when confronted with those hardships, fears and pains that are unavoidable, be put to flight and enslaved by those with training in such matters. That same lawgiver, in my view, should have thought about pleasures in the same way, telling himself, "If our citizens grow up without experience of the greatest pleasures, they will be unpracticed at enduring in the face of pleasures and at refusing to be compelled into shameful action. Their weakness in the face of
- d pleasures will subject them to the same fate as those who are worsted by fears, only their enslavement will be different and more shameful, since it will be to men who are able to endure in the face of pleasures and also extremely accomplished in them – utterly bad people, some of them. Our citizens' souls will be slaves in one respect and free in another – unworthy of being called courageous and free without qualification."

Consider, then, whether these remarks strike you as at all correct.

- e CL: Well, it seems so on first hearing, but I worry about rushing to judgment like foolish adolescents on matters requiring mature judgment.

- ATH: Well then, if we move on to the next task, Clinias, and you too, Stranger from Sparta, let us discuss moderation after courage. What will we find in your constitutions that makes them superior to any randomly established constitution in this domain—
- 636a as we just now found them to be in the case of war?

MEG: That's hardly easy. Still, it seems that our common meals and athletic training are well designed to achieve both effects.

ATH: What really seems hard, Strangers, is that constitutional matters are no less ambivalent in practice than they are in discussion. It's just like caring for the body, where there is hardly a single regimen one can prescribe for a single body that does not evidently harm our bodies in some respects,

- b while benefiting them in others. Take your athletic training and common meals. They benefit your cities in many ways, but they also expose them to the danger of faction, as illustrated by the youth of Miletus, Boeotia, and Thuri. Moreover, these long-standing practices have evidently corrupted the sexual pleasures that are natural for both humans and beasts. Your cities, to begin with, are open to this
- c reproach, as are any others that put such great emphasis on athletic exercises. Whether at play or in earnest, it is imperative to be mindful that the pleasure of female and male conjoining for procreation is evidently natural, while that of male for male or of female for female is unnatural, one of the greatest outrages arising from failure to master one's pleasures. We all look down on the Cretans for coming up with the story
- d of Ganymede: convinced as they are that their laws come from Zeus, they saddle him with this tale in order to be following the god even when reaping this particular pleasure.

- But let's not spend any more time on tales, and focus instead on what comprises virtually the whole topic of legislative inquiry: pleasures and pains—both in cities and in individual characters. These two springs flow freely by nature, and whoever draws from the right one at the right time and
- d to the right extent lives a happy life –whether city, individual person, or animal – while the one who draws from them unintelligently and at the wrong time lives in the opposite manner.

- MEG: I suppose, Stranger, that what you say is right. At any rate, we find ourselves at a loss to respond. Still, I myself think that the lawgiver for the Spartans quite rightly commanded us to avoid pleasures. As for the laws in Knossos, our friend here, if he wishes, will come to their defense.
- 637a To me, the Spartan legislation about pleasure is the finest in all the world. For example, our law has entirely banished from the country the activity in which people are most likely to indulge in extreme pleasures, outrageous behaviour, and utter folly. In neither the countryside nor any town under Spartan control will you find drinking parties and all they involve, stirring up every possible pleasure. Nor is there anyone who, upon encountering a drunken reveler,
- b will not visit upon him a severe and immediate punishment, even if he has the festival of Dionysus as his excuse. I have seen revelers of this sort piled into wagons in your city, and in Tarentum among our own colonists I once saw the whole city drunk at the Dionysian festival. At home we do nothing of the sort.

- ATH: Now, Spartan Stranger, such things are all perfectly commendable when practiced with some endurance, although I admit they are
- c the height of stupidity when practiced without restraint. In fact, someone defending our own ways might well take a shot at you, pointing to the lack

of restraint on your women at home. Of course, for all such practices – whether in Tarentum, in my home, or in yours – there is thought to be a single reply that acquits them of the charge that they are faulty or incorrect. To the stranger who is shocked at the unfamiliar practices that he observes in their home, everyone will respond, “Don’t be shocked, Stranger. This is our custom here and no doubt you do things differently where you come from.”

d However, our present discussion, my dear friends, is not about what other people do but about excellence and deficiency in their lawgivers.

Now, let us continue with the general topic of drinking, which is a practice of no small importance and requires a good legislator to understand it. I don’t mean the practice simply of drinking wine, or not, but about drunkenness itself: whether one should indulge in this, as the Scythians and Persians do, as well as the Carthaginians, Celts,

e Iberians, and Thracians—warlike peoples, all of them—or follow your practice instead. While your people, as you say, abstain completely, the Scythians and Thracians take their wine unmixed. Women and men alike spill it all over their clothes and think this a fine and happy practice to engage in. The Persians, by contrast, imbibe in a more orderly manner, but still engage most assiduously in this and the other indulgences that you reject.

638a MEG: When it comes time to take up arms, sir, we put all these peoples to flight!

ATH: Don’t say that, sir! There have been and will be many cases of flight and pursuit that tell us nothing, so this is a dubious criterion to invoke. In fact, it is highly disputable that victory and defeat in battle show whether a people’s practices are fine. For instance, larger cities defeat smaller

b ones in battle, as the Syracusans subjugated the Locrians, whose laws were thought to be the best in that region, and the Athenians did the same to the Ceians, with many other examples easy to find. So let’s set aside talk about victory and defeat and focus on the specific practices themselves, attempting to persuade ourselves that such-and-such a kind of practice is fine, while such-and-such another is not. But first, let me tell you how an inquiry into the goodness and badness of these things should proceed.

c MEG: What do you mean?

ATH: My own view is that anyone who is ready to criticize or praise a practice as soon as it is proposed for discussion, is not following proper procedure. It is as if one person praises cheese as a wholesome food and another immediately criticizes it, without first finding out its effects and the

- way it is to be served: how, to whom, with what accompaniments, and in what condition it is to be served, and the condition of those to whom it is served. That's just what I think
- d we are doing in our discussion. Drunkenness is barely mentioned, and right away some of us are criticizing it and others praising it—quite absurdly. Each of us invokes witnesses and advocates for our own side, some thinking the large number on their side settles the matter, others taking as conclusive the observation that those who don't engage in the practice are victorious in battle (although even here we might dispute the facts). It would make no
- e sense to proceed in this way as we examine the other institutions. Instead, let me illustrate for you, if I can, in the present case of drunkenness, the different approach that I think we must follow in all such cases. After all, thousands upon thousands of peoples who dispute the position of your two cities on this topic would combine forces against you in argument!

639a MEG: Well, if we have a correct procedure for investigating such matters, we must not shy away from hearing about it.

ATH: We should conduct our inquiry more or less along the following lines. Suppose one person praises goat-keeping, and praises the animal itself as a fine possession, while another reviles it because he has seen goats untended by a herdsman causing damage as they graze in cultivated fields. In the same way he disparages any animal that he has seen unsupervised or tended by incompetent masters. In our opinion, are the censures of such a critic soundly based at all?

MEG: How could they be?

- b ATH: Now, is someone a good ship's captain as long as he is skilled at navigation, regardless of whether he is prone to seasickness? What should we say about that?

MEG: He is no good at all if his skill is combined with the affliction you just mentioned.

ATH: What about a leader of armies? Is he fit to rule as long as he is skilled in military science, even if he is a coward in the face of dangers, seasick and drunk with fear?

MEG: How could he be?

ATH: And what if he is both unskilled and a coward?

MEG: That's a thoroughly rotten commander, unfit to rule over men but

only over veritable women.

- c ATH: Now what about someone who praises or disparages a group activity of whatever sort—one which naturally has a leader and is beneficial when it does—but he has never seen one properly conducted with a leader, only ones carried on without a leader or with bad ones. Do we think that the praise or criticism by such observers of such gatherings will be of any value?

- d MEG: How could it be, if they have never observed or participated in a properly conducted gathering of the kind?

ATH: Hold on to that point a moment. Would we say that drinking companions comprise one of the many kinds of group and that a drinking party is one kind of group activity?

MEG: Most emphatically.

- e ATH: Now, has anyone ever observed a properly conducted example of one? The two of you can easily reply with a resounding negative, since the practice is not native or lawful in your countries. I, by contrast, have encountered many of them in many places and examined them all quite thoroughly, but pretty well none of those I have seen or heard of was conducted properly in its entirety, except perhaps for a few short bits here and there. On the whole, they were almost entirely mistaken.

- 640a CL: What do you mean, Stranger? Could you be more precise? Our lack of experience, as you point out, hardly equips us to recognize what is proper and improper conduct in such a gathering, even if we were to attend one.

ATH: Most likely not, but see if you can learn from listening to me. You grasp the point, don't you, that in any social gathering, or group activity of any kind, it is proper that there be a leader for the participants?

CL: Yes, of course.

ATH: Now we were just saying that a leader of warriors has to be courageous.

CL: Of course.

ATH: And a courageous man is less disturbed by fears than cowards are.

b CL: That too is true.

ATH: If there was a means to put a completely fearless and undisturbed general in command of an army, wouldn't we make every effort to employ it?

CL: We surely would.

ATH: Now the leader we are concerned with at present is not one who will lead an army into battle against enemies in wartime, but one who, in peacetime, will lead a group of friends gathered together in mutual goodwill.

CL: Right.

c ATH: Now such a gathering, if it is to involve drinking, will not be without disturbances, will it?

CL: Of course not – quite the contrary, I should expect.

ATH: So, first of all, they too are in need of a leader?

CL: They surely do, like nothing else.

ATH: And shouldn't they be provided with a leader who is himself undisturbed, if possible?

CL: Of course.

d ATH: And also, it would seem, one who is wise about social gatherings, for his job is to safeguard the existing friendly relations among the participants and to use the present gathering to strengthen them for the future.

CL: Very true.

ATH: So we must set up as ruler over our drinkers a leader who is sober and wise, rather than the opposite? With a party of drunks led by a drunk, or by a young and inexperienced leader, it would be a stroke of great luck if things failed to turn out badly.

CL: Absolutely.

ATH: If someone were to find fault with these gatherings in cities where they are conducted as correctly as possible, directing

- b his criticisms against the practice itself, he might, perhaps, be criticizing correctly. But if someone were to abuse the practice because he sees it conducted as erroneously as possible, it is clear that he does not know, first, that it is being done incorrectly, and second, that any practice will appear pernicious when conducted in this way, without a sober leader as its master. Surely you understand this, that an intoxicated captain,
641a or leader of anything at all, will overturn the ship, or the chariot, or the army, or whatever he might be directing?

- CL: What you have said is all very true, Stranger, but please move on to the next point. What possible good could we get from this drinking practice, even supposing it is conducted correctly? For example, take that army under correct leadership that you mentioned: those who follow the leader reap the not inconsiderable benefit of victory in war,
b and similarly for the other examples. Now what is the great benefit that a city or private citizens would reap from a properly led drinking party?

- ATH: Well, if you are asking what great benefit we would say a city receives from having a single pupil or chorus properly educated, our answer would be that from a single case the benefit is fairly small. But if you are asking what benefit a city derives from educating people in general, then it is not hard to say that those who are properly educated become good men,
c and as a result do finely in all things. In particular, they defeat their enemies in battle! Education, you see, delivers victory, although victory sometimes undermines education. For many are made insolent by their victories in war, and this in turn fills them with myriad other vices. While is no such thing as a 'Cadmean' education, Cadmean victories have always been and will always be with us.

- CL: You seem to be telling us that the practice of drinking wine
d together is very important for education, provided it is conducted properly!

ATH: I am indeed.

CL: Are you in a position to affirm, next, that this claim is true?

ATH: As for the truth, Stranger, to insist that this is how things are, in the face of so many disputers, is the task for a god. But if I am simply to say how things seem to me, I won't begrudge you, since we are embarked, after all, on a conversation about laws and constitutions.

- CL: That is exactly what we are trying to learn, your opinion on
e the point at issue!

- ATH: That is exactly how we should be directing our efforts: you to learn my position, and me to do what I can to present it clearly. But first let me say this. Every Greek is of the opinion that our city loves argument and long discussion, while Sparta is brief of speech and Crete more given to extended thought than extended
- 642a argument. Now, I don't want to give you the impression that I am going on at length about a trifling matter and stretching out my discussion of drinking with fastidious elaboration. However, a correct and natural treatment of the topic is impossible without first giving a clear and adequate treatment of correctness in music, and this, I'm afraid, is impossible without first discussing education as a whole—a very long discussion indeed. So what do you think we should do? Should we abandon this topic of discussion for the time being, and switch to a different
- b issue about laws?

- MEG: Perhaps you aren't aware, Athenian Stranger, that my household happens to hold the position of *proxenos* for your city. Now maybe all children, upon learning that they are *proxenoi* of a particular city, are imbued with a feeling of good will toward it right from youth – as if it were a second fatherland after their own city. In my case, that's just what happened. I would hear other children say, when
- c Spartans praised or criticized the Athenians for something, "O Megillus, your city has treated us badly" or "treated us well". From hearing the things and from always defending you against those casting aspersions on your city, I developed a broad feeling of goodwill towards you. Even your accent is dear to me, and I hold to be most true the popular saying that "good Athenians are exceptionally so," for they alone are good not by compulsion but of their
- d own accord, by divine allotment, truly and without pretence. So don't be shy on my account – as far as I'm concerned you may speak to your heart's content.

- CL: For my part too, Stranger, once you have heard and taken in what I have to say, feel free to speak at whatever length you wish. You have heard, presumably, of Epimenides, a divinely good man born in this area. He was in fact my kinsman, and visited your city on a mission from the god's oracle ten years before the Persian war. He performed sacrifices commanded by the god and assured the Athenians, who were alarmed
- e about the military preparations in Persia, that the Persians would not invade for another ten years and that when they did, they would be driven back without accomplishing any of their objectives, and would suffer greater damage than they inflicted. It was at that time that my ancestors formed ties of hospitality with you, and since then
- 643a I and my progenitors have been well disposed toward you.

ATH: Well, it seems that you, for your part, are ready to listen and I for mine am ready too – at least as far as intentions go. As for being capable, that’s far from easy, but I have to try nonetheless. Now as a first step in our argument let us define education (*paideia*), what it is and what it can do, for we have agreed that the discussion on which we are embarked must go through this topic en route to the god that is its destination.

CL: Certainly, let’s do it that way, if it pleases you.

b ATH: See whether you are pleased by what I think we must affirm education to be.

CL: Please tell us.

ATH: Here is what I say. I maintain that anyone who intends to be good at anything at all as a man must practice this very thing right from childhood, playing in all seriousness at the activities appropriate to his intended occupation. For example, those intending to be good farmers or builders should

c play at building toy structures or at working the soil. Those who nurture them should supply them with miniature tools of the trade, replicas of the real ones, and see to it that they learn the necessary preliminaries. (For example, the carpenter must learn to measure and use the ruler and the warrior to ride a horse, either by playing at it or by performing some similar activity.) They must try, using playful activities, to channel the children’s pleasures and desires toward what they must be when they are grown up. The point of all this is that correct upbringing is of the utmost importance for education,

d since it inculcates as far as possible in the soul of the child at play a passion for the business at which he must be accomplished (in the excellence belonging to it) when he is a man. Now tell me, are you pleased with the account I have given so far?

CL: How could we not be?

ATH: Now, let’s be precise about what we are calling “education.” As it is, when we praise and disparage the upbringing of different people, saying that one person is educated and

e another uneducated, the latter person is often quite thoroughly “educated” in retail trade or merchant shipping or some other such thing. Our present account presumably does not count these kinds of training as education, but rather the kind that, from childhood, directs a person toward virtue, giving him an appetite and passion to become an accomplished citizen, one who knows how to rule and be ruled with justice. This sort of

644a upbringing, I gather, is what our present account aims to single out with the title ‘education.’ By contrast, an upbringing directed at making money

or cultivating strength or any other skill that does not involve intelligence and justice, it classifies as 'mechanical', 'slavish' and unworthy of the name 'education'. But rather than quibble over terminology, let our present agreement be that as a rule those who are properly educated become good and that education is

b never to be dishonoured, since it is the first of the very finest things bestowed upon the best of men. If it ever goes off course, and there is the possibility of correcting it, then anyone, at any time of life, must devote all his energies to correcting it.

CL: You are right. We agree with what you say.

ATH: And we previously agreed that those who are able to rule themselves are good, while those who are unable to do so are bad.

CL: Exactly.

ATH: Let us return now to this phenomenon and clarify further what we take it to be. I hope you will allow me, if I can, to illustrate by means of an image.

c

CL: Go ahead.

ATH: Do we assume that each of us is one person?

CL: Yes.

ATH: But each has inside himself two opposite and foolish advisors, which we call pleasure and pain.

CL: That's the case.

ATH: Besides these two, we have opinions about the future, for which the general name is 'anticipation' and the particular names are 'fear'—the anticipation before pain—

d and 'daring'—the anticipation before the opposite. And against all these we have reasoning as to which of them is better or worse. When this becomes the common view of a city, it is called 'law'.

CL: I am barely able to follow you here, but please continue as if I did.

MEG: I too am having the same experience.

ATH: Let's think about it this way. Suppose each of us living things is a divine puppet. Whether we are constituted as the gods' plaything or for a serious purpose, we have no

- e idea, but we do know that these experiences in us are like opposing cords or strings that tug against each other and pull us toward opposing actions, across the field where virtue is marked off from vice. Now, according to our account, it is to one and only one of these forces that a person must cleave without fail and pull against the other strings.
- 645a This is the sacred and golden pull of reasoning, also called the city's common law. The others are hard and iron, like all manner of different kinds, while it is soft and golden. Now, one must always pitch in with the finest pull, that of law, for while reasoning is a fine thing, it is gentle rather than violent, so its pull requires assistants, if our golden kind is to prevail over the
- b other kinds. If this happens, then virtue's tale, which likens us to puppets, would achieve its point. It also clarifies somewhat what is meant by 'self-mastery' or 'self-defeat', both for a city and for an individual. The latter must grasp in himself a true account of these forces, and live by it. A city must grasp an account of such matters (either from a god or from this person who has grasped it) and, setting this up as law, it must conduct its internal and external affairs accordingly. We might also get a
- c clearer demarcation of both virtue and vice, which in turn might perhaps shed light on education and other matters, especially drinking practices. While it might appear that, in the latter case, we have said too much about an insignificant matter, it might well turn out to be worthy of the lengthy treatment.

CL: You are right. Let's finish off whatever in our present enterprise is worth the effort.

- d ATH: So tell me, what sort of effect will we produce by getting our puppet drunk?

CL: Where are you heading with that question?

ATH: Nowhere in particular at the moment. I'm just asking what generally results when the one is combined with the other. I'll try to articulate more clearly what I have in mind. My question is this. Doesn't drinking wine render our pleasures and pains and angry feelings and passions more intense?

CL: Very much so.

- e ATH: What about our perceptions, memories, opinions, and cognitions? Are they likewise intensified? Or don't they, rather, completely abandon a person who is full of drink?

CL: You are right; they abandon him completely.

ATH: So his soul returns to the same condition as when he was a young child.

CL: Indeed.

ATH: Wouldn't he then be least in control (*enkrates*) of himself?

646a CL: Yes, least.

ATH: Don't we affirm that this sort of person is the worst?

CL: Very much so.

ATH: So it is not only the old man who becomes a child again, but also, it seems, the man in his cups.

CL: Well said, Stranger.

ATH: So is there any argument that could even try to convince us that we should partake of this practice rather than flee it with all our strength and ability?

CL: I gather there is. So you say, at any rate, and you were only a moment ago prepared to give it to us.

b ATH: You remember correctly. I am in fact still prepared to give it, since the two of you have emphatically declared your willingness to listen.

CL: How could we not listen – if only for the bizarreness of the proposal that a man should willingly launch himself into utter degradation!

ATH: You mean degradation of soul, don't you?

CL: Yes.

c ATH: Well, what of the body, friend, and its degradations: emaciation, disfigurement, and weakness? Would we find it bizarre if someone willingly brought such things upon himself?

CL: Of course we would.

ATH: And what about people who present themselves for medical treatment with drugs? Are we to suppose they don't know that starting shortly thereafter and continuing for many days their bodies will be in such a state that they would be unwilling to continue living if it were a permanent condition? Or consider those who go in for **athletic training**

and strenuous exercise. Don't we know that they become weaker immediately afterward?

CL: Yes, we know all that.

ATH: And we also know that it is for the sake of the resulting benefit that they willingly go there.

d CL: Precisely.

ATH: So, shouldn't we think about other practices along the same lines?

CL: Of course.

ATH: So this is how we should think about the practice of wine drinking – provided it is correct to place it in the same category.

CL: No doubt.

ATH: If it turns out to provide us with a benefit not inferior to what is produced in the bodily case, then wouldn't it have the advantage over bodily exercises that, in the initial stage at least, the latter is painful, while it itself is not?

e CL: Correct. But I should be surprised if we were able to discover any such benefit in it.

ATH: That's the very task incumbent upon us at the moment, it would seem. Now tell me: are we able to distinguish two roughly opposing kinds of fear?

CL: What kinds do you mean?

ATH: The following. On the one hand, we fear bad things when we expect them to befall us.

CL: Yes.

ATH: On the other hand, on many occasions we fear for our reputation, believing that people will think ill of us if we do or say something that is not fine—

647a a kind of fear that we call shame, and I dare say everyone else does too.

CL: Certainly.

ATH: These are the two fears I was talking about. The latter opposes not

only pains and other fears but the most prevalent and strongest pleasures as well.

CL: Very true.

ATH: So doesn't the legislator, and anyone else worth his salt, hold this fear in great esteem, calling it 'shame', and calling 'shamelessness' the daring (*tharros*) that is opposed to it—
 b the latter being, in his view, the greatest evil in private or public life?

CL: You are right.

ATH: Not only does this fear safeguard us in many other and important respects, but nothing is more effective, man for man, at securing victory and safety in war itself. For there are two things that secure victory – daring in the face of the enemy and fear of being disgraced in front of one's friends.

CL: That is the case.

ATH: So each of us needs to become both fearless and fearful,
 c for the reasons we have explained in the two cases.

CL: Absolutely.

ATH: Now, in many cases, when we want to make someone unafraid of certain things, it is by leading him into fear under leadership that we achieve this effect.

CL: Evidently.

ATH: What about when our task is to make a person fearful in conjunction with justice? To make him victorious in the fight against his pleasures, don't we need to throw him into the ring with shamelessness and make him wrestle against it? Or doesn't a person need to face off against the cowardice within him
 d and defeat it order to become accomplished in courage? For without experience and practice in struggles of this kind, no one would get even halfway toward virtue. So will anyone become accomplished in moderation if he has not done battle against the many pleasures and desires that urge him to commit shameless and unjust actions, and defeated them by dint of reason, effort, and skill, both when he is playing and when he is serious – if he has, on the contrary, never experienced such things?

CL: It hardly seems likely that he could.

e ATH: Well then, has any god given humans a potion for fear? I have in mind the sort of drink that the more one is willing to imbibe, the more one comes to suppose, with each drink, that he has fallen into misfortune, a drink that makes him fearful about everything in his present and future circumstances,

648a ultimately delivering even the most courageous person into absolute and total dread, but once he has slept it off, he is back to his usual self?

CL: And which of the drinks known to man might this be, Stranger?

ATH: None of them, I'm afraid. But if there were such a drink somewhere, wouldn't it be useful to the legislator for inculcating courage? For example, we could put the question to him, "Come now, legislator, whether you make laws for the Cretans or for any other people, wouldn't you welcome above all a test for courage and cowardice in the citizens?"

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CL: Any legislator would clearly say yes.

ATH: And if we asked whether he would prefer a test one could conduct in safety and away from danger, as opposed to the opposite?

CL: He would undoubtedly agree on the safe option.

ATH: "You would use it to lead them into fears and test their reactions, so that you could compel them to become fearless by exhorting, chastising, and conferring honour on them, and conferring disgrace upon anyone who does not willingly conform to your instructions on every occasion. Anyone who had performed well and courageously in these training exercises you would let go without punishment, but you would penalize whoever had done badly. Or would you decline to make use of the potion, even if you found no other reason to find fault with it?"

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CL: How could he not use it, Stranger?

ATH: As a training device, my friend, it would be amazingly easy in comparison with present methods, whether for individuals, small groups, or however many one might want. A single person training by himself in peacetime, who was bashful about being observed by others before he is in good condition, would do well to employ it when training against his fears, simply procuring this one drink instead of a lot of other equipment. Even someone confident that he is well equipped by nature and practice would make good use of it, eagerly stripping to train with fellow drinkers and demonstrate his ability to escape and overcome the

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- e compulsive shaking induced by the potion. His virtue would keep him from being seriously tripped up or led astray by impropriety, although he would leave off drinking before the final round, fearing the universal human susceptibility to being worsted by the drink.

CL: Yes, Stranger, that would be very moderate of him.

- 649a ATH: Let's return to address our legislator. "Well then, O lawgiver, I gather no god has gifted us with such a potion for fear, and we have not managed to devise one for ourselves (setting aside the claims of quacks), but what about fearlessness, the excessive and untimely daring to do what we should not? Is there any drink for this, do you think?"

CL: He will presumably answer that there is such a drink, and that it is wine.

- ATH: Now isn't this drink exactly the opposite of the one we were just discussing? The immediate effect of drinking wine is to make the drinker more expansive
 b than he was before, and the more he drinks, the more he is filled with optimistic expectations and belief in his abilities. In the end he is brimming over with unchecked speech and freedom, in conceit of his own wisdom, and full of every kind of fearlessness – so that that there is absolutely nothing that he will hold back from saying, and likewise from doing. Everyone would agree, I think, that this is what happens?

CL: Of course.

- ATH: Recall now the two things that we said should be cultivated in our souls: the first is that we should be supremely
 c daring, while the second, its opposite, is that we should be supremely fearful.

CL: The fear is the one you attributed to shame, we gather?

ATH: You remember well. Since it is in the presence of fears that we must practice being courageous and fearless, we should consider whether the opposite condition is to be cultivated in the opposite circumstances.

CL: That seems likely.

- ATH: So it is likely in the presence of things that naturally make us especially daring and bold that we must practice being least shameless and full of
 d audacity, fearing instead to dare say, undergo, or do anything shameful at all.

CL: So it seems.

- ATH: Now all these things have such an effect on us: anger, passion, insolence, ignorance, greed, and cowardice – along with wealth, beauty, strength, and all the things that make us drunk with pleasure and drive us out of our minds. Now for an inexpensive and relatively harmless way to, first of all, test ourselves, and second, get practice in these matters,
- e what more suitable pleasure can we name than the recreation and testing afforded by wine—provided it is conducted with some care? Look at it this way. Consider an ill tempered and savage soul from which myriad injustices issue. Undertaking to test its measure by entering into a business deal with the man and exposing oneself to the attendant risks
- 650a is more dangerous than keeping company with him at a festival of Dionysus. The same goes for testing a soul that is in thrall to sexual passion by entrusting to its care our own daughters, sons, and wives—endangering what is most precious to us in order to assess the soul’s character. We have no need of further examples to establish the superiority of testing through this relatively innocuous form of recreation. And in fact, on this
- b point, we think that not even the Cretans, or any other peoples, would dispute it as a fitting way of testing each other, superior to other testing methods in its low cost, safety, and speed at delivering results.

CL: That at any rate is true.

ATH: Now, wouldn’t the ability to discern the natures and dispositions of people’s souls be extremely useful for the discipline whose business it is to cultivate them? And this, I gather, we say is the task of politics. Isn’t that so?

CL: Of course.

[end of Book I]

THE LAWS OF PLATO

BOOK II

[each Stephanus section starts on a new line]

652a ATH: Now the next point to consider, presumably, is whether this is the only good to come of these events—discerning the disposition of our natures. Or is there an additional benefit of great magnitude worth taking very seriously that arises from the correct use of communal drinking? What do we say? Our line of argument seems to be directed at indicating that there is, but we need to pay careful attention as we hear the details,
 b lest we get tripped up in it.

KL: Do go on.

ATH: Well, I want to go back and recall what we say
 653a correct education is in our case. For I propose that the practice, when finely and properly conducted, is its safeguard.

KL: That is a very large assertion.

ATH: Here's what I mean. The first sensations we experience as children are pleasure and pain, and it is in these that virtue and vice initially develop in the soul. By contrast, wisdom (*phronêsis*) and stable correct opinion are things one is lucky to develop even in old age. The latter
 b goods and all those that depend on them complete a person, but it is the virtue that first develops in children that I am calling education. If pleasure and liking and pain and hatred develop correctly in souls of those who are not yet able to grasp the reason—and, in those who do grasp it, agree with reason that they have been correctly trained by appropriate habits—this agreement is virtue in its entirety. However, the part of it that consists in being properly habituated in pleasures and pains, so as to
 c hate what one should hate and love what one should love from beginning to end—if you separated this off in your account and called it 'education', you would be exactly right, in my view.

KL: Yes, Stranger, both your earlier remarks about education and your present comments strike us as correct.

- ATH: Very good. Now education, these correctly nurtured pleasures and pains, is weakened and corrupted to a great extent in human life. But the gods,
- d who took pity on the burdensome lot of humankind and ordained them respites from their toils in exchange for festivals to the gods, also gave to them the Muses, their leader Apollo, and Dionysus as fellow celebrants, in order to set them back on the correct course, nurturing them during these festivals in the company of the gods. In this light, we should consider whether the theory that we now intone is true to nature or not. It says that every young creature is virtually unable to sit still or keep quiet,
- e always straining to move about and make noise – some leaping and bounding as if dancing in pleasure as they play together, others breaking out into sounds of every sort. While the other animals have no sense of order and disorder in movements (for which the names are harmony and rhythm),
- 654a the gods, the very ones we said were given to us as fellow choral dancers, bestowed on us the perception of rhythm and harmony with pleasure. Thus they set us in motion and lead us in a chorus. They call it a chorus (*choros*) when they link us to each other in song and dance, from the name for delight (*chara*), which fits its nature. So shall we accept this as our first point, and posit that our initial education is through the Muses and Apollo, or what?

KL: Just so.

- ATH: So in our view the uneducated person will be the one who lacks choral experience
- b while the educated person shall be set down as the one with adequate choral experience.

KL: Of course.

ATH: Now choral dancing, as a whole. is a matter of dance and song.

KL: Necessarily.

ATH: So the finely (*kalôs*) educated person would be able to sing and dance finely (*kalôs*).

KL: So it seems.

ATH: Let's see just what this thing we've said amounts to.

KL: What thing?

ATH: “He sings finely” (*kalôs*), we say, “and he dances finely (*kalôs*).”
 c Shall we add, “if in fact the things he sings and the things he dances are fine (*kala*),” or shouldn’t we?

KL: Let us add it.

ATH: Now suppose the things he considers to be fine (*kala*) are fine and those he considers shameful (*aischra*) are shameful, and he treats them as such. Is such a person better educated in choral dance and music, in our view, than someone who in body and voice is able to render adequately on each occasion what is thought to be fine, but takes no pleasure in fine things and does not hate those that are not? Or is it the person who is
 d not quite able to get it right in voice and body, or to think of it, but does get it right in his pleasures and pains, embracing what is fine and offended by what is not fine?

KL: You describe a much superior education, Stranger.

ATH: So, if the three of us grasp what is fine in song and dance, we can also discern who is and who is not correctly educated. Without this knowledge, however, we could never tell whether there is any safeguard for education, or where it is to be found.
 e Isn’t that so?

KL: Very much so.

ATH: Now, like dogs on the hunt, the next thing we must track down is fine gesture, tune, song, and dance. For if these elude us, any further discussion of correct education, whether for Greeks or barbarians, will be in vain.

KL: Yes.

ATH: Well then, how should we define a fine gesture or tune? Consider a
 655a courageous soul encountering great hardships and a cowardly soul in the equivalent circumstances. Will their gestures and utterances be similar?

KL: How could they, since not even their colouring is similar?

ATH: A fine point, my friend. But while it is correct to call a tune or gesture “well rhythmmed” or “harmonious”—since gestures and tunes are in music, which is a matter of rhythm and harmony—it is not to correct to call them “beautifully coloured”, to use the metaphor employed by chorus

masters. As for the gesture and tune of the cowardly and the courageous, it is both possible and
 b correct to say that those of the courageous are fine and those of the cowardly are shameful. Now, to avoid going on at great length about all the cases, let us posit the general principle that all the gestures and tunes connected with virtue of soul or body—the virtue itself or its representation—are fine, while all those connected with vice are the opposite.

KL: A very good proposal. Let our answer for now be that this is how things stand.

ATH: Now a further question. Do we all get the same enjoyment
 c from every choral dance, or is this far from the case?

KL: Very far indeed.

ATH: What do we say causes us to stray? Is it that the same things are not fine for all of us, or that the same things are fine, but not all the same things appear to be fine? For presumably no one would say that the choral dances of vice are finer than those of virtue, or that he takes pleasure in the gestures of wickedness while others find enjoyment in an opposing Muse, but most people do say that
 d correctness in music consists in the ability to provide pleasure to the soul. But while the latter is unacceptable and altogether impious to utter, here is something even more likely to lead us astray.

KL: What is that?

ATH: Since choral music imitates different types of character in all kinds of actions and fortune, and since the performers draw both on their characters and on imitation, those for whom the words, songs or any other part of the choral dance are true to type —either
 e in keeping with their nature or with their training or with both—must enjoy them and praise them and call them fine, while those for whom they are contrary to nature, type, or training cannot enjoy or praise them, and will call them shameful. Those in whom some aspects of their nature are correct, but some of their training is opposed, or some of their training is correct but some of their nature opposed -- these will utter praises
 656a that conflict with their pleasures, calling such things “pleasant but wicked.” In the presence of those whom they think wise, they are ashamed to move their bodies in such dances, and ashamed to sing out seriously a declaration that such things are fine, although they enjoy them among themselves.

KL: What you say is most correct.

ATH: So does any harm come to a person who enjoys the gestures or tunes characteristic of badness, or any benefit to those who experience the opposite pleasures?

KL: It seems likely.

- b ATH: Likely, or is it in fact necessary? It's just the same as when someone, through associating with bad men of wicked character, enjoys and welcomes their company instead of disliking them, and condemns their conduct as if playing a game, with only a dreamer's grasp of its badness. When this happens it is surely inevitable that the person who is pleased becomes like that in which he takes pleasure, even if he is ashamed to praise it. Can we come up with a greater good or evil than this befalling us with absolute necessity?

KL: I can think of none.

- c ATH: So where laws have been properly established, or will be, concerning education and recreation in musical matters, do we think the composers will be allowed to take whatever they please in a composition, whether it pertains to rhythm or tune or phrases, and teach this to the youths and children of the good citizens in their choruses, whatever the effect this may have on their development towards virtue or wickedness?

KL: This makes no sense at all. How could they be allowed?

- d ATH: They are in fact allowed to do this in practically every city—except in Egypt

KL: What sort of legislation do you say they have on this subject in Egypt?

ATH: You will be amazed to hear. A long time ago, it seems, they recognized there the principle that we are now pronouncing, that the youth of the city must be trained to practice fine gestures and songs. Once they established which and what kind these are, they displayed them in their temples

- e and allowed no painter or other fashioner of gestures of any kind to introduce new forms or to invent anything that is not in keeping with the ancestral tradition. Nor is this allowed even today in these arts, or in music quite generally. If you look you will find painting and sculpture there that has lasted a thousand years – not practically a thousand, but actually thus—with none of the works

- 657a produced today any finer or uglier than those of the past, since they are fashioned by exactly the same art.

KL: What you describe is amazing.

b ATH: An extreme feat of legislation and statecraft indeed. Now you may find fault with other matters over there, but this truth about music is worthy of our attention: that it is possible to take the bold step of establishing securely in legislation songs that conform to what is naturally correct. (A task for a god, or a divine man; indeed, people there attribute to Isis the songs that have been preserved over this great expanse of time.) Thus, to return to my point, if someone were able to grasp somehow the standards of correctness in these matters, he should be bold enough to regiment them into law. After all, the pursuit of pleasure and pain in the constant pursuit of novelty in musical forms has no great power to undermine the sanctified choral music by branding it "old fashioned." In Egypt at any rate it has turned out to have no such power, indeed quite the opposite.

c KL: Such would seem to be the case, from your present account.

ATH: So are we bold enough to describe roughly as follows the correct use of music and recreation in choral dance? When we think we are doing well we are pleased and, conversely, when we are pleased we think we are doing well. Isn't this the case?

KL: It certainly is.

ATH: In such circumstances, feeling pleasure, we are unable to keep quiet.

KL: That is so.

d ATH: Isn't it the case that the young among us are eager to dance in a chorus, while as for us elders, we think the proper way to conduct ourselves is as their audience, taking pleasure in their recreation and revelry now that our own agility has left us. We take nostalgic pleasure in setting up competitions for those who are most able to evoke in us memories of our youth.

KL: Most true.

e ATH: So we don't find entirely off the mark, do we, the opinion about festival performers widely expressed today, that the most accomplished and deserving of victory is the one who gives us the most pleasure and delight? For if we surrender ourselves to recreation on these occasions, then the performer who most delights the most people is to be most honoured and, as I just said, carry off the victory prize.

658a Isn't this the correct thing to say, and the right way of proceeding on these matters?

KL: Perhaps.

ATH: In these matters, Sir, 'perhaps' is not good enough. Let us make up our minds after dividing the matter into its parts and examining it along lines like the following. Suppose someone were to set up a contest with no restrictions whatsoever, not defined as a competition in athletics, or music, or horsemanship. After assembling everyone in the city, he would set up a prize and proclaim that anyone who wished could compete in a contest concerning pleasure

b alone: whoever pleases the spectators most, with no requirements on how he is to do this, will be victorious —precisely because he is best at achieving this result, and is judged the most pleasing of the contestants. What do we think would result from such a proclamation?

KL: What kind of result do you have in mind?

c ATH: It is likely, I suppose, that one person will perform as a rhapsode, in the manner of Homer, while others will play the lyre, stage tragedies, or put on comedies. It wouldn't even be surprising if someone thought that putting on a puppet show gave him the best shot at victory. Now with these kinds of contestants and others advancing in droves, are we able to say which is the rightful the winner?

KL: That's a strange question to ask. How could anyone answer, as if he could tell without having listened to each of the contestants himself?

ATH: Well, would the two of you like me to give you the strange answer?

KL: To be sure.

ATH: Well, if the very small children are delivering the verdict, they will select the puppet performer – won't they?

d KL: Of course.

ATH: And if it is the older children, they will choose the producer of comedies, while tragedy will be the choice of the educated women, adolescent boys, and pretty well the majority of the crowd.

KL: Yes, probably.

ATH: But we old men would likely get the most pleasure from listening to a rhapsode reciting beautifully from the Iliad and Odyssey or from some

work of Hesiod, and we would declare him to be the overwhelming winner. Now the next point to raise, isn't it, is which of these would be the rightful winner?

KL: Yes.

- e ATH: Clearly you and I at any rate must declare that the winners selected by our own age group are the correct ones. For our training seems to be the best by far in any city anywhere today.

KL: To be sure.

- ATH: I agree with the majority this far at any rate: that music is to be judged by pleasure—not, however, the pleasure it affords any random person. I would say, that Muse is finest who delights the best people, those who are properly educated,
- 659a and especially the one who is preeminent in virtue and education. We say that the judges of these events need virtue because they must have not only wisdom but also courage – for the true judge must not take his lessons from the audience, dazzled both by the clamour of the crowd and by his own lack of education. Nor, if he has come to the correct verdict, should he be so spineless and cowardly as
- b to lie and deliver a shoddy judgment through the very lips from which he promised he would render the verdict of the gods. A judge is rightly the spectators' teacher rather than their pupil. He should sit in judgment of them, opposing those whose pleasures are unseemly or incorrect. This was in fact possible according to ancient Greek law. The Sicilian and Italian law today, which leaves the verdict up to the mass of spectators and determines the winner by a show of hands, has corrupted both the poets themselves – for they compose with an eye
- c to the base pleasures of the judges, so that the spectators themselves are educating them—and it has corrupted the pleasures of the spectators as well. Their pleasures are supposed to improve from listening to better characters than their own, but quite the opposite is in fact what happens to them, and by their own doing. Now, as the upshot of our present conclusions, consider whether it is this.

KL: What?

- d ATH: I think this is the third or fourth time that our discussion has come round to the same point: education draws and guides children toward the correct reason (*logos*) that is articulated by the law and that the worthiest and eldest citizens agree to be correct, on the basis of their experience. Now, in order that a child's soul not become trained to experiencing pleasures and pains contrary to the law and to those who are persuaded by it, but rather that it follow them, rejoicing in the same things

- e as the old and being pained at the same things—to achieve this, those things we call songs are in reality charms for our souls, devised for the serious purpose of bringing about what we call “agreement”. Since seriousness is more than youthful souls can bear, these charms are presented and performed as “games” and “songs”, just as those who care for the ill and weak in body try to use pleasant tasting
- 660a dishes and drinks to serve them wholesome foods, and they put unhealthy foods in bad-tasting dishes. They do this so that their charges will become trained, correctly, to enjoy the one and hate the other. That is just what the correct legislator will persuade the poets to do with their fine and laudable phrases, or failing that compel them: to compose correctly by rendering into rhythms and harmonies the gestures and tunes of people who are moderate, courageous, and in every way good.
- b KL: By Zeus, Stranger, is that how you think poets compose in other cities today? As far as I can see, except in my own home and that of the Lacedaimonians, I don’t know that things are actually done as you say. Rather, there is always something new going on in dance and in the other branches of music, with not law but disorderly pleasures guiding the changes. So far are matters from remaining the same and following the same forms, as
- c in your Egyptian example, that they are never the same!

- ATH: Very good, Kleinias! If I gave you the impression that I was describing how things are actually done these days, I wouldn’t be surprised if it’s my own fault for failing to express my point clearly. Perhaps I presented what I wish to happen in such a way as to make you think that I was affirming it to be the case. After all, it is never pleasant to inveigh against errors that are irremediable or far advanced,
- d although sometimes it is necessary to do so. Now since you are of like mind on this question, let’s see: you say that this is how things are done in your city and in that of our friend here, more so than in the rest of Greece?

KL: Of course.

ATH: What if in other cities were to do it this way too? Would we say they were doing it more finely than at present?

KL: It would be a vast improvement if they did it as his city and mine do it, and, what’s more, as you say they ought to be doing it

- e ATH: Now, let’s be sure we are thinking along the same lines. Is this what is proclaimed in all the musical education in your cities? You compel your poets to say that the good man, since he is moderate and just, is happy and blessed, whether he is tall and strong or short and weak, and

whether or not he is wealthy—but that the unjust man, no matter if he is “richer than Cinyras and Midas,” is wretched and lives miserably? Your poet says, if he speaks correctly:

“I would not memorialize,
nor take any account of a man”

661a who fails to accomplish with justice all his so-called fine achievements—
even one who in such a condition

“lays waste the enemy and assails him at close quarters”

but is unjust, or who is

“emboldened by the sight of bloody slaughter”

or

“outruns the North Wind of Thrace”

or achieves any other of the so-called goods. This is because what most people call goods are incorrectly so called. They say that being healthy is the best, having good looks is second, and wealth is third. And many other things too are called goods: keen sight

b and hearing, along with acuteness of all the senses, as well as acting the tyrant, doing whatever one desires, and—the summit of all blessedness—achieving immortality upon acquiring all these goods. Now you and I on the other hand presumably say this: that all these things are the best possessions for just and pious men, but to unjust men they are the greatest evil, starting right with health.

c In fact, seeing, hearing, perceiving, and even simply being alive, are the greatest evil for the person who, though immortal for all time and possessing all the other so-called goods, lacks justice—that is, virtue as a whole—although the evil is less if such a person lives only for a very short time. So isn’t this what you persuade and compel the poets in your cities to affirm, the very things that I’m now saying, which they must cast into corresponding rhythms and harmonies, and thus educate your youth?

d Look, my obvious point is that so-called bad things are good to the unjust, but bad to the good, while the good things are genuinely good to those who are good, but bad to those who are bad. So to return to my question: are you and I in agreement, or not?

KL: As I see it, we are more or less in agreement on some points, but not at all on others.

ATH: Isn’t our disagreement about the person who possesses health, wealth, and absolute tyranny—and I’ll add in for you that he has superlative strength

e and courage along with immortality, and is free from all the other so-called bad things—but has injustice and insolence inside him? Presumably I fail to persuade you that he who lives thus is not happy but obviously wretched?

KL: Exactly.

ATH: Well then. What should we say next? Take the man who is courageous, strong, handsome, wealthy, and
662a does whatever he likes his whole life long. Does it not seem to you necessary that if he is unjust and insolent, he lives shamefully? This, perhaps, you would concede, that he lives shamefully?

KL: Certainly.

ATH: And also badly?

KL: I am not prepared to go that far.

ATH: How about that his life is also unpleasant and not beneficial to him?

KL: How could we possibly concede this further point?

b ATH: How indeed, my friends? If only, it seems, the god would give us agreement, we who are so badly out of tune with one another! For these things seem to me so necessary, my dear Kleinias, that not even “Crete is an island” is more obvious. If I were a lawmaker I would do my best to compel the poets, and everyone in the city, to abide by this in their utterances. I would give virtually the greatest penalty for anyone in the land who spread word that there are
c wicked people who live pleasantly, or that some things are beneficial and profitable while others are more just. In fact I would persuade the citizens to proclaim the opposite of what it seems that Cretans and Spartans say, and no doubt other peoples as well. In the name of Zeus and Apollo, excellent Sirs, suppose we asked those same gods who established your laws,
d “Is the life that is most just the most pleasant, or are there two lives, one of them the most pleasant, the other the most just?” If they answered that the lives were distinct, we would be correct to follow up by asking them, perhaps, “Should we call “happiest” those leading the life that is most just, or the most pleasant?” If they replied that it was the most pleasant, their position would be very strange, but I don’t wish to attribute such a position to the gods, but rather to our ancestral
e legislators. Let the preceding question have been put to our ancestral legislator and let him be the one to reply that the person living the most pleasant life is most blessed. I would then declare, “Didn’t you wish for

me to live the happiest life? But you never stopped exhorting me to live most justly!" A legislator or father who took such a position would be very strange and quite at a loss to stay in agreement with himself. But if, instead, he declared most happy the life that is most just, anyone hearing this, I think, would want to find out what good and fine thing
 663a the law commends in that life that is superior to pleasure. For indeed what good could there be for the just person that is separated from pleasure? Come now, in the eyes of men and gods, are renown and praise good and fine, but unpleasant, and ill repute the opposite? We will hardly assent to that, my two dear legislators. But what about neither wronging anyone nor being wronged by anyone? It is surely not the case that it is unpleasant but good and fine, while the contrary is pleasant but shameful and bad?

KL: How could it be so?

- b ATH: So the doctrine that does not divorce the pleasant and the just or the good and the fine, even if it accomplishes nothing else, can persuade a person to be willing to live a just and pious life. So, as far as the legislator is concerned, any doctrine that denies this is the most shameful and to be resisted to the utmost. For nobody would willingly be persuaded to do anything that failed to result in a preponderance of pleasure over pain. But since things viewed from a distance appear hazy to most people, especially to children, the legislator will instill in us an opposing opinion that dispels the haze
- c and he will somehow manage to persuade us, by training, by praises, and by discourse to the effect that matters of justice and injustice are subject to distortion by perspective, for they strike us in opposing ways. When viewed from the standpoint of one's own injustice and vice, unjust things appear pleasant and just things unpleasant, while from the standpoint of justice the situation is completely reversed.

KL: It seems so.

ATH: Now which judgment shall we say is more authoritatively true – that of the worse soul or that of the better?

- d KL: Necessarily, I suppose, that of the superior person.

ATH: So it is necessary that the unjust life is not only more shameful and more depraved, but also in truth more unpleasant than the just and pious life.

KL: So it would seem, friends, at least as far as the present argument goes.

e ATH: Now even if things were not as our present argument has maintained, could a legislator of any worth, one who dared to lie to the youth for the sake of the good, ever tell a lie more advantageous than this, more capable of making everyone—not by force, but **willingly**—primed for every act of justice?

KL: Truth is a fine thing, Stranger, and an enduring one. But persuasion, it seems, is not an easy matter.

ATH: Well, it has proved easy to persuade people of the tale about the Sidonion, implausible as it is, and of many others as well.

KL: What kind of tales?

664a ATH: About armed warriors growing from teeth sown in the earth—a great example to show the legislator that a person will succeed in persuading **young people's** souls of whatever he sets out to convince them. So all he has to discover in his inquiry is what will deliver the greatest good to the city if he convinces them of it, and then use every means to figure out a way by which the whole community throughout their lives will speak as one on this topic—in their songs and stories and doctrines. Of course if you think at all differently, no one will begrudge you the chance to articulate your disagreement.

b KL: I don't see either of us as being capable of disputing these points.

ATH: Then I will take it on myself to continue. For I maintain that all three choruses should direct their charms at the souls of children, which are still young and pliable. They should affirm all the fine doctrines we've gone through, as well as those we still could go through, but the most important point – let it be noted – is this. In affirming that the gods call the same life both most pleasant and most excellent,
c we will be speaking truth to the highest degree and we will more likely persuade those whom we need to persuade than if we were to proclaim any other doctrine.

KL: What you say must be conceded.

ATH: To begin with, the chorus dedicated to the Muses and consisting of children would rightly be the first to take the stage, singing out such things with all their heart before the entire city. Second will be the chorus of those up to thirty years old, who call upon Paeon Apollo as witness for the truth of what they say, and pray that he be gracious to the youth and grant them persuasion.

d And further, a third chorus must sing, consisting of those over thirty and up to sixty years of age; those beyond these things, no longer up to the

challenge of singing, must recount stories about these same characters, by divine inspiration.

KL: What's this you say about the third choruses, Stranger? We don't quite follow what you mean to say about them.

ATH: Well, they are pretty much the whole point of most of the preceding discussion.

e KL: We don't understand at all. Please try to explain more clearly.

ATH: We said in the beginning of our discussion, if we recall, that all young creatures have a fiery nature, unable to keep still either in body or voice, and always breaking into disorderly leaps and sounds. But a sense of order in both these domains, although missing in the other animals, belongs to human nature alone. The name for order in motions
665a is rhythm, while that in voice, a mixture of high and low, is given the name harmony, and the combination of the two is called **choral dance**. We said that the gods, taking pity on us, gave us Apollo and the Muses to join and lead our chorus, and third, we said, they gave us Dionysus—if we remember.

KL: How could we not remember!

ATH: Now that we've spoken of the chorus of Apollo and that of the Muses,
b we need to discuss the third and remaining chorus, that of Dionysus.

KL: Please tell us how could this be. For it certainly is exceedingly strange to hear, out of the blue, of a Dionysian chorus of elders. Will those over thirty, fifty, and even up to sixty years of age really perform a chorus in his honour?

ATH: You are absolutely correct. Now it does require an accounting, I think, of the way in which it would be reasonable for this to happen.

KL: I should say!

ATH: Are we agreed on the points that we took up before?

c KL: Which ones?

ATH: That every adult and child, free person and slave, female and male—indeed the whole city—should never cease repeating to itself those **charms** that we went through, with the hymns always altering somehow or

other, and in any case with enough variety to please the singers and make their thirst for them insatiable.

KL: How could one disagree with this way of doing things?

- d ATH: Now as for this best element of the city, whose collective age and wisdom (*phronêsis*) makes it the most persuasive in the city, where should it sing those finest songs, if it is to bring about the most good? Or will we be so foolish as to neglect those who are in charge of the finest and most beneficial songs?

KL: We cannot let them go, according to our present argument

ATH: So what would be a fitting arrangement? See whether it is this.

KL: What?

- e ATH: Presumably every person, as he advances in age, becomes full of reluctance to sing. He enjoys the activity less and, when compelled to engage in it, feels especially ashamed—the more so the more elderly and moderate he has become. Isn't this so?

KL: Very much so.

ATH: And he would feel even more ashamed if he sang in the theatre, standing up before all kinds of people. Even worse, suppose men of this sort were compelled to lose weight and fast, as choruses do when entered into competitions. Wouldn't they find singing the height of unpleasantness and shamefulness, and carry out their task with no eagerness at all?

- 666a KL: Most necessarily.

- ATH: So how shall we encourage them to sing eagerly? Shall we not make a law forbidding children up to eighteen years of age to taste any wine at all, explaining that one must not pour additional fire into their bodies or souls, that in the period before they engage with toilsome burdens, one must be especially careful of the manic condition of youth? After that, those up to thirty years of age may drink wine
- b in moderation, but the young must abstain completely from drunkenness and from drinking large quantities of wine. A person approaching forty, by contrast, when feasting in the common messes, will invoke the gods, and Dionysus in particular, calling him to that rite and recreation of the elders which he gave to humans as a drug for the crabbedness of old age. It makes us forget our ill temper and grow young again, softening
- c the hardness of our souls' character, like iron that becomes pliable when placed in the fire. Once in this condition, wouldn't each of them willingly

sing more enthusiastically and less ashamedly those songs that we have repeatedly said are charms? I mean, if the audience is not large but moderately sized and he is among familiars rather than strangers?

KL: Very much so.

d ATH: Inasmuch as it leads them to join with us in song, then, this practice would not be not at all unseemly.

KL: Not at all.

ATH: Now to what kind of sound, or music, will these men give voice? Surely it must be suitable for them?

KL: Of course.

ATH: Well, what kind would suit divine men? Would it be that of a chorus?

KL: Well Stranger, speaking for my own city and that the Spartans, the only type of song we are capable of is what we learned when we were trained to sing in choruses.

e ATH: That's quite likely, since in fact you have failed to master the finest kind of song. Running your cities like an army camp instead of a settlement of city dwellers, you keep your youth herded together like colts at pasture. None of you lays hold of his own colt, drags him wild and kicking away from his fellow grazers, and commits him to the individual care of a groom – an education that strokes him, gentles him, and pays all due attention to the nurture that will make him not only
667a a good soldier, but also capable of managing the affairs of a city and town—the type whom we said earlier was even more warlike than Tyrtaeus' warriors, one who always and everywhere esteems the possession of courage as fourth in virtue, not first, both for individuals and for the whole city.

KL: If I'm not mistaken, Stranger, you are again casting aspersions on our lawgivers.

b ATH: If I do, sir, it is not my intent. Let us simply follow the argument where it leads, if you will. If there is a kind of "music" finer than that of the choruses and the public theatres, let us try to assign it to those whom we said were embarrassed by the latter kind but eager to partake of the **finest** variety.

KL: Yes, indeed.

ATH: Now, doesn't the following at any rate have to be true of anything that brings enjoyment in its wake? Either this very feature on its own is the most important thing about it, or else it is a certain correctness or, third, benefit? I mean, for example, eating, drinking and food in general bring us enjoyment, which we would label 'pleasure.'

c But as to its correctness and benefit, whatever we would call healthy in a meal is what is most correct about it.

KL: Absolutely.

ATH: Now there is also an element of enjoyment, a pleasure, that comes from learning, but its correctness and benefit, what is **good and fine** in it, derive from its truth.

KL: That is the case.

d ATH: Now what about what follows the production of likenesses in the case of the representational arts? When they achieve their goal, isn't it right to call the attendant pleasure, when it does occur, 'enjoyment'?

KL: Yes.

ATH: But presumably the correctness in such cases would be achieved, not by pleasure but, generally speaking, by equality in quantity and quality.

KL: Right.

e ATH: So the only matter that is correctly **judged** by pleasure is that which provides neither benefit nor truth nor likeness when it is achieved (nor harm either, for that matter), but rather comes to be simply for the sake of this single thing, enjoyment, which follows in the wake of those other things and is best named pleasure, when none of these others are involved with it.

KL: You mean only harmless pleasure.

ATH: Yes, and I call it recreation, when it produces neither harm nor benefit worth taking seriously or talking about.

KL: What you say is most true.

ATH: On the basis of our present discussion, therefore, wouldn't we say that imitation as a whole (and in fact equality of any kind) is least suitably **judged** by pleasure and appearance that lacks

668a truth? For in no case is it in virtue of appearing to someone, or of someone not enjoying something, that the equal is equal or the symmetric is symmetric. Rather, an imitation is to be judged in terms of its truth above all else, and least of all in any other terms whatsoever.

KL: Absolutely, indeed.

ATH: Now all of music, we say, is representational and imitative?

KL: Of course.

b ATH: So we should be least prepared to accept it when someone says that music is to be **judged** by pleasure. That sort of music, if there should be any, is unworthy of our serious attention. We should seek instead the kind that involves likeness, imitating what is fine.

KL: Most true.

ATH: So those who seek out the finest song and music must not search for the kind that is pleasant but the kind that is correct. For, as we said, correctness of imitation consists in rendering the actual dimensions and qualities of the object imitated.

KL: How could it not?

c ATH: Now anyone would agree on this point about music, that all of its compositions are imitations and representations. On this point surely all poets, audiences, and actors would agree?

KL: Certainly.

ATH: So the person who will not be in error about a particular composition must know what it is. For if he fails to know the nature, what it intends and of what it is actually a representation, he will hardly discern whether the intention is correctly carried out or misses the mark.

KL: Hardly indeed.

d ATH: If he fails to know whether it is correct, will he ever be able to discern whether it is good or bad? I'm not expressing myself very clearly here. Perhaps this way of stating the point is clearer.

KL: What way?

ATH: There are no doubt myriad likenesses involving our sense of sight.

KL: Yes.

ATH: Suppose, in these cases, a person was ignorant of what the particular body being imitated is. Would he recognize whether it is correctly rendered—I mean for example the measurements of the body and the
 e position of its parts, if it has them, how many there are and what their proper arrangement is, and so too for their colours and shapes—or whether it renders them all mixed up? Do you think that a person completely ignorant of what the imitated creature is could make these discriminations?

KL: How could he?

ATH: But suppose we knew that the drawn or sculpted figure is a human being, and that all its parts and
 669a colours and shapes are captured by the art. Is it necessary that someone who recognized these things would thereby readily recognize whether it is fine, or falls short in some way from beauty?

KL: But then, just about all of us would recognize what is fine in the case of pictures!

ATH: You are quite correct. So, for each representation (*eikôn*), whether in painting or in music as a whole, aren't there three things a wise judge needs to have?
 b He must know first what it is, next how correct it is, and third, how well worked the particular representation is in phrases and **tunes** and rhythms.

KL: So it would seem.

ATH: Now, let's not overlook the challenges we face in the case of music. Although this gets talked about more than any other kind of representation, it requires the greatest care of all. Not only will a person who goes wrong here incur the greatest harm,
 c from looking favourably on bad characters, but it is most difficult to detect, due to the fact that the composers are inferior poets to the Muses themselves. For the latter would never be so mistaken as to compose words of men and then give them the colour or **tune** of women, or after composing the tune and gestures of free persons, attach to them the rhythms of the servile and slavish. Nor, having composed rhythms and gestures of a free person will they give them a **tune** or speech that conflicts with the rhythms. Furthermore,
 d they will not combine the voices of beasts and men and instruments, and every kind of sound, as if they were imitating a single thing. Human

- composers, however, eagerly weave such things together and pour them into a great jumble devoid of reason, a source of merriment for people who are in what Orpheus calls the “prime season of delight.” They see these things all jumbled together by the composers, who also wrench them apart, composing rhythm and gesture without **tune** and setting unadorned words into metre.
- e In addition, they employ **tune** and rhythm without words, in unadorned lyre and flute, making it all but impossible to discern what this wordless rhythm and harmony intends—what worthy object of imitation it represents. One must understand how utterly crude it is to be so enamored of speed, dexterity, and animal cries that one employs the flute and
- 670a lyre in any other way than as accompaniment to dance and song. Such unadorned employment of either instrument is completely unmusical showmanship.

- Well, enough about that, since our inquiry is not about the ways of employing the Muses that should be forbidden to those of us who have reached their thirties or gone past fifty, but rather the way they should employ them. Our discussion has already indicated this much, I think:
- b that those who have reached fifty and are fit to sing must have received an education better than that of the choral Muse. They must be keenly perceptive and knowledgeable of rhythm and harmony. Or else how could someone recognize the correctness of **tunes**—which of them should be in the Dorian harmony, and whether the poet has attached the correct the rhythm to it or not?

KL: Clearly, there is no way.

- ATH: So it’s laughable for the general crowd to think that they have adequate knowledge of what is and isn’t harmonious and well rhythmized simply from having been drilled at singing to the flute and marching in rhythm.
- c They fail to appreciate that they don’t know a single thing about what they are doing. Presumably the **tune** that has the appropriate features is correct, while that which has inappropriate ones is in error.

KL: Most necessarily.

ATH: Suppose a person does not even recognize what features it has. As we said before, will he ever recognize whether it is correct in a given case?

KL: By what means could he do so?

ATH: That is exactly what we are uncovering now, it would seem. Those singers of ours, whom we encourage to sing **willingly**—

- d even compel them in a way—they must be educated to the point that each is able to follow closely the feet of the rhythms and the notes of the melodies so that, with a synoptic grasp of harmonies and rhythms, they will be able select the ones that are appropriate. This is what is fitting for people of their age and character to sing, and singing thus they not only enjoy harmless pleasures of the occasion,
- e but become leaders of the younger singers, guiding them to the appropriate embrace of worthy characters. This level of education will be more exact than that of the common run, and even of the composers themselves. For there is no need for the composers to know the third thing—whether the imitation is fine or not—but only, one might say, about harmony and rhythm. These people, by contrast, must know all three, in order to select what is finest as well as what is second. Otherwise, their incantations will never succeed in drawing
- 671a the youth toward virtue.

- Our discussion has now carried out, as far as it could, its original intention of showing that we were right to come to the defense of the chorus of Dionysus. Let's consider whether it has succeeded. Now, a gathering of this sort necessarily becomes more boisterous as the drinking proceeds—an inevitable feature, we originally supposed, of these
- b events as they take place nowadays.

KL: Necessarily.

ATH: Every participant in such a gathering loosens up and becomes merry, bursting with unchecked speech and unwilling to listen to his neighbours, each in his own mind sufficient to rule both himself and all the others.

KL: Of course.

- ATH: We said, didn't we, that when this happens the souls of the drinkers are like iron infused with fire; they become softer and more youthful, susceptible to the influence
- c of a capable educator who knows how to shape them, just like when they were young? That sculptor, the same one as before, is the good legislator, who must make laws for drinking parties, laws that can take that drinker who is cheerful, emboldened, and unduly uninhibited—loathe to abide by order and take turns at keeping silent, speaking, drinking, and singing—and make him willing to do just the opposite. Against the shameful boldness that is entering him,
- d such laws will launch the finest fear combined with justice, a divine fear that we have called "modesty" and "shame". Isn't that so?

KL: That is so.

e ATH: Those undisturbed and sober commanders of the inebriated will be guardians and assistants of these laws, without whom it is more dangerous to enter the fight against drunkenness than it is to take the field against an enemy host in the absence of undisturbed leaders. He who in the realm of Dionysus cannot willingly obey his leaders—those over sixty years of age—incur a shame equal and even greater than he who disobeys his officers in the realm of Ares.

KL: Correct.

672a ATH: So when the drunkenness and recreation are of this sort, won't the drinking companions be benefitted and part company better friends than when they started—unlike today, when they part as enemies—since they spend their whole time together in a lawful and accommodating manner when the sober give directions to the inebriated?

KL: Correct, provided the gathering is as you describe.

b ATH: So let us no longer roundly condemn Dionysus' gift, saying that it is bad and not to be allowed into a city. Indeed, there is more to be said on this subject, only I am hesitant to state publicly the greatest good he has bestowed, since people misconstrue and misunderstand the claim.

KL: What kind is it?

c ATH: According to a widespread oracular tale about this god, it is in revenge for being driven out of his mind by his stepmother Hera that he inflicts us with Bacchic frenzy and all that manic dance, and it is for this purpose that he gave us the gift of wine. For my part, I leave it to those who think they have sound judgment about the gods to pronounce on such matters, but this much I do know: that every creature that develops a degree of intelligence (*nous*) when it is grown, does not have it, or not to that degree, when it is born. During the time when it has not yet acquired its proper intelligence (*phronêsis*), it raves and shouts at random and as soon as it gets to its feet it jumps about in disorder. Let us remember that we said these are the origins of music and athletics.

KL: Of course we remember.

d ATH: Do we also remember saying that in the case of us humans this origin gives rise to a sense of rhythm and harmony, and that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus among the gods are responsible for this?

KL: Of course.

ATH: Now it seems that, on the popular story, wine was given to drive us mad, an act of revenge on human beings. On our account, by contrast, it is a beverage with quite the opposite effect, given to us for the sake of instilling shame in the soul and health and strength in the body.

KL: You have recapitulated our discussion most finely, Stranger.

- e KL: So much for one half of choral dance. As for the remaining half, shall we will finish off by stating how things seem, or leave it be?

KL: What sort of halves do you mean, and how do you divide them?

ATH: We said, didn't we, that choral dance as a whole amounts, in our case, to education as a whole, and that rhythm and harmony are one part of it, the part that concerns the voice.

KL: Yes.

ATH: The other part, which concerns bodily movement, has rhythm in common with movement of the voice, but gesture is its distinctive feature. In the former case,

- 673a a **tune** is motion of the voice.

KL: Most true.

ATH: Now in matters concerning the motion of the voice that reaches the soul, we called it education in virtue, and we ventured to give it the name 'music'.

KL: Quite correctly.

ATH: But in matters concerning the movement of the body, which we called 'dance' when done as **recreation**—when such movement leads to virtue of the body, let us call the discipline directed toward that condition '**athletics**'.

KL: Most correctly.

- b ATH: So much for our account of music, which is the half of choral dance whose treatment, we just said, we have completed. As for the other half, shall we discuss it too, or how should we proceed?

KL: Sir, you are talking to Cretans and Lakedaimonians here! If we have

dealt with music, but omitted athletics, what do you expect either of us to answer to your question?

c ATH: I would say that your question gives me my answer loud and clear. Your reply, I gather, is not only a question, as I said, but also an injunction to complete the discussion of athletics.

KL: You have understood me perfectly. Please do just that.

ATH: Yes we must. It will not be very difficult discussion, since the two of you are familiar with the subject and considerably more experienced in this discipline than in the other one.

KL: What you say is pretty much the truth.

d ATH: Now this kind of **recreation**, in turn, originates in the natural propensity of all animals to jump about. In the case of humans, as we said, acquiring a sense of rhythm engenders and gives birth to dance. Since **tunes** remind us and rouse us to rhythm, the union of these with each other gives birth to choral dance and all its **recreation**.

KL: Most true.

ATH: Having gone through one part of it, as we said, we will next try to go through the other.

KL: Absolutely.

e ATH: Let us first put the finishing touches on our discussion of the use of drunkenness—that is, if you agree.

KL: What sort of thing do you mean?

ATH: If a city treats the business in question as a serious matter and employs it in an orderly and law-governed manner, using it as a practice for cultivating moderation, and it treats other pleasures along the same lines—not abstaining from them but cultivating mastery over them—that is how it should treat them all. However, if it treats it as a form of **recreation**, allowing anyone who wishes to imbibe whenever and with whomever

674a he wishes and in conjunction with any activity whatsoever, I would not vote in favour of allowing this city, or man, to engage in drunkenness at all. Indeed, I would go beyond even the Cretan and Lakedaimonian practice and vote for the Carthaginian law that prohibits soldiers on campaign from partaking of this beverage, requiring that their gatherings

- during this period serve only water, and that even in the city itself no slave—male or female—shall taste it, nor any of the officials
- b during their year in office. Ship captains and jurors on active duty may drink no wine at all, nor should any person who is about to participate in important deliberations, or anyone at all during the day (except for purposes of bodily training or medical treatment), nor even at night if they are intending to beget children (this holds for women as well as men). There are many other circumstances one could mention in which no one in their right and lawful mind should drink wine,
- c so the upshot of our account is that there would be no need for any city to have many vineyards. Once all agricultural and dietary arrangements have been made, those involving wine will turn out to be the most measured and comprise the smallest part.

With your agreement, Strangers, let this be the finishing touch to what we have said about wine.

KL: Well put. We do agree.

[end of Book II]

Commentary on
Book I

Notes¹

Setting, characters, and themes in the dialogue

On the island of Crete three elderly men from different Greek cities, Athens, Sparta and the Cretan city of Knossos, begin a lengthy pilgrimage on foot to the sacred cave of Zeus. They agree to occupy their time with a discussion of “constitutions and laws” (625a6-7; 641d9). In particular (as is made more precise later), their concern is to investigate what makes for good legislative practice (637d1-2; 630e-631d), and to compare the relative merits of different ‘*nomoi*’ or laws (627d3-4, 638b4-7). Much of Books I and II is devoted to a comparative evaluation of institutions distinctive of the interlocutors’ home cities, in particular the characteristically Dorian institutions, like the common messes (*sussitia*) of cities like Sparta and Knossos, as well as the paradigmatically Athenian institution of the drinking party (*sumposion*). Book III investigates the origins of the practice of legislation, and attempts to explain the successes and failures of different types of constitution. Book IV turns to the task of devising legislation for a soon-to-be founded Cretan colony, a project that takes up the remainder of the twelve books of the work (which in fact contain at least as much methodological discussion as they do actual legislation).

The “*nomoi*” under examination (generally rendered “laws” in this translation, but occasionally by “norms”) are not restricted to the products of a legislator or legislative process, but include a wide variety of social norms, both written and unwritten (see note on 626a7-8). For example the Dorian norm that forbids the youth to inquire into legislation and requires everyone to “sing out their agreement” in praise of the laws (634d-e) is hardly likely to be a statute “on the books” of these cities, and the practice under examination in much of Books I and II, the after-dinner drinking party (*sumposion*) prevalent in Athens and other non-Dorian cities, is what we might call an institution or a social practice, but it owes neither its origin nor its continued existence to legislation. By and large, Plato’s *Laws* (especially Books I and II) is a sustained examination of the goals and merits of such norms and practices. While the interlocutors are particularly interested in methodological and epistemological problems faced by those who devise legislation and seek to implement it, even these issues cluster around the focal question of what makes for a good or bad norm (or social practice), broadly construed. The semantic range of the Greek term ‘*nomos*’ (which can often be translated ‘convention’) is broad enough to encompass this range; other terms used to refer to this object of inquiry include ‘*nomima*’ (customs, norms), ‘*ethe*’ (usage) and ‘*epitedeumata*’ (practices).

¹ Citations in the notes refer to the Greek text, and will not always line up precisely with the translation.

The three interlocutors are an unnamed Athenian, a Spartan named Megillus, and a Cretan named Clinias who is identified as a citizen of Knossos. Plato's refusal to give a name to the Athenian (who comes from Plato's home city, birthplace of philosophy) has roused considerable speculation as to whether he is intended to be recognized as a philosopher – perhaps even Plato's teacher Socrates, the main speaker in many other Platonic dialogues. What is clear, at any rate, is that first of all, the Athenian is the dominant speaker in the dialogue (pretty much the exclusive speaker after Book II); it is the views put into his mouth by Plato that comprise the "doctrine" of the work, such as there is. Second, the stubbornly generic classification of the Athenian in terms of his home city is in line with the fairly stereotypical characterization of Clinias and Megillus as paradigmatic exemplars of their own home cities' national characteristics. While it is possible that Megillus is a real historical figure (see note on ____), nothing is known about Clinias... (Nails); in any case, their names add no greater depth to their characterization than does the Athenian's minimal identification in terms of his native city. Clinias and Megillus are presented, from the outset, as products of their Dorian upbringing (625a5) – hence their preference for militaristic institutions and distaste for luxury (628e, 636e-637b). Plato depicts their intellectual tastes and ethical notions as very much in keeping with the familiar stereotype of Spartans as brief and wooden in discourse and Cretans as disinclined to elaborate their thoughts into language (641e, 721e; cf. *Protagoras* 342c-343c). The loquacity of the Athenian and his evidently greater intellectual facility are also in keeping with the stereotype of Athenians articulated in the same context in *Laws* (641c-d). While the differences between Knossian and Spartan norms turns out not to be of great interest to the Athenian (see note on 624a1-2) the common features they share as Dorian polities, and that distinguish them from non-Dorian cities such as Athens, is a subject to which Plato consistently directs our attention throughout Books I and II.

As paradigmatic products of two very different types of institutions, the three interlocutors replicate almost exactly the position of the original legislators in the natural history of legislation set forth at the beginning of Book III: they are members of societies that prize different and conflicting norms who come together to select which norms are best to implement as written laws (681a-d). Even the term the interlocutors use to address each other, *xenos*, highlights this feature of their respective relations. The term is a respectful form of address to a foreigner. It is often translated 'visitor' or 'guest' (which reflects its link to a deeply rooted norm of offering hospitality to strangers). But this won't do here, since all three interlocutors address each other as *xenoi*, and Clinias, who is on his home turf, and neither Megillus nor the Athenian is host to the other. For want of a more idiomatic alternative, the term is consistently rendered 'Stranger' in the present translation. 'In keeping with their status as *xenoi* to each other, the three interlocutors of *Laws* are engaging in a cross-cultural inquiry premised on mutual respect. And unlike so much of the discourse that goes by that name in the present day, Plato's interlocutors proceed on the assumption that it is possible for such inquiry to yield results of universal significance.

I

Introductory Conversation**(624a1-625c5)**

The divine origin of legislation, and the human project of inquiring into laws

624a1 “A god or a human being”

The theme of the divine origin of the law runs throughout the *Laws*. On the view the Athenian will develop, law is an expression of reason (644d1-3, 645a1-2), which is the spark of the divine in us (713e8-714a2 cf. 645b4-8). The so-called “divine” goods identified at 631b-d are all expressions of wisdom (*phronêsis*). The Athenian’s project in Books I-II is to draw out the implications of the assumption that the Spartan and Cretan constitutions meet the standards of such a “divine” origin, and ultimately to reject it. Note that the assumption of divine origin is not taken to preclude a rational human investigation into the basis of law; indeed, the assumption that identifies reason and god presumably licenses such an investigation. Nowhere in *Laws* is it assumed that correct norms are based on divine fiat inaccessible to human reason and immune to moral evaluation. Thus the position put forth in Plato’s *Euthyphro* (that what is holy is not thus because the gods command it – 10a-11b) is completely consistent with *Laws*.

624a1 “Strangers” (xenoi)

A polite form of address to a foreigner. The dialogue’s three interlocutors are *xenoi* to each other (see introductory note) and repeatedly address each other as such throughout Book I. In subsequent books, the frequency of the term drops significantly.

624a1-2 “your laws”

Here, as elsewhere in Books I-II (e.g. 643b1-2), the Athenian addresses Clinias and Megillus together (and they typically reply on behalf of both—e.g. 626c3, 628e2-5, 629b3-4, 636e4-6, 644b5). The two men are citizens of different city states – Clinias of the Cretan city of Knossos (629c3) and Megillus of Sparta (624a4). But both cities have characteristically Dorian constitutions whose historical roots are explored in Book III and whose characteristic features are the subject of study (and criticism) by the Athenian in Books I and II. Thus he addresses his question to them together.

624a7 “Isn’t your story the one in Homer...”

The question is addressed to Clinias and inquires into specifically Cretan stories about the divine source of legislation. On Minos, whose father is Zeus, see Homer, *Odyssey* 11.568-71 and 19.178-9. Like Minos, the three interlocutors in *Laws* are embarked upon a pilgrimage to Zeus (625b2). The lawgiver in the corresponding Spartan stories, Lycurgus, is mentioned at 630d.

625a2 “legal disputes”

This prefigures Clinias’ general point that conflict sets the context for all norms and laws (625e-626b). The Athenian, like Socrates in *Republic* (III, 405a-410a), will denigrate legal disputation as a sign of a defective constitution (*Laws* XI 937d-938a). The lived experience of the laws will not be legal wrangling, but correct living and the shaping of character (as the Athenian notes in his next comment, 625a5). On the Athenian’s version of the proper judge, compare 627d-628a.

625a5 “raised under such distinguished laws” (*en toioutois êthesi tethraphthe nomikois*)

More literally “raised in such lawful training (alt: “habits”, *êthesin*)”. The parallel language at 695e1, 708c7, 751c9, 752c, 770d indicates that *êthos* is used here, not in its typical sense of ‘character’ (as e.g. at 636d7, 650a5, 655d6, 656b2, 666c1) but as the training or practice that shapes character (a reversal of the terminology of 792e2: “all *êthos* is due to *ethos*”). On *ethos* as training see note on 655d7-e1.

625a6 “not ...unpleasant”

Pleasure, and its relation to laws and institutions is a persistent theme through the *Laws* (636d-e; cf. 644c-d). In particular, the laws one is raised under shape one’s feelings of pleasure and pain (631e-632a, 643c-e).

625a7 “in conversation” (*legontas te kai akouontas*)

Literally: “speaking and listening,” with the implication that the interlocutors will take turns in each role. In fact, the conversation will be decidedly one-sided, with the Athenian doing almost all the talking. But here, as England points out, the Athenian’s initial invitation to engage in a legislative inquiry invokes his

interlocutors' credentials, not his own. The Athenian, who will soon turn the tables and become the lecturer to his two interlocutors (630b1), has not yet asserted his authority on the matter.

625b4-5 “those at our stage of life (*tais hêlikiais*)”

The three interlocutors are self-proclaimed old men (*gerontes*) (634e, 658d; see note on 664d1-2). As such, and they are at the proper age in engage in legislative inquiries (643e-635a) and their views on legislation and education are to be accorded a special authority, according to the Athenian in Book II (658e-659c; 666a ff). The significance of different stages of life is marked in the institution of the three choruses (664b-665d).

625b6-7 “That way the distance will pass quite easily” (*paramouthoumenous ten hodon*).

See note on 632e4-5, where the expression is repeated.

II

Peace not War as the proper focus of legislation

(625c6-632d7)

Clinias indicates that the institutions of his home city, Knossos, are organized to promote victory in war (625c-626c). This is a mark of their excellence, he argues, since war and conflict are a ubiquitous and inevitable feature of human life at every level (626c-627c). The Athenian responds that reconciliation of warring parties is preferable to victory of the better over the worse, and hence that peace is a superior goal to victory (627c-628e). The military ethic propounded by the Spartan poet Tyrtaes is criticized in this light (628e-630d) and the Athenian concludes that a correct legislator will aim at cultivating “the whole of virtue” in the citizens, which will involve training them in wisdom and justice, not just courage (630d-632d).

(625c6-626c5) *The military focus of Cretan Institutions*

625c7-9 “on what principle has the law ordained your common meals (*sussitia*), your regime of athletic training (*to gymnasia*), and your style of arms?”

The question is asked of Cretan city states in general, not just of Clinias' own city, Knossos. Cretan cities, like Megillus' home city Sparta, are Dorian constitutions, whose characteristic features, here enumerated, are the subject of sustained criticism over Books I and II, and whose history is outlined in Book III. On the common meals (*sussitia*) see note on 625e2-7. “Athletic training” here renders ‘*gymnasia*’ – which includes military training; on the scope of the term, see note on 672c5-6.)

625e2-7 “our common meals ... he organized...based on the observation that ... everyone is engaged in a continuous life-long war against all other cities.”

Here Clinias passes from specifically military institutions, to an institution that is a familiar feature of Dorian societies even in peacetime: the common messes (*sussitia*) in which all male citizens participate, rather than dining at home in private families. On the difference between Cretan and Spartan *sussitia*, see Aristotle, *Politics* 1271a26-37, 1272a1-27. A version of *sussitia* play a role the ideal city outlined in *Republic* (416e), and will be included in the plan of legislation endorsed by the Athenian in *Laws* VI (780a-781d, 783b-c; cf. VII 806e), but not without criticism for the institution's potential to undermine the norms of a peaceful society (see 636b). On *sussitia* in *Laws* see Samaras, _____. and Schöpsdau 2003.

626a4-5 “every city is by nature always in an undeclared war against every other”

Aristotle reports that city states on Crete were in persistent conflict with each other (*Politics* 1269b1).

626a6-8 “it is with war in mind that the Cretan lawgiver established all the institutions (*nomima*) that govern our public and private life ...”

Aristotle concurs with this diagnosis of the goal of Cretan constitutions (*Pol.* 1324b7-9. As at 630d7, “institutions” translates ‘*nomima*’, which differs little in meaning here from ‘*epitédeuma*’ (‘practices’) at 626b2). These need not themselves be the result of legislation (e.g. national or ethnic temperament is cited as also be a source of norms in Book III (681a-b).

626a8-b1 “and endowed us (*paredôke*) with laws (*nomous*) to stand guard (*phulattein*)”

Thus Clinias portrays the laws as performing the function of *phulakê* (defense, standing guard), which he has just identified (625d-626a) as the central function of Cretan institutions. (Thanks to Brad Inwood for pointing this out). While Clinias has in mind the defense against military foes, the Athenian will later use the same vocabulary to invoke the role that legislation or institutions play in guarding peace-time objectives such as friendship, justice, or education (628a2, 632b3, 640c10, 654d8; for a further extension of the use, see 705d-e). See note on 632b2.

The present translation takes *tous nomous* (b1) to be the subject of the infinitive *phulattein* (stand guard, in a 8). By contrast, most translators take *tous nomous* to be the object. Herodotus 1.73 shows that this construal is not necessary. In the present case it yields either the translation “and commanded us to abide by (*phulattein*) the laws” (England, followed by Schöpsdau, Lisi)—an odd use of *phulattein*— or “commanded us to preserve the laws” (Brisson/Pradeau). The latter sense would prefigure the Athenian’s later theme that laws require guardians (632c, 752e ff; see note on 632c4).

626b3-4 “all the goods of the vanquished go to the victors”

Clinias implies here that the point of victory in war is to “possess goods” – presumably material possessions such as money and property. The Athenian will reject this point in the doctrine of divine and human goods at 631d4-e3, claiming instead that the benefit that comes from the possession of such “human goods” depends the proper use of and attitude them, which issues from moderation and justice. A militarized version of the Athenian’s principle is quoted from the Spartan poet Tyrtæus at 629a6-b3.

626b5-6 “a very well trained understanding of Cretan customs”

The Athenian’s choice of words (*gegumnasthai*) here invokes the athletic training (*gymnasia*) inquired into at 625c7, and supplies an example of the point made at 625a5-6 that Clinias’ outlook has been shaped by the institutions under which he was raised. Given the traditional understanding that *gymnasia* is training of the body, while “music” is training of the mind (II 672e-673b, VII 795d; cf. *Rep.* II 376e, there is also a suggestion here that Clinias’ views are inculcated by rote (e.g. a “well-rehearsed understanding”). See also note on 632d5-6.

626c1-2 “its affairs must be ordered so as to give it victory in war over other cities”

By contrast, the Athenian will argue that peace, as distinguished from mere victory in war, is the proper goal of law (628a-e).

(626c6-627c2) War and conflict as the human condition; the nature of victory and defeat.

Responding to Clinias’ and Megillus’ affirmation that victory in war is a city’s ultimate aim— and thus the primary focus of its legislator -- (626c1-5), the Athenian asks whether the war or conflict also characterizes the relations between villages within the domain of a city, between households within villages, and between siblings within a household (626c6-13). To his interlocutor’s “yes,” he asks whether the same applies to an individual person’s relation to himself -- again an emphatic “yes” (d1-9). Victory in the battle against oneself, Clinias declares, is “the highest and most excellent of all victories” (626e2-3). This victory, Clinias clarifies, consists in the better part (or party) defeating the worse (626e7-627c2), although the point is not developed in the context of psychological conflict within a person, but of civil strife within a city state.

626d4 “an appellation invoking the goddess”

Athena, after whom the city of Athens (in the region of Attica) is named, is the goddess of wisdom. With the main speaker now identified as stereotypically Athenian, Plato has completed his presentation of the three interlocutors as displaying the distinctive features of their respective home states.

626d5-6 “You invoke quite correctly (*orthôs*) the fundamental principle (*archên*) that clarifies the matter (*logon*)”

More literally: “clarifies the discussion” (*logos*). The “fundamental principle” (*archê*, d5) is about to be stated explicitly by Clinias at 626d7-9: “everyone is the enemy of everyone else in public life, and in private each person is pitted against himself”—on which see note on 626e5.

626e1 “my goodness” (*ô thaumasie*) Literally, “you amazing man”.

626e2-3 “victory (*nikân*) over oneself” is the highest and most excellent of all victories”

In making this affirmation, Clinias does not undermine his earlier claim (626a-b) that victory in battle against external foes is the ultimate aim of the legislator. As Clinias and Megillus understand it, the self-mastery they praise is displayed by the warrior who conquers his fears in battle (cf. 635b-c, 649c). By contrast, Schöpsdau (159-160) claims that the switch in focus to self-mastery provides the basis for the Athenian’s criticism of Dorian legislation for over-valuing military courage. However, that criticism (articulated at 627c-628e, and 629c-630c) makes no mention of personal self-mastery; the conflict invoked in those contexts is internal to a city or a family (see note on 628c9-11, and “A Tactical Concession” in the general note on 628e2-630d1). While the Athenian is responsible for the line of questioning that leads to the present focus on personal self-mastery, it is not the Athenian, but his interlocutors, who embrace self-mastery as a paradigm for virtue. While the Athenian will later exploit his interlocutors’ belief that virtue, quite generally, is displayed in victory over opposing internal impulses (633d-634c, 644b), he will himself advance a conception of virtue in Book II (653a-b), also implicit in the account of education he offers in Book I (643b-644b), on which virtue consists in “agreement” (*sumphônia*) between internal impulses. See notes on 626e5, 627a6-7, 628c9-11, 632d8-641a3, and 643a2-646e2.

626e4 “these ways of speaking” (*tauta*)

These are the common locutions “worsted by oneself” (*hêttôn heautou*) and its contrary “master of oneself” (*kreittôn heautou*). The Athenian substitutes the latter at e8 for Clinias’ locution: “victory (*nikan*) over oneself” (e4).

626e5 “each of us is engaged in an internal war against himself”

Clinias’ original proposal, that conflict is a universal feature of human life, is here extended to the internal workings of an individual person. The analysis of personal self-conflict, however, is not pursued in the present context and will not be addressed explicitly until 644b-645c. The assumption that such conflict is inevitable informs the paradigm for virtue invoked at 632e-636c and 644b. On the difference between that paradigm and the alternative conception that the Athenian will endorse in Book II, see notes on 626e2-3, 628c9-11, 634e1-2, 643a2-646e2.

626e7 “let’s apply this thesis (*logos*) back to the previous cases”

The thesis is that of e5—that an individual person is subject to internal conflict. Instead of dwelling on the psychological implications of this thesis in its application to an individual person (a point not raised until 644b ff), the Athenian here immediately applies it to the parties involved in the types of conflict just enumerated at 626c-d: “households, villages, and cities” (627a1). It is the problem of internal conflict within cities, not within persons, that will allow the Athenian to conclude at 628c9-e1 that peace, not war, is the proper focus of legislation. On the Athenian’s tactical reasons for not pressing the analogous point about individual virtue, see note on 626e2-3.

627a6-7 “This sort of thing most emphatically does occur, especially within cities”

This introduces the notion of *stasis* or civil faction—internal conflict within a city that was a familiar problem in many Greek city states in Plato’s time, hitherto not mentioned in the discussion. (It is not equivalent to rivalry between the villages in a city’s domain noted at 626c). The problem of civil strife also looms large in Plato’s *Republic*, where it is deployed as an analogue to the psychological turmoil within the unjust person. Here in *Laws*, however, the Athenian conspicuously fails to draw the analogy between civic strife and the psychology of vicious character. Not doubt this is at least in part because the Athenian’s interlocutors are attracted to a model of virtue that involves, indeed presupposes, internal conflict. See notes on 626e2-3, 643a2-646e2.

627a7-9 “where the better people are victorious over the inferior mob, the city might correctly be said to be “master of itself”

Here the better and worse parts of a political entity are invoked, and it will not be until 644b-645c that the analogous parts of an individual person are identified.

627b1-2 “whether we should ever accept that it is possible for the inferior (*cheiron*) to be master (*kreitton*) over the superior (*ameinonos*)”

An allusion to the surface paradox more accessible in Plato’s Greek than in English translation. ‘Master’, here translates ‘*kreitton*’, which is ambiguous in meaning between ‘better’ and ‘stronger’ – hence the paradox is something like saying that the inferior are superior to their betters. Such a paradox is exploited by Socrates in Plato’s *Gorgias* 488b-e; and a different paradox in the notion of self-mastery is articulated at *Republic* 430e-431b (cf. *Charmides* 167b-168e), where it is solved by positing, as in our present passage, a ‘better’ and ‘worse’

part within a person's soul. See Dorion 2007 for discussion. Schöpsdau, by contrast, following Gigon, finds the grounds of doubt in Socrates' conviction that a good person cannot be harmed by a bad one (Apol. 30d) and the general thesis that a good person will never do wrong (Laws. 904a ff, 906a).

627c1 "this way of speaking is decidedly odd"

The expressions for self-mastery and self-defeat (on which see note on 626e4-6), apply, in ordinary speech, to individual persons. Clinias is commenting on the anomaly of using them to describe a city.

(627c3-628c8) Reconciliation of warring parties is preferable to victory.

Following up on his interlocutor's claim that victory in internal conflict is the "highest and most excellent victory", the Athenian distinguishes three different ways in which such conflict might be settled – illustrated in the case of a feuding family brought before a judge (627d8-628a5). The first two are varieties of victory of by better party over its rebellious inferiors: the latter are either (1) executed, or (2) politically subjugated. On (3), the parties are reconciled by laws that ensure their peaceful and friendly coexistence for the future (627e3-628a3). Only (3) is a legislative solution, and only in that case is the conflict eliminated rather than decided in favour of one of the warring parties. Clinias agrees that it is the preferable solution, both in itself (628a4-5), and from the point of view of making the city best able to overcome external foes (628b6-c3). Thus the Athenian will explicitly conclude, at 628c9-e1 that peace is the ultimate focus of the legislator (628a6-7, c9-e1). (It also puts him in a position to make the analogous point about an individual person: that internal harmony is a superior achievement to victory of the better part over a recalcitrant worse, but the Athenian conspicuously fails to draw that conclusion; see note on 628c9-11).

627c8-10 "it wouldn't be proper ... to insist that when the wicked brothers win, the household and entire family be called "worsted by itself"..."

This would indeed be an odd way to use the expression in Greek. See note on 627c1. The primary application of the expression is to the self-control and lack thereof in an individual person. That form of internal struggle is not discussed until 644b6-645c8.

627d5-7 “most true... . And very fine...”

As at 625c4-5, Clinias displays his preference for practical over verbal matters, and the hitherto passive Megillus concurs. On the Dorian distaste for verbal elaboration, see 641e.

627e1 “and the better ones to rule themselves (*archein...heautôn*)”

The expression “rule themselves” (*archein heautôn*) is used at 644b7 to refer to individual self-control or self restraint, which is then explained, at 644b-645b as the victory reasoning’s golden pull over the opposing “iron strings” of pleasure and pain. See note on 644b6-7. In the present context, by contrast, the expression has its ordinary meaning of political self rule, with no implication that a better part is ruling a worse (as at 627a7-9). Indeed, such self-rule is exercised entirely within the “better part” of the family, since the worse part, on this first option, has been eliminated.

627e2-3 “a judge who lets the inferior brothers live but makes ... the inferior ones agree to be ruled”

More literally: “makes thembe ruled voluntarily (*hekontes*).” While ‘voluntary’ (*hekôn*) is often correctly translated ‘willingly’ (see note on 663b4-), this is too strong for the present context and would obscure between the second and with the third judge’s solution (see note on 627e3-4). Even actions taken under duress or constraint may be classified as *hekousion* (voluntary) in ordinary Greek—as the Athenian allows explicitly at 670c9-d1; cf. 921d8—which is why they constitute a “grey area” for Aristotle’s discussion of the topic to exploit (EN III 1 1110a4-b9). Thus the Athenian’s characterization of the wicked brothers as *hekontas* in the second solution is consistent with their unhappiness at being ruled. It is because they prefer this arrangement to the alternative of being put to death that they are made to “agree” to it.

The notion that citizens should be voluntary (*hekontes*) subjects to the laws will be a persistent theme of the Athenian’s(700a5), although the relevant notion of voluntariness in those contexts (captured by the translation “willingness”), unlike the one at play in the present passage, implies the absence of constraint (as at 663e1-2, 690c3; cf. 832c); see Laks 2005. On the different ways of marking the contrast between ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ in Greek, see Meyer 2010: 9-14.

627e3-4 *“Even better is a third judge...”*

Literally, “third in excellence (*triton ... kat’ aretên*)”. The excellence (*aretê*) is specifically that of a judge (cf. 637d2 the excellence (*aretê*) of a lawgiver). Later (630a ff) the more general human *aretê*, consisting of wisdom, moderation, courage and justice, will become the focus of the discussion, where the term is rendered ‘virtue’. See notes on 629e9-630a2 and on 630b2-3.

England and others puzzle about how the third judge is different from the second, but there is a clear contrast if we construe the evil brothers’ attitude in the second case as in the note on 627e2-3. The first judge executes the evil brothers, the second makes them submit to the rule of the better brothers (even if they are not entirely happy with this arrangement), and the third reconciles the two sets of brothers, making them friends (*philous*, 628a3) rather than masters and subjects (the importance of friendship (*philia*) among fellow citizens is stressed in Book III). By contrast, England, followed by Schöpsdau, takes the relevant difference between the second and third judges to be that the third makes permanent, through laws, the arrangement instituted by the second.

627e5 *“this family at odds with itself”*

The term translated ‘family’ (*sungenneian*) emphasizes the blood ties of the warring parties (recalling the same use of the term at 627b3-4), thereby highlighting the superiority of reconciliation over victory as a solution.

628a1-2 *“reconcile them by establishing laws”*

The third solution is the first truly legislative solution, in contrast to the first and second, which are judicial verdicts awarding victory to one of the warring parties and assessing penalties against the loser. The point of proper legislation, as the Athenian will explain in Book III, is to raise citizens under institutions that will make them well disposed to each other and to the importance of following the laws; as a result, no conflict should arise in the first place.

628a6-7 *“it would not be with a view to war but to its opposite that he establishes their laws.”*

The Athenian here neatly draws the conclusion that contradicts Clinias’ initial claim that victory in war against other cities is the single goal of the legislator (625d7-e2, 626a5-8). This is not to say that victory in that kind of war is

unimportant, but that establishing friendly relations among citizens is an important goal of the legislator. Since the issue in the immediate context concerns conflict *within* families or states, not between them, all that is established here is that it is better to have a community that is reconciled and friendly with each other than one where a discordant element is present but kept under control. At 628c9-e1 he will draw the stronger conclusion that victory against external enemies is a subordinate goal to that of living in peace without faction. See also note on 628c9-11.

628a9 *“the one who sets up (sunarmottôn) a city”*

A transition from the case of the family to the analogous case of the city. The Athenian’s present affirmation that the legislator has civil war rather than external war in mind (628a9-b4) is in superficial tension with his statement that the proper legislator does not have war as his focus (628a6-7, 630d5-7). However, as the present context develops the point, it is clear that the legislator has civil war in mind in the sense that he aims to avoid it in the first place, rather than to secure victory in it. The verb *sunharmozein*, here translated “sets up” (with Taylor, Lisi), also evokes the “harmonizing” functions of the “third judge” above at 627e3, as well as the notion of *sumphônia* (agreement) that will be important later on (see notes on 628c9-11 and 634e1-2). Thus it is translated “harmonizes” by Saunders in the present context (and similarly des Places and Brisson/Pradeau; Schöpsdau manages to capture both connotations); however, its primary meaning of assembling together or building is likely operative here. Otherwise it makes no sense for the Athenian to ask, of the legislator so characterized, whether civil war or war against external enemies is the focus of his efforts.

628b9-c1 *“and in this condition the city be forced to direct its attention toward external foes”*

Here the Athenian exploits the high value his Dorian interlocutors put on victory in war against external foes in order to support of his own contention that a city at peace with itself rather than one that has merely vanquished internal opposition is the legislator’s proper goal.

628c6 *“for the sake of (heneka) what is best (aristos)”*

Here Plato uses “best” to indicate not just the greatest good, but a goal: that for whose sake the other things are pursued – a teleological notion of goodness that Aristotle famously exploits in EN I 1094a18-22, 1097a18-24. “*Aristos*” in some contexts might alternatively be rendered by “excellent” (as at 629b3 and 630a1, where for consistency’s sake, it is also translated ‘best’). Its cognate noun

(*areté*) is translated “virtue” at 630b3, c4, e1-3, 631a3-5; on the translation see note on 629e9-630a2.

(628c9-e1) Peace, not victory, is the ultimate goal of legislation

In this difficult paragraph, the Athenian takes up his announced points in reverse order: victory over internal faction is not the best thing to aim at (628c11-d4); nor is victory in external war (d4-e1). His conclusion, that war is “for the sake of” (charin) peace allows victory in external war to be a goal of the legislator, but one that is subordinate to the ultimate goal of peace.

628c9-11 “The best (*aristos*), however, is neither war nor faction... but peace and mutual goodwill”

Presumably ‘war’ and ‘faction’ are here shorthand for “victory in war” and “victory in faction.” The Athenian here explicitly articulates this conclusion only as a claim about what is good for a city state (*polis*), not an individual person, notwithstanding the mention of the latter at 628d5. It is, of course, easy to make the analogous criticism of the ideal of self-mastery affirmed by Clinias at 626e2-3: while “victory over oneself” is better than being “worsted” by pleasures or pains, far superior than either is the condition of not being torn by opposing inclinations in the first place (thus Stalley 1983: 55 and 1994: 164). Indeed, the latter condition is captured by the conception of virtue as “agreement” (*sumphônia*) that is implied in the account of education that will be sketched later in Book I (see note on 643a2-646e2), and articulated explicitly in the fuller account of education in Book II, 653a-b. In the present context, however, the Athenian conspicuously fails to apply these conclusions to the case of an individual person. Indeed, as the discussion proceeds, he will continue to appeal to his interlocutor’s conception of virtue as self-mastery at 633c-d, 635b-d, 644b. (On the tactical reasons for doing so, see note on 627a6-7 and general note on 628e2-630d1). On self-mastery and internal “agreement” as competing paradigms for virtue, see notes on 626e2-3 and 643a2-646e2).

628d1 “a necessary evil”

The Greek text contains no term corresponding to ‘evil’, but the Athenian is clearly trying to distinguish between a proper good, on the one hand, and what is necessary to undo or mitigate an evil, on the other. His main point is that peaceful internal relations are more desirable than the suppression of internal dissent, and the latter is to be pursued only when the former is not available. On

the opposition between necessity and the good, see *Laws* 858a, *Rep.* 493c.

628d2 “flushed out by a purgative”

The metaphor of the purgative is invoked again at 646b4-e2.

628d5 “the happiness (*eudaimonia*) of a city or an individual”

‘Happiness’ (*eudaimonia*) is here used as equivalent to “performing at [one’s] best” (*arista prattein*) at 628d5. This usage is in keeping with Aristotle, who takes both “doing well” (*eu prattein*) and “living well” to be the same thing as *eudaimonia* (EN, 1095a18-19); cf. *Rep.* 354a1, where “being happy” (*eudaimonein*) is glossed as “living well” (*eu zên*). Thus *eudaimonia* is a notion of well being, or well functioning, rather than subjective contentment (as the English term ‘happiness’ often connotes. That it applies to both cities and individuals: *Laws* 631b, 636e, 683b, 697b, 710b, 781b, 927b, 945d; *Rep.* 420b-c, 473e, 500e. That the lawgiver aims to bring *eudaimonia* to the city and its citizens: *Laws* 631b, 713b-e, 742d-743c; *Rep.* 421a-b. The Athenian will explain at 631b-d that one is happy insofar as one has good things—the chief of which are the virtues (631____)—hence his later remarks that one is happy (*eudaimon*) insofar as one is good (*agathos*) or just: *Laws.* 660e, 742d-743c; *Rep.* 544a, 580c. On the notion of ‘happiness’ in Greek ethics see Kraut 1979 (“Two conceptions of Happiness”), Annas 1993: 27-46. On the relation between being good (or virtuous) and being happy, see Meyer 2008: 11-14. See also note on 631b5-6.

628d8-e1 “rather than regulating peacetime for the sake of war”

A point repeated in Book VII, 803d3-4. On the expression “for the sake of” (*charin*) see notes on 631d-5 and on 647c1.

(628e2-630d1) Criticism of the military ethic of the poet Tyrtaeus.

Clinias notes that whatever the merits of the Athenian’s remarks, Spartan and Cretan institutions evidently have war as their primary focus (628e2-5). The Athenian encourages him not to be defensive on the issue, but to proceed on the assumption that all parties to the discussion take military success “most seriously” (629a2-3). As a device to make concrete this common sense of purpose, he shifts the conversation away from an examination of *Clinias*’ and

Megillus's views, to a hypothetical conversation with the poet Tyrtaeus, whose alleged ties to both Athens and Sparta (629a4-b7) make him an appropriate spokesman for the alleged shared concerns. It is Tyrtaeus, rather than the Dorian interlocutors or their legislators, who is the target of criticism for eulogizing prowess in war against external foes instead of the broader range of virtue that includes not only courage but also justice and moderation (629e-630d). The engagement with Tyrtaeus thus serves to introduce the notion of virtue (areté) into the discussion. The issue is no longer whether peace or victory is the legislator's goal, but which virtues the legislator should aim to cultivate in the citizens; those for peace or whose for war.

A tactical concession?

The Athenian's argument takes the curious tack of conceding the Dorian assumption that excellence in war is of the utmost importance (629b-c), and limiting the debate to the question of which kind of war (external or internal) is more important (629c-d). On the face of it, this concession contradicts the conclusion just articulated by the Athenian that war is not the legislator's ultimate focus (628c9-e5; to be reiterated at 630d4-7). Having previously established (a) the greater danger of civil conflict to external war (628a-b) and (b) the superiority of peace as a goal to success in either version of conflict (628c-d), the Athenian now appears to conduct his "conversation" with Tyrtaeus as if (b) had not been established, arguing simply that the person who excels in civil conflict is superior to Tyrtaeus' warrior against external foes (629e-630a). However, the Athenian's enumeration of the virtues required for success against internal faction (630a-c; developed further in 631c-e) makes it clear that these include the virtues of sociable cooperation during peacetime, in particular, moderation and justice. Rather than simply equipping a person for success the battles of a civil war, these virtues will prevent faction and civil strife from arising in the first place, and it is the combination of these that the Athenian presents to Tyrtaeus as superior to strictly military courage. However strained the assumption that this expanded range of virtue displays "excellence in civil war", it fits with the Athenian's strategy of appealing to normative assumptions that his interlocutors find attractive.

628e4-5 "with this goal in view"

Literally: "are for the sake of (*heneka*) this" i.e., success in war against external enemies.

629a2 "maintain... a civil tone"

'civil' translates the adverb *êrema* – 'gently', which invokes the gentleness

(*praotês* or *hemerotês*) typically used in Plato to characterize the tenor of rational persuasion, in contrast to the force and violence of military means. *Stsm.* 307a, *Rep.* 375b-e, 410e-411e, 441e-442a; *Laws* I 634c8, 635b1; II 666e6; V 731b-d cf. *Rep.* 399a-c). On the problem of balancing these two tendencies, see note on 631c7-8. See also notes on 629d2-3, 634c8, 645a6-7.

629a2-3 “we and they alike take these matters most seriously”

The antecedent of ‘they’ is not supplied by the context, but it is presumably the legislators of the Spartan and Cretan institutions cited by Clinias at 628e2-5. “These matters” (*tauta*) are most likely the military goals that Clinias has just cited as the focus of Dorian legislation (e3-5). Thus Schöpsdau. By contrast, England proposes, “laws and government” as the antecedent. However, as Schöpsdau notes, Clinias’ use of ‘emphatically’ (*spoudên*) in e4 (which concerns military matters) is picked up by the Athenian’s “take... seriously” (*spoudazonton*) here at 629a3. The two occurrences of “these matters” (*peri tauta*) in a3 and a6 both refer back to the “*toutôn*” in Clinias’ remark at e4. That the shared agreement in 629a3 is on the importance of war is reinforced by the restatement of the agreement at 629c2-4.

629a4 “Tyrtaeus”

An elegiac poet of the 7th century BCE whose martial poems glorifying valour in combat were a staple in Spartan culture. See Podlecki (1984). Pausanias 4.15.6 tells a story in which Tyrtaeus transfers his allegiance from Athens to Sparta. The tale is not very flattering to the poet and reflects the centuries-long tension between Athens and Sparta. See also note on 634a2-4, where Tyrtaeus may be alluded to.

629a7-b3 ““I would not memorialize a man... not even... the richest of all men... who did not always prove to be best in war.”

Being “best in war” is “the virtue (*aretê*) that Tyrtaeus singles out for praise” (630c6-7). Thus the quotation-cum-paraphrase from Tyrtaeus articulates a slightly skewed version of the principle that the Athenian will express in the doctrine of divine and human goods at 631b6-c1. In refusing to praise wealth and the other generally recognized standards of success unless it is combined with “virtue”, Tyrtaeus implies that there is no value in possessing the usually recognized goods (e.g. wealth) unless one also possesses virtue (*aretê*). By contrast, Clinias at 626b2-4 implies that military valour is to be prized because it secures and defends material possessions. For development of this point, see

Bobonich 2002: 131-6.) Tyrtaeus error, attributed to the interlocutors quite generally at 630d4-e3, is an overly narrow conception of the requisite virtue or excellence. (On ‘virtue’ and its connection to being “best in war” see note on 629e9-630a2.)

629b9 “most divine”

A typically Spartan locution, also used by Megillus at 626a4; see note on 642d5.

629d2 “the hardest (*chalepôtatos*) conflict”

“Hardest” translates the superlative of *chalepos*, which is regularly contrasted with *praos* (mild, gentle; see notes on 629a2, 634c8, 645a6-7) but also with ‘easy’ (*rhadion*) at 636a4; cf. 641b7. England prefers “deadliest”, but the Athenian’s point is unlikely to be that external war causes less death and destruction to the citizenry than civil war, given the bloody carnage invoked to characterize external war just a few lines later in the quote from Tyrtaeus at 629e2-3. The greater damage or violence in civil war is to the body politic, as explained at 628b2-4. Presumably ‘*chalepos*’ is to be understood in the same sense as in the quote from Theognis at 630a5-6 where it (and its comparative form) is used to modify ‘*dichostasie*’ (faction) and ‘*polemos*’ (conflict). In Book II, the same term is used to describe the dangers of mistaken music (see note on 669b5-6).

629d3 “as we were saying just now” 628a7-b4

629d5 “far milder (*pra(i)oteron*)” See note on 629d2.

629e9-630a2 “*while these men are good (agathôn), better (ameinous) still by far are those who, in the most important battle, prove clearly to be best (aristous)...*”

‘*Agathos*’ is an ordinary adjective meaning ‘good’ and is used here along with its comparative (*ameinôn*) and superlative (*aristos*) forms (cf. 628c6-7, 629b3). Many translators, however, translate the terms here by forms of ‘courageous’ or ‘brave’ (Saunders, Des Places, Brisson/Pradeau, but not Lisi or Schöpsdau). But

this is a mistake. While the sort of goodness that Tyrtaeus has in mind is undoubtedly courage or bravery, it is important to distinguish the general notion of goodness that is invoked by 'agathos' and its cognates from the specific kind of goodness that is manifest in the bravery extolled by Tyrtaeus. Even if, as the Athenian charges, Tyrtaeus and his ilk collapse all of goodness into *andreia*, one cannot articulate this point without respecting the distinct meanings of the two terms.

The Athenian will restate the present affirmation at 630b-c as a claim about "excellence" or "virtue" (*aretê* – the abstract noun cognate with the superlative *aristos*). In many literary contexts, including the poems of Tyrtaeus, '*aristos*,' its cognate verb '*aristeuein*' and the noun '*aretê*' characterize warriors who are victorious over opponents, as in Homer (e.g., *Iliad* 6.208, 11.784) and in such contexts '*aretê*' often refers to strength, speed, or military prowess (e.g. *ibid.* 8.535, 11.90, 22.268; cf. Tyrtaeus fr. 12 (West) line 33.). But in the fourth and fifth century political context which Plato depicts in his dialogues, '*aretê*' connotes excellence much more broadly construed. For example, it is the object of pursuit by any ambitious participant in the public life of the city (dramatized by Plato in openings of *Protagoras* 310b-319a and *Meno* 70a ff.; see Meyer (2008) 8-11). Thus even if what Tyrtaeus has in mind when he uses the term '*aretê*' (as at fr. 12.13, West) is bravery, we must translate the term 'virtue' or 'excellence' rather than 'bravery'. On virtue, see also note on 630b2-3.

630a4 *Theognis ... of Megara*

an elegiac poet of the 6th century. The verses quoted are v.77 [edition?]

630a7-b2 "*a blend of justice, moderation and wisdom along with courage (andreia) is better (ameinôn) than courage on its own*".

Literally: "justice, moderation, and wisdom coming to the same thing (*eis t' auton elthousai*), along with (*meta*) courage is better...".

This remark, together with the classification of courage as "fourth in rank and merit" at 630c9, is elaborated and explained at 631c5-d1 (on which see note on 631c7). The phrase "than courage on its own" (b2) is missing from the MSS but quoted in Eusebius and Proclus. Whether or not the phrase was in Plato's text, the comparison the Athenian intends is clearly with the virtue singled out for praise by Tyrtaeus (630c6-7). The latter is exemplified in the behaviour of the rapacious mercenaries (b5-8). Unlike the virtues invoked by Socrates in *Protagoras* (329c-333c, 349b-d; cf. 361b) it does not depend on or imply the presence of the other virtues, and the same might be said of the "moderate disposition of a soul" invoked at 631c7 that must be combined with wisdom

(phronêsis) to become a divine good (see note ad loc). Such “courage” and “moderation” are rather like the tendencies that go by those names in *Euthydemus* 281c, *Statesman* 306a-308a, 310d-e and *Laws* III 661e1, 696d, 681b, and 710a: tendencies to aggression and risk-taking on the one hand (“courage”), and to restraint and deliberateness on the other (“moderation”); see Irwin 1995: 340, 347-8, Carone 2002: 336-7, Bobonich 2002: 289-90; for a history of discussion on this point see Cairns 1993: 374n90. These tendencies not always yield appropriate action and are not always good (witness the case of the mercenaries— on which cf. Protagoras’ initial position in *Prot.* 349d6-8). Only when balanced against each other and tempered with wisdom do they amount to the conditions that are called ‘courage’ and ‘moderation’ in *Protagoras*, and are there argued by Socrates to depend on wisdom. By contrast, the Athenian counts the mercenary’s imperfect trait as a virtue (*aretê*) at 630c6-7 (taking *aretên* at c4 to be the antecedent of *hên* at c6). It is still worth having, although less valuable than it would be as part of “complete virtue”. See also note on 661d8-e1.

630b2-3 “no one would be trustworthy and dependable in the face of faction without virtue as a whole (*sumpasês aretês*)”

What is here called “virtue as a whole” (*sumpasês aretês*) is referred to indifferently at 630c3-4 as “the greatest virtue” (*megistên arêten*). The phrase is used again at 661c4, in the same sense: It is the blend of justice, moderation, wisdom and courage invoked at 630a_-b2 (see note above) and called “virtue in its entirety (*pasan aretên*)” at 630e2-3, 632e5. This is the sort of virtue that the legislator should aim at (630c2-4). It is necessary for trustworthiness in times of civil strife because while courage alone might equip one to defeat the seditious party in battle, the other virtues (especially moderation and justice) equip one to resist the temptation to engage in sedition oneself (e.g. by joining the other). The latter virtues, moreover, if cultivated widely in the citizen body, are proof against the tendency for faction to develop in the first place. Thus Theognis’ figure of the warrior who is trustworthy in times of faction nicely makes the transition from the awkward assumption that prowess in war is, after all the legislator’s primary concern (see general note on 628e2-630d1) to the Athenian’s main contention, that the legislator must aim at inculcating “all of virtue”.

This is the first use in *Laws* of the noun *aretê* (virtue, excellence; cognate with the adjective *aristos*, best) to characterize the focus of the legislator. As in other works of Plato, *aretê* is used as a general term for the personal traits: wisdom, moderation, justice, and courage, and is not restricted (as in some Homeric contexts) to courage or military prowess (see note on 629e9-630a2). Also in keeping with his general usage, the singular *aretê* (rather than the plural *aretai*) is used to the totality of the virtues (cf. *Laws* 965d; cf. *Protag.* 325a). Accordingly, justice, wisdom, etc. are not called virtues (*aretai* –in contrast, e.g., with Aristotle’s usage: EN 1114b26, 1144b18) but “parts of virtue” (630e1, 631a5,

633a8). See note on 633a8. Unlike Socrates in *Protagoras*, however, the Athenian will later (633a8) disavow interest in distinguishing between the thesis that justice, wisdom, courage etc are “parts” of virtue, and that ‘justice’, ‘courage’, etc. are different names for the same thing (Protag. 329c-d).

630c2-4 “any legislator who is any good, will set his primary sights on nothing other than the greatest virtue (*megistên aretên*) when he is devising laws...”

That the legislator should aim at the “greatest virtue”, “the whole of virtue”, or virtue in its entirety” (see note on 630b2-3)—of which courage is only a part, or fourth-ranked, is developed further at 631c-d, and is repeated in book III 688a-b, IV at 705e-706a. On virtue (*aretê*) see note on 629e9-630a2.

630c5-6 “which one might call complete justice (*teleian dikaiosunên*)”

Why describe the trustworthiness invoked by Theognis at 630a4 as “complete justice” here, when just a few lines above (630b2-3) he has identified it as “virtue as a whole,” explained as a combination of justice with moderation, wisdom and temperance? The oddity evaporates in the light of 631c7-8, where the Athenian explains that justice is a combination of wisdom, moderation and courage (rather than a trait that, like courage—and possibly also moderation can exist both in isolation from, and blended with the other traits; see note on 630a7-b2).

630c7 “fine” (*kalon*)

The notion that virtue is *kalon* is a frequent motif in Plato. e.g. *Charm.* 160e-161b, *Laches* 192c-d; see Irwin 1995: 37-8. Add dissent from Irwin on Gorg ____: on *kalon* as distinctively moral vs. *agathon*; these rather overlap: witness easy alternation of *kalôs* & *eu* at 641b8-c1, 657c5-6, 667c6-7; and idiomatic use of *kalôs legeis*: you are right (636e4, 646d1)
relevant notes: 630c7, 636e4, 637e5, 641b8-c1, 646d1, 657c5-6, 667c6-7.

630c6-d1 “The virtue Tyrtaeus praises ... comes fourth”

A point repeated in Book II, 667a2-5 in a context less circumspect in its criticisms of Spartan institutions; cf. 688a. There is even stronger criticism of the poet in Book IX, 858e1-3. The virtue in question is courage unmixed with moderation and wisdom (630b2; see note on 630a7-b2). The fourth place ranking is explained at 631c5-d1. See note ad loc.

(630d2-631b2) *The goals & practice of the proper legislator.*

The proper legislator, the Athenian explains—still leaving it open that the Dorian legislators fall into this category (630d-631a)—aims at cultivating “virtue in its entirety” not just the military courage extolled by Tytraeus (a point repeated at 688a-b without the polite supposition).

630d4-7 *“It is we who are doing poorly by supposing that Lycurgus and Minos had war in view “*

Lycurgus is the legendary Spartan legislator (mentioned unfavourably at IX 858e). Minos as the legislator for Knossos is invoked at 624a. The Athenian’s generous assumption here (630d4-e3) that the Dorian constitutions do in fact aim at virtue in its entirety, not just military courage (repeated by implication at 632d1-4), will not be sustained in Book II, where he will not mince words in castigating their societies for being organized on exclusively military principles (666d-667a).

630d7 *“when establishing the institutions (nomima)”*

For consistency of translation ‘*nomima*’ is here and elsewhere rendered by ‘institutions’ and ‘*nomoi*’ by laws, but no distinction is intended by the Athenian here between institutions, practices, and laws. See introductory note on Book I and note on 626a6-8.

630d9-e1 *“What is only right and true to say on behalf of a divine lawgiver”.*

Translation following England, Schöpsdau and Lisi. Although nothing in the MSS corresponds to “lawgiver” and the transmitted text is problematic, it is clear from the context that the Athenian has in mind the divinely inspired legislators invoked at 624a—either a divine man (*theiou andros*) or divine legislation (*theias nomothesias*) or divine constitution (*theias politeias*). Des Places conjectures “*euêthesias*” (ingenuousness), followed by Saunders and Brisson/Pradeau.

630e1-3 *“that when he made the laws he was looking not to a part of virtue, and the most trifling one at that, but to virtue in its entirety (pasa aretê)”*

This recapitulates the conclusion about the proper goal of legislation just drawn

at 630c1-6, in light of the conceit at 630d4 that it is the interlocutors rather than the Dorian legislators who have failed to note that legislation should be aimed at “virtue as a whole” (*sumpasa aretê*); the latter locution is offered as equivalent to “all of virtue” (*pasa aretê*) in 630b2-3. See note ad loc.

630e3-4 *“and that the kinds (eidê) under which he sought to devise (zêtein) laws were different than those used by legislators today...”*

The verb ‘*zêtein*’ encompasses both seeking out (as it is rendered at 630e5) and “inquire into” at 631a1). The implication is that the interlocutors are conducting the same sort of inquiry as the divine legislators.

We are given here a general methodological principle about how to implement the insight that legislation has virtue as its goal (630c1-5; 631a3). Current legislators devise laws seriatim under heterogeneous categories (inheritances, assaults...), which are introduced as the need for them arises. There is some suggestion that it is a methodology of responding to problem cases (an “heiress” *epiklêros* is a fatherless brotherless woman (Pomeroy (2002) 84) and hence poses a problem for the typical Greek practice of passing on family wealth through the male line). Such a reactive and consequently disorderly legislative practice (see Rep. 427a) is contrasted with the type of inquiry (*zêtêsis*) that underlies proper legislative practice. The latter takes virtue as its focus, and devises laws with a view to what is required to inculcate it in the citizens (a point made clearer in the ensuing 631b3-632d7). The methodology is specified more precisely at 632d8-e3 (see note ad loc): the legislator considers each virtue in turn, devising laws and institutions suitable for inculcating each. The use of ‘*eidōs*’ (kind) at 632e2 (repeating the term at 630e3) indicates that the different virtues (called “parts of virtue at 633a8; cf. 630e1, 631a5) are the ‘kinds’ under which the investigation is to be organized. See note on 632d8-e3.

631a1-2 *“to start from the point where our present inquiry began”*

Literally: “to begin (*archesthai*) as we did”.

631a3-4 *“for you began with virtue (aretê), noting correctly that it is for its sake that the legislator framed his laws”*

Clinias did not in fact begin by invoking virtue (*aretê*), a term which is introduced explicitly only by the Athenian and at 630b3, where it captures the considerations about what sort of person is “good”, “better” and “best” invoked in the dialogue with Tyrtaeus (629b3, 629e9-630a2); see note on 629e9-630a2. Clinias did

affirm at 626e, that “victory over oneself” is the greatest kind of victory (626e), a remark which the Athenian will later interpret as a proposal about what makes a person good (644b), but Clinias does not himself use the vocabulary of virtue when affirming that ideal at 626e. It is the Athenian who has redirected the conversation away from Clinias emphasis on external results (victory over the enemy in war, 625d-626b) to virtue, considered as a personal trait. This transition prepares the way for the dialogue’s next topic: education, the project of cultivating the virtues in the citizens.

631a5-7 *“But in supposing that it was only to a part of virtue, and the smallest one at that, that he referred all his laws, you were clearly incorrect”*

See note on 630d4-7.

631a8-b1 *“the sort of divisions”*

Literally: “dividing in what way (*pêi dielomenon*).” In the present passage, *dielomenon* might simply mean “expounding” (thus England), but it also picks up the invocation, earlier in this paragraph, of the different “kinds” (*eidê*) into which the lawmaker organizes his legislation (note on 630e3-631a2). One might suppose that in the sample speech that follows (631b-632d), the distinction between divine and human goods is an example of the requisite “divisions”. At any rate, it shows the kinds of distinctions one should make in order to have the proper appreciation of virtues as the focus of one’s legislation. On the connection between *eidê* (forms, kinds) and (*diairesis*) division, see *Statesman* 262b-e, 285a-b, *Phaedrus* 273d-e.

(631b3-631d1) Divine and Human Goods

The previous thesis that virtue is the focus of legislation (630d-631b) is here subsumed under the more general thesis that worthy laws benefit the community by “providing them with goods”. The Athenian then provides a theory and ranking of goods that accords a central place to virtue and is to inform the legislator’s practice: The virtues wisdom, moderation, justice, and courage (ranked in that order) are “divine goods” on which all “human goods” (wealth, health, etc.) depend (631b-d).

631b5 *“They are correct laws...”*

Lit: “they are in correct condition” (*orthôs echei*); presumably a synonym for

kalôs ... echei (“[they] are in fine condition”) at 634d9-e1; cf. 635b2; see notes on 667c6-7 and 668d1-2, 669a2-4.

631b5-6 “...and bring happiness to those who live by them, since they provide them with every good”

The Athenian moves seamless from saying that proper legislation aims at the virtue of the citizens (630e-631a) to claiming that it gives them happiness. ‘Happiness’ (*eudaimonia*) here is not to be understood narrowly to mean a feeling of satisfaction or pleasure (as it often does today). Rather, it is a synonym for “well-being” or “doing well” (*eu prattein*) (as at 657c; cf. *Rep.* 354a1, *Euthydemus* 278e3, 280b6; Aristotle, *EN* 1095a18-20). ‘Happiness’ (*eudaimonia*) is used in the same sense at 628d5 and 636e1, as is “do well” (*prattoien kalôs*) at 641c1. See also note on 628d5. To provide happiness to the citizens is, as the Athenian immediately explains, to “provide them with everything good” (631b6; the same explanation offered in the *Euthydemus* (279a2-3, 280b5-6). The virtues, he is about to explain, are the “divine” goods on which all “human goods” depend (631b7-8).

Human Goods depend on the Divine

631b6-8 “Now goods are twofold – some of them human, others divine, and the former depend (*êrtêtai*) on the divine.”

In what sense do the “human goods” (health, beauty, strength and wealth) depend on the “divine goods” (wisdom, moderation, courage, and justice)? To the extent that the divine goods depend on wisdom (631d), one might find here an instance of the thesis affirmed by Socrates in *Euthydemus* 278e-282e and *Meno* 87c-89a): that such things as health and wealth are good only if their use is directed by wisdom. For discussion, see Bobonich 2002: 136-153 ____, who finds a better explanation in the theory of goods in *Philebus* (153-179). On the relation between this thesis of “dependent goods” (Bobonich’s term) and the Athenian’s declaration in Book II that “so-called goods” such as health and wealth are good only to the good person (661b-d), see note on 631c5-d1 and general note on 660d11-661d6.

631b8-c1 “A city that acquires the greater ones receives the lesser ones as well, but if not, it is bereft of both.”

One might also suppose that this sentence explains or elaborates the dependence of human on divine goods just asserted in the previous sentence.

However, the present sentence is in fact a conjunction of two theses: a sufficiency thesis (possessing the divine goods suffices for possessing the human ones) and a necessity thesis (possessing the divine goods is necessary for possessing the human ones). Only the latter affirms the dependence of human on divine goods. Moreover, both theses invoke the city, not an individual person, as the recipient of the relevant goods. This fact has troubled many readers; England (endorsed by Bobonich 1995 p.137 and 2002: n42p509), who proposes to emend the MSS text to make a person the subject. Let us call the MS version of the thesis the “political” version, and the emended version the “personal” version.

While it is no doubt true, as England points out, that it is individual persons, not cities, who are subjects of the divine and human goods here enumerated, it still makes sense for the Athenian to talk about a *city* receiving these goods, in the sense that its citizens have them, since the passage is intended to illuminate the goals with which a legislator devises laws for a city (630d9-e3). Moreover, the “personal” version of the sufficiency thesis is far stronger than any other claim affirmed in the *Laws* (or indeed anywhere else in Plato) about the relation between virtue and the other goods. It would affirm that any person who has the divine goods (the virtues) will also have the human goods (health, wealth, etc.). But it is hardly plausible for the Athenian (or Plato) to suppose that a person who is wise, moderate, courageous will never fall into illness and poverty.

The “political” version of the sufficiency thesis is considerably more plausible. Consider first the corresponding version of the necessity thesis: that without the divine goods, the city will lack the human ones. Even if it is not strictly impossible for health, wealth, and the like to be available in adequate quantity in a city whose inhabitants are unwise, immoderate, cowardly and unjust, a legislator devising the basic institutions of a polity would be well advised to operate on the assumption that neglecting to cultivate “complete justice” in the citizens will seriously impair the prospects of the population securing an adequate supply of human goods (for reasons made memorable by Hobbes many centuries later). The reason why the supply of human goods in a city might reasonably be expected to depend on the extent of wisdom, moderation, courage, and justice exercised by its inhabitants is that these virtues concern the ways in which one engages with the human goods. For example, moderation, courage and justice concern the ways one pursues, uses, safeguards, disposes of or risks losing such things as health, beauty, strength, wealth, and the like (thus the idea that wisdom, which the Athenian here insists is integral to “complete virtue”, involves the correct “use” (*chrêsis*) of such “goods” in *Euthydemus* 281e-282a; *Meno* 88a). On such a conception, it is not unreasonable to suppose that a city whose citizens have been taught to engage properly with the human goods will thereby *have* the human goods to engage with (the sufficiency thesis). To be sure, “engaging” with the human goods extends to the limiting case where a person loses, gives up, or refrains from pursuing such a good, and thus it is conceivable

that an individual person might, for example, be perfectly just in poverty and ill health; indeed one of the legislator's tasks will be to teach the citizens to respond appropriately to such an eventuality (632a2-5). But this is a problem for the individual version of the sufficiency thesis, not to the legislative-political version. From the perspective of a legislator aiming to inculcate the virtues in the citizens, which is precisely the perspective invoked in this passage, it is highly unlikely that the disposition to engage properly with the human goods could be cultivated in and exercised by the citizenry at large without there being an adequate supply of those goods. The Athenian is entitled to assume that the legislator whose primary goal is to inculcate complete virtue in the citizens will have to provide them with an adequate level of human goods, and this may be all there is to the sufficiency thesis. While supplying the city with the human goods is an important objective of his, this will be achieved in the course of carrying out his ultimate aim of supplying it with the divine virtues. Thus the political versions of both the sufficiency thesis and the necessity thesis are reasonable claims for the Athenian to make in this context.

The human goods

631c1-5 *“Chief among the lesser goods is health, second beauty, and third prowess at running and other physical activities. Fourth is wealth that is not blind but clear-sighted, which comes from following wisdom.”*

Compare the more open-ended enumeration of the “so-called goods” in 661a-c, and in 649d and 716a, as well as in the popular drinking song reported at Gorgias 451e. One might note that the goods listed in the present passage are not entirely independent of each other; the second and third items (beauty and strength) arguably depend on the first (health), and the fourth item (“wealth ... clear-sighted to the extent that it is guided by wisdom”) is explicitly marked as involving the primary divine good, wisdom (which recalls *Euthydemus* 280b7-282a5). Are we to understand a similar qualification implied for the other human goods? See note on 631c4-5. If the human goods involve the divine goods (and in this sense “depend” on them), then they do not correspond to the “so-called” goods of 661a-d. See note on 661a5-7.

631c3 *“third is ... running”*

Note the importance placed on running in Clinias' initial discussion of Cretan practices at 625d; prowess in running also appears on Tyrtæus' enumeration of goods (661a3; fr. 12.4, West). According to the Athenian, by contrast, the activity is only the third most important of second-class goods.

631c4-5 “wealth ... clear-sighted to the extent that it is guided by wisdom”

The qualification is parallel in structure, but slightly different in content, to that in the drinking song of Gorg. 451e. That wealth is even on the list of human goods is contingent on its being properly used (cf. *Euthydemus* 280b7-282a5). Are we to understand a similar qualification implied for the other human goods? If so (see note on 631c1-5), the Athenian might be motivated to make the qualification explicit in the case of wealth because it looms large in the legislative priorities that the Athenian is concerned to reject: “wealth and ambition” (632c7).

The Divine Goods

631c5-d1

The four virtues enumerated (wisdom, moderation, justice, and courage) recapitulate the four cardinal virtues enumerated in the Republic (427e). They are here ranked in order of priority:

- (1) *wisdom (phronêsis);*
- (2) *moderation tempered by wisdom;*
- (3) *moderation tempered by wisdom plus courage (= justice);*
- (4) *courage on its own – e.g. that of the mercenaries at 630b3-8.*

631c5-6 “Wisdom (*phronêsis*) itself is first and leader of the divine goods”

‘Wisdom’ translates ‘*phronêsis*,’ which the Athenian uses interchangeably with ‘*nous*’ (translated ‘intelligence’ at 631c7 and d5). This marks a terminological difference from the *Republic*, where the enumeration of the canonical four virtues the *Republic*, consistently uses *sophia* for wisdom (e.g. 427e—although the rulers are regularly descried as having *phronêsis*: 412c12, 431d1, 433d1). In *Laws*, the term ‘*sophia*’ rarely occurs and when it does, it is typically used in a broad sense that applies for any learning or skill (e.g. 644a4, a context where it is explicitly distinguished from virtue; cf. 677c, 701a, 732a).

Wisdom leads the divine goods not just in being the highest ranked, but in giving direction to the others—at least in the case of the second and the third, whose descriptions indicate that the third (justice) involves the second, and the second involves the first. Perhaps it leads the fourth, courage, in the same way that it leads the “human goods”—as being that on which their goodness depends; see note on 631b6-8 and on 631c8-d1).

631c7 “a moderate (*sôphrôn*) disposition (*hexis*) of the soul that is accompanied by intelligence (*meta nou*)”

Reading *nou* with Eusebius, for the MSS’ *noun*, following Schanz, Burnet, England and des Places. On the latter reading the text would describe the second-place divine good as “a moderate disposition of the soul” that is “ranked second after intelligence (*meta noun*)”; it would not say that such a disposition is and is accompanied (or informed by) intelligence. The second-place moderate disposition would thus differ from with the third place good (justice) of which is intelligence is explicitly identified as a ingredient. On that reading, the text would not exclude from the second place rank in the divine goods instances of moderation (self-restraint) that are foolish or otherwise lacking in wisdom (for instances of such moderation see *Euthyd.* 281c6 and *Stsm.* 306a-b; cf. 308b). But this is a position the Athenian explicitly rejects in later books (IV 710a , with reference to the question raised at III 696d), and so even on the MSS reading, we must suppose that moderation’s second-place status in the hierarchy of divine goods (it’s being “second after intelligence”) depends on its being combined with wisdom. See also note on 630a7-b2. That “intelligence” (*nous*) here stands for wisdom, the first of the divine goods, is indicated by 631d5-6.

631c7-8 “justice, which consists of these two combined with courage”

‘These two’ are the first two divine goods, wisdom and the “moderate disposition” involving wisdom (c6-7). The ‘courage’ that is combined with them is the disposition that, when not so combined, is “courage alone” and is ranked fourth here at c8-d1 and at 630c-d. That the virtue of justice consists of such a combination implies that the just person has appropriately tempered and balanced the opposing dispositions of aggression (raw courage) and restraint (raw ‘moderation’—see note on 630a7-b2, 661d8-e1). Thus justice arises from solving the problem articulated in Book II of the *Republic*: how to balance in the city’s guardians the requisite but opposing tendencies of ferocity and gentleness (375a2-d1). The account of justice presented in *Republic* IV is explicitly identified as solving the balancing problem (441e8-442a2), with the ferocious tendency being gentled by means of “harmony and rhythm” (442a2), which will loom large in the educational program set forth by the Athenian in Book II (a passing reference to the issue may be at V 731b-d). In the *Statesman* as well, the statesman’s task (analogous to that of the legislator in *Laws*) is to balance and interweave in the citizens the opposing tendencies of “courage” and “moderation” in the citizens. While in that dialogue true belief provides the proper direction, here is it wisdom (*nous* or *phronesis*), although the Athenian seems willing to allow later on in the present contest that in some contexts true belief can do the job of wisdom (632c5) See also note on 630c5-6. [check Melissa Lane on *Stsm.*]

631c8-d1 “fourth would be courage”

Courage alone, as it figures as the fourth good, is the ingredient added to wisdom and moderation in the recipe for justice, the third good. It is the disposition praised by Tyrtaeus construed by the Athenian as daring devoid of wisdom (see notes on 630a7-b2, 661a8-e1). On how wisdom “leads” courage, see note on 631c5-6.

(631d1-632d7) *Legislating with a view to Divine and Human Goods*

The theory of divine and human goods just articulated (631b-631d) is to inform the practice of the proper legislator, who will instruct the citizens in this scheme of values (631d), and monitor their compliance, using the laws to commend “what is fine and what is not” (632b1) in their emotional responses to each other and to the vicissitudes of life (631e-632b) and in their financial dealings with each other (632b). After describing the “finishing touches” to such a legislative project (632c), the Athenian invites Clinias and Megillus to explain how the laws of their cities are structured according to these principles (632d).

631d2-4 “...the lawgiver must order (*takteen*) them thus as well.... [*H*]e must inform the citizens that his other directives to them have these goods in view”

The theory of divine and human goods just articulated informs the practice of the proper legislator in two ways. First of all, the legislator will design institutions that reflect the greater importance of cultivating citizen’s virtues over their acquisition of e.g. wealth. Second, and more prominent in the Athenian’s discussion here, the legislator will instruct the citizens in this scheme of values (631d1-6), and will shape their emotional responses accordingly (631d7-632c3). Thus the citizens raised under good laws (cf. 625a5) will be able to recognize the hierarchy of goods that informs the lawgiver’s legislative decisions (as the Athenian will claim at 632d; see note on 632d4-6.) On the importance on this instruction, and the way it is embodied in the laws, see Bobonich 2002: 97-118.

631d5-6 “the human goods directed at (*[blepein] eis*) the divine, and the divine ones directed at intelligence (*nous*) their leader”

That the human goods are “directed at” the divine is a function of their dependence on the divine goods (see note on 631b6-8); that the divine are “directed” at intelligence is a function of the role of wisdom in the moderation and justice. See note on 631c5-6. The present passage confirms that “intelligence”

(*nous*) here stands for wisdom (*phronêsis*), the first of the divine goods enumerated at 631c.

The expression '*blepein eis*' (d3-4, literally "look towards", here rendered "directed at") recalls the language '*blepein pros*' that identifies the goal or focus of legislation at 625e, 626a, 628a, 630c-e; cf. 632e6. The Athenian indicates that he takes the latter to be interchangeable with "for the sake of X (*heneka or charin*)" at 628c, 628d-e, 631a. Thus we may understand the legislator to be instructing the citizens that the human goods are to be pursued "for the sake of" the divine. To use or pursue wealth for the sake of the divine goods is to regulate one's pursuit and use of it via the standards of wisdom, justice, moderation, and courage. This is to limit one's pursuit or use of a "human good" by the standards of the virtues. Plato uses '*heneka*' in a similarly limiting sense at *Gorgias* 506c9 where pleasure is to be pursued "for the sake of" (*heneka*) the good, rather than vice versa (similarly, *Republic* 403b4-c2, Aristotle *EN* 1102a24; for discussion, see Meyer 2011: 56).

631e2-3 *"he must take care to mete out honour and censure correctly"*

That the laws apportion honour and censure, in connection with the proper ranking of goods, is developed at greater length at the end of book III, 696d-697c; cf. 711c, 862d; that the citizens must give honour accordingly: 726a-728a. In the present context, meting out honour and its opposite involves praising and blaming (632a2-3) and indicating what is "fine" (*kalon*) and not (632b1; cf 635a, 655d-656a). These are not legally mandated rewards and sanctions, but rather the expression of praise and blame in the laws themselves (as 632a2-3 makes explicit). Here as at 632b6-7 he anticipates the methodological point of Book IV that the laws will instruct and persuade citizens (by teaching them), shaping their motivations, not just giving them orders backed up by threatened penalties. Cf. 631e2-3 & note ad loc. See note on 632b7-8.

631d6-e2 *"When the citizens join together in marriage, when they beget and raise children ... and as they mature and reach old age"*

The private and familial lives of the citizens will be the legislator's concern, as well as their financial dealings with each other (632b1-c1) and their burial rites (632c1-3). Note the omission of the military contexts that Kleinias and Tyrtæus have claimed to be the most important, except for the oblique reference to war on the list of misfortunes into which one might fall (632a6); on this see note on 632d4. Legislation concerning military matters is outlined in Book VIII.

631e4-632a1 *“the citizens’ pains, pleasures, desires and the general intensity of their passions”*

The legislator’s concern is not simply with the citizens’ behaviour, but with their emotional responses and desires. It will later become explicit, in the account of education (643a2-644b5, 653a5-c4) that the legislator’s goal is not just to evaluate these affective responses but to train them, and that such training inculcates the virtues (see 647c-d), which are the “divine goods” invoked in the present context. The responses in question include anger, fear, and their opposites invoked below at 632a3-b1. They are responses to the gain and loss of the human goods (see note on 632a3-7). On the centrality of pleasure and pain to the legislator’s concerns (a prominent theme in Book II), see also 636d4-e3 and the notes on 644c7-d7 and on 649d4-7. On emotional responses as pleasures and pains, see note on 633c9-d2.

632a3-7 *“As for feelings of anger and fear (orgais te kai phobois) that disturb the soul as a result of misfortune, and the relief from these in good fortune...”*

These are further instances of the citizens’ “pleasures and pains” that the legislator is to scrutinize and evaluate (631e4-632a1). They are presented here as responses to the loss (or gain) of the “human goods”. Anger and fear are pain at misfortunes in the human goods, e.g. loss of wealth (a5-6). Their opposites are presumably joy in (anticipation) of the possession of these goods. (See, for example, 649d6-7, where the human goods, wealth, health, and strength are said to “make us drunk with pleasure”.) Their presentation here as “disturbances” and relief from disturbance (632a2-632b1) fit the account of pain and pleasure as disruption and restoration in *Philebus* 31d-32b. See Frede 2011: 118, 124-6. Fear and its opposite will be discussed in detail at 644c9-d and 646e3 ff. It is linked to judgment about misfortune at 647e1-4.

632a7 *“the sorts of feelings (pathêmata)”*

While *pathêma* (here in the plural; *pathêmata*) is not a general term for feeling or emotion, and could mean simply “occurrence” (thus England, followed by Des Places) or something that happens to one, it is used here as a general term to capture the *orgai* and *phoboi* (literally, “angers and fears”) at 632a3. Thus Schöpsdau, Lisi, Brisson/Pradeau translate.

632a7-b1 *“he must define and teach what is fine (kalon) and what is not in each person’s condition (diathesis)”*

This is what he does by “using the laws as instruments of ... praise and blame” (a2-3); the close connection between praising and calling something fine is made explicit in Book II (655d-656b). “Condition” (*diathesis*, used interchangeably with ‘hexis’ at 791b and 792d; cf. *Philebus* 11d, 32e, *Tim.* 42d2) could mean either the occurrent condition of the soul (its current level of agitation or serenity), or a more settled disposition. Aristotle, by contrast, will reserve *diathesis* for the occurrent state and *hexis* for the settled disposition (*Catg.* 8; *EN* II 5). The Stoics will restrict *diathesis* to the latter – a usage that is reflected in the pseudo-platonic *Definitions* 411d.

632b2-3 “*the lawgiver must guard (phulattein) the ways the citizens acquire and dispose of property...*”

The Athenian here uses the military language of standing guard (*phulattein*), originally invoked by Clinias, to apply instead to the activities of peacetime; see note on 626a8-b1. The present context uses that vocabulary to describe vigilance on behalf of the norms of justice. In contrast to the preceding lines, there is no mention of citizens’ pleasures and pains. This would make sense if courage and moderation (the focus of the ensuing discussion in Book I) are the primary domain for assessing pleasures and pains.

632b7-8 “*those who are receptive (eupeitheis) to the laws and.... those who prove difficult to persuade (duspeitheis)*”

A recurring theme in laws is that the citizens must be “receptive to” or (more literally) “easily persuaded by” the laws (*eupeitheis tois nomois*) (708c-d, 715c, 801e, 880a, 890c; cf. 718c), or “willing” (*hekontes*) subjects to the laws (663b-c, 700a, 701b; see note on 663b4-6. That those who are not “persuaded” by the laws are to be punished reflects the coercive aspect that must be joined with the persuasive aspect of the law (IV, 711c, 718b, 722b-c). On what such persuasion amounts to, see Bobonich 2002: 97-106, Laks 2005: 129-150, and Annas 2011, and note on 629a2.

632c1 “*puts the finishing touches on his constitution...*”

Literally “when he reaches the end (*telos*) of the entire constitution ...”—a pun on the root *telos*, which occurs in *teleutêsantôn* 632c2 (translated “those who have died”; more literally: “when they have reached their end”). The legislation regarding “burial rites and honours” (c2-3) is the first of those finishing touches. It completes the enumeration of life-cycle milestones begun at 631d6 with marriage

and the begetting of children. Legislation about marriage is detailed in Book IV 721a-d, VI 771e-776b, 779e-785a, about childbearing and rearing in Book VII 788c-795d, about education in Book VII 795d-806d, 808d-822d, and about burial rites in Book XII 958d-960b. The second “finishing touch” will be the appointment of “guards” for the laws (c4).

632c4 *“he will station guards (phulakas epistêsei) to watch over them”*

This military language recalls Clinias’ original invocation of guards (*phulakeis*) on the watch for enemy attack (625e-626a). While Clinias notes the role laws will play in standing guard (*phulattein*) (see note on 626a8-b1), the Athenian here points to the necessity of guarding the laws themselves. That the laws require constant oversight and vigilance is a recurring theme later in *Laws*: see 769c-770a, and the office of “guardians of the laws” (*nomophulakeis*) will be one of the most important in the constitutional legislation in Book V (752e-755b; cf. 961a-c); see Meyer 2006, 380-1; parallel language to the present passage is used at 759e2 for such *nomophulakeis*.

632c5 *“some of them with wisdom (phronêsis), others proceeding via correct opinion”*

653a7 presents both *phronesis* and “stable correct opinion” as rare achievements. Presumably the members of the “nocturnal council” outlined in Book XII 961a-b; 964e ff aspire to wisdom, but it is not made clear who else will have (or lack) it. The Athenian regularly insists in book III, that *phronêsis* is a characteristic of the city (e.g. 693c-e), without specifying which citizens will possess it, or what distinguishes it from correct opinion. Perhaps his self-deprecating comment at 859c classifies his own legislative competence into the latter category. On true belief as a substitute for wisdom see *Stsm.* 309c -- a more optimistic assessment of true opinion than *Rep.* V 477b-480a. See also *Tim.* 51d. Compare the distinction between “expert” and “trained” legislative experience at 632d5-6 and see note ad loc.

632c6-7 *“intelligence (nous) will bind all this together to follow moderation and justice, rather than wealth and ambition”*

As at 631d5-6, ‘*nous*’ is used as a substitute for ‘*phronêsis*’ (wisdom), which is here reaffirmed in its role as “leader” of the divine goods (cf. 631c5). The “moderation and justice” in whose service it binds the legislation are the “complete justice” that is the focus of the proper legislator (630c-e). Courage, the single virtue of concern to Tyrtaeus, and the focus of Dorian legislation, is not

even mentioned. Instead, wealth and “ambition” (*philotimia*: literally: love of honour) stand in for the goals of the state as conceived of by Clinias, Megillus, and Tyrtaeus (see notes on 626b3-4 and 631c4-5). On *philotimia* as characteristic of militaristic constitutions like Sparta, see *Rep.* 545a-b. On the connection between love of honour and love of wealth see *Rep.* 548a-b; *Phaedo* 68c, 82c.

632d2-4 “*how all this is present in the laws attributed to Zeus and to Pythian Apollo ...*”

“All this” (*panta tauta* – d4) is a vague way of referring to the burden of the Athenian’s speech at 631b-632c: that laws should comply with and communicate the relative priority of the divine and human goods. Alternatively, “all this” (*panta tauta*) might refer to the specific categories and features of legislation enumerated in that speech: family life, property and contract law, funeral law. But the point at issue is not whether the Dorian laws regulate these matters, but whether about they respect the priority of relative priority of divine and human goods (see 628e, 630d-631a).

632d4-5 “*that they adhere to a certain order ...*”

England takes the “order” (*taxis*) to express a distinctively philosophical understanding of law. But there is no mention of philosophy in the present context (and barely any at all in the dialogue as a whole: 857c, 967c; but cf. Zuckert 2009___). The order in question is more likely the relative priority of divine and human goods invoked at 631d1-2, which one might naturally describe as a structure or order (*taxis*); indeed, the Athenian explicitly uses language to that effect: ‘*taktai*’ and ‘*takton*’ in d1-2. The Athenian’s intended point is that the Dorian laws and institutions “adhere to a certain order” (with Plato vaguely referring to that body of legislation in the neuter plural, as he did at c6, forgetting his use of the masculine *nomoi* for this purpose in d3). Alternatively, if we read *panta tauta* on the construal rejected in the note on 632d2-4 (as referring to the specific categories of legislation enumerated in 631b-632c), the point alleged to be clear (*diadêla*) would be that these categories exemplify the structure of divine and human goods. On either alternative, the Athenian’s point is the same, even if the formulation is infelicitous.

632d5 “*clear to those experienced about laws...*”

The adjective “experienced” (*empeiros*, 632d5) here has positive connotations (as at III 692b and V 741d-e), as does the cognate noun *empeiria* in II 659d3-

4(see note ad loc). This non-pejorative use of the adjective is widespread in Plato: *Gorg.* 448b, 465d; *Protag.* 341a, *Meno* 89e, *Hipp. Min.* 367d; *Rep.* 527a, 533a; *Parm.* 133b; *Stsm.* 277e, 291c; *Tht.* 179e, 206b. It contrasts with Plato's regularly pejorative use of the cognate noun, *empeiria*, to mark a "knack" (*tribê*) as distinct from genuine knowledge (*Laws XI* 938a; *Gorgias* 462c, 463b; *Phaedrus* 260e, 270b, *Philebus* 55e, *Republic.* 493b). See Muller (apud Schöps).

632d5-6 "whether through skill (*technê(i)*) or through being trained (*tini ethesin*)"

Skill (*technê*) allows the legislator to discern the order of goods expressed in the laws, while "training" (*ethos*, *alt.*: "habituation"; see note on 655d7-e1) is the way the citizens raised under those laws will learn to recognize that order in them—as in the case of Clinias' "well trained (*eu gegumnasthai*) understanding of the focus of Cretan norms" at 626b5-6). On lawgiving as a skill (*technê*) see Book IV 709b-d (presumably related to the *techne* of politics at 650b). In the present context, the Athenian has just explained that the proper lawgiver (later to be described as "experienced in legislating" (*nomothesias empeiroi*, III 692b3-4) frames laws with a view to the doctrine of divine and human goods, and that one of his goals is to communicate this understanding to the citizens. In particular, he is to ingrain it into their patterns of emotional response (see note on 631e3-632a1). Thus it is intelligible for the Athenian to claim here that the citizens' experience of the laws allows them to identify the norms implicit in those laws. Indeed, his main point in the long exposition to which the present comment is the peroration is that both parties to the legislative enterprise (lawgivers and the citizens for whom they legislate) must recognize the order of goods that structures that legislation. England proposes that skill and training characterize the two types of law-guardians distinguished at 631c5. This is not incompatible with the present interpretation, which has the advantage of connecting the distinction to the main concerns of 631b-632d.

632d6 "but is in no way evident to the rest of us"

Schöpsdau and England construe as ironic the Athenian's inclusion of himself in the "rest of us". But while the actual structuring principle of the Dorian laws is no doubt evident to the Athenian, as it is to Clinias and Megillus, the principle thus evident is not the doctrine of divine and human goods (but a perversion of that ordering, ranking courage as the greatest good). The Athenian here perseveres in the polite fiction that the Dorian laws exemplify the highest legislative standards, as befitting their hypothesized divine origin (630d9-e1), and that the fault lies simply with those who fail to recognize these standards as structuring those laws. The intended irony is that it is "evident" to none of the interlocutors, including those with trained under Dorian laws, that those laws exemplify the

order of divine and human goods.

III

Institutions to Cultivate Courage and Moderation

632d8-643a1

Having established that the goal of correct legislation is to inculcate complete virtue (630d-632c), the Athenian now invites his interlocutors to identify the Dorian institutions that train citizens in this expanded range of virtue (632d-e). The discussion begins with courage, conceived of initially as resistance to pain and fear (632e-633c), then expanded to include “resistance to pleasures” (633c-d)—the latter eventually to be classified under the domain of moderation (see note on 635e_). While Megillus has no difficulty enumerating a range of Spartan institutions aimed at cultivating resistance to pains (633a-c) both he and Clinias are at a loss to name any that cultivate resistance to pleasures (634a-c). After an interlude about how best to conduct the delicate business of criticizing the laws or institutions of one’s own, or another’s, city (634c-635a), the Athenian insists, against Megillus’ objections, that exposure to the greatest pleasures is crucial to the process of cultivating moderation (635b-637b). In particular, he makes the provocative proposal that drinking parties, condemned by Megillus as occasions for excessive indulgence (636e-637b), in fact provide enormous social benefits (637b-e). As a prelude to identifying these benefits—which he will eventually alleged to be the sought-after resistance to pleasures (649a ff.)—the Athenian first expounds the proper methodology for adjudicating disputes about the value of particular institutions or practices (638a-641a3).

Fighting against pleasures and pains

In treating virtue as a matter of victory in a fight against pleasures and pains (633d), the Athenian is appealing the conception of virtue as self mastery that is endorsed by Clinias at 626e and that will be modelled in the figure of the divine puppets at 644b-645c. On whether this model is one the Athenian endorses, see notes on 626e2-3 and 643a2-646e2. On the nature of the pains and pleasures to be resisted or fought against, see notes on 633c9-d2, 633e1-2, and 634a6-8.

632d8-e2 “we need to go back to our starting point (*archê*),... and ... go through the ... kinds of virtue”

A reiteration of the agenda announced at 630e3-631a2: start with virtue (*aretê*), and organize the categories of legislation according to the relevant kinds (*eidê*). Here the Athenian makes explicit a point implicit in the former passage: that the relevant “kinds” are the different virtues: courage, moderation, etc. See note on 630e3-631a2

632e3-4 “the first case... can serve as a model for our treatment of the others”

The first case will be courage, treated as resistance to pains. It serves as a paradigm for the treatment of moderation, construed analogously as resistance to pleasures (634b, 635e-636c; see note on 635e5-6). On a the different paradigm for virtue that will dominate the discussion in later books, see notes on 626e2-3, 643a2-646e2.

632e4-5 “*plenty of discussion (diamuthologountes) to lighten our journey (paramuthia ... tês hodou)*”

A reiteration of the original proposal (625b6-7) that a conversation about laws will lighten the burden (*paramuthein*) of the long journey. Here the root *muth-* in *paramuthia* is repeated in *diamuthologeîn* (express in speech), making a pun on the double sense of *paramuthia* as both verbal exhortation and (derivatively) an alleviation. It is by filling up the time with talk that their journey will be made less onerous. The relevant notion of *muthos* (story) invoked here (and at 752a1) need not indicate that the content of the discussion will be fanciful, but rather that its participants have leisure to “spin out the tale” at considerable length (as at Rep. 376d9; cf. Rep. 501e4). See Schöpsdau ad loc. For a contrary view, see Brisson ____).

632e5-6 “After treating virtue in its entirety (*aretês pasês*)

This, rather than the narrow courage extolled by Tyrtaeus, is the focus of proper legislation (630b-c). See note on 630b2-3.

632e5-6 “After treating virtue in its entirety (*aretês pasês*), we will make it clear that the matters we were just now discussing are directed towards it [sc.

virtue in its entirety]—provided the god is willing”.

“Virtue in its entirety” (*aretês pasês*), in contrast to the narrow courage extolled by Tyrtaeus, is the focus of proper legislation (see note on 630b2-3). The “matters we were just now discussing” are the regulations (631d2 ff) that govern citizens’ personal lives, private property, financial transactions, etc. These, referred to in summary at 632c6 as “all this” (*panta tauta*) are supposed to “follow moderation and justice” (632c6-7), which are the elements of “virtue in its entirety” overlooked by Tyrtaeus (630b-c). Thus Schöpsdau. But this does not mean that it is only the very general divisions of laws that are here invoked. It is also, as England claims, the specific instances of those laws that the Dorian legislators have ordained – and hence the specific Cretan institutions enumerated at 625d ff, and the Spartan ones about to be canvassed at 633a-d. To show that these constitutions are in fact aimed at virtue in its entirety, is to show that they “adhere to [the] certain order” invoked at 632d4-5 (see notes on 632d5-6). Of course this aspiration will be unfulfilled, as the ensuing discussion will identify no Spartan or Cretan institutions that cultivate moderation, and indeed some that undermine it (636a-c)—hence the ironic proviso, “*provided the god is willing (e6)*,” whose implication that establishing the relevant claim is not easy, would make less sense if the claim concerned only the general categories of institutions enumerated at 631d-632c.

633a1-2 “let our admirer of Zeus here be the first one you set out to examine”

Megillus acknowledges the Athenian’s control of the discussion. In putting forward Clinias (who credits Zeus with the origin of Cretan laws and institutions at 624a) to bear the burden of the Athenian’s questioning, Megillus shows that characteristic Spartan endurance does not extend to verbal engagements. He does, however, step forward to answer the Athenian’s question at 633b-c.

633a3-4 “our discussion (*logos*) is a group effort (*koinos*)”

Alt: “our discussion is a communal enterprise.” Compare 629a4. The motif of a communal undertaking (*koinônia*) will be important in the Athenian’s later discussion of drinking parties (see note on 639c1).

Courage as Resistance to Pains

633a4 “So tell me (*legete*)... your common meals and regime of physical training”

The Athenian addresses his question to both Clinias and Megillus (2nd person plural), and the two institutions he mentions are common to both Sparta and to cities on Crete (cf. 625c6-8). Megillus will answer first, and will cite specifically Spartan institutions (633a-c), thus balancing the earlier focus (625d-626b) on specifically Cretan norms.

633a8 “for the parts (*peri tôn ...merôn*) of the rest of virtue (*tês allês aretês*)”

See 632e. Courage, moderation, justice, are described as “parts” (*mere*) of virtue (630e1, 631a5, 705d8; cf. 709e9, 936b4) or “kinds” (*eidê*) 630e3-631a2 (see note ad loc). On the Athenian’s lack of interest in the precise terminology of “parts”, see note on 630b2-3.

633b2 “*the hunt*”

On the importance of hunting in Spartan society see Vidal-Naquet (1981), Anderson (1985), David (1993).

633b8 “*raids that regularly involve a severe beating*”

A ritual in which Spartan youth were supposed to “steal as many cheeses as possible” while others were supposed apprehend and whip them (Xenophon, *Lac.* 2.9; Plutarch, *Life of Aristides* 17.10; Isocrates *Panathenaicus* 211). See Kennell 1995: 79-82, David 1993: 394-5.

633b9 “secret service (*krupteia*)”

On the Spartan practice, see Plutarch, *Lyc.* 28.2-3. A version of this institution will be replicated in the legislation proposed in Book VI 762e-763b. The Athenian will also commend the salutary effects of going barefoot and sleeping rough (942d).

633c4 “*naked games (gumnopaidiais)*”

These were not athletic but cultural competitions between choruses of male citizens (Athenaeus XIV-XV). Competitions between choruses at religious festivals was a familiar feature of life in Plato’s day: see *Laws* II 657d, 665e.

Cultural competitions (fully clothed) will be prevalent in the city of the Magnesians (VIII, 828c-d).

(633c8-634c4) Courage as a fight against pleasures and pains

The Athenian here expands the conception of courage, originally construed as endurance of pains (633a-c), to include “resistance to pleasures” and he challenges his interlocutors to identify Dorian institutions that cultivate the latter sort of resistance. Eventually the discipline of resisting pleasures will be classified under moderation rather than courage (635c7-d8, 636e4-b5). The Athenian’s introduction of it here, under the rubric of courage, predisposes his interlocutors to endorse it as an excellence, since they readily see the importance of resisting pleasures that would distract one from the pursuit of military objectives.

633c9-d2 “[Is courage] *quite simply a battle (diamachê) against fears and pains alone... [o]r ... also against yearnings (pothous) and pleasures...?*”

Courage, on this expanded conception, involves fighting against two sorts of opponents: “pains and fears” on the one hand and “yearnings and pleasures” on the other (cf. *Laches* 191d-e). Elsewhere, the two kinds of challenge are more economically described as “pains” and “pleasures”—most notably when these are identified as “two opposing advisors” at 644c and as “two springs” from which we much draw wisely (636d-e), but also here at 633e-634b. Sometimes pain’s side of the contrast is expanded to include fears (635b-d, 647a), or pain is replaced with fear (647c, 648b-e); at other times pleasure’s side is expanded to include appetite (*epithumia*), passion (*erôs*) (647c-d; cf. 631e-632a, 643c, 643e), daring (*tharros*, 644c-d) or yearnings (*pothous*), as in the present passage.

An ambiguity in ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’

What is the significance of invoking fears in addition to pains, and in addition to pleasures? One might suppose that the expanded enumeration reflects a more precise account of the motivational factors at play in the endurance or “battle” that the Athenian has in mind—for example: that pain and pleasure are pleasant and painful experiences—e.g. painful experiences such as the ones Megillus lists at 633b-c (receiving a beating, being cold and hungry, suffering in the heat), and pleasant experiences such as the “entertainments” he mentions at 635b5 and those available from the purveyors of illicit pleasures mentioned at 635d)—while ‘fear’ and ‘yearning’ are affective responses in the agent to the prospect of such experiences (fear acting as in impulse to flee pain, and yearning or appetite an

impulse to pursue pleasure). But this would be a mistake, for ‘pleasures’ and ‘pains’, in the Athenian’s use, range over both sides of this contrast.

At 636d4-7 he will claim that “pleasures and pains ... both in cities and in individual characters” constitute the “whole subject” of legislative study (636d4-7). What he understands by pleasures and pains “in cities” may well be pleasant and painful experiences of the sort Megillus has in mind at 633b and 636e-637a; however, those “in individual characters” presumably include affective responses. The latter are what he has in mind at 631e-631a when he describes the legislator’s concern with the citizens’ “pains, pleasures, desires, and ... passions,” in which he evidently includes “feelings of anger and fear that disturb the soul” (631e-632a); the latter are classified as “pains of the soul” at *Philebus* ____.) Indeed, in the account of *paideia* at the beginning of Book II, he uses “pleasure and pain” as a general term for affective response, covering for example such things as love (*philia*) and hate (*misos*) (653a-b; cf _____ [citation from Book II notes]).

Thus ‘Pleasure’ and ‘pain’ are ambiguous in the Athenian’s usage between [A] pleasant and painful experiences of the sort that Megillus has in mind, and [B] affective states (desires, fears, and other emotions) that may have [A] as their intentional objects. The pleasures and pains that one “battles” against in the struggle for self mastery described here must be those of type [B]; see notes on 633e1-2 and 634a6-8. (On a further ambiguity concerning fear and pleasure, see notes on 647c3-4 and 648b7-8).

633d3 “*melt the resolve (thumous)*”

Note the similar use of the term ‘*glukuthumias*’ (translated “susceptibility to pleasure”) at 635c8, which shares the root for *thumos* (here used in the plural). In the *Republic* *thumos* invokes the toughness and ferocity of the warrior who is neither deterred by the pains he faces nor distracted by the prospect of pleasures (*Rep* 375a-b, 410d). The Athenian thus presents self control in the face of pleasures—which he will eventually classify as moderation (*sôphrosunê*) see note on 635e5-6—within the domain of the military values that his interlocutors endorse.

633d5 “*our previous discussion... spoke of a city being “worsted by itself”, and likewise a man*”

The notion of individual self mastery is originally discussed at 626d-e, and it is applied, with some awkwardness, to the case of a city at 627a-c. While Clinias proposes it as the highest achievement (626e), the Athenian criticizes the ideal at 628c-e.

633e1-2 “a person worsted (*hêttô*) by pleasures” ... “worsted by pains”

On being “worsted by pleasures or pains” cf. *Protagoras* 352d-353a, where the vanquishing force is more fully characterized as anger, pleasure, pain, passion (*erôs*), or fear (352b). At 635d1 the Athenian replaces the present locution “worsted by pains” with “worsted by fears”. Both there and in the present context (633d5-6) the Athenian is referring back to the condition that Clinias described as being “worsted by oneself” (626e3-4).

While the Athenian uses ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ ambiguously—to refer both to [A] pleasant and painful experiences such as sexual indulgence and bodily discomfort and to [B] pleasant and painful affective states that may have [A] as their intentional objects (see note on 633c9-d2)—the pleasures and pains that defeat a person must be those of type [B]. The sort of scenario Megillus describes at 633b-c under the heading “endurance of pain”, might be one in which a person is actually experiencing a pain of type [A], and at the same time a pain of type [B]: an affective response to flee the situation. But it might equally be one in which the [A]-pain is only in prospect (the enemy is advancing with gleaming swords, but one is as yet unscathed...) and the only pain the agent experiences is of type [B] (his fear and desire to flee). Thus it is strictly speaking, pains of type [B] that one struggles against, and that defeat one when one loses the battle. Similarly, cases of being worsted by pleasures need not be ones in which one is actually engaging in an [A]-pleasure. All that is needed is that one experience a pleasure of type [B]: an affective pleasure at the prospect of, or desire to engage in, that [A]-pleasure. To be precise where the Athenian is not, one would have to say that it is strictly speaking pleasures and pains of type [B] that a person struggles against and is “worsted” by, not pleasant and painful experiences of type [A]. Indeed, in the case of [A]-pleasures, the battle has already been lost when the agent actually experiences them. And even in cases where the conflicted agent is struggling to endure an [A]-pain, the battle is lost only if he flees that experience, and this is the work of the [B]-pain he feels. Thus only [B]-pleasures and -pains can function as the sorts of forces that one struggles against in the contest for self-mastery; see further note on 634a6-8. This is the sort of struggle modeled in the figure of the divine puppets at 644c-645c.

634a1 “the Pythian lawgiver”

Apollo, credited with the origin of Spartan laws at 624a.

634a2 “*courage lame in one foot*”

An unflattering allusion to the poet Tyrtaeus (who is “interrogated” at 629b-630d). Pausanias in the 2nd century AD reports a story that Tyrtaeus was a dimwitted Athenian school teacher “lame in one foot” sent by Athens to Sparta in grudging compliance to an oracle requiring an Athenian advisor be sent there (4.15.6 line 10). On “lame” courage, see also note on 634b4.

634a6-8 “*practices (epitêdeumata) ... that partake (geuesthai) of pleasures rather than flee them— just as where pains are concerned they don’t avoid them but thrust a person into their midst...*”

“Partaking (*geuesthai*) of pleasures” (more literally, “tasting pleasures”) is presumably intended to be analogous to the “endurance (*karteria*) of pains” that Megillus cited at 633b6; cf. “enduring in the face of pleasures” at 635d3. But “partaking of pleasures” hardly sounds like a feat of endurance or resistance— which the Athenian needs it to be, if it is to count as a “battle against pleasures” analogous to the “battle against pains” at 633d1-2. Nor would it be plausible of him to claim that one needs to partake of certain pleasures (e.g. those of adulterous sex) in order to develop resistance to their appeal (cf. 636c5-7). The Athenian’s point can be made both precise and plausible by distinguishing between the different senses of ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ that he employs ambiguously (see note on 633c9-d2). Cases of self-mastery (and self-defeat) where pleasure is the opponent are ones in which a person faces a situation in which inappropriate [A]-pleasures (e.g. adulterous sex) are available to the person and he experiences a [B]-pleasure that urges him to indulge in those [A]-pleasures. Self-mastery involves “defeating” or “subjugating” (*kratein* 634b1) the [B]-pleasure, i.e. “enduring” its pull without acting on it. Thus it is the [B] pleasures, not the [A] pleasures, that one must have experience “tasting” or “partaking” (*geuesthai*, 634a7) if one is to develop such self-mastery. So the legislator needs to devise institutions that expose citizens to the situations that provoke those [B] pleasures. Such training by exposure is described more fully at 647c-649d; see notes on 647c3-4, 647c8-10

634a9 “*compulsion and persuasion by honours*”

The honours would include those meted out by the lawgiver at 632b, and would include the praises delivered by the laws at 632a. On the interplay between compulsion and honours in training, see 648b8-c5 and note ad loc. Once again, as at 632b the dual coercive and persuasive aspects of the law are foreshadowed (see II 660a, 661c, 670c-d IV. 711c, 718b, 722b-c). See note on 629a2.

634b4 “the same people”

The same people must be “courageous” both in the face of pleasures and in the face of pains; otherwise they will have the “courage lame in one foot” (634a2). This would be either the so-called “courage” that is not combined by moderation (criticized as “fourth place” at 630c9) or “moderation” unmixed with “courage” (as at 681b; see notes on 630a7-b2).

634b4-5 “defeat the ones that they should (*ha dei*)”

The qualification “that they should” (*ha dei*, b4) indicates that not all pleasures and pains should be resisted, anticipating 636 d-e where pleasure and pains are “two springs” from which one must draw intelligently; cf. 646e-647b, which advocates cultivating certain pains, and 643c-d, which advocated cultivating certain pleasures). On the ambiguity in the pleasures and pains to be resisted and indulged in, see general note on 633c9-d2. Identifying which pleasures and pains to resist and which to cultivate is the job for wisdom – hence the role of wisdom in properly cultivated courage and moderation at 631e and the requirement of “intelligent selection” of pleasures and pains at 636d-e.

634b5-6 “the hardest (*chalepôtaton*)” enemy

This description of pleasure invokes the previous characterization of civil war as “the hardest conflict” at 629d2 (see note ad loc) and ad II 669c1-3). As at 633e1-2, the pleasure that defeats one’s purpose from within must be of type [B], an affective response, rather than type [A], a pleasant experience that is the intentional object of the former. See note on 633e1-2.

634b8 “a large number of laws (*nomoi*) directed against pains”

Here as at 634c8 and 634d7-8, the *nomoi* need not be written statutes, but only practices and institutions (*epitêdeumata*, as at 632e1, 634a6). See general note on translation of “law” and note on 634d7-8.

(634c5-635b3) Etiquette and Credentials for Criticizing Norms

Having now exposed deficiencies in the home institutions of his Dorian interlocutors the Athenian here encourages his interlocutors not to interpret this as an expression of hostility (634c-d). Rather, he proposes, their discussion is the sort of inquiry into the value of norms that Dorian laws rightly permit only to those of their own advanced age (634d-e). The interlocutors agree to proceed with both frankness and good will (635a-b).

634c5 *“that’s not in fact surprising”*

Translation following Schöpsdau, contra England, who reads this as a tactful comment to the effect that no constitution is perfect. Both Clinias and Megillus have proved unable to identify Dorian institutions for cultivating an important part of virtue, and it is this that the Athenian says is not surprising. This suggests, at least to the dialogue’s audience, that there are no such institutions to be found in the Dorian cities, and hence that they are imperfect. The Athenian here begins to abandon the pretense that Dorian legislation is unimpeachable (630d-e, 631b), and he begins to articulate direct criticisms of those laws, although he will first adopt the pretense of simply relaying what “most people say” (634d6). Compare the direct and unmitigated criticism of Dorian educational institutions at in book II, 666e-667a.

634c7-8 *“not take it hard (chalepôs) but accept the criticism graciously (praôs) ”*

Once again the contrasting manners of engagement are *chalepos* (harshly) and *praôs* (graciously; translated ‘in a civil manner’ at 629a1-4 where a similar point is made); cf. 635b1 and note on 629a2, 629d2-3, 645a6-7. The aggression implied in *chalepôs* is connected to anger or defensiveness, hence it’s invocation in the present context.

634c9 *“it should persuade us (peisteon)”*

Persuasion is the project in “gracious” or “civil” (*praôs*) discussion, in contrast with the violent or coercive methods involved in aggressive argument (on the aggression implicit in *chalepôs*, see note on 634c8). On coercion vs. persuasion, see 634a9 and note on 629a2. Laws IV 711c, 718b, 722b-c. See note on 632b7-8.

634d5-7 “I would ... find it easier than either of you to voice what is generally said”

“What is generally said” (*ta legomena pros tôn pollôn*) is presumably what is generally said in criticism of Spartan and Cretan norms (thus Schöpsdau). The reason why the Athenian is better placed to state these criticisms is that his Dorian interlocutors have been trained from youth to reject any criticism of the laws, as he is about to note.

634d8-9 “one of your finest laws”

For consistency, ‘laws’ translates ‘*nomoi*’, although ‘norms’ would be more appropriate here, for it is unlikely that what is being reported here is a written statute (see Wilamovitz *Platon I* 661n).

634d9-e1 “what is fine (*poia kalôs ...echein*) and what is not among those arrangements”

Literally: “what is in fine condition and what is not”. *Kalôs echein* (like *kalôs keisthai* at 634e2; cf. 635b2) here recalls the expression “*orthôs echein*” (“is in correct condition”) used of laws that follow the divine and human goods at 631b5. The Athenian has characterized the subject of their present inquiry as “what is ... correct and mistaken about laws” (627d3-4).

634e1-2 “with one voice and from a single mouth everyone must sing out their agreement (*sumphônein*)”

The musical metaphor continues at 635a5, and will be given a concrete application in the institution of the three choruses in Book II (664b-665d). ‘*sumphônein*’ in the sense of “agreement” can apply to (a) interpersonal “agreement” (as in the present political context and likewise at 661d, 662b); as well as to (b) intra-personal harmony, the conception of virtue articulated in Book II on which a person’s pleasures and pains should *sumphônein* (“agree”) with their reasoned judgments (653b; cf. 689d, 696c). These two kinds of *sumphônia* are connected at 659d-e. On the differences between conceiving of virtue as “agreement” and Clinias’ conception of virtue as self-mastery, see notes on 626e2-3, 628c9-11, 643a2-646e2. On the various kinds of “agreement” see notes on 653b4-5, 659d2-3.

634e4 “an old man”

The advanced age of the interlocutors (cf. 625b, 635a) is here invoked as a credential for engaging in the critical inquiry into the laws; cf. 635e1-3. On the corrupting effects of political criticism on the young, cf. *Rep.* VII 537e-539e. On the special role for the elderly in education see *Laws* II 664e-666e.

635a5 “without striking a discordant note”

Continues the choral metaphor of 634e1-2.

635b2-3 “I won’t be speaking in criticism of your laws Rather, I express my puzzlement”

This disclaimer notwithstanding, the ensuing paragraph (635b2-d8) provides the foundation for a trenchant criticism: that failure to train citizens in the resistance to pleasures makes them “slavish”. The remarks introduced by this disclaimer can be interpreted as a “puzzle” only on the strained assumption (articulated at 630e, 632e, and soon to be reiterated at 635e) that the Dorian legislators do aim at inculcating moderation as well as courage, and hence that they do cultivate resistance to pleasures. The expression of puzzlement (*aporia*) is a common trope in Plato’s portrait of Socrates in dialogues such as *Euthyphro*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, and *Republic* I.

(635b4-e3) Cultivating resistance to pleasures requires exposure to “the greatest pleasures”

Having expanded the range of courage to include not just resistance to pains but also resistance to pleasures, the Athenian points to the necessity of practices that expose citizens to pleasures. Just as a person cannot be trained to resist pains and fears without being exposed to them, one cannot be trained to resist pleasures to which one has never been exposed (635b-d).

635b5 “recreations” (*paidiôn*)

Here and elsewhere, ‘recreation’ translates *paidia* (or its cognate verb (*paizein*)), although for stylistic or contextual reasons these are occasionally translated ‘play’ (643b-d; cf. *prospaizein* at 653e7-8) or ‘game’ (659e4-5). As in the present

context, *paidia* is closely associated with pleasure (cf. 657c3-6, 667e6-8). It plays a central role in the Athenian's account of education (*paideia*)—a cognate term, related via the root 'pais', child—(643a2-644b5, 656c2-3; cf. 657c3-4). *Paidia* is also regularly used in contrast with *spoudê* (verb: *spoudazein*), seriousness (as at 636c2, 643b6, 647d6-7, 656b3, 659e4, 667e6-8, 673e3-8, 732d6). On this persistent motif in Laws, see Jouet-Pastré 2006 and Stalley 1983: 130-31). A striking claim of Book VII is that music performed at festivals to the gods, which people normally think of as recreation (*paidia*), is in fact a most serious undertaking (*spoudê*) 803a-804c. The kind of 'recreation' that is about to become the focus of the present context is the drinking party (labeled *paidia* at 664b4-5, 671e5-6). The Athenian will argue, over the course of Books I and II, that this is an important institution of education (*paideia*) (641b-d, 653a), and thus must be treated as a serious matter (*spoudê*) rather than mere *paidia* (673e3-8).

635c1-2 *"hardships, fears and pains that are unavoidable (anankaious)"*

Alt: "... and pains that are compelling" (see note on 648d7-e1). Most likely these are the pains involved in battle. '*Anankaious*' conveys not only necessity but force and violence – the latter being consistently associated with military contexts. Both senses may be active in the present passage, while the latter predominates in its use at 648d7-e1, where it is translated "compulsive". See note ad loc.

[note that the fears and pains that are not unavoidable in the sense that one cannot avoid feeling them in those situations; rather that certain situations that are naturally fear provoking (fearful situations) are unavoidable; one can train not to experience feelings of fear in such situations. The terms 'fear' and 'pains' as used here are ambiguous between such fear- and distress-provoking situations and the feelings of fear and distress that they tend to provoke; see notes on 633e1-2, 647c3-4 and 648b7.

635c6-8 *"they will be unpracticed at enduring (karterein) pleasures and refusing to be compelled (anankazesthai) into shameful action"*

Here the scope of the improper action into which one might be led by the prospect of pleasures is of broad scope – not just failures in a military context (as implied at 633d) but any "shameful" action one might perform because of the prospect of pleasure – hence its classification under moderation). On "enduring" pleasures, see note on 634a6-8.

635c8-d1 “weakness (*glukuthumias*) in the face of pleasures”

Glukuthumia is used here to stand in for the analogue, in the case of pleasures, of being “worsted by fears” (635d1); thus it invokes what Clinias has identified as the central and worst case of being “worsted by oneself” (633e3-6). On the connection with “*thumos*” (spirit, resolve) see note on 633d3.

635d1 “worsted (*hêttomenous*) by fears”

This invokes the notion of self-mastery and self-defeat originally introduced at 626e and brought up again at 633d. Here “fears” stands in for “pains” in the formulation at 633e1-2 (see note ad loc). On the relation between fear and pain see note on 633c9-d2.

635d1-4 “they will be enslaved to men who are able to endure in the face of pleasures and also extremely accomplished in them... utterly bad people”

On enduring in the face of pleasures (*katerein en tais hedonais*, d1), see note on 634a6-8. The “utterly bad people” (d4) may be purveyors of illicit pleasures. The Athenian’s point is that lack of self control in the pursuit of pleasures puts one at the mercy of those who control access to those pleasures (as in the figure of the besotted lover sleeping on doorsteps (*Symp.* 203d, *Phdr.* 252a-b; cf. Epictetus *Diss* IV.1), just as failure to cultivate resistance to the pains and fears of battle may lead to capture and enslavement by the foes you meet in battle. In any case, the sort of enslavement and defeat of primary interest to the Athenian here is not at the hands of another person, but by one’s own pleasures, pains, desires, and fears—on which see 633e1-2 and note ad loc.

635d5 “slaves in one respect and free in another”

They would be “slaves” to pleasure (in the sense that they are “worsted” by their desires for pleasures) but “free” from compulsion by pains and fears (in that they are not “worsted” by the pains and fears that urge them to cowardly behaviour. The notion of freedom, introduced in this context for the first time in the dialogue, has several senses: (1) the ordinary political sense, on which it means not being a literal slave or subject (*Stsm.* 298c, *Lysis* 208b *Gorg.* 502d, *Rep.* 351d); (2) an extended, social, sense in which it contrasts with the status of the ‘*banausos*’ (mechanical worker or tradesman), and is identified as the product of *paideia* (education) in the strict sense (644a5 cf. 741e3-5; cf. *Rep.* 590c); (3) an extended psychological sense, in which it means not being “mastered” or

“worsted” by oneself (627a, 633d; cf. Phdr. 256e, Rep. 577d). See also note on 635d1-4.

635d6 *“courageous and free without qualification”*

In contrast to the “courage lame in one foot” (634a2) praised by Tyrtaeus, the courage “without qualification” invoked here is that involved in the “complete virtue” described at 631a-c. While freedom is not explicitly mentioned in that context, the Athenian here presents it as a kind of self-mastery that is involved both in courage (resistance to pains) and in moderation (resistance to pleasures). “Qualified” freedom would self mastery on one of these fronts together with self-defeat on the other.

635e1-3 *“rushing to judgment like foolish adolescents on matters requiring mature judgment”*

A comic touch, recalling the Dorian prohibition against letting young people engage in such inquiries (634d-e).

(635e4-636d4) *Institutions aimed at cultivating courage undermine moderation*

The Athenian ostensibly switches from the topic of courage to that of moderation, (although see note on 635e5-6), and invites Megillus to name Spartan institutions that cultivate the latter virtue. To the latter’s hesitant proposal that the same institutions that prepare a city for war also cultivate moderation, the Athenian responds that, on the contrary, they promote two kinds of excess that the legislator needs to guard against: a willingness to resort to force in political contexts (civil strife), and the readiness to indulge in inappropriate sexual pleasures. The implication (not drawn explicitly) is that institutions specifically designed for cultivating moderation are necessary to counterbalance the immoderate side effects of the institutions aimed at cultivating courage.

635e5-6 “discuss moderation next after courage”

The ensuing treatment of moderation indicates that resistance to pleasure, originally introduced under the rubric of courage (633c-d), is the domain of moderation (cf. “failure to master pleasures” 636c7; 647c-d). The strategy of presenting moderation as a form of courage is a device, similar to that employed

in the discussion of Tyrtaeus (see note on 628e2-630d1), to introduce a novel idea to the interlocutors in terms of values (e.g. courage) that the interlocutors already endorse.

635e6-636a1 “superior (*diapheron*) ... —as we just now found them to be in the case of war”

Note that it is superiority in war, not in courage, that the Athenian attributes to Cretan and Spartan institutions.

636a2-3 “it seems (*eoike*) that our common meals and athletic training ... achieve both effects (*pros amphoteras*)”

Megillus proposes that the same institutions that cultivate courage also cultivate moderation (*pros amphoteras*). The Athenian’s reply (636a4-d4) will reflect back both Megillus’ “it seems” (636a4) and his “*pros amphoteras*” (*anamphisbêtêtôs*, b5)), and claim that, on the contrary, the institutions that cultivate military readiness, far from cultivating moderation, in fact breed its opposite.

636a4 “What really seems hard (*eoiken dêta chalepon*)”

‘*Chalepon*’ is the opposite to ‘*rhadion*’, and responds to Megillus’ use of the latter term at 636a2, while “what really seems” (*eoiken dêta*) responds to his “it seems” (*eoiken*) in the same line. The upshot of the Athenian’s reply (on which see next note) is that the institutions mentioned by Megillus, far from cultivating moderation, in fact breed its opposite.

636a5 “are no less ambivalent (*anampisbêtêtôs homoiôs*) in practice (*ergo(i)*) than in discussion (*logo(i)*)”

A difficult phrase, in which the key term, *anampisbêtêtôs*, reflects back the language of Megillus’ proposal that Spartan institutions achieve “both effects” (*pros amphoteras*, a3; see note on 636a2-3). The core notion invoked is *amphisbêtêsis* (literally, “going (*bainein*) in both (*amphi*) directions”), used here in a sense broad enough to include both practical implementation and discussion. In the case of discussion, argument, or theory (*logos*), “going in both directions” is disagreement or dispute (as in the standard use of *ambisbêtêsis*). In the case

of practice or implementation—“*ergo(i)*,” as contrasted with “*logo(i)*”—we may understand it is a tendency to produce opposite effects, as in the analogy that the Athenian proceeds immediately to give (636a6-b1): just as any given training regimen has both good and bad effects on the body, the Spartan regimen of communal meals and physical training both benefit and harm the body politic.

The translation ‘ambivalent’ has the advantage of having a similar etymology (Latin: *ambi* + *valere*) to Plato’s Greek term, and it avoids the misleading impression that the Athenian is talking solely about disagreement – as in the translations of England, Des Places, Jowett, Pangle, and Taylor [check Bury]. To be sure, the term “*anamphisbêtêtôs*” in its typical use does mean “without dispute” or “without controversy” (as at *Laws* 684e5, 768c4, 794c2), and this does seem to be the way to understand “*anambisbêtêtôs... logo(i)*” in the present context (cf. the cognate term *amphisbêtêsimon* at 638a5-6 and 638d6, e6). But it makes obscure the intended contrast with “*anambisbêtêtôs... ergo(i)*”, since *logos* (discussion, argument, reason) is the medium of dispute or controversy. (England thus proposes to understand it as dissatisfaction with the results.) Saunders’ use of “trouble free” for *anamphisbêtêtôs* is preferable in this respect, as it nicely reflects the Athenian’s concern with devising institutions that are free from unwelcome side-effects, and similarly for Schöpsdau’s ‘*tadellos*’ (irreproachable), although neither captures the connection with Megillus’ *amphoterias*.

636a7 “hardly a single regimen (*epitedeuma*)”

The emphasis on the “single” suggests that the problem is to be solved by multiple practices (*epitêdeumata*, here translated ‘regimen’), which severally correct for the undesirable effects of each other. To counter the effects of vigorous military training that makes citizens eager to fight, and hence runs the risk of that they will fight with each other where there is no external foe, another set of practices is necessary to cultivate good relations among the citizens. The Athenian will propose that the institution of the *sumposion* (drinking party) achieves this effect (640c-d, 671e-672a).

636b2-4 “the danger of faction (*stasis*), as illustrated by the youth of Miletus, Boeotia, and Thurii”

Faction is first mentioned at 628b2. The cities of Miletus and Thurii, along with Thebes, in the region called Boeotia, were famous in Plato’s day for their civil strife (for citations see Schöpsdau and England). The Athenian proposes that the youth in these cities were subject to vigorous military training, which made them eager for a fight, but had no counterbalancing education about how to get

along with their fellow citizens.

636b4-6 “... seem also to have corrupted the sexual pleasures that are natural for both humans and beasts...”

See also VIII 838e-839b. For similar negative evaluations of homosexual activity (as distinct from homoerotic attraction) see *Phaedrus* 253d-256e, *Republic* III 402d-403c. For discussion see Dover ____ and Nussbaum _____. The Athenian’s broader point here is that, contra the Cretan and Spartan self-conception as very restrained and moderate in the face of pleasures, their societies are, at least in this respect, self-indulgent. Indeed, the very institutions that Megillus has proposed as cultivators of self-restraint in fact cultivate self-indulgence.

636b7-c2 “One might criticize your cities in particular for this, along with any others that put such great emphasis on bodily exercises”

The link between bodily exercises (*gymnasia*) and sexual temptation is more evident in Plato’s Greek. *Gymnasia* are typically exercises for which one strips naked (hence the root *gymnos*, naked) – paradigmatically, wrestling with a partner. All the wrestlers would be male, and the common meals (*sussitia*) were also all-male affairs. A good example of the sexual innuendo surrounding the gymnasium is at the opening of Plato’s *Charmides* 153d-155d; cf. *Symposium* 217c).

636c5-7 “[the pleasure] of male for male or of female for female is unnatural, one of the greatest outrages resulting from failure to master one’s pleasures (*akrateia hedonês*)”

“Outrage” (*tolmêma*; alt: brazenness) foreshadows the notion of *tharros*, here used (as at 649c8-d2; cf. 650a2-4) to refer to the impulse to pursue inappropriate gratifications. The locution *akrateia hedonês* (“failure to master one’s pleasures”) is used instead of (*hêttasthai tôn hêdonôn*) “being worsted by pleasures”, used to describe the struggle for self-mastery at 633e1-2. As at 633e1-2 (see note) the pleasures that one struggles are presumably not [A] those involved in homoerotic activity, but [B] desires to engage in that activity.

636c8 “Ganymede”

The mythical boy cupbearer to the Olympian gods, abducted by Zeus. See Plato *Phaedrus* 255c. The Athenian charges the Cretans with the homoerotic element in the story, which is absent, e.g. from the version in Homer. See Schöpsdau ad loc.

636d2-4 *“they saddle him with this tale in order to be following the god even when enjoying this particular pleasure”*

An cynical perspective on the stories of the ‘divine origin’ of the laws introduced at 624a1-5.

(636d5-637c3) *Happiness depends on intelligent selection of pleasures and pains*

From his preceding criticism of Dorian societies for indulging in what he castigates as inappropriate sexual pleasures (636b-d), the Athenian draws a general moral that legislation’s chief concern is pleasures and pains: these are “two springs” from which one must draw intelligently in order to live a happy life (636d-e). This in a brief but memorable metaphor implies an important qualification to the simple “resistance model” for virtue that has informed the discussion since 633b. The challenge we face as human beings is more complicated than simply resisting pleasures and pains: we must to select intelligently which pleasures to resist and which to indulge in, and similarly which pains to endure and which to avoid. When Megillus proposes that drinking parties are an instance of the sort of indulgence to be avoided (637a-b), the Athenian comes to the defense of the practice (637b-c), thus introducing the issue that will structure the rest of Books I and II.

636d5-7 *“virtually the whole topic of legislative inquiry: pleasures and pains—both in cities and in individual characters (idiois êthesin)”*

This is a prescriptive point about how the interlocutors are to conduct their own inquiry (recalling the description of the proper legislator’s attention to citizens pleasures and pains at 631e-632a), not a description of the practice of actual legislators. The pleasures and pains in “individual characters” (d7) are presumably those already mentioned at 631e-632a as the legislator’s concern; those “in cities” would indicate the sorts of pleasant activities that are allowed (or forbidden) to citizens, and the sorts of pain or hardship they would be required or expected to endure (e.g. in military service). On this range in the reference of the terms, see note on 633c9-d2. On the role of pleasures and pains in motivation

see also 644c, 663b, 732e-733d.

636d7-8 *“These two springs flow freely by nature (metheintai phusei)”*

Alternatively: “these two springs flow naturally without restraint”. The point is that we are naturally disposed to follow the one and shun the other, so restraint in that pursuit/avoidance must come from some other source. *Metheintai* foreshadows the related *aneintai* (“practiced without restraint”) and *anesis* (“lack of restraint”) in 637c1-2.

636d8-e1 *“the right one at the right time and to the right extent”*

This recalls the “doctrine of due measure” at *Statesman* 283c-284e (later made famous by Aristotle in *EN* II 6 1106a26-b28). cf. 638c5-8. Figuring out what is the right time, extent, etc. for pleasures and pains will be a job for reason (logismos, 644d1-3) – hence the inopportune selection is “unintelligent” (*anepistemonôs*) at 636e2.

636e1 *“lives a happy life (eudaimonei)”*

On happiness (*eudaimonia*) as the legislator’s concern, see 628d5, 631b5 and note ad loc. Here we are told that citizens’ happiness (i.e., well being) depends on how well they select which pleasures to indulge in (or forgo) and which pains to endure (or avoid). Compare 631e-632a where the legislator, who provides happiness to the citizens (631b), scrutinizes the pleasures and pains that are involved in their emotional responses. See note on 636d4-7. On happiness as well being, see note on 628d5.

The pleasures of drinking parties

636e4 *“What you say is right, ... I suppose”*

More literally: these things are finely said, in a way (*kalôs pôs*).” The expression *kalôs legein* typically means to be correct or right, without invoking the ethical or aesthetic dimensions of the term *kalon* (see note on 646d1).

636e6-7 “the lawgiver for the Spartans is right to command us to avoid pleasures”

Literally, “flee from (*pheugein*) pleasures,” as at 635b-d. The blanket command to avoid pleasure violates the doctrine of due measure just articulated by the Athenian (636d8-e3) that the right pleasures, at the right times, etc. are to be allowed by the legislator.

637a5-6 “drinking parties (*sumposia*) and all they involve”

The *sumposion* (pl. *sumposia*, root of the English ‘symposium’) was a venerable institution in Athens and other non-Dorian Greek states: an after-dinner ritual in which drinkers reclining on couches sing songs and partake of entertainment ranging from exotic dancers and prostitutes to more refined conversation. See Plato, *Protagoras* 347c-d and *Symposium* 176b-e for a description of the range of possible entertainments, as well as Xenophon, *Symposium* 2.1-23. Drinking to the point of drunkenness was an essential feature of the event, as the Athenian emphasizes at 637d5-6. (Many features of the modern Jewish Passover seder derive from the Greek symposium. In the Hellenized world, including the land of the Israelites, the symposium was the epitome of leisured and free entertainment among the ruling class.)

637b2 “even if he has the festival of Dionysus as his excuse”

Dionysus is the god of wine and his festivals in the Greek world typically involved communal drunkenness. See Burkert 1985: 161-7 and Seaford 2006. Even Spartan colonists in the city of Tarentum engaged in the practice, Megillus notes at 637b3-5 – hardly evidence, as England notes *ad loc*, for Megillus’ earlier contention (636a2-3) that Spartan austerity inculcates resistance to such temptations. In book II the Athenian will shock his interlocutors by claiming that old men such as themselves should sing and dance in honour of Dionysus (665b3-6).

637b7-8 “when practiced with some endurance (*karterêseis*)... when practiced without restraint (*aneintai*)”.

Endurance (*karteria*) is recurring motif throughout the *Laws*, especially as a response to pains: 633b, 727c6, 836e1, 840b8, 918d1, 942d5, 955d1. Here, as at 635d3 the endurance is in the face of pleasures (cf. the “fight against ...pleasures” 633d1-2: see note on 634a6-8).

Saunders' translation, "in men with a certain strength of character" wrongly implies that the endurance is a trait of the participants' character. The Athenian will soon make it clear, in the case of drinking parties (647c-d) that such strength of character may result from engaging in a properly "restrained" form of such activity, where the restraint exercised on the occasion is due to the leader or conductor of the activity. At 639d-e the Athenian will concede that the drinking parties whose results Megillus has observed lack the appropriate restraint.

637c2-3 *"lack of restraint (anesis) on your women at home"*

'Lack of restraint' (*anesis*) picks up on *aneintai* in "when practiced with abandon (*aneintai*)" in the previous line (c1). The charge of license is elaborated by the Athenian in Book VII, 806c: the Spartan men are tightly regulated by the legislator, while the women are free to indulge in luxury (cf. also *Rep.* 548b1-2). Aristotle elaborates on the charge, with language echoing this passage, in *Politics* 1269b13-1270a15. In the cross-cultural tit-for-tat envisaged here by the Athenian, a hypothetical Athenian criticized for the abandon (*anesis*) of his own city's drinking practices responds by pointing out lack of restraint in certain Spartan practices as well. There is no reason to suppose that it is specifically the sexual mores of Spartan women that are invoked here (as in Saunder's translation "the easy virtue of your women"). On Spartan women see Pomeroy (2002) and Millender (1999).

(637c3-639a1) Principles for Evaluating Practices

Having identified conflicting norms in Sparta and Athens on the regulation of drinking and the regulation of women's activities (637a-c) the Athenian here canvasses a variety of different approaches one might take when assessing the merits of practices or institutions. The first, dismissed out of hand, is a variety of cultural relativism: there are simply differing cultural practices and none of them is incorrect (637c-d). The second appeals to the previously discredited military ethic already: the norms of the society that prevails in war are best (638a-b). Athenian here rejects it on empirical grounds, and also rejects the criterion of popularity (638d). He proposes instead that the evaluation must take into account the proper context and conduct of the practice (638c-d, 639a).

637c6 *"the stranger (xenos) who is shocked at the unfamiliar practices he observes..."*

Since 636a, the Athenian and Megillus have each been playing the part of the foreigner affronted by alien customs and unreflectively partial to those of his

home: the Athenian in his repugnance at Dorian homosexual practices (636b4-d4), and at the freedom accorded to Spartan women (637c2-3); the Spartan in his chauvinism for his own city's asceticism (636e8-637a2) and contempt for drunkenness in rituals and institutions of Athens and other cities (637b2-5).

637c7-8 “this is our custom (*nomos*) here and no doubt you do things differently where you come from”

This is the all-purpose method for diffusing criticism introduced at 637c4 as the “single answer”; it echoes the 5th century view that law or convention (*nomos*) has no basis in reality (*phusei*); for an especially clear articulation of such a view, see Plato, *Gorgias* 482c-484c. The Athenian makes it clear here that the joint project of the dialogue, an inquiry into the merits of different laws, rejects this simple relativism.

637d2 “*excellence and deficiency in their lawgivers*”

More literally: “excellence (aretê) and badness (kakia) in...” ‘[a]retê,’ translated “virtue” above (630b-631a, 632e-633a), here indicates accomplishment in the discipline of the legislator; at 627e4 it indicates the excellence of a judge.

637e2-3 “*While your people, as you say, abstain completely, the Scythians... take their wine unmixed (akratô(i))...*”

It is from drunkenness, not wine drinking, that Megillus has said the Spartans abstain (637a). Greeks of Plato's day drank their wine diluted with water even at drinking parties. Some of the most beautiful relics of the material culture of the era are the mixing bowls (*kratêres*) whose sole purpose was for this mixing. Drinking “unmixed” wine was considered uncivilized, and would lead more readily to inebriation.

637e5 “*a fine (kalon) and happy (eudaimon) practice*”

“happy” here, while not idiomatic in contemporary English, indicates either that the practice conduces to the good life, or is an element or expression of such a good life. On happiness as having a good life, see note on 628d5. The conjunction here of the adjective *kalon* (fine) with ‘happy’ shows the close connection between the notions of the fine and the good, also evident at 641b8-c1. See note ad loc and on 630c7

638a1-2 *“we put all these peoples to flight”*

Megillus here reverts to Clinias’ original proposal that military success is criterion of legislative excellence (626b7-c2), notwithstanding the Athenian’s exposition of the deficiencies of that standard at (627c-628d).

638a4 *“that tell us nothing” (atekmartoi)”*

Translation following Ast, with Brisson/Pradeau. Alternatively one might render *atekmartoi* as “inexplicable” or “mysterious” (Saunders, des Places, England, Schöpsdau, Lisi), but the Athenian’s point is that such cases provide no evidence or proof (*tekmêrion*) of the superiority of the victorious people’s institutions.

638b1-3 *“Syracusans subjugated the Locrians, whose laws were thought to be the best in that region, and the Athenians... the Ceians”*

The Syracusans under Dionysus II conquered the Locrians in 352 BCE. In praise of Locrian laws, see Plato, *Timaeus* 20a, Aristotle Pol. 1274a23. The Caens attempted to secede from the Athenian naval confederacy in 364 BCE, but were forcibly brought back into the alliance. For details see Schöpsdau ad loc and Gehrke 76 ff.

638c5 *cheese*

Reading ‘*turous*’ (cheese) for the MSS’ ‘*purous*’ (wheat). Thus Saunders 1972, England, Lisi, and Brisson/Pradeau but not des Places or Schöpsdau. The Hippocratic corpus contains a similar example involving cheese (*On Ancient Medicine* 20.18).

638c7-8 *“how and to whom it is served, with what accompaniments, and in what condition, and the condition of the person who eats it”*

These would be specific instances of the variables mentioned in the doctrine of due measure at 636d8-e3 (see note ad loc).

638d4-5 *“some of us thinking the large number on our side settles the matter”*

It is not obvious that any party to the present discussion has invoked this consideration (as for example it is clearly invoked at *Gorgias* 471e and criticized there and at *Laches* 184d-e). Although the Athenian has just pointed out the large number of societies with wine-drinking practices different from the Dorians' (637d6-e8), he has not concluded from this that their practices are superior, although he will do so in a joking manner at 638e5-6.

(639a2-641a3) *Goals and Leadership of a properly conducted drinking party.*

Applying the general principles of evaluation articulated above at 638c-d, the Athenian proposes that a properly conducted drinking party must have a sober leader. While the order of exposition in this passage is not straightforward, the general line of argument is as follows: A collective undertaking – whether it be a sea voyage, a military campaign, or a drinking party – requires a leader if it is to have any chance of achieving anything good (639a-c, 640a); thus to find fault with a leaderless or ill-led collective enterprise is pointless for those investigating the merits of social practices (639a, 639c, 640d-641a). The drinking parties criticized by Megillus (and indeed all those in the Athenian's experience) fall into the ill-led category (639d-e). To appreciate the benefits that might come from a drinking party, therefore, one must consider what it can achieve under proper leadership. In developing this point, the Athenian indicates, without fanfare, that the goal of such an enterprise is to increase the bonds of civic friendship among the drinkers (640c-d).

639a9 *“Now, is someone a ship's captain (archôn) of ships as long as ...”*

Picking up on the importance of having good masters in the example of goat-keeping (639a2-7), the Athenian now turns to the criteria for good leadership, switching the example from animal husbandry to navigation and warfare. The two criteria are identified here (639a9-b11) and will be applied to the leadership of a drinking party at 640a8-d9: (1) knowledge of how to conduct the enterprise at hand (e.g. navigation or military strategy for the ship's captain or the general); (2) immunity to the naturally occurring disturbances that are occupational hazards in the enterprise (e.g. seasickness in a naval voyage, fear in a military campaign).

639b5 *“leader of an army”*

The term translated 'leader' here and at 639c-d (*archôn*) is rendered by 'master'

above in 639a-b in the case of goats and ‘captain’ in the case of ships.

639c1 “*group activity (koinônia)*”

The term (also translated ‘gathering at 639c9, 639d1-2), is used interchangeably with *sunousia* and *sunodos* (social gathering, assembly) from 639c1-d10, with no difference in meaning. Its range, encompasses many forms of concerted or collective activities (as stressed at 640a4-5); thus it applies equally to the collective enterprise (sailors on a ship or soldiers on a military campaign) that the Athenian has just been discussing and that his interlocutors have fresh in their minds (639a9-b11). The point to which the Athenian is here leading, but which he has not yet asserted, is that drinking parties, just like the military and naval undertakings of which his interlocutors approve, are in the general category of collective action for a purpose.

639d2-3 “*drinking companions are one of the many kinds of gathering (koinōnnia) and a drinking party (sumposion), one kind of group activity (sunousia)*”

Here the Athenian makes the crucial move of subsuming drinking parties under the general principle about group activities just articulated at c1-6; see note on 640c10-d1.

639d9-e1 “*practically none that I have seen or heard was properly conducted*”

The Athenian here concedes the criticism Megillus leveled at the symposia he has observed at 637b.

640a8-9 “*we were just saying that a leader of warriors has to be courageous*”

At 639b. Courage is here understood in the sense of fearlessness in battle. At 646e-649d courage will be presented as a kind of fearlessness, and moderation a kind of fearfulness.

640b7-8 “*one who in peacetime will lead a gathering of friends joined together in mutual goodwill (philophrosunê)*”

The link between peace and *philophrosunê* is repeated here from 628c10-11, where these, rather than war and conflict, are identified as the ultimate focus of the legislator. The Athenian here presents the symposium as an institution for achieving the social goals of the legislator – a point reiterated more emphatically at 640c9-d2.

640c1-2 “not without disturbances (*athorubos*)”

Athorubos refers back to the use of the verb *thorubein* “disturb” (at 640a12 and b3) to characterize the fears that the military commander must be without. The (as yet unspecified) disturbances that characterize a drinking party (cf. 671a5) are presented as analogous to the fears that assail the soldier in battle. In the present context, the ‘disturbance’ is implied to be drunkenness, given the requirement that the leader be “sober” at 640d4. Later in Book I, it will be further specified as a tendency to disruptive or unrestrained behaviour (649a-b; 671a-b).

640c10-dc “for his job is to safeguard the existing friendly relations among the participants and ... strengthen them for the future

More literally: “for he is the guard (*phulax*) of...”. In contrast to the sort of guarding that Clinias identified as central to the goals of the Dorian state (see note on 626a8-b1, the Athenian here talks about “guarding” peaceful relations of friendship (*philia*) among citizens. He thus implies that a properly led drinking party furthers this civic goal. On friendship as a civic goal, see Book III.

640d4-5 “we must set up as ruler over our drinkers a leader who is sober”

Cf. the leadership of the drinkers in Plato’s *Symposium* (177a-d). Socrates is the only sober participant (223c-d).

640d6 “or by a young and inexperienced leader”

“Inexpert” renders “*mê sophon*”. As at 640c9-10, the Athenian applies the two desiderata for leadership articulated at 639a9-b11 (see note on 639a9)—this time invoking the requirement of knowledge.

(641a4 -643a1) Drinking parties claimed to benefit education

Having granted at 640d-e that a collective undertaking is beneficial only when properly led, Clinias now asks, with some impatience, what benefits a city could possibly derive from drinking parties, even if they are conducted by competent leaders (641a-b). The Athenian answers that the benefit concerns education (paideia) (641b-d). He warns that a full defense of this claim will require a rather lengthy detour on the topic of education (641d-642b), but his interlocutors declare (with uncharacteristic prolixity of their own) that they willing to hear him out in a speech of any length (642b-643a).

641b1-2 “a properly led (*paidagôgêthentos*) drinking party”

“led” renders the passive form of the verb *paidagôgein* (from which the term ‘pedagogy’ derives), and thus might also be translated ‘instructed’, or ‘trained’, as it is at 641b3 in the Athenian’s reply. But it is also a general term for leadership or guidance, which is how Clinias deploys it here. The educational connotations of the term, and the use of it here in the passive voice, switches the focus from the activity of the leader (leading, instructing) to the effects on those led – and hence to the notion of *paideia* (education), as a cultivated disposition in a person, which is the topic to which the Athenian now turns.

641b3-4 “a single pupil (*pais*) or chorus that is properly trained (*paidagogethentos*)”

The Athenian’s reply uses the same verb, *paidagôgein*, that Clinias used in his question (b1-2), and singles out from its compound elements ‘*pais*’ (child, or in this case pupil). Choral performance will turn out to play an important role in education, as Book II makes clear (653c-654a).

641b6-7 “what benefits a city receives from educating people (*paideian tôn paideuthentôn*)”

Here the Athenian switches the verb from *paidagogein* (lead, train, guide) used by Clinias (see note on 641b1-2) to the related *paideuein* (educate) and the cognate noun *paideia* (education), thus completing the transition to the topic of education, which he will indicate is next on his agenda (642a5-7).

641b8-c1 “those who are properly educated become good (*agathoi*) men, and as a result do finely in all things”

That is, education cultivates the virtues enumerated at 631c-d. A more idiomatic translation of *prattoien kalôs* (“do finely”) would be “do well” or “succeed” (thus Des Places, Lisi, Saunders, Schöpsdau); the sense of the expression here is indistinguishable from that of “doing one’s best” (*arista prattein*) in 628d5, which is used to stand in for “being happy” (*eudaimonein*). See note ad loc. As at 637e5 and 667c6-7, doing finely and being happy (doing well) are very closely connected; see notes ad loc and on 630c7. Brisson/Pradeau’s translation (“they conduct themselves as they should”) is too narrow to capture the success encompassed by the term, which extends to victory in war, which the Athenian is about to include on the list of beneficial effects of education.

641c1-3 *“In particular, they defeat their enemies in battle! Education, you see, delivers victory...”*

Education here includes the military training that cultivates resistance to the pains and fears of battle (cf. 647b3-7), and hence can be credited with military success. Of course, the Athenian recognizes that even the courageous are sometimes defeated in battle, as for example when they are outnumbered (638a-b). He is speaking here “generally” (*holôs*, 641b6).

641c3-4 *“although victory sometimes undermines education. For many are made insolent by their victories in war...”*

Insolence (*hubris*), a form of shamelessness (*anaideia* 647a10), will be identified as the fault that training in the virtue of moderation (*sôphrosunê*) wards off (647a-b, 649a-e). *Hubris* that can be induced by the possession of goods, such as wealth (649d) and these can be gained by military conquest (“all the goods of the vanquished go to the victors” (626b).

641c6 “Cadmean victory”

Like a ‘Pyrrhic victory’, a Cadmean victory sows the seeds of its own undoing. Cadmus is the legendary founder of the city of Thebes who slew a dragon and then planted its teeth in the ground, from which twelve armed warriors sprang up. See Saunders 1972.

641d7-8 *“... , if I am simply to say how things seem to me”*

The Athenian's epistemic reticence is repeated at 641e2-3, and 643a2-4 even as he assumes explicit leadership in the conversation.

641e2-4 "you striving to grasp my position (*ton logon*), and me doing what I can to present it clearly ..."

Here all pretense that the three interlocutors are on an equal footing in the conversation is abandoned (see note on 625a7). The Athenian takes charge of the conversation, from here to the end of the dialogue. See also 643a2-4.

641e4-5 "our city" i.e., Athens.

On the association of Athens with intellectual acuity, see 626d, 641e. The Athenian here appeals to stereotypical intellectual characteristics of the cities of the three interlocutors.

642a4 "music"

'*Mousikê*' encompasses music in the strict sense (instrumental and vocal), along with poetry, and literature quite generally. The two traditional divisions of *paideia* (education) are "music" and "athletics" or physical training (*gumnastikê*) (672e-673a, 764c, 795d; cf. *Rep.* 376e, 441e).

The good will of the interlocutors

642b4 "proxenos" (plural, *proxenoi*)

A *proxenos* represented in his own city the interests of a foreign state (rather like a modern consul, except that a *proxenos* is not a citizen of the city he represents). The character Megillus in *Laws* may have been modeled on the Megillus who led a delegation of Spartan peace envoys to Athens during the Peloponnesian war (circa 407-10 BCE), and was probably a *proxenos* of Athens. Nothing else is known of this Megillus (See Nails pp. 197-8, Dusanic ____).

642c2-3 "treated us badly" (*ou kalôs ...errexe*)

A Spartan locution.

642c3-5 “From hearing this and from always defending you against those casting aspersions on your city, I developed a broad feeling of goodwill towards you.”

An instance of the kind of training (*ethizesthai*) that shapes feelings of pleasure and pain in the account of education (*paideia*) that opens Book II (653a).

642c8 “without compulsion”

Megillius here prefigures the Athenian’s emphasis on persuasion (as opposed to compulsion (*ananke*) as the essential mode of education. The point (at least as it is developed by the Athenian) is not that the Athenians, unlike e.g. the Dorians, are free to become bad (thus England ad loc), but that their education uses gentle and persuasive means rather than forcible and violent ones.

642d1-4 “don’t be shy... feel free”

Both phrases translate “*tharrôn*” – verbal form of *tharros* (daring, confidence), which figures prominently in the Dorian ideal of courage that will be one of the main elements of the moral psychology introduced at 644c9-d3 and whose negative and antisocial side the Athenian will develop at 647a ff.

642d5 “divinely good man (*anêr theios*)”

A typically Spartan Locution. It attributes not literal divinity but superlative excellence, as in the address to Tyrtæus at 629b9.

642d5 “Epiminedes”

Epimenides of Cnossos, legendary wonderworker and prophet from the archaic age of Crete (see Morrow p. 18;), fabled to have visited Athens during the time of Solon (Plutarch, *Life of Solon*), that is, in the late 7th/early 6th century BCE. Clinias’ claim that Epimenides was in Athens “ten years before the Persian wars began” (d6-7), would put that visit to Athens circa 500 BCE, nearly one hundred years later than our other sources report. If Plato’s Athenian audience could be expected to notice the discrepancy in dates, he is portraying Clinias as grossly ignorant of Athenian history. Cf. 677d7-8, where the Athenian jokes to Clinias

that Epimenides is “your friend... of practically yesterday”. For discussion of the historical evidence, see Schöpsdau ad loc; Dusanic ____.

642e4 “my ancestors formed ties of hospitality (*exenôthesan*) with you”

The verb *exenôthesan* contains the root ‘*xenos*’ (Stranger – ubiquitous as a form of address between the interlocutors; see note ____). Strictly speaking, the ties Clinias mentions were between families, not cities. So it is between the families of Epimenides and the family of the Athenian. One might note that Solon, the celebrated Athenian lawgiver at the time of Epimenides’ visit (Plutarch, *Life of Solon*) is Plato’s own ancestor (DL, *Life of Plato*).

IV

Education, Virtue, and Self-Mastery

(643a2-646e2)

Having claimed that the value of drinking parties is educational, the Athenian turns now to give a preliminary account of education (643b4-644b5). It is the process of training the “pleasures and desires” (643c7-8) of citizens towards the virtues of citizenship (643e). Next he provides a psychological analysis of self-mastery and self-defeat in the memorable image of the divine puppets: we are moved the “iron strings” or pleasure, pain, and their “anticipations” as well as by the “golden cord” of reason; self mastery is to be understood as the victory of the golden over the iron cords (644b-645c). As the first step in his explanation of the educational benefits of drinking parties, he claims that drunkenness, while it temporarily lessens self-mastery, ultimately yields an important benefit (645c-646e), later to be identified as the cultivation of moderation (646e-650b).

Two paradigms for virtue

The account of education presented here implies a conception of virtue that is significantly different from the self-mastery that is praised by Clinias at 626e and has served as a paradigm for virtue in the discussion of courage and moderation from 632e-636c. On the self-mastery model, pleasures and pains are forces that the virtuous person struggles against and overcomes; thus internal conflict and struggle are an inevitable feature of virtuous experience. The account of education presented at 643b4-644b5, however, in allowing that pleasures and pains can be trained, and therefore properly directed, implies a conception of virtue that does not involve internal struggle against opposing inclination (see note on 643d1-2). Rather, the best condition a person can achieve is one in

which all one's internal motivations are harmonious, and directed towards the activities required by justice. Such a conception of virtue is easy to infer from the Athenian's earlier argument that peace, not victory in war, is the greatest good (627d-628d), although the Athenian stops short of drawing it there (see note on 628c9-11). At the beginning of Book II, he will explicitly articulate such a conception of virtue as "agreement" (sumphōnia) between pleasures and pains on the one hand, and reason on the other (653a-b) and later in Book I, when explaining how drunkenness can be used to train citizens in moderation, he will quietly deploy this conception of virtue in his construal of the goal of such training (see notes on 647b9-c1, 648c2-3). However, he does not explicitly renounce the "conflict" model espoused by Clinias. Indeed, the Athenian will continue to invoke it episodically over the rest of Book I, most notably in the psychology articulated at 644b-645c, where he explicitly invokes self-mastery (victory in such internal conflict) as the paradigm for virtue, illustrated in the figure of the divine puppets (see note on 644b6-7), and he will invoke both models in his concluding discussion of drinking parties as a training ground for moderation (see note on 646e3-650b10).

In continuing to appeal to a paradigm for virtue that he has discredited, but that his opponents accept, the Athenian is pursuing a tactic similar to that involved in his earlier discussion of Tyrtaeus, where, even though he has renounced victory in battle as the ultimate good, he argues for the importance of "virtue as a whole" by appealing to the notion of "victory" in the "greatest battle" (see note on 628e2-630d1). In both cases, the Athenian appeals to normative assumptions that his interlocutors endorse in order to lead them to conclusions that they are not initially inclined to accept.

The distinction and complicated transition between these two paradigms for virtue in Laws I-II tends to be overlooked by commentators. Stalley 1983: 50-53, 58, 62 correctly notes the competing models and observes that Book I concentrates on the conflict model and Book II on the "agreement" model (but he does not note the extent to which the "agreement" model is advanced in Book I later than 628d). The two conceptions of moderation identified in Bobonich 2002: 289-90 concern a different distinction (whether the resistance to pleasures is guided by wisdom) and Bobonich himself finds the Athenian endorsing a conception of virtue on which residual conflict with recalcitrant desires is inevitable (Bobonich 2002: 289, 350, 546n122). Similarly Belfiore 1986: 428-433 takes the Laws, in contrast to Republic, to allow that virtue necessarily involves a struggle against conflicting desires; cf. North 1966: 189. By contrast, Laks 2005: 47; 2000: 277_, Jouët-Pastré 2006: 42, Frede 2011: 117, Annas 1999: 144 and Wilburn 2013 interpret the self-mastery involved in the puppet analogy as an expression of the "agreement" model. See note on 644e5-645a3.

643a4 *“as a first step in our argument (logos)”*

i.e., the argument that drinking parties benefit education (641c8-d9), to which a definition of education has been identified as a necessary preliminary (642a1-b2).

643a7 *“the god that is its destination”*

The phrase invokes the journey that the three travelers are making to the cave of Zeus, to characterize the general conversation about laws that they are undertaking along the way (625a-b); the destination of the former here stands in for that of the latter. By contrast, des Places, Saunders, Taylor, England, Schöpsdau Lisi and Brisson/Pradeau take the god in question to be the god of wine (Dionysus). However, Dionysus has not been invoked in the immediate context.

643a8 *“if it pleases you”*

After the Athenian has just placed the route of the discussion in the context of the sacred journey to the god (643a7), Clinias’s good-natured response misses the point. It is not that it pleases the Athenian that makes it the right thing to do (the Athenian picks up on this at 643d3-4), but because the discussion itself requires it (642a6). The notion that pleasure is the criterion of choice will be subject to severe criticism in Book II (657c-659e, 667b-668b). On pleasure as a motive for the conversation, see also 625a6 and note ad loc.

(643b4-644b5) Education (*paideia*) defined

*The Athenian gives a preliminary definition of education that exploits the connections between the terms for education (*paideia*) and play (*paidia*, *paizein*)—all with the same root ‘*pais*’ (child). The goal of education is to channel the pleasures and desires of a child toward the activity that will be his adult occupation, and it does so by using the child’s play to practice and rehearse the activities of that occupation, suitably scaled down for a child (643b-d). The definition is further refined to distinguish education in a more precise and restricted sense (reflected in the use of the adjective *pepaideumenos*, “cultivated” or “educated”), on which a person trained in a trade does not count as “educated”. Education in this restricted sense is training in virtue (643d-644b). On the conception of virtue thus implied, see note on 643a2-646e2.*

643b5 *“right from childhood (ek paidôn euthus)”*

The reference to childhood picks up on the use of *‘pais’* (child) at 641b3-4, where it is translated ‘pupil’ (see note ad loc).

643b6 *“playing in all seriousness”*

More literally: “both in play (*paizonta*) and in earnest (*spoudazonta*).” A deliberately paradoxical phrase, since *paizein* and *spoudazein* typically function as opposites (see note on 635b5). Children’s play is serious business, we are about to be told, because it is the earliest stage of the education (*paideia*) that cultivates their adult dispositions. On the sort of play that cultivates virtue (which will be the goal of education in the strict sense to be identified in 643d6-644b4), see note on 647d6-7.

643c7-9 *“They must try, using playful activities, to channel the children’s pleasures and desires toward what they must be when they are grown up...”*

A further definition of education will be given at the beginning of book II (653a-c), where it is said to shape a person’s “pleasures and pains” from an early age. (On “pleasures and desires” as opposed to “pleasures and pains”, see note on 633c9-d2). As to which “playful activities” cultivate these pleasures and pains, see note on 643d1 and 647d6-7.

643c9 *“correct upbringing (orthê trophê) is of the utmost importance for education (kephalaion paideias)”*

Early upbringing of a child in the home (*trophê*) would ordinarily be distinguished from the formal education (*paideia*), comprised of musical and athletic training at the hands of teachers (see Aristophanes *Clouds* 961-983; and note on 642a4; cite M. Golden, *Children and Childhood in Classical Athens*; Baltimore 1990 (JHU Press)). The Athenian’s main point here is that those earlier activities form a necessary basis for the later formal training.

643d1-2 *“since it inculcates ... a passion (erôs) for the business at which he must be accomplished (teleion)”*

Passion (*erôs*) is one of the feelings that the legislator must supervise in the citizens (“pains, pleasures, desires, and the general intensity of their passions”, 631e4-632a1). The “business at which he must be accomplished (*teleion*)” (alt: “perfect”), in the cases of interest to the Athenian, is that of an “accomplished citizen (*politên... teleon*) ... who knows how to rule and be ruled with justice” (643e5-6). The Athenian thus envisages a condition in which the well educated citizens do not feel conflicted about living up to the demands of justice, since their desires and feelings are properly directed. This is to presuppose a conception of virtue very different from the self-mastery model espoused by Clinias (626e2-3, 631a3-4); it evokes instead the harmonious internal condition of “agreement” (*sumphônia*) that the Athenian will explicitly identify as virtue in Book II, 653a-b. See note on 626e2-3 and general note on 643a2-646e2. While the Athenian does not here identify the sort of “playful” activity that will train the requisite pleasures and desires (analogous to the would-be carpenter learning to enjoy carpentry by playing with toy hammer and saw), he will indicate in Book II that it is the performance of choral music, in which citizens participate from childhood on (664b-d) and whose songs are presented as games (659d-660a).

643d2-3 *“in the excellence belonging to it”*

Translation following England (with Lisi (check), Brisson/Pradeau, and Schöpsdau), taking the difficult phrase (*tês tou pragmatos aretês*), it to qualify the scope of “accomplished” (*teleion*) in d2. The distinction in the following paragraph (643d5-644b4) between a narrow and a broader sense of ‘education’ (according to which one does not count as ‘educated’ in the narrow sense simply in virtue of vocational training) allows us to suppose that the intended qualification here is analogous: *education*, here used in the wider sense, instills in the pupil a desire to achieve whatever *excellence* (*aretê*) his intended occupation admits of; ‘*aretê*’ is used in this sense at 627e3-4 and at 637d2. In the narrower sense, captured in the translation ‘virtue’ (at 642e4, as at 630e1 and passim) the relevant excellence is restricted to accomplishment in the domain of citizenship (643e). The virtues to be inculcated in the citizens are wisdom, moderation, justice, and courage (630e-631d).

643d6 *“let’s be precise about what we are calling education”*

More literally: “let’s not leave imprecise (*aoriston*) what we are saying is education”.

643d8 “*upbringing* (trophê)”

The cognate verb *trephein* is translated ‘nurture’ at 643c.

643e3-4 “does not count these kinds of training as education, but rather the kind that, from childhood, directs a person toward virtue”

The disparagement of “mechanical” and commercial occupations is a frequent theme in Plato and his contemporaries (Plato, *Republic* 495d7-e2, Aristotle, *Politics* 1289b33, 1321a6, 1337b8-15; Xenophon, *Economics* 4.2, 6.5. The virtue (*aretê*) that education in this strict sense cultivates is the virtue of a citizen, called “complete justice” at 630c and comprising the “divine goods”: wisdom, moderation, justice, and courage” (631c-d). The Athenian will later make the stronger claim that the practice of manual crafts or retail trade are to be forbidden to citizens (VIII, 846d2-3; XI 919d4-e8) whose full-time occupation is the cultivation of virtue (VII, 806d7-807e2; VIII, 846d4-e2). ; see Meyer 2003 and 2005.

643e5-6 “*giving him an appetite and passion to become an accomplished citizen, one who knows (epistamenon) how to rule and be ruled with justice (meta dikês)*”

On appetite (*epithumia*) and passion (*erôs*) see also 631e4-632a1, 645d7. On the citizen’s knowledge (*epistamenon*, e6), see note on 644a4. Citizens “ruling and being ruled (*archein te archesthai*) with justice” would preclude the civil strife identified as the premiere evil in a city at 628a-d. The phrase also recalls the good brothers at 627e who are left to “rule themselves”, while the wicked brothers are ruled by them. For more on self-rule see note on 644b6-7. The phrase “with justice” (*meta dikes*) will be used again to define a sense of shame as “fear in conjunction with justice” (647c7-8). Used here in close proximity to “*teleon*” the phrase evokes the notion of “complete justice” (*teleian dikaiosunen*) at 630c5-6, used as a variant for “virtue in its entirety” (630e2-3; see note on 630b2-3), which is the combination of wisdom, moderation, and courage that amounts to justice (631c-d), in contrast to the narrow conception of courage touted by the Dorian apologists (630c-d).

644a3-4 “*any other skill (sophia) that does not involve intelligence (nous) and justice*” .

Skill (*sophia*) here applies both to the knowledge of the “accomplished citizen” (643e5) and to the technical knowledge of the farmer, carpenter, merchant etc.

invoked at 643b7-c6, 644e1-2. *Nous* here is used for the wisdom (phronêsis) that informs the virtues, which also involve justice (since phronêsis + moderation + courage = justice. See notes on 631c5-6 and on 631d5-6)

644a8-b1 “*education is never to be dishonoured (atimazein)*”

The long prologue at the beginning of Book V (726a-728a) indicates that to dishonour (*atimazein*) something need not involve speaking disrespectfully of it (as e.g. Callias does of philosophical education at *Gorgias* 484c-485e), but might consist simply in behaving inappropriately toward it. The Spartan and Cretan constitutions are charged with just such a disregard for education at 666e-667a, given their focus on narrowly military training.

644b1-2 “*first of the very finest things bestowed upon the best of men*”

The sense in which education is “first” is explained in the account that begins Book II, where education is described as the “first route” by which virtue enters the developing child’s soul (653a5-b2). For a similar valuation of the benefit of education (*paideia*) and upbringing (*trophê*) see *Phaedo* 107d2-5.

644b2-3 “*If it ever goes off course, and there is the possibility of correcting it*”

At the beginning of Book II, we are told that such deterioration is an inevitable effect of daily life (653c7-d5); there the preservation (*sôteria*, 653a3) of a correct childhood education is conceived of as a lifelong project of maintenance and repair. Drinking parties, the Athenian will argue in Book II, play a crucial role in this project of repair 671a2-d10.

(644b6-c3) Virtue as Self Mastery

Having just identified education as the process of making citizens good (644a8; cf. 641b8) by appropriately directing their pleasures and pains (643a-644b), the Athenian now takes the curious tack of reverting to the very different model of goodness advocated by Clinias at 626e and used as a paradigm for the discussions of courage and moderation at 633b-636c. On this paradigm, goodness consists in struggling against and defeating pleasures and pains. (On the competing paradigms for virtue, see notes on 626e2-3, 643a2-646e2.)

644b6-7 “we previously agreed that those who are able to rule themselves (*archein hautôn*) are good, while those who are unable to do so are bad”

An interestingly ambiguous statement. The Athenian evidently has in mind Clinias’ invocation of self-mastery as the greatest achievement (626e), which provided a paradigm for the treatment of courage and moderation at 633a-c. However, it is misleading of the Athenian to represent himself as having endorsed this conception of excellence; since he has objected, against Clinias, that while self-mastery is preferable to self-defeat, a far superior achievement is internal harmony, where there are no conflicting forces to be overcome (628a-d). His objection there explicitly addressed only the case of a city state, and drew no explicit conclusions about personal virtue; however, the conception of virtue presupposed in the account of education that the Athenian has just sketched (643b-644b) conforms to that paradigm of internal harmony (see notes on 628c9-11, and on 643a2-646e2).

It is worth noting, furthermore, that the expression used here, “rule themselves” (*archein hautôn*) is an odd one to employ to invoke self mastery. It has not been used in this sense previously in the dialogue. Rather, the locutions used for self mastery and self defeat have been: , “victory over oneself” (*nikân auton hauton*, 626e2), being “master of oneself” (*kreittôn hautou*, 626e8), “being worsted by oneself” (*hêttasthai auton hup’ hautou*, 626e3 or *hêttôn hautou*, e8), “lack of control (*akrateia*)” (636c7), and self-control (*enkrateia*, 645e8. The expression “ruling themselves” (*archein hautôn*), by contrast, has been used to describe the political autonomy of the good brothers in the warring family at 627e1, as contrasted with the political subjugation of the wicked brothers who are ruled (*archesthai*) by them (627e3). The expression is used again in this political sense at the end of Book II, where the inebriated participant in a *sumposion* is described as thinking himself fit to rule (*archein*) his companions as well as himself (671b5)—the self rule in that case is not self-control, but autonomy. Nowhere else is the expression used in *Laws* in the sense of self-mastery (victory over conflicting internal impulses). Nor does Plato use it to characterize internal conflict in the *Republic* (pace Bobonich 1994: 18, Dorion 2007: 135). In that dialogue, parts of the soul are described as ruling (*archein*) and being ruled (*archesthai*) by each other, or as ruling or being ruled by the person (442c-443b, 558d, 561b, 590c-d, 606d), and a person is said to rule or be ruled by other persons (579c, 590e-591a). However, the expression “rule over oneself (*heautou archên*)” where it does occur (561b4) does not mean self mastery, but rather self-rule (autonomy). And where we would expect to find the locution, as an elegant contrast with “*allôn... archein*” (579c7-8), we find instead “*heautou akratôr*”— suggesting that the most natural sense of the expression is not self-mastery. Similarly in *Protag.*, the disputed issue is whether knowledge rules (*archein*) a person, or whether instead a person can be “worsted” (*hettasthai*) by pleasures etc. (352e1) or have pleasures “master” (*kratein*) him. Only in *Gorgias* 491d, does Plato use the expression “ruling oneself” (*archein heautou*) in the

sense of self-restraint. But even there Callicles' initially puzzled reaction marks this as an extended sense of the expression, whose primary application is political (self-rule) rather than psychological (self-restraint).

Thus the Athenian's use of the expression "rule themselves" at this point in *Laws* would likely strike Plato's intended audience first in its primary, political sense. Although self-restraint is about to become the topic of conversation, the extended context preceding preceding the present text is the account of paideia, from which the topic of self-restraint has been quite absent (see general note 643a2-646e2). Indeed, the description there of the "accomplished citizen" as knowing how to "rule and be ruled (*archein te archesthai*) with justice" (643e6), which captures the political sense of self-rule, will be fresh in the reader's mind. It is in this political sense of "archein heautous" (self-rule) that the Athenian can here legitimately represent himself as having agreed that self-rule belongs to the good person, since it is the citizens who possess the virtues who engage in the collective project of ruling (*archein*) the polity. Of course it is in its extended, psychological sense of self mastery that it captures Clinias' position – to which the discussion now turns. The ambiguity might well be deliberate on Plato's part, as it allows the Athenian to appeal to the paradigm of virtue that so appeals to his interlocutors, but without endorsing it. On this tactical strategy, also deployed in the discussion of Tyrtaeus, see general note on 628e2-630d1.

644b9-c1 *"clarify further what we take it [ruling oneself] to be"*

Clarification is called for because the earlier discussion of the various types of self mastery (626e7-627d4) did not analyze the phenomenon in an individual person. Mastery of a city or of a family "by itself" was explained in terms of the better party overmastering the worse (627a7-11, c8-d1), but no attempt was made to identify the "better" and "worse" forces at war within a single person. This analysis is the task at hand (644c-d).

644c4-d6 *Pleasure, Pain, and Reason in Human Motivation*

Having just invoked self-mastery as a paradigm for goodness (644b-c—on which see note on 644b6-7), the Athenian now prepares to illuminate the internal structure of such "self mastery" by distinguishing various items within a single person. There is first of all the distinction between the "opposing advisors" pain and pleasure (644c4-8). Then there is the distinction between these and their respective "anticipations" (elpides), fear and daring (c9-d1). And finally, there is the distinction between pleasure, pains and their anticipations, on the one hand,

and, on the other hand, the “reasoning” (*logismos*) that evaluates them (d1-3).

644c4 “each of us is one person”

More literally: “each of us is himself one.” No term in the Greek corresponds to “person.” On the significance of this assumption, see note on 645a2-4.

644c6-7 “But each has inside ... two opposite and foolish (*aphrône*) advisors, which we call pleasure and pain.”

cf. *Timaeus* 69d1-4, where the phrase “foolish advisors” (*aphrone sumboulô*) is used to characterize fear and daring (*tharros*)—the adjective “foolish” (*aphrôn*) indicating that they are without wisdom (*phronêsis*) (cf. 630b7, 733e6, 734c-d). Pleasure and pain have been invoked already as forces to be resisted in courage and moderation (633a-636c) and as the general concern of the legislator (631e-632c, 636d-e). Those invoked in the preset context as internal advisors must be those “in individual characters” at 636e; they must be (or include) impulses that move a person to act. Elsewhere, the Athenian uses “pleasures and pains” as a general category (659d, 689a-b) that includes love and hate (653a-b), fear and anger (631e-632a, 645d), yearnings (633d2), desires (*epithumiai*) and passions (*erôtas*) (643c-d, 643e, 645d). So construed, the category includes both positive and negative feelings about things (e.g. grief at a loss, joy at the birth of a child) as well as impulses that direct us towards or away from certain objectives. D. Frede (2011), p. 116-117 proposes that strictly speaking it is not the pleasures and pains but their “anticipations” (*elpides*), about to be mentioned, that move a person. But that would be more plausible if the quartet was pleasure, pain, fear and desire (as at *Phaedo* 83b6-7, *Laches* 191d, *Rep.* 430a7-b1, *Symp.* 207e, *Theaetetus* 156b4-5; cf. *Laws.* 639d1-2, not (as it actually is) pleasure, pain, fear and daring (*tharros*); see note on 644c9-d1 and Meyer 2012. Desire, if it is to figure among the quartet enumerated by the Athenian, must be a kind of “pleasure or pain”, although the Athenian shows no interest in explaining in what sense it is a pleasure (or pain). On the inclusion of desire under pleasure and fear under pain, see note on 633c9-d2.

644c9 “Besides these two (*pros de toutoin*), we have opinions (*doxai*) about the future...”

Is the Athenian implying that *doxa* (opinion or belief) is not involved in the non-anticipatory pleasures and pains just mentioned? If so, it would be hard to see how, e.g., anger could be in the former category, and 645d indicates that it is—although the latter context also lists *doxa* (opinion) as on the side of reasoning in

its opposition to the “iron strings” that include these anticipations, a remark in keeping with III 689b2-3, which classifies *doxa* along with knowledge and reason (*logos*), as the natural rulers of the soul. On the possibility that some level of cognition below “*doxa*” is involved in these non-rational states (see Sassi 2008: 131; cf. Lorenz 2006: 95-110) in which case the present passage is a careless misstatement. This disarray in the evidence suggests that the Athenian is unconcerned with keeping the details of his psychological categorizing consistent, which suggests further that we are not being presented with anything that aspires to the status of a complete and consistent psychological theory.

644c9-d1 “whose general name is anticipation (*elpis*) and whose specific names are ‘fear’, which is anticipation (*elpis*) before pain, and ‘daring’ (*tharros*) before the opposite ...”

For parallel passages about “anticipation”, see *Philebus* 32b9-c5 and 39d1-5; *Timaeus* d1-4: cf. Laws 864b. While ‘*elpis*’ in many other contexts means ‘hope’ (as at *Timaeus* 69d3-4 and in the famous story of Pandora’s box in Hesiod’s *Works and Days* 60-99), the term has a well-attested more general use for anticipation or expectation, where the expected results may be either positive or negative: both hopes and fears. The Athenian here uses *elpis* in that broader sense, hence the translation ‘anticipation’. The positive expectation invoked here, however, is not hope, but *tharros* (daring). The term is often rendered ‘confidence’, but this is too weak to capture the Athenian’s point. As he will soon make explicit, he considers *tharros* to be an aggressive impulse for self assertion, even in the face of opposition or adversity (647a-d; note the cognate terms *tharraleoi* (daring) (*thraseis*) (bold) and *thrasutês* ... “audacity” at 649c-d). It thus performs some of the functions attributed to the spirited part of the soul in *Republic* (see Meyer 2012, 358-60). The adversarial context for a display of *tharros* gives a double meaning to ““daring before the opposite (*enantion*)” (644d1), since *enantion* can also be used for an opponent. See also note on 646e4.

With *tharros* construed in this way, it is tempting to suppose that with the quartet pleasure, pain, fear, and daring, the Athenian is invoking a simple psychological hedonism: pleasure and pain are objects of pursuit and avoidance, while fear and daring are the impulses that move us to avoid the one and pursue the other. However, this won’t do, since the upcoming discussion of *fear* and *tharros* (646e-647c) indicates that one variety of fear plays the role of resisting the attraction of pleasures, and that *tharros*, in a military context, involves enduring pains rather than fleeing them (see Meyer 2012, 355-8). *Tharros* is not a general kind of pleasure-seeking impulse, nor is fear a general kind of impulse for avoiding pain. Rather, each has a specific role to play in the account of training for courage and moderation that occupies the final pages of Book I (647-49), and that might be enough to account for why the Athenian

introduces them here alongside pleasures and pains. NB the distinction between pleasures and pains, on the one hand, and their “anticipations” drops out in subsequent discussions of the forces that can be opposed to reason (e.g. 653a-c, 689a-b). For further reasons to doubt the theoretical aspirations of the Athenian’s comments, see Frede 2011: 118-120. Bobonich 2002, by contrast, finds a highly developed theory (chapter 3), although not one to which the distinction between pleasures or pains and “anticipation” is central.

644d1-2 “*against all these (epi de pasi toutois)... reasoning (logismos) as to which of them is better or worse*”

“Against all these” (*epi de pasi toutois*) marks off this third set of items from the first two. The fundamental distinction of concern to the Athenian here is between *logismos* (reasoning or calculation) on the one hand, and the impulses concerning pleasure and pain on the other; these are opposing forces at work of self mastery and self defeat, he is about to claim (644d-645a). (On the nature of that opposition, see note on 644e5-645a3). Bobonich construes *logismos* as “practical deliberation” that delivers “all things considered” judgments about what is “good or bad for the person in the long run” (Bobonich 2002: 263-7 & passim ch. 3). Wilburn 2013 proposes that *logismos* (construed as the “golden cord” in the analogy of the puppets at ____) is a commitment to general principles of rational conduct. Mouracade 2005: 83-4, who defends a hedonistic interpretation of the iron strings, proposes that *logismos* here is the calculation of long-term pleasure and pain, while the iron strings pursue and avoid short term pleasures and pains. But all the Athenian says here to characterize *logismos* is that it assesses which of the pleasures pains and anticipations is “better or worse” (644d2), without giving any indication of the grounds on which that evaluation is to be made.

644d2-3 “*When this becomes the common view of a city, it is called ‘law’*”

See also 645a2, 5. The evaluative function of reasoning (see previous note on 644d1-2) reflects the role of the law in expressing a correct account of goods (631-2). The notion that law is the external manifestation of reason is a theme developed at length throughout the *Laws*, closely connected to the view that reason is a portion of the divine in us (and we approximate living by divine reason via the practice of living according to law. I 645a3-5; III 700b; IV 713e-714a; VII 799e). On reason and law as divine or holy (*hieran*), see 645a1.

644d4-6 “I am barely able to follow you here”

Exactly what the interlocutors have difficulty following is not explicit. The Athenian has enumerated (a) pleasures and pains, (b) anticipations, and (c) reasoning, and (d) he has connected the latter to law. Clinias has already assented to (a) at c8; (b) does not seem particularly arcane, and even (c) is intelligible as one of the forces at play in internal conflict. So it may only be (d) that poses the difficulty.

(644d7-645c8) *The divine puppets and internal conflict*

To illuminate the psychological forces just distinguished (644c-d), and analyse the nature of self-mastery and self defeat, as promised at 644b, the Athenian now invokes the figure of a “divine puppet” pulled by two different kinds of strings: those of reason and calculation on the one hand (“golden cords”), and those involving pleasure and pain on the other (the “iron cords”). Our task in life is to live according to the golden “pull” (645a1), and self-mastery is to be understood as the victory of that “golden pull” in its struggle against the opposing iron “pulls”. On the difference between such self-mastery and the conception of virtue implied in the account of education at 643b-644b, see note on 643a2-646e2.

644d7 “puppet” (*thauma*)

This is the image (*eikôn*) promised by the Athenian at 644c1. ‘Puppet’ renders ‘*thauma*’, literally ‘marvel’ or ‘wonder’. In calling us puppets, Frede (2011) 116 rightly points out, the Athenian is not intending to impugn our freedom (e.g. that we are controlled from without) but rather emphasizes our inner workings and amazing nature (like the marvel of a wind-up toy to a small child). The image of a human being as a puppet (*thauma*) of the gods is invoked again in book VII, 804b3. On the significance of the image see Laks 2005: 46-7.

644d8-9 “whether as ...[a] plaything (*paignion*) or for a serious purpose (*spoudê(i) tini*)”

The contrast between what is serious (*spoudaion*) and in jest or play (*paizein*) is a motif throughout the *Laws*, already invoked in book I at 643b, it is treated explicitly in book VII (803c-804b, 806d-808c). See Jouët-Pastré (2006). Humans are again called “plaything” (*paignion*) of the gods at 803c4.

644e1-2 “these experiences (*pathê*) in us are like cords or strings that pull us...”

The experiences (*pathê*) in question are those just enumerated by the Athenian at 644c6-d3; cf. *Timaeus* 69d1-4. While the term '*pathos*' (pl. *pathê*) is often translated 'feeling' its scope here is broader, including not only the pleasure, pain, and their anticipation invoked at 644c9-11, but also the reasoning or judgment (*logismos*) introduced at 644d1-2. Note that Megillus has just referred to his own incomprehension as a *pathos* at 644d6. In likening all these psychological phenomena to "cords or strings that pull us", the Athenian indicates that each of them is, or involves, an impulse that moves the agent to act (see further in note on 644e5-645a3). He does not find it necessary to explain how pleasures, pains, anticipations, and reasoning issue in such impulses, but he takes it for granted that they do; see Bobonich 2002: 541n85; for an alternative proposal, see Wilburn 2013. On the relation between these "strings" and parts of the soul, see note on 645a2-4.

644e2-4 "...toward opposing actions, across the field where virtue lies marked off from vice"

A difficult phrase, but the general idea is of a struggle is to perform a virtuous action (or to refrain from performing a vicious one) against the pull of opposing inclination.

644e4-5 "according to our account (*logos*)"

Literally: "the account (*logos*) affirms (*phêsin*)". The account (which extends through "prevail over the other kinds" at 645b1) identifies self mastery as the victory of the golden over the iron strings. The earlier discussion of self-mastery at 627a-b, which addressed only the political, not the personal case, identified it as the victory of the "better part" over the worse. Here the Athenian identifies the better party to the conflict within a person. Alternatively, one might suppose the *logos* to be the golden cord, but the Athenian has called it "*logismos*" (reasoning) not *logos*.

644e5-645a3 “these forces (*helxeôn*) ... the sacred and golden pull (*agôgên*) of reasoning... the others ... hard and iron...”

“Force” translates *helxis* (pl. *helxeis*) from the verb *helko*, to drag or pull. The Athenian uses it as a general term for all the pleasures, pains, anticipations, and reasonings that draw (*spôsin*) and drag (*antheikousin*) a person toward different actions (644e2-6). “Pull” translates *agôgê*, (alternatively: direction, leadership, guidance) at 645a1, 5, 7. The same terms (*holkê* and *agôgê*) are used to characterize education in Book II (659d2) where they invoke the shaping or guiding effect on an agent’s emotional responses. In the present context, by contrast, they invoke opposing motivational pulls in an agent who experiences conflicting motivations: the “golden” pull of *logismos*, and the “hard and iron pulls” of pleasure, pain, and the anticipations, which “pull us toward opposing actions” (644e3)—as when the iron strings pull us toward a vicious action and the golden string pulls us away; thus Bobonich 2002: 261-4.

Internal conflict and the “pull” of reasoning

Frede, by contrast, proposes that strictly speaking, only the iron strings actually pull against each other, while reasoning plays the very different role of giving them their direction and content (2011, 217-220). So too Annas 1999: 142-44, who concludes that the “self mastery” in which the golden strings are victorious over the iron strings is the condition in which a person’s pleasures, pains, desires, etc are shaped by reason, and similarly Jouët-Pastré 2006: 42. Wilburn 2013 gives an extended defense of the latter construal of self mastery, arguing that the golden cord is a general commitment to follow the rational principles that one accepts, which must be “assisted” by deliberation that applies those principles to one’s particular situation, and that only when this happens does the “golden cord” issue in a motivational “pull” toward or away from a particular action. Against this, one might note that the Athenian says that the golden cord requires “assistance” in order to defeat (*nikan*) the iron strings (645a6-b1) not in order to pull against them, as Wilburn claims (29, 31, 35). Although Wilburn rightly points out that the lack of “agreement” (*sumphônia*) invoked in Book III 689a-b does not concern cases in which an agent experiences conflicting motivation (but rather experiences motivational impulses that fail to live up to her rational commitments) (40-43), and that there are a number of objections one could raise to the conception of self-mastery articulated in the present passage, construed as involving the experience of motivational conflict (30-31), we need not suppose that the conception of self-mastery modeled here in the analogy of the puppets coincides with the conception of virtue as internal “agreement” explicitly developed in Book II. Rather, it explicitly offers to elucidate Clinias’ and Megillus’ conception of virtue as self-mastery – originally invoked at 626e. Both the Athenian and his interlocutors conceive of this as an internal struggle between opposing forces, on analogy with the feuding family and the stasis-ridden city (627a-d), rather than a failure to implement accepted policies. This “conflict” model has informed the treatments of courage and moderation from

632e-636e and is precisely what the Athenian has promised to elucidate with the present sketch of the inner workings of a human being (644b6-c2). On the replacement of the conflict model for virtue by the agreement model, see note on 643a2-646e2.

Parts of the soul?

So construed, the iron and golden strings are occurrent mental or psychological states—the feelings of pleasure, pain, anticipation, and judgments of worth that are collectively called *pathê* (“experiences”) at 644e1). Bobonich 2002: 261-4 emphasizes that, in contrast to the argument in Republic IV ____, the Athenian does not infer, on the basis of the conflict between these pullings, that a person’s soul can be divided into “parts.”. Thus he concludes that Plato has in *Laws*, abandoned the tripartite theory of the soul articulated in the Republic—where soul “parts” are construed in the very strong sense as the subjects of psychological states. Setting aside the question of whether the Athenian’s remarks here are expressions of a developed theory (see note on 644c9-d1), we may distinguish two very different elements to the tripartite doctrine of the *Republic*. One is that conflicting occurrent impulses in a single soul must issue from different “parts” that are the subjects of those states (the view Bobonich finds abandoned in *Laws*—although one might argue that 689b1-2 uses the language of partition (see Sassi 2008: 132); for additional responses see Gerson 2003, Kahn 2004, Laks 2005, 85-92, and Lorenz 2006, 26n18). The other thesis is that there are three fundamentally different types of human motivation or impulse (for this construal of the tripartite theory, see Cooper “Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation” HPQ 1 (1984), 3-21; reprinted in his *Reason and Emotion*, 118-37). The latter thesis can in principle be separated from the former, so one might ask whether the Athenian, even if he does not recognize distinctive soul parts, still recognizes the three fundamental types of motivation that in the Republic are classified as “appetitive”, “spirited”, and “rational”. Bobonich 2002: 263-4, like most commentators, takes the Athenian to recognize only a two-fold distinction: between rational and non-rational motivation, marked by the contrast between golden strings and iron strings, (cf. Müller 1951: 22, Rees 1957: 112-116; Graeser 1969: 102-5; Robinson 1970: 124-5, 145; Fortenbaugh 1975: 24, Schöpsdau 1994: 229-30; Sassi 2008: 133-8; Frede 2011: 18). The consensus among these accounts is that Plato in *Laws* no longer recognizes a distinct category of “spirited” impulses; the contrary position has been argued by Ritter 1923: 451 and Saunders 1962: 37-8, and a qualified version is defended in Meyer 2012. See note on 644c9-d1.

645a6 “gentle (*praou*) rather than violent (*biaiou*)”

This characterization of reasoning as gentle rather than violent continues the thematic opposition between persuasion, on the one hand, and force or violence (*bia*) on the other (see note on 629a2, 629d2-3, 634c8). Reason and law are

here placed in the gentle and persuasive camp, but their very gentleness highlights the challenge of achieving self-mastery: how is reasoning's gentle "pull" (*agôgê*, 645a7, repeating the term from 645a1) to overcome the stronger pull of the iron cords?

645a6-7 "so its pull (*agôgê*) requires assistants (*hupêretôn*), if our golden kind is to prevail over the other kinds"

The nature of the assistance is not here elaborated upon, although the repeated injunction in the preceding lines to "cleave to" (*sunhepomenon* 644e5) and "pitch in with" (*sullambanein*, 645a5) the pull of reasoning—note the prefix 'sun-' (together) in both cases—together with the 'gar' (for) at a5, suggests that this is a call to the requisite assistance. What would count as such assistance, however, is not made explicit. The notion of "assistants" (*hupêretai*) to *logismos* recalls the doctrine of the *Republic*, that the spirited part of the soul functions as an ally (*summachos*) of *logismos* against the appetites (*Rep.* 441e-442b). While the Athenian does not here avail himself of the tripartite psychology of the *Republic* (on which see note on 645a2-4) his treatment of the *elpides* at 646e-647a attributes to them many features of *thumos* from the *Republic*, and in particular gives them the task of resisting pleasures and pains: the *tharros* that enables a warrior to resist the pains and fears of battle, and the sense of shame (*aidôs*) that enables the just citizen to resist the temptations of illicit pleasures are candidates for the "assistants" mentioned here (thus Meyer 2012: 358-60). See note on 644c9-d1. In Book II language reflecting the present passage will identify education as exerting a "force" (*holkê*) and "pull" (*agôgê*) in the direction of law (*nomos*) (659d2-3); see note on 644e5-645a3; so education is a candidate for the "assistant" that the Athenian has in mind (thus Schöpsdau, Brisson/Pradeau 2007: 32-3)—although education, as defined at 643b-644b and 653a-c, functions to direct the pleasures and pains in the same direction as reason; so that it does not actually assist reason in the sort of internal struggle captured by the puppet analogy. More speculative construals of the "assistants" include the idea that it involves the psychological activity of intention or decision (Bobonich 2002; 273-82) and the proposal by Wilburn 2013 that it is deliberation that implements general principles. Klosko 2006: 221 proposes that the law is the assistant.

Conclusions about virtue and self-mastery

645b1-2 "virtue's tale (*muthos*), which likens us to puppets, would achieve its point (*sesômenos an eiê*)"

More literally: "...would be preserved". Translation following Brisson/Pradeau. On the preserving a *muthos*, see England ad loc and Brisson, *Platon: les mots et les mythes* 71-5. The expression is also used at *Rep.* 395b, 621b, *Th.* 164a,

167d, *Philebus* 14a. The puppets fable is “virtue’s” in the sense that it exhorts us to achieve self mastery, which Clinias and Megillus have endorsed as a paradigm for virtue (626e, 644b; see notes on 627a6-7, general note on 643a2-646e2).

645b2-3 “what is meant by ‘self-mastery’ or ‘self-defeat’, both for a city and for an individual”

Self-mastery was first explained in the context of a city at 627a-b. The analysis is extended to the case of an individual person only at 644b ff.

645b4-5 “grasp...*a true account (logos) of these forces (helxeis) and live by it*”

More literally: “...and live following (*hepomenon*) it.” The “true account” of “these forces” might be reasoning’s verdict as to which pleasures, pains and anticipations are better and which are worse (644d2). Such an assessment presumably will depend on a grasp of the doctrine of divine and human goods (631b-d) in the light of which the legislator is said to evaluate citizens’ emotional responses (631e-632a). Note that a person can “live by” or “follow” (*sunhepetai*) such a doctrine in two different ways: (1) by winning the struggle against any “forces” shown to be inappropriate by that doctrine (e.g. grief at the loss of a human good); this is to achieve self mastery, and hence virtue as conceived of by Clinias and Megillus. Alternatively (2) one might have all one’s “forces” obedient to the doctrine (so that e.g. there never arises a “force” that one has to struggle against). This would be to achieve the standard of virtue as “agreement” (*sumphonia*) implicit in the account of education at 643b-644b. On these two paradigms for virtue, see notes on 626e2-3 and 643a2-646e2.

645b6-8 “*A city must receive an account of such matters (either from a god or from this person who has grasped it) and [set] it up as law...*”

An application of the point at 644d2-3 that the reasoning (*logismos*) internal to a person is an expression of law (*nomos*), and that the law is an expression of the divine (see note on 624a1) The “true account” (b4-5) by which an individual person is supposed to regulate his own behaviour is identical to the content of the law that regulates the city as a whole.

645b8-c1 “We might also get a clearer demarcation of both virtue and vice”

On the assumption that virtue consists in self-mastery and vice in self-defeat, articulated at 644b. On the alternative conception of virtue as internal agreement (*sumphônia*), see notes on 626e2-3 and 643a2-646e2.

645c2-4 “education and drinking practices”

The present discussion is part of an account of education (*paideia*) begun at 643b, which has been proposed as the proper context to demonstrate the worth of the institution of drinking parties (642a).

645c7-8 “*whatever in our present enterprise is worth the effort*”

Clinias’ patience (proclaimed at 642d3-643a1) appears to be wearing thin, perhaps because, as the next exchange makes clear (645d1-3), he has no idea what bearing any of the preceding discussion has on the issue of drinking parties.

(645d1-646e2) Drunkenness and Self mastery

The Athenian now brings to bear on the topic of drunkenness his preceding discussion of self mastery and the divine puppets (644b-645c): the iron strings are strengthened by drink, and the golden weakened, with a resulting loss of self-mastery (645d-646a). This is, however, only a temporary debility that is instrumental to a longer-term benefit, just as vigorous exercise or medical treatment weakens a body in the short term but benefits it in the long run (646b-e). This sets the stage for the Athenian to argue in the next section (646e-650b) that the longer term benefit of properly supervised drunkenness is the cultivation of moderation.

645d6-8 “Doesn’t drinking wine render our pleasures and pains and angry feelings (*thumous*) and passions (*erôtas*) more intense?”

If this is to be an application of the puppet analogy (as indicated by 645d1-2), these must be impulses that figure among the “iron strings” (645a2-3), originally

enumerated as “pleasures and pains” and their anticipations at 644c7-d1. See also note on 645d1-646e3.

645e1-3 “*perceptions, memories, opinions (doxas) and cognitions (phronêseis) ... completely abandon a person who is full of drink*”

An ascending order of cognitive activities (see *Philebus* 34a, 38b, 39a-b, *Tim.* 28a-c, 37a-c, 52a, 69d, 77b); for a similar use of *phronêsis* in the plural as a term for occurrent mental states, see *Tim.* 90b7).

In the context of the puppet metaphor explicitly invoked in the present context (645d1-2), we must understand this to describe a weakening (or incapacitation) of the “golden cord”. However, it is difficult to construe the listed cognitive states as being characteristic of golden cord exclusively. For example, the “anticipations” that figure among the iron strings are explicitly identified as “opinions about the future” (644c9-10; see note ad loc). And it would be odd if the iron strings did not involve at least sense perception or some kind of representation of content, to the extent that they have intentional objects (cf. the “pictures in the soul” of *Philebus* ____); see Bobonich 2002, 295-330, Lorenz 2006, 95-110 and Sassi 2008, 131-133, for different proposals about how they have content). Thus the Athenian is not entitled to conclude (absent further argument) that a general loss of cognition tips the balance in favour of the iron strings. See Bobonich 2002: 270 for a proposal about how the two factors might interact to yield a loss of self-control. The Athenian’s emphasis here on the drinker’s cognitions thus fits awkwardly with the psychology illustrated by the puppet metaphor (644c4-d6). However, it fits better with the account of education sketched at 643b-644b, on which education gives content and direction to a person’s pleasures, desires, etc. A general impairment of cognition would undo this educational effect. (On the different paradigms for virtue implied in these two discussions, see notes on 626e2-3 and 643a2-646e2).

645e5-6 “*his soul returns to the same condition as when he was a young child*”

This is the uneducated juvenile condition described at the beginning of Book II, when a child’s pleasures and pains, desires etc. have not yet been shaped and given their content by musical training (653d-654a), and a young person lacks both *phronêsis* and “stable correct opinion” (653a) – two of the items just mentioned as absent in a drunkenness. While here the Athenian is about to describe this condition as a lack of “self control” (*enkrateia* –645e8), in Book II he describes it as a lack of order (*taxis*). On that juvenile state see note on 653d6-7.

646a2 “Don’t we affirm that this sort of person is the worst (*ponêrotatos*)?”

The person unable to control himself has been identified as the “most shameful (*aischistos*) and worst (*kakistos*)” at 626e4 and as bad (*kakos*) at 644b7. On the different question of whether the corresponding self-mastery is best (cf. 628c-d) see note on 644b6-7.

646a10 “only a moment ago”. At 641d.

The Athenian has now completed the account of *paideia*, which he heralded at 641e (and 643a) as a lengthy but necessary preamble to his explanation of the benefits of drinking parties.

646b2 “the two of you have emphatically declared your willingness to listen”

At 642b-e.

646b10-c1 “if someone willingly (*hekôn*) brought such things upon himself”

The thesis that no one willingly or voluntarily (*hekôn*) brings bad things upon himself is a central theme in Plato, and core to the so-called “Socratic Paradox” that no one does wrong *hekôn* (Platonic texts: Protagoras 345e 358c, e; Gorgias 509e, *Tim.* 86e; *Laws* 731c, 734b, 860d-e; see O'Brien 1967, Segvic OSAP 2000).

646d1 “Precisely” (*kallista*)

A superlative and elliptical version of “*kalôs legeis*”, which generally indicates agreement with the preceding statement (“you are right”) rather than an aesthetic or ethical assessment of the speaker’s words. Clinias here gives his strong endorsement to the Athenian’s preceding statement. (cf. *Philebus* 31d1, *Tht.* 148a5). Pangle’s “that’s a very noble (*kalon*) way of putting it” wrongly implies that the ethical dimensions of the *kalon* are operative here (as they are, e.g., at

630c7, 637e5, 646e11, 654c-d).

V

Drinking Parties Cultivate Moderation

(646e3-650b10)

We are now told that drunkenness, precisely because it lessens or eliminates self-mastery, thereby provides the opportunity for battling against “pleasures and desires” (647d4-5). Indeed, properly supervised drunkenness is an especially safe forum in which to cultivate resistance to pleasures and desires. This is to develop further the elaborate analogy between courage and moderation originally deployed at 632e-636c, where the paradigm for virtue is self-mastery (victory in internal conflict). Here, however, while the struggle for self mastery continues to be invoked as part of the training regime that cultivates courage and moderation, the Athenian characterizes the virtuous condition to be achieved by this training in terms that fit the alternative paradigm for virtue that is implicit in the account of education at 643b-644b and that will explicitly inform the discussion of virtue in Book II (see note on 647b9-c1 and general note on 643a2-646e2). On this new paradigm, virtue is a matter of having appropriately directed pleasures, pains, desires, fears, etc. (the “agreement model”) rather than victory over conflicting internal impulses (see notes on 626e2-3 and 643a2-646e2). On an ambiguity that masks the transition to the “agreement” model of virtue, see note on 647c3-4.

The Athenian begins by identifying varieties of fear (shame) and daring (shamelessness) that apply in social contexts (646e-647c). He then argues (on analogy with the case of courage) that shame is to be cultivated by exposure to shamelessness and training against it (647c-d). Drunkenness, he proposes, simulates the conditions in which we are prone to shamelessness (647e-649d), and thus it is a valuable method for both testing and training moderation (649d-650b)

(646e3-647c2) Varieties of Fear and Daring

The Athenian begins by invoking the two “anticipations” identified in the puppet psychology of 644b-645c: fear and “daring” (tharros). He points out that there are appropriate and inappropriate versions of each. While the pair are ordinarily construed as applying to military contexts, where the coward is fearful and the courageous soldier is daring, they have an important application in social contexts, where the just and moderate person has an appropriate fear (a sense

of shame) and the immoderate person is inappropriately daring (shameless). Thus while a limited kind of daring is to be cultivated for military purposes, a far more important trait for the legislator to cultivate in citizens is a sense of shame.

646e4 “two roughly opposing (*enantia*) kinds of fear”

These are the fear involved in cowardice, and the sense of shame (*aidôs*) involved in just and moderate behavior. What the Athenian means by calling them “opposing” (*enantia*) is unclear. Perhaps it is that the former fear motivates a person to flee the enemy and the pains of battle, while latter (as described at 647a4-6) makes one stand one’s ground. Compare the sense of *enantios* at 647a4 (see note on 647e4-6).

647a4-6 “the latter [*shame*] opposes (*enantios*) not only pains and other fears but the most prevalent and strongest pleasures”

Here “opposes” clearly has the sense of resistance, and shame is portrayed as furnishing resistance in the domains of both courage and moderation (cf. 633b-636c. On an ambiguity in the notion of resistance, see note on 647c3-4.

647a10-b1 “the daring (*tharros*) that is opposed (*enantion*) to it... being ... the greatest evil in private or public life”

This is the daring or brazenness involved in transgressing social norms, as at 647c7-d8; cf. 649d-650a.

647b3-5 “nothing is more effective [*sc. than shame*] ... at securing victory and safety in war itself”

Even in the military context, the “fear” touted by the Athenian outperforms the daring (*tharros*) venerated in the military ethic of the Dorians. Cf. 641c2-7.

647b9-c1 “So each of us needs to become both fearless and fearful”

As at 648b8 and 649c4, the courageous person is presented as “fearless”

(*aphobos*) is instead of “*tharraleos*” (daring); cf. 649b8-c1. While the natural contrast between fear and daring might make the substitution seem a mere stylistic variation, it is in fact highly significant, for in characterizing the courageous person as fearless (or more precisely as “lacking certain fears” (*aphobia phobôn tinôn*, 647c3-4), rather than as victorious in the struggle against the fears in question, the Athenian invokes the “agreement” model for virtue implied in the account of education at 643b-644b, rather than the conflict model that informs his interlocutor’s conception of virtue. For the analogous point about resistance to pleasures, see note on 647c8-10. On the two models for virtue see note on 643a2-646e2.

647c1 *“in each case for the reasons we have explained”*

More literally: “for the sake of what (*hôn d’ hekateron heneka*), we have explained in each case”. The expression (“for the sake of “ –“*heneka* + gen.) is familiar teleological language, used to characterize the legislator’s activity: Just as military matters are to be regulated “for the sake of” peace, not vice versa (628d-e), fearlessness is not an end in itself, to be cultivated in the citizens as an ultimate goal; rather, it has a point or goal (peace) that both limits its pursuit and gives it its point. And even fear has a point, or goal, the Athenian insists, when it fulfills an important social function.

(647c3-649d3) Cultivating shame by exposure to shamelessness

The Athenian now applies the preceding remarks about shame and shamelessness (646e-647c) to his earlier claim that cultivating moderation requires exposure to pleasures (634a-635d): just as cultivating courage requires exposure to cowardly feelings and practice in fighting against them, cultivating moderation requires exposure to “shamelessness” and practice at battling against it (647c-d).

647c3-4 *“make someone unafraid of certain things...by leading him into fear (eis phobon)”*

Note that the disposition to be cultivated is a kind of “fearlessness” (*aphobia*; see note on 647b9-c1), not simply the strength to resist acting on the fears that one feels. We may thus understand as follows how “leading” a person “into fears” serves to cultivate such a disposition. The trainee is

- (i) led into fearful (fear-provoking) situations and as a result

- (ii) experiences feelings of fear, and
- (iii) struggles to resist acting on those feelings.

Repeated success at (i)-(iii) eventually cultivates in the trainee:

- (iv) a disposition to not experience feelings of fear in those fearful situations.

While the trainee who engages in (iii) will be fighting against “fears and pains” in the way that Clinias takes to be central to courage at 633d-e (see note on 633e1-2) and hence will experience the internal conflict modeled by the divine puppets at 644c-645c, the courageous person who has achieved (iv) will not experience such internal struggle when placed in situations like (i). The virtue he or she has achieved fits the Athenian’s paradigm of “agreement” rather than Clinias’ paradigm of self-mastery. On those two paradigms for virtue, see note on 643a2-646e2. Later it will become clear that the “fears” into which the trainee is led are ambiguous between the fear-provoking situations in (i) and the fearful feelings they provoke in (ii). Thus it will be intelligible to say that a person displays courage by being led into fears of type (i), but not experiencing fears of type (ii). See notes on 648b7-8, 649c4 and 649c8-10.

647c4 “under leadership (*meta nomou*)”

Literally: “with law”. Cf. 672a1 where “kata nomous” (in a lawful ...manner) used in a similar context. In both cases the scenario evoked involves the leadership or guidance of soldiers under a commander. As England notes, ‘*meta nomou*’ here is parallel to the characterization of the requisite fear as “*meta dikes*” “in the next line (c7-8), translated “in conjunction with justice” (See note ad loc) as well as with “by dint of reason” (*meta logou*) in d6.

647c7-8 “*fearful in accord with justice (phoberon meta dikês)*”

The fear to be cultivated is shame. See notes on 647c4 and c8-d8. The phrase “with justice” (*meta dikês*) was used at 643e6 to describe the accomplished citizens who “know how to rule and be ruled with justice”.

647c8-10 “*To make him victorious in the fight against his pleasures... we... throw him into the ring with shamelessness and make him wrestle against it ...*”

The shamelessness (*anaischuntia*) that the trainee is made to battle against is manifest in the “many pleasures and desires that urge him to commit shameless and unjust actions” (d4-5). On analogy with the case of training to resist fears,

which cultivates fearlessness (see note on 647c3-4), the goal of such training is to cultivate a disposition in which one is free of such shamelessness; that is, one does not experience (ii) such pleasures and desires in (i) the situations that naturally provoke them. (At 649d-e we are given a sketch of the situations that tend to provoke such feelings in the untrained; the Athenian's point will be that drunkenness simulates those situations).

647c10-d1 “*face off against the cowardice within him and defeat it...*”

Cowardice (*deilia*) is often a term for a character trait is here used for a cowardly impulse or feeling (i.e. fear).

647d3 “*even halfway toward virtue*”

An indication that there can be different stages of achievement on the way to the “accomplishment” or perfection in moderation (*sôphrôn teleôs*, d4) that is the goal of this training regime. The person who has developed the sort of self-mastery praised by Clinias, which presupposes internal psychological conflict, might be “half way” towards virtue, while the complete or perfect virtue of interest to the Athenian would then be that of the soul whose feelings have been trained to “agree” (*sumphônein*) with its reasoned judgments. See note on 647c8-d8. On the difference between self mastery and agreement as paradigms for virtue, see note on 626e2-3 and general note on 643a2-646e2.

647d6-7 “both when he is playing and when he is serious” (*en te paidiais kai en spoudais*)

A reflection of the claim, implicit in the account of education at 643b-644e that there is a kind of ‘play’ or “recreation” (*paidia*) that cultivates virtue. We are about to be told that drinking parties (explicitly called *paidiai* at 664b4-5 and 671e5-6; cf. 635b5) provide a forum for battling against shamefulness (i.e. cultivating moderation). In Book II we will be told that regular performance of choral song and dance (also a kind of *paidia*—673d4) is the means by which virtue is to be cultivated. See also note on 643d1. On the distinction between play and seriousness see note on 635b5.

(647e1-649d7) Wine as a drug to induce shamelessness

Having insisted on the necessity of experiencing the sorts of feelings that one must struggle against when training to cultivate courage and moderation, the Athenian now raises the possibility of using a drug to stimulate such feelings, for purposes of practicing against them. A drug that could stimulate fear would provide a safe and convenient way to train for courage, with many advantages over conventional methods (647e-648e). While there is no such drug for fear, we do have wine to stimulate the sorts of shamelessness that one must struggle against in order to cultivate moderation (649a-d). Thus wine provides a safe and convenient alternative to conventional training methods—since those conventional methods involve situations in which the “trainee” is in a position to do serious harm to his fellow citizens (649d-650b).

647e1-2 “has any god given humans a potion (*pharmakon*) for fear?”

This hypothetical potion induces the fears that one must struggle against in training for courage, just as wine (traditionally described as a gift from the god Dionysus), induces the feelings of fearlessness (shamelessness) to be battled against in moderation-training.

647e3-4 “the more one comes to suppose (*nomizein*) ... that he has fallen into misfortune (*dustuchia*)”

The Athenian here construes fear much more broadly than a response to bodily danger, expanding it to include all the feelings responding to apparent misfortune (*dustuchia*) that are identified as the legislator’s concern at 632a3. This broad characterization of the fear to be combated suggests that the coordinate “daring” that is to be combated arises in response to apparent good fortune (*eutuchia*; cf. 632a4). See note on 649d4-7. Note that fear—classified as an opinion (*doxa*) at 644c9-d1—is here said to involve thinking (*nomizein*) that one is unfortunate. On the connection between feelings of pleasure and judgments that one is doing well, see 657c.

648a6-7 “for inculcating courage” (*pros andreian*)

More literally: “towards courage.” The phrase also occurs in 647d1 “*teleion pros andreian*” where it is translated “accomplished in courage”.

648b1-2 “*a test (basanon) for courage and cowardice*”

A slight change of focus here, from training for courage (the subject above), to testing to determine whether a person is courageous or cowardly. The testing function will be emphasized below, 649d-650b, but the training function will reclaim the Athenian’s attention from the start of Book II. The shift of focus is understandable, since the circumstances in which one trains to develop a trait (whether courage, moderation, or any other skill) also reveals how close the trainee currently is toward proficiency in that endeavour. Indeed, the diagnostic function will be bound up with the training function as a feedback mechanism as and a motivation for improvement, as indicated by 648b8-c5 and 648d6-e3.

648b7-8 “*lead the citizens into fears (eis tous phobous) and test their reactions (pathêmasin)*”

The Athenian indicates, in the very next clause, that the goal of such exposure is to cultivate fearlessness (“so that you .. compel them to become fearless” b8-c1; see note on 647b9-c1). At 649c4, that goal is explicitly described as being fearless “in the presence of fears” (*en tois phobois*). Thus the “fears” into which the trainees are led must be (i) fear-provoking situations, rather than (ii) actual feelings of fear (see notes on 647c3-4 and on 649c8-10). Accordingly Schöpsdau translates: “Situations der Furcht”. “Reactions” (*pathêmata*) recalls the characterization of the puppet’s strings as *pathê* at 644d/e (*pathêmata*) in the parallel passage in *Timaeus* _____. England would translate it “disturbances”; however, while the feeling of fear is indeed a disturbance (*tarachê*, 632a4) the present passage leaves it open that not every person “led” into such a situation will experience such feelings. Thus ‘reactions’ is a better translation.

648b8-c5 “*so that you could compel them to become fearless by exhorting, chastising, and conferring honour on them*”

On fearlessness, see previous note. The testing function of the drug is here shown to play a role in its training function (see note on 648b1-2). The trainer is here invited to use exactly the same tools of praise, blame, reward and punishment that the Athenian attributed to the legislator at 632a-b; here it is made explicit that these are tools of shaping character, not just evaluating it. We have a model in which a leader (like the coach of an athlete, a drill sergeant of a military recruit, or a ship’s captain of sailors, 639b-640) uses praise and blame and reward and punishment to cultivate that result. This would be an instance of the legislator’s use of “compulsion and persuasion by honours” at 634a9 (see note ad loc).

648c2-3 “anyone who does not willingly (*peithoito*) conform to your instructions”

More literally “anyone who is not persuaded (*peithoito*) to be (*toioutos einai*) as you instruct on every occasion”. On the close connection between being persuaded (*peitesthai*) and being willing (*hekôn*), see note on 663b4-6.

Note that the trainer is not simply concerned with how the trainee behaves in the circumstances, but with the latter’s attitude (whether willing or reluctant) and with the “sort he is”; this reflects the fact that feelings and affective responses quite generally are being trained (as on the “agreement” (*sumphônia*) model—see note on 643a2-646e2).

648c5 “no other reason to find fault with it”

The residual reason one might “find fault” with the practice, analogous to Megillus’ original criticism of drunkenness, is the initial/temporary degradation it induces (cf. 646c)

648c7 “training device” (*gymnasia*).

Gymnasia (physical training or exercise, including military training) is the cornerstone of Dorian education (see 625c7, 626b5, 635c).

648d7-e1 “to escape and overcome the compulsive shaking (*anankaia(i) diaphora(i)*) induced by the potion

“Shaking” renders ‘*diaphora*’, here used in the medical sense (thus Des Places, Schöpsdau) and ‘compulsive’ renders *anankaia* (in contrast to the more usual translation “necessary” or “inevitable”—England, Saunders, Schöpsdau, Brisson/Pradeau, Lisi—as at 635c1-2), since the effect (feeling fear) is, as the Athenian here claims, avoidable by proper training (see notes on 647c3-4, 648b7-8). Construing the effect as inevitable fits the self-mastery paradigm for virtue endorsed by Clinias, but not the “agreement” (*sumphônia*) model espoused by the Athenian; on the two models, see note on 643a2-646e2.

If the effect were in fact inevitable, then even the perfected form of courage would involve struggling against conflicting impulses (see note on 626e2-3 and general note on 646e_-650b).

648e1-3 “his virtue protecting him from being tripped up or diverted to any serious extent by impropriety (*aschêmosunê*)”

That is, his virtue keeps him from responding inappropriately (either in feeling or in action) to the frightening circumstances.

648e4-5 “the universal human susceptibility to being worsted by the drink”

The Athenian seems already to be making the transition from talking about a hypothetical drug to induce fear, useful in the cultivating courage, to talking about wine as a drug useful in the cultivation of moderation; note Clinias explicit mention of the latter virtue in his reply (e6)

649a4-6 “what about fearlessness, the excessive and untimely daring to do what we should not? Is there any drink for this...?”

The Athenian now explicitly turns to make the parallel point about wine, that it induces the inappropriate “daring” (*tharros*) that is “opposed” to shame at 647a10. Its characterization as “untimely” (*akairôs*) indicates that it violates the doctrine of due measure at 636d-e (cf. “at the wrong time” (*ektos tôn kairôn* – 636e2). In keeping with the initial description of “daring” (*tharros*) as a kind of *elpis* (anticipation) at 644c9-d1, drunkenness is said here to induce the “anticipation of good things” (*elpidôn agathôn* - 649b2) here expanded to include the belief in one’s abilities to secure them and the wisdom of his pursuit of them. On the invocation of “wisdom” (*sophos ôn*, 649b4, one might note that in book III, “ignorance” (*amathia*) is used to characterize the condition of the person whose pleasures and pains are not subordinated to his reason (III 689a).

649b9-c1 “supremely daring” (*malista tharrêsomen*) ... “supremely fearful” (*malista phobêsometha*)

cf. 647b9-c1. The former is the *tharros* required for courage in battle (647b6-7), the latter the shame that characterizes the moderation required in social/peaceful contexts (647e10-647a7). At 647b9-c1 these two desiderata are presented as

fearlessness and fearfulness respectively.

649c4: *“it is in the presence of fears that we practice being courageous and fearless”*

As is made explicit in the analogous point about moderation (see note on 649c8-10), the “fears” in whose presence the “practice” takes place must be (i) fear-provoking situations rather than (ii) actual feelings of fear (see note on 648b7-8). On the training regime that involves this practice, see note on 647c3-4.

649c8-10 *“So it is ... in the presence of things that naturally make us especially daring (tharraleoi) and bold (thrasedis) that we must practice being least shameless...”*

More literally: *“...in the presence of those things that, when we experience them (ha pathontes), we are naturally (pephukamen) especially daring...”* (c8). The Athenian here acknowledges a distinction between (i) the circumstances that naturally provoke inappropriate feelings of daring and (ii) the inappropriate feelings that are provoked in those circumstances. As in the parallel case of training against fears just described (640c3-4), it is those circumstances, rather than the inappropriate emboldened responses, that are the context for the exercise of the virtues (see note on 648b7-8). That the “shamelessness” to be resisted will not be a feature of the successfully trained condition is indicated by the trainees’ objective of “being least (*hékista*) shameless and full of boldness” (c10). The “fear... to say, undergo (*paschein*), or do anything... shameful (*aischron*)” (d1-2) must be the person’s responsiveness to considerations about what is *kalon* (opp. of *aischron*), rather than an occurrent feeling of shame that battles against an impulse toward shameful behaviour.

649d4-7 *“all these things have such an effect on us: [a] anger (thumos), passion (eros), insolence (hubris), ignorance (amathia), greed, and cowardice – along with [b] wealth, beauty, strength, and all the things that make us drunk with pleasure and drive us out of our minds”*

The antecedent of “all these things” (*tauta*, d4) is the “experiences (*ha pathontes*) that naturally tend to make us especially daring and bold...” (649c8), which are here enumerated. The listed items are heterogeneous: [a] are psychological states or conditions, which we might understand as instances of boldness. Cowardice (used as at 647c10 for cowardly feelings), might seem slightly odd to find on the list, with its suggestion of timidity, but consider e.g. a case where cowardice leads to traitorous action. By contrast [b] are among the “human

goods” listed at 631c. As a rough approximation, [a] are the pleasures and pains of the citizens that 631d6-632b1 identified as the legislator’s concern to evaluate and shape, while [b] are items whose acquisition or loss are the circumstances in which we “naturally” (*pephukamen*, 649c9) experience [b]. This passage taken together with 631d2-632b1 suggests the view that the pleasures and pains we feel at apparent misfortune and good fortune – in particular, when we mistakenly believe that possessing the human goods is the marker of good fortune, without recognizing that the virtues are a precondition of deriving any benefit from them—are the causes of, or constitute, the antisocial *tharros* that the legislator trains the citizens to avoid. Thus we are given a reason here why the legislator is supposed to supervise the pleasures citizens feel when they experience what they take to be good fortune (*eutuchia*) (632a). See also note on 647e2-4. The Athenian may also have in mind here a point he develops in later books: that our desire for the human goods is has no natural limit to it, and satisfying it makes it stronger (813d-832b, 918c-919c; see Meyer 2003). Thus a person who finds himself very wealthy may feel emboldened to seek out more wealth. Such a hypothesis would also explain the previous claim (641c) that victory in war (where “the goods of the vanquished go to the victors” – Clinias: 626b) leads to “insolence” (*hubris*, 641c5) and hence undermines *paideia*. The examples in the present context (649e2-650a7) indicate that the greed or insolence in question concern the pursuit of financial gain or sexual gratification, so we may suppose the latter also figures on the list in [b]. On “driving us out of our minds” see Bobonich 2002: 270.

Drunkenness as a test of character

649d7-9 “Now for an inexpensive and relatively harmless way to, first of all, test ourselves, and second, get practice in these matters...”

Note that both the testing function and the training function of the drug are invoked.

649e1-2 “provided it is conducted with some care”

That is, under knowledgeable leadership; cf. 637b-c, 640a-641a. The proper leadership of drinking parties will be addressed further in Book II 671c-e.

649e3-650a5 “entering into a business deal with the man and exposing oneself to the attendant risks ...” ... “entrusting to [his] care our own daughters, sons, and wives—endangering what is most precious to us in order to

assess the soul's character ...”

These examples of the dangers avoided by the “safer” method of testing by wine indicates that the danger avoided is that of fellow citizens being unjustly treated by the person who is inappropriately “daring”.

650b7-8 “*the discipline (technê) whose business it is to cultivate (therapeuein) them*”

To cultivate (or care for, *therapeuein*) the citizens' souls is to train them in the virtues. Thus the testing function of the drinking party emphasized in 649e-650b is subordinated to the training function. Caring for the citizens' souls is in effect what the legislator is charged with at 631-2, and the account of *paideia* introduced at 641-3, to be elaborated at length in book II, is the process of such cultivation.

650b8-9 “*this is the business, I think we agree, of politics (politikês)*”

The legislator is referred to as a *politikos* at 628d6 (translated “statesman”; cf. 657a, 688a, 693a). The conception of politics (*politikê technê*) as caring for the citizens souls is developed at length in other dialogues (*Gorgias* 513e, 515a-e; *Euthydemus* 292c-d; *Statesman* 297b) and is taken up by Aristotle, *EN* 1102a8-11.

COMMENTARY ON

Book II

Notes²

Overview of Book II

Book II opens by announcing an even greater benefit from drinking parties than the diagnostic function proposed at the end of Book I (652a-b). True to his claim in Book I that the institution has an important educational function (641b-d), the Athenian now announces that it is a safeguard to education (653a). He follows up with a more precise and detailed account of education than the one he initially sketched in I 643a-644b: virtue consists in the “agreement” (*sumphōnia*) between pleasures and pains on the one hand, and reason on the other and “education” (*paideia*) is to be understood as the condition of having correctly trained pleasures and pains (653a-c). The training is to be done by choral music—ensemble song and dance regularly performed by citizens at festivals to the gods (653c-654a). Since only fine (*kalon*) music will have the requisite effect, the question of how to safeguard education, thus becomes, for much of the rest of Book II, the question of what makes choral music fine, and of what institutions will ensure that fine music is selected for choral performance. In a long and complicated dialectic (654b-660a) directed mainly against the thesis that music is fine insofar as it gives pleasure, the Athenian insists instead that fine choral music trains performer and audience alike to enjoy what is actually good and fine, and thus that the composition of music must be strictly controlled. Next (660b-664a), he faults Crete and Sparta for failing to live up to this standard on the ground that their music, however regimented, fails to teach the appropriate lessons about virtue and goodness. Then (664b-670e) he specifies the institutions that should structure musical education if a city is to avoid such errors. These are the three choruses, composed respectively of children, young adults, and elders. The first two will perform choral song and dance in festival settings while the third, identified as the chorus of Dionysus, will vet choral compositions for performance. They will do so by employing general criteria, articulated by the Athenian at considerable length and amounting to a general theory of what is fine or beautiful in representational art (666d-670b), presented as an alternative to the view that pleasure is the criterion for judging works of art. The chorus of Dionysus is thereby an important safeguard to education, although its operation, so described, has no obvious role for the drunkenness associated with Dionysus and with the drinking parties whose importance the Athenian has proposed to defend. Accordingly, he concludes by explaining that the chorus will function as a drinking party, where wine “loosens up” the singers and makes them amenable to the educational effects of song (671a-674c).

² Citations in the notes refer to the Greek text, and will not always line up precisely with the translation.

I
Education, Music, and Human Nature

652a1-654d4

(652a1-653a4) Drinking parties are a safeguard for education

The Athenian has just claimed at the end of Book I that drunkenness reveals a person's true character (649d-650b); however, that was a subordinate point in a larger discussion, begun at 636e, whose aim was to show that drinking parties are a training ground for developing moderation; specifically, that they have beneficial effects on education (paideia, 641b-d). His present remarks serve to redirect the discussion back to that larger benefit, which is the shaping of character, not just its revelation. The role that drinking parties play as a "safeguard" to that larger benefit will later be explained in the context of the so-called Chorus of Dionysus. See notes on _____INSERT SPECIFIC: 665D9-666D2, 670A3-671A1, 671A2-672D10.

652a3-4 *"a benefit of great magnitude worth taking very seriously (axion pollês spoudês)"*

Echoed in the conclusion at 673e that drinking parties are a "serious matter" (*spoudê*) rather than recreation (*paidiá*). The benefit concerns education *paideia*, identified as the "the first of the very finest things bestowed upon the best of men" (644b1-2), and for which the Athenian has proposed communal drinking is "very important" (641c8-d2). On the contrast between what is serious (*spoudê*) vs. play or recreation (*paidiá*) see note on ____.

652a4 *"the correct use (kat' orthon chreia) of communal drinking"*

That is, only under correct leadership; cf. 638c-641a, 671b-e.

652a5-6 *"Our argument seems to be directed at indicating there is such a benefit"*

This goal of the argument was announced explicitly at 641c8-d3-d.

652b1 *"lest we get tripped up in it (mê parapodisthōmen hup' autou)"*

Alternatively: “lest we get ensnared in (or led astray by) it.”

The potential confusion or misdirection is not identified explicitly. Klinias mistakes the import of the Athenian’s argument at 660b-d, but the argument there is not specifically about drinking parties. Perhaps the caveat refers to the convoluted and oft-interrupted train of argument in which the specific topic of drinking parties, beyond a brief mention at 666b-c, will not be addressed explicitly until the end of Book II (671a-674c).

652b3-653a1 “recall what we say education (*paideia*) is in our case (*hêmin*)”

The qualification “in our case” recalls 643d-644b in Book I, where education in the strict sense is identified as the training in the virtues of citizenship, as distinguished from training in manual or technical skills.

653a3 “its safeguard (*sôteria*)”

That education (*paideia*) might require *sôteria* (literally “saving”, but also used for preservation or safeguarding; see *Rep.* 425e and England’s note ad loc.:) was allowed in the initial account of *paideia* which speaks of *paideia* “going off course” (*exerchetai*) and requiring “correction” (*epanorthousthai*) (644b). Cf. 653c where the problem is described as a “slackening”. The notion of a safeguard for education is invoked again 654d8, with a different term ‘*phylax*’ (guardian).

(653a5-c6) Education (*paideia*) is properly trained pleasures and pains

The Athenian now defines the education to be preserved by drinking parties. While the term ‘paideia’ (like “cultivation” and its cognates in English) can be used to describe both an educational process and the cultivated disposition that results from that process, the latter sense is operative here, where we are given a further refinement of the conception of education presented in Book I (643d-644b). There paideia in a strict sense was distinguished by its goal of inculcating the virtues of a citizen. Here virtue and paideia are defined more precisely and distinguished from each other. Paideia consists in the proper cultivation of one’s “pleasures and pains”, while virtue “in its entirety” consists in agreement between those properly trained “pleasures and pains” and reason (logos).

653a6 “pleasure and pain”

These are the ‘witless advisors’ identified as “iron strings” in soul, according to the metaphor of the puppets in Book I (644-____). Here they are evidently intended to include love (*philia*) and hate (*misos*) (635b2-3, b8-c1). On the range of the scope of the notions of pleasure and pain, see note on ____

653a7-9 “wisdom (*phronêsis*) and stable correct opinion are things one is lucky to develop even in old age”

On the distinction between *phronêsis* and correct opinion see 632c-d and notes on 632c5-6 and 632d5-6. Later, at 672c, *phronêsis* is linked to the order (*taxis*) associated with rhythm and harmony which, in the present context, is about to be attributed a large role in *paideia* (653e-654a). Here both it and “stable correct opinion” are distinguished from the pleasures and pains that will agree with them (*sumphônein* 653b) in the case of “virtue in its entirety” (653b6). Presumably they are conditions of the “golden strings” in the puppet metaphor of 644c-645c. Note the Athenian’s pessimism here about the prospects of either condition being widespread in the citizens.

653a9-b1 “all those [sc. goods] that depend on them (*ta en toutois*) complete a person (*teleos est’ anthrôpos*)”

These dependent goods are most likely the virtues other than *phronêsis* identified at 631c6-d1) as “divine goods” that depend (*êrtêtai*, 631b7) on *phronêsis*. These are the elements of “virtue in its entirety” (*sumpasa arete* 630b2-3; cf. 653b6) that are said to make up “complete (*teleian*) justice” at 630c5-6; cf. 631c7-8, and note ad 630c5-6. Hence here they are said to make a person “complete” (*teleos*). Might the dependent goods cited here also include the “human goods” (wealth, health, etc.) invoked at 631c-d? See note on DEPENDENT GOODS _____. The notion of a “complete” (*teleos*) a person, however, is strongly connected with the aims of education (see 643d2, and e5, where *teleos* and its variant *teleion* are translated “accomplished”; cf. 643c8). So the items that here are said to do the completing are probably restricted to the virtues.

653b3-4 “those who are not yet able to grasp the reason (*logon lambanein*)—and, in those who do grasp it (*labontôn de ton logon*) ...”

Alternatively: “those who are not yet able to engage in argument—and, in those who do engage in it, ...” (thus England).

The phrase *logon lambanein* (Des Places) as well as the alternative *logoi lambanein* (Burnet) are sometimes used by Plato to indicate a kind of epistemic grasp (*Parm.*, 135e, *Tht.* 208d, *Rep.* 534b)—hence the present translation; but he also uses them with the weaker meaning of “discuss”, or “examine by argument” (*Laws* 638c, *Soph.* 246c, *Protag* 348a, *Meno* 75d, *Rep.* 337e). The latter sense would license the alternative translation. On either alternative, the distinction is presumably between those who have not yet reached the age of reason and those who have. These two developmental stages who will later be assigned, respectively, to the chorus of the Muses and the chorus of Apollo (664c-d)

653b4-5 “agree (*sumphônein*) with reason (*logôî*) ... ”

This agreement or concord (*sumphônia*, b6) is later described at 659d-e as *sumphônia* between a child’s pleasures and pains, on the one hand, and the “correct reason (*orthon logon*) articulated by the law” on the other; cf. 696c. Here the agreement is a internal psychological concord between a one’s “pleasures and pains” and one’s faculty of reason (*logos*) when the latter has taken on the views expressed in the law (cf. 644d, 645a), and thus has achieved the *phronêsis* or “stable correct opinion” of 653a7. The parties to the agreement are presumably the iron and gold strings in the puppet metaphor of 644c-645c. An instance of such *sumphônia* is given at 654c: one takes pleasure in the things one judges to be fine (*kalon*) and hates those that one considers shameful (*aischron*). In Book III we are told that, absent such *sumphônia*, no one has *phronêsis* (689d).

Elsewhere, the verb *sumphônêin* indicates agreement between persons— as at 661d, 662b, 686b, and at 634e where it is translated “sing out their agreement” — or logical consistency: 662e; cf. *Rep.* 380c. The verb and its cognates are regularly used in *Rep.* to indicate the relation between the parts of the virtuous city (432a, 463e) and soul (441e, 442c).

653b5-6 “that they have been correctly **trained** (*eithisthai*) by appropriate habits (*ethôn*)”

On the emendation favoured by Schöpsdau following Stallbaum, the translation would be “because they have been correctly habituated...”

Eithisthai and habit (*ethos*), are the terms the Athenian will use to describe the cultivated disposition of a person’s pleasures and pains (see note on 655e1). On the translation ‘training’, see note on 655d7-e1.

If the MSS text translated is sound, the Athenian claims here that the iron and golden strings alike express normative assessment of the condition of the iron strings. He explicitly says as much about the golden strings at 644d1-2, and

about the laws in general at 631e-632b. So if the iron strings are to “agree” with the laws and the reason they express (659d-e), then they too must be directed at such objects; moreover, it is clear that the iron strings include attitudes, such as shame, that are capable of expressing such evaluative attitudes (see notes on Shame in Book I). However, it is somewhat awkward for the Athenian here to be stressing this particular point of agreement between the one’s pleasures and pains, loves and hates, on the one hand, and one’s reasoning on the other, rather than the overall agreement between the former and the latter (as at 659d-e, 689d, and 696c; cf. *Rep.* III 402a). Schöpsdau’s prefers emending the text (following Stallbaum), and the resulting translation would avoid this awkwardness.

653b6 “this agreement (*sumphōnia*) is virtue in its entirety (*sumpasa arete*)

The agreement is between one’s “pleasures and pains”, on the one hand, and one’s reason (*logos*) on the other (see note on 653b4-5). In identifying this condition with virtue, the Athenian explicitly endorses the “concord” model of virtue, rather than the “conflict” model espoused by his interlocutors in Book I (on those two models, see note on ____). The phrase “virtue in its entirety” (*sumpasa aretê*) has a different sense here than it does in Book I at 630b2-3 where it refers to the combination of wisdom, moderation, courage and justice, also called “complete (*teleion*) justice at 630c5-6. Here however, the “entirety” is that of a whole, as distinct from one of its parts—*paideia* being a distinguishable part (the correctly trained pleasures and pains) that is “part” of the condition of agreement (those pleasures and pains agreeing with reason) that constitutes virtue “in its entirety”.

653c1 “from beginning to end (*mechri telous*)”

This use of *telos* (end, goal) recalls the notion of a “complete” (*teleos*) person at 553a9, and suggests that the aspect of virtue here singled out as *paideia* persists even in the complete form of virtue (“virtue in its entirety, 653b6), not just in its early stages of development.

653c5-6 “your earlier remarks about education” Bk I, 643b-644a.

(653c7-654b8) Choral Music is the medium of education

The Athenian here notes that correctly nurtured pleasures and pains, i.e. education (paideia) in the sense just identified above (653a5-c6), require regular

maintenance to withstand the stress of human life (653c7-d5), and that this maintenance is achieved through choral performance at religious festivals. He explains the natural origins of choral dance (653c7-654a8): (1) all young animals are naturally exuberant—prone to voicing sounds and leaping about; and (2) humans naturally enjoy harmony and rhythm. Thus choral performance (choreia), a combination of song (ôidê) and dance (orchêsis), is something we are eager to engage in, at least when we are young. Drinking parties, the Athenian will later argue (666c-d, 671a-672d), will replicate this youthful condition in the elderly. He does not explain how song and dance shape the pleasures and pains and love and hate that are involved in paideia, although some of his presuppositions emerge over the course of _____; see notes on 660a5-8, _____.

Choral dance at religious festivals maintains education

653c8-9: “education ... is weakened (*chalatai*) and corrupted (*diaphtheiretai*) to a great extent (*kata polla*) in human life”

The MSS text is difficult to construe, as it provides no explicit subject for the verbs “weakened and corrupted”. The present translation follows England in taking *paideia* (in the sense of the cultivated condition) to be the implied subject and *kata polla* to be adverbial. As England points out, Ast’s emendation of *kata polla* to *ta polla* would make the Athenian’s claim much stronger: that most of *paideia* is weakened and undone by human life. The burdens of life are invoked again at 666a6-7.

653d2-3 “ordained (*etaxanto*) respites from their toils in exchange for festivals (*tas tôn heortôn amoibas*)”

Plato’s Greek is difficult to render precisely here, but the parallel language at *Symposium* 202e5 invokes rituals that the gods command (*epitattein*) mortals to perform, and benefits that they promise in exchange (*amoibas*). The immediate point in the present passage is that holding festivals as commanded by the gods brings humans, in return, the benefit of respite from their toils, in the sense of a holiday from work. The larger point, about to be elaborated, is that these festivals in fact bring about a much larger benefit than rest and recreation: maintenance of *paideia* that repairs the corrupting effects of human life. This prefigures the theme, to be developed more fully later in Book VII (806e-808c), that the sort of “play” (*paidiá*) one engages in when singing and dancing at festivals to the gods, is really of the utmost seriousness (*spoudê* – cf. 652a4).

653d3-4 “the Muses, their leader Apollo, and Dionysus as fellow celebrants”

The Muses are patrons of culture: poetry, song, and dance; the god Apollo too is associated with music and Dionysus is the god of wine, whose festivals involve drunkenness. On the Muses see Murray and Wilson 2004; on Apollo see Burkert 1985 and Graf 2009; and on Dionysus see Burkert 1985 and Seaford 2006. Later in Book II, these three will be the titular leaders of three different choruses 664b-665d. They are “fellow celebrants” (*sunhêortas*) at the festivals to the gods insofar as these festivals involve the performance of song and dance (to be elaborated at length in Book II). The Athenian’s point is that by involving the Muses, Apollo, and Dionysus in these festivals (that is, by involving music and wine), the gods are giving humans a way of restoring the *paideia* that has been “weakened and corrupted” (653c9) over the course of daily life.

653d4-5 *“in order to set them back on the correct course (epanorthôntai), nurturing them during these festivals”*

More literally: “in order that they be set back on the right course, “[giving them] the nurturing that takes place (*tas te trophas genomenas*) in the festivals”. The translation takes the verb *epanorthôntai* as passive rather than middle, as it is in the parallel text at 643b2-3. The antecedent of “them” is either humans (thus Brisson/Pradeau) or their education (*paideia* in plural at 653c8). Either may be construed as “set back on the right course” in the sense that the celebrants’ pleasures and pains (*paideia*) are cultivated anew during these festivals.

England, by contrast, takes the festivals to be the object of *epanorthôntai*, which would then mean, “set up correctly.” Schöpsdau agrees this is the natural reading of the text, but prefers an emendation that would make the “nurture during these festivals” (d5) the object of the verb. On neither of the latter readings, however, does *epanorthousthai* have the restorative force that it has at 643b and that is clearly relevant in the present context.

The natural basis of choral dance

653d6-7 *“a theory (logos) that we now intone (hêmin...humneitai) ...”*

The theory is introduced here 653d5-654e3 and repeated at 664e3-665a3, 672c1-d4, and 673c9-d6. While his interrogative preface to the theory in the present context “consider whether ... [it] is true to nature or not” (d5-6) stops short of endorsing it, he recalls it at 672c-d as a theory he has affirmed.

The two main components introduced here are (i) that young animals are naturally inclined to motion (both of voice and body) – and hence to a prototype

of choral dance (cf. 673c-d); and (ii) that humans naturally take pleasure in the orderly motions of harmony and rhythm—and hence in choral dance, which is about to be named as the medium for cultivating *paideia* (654a). Other statements of the theory make explicit what must be assumed to be implicit here: (iii) that the natural juvenile motions are disorderly and indeed display a kind of madness (664e, 666a, 672c); and (iv) that the juvenile soul is pliable, receptive to being trained to acquire various kinds of order (664b, 671b-c). The educational function of drunkenness, eventually to be identified at 666b-c, 671a-672d, is to replicate that pliable juvenile condition (with all its disorderliness), in an adult soul whose education has been “weakened and corrupted” (653c8-9), thus allowing it to be retrained in appropriate harmonies and rhythms. Fire is a frequent metaphor for the kinetic juvenile soul, used to invoke both its frantic disorderliness (666a) and its malleability: like iron in the fire, capable of being shaped (or reshaped) by a knowledgeable sculptor (671b-c). While the thesis of disorderly juvenile motions recalls the degraded condition of the incarnated soul in *Timaeus* (43a-47e) [Sch^hpsdau, England? Brisson/Pradeau...?? Stalley], the Athenian casts those motions in a very positive light, taking them to be mark the educability of youth, in contrast with the stiffness (and corresponding resistance to the forces of education) in the elderly. What is important, in his view, is that the juvenile condition is eager to engage in the motion of voice and body—in contrast to the elderly who are disinclined on both fronts (cf. 665d-e, 666b). Juvenile motions are not so much disordered (as in *Timaeus*) as unordered; thus given their natural affinity to move their bodies and raise their voices and their natural pleasure in harmony and rhythm, the juvenile condition is uniquely susceptible to the shaping influence of education. The theory is more fully articulated at 671b-672d (see notes ad loc).

653e1-3 “leaping and bounding as if dancing (*hoion orchoumena*) with pleasure as they play together (*prospaizonta*)”

This activity is invoked again at 673a7-8 as *paizontôn orchêsis* (dancing in play or recreation). On play or recreation (*paidia*) and its relation to *paizein* (playing, amusing oneself), see note on 635b5. The close connection of pleasure with such *paidia* is apparent 657c4, which also recalls the present passage.

653e3-5 “While the other animals have no sense of order (*taxis*) and disorder in movements (for which the names are harmony and rhythm)...”

Rhythm and *harmonia* are the domain of music (655a; cf. 660a, 661c). The latter, often translated “mode” (as in Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian: cf. Rep _____), does not correspond to harmony in the modern musical sense (simultaneous notes of differing pitch), but to a structure of the intervals and pitches used in a melos (tune or song). Thus the Athenian presents it as a kind of order (*taxis*) that

structures sound, just as rhythm is a *taxis* that structures movement (664e-665a) That perception of such order (not just pleasure in that perception) is distinctive of humans is made explicit at 664e6-8. On the significance of this affinity to order, see Mouze 150, Laks 2000: 277.

653e5-654a1 “the gods ... we said were given to us as fellow choral dancers (*sunchoreutas*) “

The gods described as “fellow celebrants” (*sunheortastas*) at 653d4 are now identified more precisely as “fellow chorus members,” thus indicating that the specific medium of their educational influence is choral performance. The connection between *paideia* and choral training has already been hinted at in Book I, 641b3.

654a2-3 “...made us perceive rhythm and harmony (*harmonia*) with pleasure”

The educational significance of the pleasure we naturally take in harmony and rhythm is given a partial elucidation at 660a5-8: a composer can train us to take pleasure in words or gestures simply by setting them into rhythm and harmony. The further point that particular harmonies and rhythms are appropriate to different characters is a given special prominence at 670a-e, where the Athenian identifies the expertise that will keep musical education on the right course.

654a4-5 “they call this a chorus (*choros*)”

A *choros* involves both song and dance (654b3-4), unlike a “chorus” in modern sense of the term, which performs only song. The broader meaning is reflected in the contemporary notion of a “chorus line”.

654a6-7 “our initial education is through the Muses and Apollo”

Dionysus is here omitted (although mentioned along with the Muses and Apollo at 653d) because the present comment concerns initial (*prōtē*) education—i.e. that of children, who naturally have the propensity to engage in the choral dance that will educate them. Dionysus will be invoked later (666c-d, 671a-672d) to address the educational challenge of making the elderly, who have lost that enthusiasms for song and dance, eager to participate in the music that will put their *paideia* “back on the correct course” (653d4).

(654b9-d4) choral training shapes pleasures and pains

Having identified choral music (a combination of song and dance) as the medium of education, the Athenian here completes his sketch of the properly educated person. Such a person not only (a) will be able to perform fine pieces of choral music (654b11-c3; but also (b) will feel pleasure in fine things, and will be distressed at shameful things (654c4-d4). While (a) introduces a topic to be treated at length in the next section (654e-660a), where he will inquire into the criteria for fine choral compositions (and further at 667b-670e), his emphasis here is on (b), which reflects his definition of education at 653a-c as the correct disposition of a person's feelings of pleasure, pain, likes, and dislikes.

654b3-4 "Now choral dancing (*choreia*), as a whole, is a matter of dance (*orchêsis*) and song (*ôidê*)."

"Choral dance" translates *choreia*, which is distinct from *orchesis* (dance), in that it involves both singing and dancing. (Thus Saunders translates the former "song and dance" and Brisson/Pradeau "l'art chorale").

654b11-c1 "He sings finely" (*kalôs*) and dances finely, if in fact the things he sings (*ha aidei*) and the things he dances (*ha orcheitai*) are fine (*kala*)"

The "things" sung and danced are ambiguous between the songs and dances (the works of choral art), the gestures and utterances of the choral dancer who performs them, and the behaviour represented or imitated in such song and dance. At 654e-655b, the Athenian will say that fine gestures and utterances in choral music are those that represent or imitate the words and actions of a virtuous person. At 654e-660a and 667b-670e he will address the criteria that make works of choral art fine. In contrast with those later discussions, here his emphasis is on the condition and attitudes of the person who is trained by that choral music -- hence the adverb *kalôs*. This is in keeping with his present focus on education (*paideia*) as a cultivated condition of a person. Here he notes the "exterior" aspects of fine behaviour, but he is about to note the interior aspect: feelings of pleasure and pain (654c4-d3)

The well educated person takes pleasure in what is fine
654c4-d3

In this difficult passage, the Athenian sketches three different psychological profiles and asks which displays the best education. While the details of the passage are difficult and disputed, his main point is clearly that the most important educational result of choral training is to have properly cultivated feelings of pleasures and pain (i.e., education as defined at 653a-c). This is a

further requirement in addition to the one he has just articulated at 654b11-c3 for “singing and dancing finely” (the latter phrase standing in for being “finely educated” (*eu pepaideumenos*, 654a9-b1).

The three people are contrasted along the following dimensions:

- (i) whether they have correct thoughts about what is fine and shameful:
- (ii) whether they have correct pleasures and pains about what is fine and shameful;
- (iii) whether they are able to “adequately render in voice and gesture” what is fine and shameful.

The first person is correct either on all fronts or on (i) and either of (ii) and (iii); the second is correct on (iii) but not (ii); and the third is correct on (ii) but not (iii) or (i). Difficulties arise because the Athenian switches from posing the question, whether the first or second is better educated, to accepting the answer that the third is superior in education. England proposes that the second and third persons are instances of the first (reading the first ‘than’ (ê, c6) as ‘whether’; criticized by Schöpsdau). Alternatively, it is possible that Plato begins with the contrast between the first person (who gets it right on all fronts) and the second, who is deficient in the crucial domain, (ii); but then switches to an even stronger point, that even a person falling short of the first’s success in (i) and (iii) (or in (i)) is still better educated than the second.

In any case, the main point of the passage is clearly to single out (ii) over (iii) as the salient educational effect of choral training. The passage is also significant in betraying the assumption, on the part of the Athenian, that musical training also shapes (i) one’s judgments about what is fine and shameful. The Athenian will later (655b-656b & note___) indicate a close relation between (ii) and (iii).

654c4-5 “suppose the things he considers (*hêgoumenos*) to be fine (*kala*) are fine and those he considers shameful (*aischra*) are shameful, and he treats them as such (*houtôs autois chrêtai*).”

The first person is characterized in terms of what he believes is fine and shameful (the latter here ambiguous between the fine songs and dances just invoked at c1-2, and the fine actions they imitate (cf. 654e-655b). The Athenian thus indicates here that choral training cultivates not only one’s singing and dancing, but also one’s views about what is fine and shameful. The intended senses of “treating them as such” (*houtôs autois chrêtai*) is unclear. If the verb *chrêtai* is parallel to the *orthê chreia* at 657c3-4 (see note ad loc), it might mean that this first person has the correct pleasures and pains attributed to the third person at 654d2-3. Or it could extend to all ways of conducting oneself properly regarding fine and shameful things, in which case it would extend to correct behaviour, not just correct feelings.

654c5-9 “Is such a person better educated in choral dance and music than someone who in body and voice is able to render adequately on each occasion what is thought (to *dianoêthen*) to be fine, but takes no pleasure in fine things and does not hate those that are not”

The second person’s speech and actions conform to standards of the *kalon*, although the passive to *dianoêthen* (“what is thought to be fine”) leaves it open that this person does not himself believe these standards, which would mark a contrast with the first person. The restriction of the question about his education to “choral dance and music” (c6) is what makes the correctness of one’s judgments (which will belong to the *logos* distinguished from *paideia* at 653a-c) less significant as a mark of *paideia* than the correctness of his pleasures. Thus the salient defect of this person (as the contrast with the third person will make clear) is the failure to feel pleasures and pains that reflect these standards. Here, as in the description of the third person (c9-___) “body and voice” is ambiguous between the song and dance of the choral performance, and the words and actions that they represent (cf. 654e-655a)

654c9-d3 “Or is it the person who is not quite able to get it right (*katorthoun*) in voice and body, or to think of it (*ê dianoeisthai*), but does get it right (*katorthoi*) in his pleasures and pains, embracing what is fine and offended by what is not fine”

The third person, in “getting it right” (*katorthoun*) in voice and body, contrasts with the second person’s success in this domain, but in “getting it right” in pleasures and pains, he contrasts with the second’s failure. His inability “to think of it” (*dianoeisthai*) contrasts with the first person’s correct conception (*hêgoumenos*, c4) of what is fine and shameful. On the emendation favoured by England (rejected by Schöpsdau but reflected in the translation of Brisson/Pradeau) the translation would be not “or think of it” but “in the way he thinks of it” (*hê(i) dianoeisthai*), in which case the the third person, like the first, would have correct thoughts about what is *kalon*.

II

Virtue, not Pleasure, is the Standard of Fine Choral Music

654d5-660a8

Having stated that fine song and dance are the medium by which education is to be cultivated and maintained, the Athenian now asks what such fineness amounts to. He rejects the popular view that music is fine simply insofar as it is

pleasant, and proposes instead a standard of virtue: choral song and dance is fine insofar as it depicts the speech and actions of virtue (654e3-655b8). Taking pleasure in the behaviour of wicked characters shapes one's character accordingly (655b9-656b8). Thus it is important for the legislator to establish and enforce standards for appropriate music (656c1-657c2). The view that pleasure is the criterion of correct music derives its apparent plausibility from the intimate relation between our feelings of pleasure and our judgments about goodness (657c3-658a2). Against this the Athenian urges that: different kinds of people find different kinds of music most pleasant (658a3-d10); the most authoritative verdict is that of the best educated (658e1-5); and in musical education, the pleasures endorsed by the best educated should be used to shape those of the inferior (658e6-659c5). Thus, he concludes, the proper task for the composers of choral music is to make pleasant the speech and actions of virtue by casting them into the pleasant vehicles of beautiful language, harmony, and rhythm (659c5-660a8)

654d7-e1 “Without this knowledge... we could never tell whether there is any safeguard (*phulax*) for education, or where it is to be found”

A reference to the Athenian's stated intention at 653a3 to establish that drinking parties are a safeguard (*sôteria*) to education. While drinking parties are not presently the focus of discussion, the question here raised about what makes song and dance fine, will turn out to occupy (at least some of) those who participate in drinking parties (members of the chorus of Dionysus _____)

(654e3-655b8) *Fine choral music depicts the speech and actions of virtue*

Having concluded that fine choral dance is the medium for education (654b11-c2), the Athenian now turns to consider what kind of choral performance is fine.

654e4-5 “fine gesture (*schêma*), tune (*melos*), song (*ôidên*), and dance (*orchêsin*)”

Gesture (*schêma*) and tune (*melos*) are the material of dance and song, respectively, as is clear below at 655a5.

655a1-2 “will their gestures (*schêmata*) and utterances (*phthengmata*) be similar...”

Here the Athenian is talking about the real behaviour of a person, not the enactment of such behaviour in song and dance; hence his use of ‘gestures’ and ‘utterances’ instead of the more usual pair “gestures and tunes” (as at 654e4, e9, 655a5, a7; cf. 669c5-8. Strictly speaking, *melos* (tune) is a combination of words (*logos*), harmony, and rhythm (*Rep.* 398c-d). Thus the tunes (*melê*) are conceived of as the utterances of a person, and the “schêmata” as the movements of his/her body. When these are set into rhythms and harmony, the result is song and dance (655a4-7).

655a4-8 “while it is correct to call a tune or gesture “well rhythmmed” (*eurhuthmon*) or “harmonious” (*euarmoston*)... it is not to correct to call them “beautifully coloured” (*euchrôn*), to use the metaphor employed by chorus masters”

While he objects here to the using ‘colour’ to describe music, the Athenian will later, at 669c4, use the term to refer to a feature of music, in a context in which, like the present one, also invokes the notions of being “well rhythmmed” (*eurhuthmon*) and “harmonious” (*euarmoston*), explaining that this is a matter of a choral work’s having rhythm and harmony (mode) that are appropriate to its gestures and tunes. The Athenian’s concern here, by contrast, is with fine gestures and tunes conceived independently of their specifically musical features (e.g. harmony and rhythm): whether they represent the actions and utterances of virtuous people (see 655b2-6 and note ad loc). Thus the present passage’s concern is what will later be listed (669b1-3) as the second of three criteria for evaluating song and dance, while the deferred question about what is well rhythmmed and harmonious concerns the third criterion. See also notes on 655b2-6 and 669a7-b3

655b2-3 “going on at great length about all the cases”

i.e. all the virtues, not just courage.

655b3-6 “all the gestures and tunes connected with virtue of soul or body (the virtue itself or a representation—*eikonos*) are fine, while all those connected with vice are the opposite”

Virtue is the standard for fine gestures and utterances: fine “melodies” (*mele*) and gestures (*schêmata*) are those characteristic of a virtuous character—both in the case of the activities of real persons, and in the case of representations of those activities. The Athenian here betrays his assumption, to be made explicit later, that choral music is a representative (*eikastikê*) or imitative (*mimetike*) art (667c10, e10, 668a6-7). Choral music in particular, he is about to say, imitates

the characters (*tropoi*) of different people (655d5; repeated Book VII 798d9; cf. *Rep.* 392d-397b). Thus the representations of virtue he mentions here are gestures and songs of choral performance. Thus the present passage implies that fine tunes and gestures are those that imitate or “represent” the actions and utterances of virtuous people, although, contra Hatzistavrou 2011: 367-8, the Athenian is not here insisting on a representational standard. He will do so later at 667b-668b. Here he is insisting on the standard of virtue, without addressing precisely how to articulate that standard in the case of representations of human activity. On choral music as imitating what is fine, see also 668b2 and note ad loc, as well as note on 669a7-b3.

(655b9-656b8) *Taking pleasure in wicked characters shapes one’s own character accordingly*

We now turn to the pleasures that choral dance elicits in us (originally introduced into the discussion at 654d2-3). The Athenian begins by noting that people vary considerably in how pleasant they find different choral dances, then raises the question of what accounts for this divergence (655b9-c3). What follows is an extremely puzzling stretch of text, which may be divided into three parts:

1. 655c4-d4: *questions and opinions about the pleasant and the fine;*
2. 655d5-656a6: *an explanation of how a single person could come to have pleasures opposed to what he thinks is fine;*
3. 656a7-b8: *an explanation of the dangers of taking pleasure in music that portrays bad characters.*

While the relevance of (1), (2), and (3) to the question that elicits them is not immediately obvious, a thread that unites the entire discussion is the assumption, made explicit at 655e1-5, that what we experience as pleasant seems fine to us. The upshot for the discussion of education through choral music is that choral music must train us to take pleasure in behaviour that is actually fine.

655c3-d4

(1) opinions about the pleasant and the fine

655c3 “What ... causes us to stray?” (*to peplanêkos hêmas*).

(Alt: “What ...causes us to diverge”). The participle (*peplanêkos*) is difficult to translate here, as the verb *planân*, repeated at the end of the paragraph, d3) ranges from ‘wander’ in the sense of varying (e.g., “the variety in our response – as Schöpsdau, Mouze 2005: 156-7), to ‘err’ (wander off the correct path – as Brisson/Pradeau). The latter sense best fits the use at the end of the paragraph,

where ‘mallon’ (“even more”) implies that *planân* is on a continuum with the unspeakable error mentioned in d2-3—although the explanation that follows (655d5-656a5), at least at the beginning, might explain inter personal variation; see Mouze 158-9). Here, however, the Athenian may be trading on the ambiguity, saying at least that we stray *from each other* in what pleases us, and perhaps also implying (what he will make clear later is his view) that we thereby stray from the truth.

655c4-5 *“Is it that the same things are not fine for all of us, or that the same things are fine, but not all the same things appear to be fine”*

More literally: “...or that the same things are fine but not do not appear to be the same.” The Greek is imprecise and colloquial, as is typical of quantifier use in a natural language.

We are faced with the two alternatives posed here by the Athenian (henceforth, “the dilemma”) if we combine the observation he has just made, about the variation in what pleases us (655b9-c2), with the assumption made explicit below at 655e1-5 (and implied at 655c5-8; see note ad loc): that what we take pleasure in seems to us to be fine. This yields the implication that different things appear to us to be fine; hence the question arises as to whether there is any difference between what seems to us to be fine (because it pleases us), and what really is fine. Those who accept the common view that he is about to identify as impious—that pleasure is the criterion of what is fine in music (655c8-d2) —must endorse the first horn of the dilemma. The second horn would therefore be the position to defend for those who, like the Athenian, reject the view that pleasure is the criterion of what is fine. (He rejects it explicitly at ___ and articulates a detailed alternative at ___).

655c5-8 *“For presumably no one would say that the choral dances of vice are finer than those of virtue, or that he takes pleasure in the gestures of wickedness while others find enjoyment in an opposing Muse...”*

The “choral dances of vice” and the “gestures” of wickedness are to be understood as at 655b3-6: they depict the actions of vicious people. The Athenian here presents the first two of four observations that he will make, over 655c5-656a5, about what people say on the subject of what is pleasant and what is fine. (They are numbered consecutively across the notes ad loc) :

[1] No one would say that vice is finer than virtue.

[2] No one would say that he takes pleasure in the gestures and sounds of vice, while those with the opposing pleasures take pleasure in virtue.

He offers these as a pair in support (gar, c5) of the dilemma he has just posed. [2] concerns precisely the situation in which different people enjoy different choral performances: those who notice that their pleasures are at variance with those of others will affirm that the behaviour they enjoy is virtuous rather than vicious. [1] allows this claim about virtue and vice in [2] to be translated into claim about what is fine and shameful. Hence the two claims together amount to the view that everyone thinks that what they take pleasure in is fine – and this, we have seen, is an assumption that makes sense of the preceding dilemma (see note on 655c4-5). Alternatively, one might suppose (with Schöpsdau) that the Athenian offers [1] and [2] in support of his preferred answer to that dilemma (that things are fine regardless of how they appear to us); however, [1] and [2] fall short of attributing to most people the view that those with opposing pleasures to theirs are taking pleasure in vice or what is shameful. They are compatible with both horns of the dilemma.

655c8-d2 *“but (kai to i) most people do say (legousi ge) that correctness in music consists in the ability to provide pleasure to the soul...”*

This third observation about what people say concerns a doctrine which the Athenian is about to classify as “impious to utter” d2-3, and against which he will later marshal a sustained attack at ____:

[3] Most people say that music is correct to the extent that it provides pleasure.

If the correctness (*orthotês*) is to be understood as being fine (*kalon*) (as indicated by 667c6) then [3] notes a majority opinion in support of the first horn of the dilemma articulated at 655c4-5, which is posed on the basis of [1] and [2]. The adversative force of the *kai to i* is focussed on what people *do say (legousi ge)*, as opposed to what they don’t say, which is reported in [1] and [2]. Alternatively, one might suppose *kai to i* to mark [3] as an objection to the Athenian’s answer to the dilemma; however, the Athenian has as yet to indicate what his answer is. For more on correctness (*orthotês*) in music see 657a-c and 667b-669b.

655d2-3 *“But while the former is unacceptable and altogether impious to utter, here is something even more likely to lead us astray (planân hêmas)”*

The Athenian signals his rejection of [3], which he will subject to examination starting at 657c and reject for its disastrous educational consequences at 658e-659c. But before taking on that challenge, which will preoccupy his attention for much of the rest of Book II, he draws our attention to an even more pernicious doctrine, which he will make explicit in the next paragraph (655d5-656a5):

[4] Some people take pleasure in things that they call shameful (*aischron* 655e4) or wicked (*ponêrous*, 656a6).

We can explain why the Athenian thinks it relevant to address [4] in the present context by noting that the attitude reported in [4] is one way in which a person might suppose that what is pleasant diverges from what is fine, i.e., from a first-person perspective: what pleases me is shameful. By contrast, the Athenian rejects the pleasure criterion from a third person stance: what pleases people is not thereby fine. In rejecting [4], the Athenian will argue that such people do not in fact truly believe that the behaviour that pleases them is shameful—a point that also dissolves the apparent tension between [4] and [2]). On “leading us astray”, see note on 655c3.

655d5-656a6

(2) *Enjoying what one thinks is shameful*

We are given first a brief account of the psychological factors giving rise to (i) our verdicts about what is fine and shameful, and (ii) our reactions of pleasure and pain, and second that account is employed to explain how (iii) one could come to call something “shameful but pleasant”.

655d5-6 *“choral performance is a matter of imitating types (tropoi) of people in all kinds of actions and fortune,*

A person’s ‘*tropos*’ is his or her character, as at Rep. 329d. The language here recalls Rep. 399a5-c4, which describes the range of vicissitudes in which imitative music will present a dramatic character’s response, a theme developed at length in Laws VII 814e6-815d5. Music in general is treated as an imitative (*mimêtikê*) or representational (*eikastikê*) art in Laws II at 667d-668c; cf. 669e, 670e. Imitation is also discussed in later books: IV 719c, VI 764d-e, VII 796b, 798d, 812b-c, 817. On this passage see also “The Object of Imitation” in the note on 669b1-3.

655d6-7 *“the performers draw both on their characters and on imitation”*

That is, to perform song and dance characteristic of a courageous person, one either draws on one’s own courageous character (*êthos* – used here as an alternate for ‘*tropos*’ in the previous line) if one has it, or if one lacks such a character, one imitates the actions of a person who has such a character. In the former case, the performance will be pleasant, according to what follows, but the latter will not (at least for the reasons about to be given). Presumably the

composer makes the behaviour pleasant in the latter case by attaching to it the pleasant media of harmony and rhythm (cf. 654a).

655d7-e1 “those for whom the words, songs ... are true to type (*pros tropou*), either in keeping with their nature (*phusis*) or with their training (*ethos*) or with both...”

One’s *tropos* (character) is here distinguished into one’s nature (*phusis*) and one’s “training”: *ethos* or *sunêtheia*, the latter used equivalently for *the former* at e4-6. *Ethos* and *sunêtheia* are used at 658e3 and 666d9-10 respectively to refer to a trained or educated disposition (and even for a natural disposition at 673d1), but both are also used to describe the process of training itself (as at 653b5-6, and 663c1 (*ethos*), and 656d8 (*sunêtheia*), as is the verb *ethizesthai* at 659d5 and 660a3. In all these contexts (with the exception of 673d1) the relevant term is translated ‘training’; cf. 632d5-6 in Book I, where *ethos* (also translated training) is contrasted with technical expertise as a source of knowledge. Both senses (disposition and training) are operative in the use of *ethos* and *ethizesthai* in Book III, 681b1-3. These terms are often translated ‘habit’ or “habituate”, but the English terms have a strongly behavioural connotation, whereas the Athenian uses the Greek terms to refer to a disposition to feel, not just to act. ‘Training’ has also been used to render *gumnazein* (athletic or physical training) at 635c2-3, 647c9, 648c3, and 6483-7; at 626b5 *gumnazein* is used, perhaps figuratively, for more cultural training. On the distinction between *êthos* and *ethos*, see note on 625a5.

In saying that some aspects of a person’s *tropos* are due to nature, the Athenian does not mean that they cannot be changed by training, only that they do not arise from training. His point is to allow that one’s natural disposition can be changed or shaped (for better or for worse) by training, but that such a change may be incomplete, leaving a person with an inconsistent disposition (as he is about to describe at 655e5-656a5).

655e2-5 “...must enjoy them and praise them and call them fine, while those for whom they are contrary to nature, type, or training cannot enjoy or praise them, and will call them shameful ...”

On nature, type, and training, see previous note. We are told here that those choral works just described as “in keeping with our character” (*pros tropou*, d7) are pleasant to us, while those that are contrary to our character (*para tropon*) are unpleasant. Presumably this means that for a courageous person it is pleasant to perform songs and dances that depict the words and actions characteristic of courage, and unpleasant to perform songs depicting cowardly actions or words. Cf. 669c and Book VII, 802c-e where different rhythms and

harmonies are appropriate to male, female, slavish, and free character types. We are also told that such pleasure and pain goes along with the behavior of praising and “calling fine” the thing that pleases one. Such behaviour is the external manifestations of the “appearance” that the behaviour is fine. Thus here too, as in the dilemma posed above (see note on ____), the Athenian assumes that what pleases us seems to be fine. At 657c5-6 the Athenian will state the connection between pleasure and evaluative judgments more explicitly (see note ad loc).

655e5-656a2 *“those in whom some aspects of their nature are correct, while some of their training (sunêtheia) is opposed, or some of their training is correct but some of their nature opposed, will utter praises that conflict with their pleasures, calling such things “pleasant (ponêra) but wicked.”*

Having explained how one comes to take pleasure in choral music and to think it fine (655d5-e5), the Athenian now explains how one can come to have pleasures opposed to what one thinks fine. Thus he accounts for how people arrive at the view announced at 655d3 to be “even more likely to lead us astray.” The harmful consequences of the straying will be explained next at 656a7-b8. Here we are given the cause of the “straying”: either one’s “nature” or one’s training (*sunêtheia*) is incorrect. The Athenian does not simply say that nature and training are inconsistent, but that one of the two is incorrect: thus displaying his rejection of the first horn of the dilemma at 655c4-5.

Note that these remarks concern the experience of choral music – it is not a general discussion of psychological conflict. The divided response here described (being pleased in what one calls shameful) should be distinguished from the phenomena of psychological conflict described in the puppets metaphor in Book I (644-5) (pace Mouze 2005: 160). In the puppets passage, conflicting impulses issuing from the gold and iron strings, respectively, pull a person in opposing directions: one struggles to do what one’s reasoning (*logismos*) thinks is right, against the opposing pull of pleasures and pains. But the “nature” and “habit” that issue in the conflicting responses are both aspects of the iron strings; each is treated as capable of giving rise either to the affective response (pleasure/displeasure), or to the evaluative assessment (praising, calling it fine/shameful). These evaluative responses are intimately bound up with the pleasures and pains that, at 653a-c, that must be trained (*eithizesthai*) to follow reason.

656a2-5 *“In the presence of those whom they think wise, they are ashamed to move their bodies in such dances ... although they enjoy them among themselves (par’ hautois)”*

Taking *para* + dative like Fr. *chez* (as at 656d6; more literally: “at their own homes”). Alternatively: “... inside themselves” (thus Saunders, Brisson/Pradeau, Schöpsdau.) But this is not a standard meaning of *para* + dative, and the Athenian’s point is not that such imperfectly educated agents hide the pleasure they feel while performing shameful songs in the presence of their betters. Rather their sense of shame either restrains them from engaging in those activities in the presence of better people (or makes them feel shame if discovered in the act), but when on their own (or among bad characters – cf. 656b3-4) they enjoy performing them. NB shame is one of the iron strings (cf. ____)

656a7-b8

(3) *benefits and harms from choral pleasures*

While above ____ the Athenian explained the causes of our being pleased with some pieces of choral music and displeased with others, here he considers the effect of experiencing such pleasures and pains, with particular focus on the question of whether the choral music to be performed on a regular basis, as part of the educational curriculum (see ____) may include (contrary to ____) songs and dances depicting vicious people. He identifies two harmful consequences of enjoying such music (656b3-6): one’s censure of such people becomes insincere, and one becomes like them oneself.

656b1-3 “It’s just the same as when someone, through associating with bad men of wicked character (*ponêrois êthesin*) enjoys and welcomes their company instead of disliking them ...”

Character here translates *êthos*, used in place of *tropos*, translated “type of person’ in 655d5-e5.

We are here given an account how a person whose nature (*phusis*) is decent comes to have an *sunêtheia* that is incorrect (as at 655d5-e5). Regularly performing (or experiencing) choral music depicting vicious behaviour is like spending time with vicious people, thereby coming to enjoy their company. A point repeated at 669b8-c1. See Mouze 2005: 161-4; Hatzistavrou 2011: 362-366.

656b3-4 “and condemns their conduct as if playing a game (*hôs en paidias moirai*), with only a dreamer’s grasp of its badness”

Reading *autou tèn mochtherian* in b4, with England; Schöpsdau favors the alternative reading *hautou* (reflexive), which would yield the translation: “with only a dreamer’s grasp of his own badness”.

In keeping with the general claim above that one's praises and censurs go along with one's feelings of pleasure and pain, respectively (655d7-e5), the Athenian here betrays the assumption that those feelings of pleasure and pain affect the security or depth of those evaluations: the person who condemns a bad activity but also enjoys it has an impaired grasp of its badness (or, on the alternative reading, of his own badness in enjoying it). Thus the person who fully grasps what is fine and shameful must love and take pleasure in the one and hate and be pained at the other. While such proper pleasures and pains will not suffice for wisdom (as 653a), the Athenian here indicates that they are necessary for it. On "playing a game" (*paidias*, b3) vs. being serious (*spoudé*, 656a5), see note on 635b5.

(656c1-657c2) Musical composition must be strictly controlled

Having just established that choral music depicting vicious characters will make its performers vicious (and similarly for vicious character), the Athenian now concludes that the legislator (whose concern with making the citizens virtuous was made clear in Book I ___) must exercise strict controls over the choral compositions to be used in education (656c1-8). He hails Egypt as an example of such successful control (656d1-657a2). Only "fine" (___) or "correct" (657c ___) music is to be performed by the youth of the city and once the standards of such correctness are determined (a task addressed later at ___), no composer is to be allowed to transgress them (656d5-657a2).

656c2-3 "education (*paideia*) and recreation (*paidiá*) in musical matters"

A play on the similar words for education (*paideia*) and for play, amusement, or recreation (*paidiá*). At 657c3 "education and *paidia*" is restated as "music and recreation". On the range of the term *paidia*, see note of 635b5. In the present context, as at 635b, 649d, 650a, 657c-d, and 685a, its connection to pleasure is especially salient.

656c6-7 "whatever the effect this may have on their development towards virtue or wickedness"

More literally: "bringing about whatever may chance regarding (*pros*) virtue or wickedness" (taking *hoti* as the subject of *tuchê(i)* in b6: thus Schöpsdau, against England). On England's preferred reading, the effect on the children is to give them whatever character (virtuous or vicious) the poet happens to have.

656d7-8 “the youth of the city must be trained to practice (*metacheirizesthai tais sunêtheiais*) fine gestures and songs”

That properly educated youths must perform fine songs and dances was asserted at 655c. On *sunêtheia* as training (as at 666d9-10) see note on 655d7-e1. On choral performance as a way to shape character, see note on 656b1-3.

656d8-9 “Once they established which these are and what kind they are,”

Identifying these standards for fine choral music will be the Athenian’s focus from 667b-671a; he will reject the standard of pleasure at 657c-659c; cf 667b-668b. On what these standards consist in, see next note.

656d9-e3 “they put them on exhibit in their temples and allowed no painter or any other fashioner of gestures of any kind to introduce new forms (*kainotomein*) or invent (*epinoein*) anything other than in accordance with the ancestral tradition”

Here control of the visual arts is used to illustrate the way in which choral compositions are to be regulated. As at 424b7-c6, the prohibition is not against composing new works, but introducing new musical forms—*kainotomein*, as at 657b4-7; see note ad loc. That new songs and dances will be allowed, even encouraged, is indicated at 665c5-7. The point of the restrictions invoked here by the Athenian is to make sure that any new compositions are as fine (*kalon*, 657a1-2) as the old ones. What the requisite musical orthodoxy consists in is not further specified here. Note that he has already given at least a preliminary answer to the question, what makes songs and dances fine (654b-c): they depict the words and actions of virtuous people (655a-b), but this answer does not identify the specifically musical forms (on analogy with the styles of painting in the Egyptian example) in which such behaviour is to be depicted.

His later discussion will require that the kind of rhythms and harmonies (“modes”) be appropriate to the gestures and songs (669b-670e), which, in conjunction with the restriction to the depiction of virtuous activities (655a-b) would (on the musical theory of Damon) effectively require e.g. that music be in the Dorian and Phrygian “harmonies” (see “Harmony and rhythm as imitations of character” in note on Laws 669c3-8). (It is perhaps these “harmonies” and rhythms that are the “kinds” (*tropoi*) and “forms” (*eidê*) of music that are distinguished from the musical compositions themselves at *Rep.* 424b7-c6.) While the Athenian here suggests that it will suffice to display exemplars of the allowed forms, his later

discussion will require “wise judges” to discern whether the appropriate harmonies and rhythms are employed (see notes on 670a3-671a1).

657a4 “An extreme (*hyperballontôs*) feat of legislation and statecraft indeed (*men oun*)”

The Athenian here endorses Klinias’ remark, “that’s amazing” (*thaumaston legeis*, a3), the latter being not an expression of disbelief (as Des Places, England, Schöpsdau, and Saunders construe it), but a confirmation of the Athenian’s own “[y]ou will be amazed to hear” (*thauma akousai*, 656d5); thus Brisson/Pradeau. Denniston’s citation of the passage (1950: 475) does not select between affirmative and adversative senses of *men oun* (Denniston 1950: 475).

657a6-8 “it is possible to take the bold step (*tharrounta*) of establishing securely in legislation songs that conform to what is naturally correct (*tên orthoteta phusei*)”

The transmitted text here poses intractable difficulties (discussed by England, Saunders 1972, Schöpsdau) some of which are alleviated by construing *tharrounta* as invoking boldness rather than confidence (see notes on *tharros* in Book I ____). Schöpsdau rightly draws our attention to the three-fold occurrence of the verb in this paragraph. On natural “correctness” (*orthotês*) see note on 657b3.

657b2-3 “the standards of correctness in these matters (*autôn... tên orthotêta*)”

More literally: “the correctness in these matters”. The same term, *orthotês*, is used at 657a8, where it is translated “what is ... correct”. It is clear from 657a1-2 and 656d7-9 that the Athenian understands correct music as fine (*kalon*) music. The Athenian will return to the topic of correctness in music at 667b-670e, again with a view to identifying music that is fine.

657b4-7 “the pursuit (*zêtêsis*) of pleasure and pain in the constant pursuit of novelty in musical forms (*kainê(i) mousikê(i)*) has no great power to undermine (*diaphtheirai*) the sanctified (*kathierôtheisan*) choral music

The phrase “pursuit of pleasure and pain” must be shorthand for “pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain” since pain an object of avoidance rather than pursuit (634a8, 792d1, 875b8), hence its status as an “opposing advisor” to pleasure at 644c. The “novelty in musical forms” (*kainê mousikê*) must be what is referred to as “introducing new forms” (*kainotomein*) at 656e2 (see note on 656d9-e3). [*K*]athierôtheisan recalls the connection of music to religious festivals at 653c-d and the term is used again for the officially sanctioned music in Book VII (799a4, 809b6, 813a2). The Athenian’s point is that giving the correct musical forms a solid (cf. *bebaiôs* 657a7) institutional basis in religious rites is a sufficient and powerful antidote to the natural craving for novelty. On the power of religious norms to combat the attraction of certain pleasures, see also Book VIII 838a-c.

(657c3-660a8) Why pleasure is not the standard for judging choral music

Having established that the goal of musica education is to shape citizens’ pleasures and pains to be those of a virtuous person (___) and that therefore legislators must take steps to ensure that only fine music is performed in the choral music that is the medium by which such pleasures and pains are cultivated (___), the Athenian now turns to consider the popular thesis that fineness in music consists simply in its ability to give pleasure. After acknowledging the considerations that give the thesis its apparent plausibility (657c3-658a3), he details at length its specific consequences (658a4-d10), which conflict with the assumption, shared among the three interlocutors, that the verdict of the best educated (specifically the elders) is authoritative on the relative merits of musical compositions (658e1-5). He concludes by remarking that the institutions for making such discriminations must be such that the virtuous select the music that will improve the pleasures of the spectators and performers (658e6-659c8).

The apparent plausibility of the pleasure criterion (657c3-658a2)

The intimate relation between feelings of pleasure, judgments about goodness, and choral music gives initial plausibility to the thesis that the finest choral music is that which gives the most pleasure.

657c3-4 “correct use (*orthê chreia*) of music (*mousikê*) and recreation (*paidia*) ...”

Paidia in the sense of pleasure or amusement is operative here, as is clear at 657e4. See 656c2-3 and general note on *paidia* at 635b5; cf. 673a7-8 and note. The notion of “use” (*chrêia*) here is difficult to construe, as the explanation about to be given (657c5-6; see note) cites the intimate relation between our feelings of pleasure and our judgments of value, rather than a way of “using” or employing” music. “Use” here might have the same sense as the cognate verb “*chrêtai*” at 654c4-5, where someone who has correct views about what is fine and shameful “treats (*chrêtai*) them as such” – and it is possible to interpret the latter as feeling pleasure to the things one thinks fine, and distress at those one thinks shameful (see note ad loc).

657c5-6 “When we think we are doing well (*eu prattein*) we are pleased (*chairoumen*) and ... when we are pleased we think we are doing well”

A more explicit statement of the relation between feelings of pleasure and evaluative judgments than the implications at in 655e1-5 (see note ad loc). Not only does one praise and call (*prosagoreuein*) “fine” what one enjoys (655e1-5), but one thinks it good. *Eu prattein* is a synonym for *eudaimonia* (happiness); see note on _____. On the connection between fine (*kalon*) and good (*agathon*; adverb: *eu*) see note on _____.

657c8-d2 “unable to keep quiet (*hêsuchian agein*)... eager to perform a chorus (*choreuein*)”

“Keeping quiet” (*hêsuchian agein*) encompasses both keeping silent and keeping still, while *choreuein* involves both singing and dancing. The inability to refrain from sound and movement recalls the juvenile propensity to engage in both that is invoked as the origin of choral dance at 653e1-3 and 673a7-8; see notes ad loc.

657d5 “We [sc. elders] take nostalgic pleasure in setting up competitions..”

Competitions between choruses were a regular feature of religious festivals in Plato’s time, discussed further in VII _____. Their contestants are the “festival performers” of e1. That the elders are the proper judges of the relative merits of musical works is reiterated at 658e-a and 670a-b.

657d9-e3 “So we don’t find ... entirely off the mark.. the opinion...that the most accomplished and deserving of victory is the one who gives us the most pleasure and delight”

It is because we take pleasure in the performances we think are fine, and think fine those performances that please us (657c5-6; see note ad loc) that we tend to might think that pleasure is the criterion of fine performance. Thus Klinias endorses pleasure as the criterion at 658a3. The Athenian endorses a qualified version of the principle at 658e6-659a1; but he rejects the criterion outright at 667e-668a; see note on 668a9 and 658e6-9.

***The divergence of verdicts on the pleasure criterion* (658a3-e5)**

Those of different age, sex, and education would judge different compositions most pleasant. However, the most authoritative judgment would be from those with the best education: the elders. the Athenian here sets out to raise problems for the pleasure criterion, pointing out that it conflicts with his and his opponents conception of elders (as at ___) as the judges of musical competitions in which younger age groups compete.

658a4 “we should not be content with a hasty ‘perhaps’”

More literally: “let us not judge quickly (*tachu*) in such a matter”; ‘*tachu*’ refers back to *Kleinias* answer ‘*tach’ an’* (a3) translated “perhaps” (alternatively: probably).

658a5 “dividing (*diairountes*) the matter into its parts (*kata mere*)”

On the method of division (*diairesis*) see note on _____ (BK I). The Athenian proceeds, over 658a-e, to take the topic of pleasure in music quite generally, and to divide it into the pleasures of different kinds of people, which have different sources.

658c3 “... which is the rightful (*dikaiôs*) the winner?”

Note the assumption that there is a rightful winner. It is his interlocutor’s acceptance of this assumption to which the Athenian will appeal in order to discredit the pleasure criterion. Klinias, in taking this question to be “strange” shows (c4), and his explanation of that strangeness (see note on 658c4-6), shows that he has no idea that the pleasure criterion puts his own judgments on a footing with those of every other person, a point the Athenian is only about to make.

658c4-6 “How could anyone answer ... without having listened to each of the contestants himself?”

Kleinias responds as if he is being asked for his own opinion about which composition should win. The Athenian will appeal to this presupposition at 658e1-5. This indicates that Klinias endorses the pleasure criterion (658a3) primarily as a reflection on the standards that he himself uses to evaluate music. Had he anticipated the direction of the Athenian’s questioning (in the way a modern reader might), he would have asked “how could anyone answer without knowing the composition of the audience...?”

658c7-8 “shall I give you the strange (*atopos*) answer”

Klinias has evidently not considered the consequences of the pleasure criterion about to be drawn, which conflict with his assumptions about that the elders are the authoritative judges.

658c10-d8 “if the very small children are delivering the verdict, they will select the puppet performer... But we old men... would declare [the rhapsode] to be the overwhelming winner”

The Athenian predicts that the audience’s verdicts will differ according to the age, sex, and education. When he claims, subsequently, that the verdict of his own age and sex class (old men) is most authoritative, since their training is the “best by far in any city anywhere today” (658e3-4), the comparison is presumably with that of other age and sex groups.

658e1-3 “you and I at any rate (*ge*) must declare that the winners selected by our age group are the correct ones (*orthôs nikân*)...”

More literally: “it is necessary for you and me at any rate (*ge*) to declare that...” The claim of necessity is striking. One might expect, given the restrictive *ge*, that it expresses the psychological necessity noted above (655d-656a; cf. 657c) that one think finest whatever pleases oneself the most. But then every one of the groups he has just mentioned will be under the same necessity to affirm the superiority of their own verdict. Instead, he goes on to give a reason to support of his own privileged discriminatory role (e3-5; see note ad loc)

658e3-4 “For our training (*ethos*) seems to be the best by far in any city anywhere today”

‘Training here translates ‘*ethos*’ (see note on 655d7-e1). *Ethos* refers to the cultivated disposition alternately referred to as *ethos* or *sunetheia* at 655e1 that is distinguished from one’s *physis*, as separate aspects of one’s character (*tropos*) at 655d-656a). It is the result of musical training (656d8). The evaluative stance the Athenian here takes to the results of his own affective training is remarkably like the attitude expressed in the puzzling passage at 653b5-6, but the main force of the present claim is that in any city today, the cultivated disposition of the elders is superior to that of other age groups.

The restriction of the comparison to the present (nun) might, as England suggests, leave room for the further expertise that members of the Chorus of Dionysus will need (670a-670e). At any rate, the Athenian is not seeking to prove that the education of the elders is best; he simply appeals to their own assumption that they themselves are the authoritative judges of musical compositions (cf. 657d5) to show that this stance conflicts with the pleasure criterion.

Music should improve the pleasures of the audience
(658e6-659c5)

Having appealed to his interlocutor’s assumption that the best educated people are the authoritative judges of what is fine in music, the Athenian now connects this point to the goals of the education that uses that music to shape character. The judges of choral music should not be swayed by the approval of the audience, since the function of music at those festivals (as was said at 654a) is to shape the pleasures and pains of the mass audience, not to reinforce those they already have. Hence the poets should take their standards from the qualified judges, not from the audience.

658e6-9 “I agree with the majority this far at any rate, that music is to be judged (*krineitai*) by pleasure—not, however, the pleasure it affords any random person. I would say (*schedon*), that Muse is finest who delights the best people ...”

The majority view is stated at 657d9-e3 and will be explicitly rejected at 668a9 (see note ad loc). Note that the Athenian’s positive statement of his view (“that must is finest...”) does not endorse pleasure as the *criterion* by which the best people evaluate music; rather he notes the extensional equivalence between the finest music and that which pleases the best educated. When he says below that

such judges require wisdom (*phronêsis*) and courage (659a3), he implies that their verdict is an expression of wisdom. Thus there is no substantive conflict between what he says here and his categorical rejection of the pleasure criterion at 668a9. See note on 668a9. The criteria by which the best educated will judge (*krinein*) music will be detailed at length at 669b-670e. (Hatzistavrou proposes to avoid the conflict by supposing that pleasure is a criterion for the Athenian only in the sense that good music must be pleasant to the young people it is intended to educate (2011: 367) but the present text clearly tells against that proposal.

659a3-4 “they must have not only wisdom (*phronêsis*) but also courage”

The requirement of wisdom (*phronêsis*) is explained at 659a4-6), then that of courage at 659a6-b1. On the wisdom (*phronêsis*) involved in complete virtue, see note on 653a7. Presumably here it is used to include the expertise outlined at 668b-670e for evaluating musical compositions.

659b5-6 “The Sicilian and Italian law (*nomos*)

Here ‘*nomos*’ probably indicates a practice or norm rather than a statute. See note on term *nomos* Book I.

659c3-4 “better characters (*êthôn*) than their own”

‘Character’ here translates ‘*êthos*’ – as at 656b1-2 (see note ad loc); It is the “type” (*tropos*) invoked at 655d5-e5

Composers should put serious content into pleasant media
(659c5-660a8)

The Athenian concludes his rejection of the pleasure criterion and draws together the strands of his previous accounts of education and music. The job of the poets is to put into pleasant vehicles (fine phrases, harmony, and rhythm) the speech and actions of virtue. Songs are “charms” to make serious matters pleasant.

659c9 “the third or fourth time...”

The account of education about to be recapitulated was first sketched in Book I at 643c-d and set out more fully at the beginning of Book II, 653a-c. On the relation between the three definitions see Mouze 2005: 113-119.

659d2-3 “education draws and guides children toward the correct reason (*logos*) that is articulated by the law (*nomos*) and that the worthiest and eldest citizens agree to be correct, on the basis of their experience (*empeiria*)”

More literally: “education is a draw (*holkê*) and pull (*agogê*)...” which recalls the language of the puppet metaphor in Book I where the gold and iron cords are pulls (*agôgê*) that draw against each other (*anthekein*) (see note on 644e5-645a1). This identifies education as the “assistance” required by the golden cord (see Schöpsdau ____).

To his previous statements that education trains a person’s pleasures and pains to agree (*sumphônein*) with what reason (653b1-6), and that the elders are the authoritative judges of music (658e-659a) the Athenian here adds the elaborations that the reason (*logos*) in question is (1) articulated in the law (cf. 644d2-3, 645a5, b3-8); and (2) expressed in the judgments of those elders. Thus the goal of *sumphônia* (agreement) to be cultivated (e3) is intra-personal agreement across generations: obedience to the law and to the elders of the community, in contrast with the intra-personal (*sumphônia*) in the “complete virtue” mentioned at 653b. The experience (*empeiria*) of the old is also mentioned at 632d5. On experience see also 632d and 673c.

659d5 “trained (*ethizêtai*) to experiencing pleasures and pains...”

The same verb is used at 660a2-3. The habituation or training is what cultivates the *ethos* or *sunêtheia* mentioned as part of a person’s character type (*tropos*) at 655d7-e1 (see note ad loc). The cultivated disposition that results is called ‘education’ (*paidiea*) at 653a-c, and the training is by participation in choral music (654a)

659e1-3 “those things we call songs (*ôidai*) are in reality charms (*epôidai*) for our souls, devised for the serious purpose (*espoudasmenai*) of bringing about what we call agreement (*sumphônia*) ...

A playful etymology of meant to make the point that the pleasure afforded by song and dance (in virtue of their harmony and rhythm (654a) and “fine phrases” (660a5) attracts us to the words and gestures set into them, even if we would not antecedently find those words and gestures agreeable without this pleasant

packaging. Song is thus the medium by which the young are to be trained to delight in what their elders recognize to be good, on analogy with the way a child may be trained to take pleasure in wholesome foods by getting used to eating them in pleasant-tasting dishes. On songs as charms see also 664b, 665c, 666c and Morrow 1960: 309-12, Helmig 2003, and Mouze 2005:165-8 On “agreement” *sumphônia*, see notes on 659d2-3 and on 653b4-5.

659e3-5 “Since seriousness (*spoudê*) is more than youthful souls can bear, these charms are presented and performed as games and songs...”

On the contrast between *paidia* (here “games”; elsewhere in this translation: recreations) with seriousness (*spoudê*, e4), see note on 635b5.

660a5-6 “persuade the poets to do with their fine and laudable phrases, or failing that compel (*anagkazei*) them ...”

Alternatively: “persuade the poets using fine and laudable phrases...” (Brisson/Pradeau).

The option of persuasion is dropped when the point is restated at 660e2. While it is important that the citizens be persuaded by the legislator rather than simply forced (see _____ and note on ____; cf. 663e1-2), the Athenian does not hold the same scruples about the poets. The “fine and laudable phrases” (a5) are, with the harmony and rhythms about to be mentioned (a7), the pleasant vehicles, analogous to the pleasant-tasting dishes in the nutrition analogy (659e5-660a3). By contrast, Brisson and Pradeau construe the phrase as denoting the legislator’s means of persuading the poets.

III

The Teachings of Fine Choral Music

660b1-664b2

In response to Klinias’ proposal that only Crete and Sparta conform to the standards of fine music articulated above (660b1-d10), the Athenian makes explicit the doctrines that he expects fine music will teach. The central teaching is that the just life is happy and pleasant, while the unjust is unhappy and

unpleasant, no matter how many advantages the former lacks and the latter contains (660d11-662a8). This thesis is, to the Athenian, as “obvious” as that “Crete is an island” (662b_), but to Klinias and Megillus, who have been taught differently in their Creten and Spartan education, it is quite implausible. After offering a battery of arguments for the thesis and for the importance of persuading citizens to accept it (662c5-663e2), the Athenian concludes with the optimistic assessment that, no matter how implausible a thesis is, poets are capable of persuading children of its truth (663e3-664b2).

660b2-5 “except in my own home and that of the Lakedaimonians, I don’t know that things are actually done as you say. Rather, there is always something new (*kaina*) doing on in dance and the rest of music...”

Kleinias has in mind the Athenian’s claim that innovation in musical forms (*kainotomein*) is not to be tolerated (656d9-e3; see note ad loc), not his additional constraints on the content of that music, in particular his most recent point that the legislator must use this pleasant medium to promulgate wholesome doctrines (659e-660a). It is on the latter front that the Athenian will find Dorian music deficient.

660b6-7 “with not law (*nomoi*) but disorderly (*ataktôn*) pleasures guiding the changes”

On institutions that cater to the audience’s pleasures see 659a-c.

660c6-d1 “it is never pleasant to inveigh against errors ... although sometimes it is necessary to do so”

An anticipation of his own impending criticism of Lakedaimonian and Knossan music (660d-663e).

(660d11-661d6) Music must teach that the just are happy and the unjust unhappy

The Athenian here claims that (a) poets must be compelled to affirm a very strong thesis about the relation between justice and happiness (660e2-6). He illustrates by (b) revising the poem of Tyrtaeus (criticized in Book I 629a-e) to express this thesis (660e6-661a4), and (c) offering further theses about the relation between goodness and justice (661a4-d5). The doctrines in (a) and (c),

are not obviously identical to each other or to the doctrine of divine and human goods from Book I 631b-d.

Justice, Happiness, and Other Goods

660e2-6 *“the good man, being moderate and just, is happy and blessed— whether he is tall and strong or short and weak.. or ... wealthy— but ... the unjust man, no matter if he is “richer than Cinyras and Midas,” is wretched and lives miserably”*

‘Justice’ here is standing in for ‘virtue as a whole’ (661c4); the latter is identified in Book I as a combination of wisdom, moderation, courage, and justice (631c-d). “Happy” here (*eudaimôn*) means living well (not simply feeling satisfied or content; see note on _____ in Bk. I.) “[R]icher than Cinyras and Midas” is a quotation from a poem of Tyrtaeus (fr. 12.6 West), that is about to be rewritten to conform to the doctrine here articulated (660e6-661a4). Tyrtaeus actually wrote that even a wealthy person’s life is not worth celebrating if he lacks courage (fr. 12.11-12), the Athenian here uses the poet’s phrase to make the corresponding claim about justice rather than courage.

The poets here are required to abandon the ordinary view that whether a person is happy (living well) or not depends on such things as whether he is weak or strong, wealthy or poor, healthy or ill (these are referred to as “so-called goods” at 661c). Instead, they must affirm that one’s happiness depends entirely on whether one is just:

- (1) Anyone who is just is happy (The SUFFICIENCY thesis)
- (2) Anyone who is not just is unhappy (The NECESSITY thesis)

After illustrating how a poet like Tyrtaeus might affirm (1) and (2), the Athenian proceeds to address the question of the so-called goods at 661a4-d5 (see notes ad loc):

SO-CALLED GOODS: such things as health, good looks, wealth, etc. are
 (3) good to the just person;
 (4) bad to the unjust person.

SO-CALLED BADS: losing or lacking such things as health, good looks, wealth, etc. is in fact
 (5) good for the unjust person;
 (6) bad to the just person.

A philosophical reader might well ask what relation these doctrines have to each other, and to the doctrine of Divine and Human goods that, according to Book I, the legislator is supposed to teach to the citizens (631d2-6):

DIVINE AND HUMAN GOODS:

Human goods (health, strength, wealth, etc.) depend on the Divine Goods (wisdom, moderation, justice, and courage), which themselves all stem from wisdom.

The DIVINE AND HUMAN GOODS thesis would appear to license the NECESSITY thesis, and to be indistinguishable from the first SO-CALLED GOODS thesis, (3). However the second SO-CALLED GOODS thesis, (4), along with both SO-CALLED BADS theses, (5) and (6), are much stronger than the DIVINE AND HUMAN GOODS thesis. Bobonich 2002: 126-7, 179, 183 proposes that (4) and (5) are simply hyperbolic overstatements of the DIVINE AND HUMAN GOODS thesis, which is the core doctrine in the passage; he does not discuss (6).

The SUFFICIENCY thesis too is much stronger than the DIVINE AND HUMAN GOODS thesis. Commentators are divided on how strong a thesis about the sufficiency of virtue for happiness Plato intends to endorse here: that no matter how poor, weak, sick, or powerless a person is, s/he is happy as long as she is just? Such a doctrine will become the flagship doctrine of the Stoics later in Antiquity (where a standard debating question was “is the good man happy on the rack?”). And some interpreters of Plato today find the doctrine affirmed in *Laws* (Annas 1999: 46-9; on the contrary Irwin, 1995: 343-7). Bobonich (2002: 213-215) notes that the issue turns on whether one can be virtuous in such deprived circumstances—a point which, he notes, has little practical significance for the Athenian in the present context. On Plato’s reasons for subscribing to the DIVINE AND HUMAN GOODS thesis, commentators also diverge. Bobonich proposes, drawing on *Philebus* _____, that Plato’s view is _____ (2002: _____); Annas, by contrast proposes that for Plato, the goodness/badness consists entirely in enabling/impeding virtuous activity (check _____). But there is no direct evidence from the present passage in *Laws*, or in 631-2, that Plato is concerned here to *account* for the dependence relation, any more than he is to answer questions about how strong a sufficiency thesis he endorses.

It is worth noting that the questions left unaddressed are philosophical questions, while the present passage concerns the doctrines to be affirmed by the poets. How are the latter supposed to affirm such doctrines? The immediately following revision of Tyrtaeus (660e8-661a4) betrays the unstated presumption that a poet, in “memorializing” a person, thereby declares him to be happy. And we should keep in mind that the Athenian has just recently

summarized the way musical education is used to shape our judgments about happiness: musical experience shapes our pleasures and pains (____) and these in turn shape our judgments about happiness: We think we are doing well (eu prattein – a synonym for happiness) when we are pleased, and vice versa (657c). Thus the NECESSITY and SUFFICIENCY theses would be “affirmed” by any music that makes its listeners/performers feel pleased about virtue, and makes them feel distressed at vice. This is in fact what has been identified as “fine” music at 655b. (Note that the burden of much of the following discussion (____) will be that the choral music to be used in education must portray the just life as pleasant.)

Now, as to the SO-CALLED GOODS theses, it is again helpful to note that when he invokes them (at 661a4-d4) the Athenian is identifying the general evaluative attitudes to be inculcated in correct music, rather than defending a philosophical or theoretical point about goodness. The well raised citizen, who has been trained to be indignant/ displeased at the prospect of a bad person doing well, and thus will feel bad (“boo.. hiss!”) when a bad person receives such so-called goods. And he will be pleased when the just person receives them. Thus, by the principle of 657c, he will be judging it to be bad when the unjust person receives and good when the just person does. Thus he will be affirming the SO-CALLED GOODS thesis.

As for the SO-CALLED BADS theses: while their relevance to the doctrines at 660e2-6 is less obvious, (5) is an attitude one would expect to be held by someone who has been trained to be hostile to injustice, and to be pleased when the unjust person gets his just deserts/ is punished by the gods. (On punishment as good for the unjust person see Gorg. ____; noted by Bobonich ____). As for (6), it is the attitude one would expect a well trained person to take to the sufferings of a just person (the contrary attitude one takes to these in the case of the unjust person). Together (5) and (6) will be the attitudes of the person who has been trained to be pleased at justice and pained at injustice, and who has been trained to be pleased at the so-called goods only when the just person receives them. Given her overall positive disposition toward the just person, which will include wishing him all good things, she will be pained when he loses or fails to achieve the so-called goods.

Tyrtaeus Rewritten

The Athenian illustrates his general claim about what the poets are compelled to affirm (660e2-6), by rewriting the verses of poet Tyrtaeus whose central role in Dorian education has been emphasized in Book I ____.. While Tyrtaeus himself writes that he will not praise a person who (i) “outruns the North Wind of Thrace” or is (ii) “richer than Cinyras or Midas” unless he (iii) “lays waste the enemy, assailing him at close quarters and is emboldened at the sight of bloody slaughter” (fr. 12 West)—a view that the Athenian criticizes in book I for invoking only a partial and impoverished view of virtue in (iii) ____—the Athenian here

rewrites these verses to have Tyrtaeus proclaim that he will not praise anyone who accomplishes (i) or (iii) unless they possess justice or “complete virtue”, and has just quoted from Tyrtaeus at e5 to make the same claim about (ii) (661c4). (In the ensuing pastiche of paraphrase and selective quotation the actual quotations are set off in block quotes)

660e7-9 Your poet says (if he speaks correctly) “I would not memorialize a man” ... who fails to accomplish with justice all his so-called fine achievements ...”

This is manifestly not what Tyrtaeus wrote; thus the Athenian’s point is that Tyrtaeus, (contrary to K’s confident assumption at ---660, does not speak correctly.

The unstated presupposition that connects these remarks about who is worthy of the poet’s praise to the general principle at 660e2-6, that only the just person is happy, is that a poet who “memorializes” a person thereby declares him to be happy. This easy transition between questions of praiseworthiness and questions of happiness indicates that while, strictly speaking, happiness is a matter of what is good (agathon), while praise is directed at what is kalon (NB – pl and kalon above), the Athenian is evidently unconcerned to mark any difference between what is kalon and what is good (agathon). The things that he here says are “so-called fine” (legomena kala), he refers to below as “so-called goods” (legomena agatha, 661a4). For more on these so-called goods see note ad 661a4-5.

661a1-2 “even one who (*kai dê kai*) in such a condition (*toioutos ôn*) ‘lays waste the enemy and assails him at close quarters’, but is unjust (*adikos de ôn*)”

A multiply ambiguous set of phrases. On the most natural way of reading the sentence (followed by Brisson/Pradeau), “in such condition” means “without justice” and *toioutos* refers back to “*mê ... meta dikaiosunês*” (660e9). So construed, these lines are a straightforward application of the dogma of (660e2-5). However it is also natural to read the phrase *adikos de ôn* (661a2), as parallel to and contrastive with “*toioutos ôn*” —in which case the “in such a condition” would mean “with justice” (referring back to ‘*meta dikaiosunês*’ 660e9). However, the sentence as a whole makes more sense if we take *toioutos* in the first sense, in which case the ‘*de*’ in *adikos de ôn* would contrast not with ‘*toioutos ôn*’ but with the preceding phrase directly quoted from Tyrtaeus (“lays waste the enemy...”). So construed, ἄδικος δὲ ὢν would modify the subject of ὀρέγοιτο in a1 and would be within the scope of the original μή in e8; thus it would not modify the subject of the optatives τολμῶ and νικῶ in a2-3 or the antecedent of αὐτῶ in a4 (contra Des Places, Schöpsdau, and Brisson/Pradeau;

see note on 661a2-4)

661a2-4 “or who is emboldened (*mête tolmôî*) by the sight of bloody slaughter,’ or “outruns (*mête nikôî*) the North Wind of Thrace,” or achieves (*mête autôî gignoito*) any other of the so-called goods”

(More literally: “or one who does not <sc. with justice> feel emboldened.... or outrun... or achieve...”)

This unwieldy continuation of the relative clause begun above (*hos mê ... meta dikaiosunês*....: “who fails to accomplish with justice...”) risks saying the opposite of the message (660e4-6) that the sentence is intended to illustrate. The present translation takes the “*mê*” in “*mête tolmôî ... mête nikôî ... mête gignoito*” to apply not to the verb but to an understood “*meta dikaoisunes*”, as in the original ‘*hos mê*’ clause (see note on 661a1). Without some such implicit supplement the rewritten Tyrtaeus will be refusing to praise anyone who fails to be emboldened, etc.. But such a declaration would fail to express the doctrine that the Athenian has just announced the poet will express (660e4-6). Matters are even worse if one takes *adikos de ôn* in a2 to modify the subject of the optatives in a2-4 (as do Schöpsdau, Brisson/Pradeau, Saunders, Taylor, Des Places, Pangle and apparently England), for then we are faced with the embarrassment that the revised Tyrtaeus is refusing to praise any unjust person who fails to be emboldened... etc. Following England, these translators solve the problem by treating those optatives as expressing the poet’s wish (that the unjust person not be emboldened, outrun, etc.)—a desperate measure, since those optatives are clearly syntactically parallel to those in the original ‘*hos mê*’ clause in e8. Schöpsdau glosses the wish as based the view (to be articulated below at 661b7 ff) that such things are not good for an unjust person to have. However, we have not been told that poets are to be compelled to wish their subjects well, and the intrusion of such a suggestion here is an unhelpful distraction from the Athenian’s clear message. While Plato could have avoided this confusion by writing οὔτε ὄς τολμῶ...etc., instead of μήτε τολμῶ..., he is likely attracted to the latter because it replicates Tyrtaeus’ own εἰ μὴ τετλαίη (fr 12.11 West), and yields the superficially parallel structure: ὄς μὴ ... πράττοι..., μήτε τολμῶ..., μήτε νικῶ...).

So-called goods and evils

The Athenian switches from illustrating correct poetry to supporting the claims affirmed in that poetry. First he enumerates a list of so-called goods (presumably not meant to be exhaustive)—health, good looks, and wealth, power, long life (661a4-b4). Next, he claims that their goodness is contingent on possessing justice (the SO-CALLED GOODS theses): the so-called goods are good to the just person but bad to the unjust person (661b5-c5; repeated at d3-

4). In his peroration, however (661d1-5), he articulates an even stronger thesis, a conjunction of the SO-CALLED GOODS thesis and the SO-CALLED BADS theses: losing or lacking the so-called goods is in fact good for the unjust person and bad to the just person. On the relation between these theses and the doctrines about justice and happiness just affirmed by Tyrtaeus and the doctrine of Divine and Human Goods affirmed in Book I (631-2), see note on 660e2-6.

661a5-7 “They say that being healthy is the best, having good looks is second, and wealth is third...”

This list of “so-called” goods (*legomena Agatha*) is not presented as exhaustive. One might suppose, with Bobonich (2002: 123-7), that they coincide with the “human goods” that are said to depend on the “divine goods” (the virtues) at 631c. However, it is possible to construe the “dependence” of the human on the divine goods as involving the possession of the virtues (e.g. wealth is explicitly characterized as a “human good” at ___ in terms that suggest it involves wisdom (see note on 631c1-5). On such a construal, the human goods would be the “so-called” goods conjoined with the virtues. The ranking of the so-called goods here is not precisely the same as that of the human goods at 631c (which differs in inserting physical prowess before wealth), but it does coincide precisely with the ranking in the popular drinking song (skolion) quoted at *Gorgias* 451e that may lie behind the ranking at 631e (see note ad 631e on that skolion). (It is particularly appropriate, in this context that concerns what music should “say” that a sympotic composition is the source of the view in question.)

661b4 “achieving immortality upon acquiring all these goods”

Note that immortality is not a so-called good in the same way as the other items on the list, as its goodness, as presented here, seems to consist in prolonging the goodness of the other so-called goods, if one has them. This is why it is an evil to someone whose life is unhappy (661c4-5). cf. Bobonich 202: 181.

661b5 “you and I on the other hand presumably say...”

The “presumably” is ironic, as the Athenian evidently expects his interlocutors to balk at affirming these doctrines (cf. 661d7-e4). Note that the Athenian switches seamlessly here from the question of what the poets should affirm in their musical compositions to the views of people who have been educated by musical composition. It is because the doctrines that the Athenian has just articulated are not promulgated in the musical education in Knossos and Sparta that Klinias and

Megillus do not take them to be “obvious” in the way that the Athenian will affirm they are obvious to himself (662b3-4).

661c4 “virtue as a whole” (*arêtes hapasês*)

The combination of wisdom, moderation and courage that amounts to justice at 630c; see note on 630b2-3.

661c7-8 “which they must cast into corresponding (*hepomenous*) rhythms and harmonies”

An anticipation of the requirement at 669b-670e that the rhythms and harmonies in a musical composition must fit its words. See notes on 669b5-670a3

661d1 “my obvious (*saphôs*) point”

The Athenian will use the same language at 662b4 to describe the “obviousness” of the point that Crete is an island. See Mouze 2005: 188-190, and note on 662b3-4.

661d8-e1 “superlative strength and courage”

‘Courage’ here and at e7 refers to the trait that in Book I is specified not to involve wisdom (630c-d, 631d; see note on 630c6-d1 and on 631c5-d1); thus it counts as one of the so-called goods at 661b-d that are not good unless possessed along with virtue.

(661d7-664b2) Pleasure, Injustice, and Persuasion

Klinias’ disagreement with the Athenian about whether the just person is always happy, and the unjust person unhappy (____) is shown to be due to the fact that Dorian musical education has inculcated in Klinias (and Megillus) the view that injustice is shameful, but not that it is unpleasant and bad (661e_-662a_), whereas the Athenian’s has made it “obvious” to him that injustice is both unpleasant and bad (662b__). In support of his claim that the latter view is what a legislator must persuade the citizens of (sc. through the medium of poetry) he offers a battery of arguments:

- (i) a legislator who fails to teach that justice is the most pleasant life is giving an inconsistent message to citizens (662c-663a);
- (ii) a legislator cannot persuade citizens to be just without presenting justice as pleasant and giving citizens tools to resist the impression that injustice may be more pleasant (663b-d);
- (iii) persuading the citizens that justice is most pleasant is the most beneficial thing a legislator could persuade them of, regardless of whether it is true (663d-664a)

It is important to note that these arguments are addressed to the legislator, not to the citizens (although see note on ____). There is not indication that the “persuasion” to be addressed to the citizens (662c5) comes from anything other than the power of musical to shape evaluative outlooks, supplemented by a legal penalty for voicing dissent (662b6).

Persuasion, compulsion, and what’s obvious

661e3-4 “I fail to persuade (*peitho*) you that he who lives thus is not happy but obviously (*saphôs*) wretched?”

Persuasion (*peithein*) is a recurrent motif in this section. “You” is here plural, as it is through the rest of this section. Even though Klinias first voiced his dissent his own individual voice (d6: *emoige*), both he and the Athenian understand his dissent to be characteristic of both Klinias’ and Megillus’ outlooks. The “obviously” (*saphôs*) recalls the Athenian’s use of the same term at 661d1, to be repeated at 662b3-4 (see note ad loc). What is obvious to the Athenian is not so to Klinias and Megillus, or in general to those raised under Dorian constitutions.

662a1-3 “Does it not seem to you necessary (*ex anagkês*) that if he is unjust and insolent, he lives shamefully?”

The ‘necessity’ here is ambiguous. While it is natural to read it as part of the content of what seems (as on the present translation), it is also possible to read it as applying to the seeming: (“doesn’t it necessarily seem that...?”). The latter is suggested by the use of ‘necessity’ at 662b3 to describe the cognitive effects of education, which make certain ideas “obvious” (*saphôs*). See note ad 662b3-4.

662a7 “How about that his life is also unpleasant and not beneficial to him?”

Klinias, who has agreed that the unjust live shameful lives (662a2-4), but refused to agree that they also live badly (a5-6)—refuses to assent to these further claims, which unpack two aspects of the unhappiness (badness) that the Athenian attributes to the unjust life: (1) that such life is not good for the person who leads it; (2) that it is miserable, in the sense that it is painful. Beneficial (*sumpheron*) here is used as a synonym for ‘bad’ (*kakos*). The Athenian’s later argument addressed to the mythical legislators below, especially the second horn to the dilemma (662e9-663a7), alleges a difficulty in separating the questions of whether a life is good vs. bad from whether it is pleasant vs. painful. His present strategy, by contrast, is strongly evocative of the argument that Plato has Socrates present to Polus in the *Gorgias* for the conclusion that committing injustice is worse than being treated unjustly (474c-475e). There the crucial move is from the premise that injustice is shameful, to the conclusion that it is bad, via a premise that appeals to considerations of pleasure and pain. Here Klinias, like Polus, agrees that injustice is shameful, but denies that it is bad, and the Athenian responds by invoking considerations of pleasure and pain. However, in contrast to Socrates in the *Gorgias*, the Athenian does not offer Klinias an argument from the premise about shamefulness to the conclusion about badness. Rather, he simply tries to elicit the conclusion that injustice is unpleasant and bad. The absence of argument here would be striking to any reader familiar with the *Gorgias*, and this would reinforce the point the Athenian is making: that it is not by argument, but by the affective training of a person’s basic evaluative attitudes, that the citizens are to be persuaded of such conclusions.

662b1-2 “If only ... the god would give us agreement (*sumphônia*), we who are so badly out of tune with one another...”

This responds to Klinias’ rhetorical question, “How could we possibly concede” that injustice is unpleasant and unprofitable (662a8). The Athenian’s answer is that the views in question are fundamental to a person’s ethical outlook, and must be inculcated by musical education. On *sumphônia* is a result of musical education, see 659e and 664a and notes on 653b4-6, 659e1-2, 659d2-3. Here, as at 664a and 634e, the “agreement” is interpersonal.

662b3-4 “these things seem to me so necessary.... that not even ‘Crete is an island’ is more obvious (*saphôs*)”

The use of 'necessary' here recalls that at 662a1-2, which suggests that the earlier use might be read as the necessity of the impression or seeming (connected as it is here to the notion of what seems obvious (*saphos*)). One's musical education has the effect of making certain normative views seem obvious. The example here, "Crete is an island," would be one that Klinias' own experience growing up on the island would make obvious to him. See also note on 661e3-4. By contrast, Mouze 2005: 180, interprets this bedrock principle of the Athenian as distinctively philosophical.

662b4 "If I were a lawmaker.."

At the end of Book III, the Athenian will assume the role of lawmaker for a new city, in conjunction with his two interlocutors. In Book VII he will outline legislation of the sort he describes here.

662b6 "I would give ... the greatest penalty..."

This legal penalty recalls 634d-e. It is the coercion or compulsion (*anagkazesthai*, 662b5) that accompanies the "persuasion" (662c5) that is also addressed to the citizens (on which, see note on 662c3-5).

662b7-c1 "for anyone in the land who spread word that there are wicked (*ponêrous*) people who live pleasantly"

This is to promulgate the pernicious attitude described at 655d-656a (thinking some things are "pleasant but wicked), and endorsed by Klinias at 662a.

662c1-2 "or that some things are advantageous (*lusitelounta*) and profitable (*kerdalea*) while others are more just"

The Athenian extends the list of reasons for which one might chose between justice and injustice. To the notion of the beneficial (*sumpheron*) already mentioned at 662a7 (see note ad loc), he adds the advantageous (*lusitelounta*) and the profitable (*kerdalea*). The force of the comparative in 'more just' is that if one was choosing solely with a view to acting justly, the 'juster' option would be preferable, whereas if one was choosing on the basis of advantage or profit, the other options would be preferable.

662c3-5 “In fact I would persuade (*peithoim’ an*) the citizens to give voice to entirely the opposite”

That the legislator uses the laws to persuade the citizens is a theme hinted at in Book I 634a9; cf 632b7-8, and developed in detail in Book IV, where preambles to the laws are aimed at persuading citizens to comply. (See Bobonich ____ & Laks _____). In the present context the persuasion is via the educational force of music.

*Why the legislators must proclaim that the just life is most pleasant
(662d1-663a8)*

Here the Athenian addresses an explicit argument to the legislators of the Cretan and Spartan constitutions, who have failed to promulgate the doctrine that the unjust life is unpleasant and bad. It is structured as a reductio ad absurdum of the thesis that an unjust life can be more pleasant than a just life. It proceeds as a dilemma about the relation between justice and happiness (662d4-7): (a) either the most just life is not the happiest — in which case the legislator, who urges justice upon the citizens, is not fulfilling his mandate of making them as happy as possible (662d7-e9); or (b) the most just life is the happiest—in which case there must be some good that makes it happier than any unjust alternative, without at the same time making it more pleasant, an implication that the Athenian purports to disprove by enumeration of cases (662e9-663a7).

(By contrast, the construal of the argument in Stalley 1983: 62-64 conflates the two horns of the dilemma while that of Mouze 2005: 181-5 construes the two horns as independent arguments for the conclusion that the just life is most pleasant. Schöpsdau (298-300) correctly identifies the argument’s structure)

662c6-7 “in the name of Zeus and Apollo, excellent sirs...”

Zeus and Apollo are the legendary divine lawgivers of Crete and Sparta, respectively (624a). The polite address, “excellent sirs” (literally: you best (*aristoi*) of men”) must at this point be ironic, since the Athenian has now disproved his initial assumption (I ____ init) that his interlocutors were raised under the sorts of institutions that cultivate virtue (excellence).

662d1-3 ““Is the life that is most just the most pleasant, or are there two lives, one of them the most pleasant, the other the most just?”

The superlatives here are a change to the formulation of the disputed thesis (and may be anticipating the superlative in the exhortation described at 662e6). However, the thesis the Athenian has set out to establish is not simply that the most just life is the most pleasant life, but that the unjust life is *unpleasant* (662a7). While the present formulation leaves open the possibility that there may be unjust lives that are more pleasant than lives that are less than maximally just, the Athenian has given no indication earlier (nor will he later) that he thinks justice admits of degree. On the significance of this issue, see Bobonich 2002: 213).

(a) The first horn of the dilemma
662d3-e9

A legislator who supposes that the just life and the pleasant life diverge (the thesis to be disproved) here accepts, in addition, the first horn of the dilemma: that the most just life is not the happiest. But then, on the unstated assumption that the legislator exhorts the citizens to live justly (the burden of *paideia*—643e), he is open to the charge of legislative misconduct: he has exhorted the citizens to lead lives that are less happy than they might otherwise lead. On the assumption that the legislator is supposed to aim at the happiness of the citizens, reflected in the reference to him as ‘father’ at 662e6, see I 631b5-6. Thus, the Athenian leaves unstated, a proper legislator is not entitled to this horn of the dilemma.

662d3-4 “we would be correct to follow up by asking them...”

The following question, about the happiest life, is the correct question to ask because it re-introduces the notion of happiness (*eudaimonia*) into the issue, which at present is articulated simply in terms of pleasure. The Athenian’s seamless transition between the issue about whether the just life is happy (660e-661d) and the issue of whether it is pleasant (in the present context) is in keeping with the close connection he has noted between the judgments about goodness, and feelings of pleasure (657c; see note on 661a4-d4).

662d7-e1 “their position (*logos*) would be very strange (*atopos*), but I don’t wish to attribute such a position to the gods, but rather to our ancestral legislators”

It would be impious to charge the gods with the kind of neglect and malfeasance that such an admission would invite. Thus it is not the legendary divine

lawgivers, Zeus and Apollo but the human legislator, Minos or Lycurgus (624a, 662c), to whom this question should be addressed.

662e6-9 “the legislator or father who took such a position would be very strange (*atopos*) and quite at a loss (*aporos*) to stay in agreement (*sumphônein*) with himself.”

The verb (*sumphônein*) recalls the internal agreement *sumphônia*, that belongs to fully developed virtue (653b) as well as the interpersonal agreement between citizens (634e, 664a). Here, however, lack of agreement is the internal inconsistency typically elicited in a Socratic-style cross examination of the sort portrayed in dialogues such as *Eu.*, *Charm.*, *laches*, *Gorg.*, and *Rep I*; (e.g. *Gorg.* 482b) in such contexts, the resulting condition for the inquirers is typically described as (*aporia*), which is recalled here by the adjective *aporos*.

b) The second horn of the dilemma
662e9-663a7

Here the legislator who proposes to divorce the just from the pleasant takes the second horn of the dilemma introduced at 662d1-3: the most just life is happiest. This presents him with the challenge of identifying the feature(s) of the just life that recommend it over all others (since it is, *ex hypothesi*, happiest –i.e. best) without contradicting his original contention that an unjust life may be pleasanter. The Athenian invokes two examples of the sorts of features that the law will recommend in such a life, and points out the absurdity of denying that they also make the just life pleasant—a point he presumably intends to generalize to all such features. While the Athenian does not draw the moral explicitly, his point is likely that we are left without a reason to suppose that the just life is not also the most pleasant.

662e11-663a1 “what good and fine thing the law commends (*epainei*) in that life that is superior to pleasure (*kreitton hêdonês*)”

A difficult phrase in a compressed argument: “superior to pleasure” (*kreitton hêdonês*) implies that the sought-for good is better than pleasure. But the Athenian’s tactic here is to look for goods that are not themselves pleasant (“separated—*chorizomenon*— from pleasure” e2). Perhaps the idea is that if (as the opponent alleges) the just life is best but not the most pleasant, then there must be things that makes it good that are not pleasant. That the laws commend or praise (*epainei*) was stated in Book I at 632a, and the close connection between praise, judgments of goodness, and the feelings of pleasure cultivated

by musical education is affirmed at 655c-656b, 657c; see notes on _____. The issue is presumably what things will be commended in the musical works that the legislator endorses for educational purposes.

663a3-4 “are renown and praise good and fine, but unpleasant, and ill repute the opposite?”

In Republic II, renown and praise are identified as two of the “prizes” for publicly recognized justice, and ill repute as one of the wages of injustice, that are invoked in popular opinion and in poetry and music (362e-363e). There, Socrates is charged with arguing that justice is preferable to injustice even without these rewards, but here the Athenian voices no objection to having the legally sanctioned music invoke these as attractive features of justice (on this see Mouze 2005: 184). His point is that such features are not unpleasant.

663a5-7 “what about neither doing wrong (*adikein*) to anyone nor being wronged (*adikeisthai*) by anyone? It is surely not the case that this is unpleasant but good and fine, while the contrary is pleasant but shameful and bad ...”

Neither doing wrong nor being wronged is invoked again in Book VII (829a) and is another of the benefits of justice invoked in *Republic* II (358e-359b). The Athenian here claims that it is not “separated from pleasure” (663a2). His point is most effective if the contrast is between (a) the conjunction of wronging no one and being wronged by no one and (b) the conjunction of wronging others and being wronged by others.; (a) is the benefit one gets from living under institutions of justice, which saves us from the miseries of (b). One might worry that the objections of a would-be free rider or the possessor of a ring of Gyges is not addressed by these considerations, but once again, as with the first feature (reputation), the question is what general set of attitudes must the laws (via legally sanctioned musical training) inculcate in the populace. They are not giving philosophical or theoretical arguments like those Socrates offers in *Republic* for the intrinsic preferability of justice to injustice. Rather, they are making the populace favourably disposed to justice, and antithetical to injustice. (NB: the argument in the present passage is addressed to the legislator, not to the citizens.)

Pleasure, persuasion, and truth
663b1-664b2

The Athenian now addresses to hypothetical legislators a second argument for his contention that they must teach the doctrine that the just life is most pleasant.

While the previous argument (662d1-663a8) gave them reasons to agree that doctrine is true, here the Athenian points to the good consequences of promulgating it, independently of whether it is true (663d6-e2). He invokes the legislator's goal of making the citizens willing (hekontes) adherents to the life of justice, together with the psychological thesis that we do willingly only what is on balance pleasant (663b). Another psychological reality he notes is that injustice may appear more pleasant than justice, due to the distorting effects of distance and perspective (663b___), and he sketches an argument that together with "training (ethesin) and praises" (c1) will persuade citizens to discount this appearance (663c-d). He concludes with an optimistic assessment of the power of music to make persuasive any doctrine, however antecedently implausible it may appear (663e3-664a8)

663b1-2 "the theory (*logos*) that does not separate the pleasant and the just or the good and the fine..."

The theory that separates the just and pleasant has been the target of the preceding argument (662d1-663a8). The thesis that separates the good and the fine is endorsed by Klinias when he allows that injustice is shameful (*aischron* – opposite of *kalon*), but balks at saying it is bad (*kakos* – opposite of *agathon*) (662a1-8). The link between these views is the connection between the good and the pleasant that is central to the educative enterprise (657c).

663b2-3 "...even if it accomplishes nothing else, can persuade a person to be willing to live a just and pious life"

More literally: ... is persuasive (*pithanos*) towards being willing (*ethelein*) to live a just and pious life.

Note that persuasiveness here includes success at bringing about motivation (willingness), not just action. On the connection between persuasion and willingness, and the translation of *ethelein* by 'willing', see note on 663b4-6. The demur "even if it accomplishes nothing else" allows the possibility that the thesis in question is not persuasive (*pithanos*) in a different way: e.g. on the basis of arguments advanced to support it (such arguments, e.g. as he is about to offer against Klinias' conclusion that the unjust life is shameful but not necessarily unpleasant (663c2-d5), which Klinias apparently does not find compelling (note his grudging response at d5).

663b3-4 "any thesis that denies this"

This would include Klinias' explicit refusal to assent to the thesis at 662a1-8, as well as, by the principles of 655-7, any music that portrayed injustice in a favorable light (thereby making it pleasant).

663b4-6 "For nobody would willingly be persuaded to do (*hekôn etheloi peithesthai prattein*) anything that failed to result in a preponderance of pleasure over pain"

The Athenian's claim is not that we can never be persuaded to take a course of action that we believe will be unpleasant on balance (contra Stalley 1983: 64), but rather that we will not agree to do such an action willingly (*hekôn etheloi peithesthai prattein*). "Willingly" translates the two terms *hekôn etheloi*, which have roughly the same sense—the latter tending to function as the verbal version of the former (adverb). In the context of persuasion (*peithesthai*), here as in the previous sentence (663b2), *hekôn* or *ethelein* marks the difference between what one has been convinced to do (e.g., for want of a better alternative, as in cases of coercion; cf. 663e2, 627e2-3), and what one has been persuaded to do wholeheartedly (as at 671c7). (Thus Plato will pair "*ethelein*" with "*prothumôs*" (eager, enthusiastic, as opposed to reluctant) at 666c3 (cf. III, 697d8) where it indicates a person's willingness to sing in public; *hekontes* is used to the same effect at 670c9. Book IV develops the theme that the citizens must be willing (*ethelein*) to be obedient the city's rulers (701b), alternately stated with the adverb *hekôn* (700a), or "easily persuaded (eupeithes) by the laws": 708c-d, 715c; cf. 718c) The present passage should be compared with 732e-734e in Book V, which also connects what one would choose willingly (*hekousion*—733d8) with what is more pleasant, and with 632b7-8 in Book I (see note ad loc); see Laks 2005: 45-7 and Stalley 1983: 66-70.

'Pleasure' and 'pain' here are ambiguous between (a) the affective states cultivated by *paideia* (pleasures and pains such as love and hate, etc.) and (b) the bodily sensations and experiences one could get from engaging in certain actions. It is in virtue of the latter that Klinias and others might think the life of justice to be less pleasant than a life of successful injustice. But it is pleasures and pains of the former sort that the Athenian has connected with judgments of goodness at _____. On the conflation of these two types of pleasure, see note on ____ (Book I).

663b6-c1 "since things looked at from a distance appear hazy to most people, especially to children, the legislator will instill in us an opposing opinion that dispels the haze"

(Reading *nomothetês d' hêmin* at b7-8, following Des Places and Schöpsdau, in place of the MSS *de ei mê*).

The mention of a preponderance (*pleon*) of resulting pleasure over pain at 663b4-6 raises question about how a person is to figure out the balance, especially given the difficulty of estimating accurately those pleasures and pains that are more remote (“things seen from a distance”). We are reminded of the warning by Socrates in *Protag.* that future pleasures appear smaller than those that are close at hand (_____). In contrast with Socrates’ conclusion that we need a measuring skill in order to calculate correctly (____), the Athenian here claims that the legislator will compensate for the fact that justice does not naturally appear to us to “result in a preponderance of pleasure over pain” (b5-6) by cultivating an opinion to that effect in us. On the means by which he does so, see next note. Mouze, by contrast supposes that the “perspective from afar” is that of the unjust soul (2005: 188).

663c1-2 “and will somehow manage to persuade us—[1] by training (*ethesin*), [2] by praise (*epainois*), and [3] by arguments (*logois*)...”

These are three means by which the legislator persuades the citizens that justice “result[s] in a preponderance of pleasure over pain” (663b5-6). (1) The “training” (*ethesin*; alt: “habits”; see note on 655d7-e1) is the musical training (performance of choral song and dance) invoked at 655e and 656d (cf. 666d8-10; for discussion, see Mouze 2005: 181-8); the Athenian here seems to be assuming that the musical education that, in the words of Book I gives us “an appetite and passion to become an accomplished citizen, one who knows how to rule and be ruled with justice” (643e_ =644a_), and does so by casting the “utterances and gestures” of justice into the naturally pleasant media of rhythm and harmony (Book II _____), thereby cultivates in citizens the opinion that justice is pleasant. (Cf. _____[655]. ___ where the experience of justice as pleasant involves the opinion that it is good). (2) On the use of “praises” by the legislator—as distinct from the praises the citizens themselves will make as a result of their training (cf. 655__)—see 632a; perhaps these are expressed the preambles to the statutes mandated in Book IV (_____). Praises are also expressed in poetry, such as that of Tyrtaeus. (3) The *logois* in question here constitute an argument (whose content is given at 663c2-d5) (in contrast to the parallel text at 664a4-6 where the term is translated ‘doctrines’; see note ad loc).

This is the first explicit indication that the legislator will persuade citizens by giving arguments—but note that the burden of the arguments is very narrowly specified here: ““that matters of justice and injustice are subject to distortion by perspective...” (663c2; see note ad loc). The argument itself is unlikely to convince a person whose musical education has not already trained him to be pleased at justice and pained at injustice (the fundamental “obvious” points of

____) (see note on 663c2-d5); but it might be enough to address the worries of a person who has the requisite musical education, about how to account for the fact that others (less well educated) find the prospect of injustice appealing.

(663c2-d5) Justice and injustice are subject to distortion by perspective

An argument intended to combat the “hazy” impression (663b6-7) that injustice may be pleasant. Specifically, it would address the concerns of a person who has been musically trained to take pleasure in justice and to be pained at injustice, but notes that injustice may appear to others (e.g. Klinias) to be a source of pleasure. Note that Klinias, who fails to be convinced by the argument (d5), lacks such a musical education.

The argument may be summarized as follows:

1. *Unjust things appear pleasant to the unjust person but unpleasant to the just person. (663c2-5)*
2. *The better soul is more authoritative in its judgments than an inferior soul. (663c7-d1).*
3. *The just person has a better soul and the unjust person a worse soul. [unstated]*
4. *Therefore, the unjust life is really the way it appears to the just person. [unstated; from 2, 3]*
5. *Therefore, the unjust life is really unpleasant. (663d3-4; from 1, 4)*

One might worry that the argument equivocates on the understanding of pleasure and pain. To the extent that [1] has been established so far (e.g. at 655d-656b) it concerns the pleasures and pains that are within the scope of paideia: affective states with intentional objects. But the pleasures and pains that Klinias had in mind when he balked at affirming [5] at 662a7-8 presumably include (predominantly) those of the range of human experience e.g. bodily pleasures from eating, drinking, sex, and those arising from desire satisfaction). Is the Athenian here conflating the affective pleasure or pain one experiences when contemplating a course of action with the pleasures and pains that will result from actually engaging in that activity? A similar conflation seems to plague the notorious argument about false pleasures in Philebus ____; cf. note on Book I pleasure.

663c2 “...that matters of justice and injustice are subject to distortion by perspective...”

More literally: “that just and unjust things are matters of shadow-painting (*eskiagraphêmena*).” Shadow-painting (*skiagraphia*) uses shadows to give the illusion of depth to a two-dimensional picture. Thus the metaphor invokes both deception and perspective. The following lines (c2-6) emphasize the latter.. See further note on 663c2-3.

663c2-3 “for they strike us in opposing ways.” (*ta ... dikaia tô(i) tou dikaiou enantiôs phainomena*)

More literally: “Unjust things appear to someone in the opposite manner to what is just” (with Schöpsdau and Brisson/Pradeau, following England’s construal of the MSS text:). Alternatively: “ Unjust things are manifestly opposed to the opinion of the just person” (Lisi, Allameda) or “Unjust things appear pleasant to the enemy of justice” (Saunders, with a textual emendation).

On any of these construals, the Athenian’s main point is that from the perspective of the just person, just things are pleasant, while from that of the unjust person, they are unpleasant. This is premise [1] in the argument that continues through 663d5.

663c7-9 “Now which judgment shall we say is more authoritatively true (*tên d’ alêtheian... kuriôteran*)– that of the worse soul or that of the better?...”

Klinias’ answer (663d1) opts for the latter. Here it functions as premise [2] in the argument begun at 663c2-d5.

663d2-4 “So it is necessary that the unjust life is not only more shameful ..., but also in truth more unpleasant than the just ... life”

Strictly speaking, only the second conjunct is the conclusion [5] of the present argument (663c2-d5). But Klinias conceded the first conjunct at 662a7-8, where he also rejected the second.

663d5 “So it would seem... at least as far as the present argument goes...”

Klinias is not convinced by the argument, which on its own, is insufficient to convince a person without the proper education that justice is more pleasant than

injustice (see note on 663c2-d5) because his own Dorian upbringing has failed to expose him to the “training” and “praises” (663c1-2) that will make him find justice more pleasant than injustice.

Beneficial untruths and the persuasive power of music

663d6-e1 “even if matters were not as our present argument has maintained, could a legislator of any worth... tell a lie more advantageous than this...?”

Here the Athenian abandons his brief foray into argument (*logoi*) for the thesis that the just life is pleasant and the unjust unpleasant (663c2-d5; see notes ad ____) and reverts to his primary contention: that the legislator must persuade the citizens of the conclusion because doing so will have the beneficial effect of making them wholeheartedly “primed for every act of justice” (e1-2). This result coincides with the goal of education as articulated in Book I: to produce citizens who are “passionate” (*erastai*) about “ruling and being ruled with justice” (643e5-6). One might compare the legislator’s hypothetical appeal to falsehood here with a similar use of falsehood “for the sake of the good” at Rep. 382c-d & _____. On how pernicious the “lie” would be see note on 664a2-3.

663e1-2 “not by force, but willingly (*hekontas*)”

On “willingly”, see note on 663b4-6.

663e4 “persuasion, it seems, is not an easy matter “

This remark by Klinias perhaps indicates his own failure to be persuaded by the argument that the Athenian has given at 663c2-d5. The Athenian will respond (663e5-664a8) by pointing to the ease with which music (broadly construed to include poetry and fables) can cultivate belief in even the most implausible doctrines.

663e5 “the tale about the Sidonion”

The Sidonion is Cadmus, legendary founder of Thebes (invoked in Book I at 641c; cf. Rep. 414c) of whom the story is told below (663e8-9) that he sowed dragon’s teeth in the ground, from which armed warriors sprouted. Note that the latter is a foundation myth for the city of Thebes, and thus the sort a legislator

might incorporate into the official musical education of a city.

664a1 “will succeed in persuading young people’s souls of whatever he sets out to convince them”

Recall that it is the condition of youth that is the primary focus of education, for it is the souls of the young that are open to being shaped by music (cf. 654__). These are trained to have the requisite attitudes before they are capable of employing arguments (*logoi*). The task of the legislator is to design institutions that will maintain these attitudes over the course of life. On this see note on 664a4-6.

664a2-3 “all he has to discover (*aneuriskein*) in his inquiry (*skopounta*) is what will deliver the greatest good to the city if he convinces them of it”

The same combination of verbs is used at 626a5, 656e4 to characterize the inquiry into the goals and methods of proper legislation begun in Book I; *skopein* alone is used of that endeavour throughout Book I and into II: 635d, 636d, 638b, 645d; 649e, 658a. Thus we may suppose that the discovery that the Athenian refers to here is that of the order of divine and human goods from Book I 631____, where all goods depend on the possession of justice (there conceived as a combination of wisdom, moderation, and courage). There is no suggestion that the individual citizens will be deceived for the benefit of the city – for all the benefits to the city enumerated at 631-2 are possessed by individuals. Note that the claim whose truth is said to be irrelevant to the question at hand is not whether justice is good for the citizens, but rather whether it is pleasant and injustice unpleasant. In effect, according to the theory of education here developed, the legislator, in convincing the citizens of the latter, will make it the case that it is true.

664a4-6 “then use every means to figure out a way in which the whole community (*sunoiikia*) throughout their lives will speak as one on this topic—in their songs (*oidais*) and stories (*muthois*) and doctrines (*logois*).”

The “way” of achieving this unanimity “throughout their lives” will be the institution of the three choruses, to which the Athenian will now turn (664b3 ff.) He here makes more precise the claim in Book I that the whole community must “sing out their agreement” (*sumphōnein* 634e; XREF to present passage) on the subject of the laws. Here, in keeping with the themes developed in Book II, the medium of that agreement will be the songs and stories that comprise the musical education of the citizens (cf. songs: 654a-b, 656d, 659e; on stories: 636c-d, 645b, 663e,

664d, 682a), as well as *logoi* (doctrines) which have been mentioned at 663c1-2 as additional means of persuasion (where it is translated ‘arguments’). The translation follows Saunders in rendering *logoi* as ‘doctrines’ in the present passage (as at 663b1) rather than ‘arguments’ as in 663c1-2, since the “whole community throughout their lives” will presumably include children who have not yet reached the age of using reason (*logon lambanein* – cf. 654___) (‘discourse’ too is possible, following Brisson/Pradeau and Schöpsdau).

664b1-2 “It doesn’t seem to me that either of us would be capable of disputing these points.”

A reflection of the Dorian’s lack of facility in argument, mentioned also at 641e.

IV

The Institutions of Correct Education: The Three Choruses

664b3-666d2

Having established that a proper legislator will ensure that the music used in education (paideia) depicts the just life as happy and pleasant (660b-664a), the Athenian now specifies the institutions that will structure the lifelong program of musical education “by which the whole community throughout their lives will speak as one on this topic” (664a4-6). In keeping with his pronouncement that it is by regular performance of choral music that the citizens will receive their initial education and that education will subsequently be maintained against the corrosive effects of everyday life (654c-d), he now specifies three different types of chorus in which citizens will participate, at different times of their life, each dedicated to one of the three deities he identified as the patrons of musical education at 653d. When citizens are children (under eighteen years old) they will sing in the chorus of the Muses; as young adults (from eighteen to thirty years old) they will sing in the chorus of Apollo; and those beyond thirty will perform in the chorus of Dionysus. The latter, which will occupy most of the Athenian’s attention here (665d9 ff), turns out not to be a chorus in the strict sense (which would involve performing ensemble song and dance in public at religious festivals), but a drinking party (665d9-666d2). Thus it is with his account of the chorus of Dionysus that the Athenian makes good on his promise to specify an important educational role for drinking parties (652b-653a).

The three choruses introduced

664b4 “all three choruses should direct their charms (*epaidein*) at the souls of children, which are still young and pliable”

The three choruses are specified further at 664c4-d4. This is the first mention that there will be three— but it does not seem to surprise Klinias, perhaps because there were known to be three choruses at Spartan festivals. (Plutarch, Lyc. 21.2 says a chorus of old men will lead, followed by a chorus of young men in their prime, then a chorus of children). Klinias’ question at d5-7 concerns the nature of the third choruses, not the number or composition. On songs as charms for the souls of children, see 659e; repeated at 665c, 666c. On the plasticity of young souls (which will figure in the final account of the benefit of drinking parties) see 666b-c, 671b-c and note on 653d6-7.

664b6 “all the fine doctrines we’ve gone through”

Presumably the doctrines articulated at 660e-663e (about justice, happiness, and pleasure), as well as those at 631b-632d (the doctrine of divine and human goods).

664b7-8 “that the gods call the same life both most pleasant and most excellent (*aristos*)”

A restatement of the thesis insisted upon at 662b-663e as central to the message of musical education—with the substitution here of “excellent” (*aristos*) for “most just” (*dikaiotaton*) in the former context, a minor variation, given the gloss on justice as “virtue as a whole” (*sumpasês arêtes*, 661c4; see note ad loc). An additional change in the present context is the specification that the gods affirm the thesis in question, perhaps indicating, as England notes, that such an attribution is supposed to have especial force with children. On the authority of the gods, see 634e.

664c1-2 “... speaking truth to the highest degree andmore likely [to] persuade...than if we were to proclaim any other doctrine”

Recalls 663b4-6. See note ad loc.

664c3 “What you say must be conceded (*sunchôrêteon*)”

A surprising concession, given Klinias' earlier refusal to make such a concession at 662a and his grudging resort to the argument that concludes at 663d5. Perhaps he is influenced by the substitution of the "most excellent" (*aristos*) life for "most just" at 664b7-8, which allows him to interpret the claim in light of his own, Dorian conception of excellence (cf. Tyrtaeus (fr. 12.13). Or perhaps the argument at 663c-d has been more convincing than his response at 663d5 would appear to indicate. His inability to mount a defense of the contrary position (664b1) might also be relevant.

The chorus of the Muses

664c4 "*the chorus dedicated to the Muses and consisting of children*"

The age range is specified more precisely at 666a-b as those up to eighteen years old. On the Muses as patrons of culture, see _____.

664c5-6 "take the stage, singing out such things (*ta toiauta*) before the entire city"

The choruses are conceived of as performing in a theatre before the general public assembled for a festival performance (665e; cf. 653d-654a), as was typical of choral performances in Plato's day. See Morrow 1960: 302-318. "Such things" (*ta toiauta*) are presumably the doctrines just mentioned at 664b6.

The chorus of Apollo

664c6-d1 "the chorus of those up to thirty years old, calling upon Paeon Apollo as witness for the truth of what they say (*tôn legomenōn*), and praying that he be gracious to the young and grant them persuasion"

These young adults would be at a later developmental stage than the children in the chorus of the Muses. On the developmental psychology of 653-4, they would be at the stage of "grasping reason" or "employing reason" (*logon lambanein*) (654b). How far these adult singers go towards grasping the reasons for the doctrines they affirm in their songs is not addressed here; calling upon Apollo as a witness is an appeal to authority, not to reasons. In any case, as choral performers, they will be singing and dancing to a set text, not engaging in the give and take of rational argument. The "young" (*neoi*) to be persuaded might be the children in the first chorus (as *neoi* is used at 653d, 664e), but the term can also be used to distinguish both children and young adults from the elderly, as at 666b; cf. 631e.

The Chorus of Dionysus

664d1-2 “a third chorus is yet to sing, consisting of those over thirty and up to sixty years of age”

This will be called the chorus of Dionysus at 665a-b. It will be assigned two main functions: (A) It performs a “finer music,” which evaluates musical compositions and selects those that are fine and appropriate for use in education (667b-670e). (B) It is a drinking party in which inebriation replicates, in adults, the juvenile condition of educability by music invoked at 653d-654a, thus allowing the music performed on these occasions to restore their “education” (666b-c and 671a-672a). (A) and (B) are developed in largely independent treatments (although see notes on 667b1-3 and on 665d1-2) and the Athenian makes no explicit attempt to connect them (on which see note on 667b1-3 and note on 671e1; cf. Schöpsdau on 671a1-672a4).

Note the very wide range of ages for this chorus, which encompasses what the Hippocratic writer of *De Hebdomadibus* 5 identifies as three distinct “seasons” of life: that of “man” (*anêr*) (28-49 years), “elder” (*presbutês*) (50-56 years), and “old man” (*gerôn*) (over 56 years). In developing functions (A) and (B) the Athenian will be almost exclusively interested in the “elders” and “old men” in this chorus, as much of what he says about their stiffness and other signs of old age (e.g. 666b-c) are unlikely to be general characteristics of those only recently over the thirty-year mark—not to mention their position of authority (665d, 670d-e)—although even those at the younger end of the age range will have lost the juvenile volatility that, as he will explain in 671a-672d, is replicated in the Dionysiac activities of the chorus. Note that the three interlocutors refer to themselves both as “elders” (*presbuteroi*) 685a, 712b-c, 769a and as “old men” (*gerontes*) (634e-635a, 658d, 715d-e). On the age range of the chorus see also notes on 665d1-2, 670a7-b1, and 671e1.

664d2-4 “to those who are beyond these things (*tous meta tauta*), no longer up to the challenge of singing, it falls to recount stories about these same characters (*êthôn*)...”

“Beyond these things” (*meta tauta*) might mean beyond the age of thirty-to-sixty (thus England, Brisson/Pradeau, Saunders, Schöpsdau), in which case this is a fourth age group distinct from the membership of the chorus of Dionysus. But this would be an unusual use of the expression (as noted by England), and there is no reason to suppose that the ability to sing is coextensive with the age range of the three choruses; after all, the Athenian implies at 670b that some fifty-year-olds will not be “fit to sing”—hence “beyond the ability to sing” is a more likely meaning (thus Morrow 1960: 314). At 671e1 the Athenian assigns to those “over

sixty years old” the role of supervising the conduct of drinking parties; however the inability to sing cited here is hardly a credential for the office of performing exercising that wise leadership; see note on 671e1. In any case, the Athenian’s concern in the present context is to have all citizens participate in the collective “affirmation of the fine doctrines” of 664b, regardless of their ability to sing.

664d5-6 “these third choruses”

The plural reflects the assumption that there will be multiple choruses for each age group.

664e3-5 “We said in the beginning of our discussion ...that all young creatures have a fiery nature, unable to keep still...”

A recapitulation of the theory introduced at 653d-654a, with the addition that the young have a “fiery” (*diapuros*) nature, a detail repeated at 666a-c, 671b-d; the latter points to the malleability of the young (cf. 664b) and their unique susceptibility to the influence of education. For fuller discussion of the theory, see note on 653d6-7. Belfiore: 1986: 425-6, by contrast, proposes the fieriness involves the lack of restraint on desire characteristic of the young at 645e

665a4 “to sing and dance with us (*sunchoreutas*) and lead our chorus (*chorêgous*)”

More literally: “to perform a chorus with us, and lead the chorus.” Choral performance involves both song and dance: 654a.

665b3-4 “For it certainly is exceedingly strange to hear, out of the blue, of a Dionysian chorus of elders “

It is the Dionysian aspect of the chorus that shocks Klinias (cf. 636e-637b; see note on 637b1-2.

665b7-8 “it does require an accounting (*logos*), I think, of the way in which it would be reasonable (*eulogon*) for this to happen”

The “way”, it turns out, will be to sing in a drinking party, rather than perform publicly in a chorus (666b-c).

665c2-5 “That every adult (*andra*) and child (*pais*), free person and slave, female and male—indeed for the whole city—should never cease repeating to itself those charms that we went through...

More literally: “That every man (*andra*) and child...”; however, *anêr* here is used in the sense that emphasizes stage of life, rather than the gender—hence the translation “adult”. The Athenian here indicates that community members of any age, social status, or gender, will be involved in affirming the “fine doctrines” of 664b. It was agreed at 634e that the whole city must give voice to the same opinions (cf. 661d, 662b); that the songs used in the musical training that achieves this unanimity are charms was claimed by the Athenian at 659e, repeated at 664b, 666c.

665c5-7 “with the hymns altering (*metaballomena*) in one way or another or at any rate with enough variety (*poikilia*) so that the singers will be insatiable for them and take pleasure in them.”

More literally: “with the hymns always altering (*metaballomena*) somehow or other, and in any case with enough variety (*poikilia*)...”.

Earlier, the Athenian inveighed against allowing alteration of the basic forms of musical compositions (656d-657b); here he allows variation *within* these forms – recognizing the powerful attraction of the pleasure provided by variety. It is not variety as such to which he objects, but the pursuit of variety that leads to abandonment of those features essential to making the music fine, and appropriate for education. See note on 657a1-2.

665d1-4 “whose collective age and wisdom (*phronêsis*) makes it the most persuasive (*pithanôtaton*) in the city... those who are in charge (*kuriôtaton*) of the finest and most beneficial songs ”

This description, like “divine men” at 666d6, would seem to fit the oldest members of the Dionysian chorus – those for whom the label “elder” would be appropriate, rather than those at the younger end of the (thirty to sixty year old) spectrum (see note on 664d1-2). On wisdom (*phronêsis*) coming with age (if it comes at all), see 653a7 and note ad loc. “[M]ost persuasive” (*pithanôtaton*) recalls the concerns of 663b-664b; see note on _____. On the laws embodying the wisdom of the elders, and citizens being persuaded by the laws, see 659d-e. “[I]n charge of the finest...song” (d4-5) anticipates the claim in 667b-670e that

the “finer music” to be performed by that chorus, specifically assigned to “fifty-year olds” at (670b1) is the selection of music that is appropriate to be performed by the other citizens. On the nature of that “finer music” see notes on _____.

Drinking Parties are the forum for the Chorus of Dionysus

665d9-e1 “everyone, as he advances in age (*gignomenos presbuteros*), becomes extremely reluctant to sing”

In contrast with the eagerness to sing and dance characteristic of youth (653d-654a, 657d, 664e-665a, 672c, 673c-d). The function of drunkenness, to be invoked at 666b-c, will be to restore that eagerness.

665e2-3 “feeling especially ashamed (*aischunoit’ an*)... the more so the more elderly (*presbuteros*) and moderate (*sôhpronesteros*) he has become”

Aischunê with *aidôs* is one of the two terms the Athenian uses interchangeably to describe the sort of fear that the legislator must cultivate in the citizen (647a-c; 671d). Here, as in Book I, it is associated with the virtue of moderation (*sôphrosunê*). Earlier in Book II it is what one feels performing actions that one thinks pleasant but wicked (*ponêros*) (656a-b). Here we see the feeling is associated with a natural self-consciousness, and might also be translated “embarrassed”. The term ‘presbuteros’, unlike the English ‘elderly’ connotes not just advanced years but seniority and greater respectability. While these senior performers are not performing songs or dances representing shameful behaviour, and thus have no reason to feel ashamed on that grounds (cf. 656a), they are no doubt aware of the technical imperfections of their performance resulting from the loss of agility and tone consequent on aging. While there is nothing unseemly about the behavior their song and dance would imitate, it might well be unseemly (*aschêmôn* – cf. 666c9) for geriatric bodies and voices to imitate it through the very public medium of choral performance. A choral performance by a stiff-limbed rough-voiced ensemble is likely to be less pleasant to behold by the audience that is supposed to be edified by it, and hence less effective at achieving its educational goals.

666a5-8 “explaining (*didaskontes*) that one must not pour additional fire into their bodies or souls, that ...one must be especially careful of the manic (*emmanês*) condition of youth.

“Explaining”: more literally “teaching”. Such instruction would presumably be in a preamble addressed to the parents of children (or to those charged with carrying out the law). One would not need to convince the children themselves of the reason for the restriction. On the madness of youth, as expressed in the impulse to disordered movement and sound, and the connection between fire, madness, and drunkenness see 672b-d.

666a6-7 “the toilsome burdens (*ponous*)”

See 653c-d and note on 653c9.

666b1-2 “the young (*ton neon*) must abstain completely from drunkenness...”

“young” (*neos*) here is contrasted with “children” (*paidas* 666a4) – even though the latter can also be referred to as *neoi*, as at 666a8). The young who may partake of wine but not in drunkenness are the young adults between 18-30 years old, as contrasted with the older adults in the chorus of Dionysus.

666b2 “a person approaching (*epibainonta*) forty”

i.e. in one’s thirties. Alternatively: “upon reaching forty” (Belfiore 425; LSJ). The present translation, like that of Saunders, Brisson/Pradeau and Taylor, follows England, whose case is strengthened by Schöpsdau. The alternative rendering would leave the those between thirty and forty years old unaccounted for in the drinking regulations). On the lack of precision with which the Athenian notes the age range of the Chorus of Dionysus, see note on 664d1-2, 671e1 as well as Morrow 318 and Schöpsdau ad 664d5-665d6.

666b3 “when feasting in the common messes (*sussitia*)”

On the common messes in Dorian society, see I ____; the Athenian will include the institution in the legislation for the new colony of Magnesia (VIII??_____). Such establishments for communal eating will also be the venues for communal drinking, and the drunkenness that is integral to the Dionysian function of the third chorus. On the question of whether women will participate in such rituals, see Schöpsdau 2003.

666b4-5 “that rite (*teletên*) and recreation (*paidia*) of the elders (*presbutôn*)”

There is some variation in the MSS as to whether it is the elders (*presbutôn*) or the “more elderly” (*presbuterôn*). Those “approaching forty” (666b2) are unlikely to have been given the label elder (*de hebdomadibus*: it starts at 50; CHECK JOHNSON “Revolutions in time...”). Thus there is some articulation within the Dionysian chorus. On *paidia* (recreation, play) see notes on 635b5.

666c1-2 “like iron that becomes pliable when placed in the fire “

The image is repeated at 671b-c (softens iron in the fire); see note on 653d6-7.

666c3-4 “wouldn’t each of them willingly (*etheloi*) sing more enthusiastically (*prothumoteron*)...”

On being willing (*ethelein*; alt: *hekôn*) and being enthusiastic (*prothumos*) see note on 663b4-6.

666c6 “songs that we have repeatedly said are charms”

At 659e, 664b, 665c, 666c.

V

The Finer music of the Dionysian Chorus

666d3-671a1

Having established that the chorus of Dionysus will not sing publicly in choral competitions at religious festivals, but privately in a drinking party (____), the Athenian now proposes that the music it is to “sing” will be “finer” than that performed in choruses (666d; cf. 667a-b, 665d); indeed, he will argue (670b-d; cf. 666d), it requires an education more advanced than mere choral training. He proposes first that the faults of Dorian musical education can be attributed to the lack of such music (666d-667a), and then proceeds to give a detailed account of that “finer music” (667a-670e). The latter is revealed to be the expertise for judging choral music, which the Athenian elaborates in considerable detail (667b-670a) and distinguishes both from the expertise of composers and from that of choral performers (670a-e). While their expert evaluations are not “song” or music in the narrow sense (words set to tune and rhythm), the Athenian is prepared to say that the elders “sing” this music (670d).

666d3 “what kind of sound (*phônên*) or music (*mousan*)...”

“sound” here is broad enough in scope to include not just song but speech or utterance more generally, leaving it open that it will not be song, strictly conceived, that the elders engage in. This fits the requirement, articulated at _____, that the members of the third chorus are in the business of judging which songs are fine. The term ‘*mousa*’ (repeated in a similar context at 667a10) can mean “song” (as at 829d), but admits of the broad scope of the cognate ‘*mousikê*, which can encompass learning broadly conceived – so that philosophy can be called a kind of “music” at Phaedo 61a; cf. *Tim.* 88c (see Morrow 1960: 313-14 and Saunders 1972: 10..

666d8-10 “the only type of song (*ôidê*) we are capable of is what we learned (*emathomen*) when we were trained (*sunêtheis genomenoî*) to sing in choruses”

“Trained” (*sunêtheis*) might also be translated “accustomed” or “habituated”; the related noun *sunêtheia* is used at 655e4 and 6 and is translated ‘training’. On training, habituation and music see notes on 653b5-6 and 655e1. The Athenian’s point here is that his interlocutors are able to sing the songs they were trained to sing in their youth, but, lacking the “music finer than that of the

choruses and the public theatres” (667b___) whose nature is detailed at 670a-b, they lack the resources to reflect critically on their adequacy as songs. Note his earlier comment that Klinias’ understanding of Cretan institutions is “well trained” (gegumnasthai) 626b5-6 & note ad loc. Such a training allows Klinias to identify the goal of Cretan institutions, but it does not give him the discriminatory capacity to see the deficiency in the music that communicates this message.

(666d11-667a5) Dorian Musical education fails to employ the finest kind of song

The Athenian charges that the Dorian societies in Crete and Sparta lack the “finest kind of music” (666d11) that belongs to the chorus of Dionysus (cf. 665d); and that this has resulted in educational practices that yields the impoverished range of virtue criticized in Book I (cf. 628c-631b). Tyrtaeus is once again singled out as a poet who expresses that impoverished conception. The “finest kind of song” will later be revealed (668b-670a) as the expertise which discriminates which musical or poetic compositions are fine, and which are not. Presumably we are meant to conclude that it would reject the poetry of Tyrtaeus as unsuitable for use in musical education.

666d11-e1 “you have failed to achieve the finest kind of song... “

The “finest kind of song” here said to be lacking in Dorian cities is ambiguous. In the context of the immediately preceding lines, it must be the music that will be identified as “finer than that of choruses,” indeed as “ the finest variety” at 667a10-b3). This “music” (assigned to the Chorus of Dionysus at 670d-e) is the expertise that judges musical compositions. However, the deficient educational practices deplored in the present paragraph, in particular the invocation of the poetry of Tyrtaeus, whose educational inadequacy is emphasized at 629a-630d in Book I and 660d-661d in Book II gives the clear message that the musical compositions used in Dorian education themselves fall well short of the “finest” musical compositions. The “finest music” at 668b3-6 must also be musical compositions not the competence that judges them. On this ambiguity also the note on 670e5-7. On a further ambiguity in the comparative “fineness” of music, see note on 667b1-3. 668b4-6/.

666e3-667a2 “None of you lays hold of his own colt, ... strokes him, gentles him (*hêmerôn*), and pays all due attention to the nurture that will make him ... capable of managing the affairs of a city...”

“gentles him” (*hêmerôn*, e6) recalls the conception of musical education (*mousikê*) in *Republic* (441e-442a) as contrasted with military or athletic training (*gumnastikê*): the latter rouses the spirited ferocity that is necessary for military valour, while the former soothes and gentles it to make it suitable for the peaceful cooperative project of civic life. A person “capable of managing the affairs of a city...” (667a1-2) is one who in Book I “knows how to rule and be ruled with justice” (643e6)

667a3-4 “courage as fourth in virtue, not first”

Explained in Book I at 630c-d and 631c-d.

667a6 “again casting aspersions on our lawgivers”

As at 630d, where the Athenian politely deflects the charge; cf. 634c, 635b.

667a10-b1 “If there is a kind of music (*mousan*) finer than that of the choruses and the public theatres..”

The nature of the “music” that is “finer” than what one learns by being trained to perform in a chorus is delineated at 667b5-671a1 (summarized at 670e5-8; cf. 669a7-b3). That finer music is “music” in the broader sense that includes learning more generally (see note on ____). The music “of the choruses and the public theatres” is music in the narrower sense. On an ambiguity between these two notions of comparative fineness, see next note and note on 666d11-e1.

667b1-3 “let us try to assign it to those whom we said were embarrassed by the latter kind but eager to partake of the finest variety”

A reference back to 665e-666c, where the Athenian says that the elderly members of the chorus of Dionysus would be embarrassed to sing in public choral performance, but willing to sing in drinking parties, wine will loosen their age-induced stiffness. That earlier passage, however, makes no mention of eagerness on the part of the elders to sing a finer variety of music—at least insofar as that “finer variety” is understood in the present context. Here the “finest variety” (b3) is the music “finer than that of choruses” that was just mentioned at 667a10-b1, whereas in the earlier passage, wine is said to renew the elders’ enthusiasm for singing “those songs that we have repeatedly said are

charms" (666c6). The latter is the Athenian's general characterization of choral music (659e1-5). The only sense in which the earlier passage may be said to invoke a "finer music" is that it says the elders will find it less unseemly (aschêmôn, 666c9) for those of their age to perform privately in drinking parties than publicly in choral competitions. (On a different ambiguity in the notion of "finer music" see note on 666d11-e1.)

Perhaps Plato here trades on an ambiguity in the notion of a "finer" music in order to connect

(A) the largely self-contained account of the "finer music" at 666d3-671a1 into what would otherwise be a continuous discussion of

(B) the use of drunkenness by the Dionysian chorus.

The latter resumes at 671a2 as if it were continuous with the discussion that ends at 666d2. On the connection between (A) and (B) see notes on 664d1-2, 671e1.

(667b5-668b8) Pleasure, correctness and the evaluation of representational art

Having just proposed that the Chorus of Dionysus will practice a kind of music that is "finer than ...what is performed in choruses and public theatres" (667a10-b1) the Athenian now begins to elucidate the nature of that "finer music". He here takes the preliminary step of revisiting the issue, originally raised in 657c-659c, of whether pleasure is the criterion of correct music. He sketches a general account of the (very limited) conditions in which anything is to be judged by the criterion of pleasure (667b-668a), and gives specific reasons for supposing that music, as a representational art, is not to be judged by the pleasure it provides (668a-b). Rather, it is to be judged by how accurately it represents its intended object (668b).

The Athenian appeals frequently in this discussion to the notion of 'correctness' (orthotês) or what is 'correct' (orthos), and the notion will be especially important in the sequel, where the musical expertise of the Dionysian chorus is specified (668c-669b, 670b). As there is considerable disarray among commentators about how the Athenian conceives the relation between the question of whether music is correct and the question of whether it is fine (see notes to ___), it will be helpful to make some general comments about the relation between these and related notions invoked by the Athenian.

Correctness

The Athenian appeals frequently in this discussion to the notion of ‘correctness’ (orthotês) and what is ‘correct’ (orthos). As he deploys the term here, correctness applies to any activity or object that has a goal (a good or worthwhile objective—see note on ____), and it consists in success at achieving that goal. Thus correctness of food consists in its being healthy and correctness of learning consists in its reaching truth (667a-b), and correctness of a likeness consists in accurately depicting its intended object (667b-c). It is only in the case of things that yield only harmless pleasures and occur for the sake of these that pleasure is the criterion of correctness. Where more significant benefits (and their corresponding harms) are at stake, it is those benefits, rather than pleasure, that provide the standard for correctness.

The Correct, the Fine, and the Good

So conceived, correctness is a matter of goodness: of successfully living up to the standards that apply to the activity or object in question. The correctness of music has been a preoccupation of the Athenian’s since early in Book II. While his original question (654e-655c), what kinds of song and dance are fine (kalon), does not invoke the vocabulary of correctness, he restates it as the question of what kind of music is correct (655d1, 657a8, b3). Accordingly, in the present context, the Athenian identifies the “correctness and benefit” of something as “the “well” and “fine” in it (667c7), and indicates that the search to identify the music that is “finest” must seek “the kind that is correct” (668b____). (Matters are complicated by 669b1-3; on which see note)

667b6-8 “Either this very feature on its own [sc. enjoyment] is the most important (*spoudaiotaton*) thing about it, or else it is a certain correctness (*orthotês*) or, third, benefit (*ôphelia*)”

What is *spoudaion*—often contrasted with what is “in play” (*paizonta*, see note on 635d5)—is translated ‘serious’ in other contexts. Here it is used to pick out the proper criterion of evaluation. While the Athenian here distinguishes correctness from benefit as the second and third item on the list, he will treat the two as a unit (“its correctness and benefit” when illustrating with the examples of food (c1) and learning (c6). Presumably these are cases in which correctness consists in providing a benefit. (In other cases, e.g. representations, correctness consists in likeness rather than benefit—cf. 667d9-10). By contrast, Hatzistavrou 2011: 368-371 proposes that correctness and benefit coincide even in the case of musical representations. On correctness see also note on 667d9-e1 and general note on 667b5-668b.

667c6-7 “but its correctness (*orthotês*) and benefit (*ôpheleia*), the “good” (*to eu*) and “fine” (*to kalôs*) in it,...

The Athenian here indicates that correctness is an instance of being good and fine (*eu kai kalôs* <sc. *echein*>). This is in keeping with his restatement as an issue about “correctness of music” (655d1, 657a8, b3), the question that he originally articulated (654e-655c) as what kinds of song and dance are fine (*kalon*). On the relation between correctness and goodness (“*to eu*”) cf. 668d2 and note on 631b5.

667c10-d1 “the production of likenesses (*homoïoun*) in the case of the representational (*eikastikai*) arts (*technai*)”

This representational activity will later be described as “imitation” (*mimesis*) at 667e10, and music is identified as a representational art 668a6-7.

667d5-7 “the correctness in such cases would be achieved....roughly speaking, by equality (*isotês*) in quantity (*tou tosoutou*) and quality (*tou toioutou*)”

Here a very specific kind of correctness (*orthotês*) is described as a kind of “equality” (*isotês*), which here presumably means something less than numerical equivalence and more like accuracy or correspondence: an accurate picture of a house need not have the same dimensions, but will preserve the same relative proportions (cf. 668b7 and the example at 668d7-e5). See Hatzistavrou 2011: 371-2. At 668a3 such accuracy is referred to as truth (*aletheia*).

The qualification “roughly speaking” (*hôs epi to pan eipein*) indicates that the statement is rough or approximate. The locution is rare in Plato (cf. *Laws* 917a5, *Euthydemus* 279e6) and occurs occasionally in Aristotle (e.g. *GA* 732a20, *HA* 573a28) as a variation on his more familiar locution “*hos epi to polu*” (e.g. *GA* 725b17, *Physics* 196b11, *Prior Analytics* 32b10); the latter is also used by Plato (*Stsm* 294e1, 295a4, *Rep.* 377b7, *Laws* 792b1, 875d4); in both authors it typically marks a claim as rough in the sense of admitting of exception. Here, however, it is unlikely that the Athenian means to say that correctness in representative arts is, in some exceptional cases, not a matter of accuracy of depiction. The qualification in the present context therefore probably acknowledges the imperfect adequacy of the term ‘*isotês*’ (equality) to capture the general phenomenon: it is the terminology rather than the generalization that

is “rough”.

667d9-e3 “the only matter that would be correctly judged (*krinoito*) by pleasure is that which provides neither benefit nor truth nor likeness ... but rather comes to be simply for the sake (*heneka*) of this single thing, enjoyment”

“[B]enefit ... truth ... likeness” are the different criteria for correctness (*orthotês*) just canvassed over 667b-d. The teleological language here (“for the sake of”) reveals that correctness is a matter of success in achieving a goal (that for the sake of which), such as truth, likeness, etc. See general note on 667b5-668b8.

667e6-8 “I call it recreation (*paidiá*), when it produces neither harm nor benefit worth taking seriously (*spoudês ... axion*)

On the range of the term *paidia* (recreation or play) see note on 635b5. Here its connection to pleasure, as well as the contrast with the serious (*spoudê*) are to the fore. The restrictive definition of the term articulated here underlies the claim at 673e8 that drinking parties must not be treated as mere *paidia*.

667e11-668a2 “wouldn’t we say that imitation as a whole ... is least suitably judged (*krinoito*) by pleasure and appearance that lacks truth? For in no case is it in virtue of appearing to someone, or of someone not enjoying something, that the equal is equal...”

“Appearance that lacks truth” (*doxêi mê alêthei*) explains “pleasure” (e11-a1); “The Athenian has indicated that what we experience as pleasant thereby appears to us to be fine, and vice versa (655e2-5; see note ad loc). Thus someone not enjoying something” is an instance of “appearing to someone” (a1-2) His claim is that it is not in virtue of appearing fine to someone that something is fine, anymore than a representation’s appearing to be accurate that it is in fact accurate.

668a3 “it is to be judged in terms of its truth above all else”

Here ‘truth’ is used instead of ‘equality’ (*isotês*; alt: ‘accuracy’) for the correctness characteristic of representational art. Cf. 667c5-7, where truth is said to be the standard of correctness for learning (*mathêsis*).

668a6-7 “music, we say, is representational (*eikastikê*) and imitative (*mimêtikê*)”

The two terms are used equivalently here (cf. 667c10, e10, 668b10-c1). Choral songs and dances were described as “imitations (*mimemata*) of characters” at 655d5; also in VII 798d9. The notion of “representation” (*eikastikê*) is invoked for the first time at 667c10, and its product is called *mimesis* at 667e10. On music that (scandalously, to the Athenian) is not representational, see 669e4-670a3.

668a9-10 “So we should be least prepared to accept it when someone says that music is to be judged (*krinesthai*) by pleasure”

The Athenian’s remark here is in superficial contradiction with his limited endorsement of the principle at 658e6-9. However, the Athenian in the present context continues to believe that the elders will enjoy the music that they identify as best (670d-e), and in the former context he indicates that their judgment is an expression of knowledge (see note on 658e6-9). The former passage does not credit the elders with an unreasoned intuition. They will enjoy the music that they, in their wisdom recognize to be fine, and it is their grasp of its fineness that is the basis of their discrimination. Hatzistavrou 2011: 367 proposes to avoid the contradiction by taking the pleasure criterion at 658e to require that the fine musical works must be pleasant to children, but it is emphatically the pleasures of the elders that are there identified as the criterion.

668b2 “involves likeness (*homoiotêta*), imitating what is fine (*tôi tou kalou mimêmati*)”

Cf. 655b2-6 and note ad loc, where the gestures and tunes of fine choral music are called imitations of fine actions and utterances (i.e. those characteristic of virtue). On choral music as a representation or imitation of the fine, see also notes on _____ and 669a7-b1.

Following Schopsdau, the present translation takes the dative (*tôi ... mimêmati*) not as object of ‘*homoiotêta*’ (likeness), but as instrumental, indicating the means by which the likenesses are brought about. On the alternative construal of the dative, the translation would be: “has likeness to (an) imitation of the fine” (thus Brisson/Pradeau, Des Places, Saunders, Taylor, Pangle; rejected by England). Against this construal, there is no indication in the surrounding context that the likenesses produced by representational arts (cf. 667c10-d1) are likenesses of imitations, rather than of originals..

668b4-6 “those who seek out the finest song and music must... search for the kind... that is correct”

The “finest music” here must be music in the narrow sense of song and dance; however, the “finest music” whose nature is under discussion over this whole passage (667b-670e) is music in a different sense: the learning by which the elders will identify correct song and dance; see note on 666d3. On ambiguities in the notion of the “finest” or “finer” music see notes on 666d11-e1 and 667a10-b1, 667b1-3.

(668b9-669b4) Three things a wise judge of art must know

Having just argued at some length (667b-668c) that choral music is a representational art which is to be evaluated (krineisthai) according to standards of accuracy, the Athenian here turns to consider what a wise judge must know in order to apply those standards to a particular work of art. He begins (668c4-e5) by distinguishing two questions:

1. *what is the object being represented?*
2. *how accurately does the work of art represent it?*

In keeping with the immediately preceding discussion (667b-668c), he refers to (2) as a matter of the “correctness” of the art work (668c7, d1, d9). Thus we may understand him to be introducing (1) as a prior question that must be addressed in order to assess (2) the representational accuracy that he has already identified as the standard of the “well and the fine” (667c8).

He concludes (668e7-669b3) by refining the criteria of evaluation captured in questions (1) and (2), which he now states to be insufficient to determine whether a work of art is fine. In the case of choral music, a wise judge must know in addition:

3. *how well the representation employs “phrases, tunes, and rhythms” (669b2-3).*

This third criterion will be elaborated at some length at 669b-670e (see notes ad loc), where knowledge of it, characterized generally as knowledge of what is “harmonious and well rhythmmed” (670b9) is identified as the “finer music” or “superior education” characteristic of the Dionysian chorus. Most commentators, by contrast, construe (3) as a specifically moral assessment of the work of art—against which, see the notes on 669b1-3 and 669c3-8.

Assessing Representational Accuracy

668c4-8 “the person who will not be in error (*hamartésesthai*) about a particular composition must know what it is (*ho ti pot’ estin*). For if he fails to know the nature (*ousian*), what it intends (*ho bouletai*), and of what it is actually an representation (*eikôn*), he will hardly discern whether whether the intention is correctly carried out (*tên orthotêta tês boulêseôs*) or misses the mark”

The Athenian here shifts from arguing that music is to be evaluated by its representational accuracy (667b5-668c3) to focus on a related epistemological question: what does one need to know in order to evaluate a musical composition. (Noted also by Schöpsdau). The “*person who will not be in error*” is probably the “true judge” of music from 659a5 and the “wise judge” of art at 669a9-b3, where “what it is” is listed as the first of three things such a judge must know. In the present passage, “what it is” is expanded to “the nature (*ousian*), what it intends (*ho bouletai*; a phrase repeated at 669e4), and of what it is actually an representation (*eikôn*)” (667c6-7). We may suppose the reference to the object’s nature (*ousian*, c6), indicates that knowing “what it is” includes enough information about the intended object to provide a basis for determining whether the representation is accurate. “[W]hat it intends” (*ti pote bouletai*), explained by “of what it is “actually (*ontôs*) a representation” (668c6-7), indicates that the Athenian conceives of representation (*eikastikê*) or imitation (*mimesis*, 667e10, 668a6) as a goal-directed activity; it has a target object of which it intends to produce a likeness, and its success is to be judged on how similar its product is to that target object. (On the relation between goal-directedness and correctness, see note on 667b5-668b8.). “[W]hether the intention is correctly carried out (*tên orthotêta tês boulêseôs*)” (translation following England) is, in isolation, ambiguous between “whether it is correct to carry out the intention” or “whether the intention has been successfully carried out”. In favour of the latter (endorsed by England and Schöpsdau), *orthotês* has consistently been used to refer to representational accuracy when applied to music (667c-668b), and the immediately following comment (668d1) uses ‘*to orthôs*’ (“whether it is correct”) in what is clearly the same sense. The simple point here, as illustrated at 668d8-e5, that in order to tell whether a work of art achieves representational accuracy, one needs to know what it purports to represent: “what it is” (the locution is repeated at repeated at 668d7, e5, 669b5). In effect, it affirms that knowing the second of the three things required of the wise judge at 669a9-b3 (“how correct it is”) requires knowing the first (“what it is”).

668d1-2 “If he fails to grasp whether it is correct (*to orthôs*), will he ever be able to discern (*diagnônai*) whether it is good or bad (*to eu kai to kakôs*)?”

The question “whether it is correct” (*to orthôs*) concerns the correctness just

invoked at 668c7-8, that is, how accurately the art work represents its intended object. “[W]hether it is good or bad” (*to eu kai to kakôs*) is (pace England) the same question raised at 667c6-7 with the phrase “good and fine” (*to eu kai kalôs*); it is the overall evaluative verdict of the “wise judge” invoked at 669a8. Thus the present passage summarizes the message of 667b5-668b8 that a work is to be evaluated or judged (*krineitai*) according to whether it is correct, and that the standard of correctness in the case of representational arts is accurate representation. The main difference between the two passages is that the former presented the evaluation of the work as being simply a matter of assessing its representational accuracy (see note on 667c6-7), whereas in the present passage, by contrast, knowing whether the work is an accurate representation is identified only as necessary for answering that evaluative question. Indeed, at 668e8-669a7, the Athenian will indicate that it is not sufficient (see note on 669a5-6). A wise judge of choral music needs to know, in addition, a “third thing”: “how well worked...” (*hôs ... eu eirgastai*) the piece is (669b1-3). England and Schöpsdau, on the basis of construing that third question as a specifically moral evaluation of the work of art, identify it with the question about “good or bad” (*to eu kai to kakôs*) in the present passage. Whatever the merits of their interpretation of the third criterion (to be criticized in the note on 669b1-3), Saunders oversteps in translating ‘*to eu kai to kakôs*’ the present passage as “its moral goodness or badness.” It is also worth noting that if, as shall be argued in the notes on 669b1-3 and 669c3-8, the intended object of representation in choral music is fine or virtuous behaviour, then the representational accuracy of a work will entail its moral adequacy, so there would be no reason to suppose the third criterion is the specifically moral requirement.

669a2-4 “Is it necessary that someone who recognized these things (*tauta*) would thereby (*êdê*) readily recognize whether it is fine (*kalon*) or falls short in some way from beauty (*kallous*)?”

“These things” (*tauta*) are (1) what the intended object of representation is and (2) how accurately the work represents that object—which are about to be identified as the first and second items of knowledge required of the wise judge at 669a8-b3. The Athenian here switches his focus, without warning, from the *necessity* of answering the (2) if one is to evaluate a work of art as good or bad—668d1-2 (and a subordinate concern with the necessity of answering (1) in order to answer (2)—668c4-8, d7-e5) to the *insufficiency* of (1) and (2) for assessing the fineness of a work of art. Whether the work of art is “fine (*kalon*) or falls short in some way from beauty (*tou kallous*)” is the same general evaluative question raised with the phrase *to eu kai kalôs* at 667c6-7 (see note ad loc), and with the phrase ‘*to eu kai kakôs*’ at 668d1-2; beauty (*to kallos*) is simply the cognate noun of the adjective ‘*kalon*’ (fine)). On the general evaluative question addressed by the “wise judge” see note on 669a8).

669a5-6 “But then, just about all of us would recognize what is fine in the case of pictures (*zôion*)”

Klinias answers the Athenian’s question of 669a2-4 in the negative, and the Athenian will endorse his answer at 669a7 (“*orthotata legeis*”). As noted by Schöpsdau, those who construe Klinias’ answer as affirmative (e.g. Pelosi 2010: 56 and Hatzistavrou 2011: 377) overlook the significance of the construction ‘*an*’ + imperfect, which marks Klinias’ response as the apodosis of a counterfactual conditional). Not everyone, he here implies, is a good judge of whether a work of visual art is “fine” or “beautiful”, but we would be, if such judgments simply amounted to an assessment of how accurately the works depict their objects (e.g. if evaluating the merits of a Rembrandt self-portrait was simply a matter of judging how accurately it depicted the painter’s face.) Such judgments of representational accuracy involve the first and second things a “wise judge” will be required to know at 669a7-b3; thus the current point provides a premise in the argument for the conclusion there that such a judge must also know a third thing. See note on 669b1-3.

‘Pictures’ here translates *zôion*, whose primary meaning is “animals” (and is translated thus by Des Places, Taylor, and England (following Ast). However, it has an established use (esp. in the plural) for pictures or paintings (LSJ s.v. II); cf. Aristotle *Catg.* 1a2-3) and is translated accordingly by Saunders, Schöpsdau and Brisson/Pradeau in the present passage. See Saunders 1972: 10.

The three criteria for fine art

669a7-9 “So, for each representation (*eikon*), whether in painting or in music as a whole, aren’t there three things a wise judge (*emphrona kritên*) needs to grasp?”

Having just endorsed (*orthotata legeis*, 669a7) Klinias’ reply (669a5-6) that knowing (1) what object is being represented by a work of art and (2) how accurately it depicts it does not thereby put one in a position to judge whether that work of art is fine or beautiful (*kalon*), the Athenian here concludes that there is, in addition, a third thing that a “wise judge” must know. The wise judge must be one who pronounces on the question for which (1) and (2) have just been declared insufficient: whether a work of art is fine (669a3-4); this is what the “true judge” of 659a5 does, who, like the the unqualified judges with whom he is contrasted (the verb *krinein* is ubiquitous through 657e-659a) addresses the question that has occupied the Athenian’s attention since early in Book II: what sort of music is fine?(654e ff.). That question is variously expressed in the present context as a concern with “the good and fine” (*to eu kai kalôs*, 667c7) in a work of art, or “whether it is good or bad” (*to eu kai kakôs*, 668d1-2), or whether the work is “fine (*kalon*), or falls short of beauty” (669a3). Making such a

judgment will be explicitly identified as the task of the Chorus of Dionysus, who “select” the musical work that is “finest” (*eklogê ...tou kallistou*, 670e7-8).

The Athenian here implies that the three criteria he is about to articulate apply to all kinds of representational art, including painting (“*whether in painting or in music as a whole*” 669a8). However, while he keeps to this level of generality in stating criteria (1) and (2), he will articulate (3) in terms specific to music in the narrow sense (which prompts England to bracket the phrase “with phrases and melodies and rhythms” at 669b2-3 as an interpolation; criticized by Schöpsdau). For a suggestion as to how (3) might be restated at a level of generality to apply to the visual arts as well, see note on 669b1-3 (under “the third criterion”).

669a9-b3 “He must know first what it is, second, how correct it is (*hôs orthôs*), and third, how well worked (*hôs eu ... eirgastai*) the particular representation is in phrases (*rhêmasin*) and melodies (*melesi*) and rhythms (*rhuthmois*)”

The first and second criteria have been expounded in 668c4-e5. They concern (1) the work’s intended object of representation and (2) how accurately the work succeeds in representing it – the latter being regularly described as a kind of “correctness” (667b5-668a5). The Athenian claimed earlier (668a6-c3) that such representational accuracy, rather than pleasure, is the proper basis for evaluating works of representational art. Here that position is refined. In addition to representational accuracy, (1) and (2), a fine work of art must also satisfy a third criterion: (3) that it be “well ...worked in phrases and tunes and rhythms”.

There is a tendency among commentators to disregard the significance in (3) of the qualification “in phrases and tunes and rhythms” (misconstrued in the translation by Hatzistavrou 2011: 375 as applying to all three criteria), and to take the criterion to be fully stated by “how well..” (*hôs eu*). Criterion (3) is then conflated with the general evaluative question faced by the wise critic of a work of art. The latter, for example, is articulated at 668d2 as *to eu kai kakôs* (whether the work “is good or bad” 668d2), where it is distinguished from the “correctness” of the work; and one might suppose (with Schöpsdau and England) that we have there the same distinction between (2) and (3) as in the present passage. Similarly, in 668e7-669a4, immediately preceding the present passage, the Athenian has distinguished between, on the one hand, the representational accuracy of a work (which he has been consistently calling its “correctness” (667c-668b) and, on the other hand, its beauty or fineness (*to kalon*)—the latter term being used to articulate (3) at 670e6. Thus in 668e7-669a4 too it might seem that we are given the distinction between (2) and (3). On this basis one might conclude that the 3rd criterion in our present passage concerns the fineness or beauty of a work of art (thus Hatzistavrou 2011: 376). However, this interpretation of (3) makes no sense of the fact that 668e7-669b3 amounts to an

argument from the *premise* that knowing (1) and (2) is insufficient to determine whether a work of art is fine, to the *conclusion* that some third thing must also be known—sc., in order to answer that question. On pain of irrelevance, that third thing must be the answer to a question distinct from whether the work of art is fine, although necessary for answering that question.

The third criterion

There is considerable disarray among commentators as to how to understand the third criterion,(3). On the most natural way of reading the present text, (3) concerns how well the composer has employed the various musical elements in the composition (“how well worked” (*eu ... eirgastai*) it is “in phrases and tunes and rhythms” (669b1-3; cf 656c4-5). What counts as being “well worked” in this respect is explained in the immediately following passage (669b5-670b7), which relates about the particular “challenges” presented by music (669b5-6). The latter passage, which catalogues errors in musical composition makes specific and repeated mention of tunes, rhythms, and words; it requires that the harmonies and rhythms in a choral work be compatible with each other and with the melodies (*mele*) and gestures (*schêmata*) that are set in those structures (see note on 669c3-8). Thus we may conclude that (3) in the present text, being “well worked... in (alt: “by”) words, songs, and rhythms,” is a matter of such internal consistency—a supposition confirmed by the Athenian’s identification of expertise at assessing such rhythmic and harmonious appropriateness as the specialized competence of the Dionysian chorus at 670b8-671a1 (see notes ad loc); confirmed at VII 812b9-c8. We might call such internal consistency in a work of art its “integrity”.

Most commentators, by contrast (e.g., England, Saunders, Schöpsdau, and most recently Pelosi and Hatzistavrou: 380-381) construe the ensuing discussion of fitting harmonies and rhythms (669b5-670b7) as pertaining to criterion (2)—the representational accuracy of the composition—and they interpret (3) as a moral or ethical assessment of the art work, variously understood to concern its suitability for inculcating virtue (Schöpsdau, England, Mouze 2005: 198-205) or the moral quality of the behaviour it represents (Morrow 314, Stalley 126-7, 129; Pelosi 56-7). However, while it is evident that the Athenian takes the question of whether a work of art is fine to involve a moral or ethical assessment (witness his requirement at 655a-b that fine songs and dances be those “of virtue”—see note on 655b2-6), it is a mistake to suppose that criterion (3) expresses that moral requirement. Call the latter the “moral interpretation” of (3).

The obvious embarrassment faced by the moral interpretation of (3) is that the long catalogue of mistakes made in musical compositions (669b5-670b7), which follows immediately upon the introduction of (3), does not concern the moral defects of those compositions, but rather their failure to use harmony and rhythm as fitting accompaniments to song and dance (cf. 670a1). We are to

suppose that having stated the inadequacy of judging a work of art on (1) and (2) alone —its representation features—the Athenian here announces that (3), its moral adequacy, must also be taken into account, but then proceeds to ignore the question of moral adequacy and to give a lengthy discussion of additional considerations that go into the assessment of (2). Moreover, the Dionysian chorus' signature expertise in harmonies and rhythms (670b-d) would be irrelevant to the criterion (3) here introduced—even though expertise in the “third thing” is explicitly attributed to them at 670e2-5 (see note ad loc).

This “moral” interpretation of (3) is nonetheless preferred by these commentators as the price of avoiding a variety of problems. For example, it is sometimes supposed that the alternative to the “moral” interpretation of (3) is a narrowly technical reading—as on the translations of Jowett and Taylor—according to which (3) is a matter of how well the words, songs, and gestures in a choral work succeed in representing their intended object (thus Morrow 314n55). On such a narrowly technical reading, (3) would collapse into (2)—which is at odds with the Athenian's clear message that (3) is an additional consideration not captured by (2). Schöpsdau, by contrast, supposes that the alternative to the “moral” interpretation is to suppose that (3) concerns the quality of workmanship of the composition (so construed, (3) would be distinct from (2), the work's strictly representational adequacy). But this alternative, he claims (p. 324), has the unacceptable consequence, given the Athenian's claim at 670e5 that the poets need not know “the third thing”, that the expertise of the poet does not extend to assessing the technical workmanship of poetic compositions. Thus, Schöpsdau concludes, (3) must concern a higher expertise than the poet's technical expertise. However (as will be argued in the note on 670e5-7), it is perfectly intelligible for the Athenian to distinguish between the poet's knowledge of harmonies and rhythms (which is how to produce them, that is to set words and gestures into harmonies and rhythms) from expertise as to whether the harmonies and rhythms so employed are appropriate to the words and gestures. On the “integrity” interpretation, it is the latter expertise that pertains to (3) and is the special province of the Dionysian chorus.

Once we distinguish the question addressed by the third criterion from the question of whether the work of art is fine (which will depend on all three criteria), it is intelligible to ask which of the three criteria identified in the present passage (669b1-3) expresses a specifically moral requirement for fine works of art. The evidence for supposing that there is such a requirement points clearly toward the first criterion as the locus of the moral restriction, for it asks what object is being represented (or imitated) by the work. Choral music, we are told, imitates or depicts actions and characters (655d5; cf. 798d9), and the Athenian states emphatically, early in Book II, that the words and gestures in fine choral music must be those of virtuous people (655b; see note on 655b2-6). Accordingly he indicates, closer to the present context, that serious music, unlike the trifling sort that aims only at harmless pleasure, is engaged in the business of “imitating what is fine” (668a9-b2; see note on 668b2). Thus we may conclude that the reason why a “wise judge” of music must know “the first thing” (“what it is” that the work

represents) is not simply in order to know the second thing (how accurate the representation is), but more importantly, because the answer to that first question will reject those works that imitate behaviour and character that is not fine.

Thus it is criterion (1) that expresses the moral requirement on fine music: that the object of representation in fine music must be virtuous behaviour. Criterion (2), by contrast, requires that such behaviour be represented accurately. Criterion (3) introduces a consideration in addition to (1) and (2). As an examination of the next paragraph (669b5-670b6) will reveal, the first two criteria ask whether the gestures and words in a choral work accurately represent the behaviour of virtuous people, while the third criterion asks whether the harmonies and rhythms it employs are appropriate to the behaviour depicted (see note on 669c3-8). (By contrast, Schipper 1963 denies, quite implausibly that (1) and (2) concern representational features of music, and construes (3) as pertaining to intrinsic features of harmony and rhythm, rather than to the fit between these and the words and gestures; Hatzistavrou 2011 also underestimates the significance of the question of fit.) On the extent to which the third criterion also involves a kind of representational adequacy, see “Harmony and Rhythm as Imitations of character” in the note on 669c3-8)

**(669b5-670a3) *The third criterion explained:
appropriate harmony and rhythm***

To elucidate the “third thing” that a wise judge of art must know (669a7-b3), the Athenian enumerates a variety of mistakes made by human composers:

- A. they employ mutually inconsistent compositional elements (phrases, melodies, gestures, rhythms) in their imitation of human beings (669c3-8)*
- B. they attempt to represent multiple objects as if they were a single thing (669c8-d6)*
- C. they employ compositional elements without any representational intent (669d6-670a3)*

A, B, and C amount to increasingly severe deviations from the principle of correct composition that is stated more succinctly at the end of the paragraph (670b2-6). This is the view that a tune (melos) is “correct” (670b4) or “well rhythmmed” (eurhuthmos) and “harmonious” (euharmonion – 670b9) if it employs the harmony or mode (harmony) or rhythm that is appropriate to its words or phrases (rhêmasin), and gestures (schêmata). In effect, the principle requires that the distinctively musical aspects of the work—harmony and rhythm—be in keeping with its more narrowly representational features—the words and gestures (see note on on 669c3-8). (The further errors in B and C involve abandoning these representational aspirations to increasing degrees.) Thus knowledge of the

appropriateness of harmonies and rhythms is identified as the “finer music” to be practiced by the elderly judges (a point repeated at VII 812_), and this, the Athenian claims, requires training beyond that of the ordinary citizen who is drilled at singing and dancing in a chorus (670b8-671a1).

669b5-6 “let’s not overlook the challenges we face in the case of music”

More literally: “let’s not fail to mention the way in which music is difficult (*chalepon*)”

The difficulties in the present context may be the challenges faced by judges of music (who might, for example, find amusing (*gelōta*, 669d4) rather than pernicious the musical practices about to be denounced as mistaken (669c3-670a3). Or they may be concern the dangerous consequences of engaging in the wrong kind of music. The latter is suggested by 669b8-c1, and the former by the repetition of “difficult” (*chalepon*) in the superlative at 669c1, where mistakes in music are “most difficult to notice” (*aistesthai*) (see note on 669b1-3). On either construal, the difficulty would stem from the fact that music is pleasant, and pleasure, as discussed in Book I, is a most “difficult” or “hard” opponent (*chalepotatos* – 634b6; see note ad loc). On the range of the term ‘*chalepon*’ (hard, difficult) see note on 629d2.

669b8-c1 “a person who goes wrong here (*hamartōn*) [will] incur the greatest harm, from looking favourably on bad characters (*éthē kaka*)”

The person “going wrong” will be the one who partakes in the wrong sort of song and dance, and thereby comes to enjoy bad character. The harms are detailed at 656b1-4.

669c1-3 “it is most difficult (*chalepōtaton*) to detect (*aisthesthai*), due to the fact that the composers are inferior poets to the Muses themselves”

The inferiority of the human poets is summed up at 670e: they know how to produce the various harmonies and rhythms, but not what makes them appropriate to specific words and gestures (or to each other)—hence the errors detailed at 669c4-8; cf. 670b2-6. We are not told explicitly why their error is difficult to detect (*aisthesthai*), but perhaps it is because the natural human response to the *aisthesis* (perception) of harmony and rhythm is to be pleased (654a2-3)—and this pleasure is without regard to how well the particular harmony and rhythm fit with each other and with the subject matter; detecting the latter knowledge requires specialized training beyond that of the ordinary citizen (670b8-c3, e2-4). See also the suggestion in the note on 669b5-6.

Mistaken music that fails the third criterion

669c3-8 “so mistaken as to compose words (*rhêmata*) of men and then give them the colour (*chrôma*) or tune (*melos*) of women, or after composing the tune and gestures (*schêmata*) of free persons, attach to them the rhythms (*rhuthmoi*) of the servile...”

These “mistakes” illuminate, by negative contrast, the third criterion to be used by the wise judge of representational art (669b1-3). A positive exposition of the criterion is given at 670b2-6: the rhythm the *harmonia* (“harmony” or “mode”—see note on 654a2-3) of a tune (*melos*) must be appropriate to it. The present passage, by contrast to 670b2-6 (and like the articulation of the third criterion at 669b1-3), substitutes ‘*melos*’ (tune) for ‘*harmonia*’: it is not a composition’s “harmony and rhythm”, but its “tune (*melos*) and rhythm” that must be appropriate to its words and gestures, as well as to each other. This slight variation in terminology reflects the conception of *melos* as constituted by *harmonia*, rhythm and *logoi* (____); any given *melos* involves a particular *harmonia*. The additional mention, in the present passage, of gestures (*schêmata*) ensures that the requirement applies not just to song, but to dance as well. On gestures and tunes (or gestures and words) as the material of dance and song respectively, see notes on 654e4-5 and 655a1-2. “Colour” is also invoked here, but not explained; at 655a4-8 the Athenian implies that it is used to refer metaphorically to what can be invoked more precisely via the terms *harmonia* and *rhythmos* (cf. note on 655a4-8.)

Harmony and rhythm as imitations of character

Neither the present passage nor 670b2-6 explains what make a particular harmony or rhythm appropriate to a given words or gesture. The Athenian here assumes that certain harmonies and rhythms are appropriate to women, and others to men, some to free persons, and others to slaves. In Book VII, where he makes a similar point (802c-e), he associates the “male nature” with courage and the female with moderation (*sôphrosunê*) (802e). This marks at least some continuity with the doctrine, endorsed in *Republic*, that the four different musical “harmonies” or “modes” are appropriate to different character types—the Dorian harmony to courageous behaviour and the Phrygian harmony to moderate behaviour, the Lydian and Ionian harmonies to behaviour that is weak and undisciplined in (399a-c)—with the (unnamed) three kinds of rhythm being similarly related to different character types (Rep. 398c-400a).

In *Republic*, Plato goes so far as to have Socrates state that the different harmonies and rhythms are *imitations* of particular character types or kinds of life (399a, c, 400a; cf. *Laches* 188d, 193d-e). While the Athenian stops short of using the vocabulary of imitation in the present passage, he does indicate in Book VII that the rhythms and harmonies will be “likenesses” of the soul

(*homoiotêta* – a term used for representations at 667c10, d10; cf. Rep. 401d-e). Since he has indicated that gestures and tunes in song and dance are imitations of character (655d5; to be repeated at 798d9), we might understand the principle of appropriate harmonies and rhythms as follows. The *mele* and *schêmata* in a choral performance represent the outward behaviour of a person with a given state of character, while the harmony and rhythm represent or imitate the corresponding state of soul. Thus the particular harmony, rhythm, words, and gestures of a given choral song and dance are appropriate to each other if they represent the same type of character. The conception of harmonies and rhythms as representations of character is endorsed by Hatzistavrou 2011: 382-3.

Such a representational conception of harmony and rhythm, however, raises a problem about the relation between the second and the third thing that at 669b1-3a wise judge is required to know, since it is natural to read the second criterion as requiring representational adequacy, and the third as requiring something distinct from that (see note on 669b1-3). But if harmonies and rhythms, no less than *mele* and *schêmata*, are representations of character, then it would seem that both the third and the second criteria for fine music concern its representational adequacy. One might worry that the difference between the 2nd and 3rd will then collapse. Nonetheless, it is possible to acknowledge the representational aspects of harmony and rhythm and still appreciate why the Athenian distinguishes between the second criterion and the third: (2) concerns the representational aspects of the work (words and gestures) whose “correctness” is more generally accessible to the ordinary person (parallel to the ordinary person’s ability to judge whether a painting is an accurate picture of an animal – cf. 669a). By contrast, (3) concerns aspects of the work (harmony and rhythm) whose representational properties are grasped only by specialized musical expertise. On such a construal the Athenian distinguishes between the second and third items of the competent judge’s knowledge NOT because only the former concerns the representational accuracy of the musical composition, BUT rather because assessing the representational adequacy of harmonies and rhythms (as opposed, e.g. to words and figures) is a matter of specialized knowledge. In particular, the analogy with painting emphasizes that (2) concerns how well the choral work has represented the external manifestation of virtue, while (3) concerns how well its harmonies and rhythms replicate the internal psychic structure of virtue.

669c8-d2 “they will not mix together the voices of beasts and men and instruments, and every kind of sound, as if they were imitating a single thing”

This second poetic “mistake” involves an even greater deviation than the first from the principle that a musical work must provide a consistent representation of a single entity. While the first mistake is that of combining opposing elements (courageous and cowardly) in the representation of a single person, this second error involves the incoherence of representing different types of animate and

inanimate entities as if they are a single entity. Thus Hatzistavrou 2011: 381-2; Compare *Rep.* 397a-b.

669d4-5 “a source of fun (*gelôta*) for people who are in what Orpheus calls the “prime season of delight.”

Alternatively (England): “providing objects of derision to men who...”

Orpheus is _____. see Edmonds (_____).

669e2-4 “... which makes it all but impossible to discern what this wordless rhythm and harmony intends (*ho te bouletai*)”

While the previous musical errors catalogued since 669b5 consist in making inconsistent representations (see note on 669c8-d2), the third error, here described, is to fail to use music as a representational medium at all. “What it intends” (*ho te bouletai*, e4) is the object imitated or represented by a work of art (668c5-8, see note ad loc).

669d7 “unadorned words (*psilous logous*)... “

While ‘*psilos*’ when applied to *logoi* (words) often means ‘prose’, here it indicates words not set to music i.e., structured by harmonia and rhythm. When applied to lyre and flute, as at 669a1-2, ‘*psilos*’ means “without words”. Thus England, rejected by Hatzistavrou 2011: ____.

670a1 “...other than as accompaniments to (*hupo*) dance and song”

More literally “other than as subordinate (*hupo* + accusative) to dance and song. This indictment of non-choral music reflects the requirement that music be used as representational medium. See 668a-c and note on 669c8-d2.

670a1-3 “Such unadorned (*psilê*) employment of either instrument is completely unmusical (*pasa tis amousia*)”

It is “unmusical” in the sense that it displays an absence of learning (*mousikê* in the broad sense)—in this case it displays ignorance of the representational function of music. See note on 670a1.

(670a3-671a1) The expertise of the elders distinguished both from that of the poets, and from that of choral performers

The finer music of the Dionysian chorus requires expertise in the third criterion, which is distinct both from the expertise of the composers, and from that of choral performers

670a3-6 “Our inquiry is not about the ways of employing the Muses that should be forbidden to those of us who have reached their thirties or gone past fifty, but rather the way they should employ them.”

“Our inquiry” refers back to the question posed at 666d3-4: what kind of music will be sung by the chorus of Dionysus, whose membership is specified as “those over thirty and up to sixty years of age” (664d2). The Athenian has answered that their music must be “finer than that performed by choruses” (666d-667a), and he demarcates the scope of that finer music by detailing the “three things” a wise judge of music must know (667b-669b). The catalogue of musical errors begun at 669b5 begins as an elucidation of the “third thing”. The Athenian’s present comment reflects the fact that that the catalogue has gone beyond what is necessary to fulfil this function. (Only the initial mistake listed violates the third criterion—see note on 669c3-8—while the second and third are increasingly egregious violations of the first and second.) On the age range of the Chorus of Dionysus, see also notes on 664d1-2 and 671e1.

670a7-b2 “those who have reached fifty and are fit to sing (*aidein prosêkei*) must have received an education better than that of the choral Muse”

At 812b9-10 the age for this superior education is specified as sixty rather than fifty. The question of being “fit to sing” recalls those “no longer up to the challenge of singing” (*ou gar eti dunatoi pherein ôidas*, 664d3) (see note on 664d2-4)

Cf. 666d-667a, where the Athenian suggests that the chorus of Dionysus will have such a superior education, which contrasts with that of Klinias and Megillus (666d8-10) who have been “drilled at singing to the flute and marching in rhythm” (670b10-c1) but have not been trained to discern whether the harmonies and rhythms of works are appropriate to them. See note on 670b2-4.

670b2-4 “They must be keenly perceptive and knowledgeable about rhythms and harmonies. Or else how could someone recognize the correctness of tunes (*orthotês tôn melôn*)?”

This is the knowledge resulting from the “education better than that of the choral muse” just mentioned (670a7-b1). As discussed in the lines immediately following, it is knowledge that discerns which tunes are “harmonious and well-rhythmed” (670b), which is to say that they “have the appropriate features” (670c2-3) – viz., the appropriate harmony and rhythm. As illustrated in 669c3-8 (see note ad loc): the harmony and rhythm in a song or dance must be appropriate to the words and gestures, and to each other. Thus a wise judge of music must be able (a) to identify what its harmony and rhythm are (“keenly perceptive” – *euaisthétōs*, 670b3); and (b) know what character type each of these fits (male, female, free, slavish, etc.). On harmonies and rhythms, see note on 654a2-3. (On the difference between this knowledge of harmonies and rhythms and that attributed to the poets or composers at 670e6-7, see note ad loc.)

The term ‘*orthotēs*’ here, in contrast to its use in 669b1-3, does not invoke representational accuracy. There, the correctness of a representation consists in its accuracy; here the correctness of a tune (whose constituent elements are words, harmony, and rhythm – Rep. 398c) consists in its having harmony and rhythm appropriate to its message.

670b4-6 “which of them should be in the Dorian harmony, and whether the rhythm the poet has attached to it is correct or not.”

The Dorian is one of the four *harmoniai* (“harmonies” or “modes”) discussed at Rep. III 398c-399c (cf. Laches 188d, 193d-e), but which are not named or enumerated elsewhere in *Laws*, even in the discussion of harmony and rhythm in VII, 802c-e; see note on 669b3-8. England would bracket these phrases as a later gloss not written by Plato, marked as an interpolation by its “slovenly style”. Even if he is correct as to the provenance of the phrases, the explanation they provide is surely correct.

*The finer music of the Dionysian chorus
vs. the expertise of the poets and of the choral performer*

670b8-9 “adequate knowledge of what is and isn’t harmonious (*euarmoston*) and well rhythmed (*eurhythmon*)”

This is specialized expertise as to the appropriateness of the different harmonies and rhythms (the 3rd criterion of 699b1-3), not the universal human capacity to take pleasure in the perception of harmony and rhythm (654a2-3). See notes on 669c3-8 and on 670c2-4.

670c2-3 “the tune (*melos*) that has the appropriate features is correct”

i.e., it has the harmony and rhythm appropriate to the behaviour represented by its words (see note on 669c3-8). Note that a *melos* here is not a “tune” in the narrow sense that excludes lyrics, but a combination of words, harmony and rhythm (Rep. 398c). On “correct” as applied to tunes, see note on 670b2-4.

670c5-6 “suppose a person does not even recognize what features it has... will he ever recognize whether it is correct (*hôs orthôs*)...?”

Such a person does not to recognize what harmony and rhythm a tune (*melos*) has, and hence is not in a position to assess “whether it is correct” (*hôs orthôs*, 670c6). On what such correctness consists in, see note on 670c2-3.

670c9 “whom we encourage to sing willingly (*hekontas*) —even compel them in a way”

On the willingness of the singers, see note on 663b4-6. On the contrast between willingness (*hekontes*) and compulsion (*anagke*) or force (*bia*), see 663e2 and note on ____.

670d5-6 “they are able to select the ones that are appropriate (*ta prosekonta*). This is what is fitting (*prepon*) for people of their age and character to sing...”

More literally: “the appropriate ones, which (*ha*) it is fitting for people of their age... to sing” (thus Schöpsdau). Alternatively, “select the songs that are appropriate for people of their age and character to sing...” (thus Brisson/Pradeau and Saunders)

The “appropriate ones” (*ta prosekonta*) are songs that have appropriate harmonies and rhythms (cf. the same term at 670c2). Thus the elders are applying the third criterion of the wise judge of 669b1-3 and they do so in fulfilment of their general mandate to select the fine songs to be performed by the choruses. Against the alternative translation, which construes the relative pronoun ‘*ha*’ as restrictive rather than attributive, the task the Athenian has set for the chorus of Dionysus is not simply to identify songs that are appropriate (*prepon*) for their own age and nature. All the citizens, young and old, must sing

songs with appropriate (*prosekonta*) harmonies and rhythms, and it is the business of the elders to select the songs with these features.

670d6-e1 “and singing thus (*houtôs aidontes*), they not only enjoy the harmless pleasures of the occasion ... but become leaders of the younger singers...”

On harmless pleasures, see 667d9-e5. “Singing thus” (*houtôs aidontes*) encompasses both the the “finer music” that selects the songs that are appropriate for choral performance, and the actual singing of those songs—the latter apparently being the method by which the younger singers are taught the selected songs. The “younger singers” here might be the members of the choruses of younger citizens: those citizens under the age of thirty in the chorus of the Muses and of Apollo (____). They might also be the younger members of the chorus of Dionysus. That chorus has members as young as thirty (664d1-2; see note ad loc), and the Athenian has just assigned the discriminatory expertise in harmonies and rhythms to “those who have reached the age of fifty and are fit to sing” (670b1-2). Given that the performance context of the Dionysian chorus is a drinking party (____), the leadership here would be that of the “sober leaders” who lead their juniors in a properly conducted drinking party (NB *neos* in 647??)

670e1-2 “guiding them to the appropriate embrace (*aspsmou*) of worthy characters”

A reminder that music trains a person’s affective responses. The term ‘*aspsmos*’ (embrace; alt: liking, loving; previously mentioned at 654d2) belongs to the “pleasures and pains” whose proper training constitutes education (*paideia*) so that an educated person “loves (*philein*) and hates (*misein*) as one should” CHECK QUOTE (653b-c); cf. 919e where ‘*aspsmos*’ is substituted for *philia* as the opposite of *misein* (hate).

670e3-4 “education (*paideia*) ... more exact (*akribesteran*) than that of common run, and even of the composers themselves”

This “more exact” education is training in the “finer music” of the Dionysian chorus (666d8-10, 670a7-b1, 670e2-3), which allows one to discern whether a tune is “harmonious and well-rhythmed” (670b8-9; see note ad loc). That knowledge of what is *euarmoston* and *eurhythmon* is specialized expertise rather than common knowledge is affirmed at *Tht.* 178d, Rep. 398-400, esp 400d (but compare *Protagoras* 326b). On the comparison with the choral training of the

ordinary person, cf. 666d8-10, 670a7-b1, 670e2-3. On the comparison with the training of the composers, see next note (on 670e5-7).

670e5-7 “For there is no need for the composers to know the third thing, whether the imitation is fine or not, but only, one might say (*schedon*), about harmony and rhythm”

The “third thing” is the third of the “three things” that a “wise judge” must know, enumerated at 669b1-3. There it is stated as “whether the particular representation (*hêtisoun eikonôn*) is well worked (*eu eirgastai*)...”. In the present restatement, “imitation” (*mimêma*) is substituted for “representation” (*eikôn*) in the original locution – as licensed by 668a6-7— and “fine” (*kalon*) is substituted for “well” (on the close connection between the good and the fine evident, e.g. at 667c7, see note on _____.) Alternatively, one might suppose that the “imitation” (*mimêma*) is the representative work of art itself, and hence that “the third thing” here corresponds to the general evaluative question for which the “three things” of 669b1-3 are criteria: whether the work of art is “fine or falls short... from beauty” (669a3-4); thus Ferrari 1989 [check] and Hatzistavrou 2011: 383-4. But that question is surely rather the one that is answered in the ranking of musical compositions as “finest”, “second” and so on at (670e7-8); and knowledge of “all three” things is explicitly said to be “for the sake of” (*heneka*, e7) making that ranking. (On the difference between the three criteria, and the question of whether the work of art is fine, see note on 669b1-3.)

The composers’ knowledge “about harmony and rhythm” (*to de harmonias kai rhuthmou*, e6—marked as an imprecise phrase by *schedon* (“one might say”)—must concern different matters than the expertise that allows the wise judges to discern which songs have appropriate harmonies and rhythms (670b8-c3, 670d1-5). We may understand the difference between the composer’s and the judge’s knowledge as follows: the composers’ expertise is in setting words and gestures into harmonies and rhythms, but does not extend to discerning which harmonies and rhythms are appropriate to which words and gestures (witness the mixing and matching decried at 669c3-8; see note ad loc). Thus the composers are unable to perform the task assigned to the wise judges of music: identify which pieces of music are “harmonious (*euarmoston*) and well rhythmmed (*eurhythmmon*)” (670b8-9). The higher expertise of these judges will involve not simply discriminating one harmony from another (the Dorian from the Lydian, for example, which a composer might be competent to do), but also discerning the sort of character to which each harmony is appropriate (e.g. that the Dorian is appropriate to courage). The latter discrimination involves knowing that the Dorian harmony replicates the psychic structure of courage (see note on 669c3-8), an expertise quite distinct from the composer’s knowledge of how to produce a tune in the Dorian harmony (*pace* Hatzistavrou 2011: 383). To deny such discriminatory expertise to composers is thus not to deny them competence in their craft—*pace* Schöpsdau p. 324; see note on 669b1-3. A different cognitive

deficit is assigned to the composers in Book VII, 801b9-c7. Hatzistavrou's proposal that the composers know the same things about harmony and rhythm as the wise judges know (2011: 382-3), only less expertly, conflicts with the Athenian's explicit statement at 670e7 that what the composers need not know, is one the the three things that the elderly judges must know)

670e7-8 These people (*tois de*), by contrast, must know all three in order to select (*tês eklogês heneka*) what is finest (*kallistou*) and what is second (*deuterou*)”

“These people” are the elderly singers invoked at the beginning of the paragraph (670c8-9), who are also the wise judges of 669b1-3, whom the Athenian has said must know “three things” in order to determine whether a work of art is fine or beautiful (669a3-4). Here that determination is expressed in the ranking of musical works as “finest”, “second”, etc. (on the significance of this ranking, see also note on 670e5-7). England and Brisson/Pradeau 359n94, by contrast, suppose that “what is second” is to be understood as the second of three stages of education that they find sketched at 670d1-5. On this interpretation, “what is finest” would be the “finer music” attributed to the Dionysian Chorus, which is expressed in selecting which musical compositions are fit for educational purposes. In support of the former interpretation against the latter: *toutois* (e7) is governed by the expression *anagkê ... gignôskein* (e5)— so “all three” (e7) are what the wise judges *know*, just like the “three things” of 669b1-3. Still, there has been a persistent ambiguity in the Athenian's use of the comparative and superlative of “fine music”: whether it concerns the ranking of choral music against a “finer” variety practiced by the Dionysian chorus, or whether it concerns the ranking of choral compositions, as in the competitive context reflected at 657d-659c. See note on 666d11-e1.

VI

Drinking Parties

(671a2-674c7)

The Athenian now fulfills the long deferred promise to explain his provocative claim that drinking parties have important educational benefits (641c-d, 652b-653a). His strategy of defending that claim in Book II has been to introduce the so-called Chorus of Dionysus (664c-665b), about which he has

made two main claims:

- (A) *its members will perform in drinking parties, rather than in public choral competitions (665c-666c).*
- (B) *the music they will perform is “finer than that of choruses” (667a10-b1) and amounts to the expertise that discriminates which choral compositions are fit to play a role in education (666d-671a1).*

While (B) clearly identifies an important educational function, it bears no obvious relation to the specifically Dionysian aspect of that chorus that is specified in (A) (see note on 667b1-3). Thus the Athenian now turns to focus on the benefits that arise from (B). He has already stated that drinking wine on such occasions will loosen up the older members of that chorus, and overcome their embarrassment at singing (666a-c). He here connects that point to the general theory of the natural basis of choral music introduced at the beginning of Book II 653d-654: drunkenness returns the adult soul to the kinetic youthful state that makes it amenable to the cultivating effects of music (671a-672d). Thus properly conducted drinking parties play the important educational function of renewing the education that, from the beginning, the Athenian has said “is weakened and corrupted to a great extent in human life” (653c8-9). Pulling together the strands of his discussion of drunkenness in Book I, he characterizes the goal of education as the cultivation of shame (_____; cf. _____), and insists that the drinking parties will have this educational benefit only if the drinkers are supervised by capable leaders (671c-e; cf. _____). This raises the question, whether those capable leaders are to be identified with the elders who, in narrative (A) above, discriminate what music is fit to sing, in which case the two main claims the Athenian makes about the Chorus of Dionysus are linked (on which see note on 671e1).

Finally, after a brief excursus on the necessity of including a discussion of athletic training, not just musical training, in a complete account of education, (672d-673d), the Athenian concludes his treatment of drinking parties by noting that they are serious business rather than recreation, and that in fact the consumption of wine should play an extremely limited role in social life (673d1-674c).

671a3 “that we did well (*kalôs*) to come to the defence (*boêtheia*) of the chorus of Dionysus”

At 665b the Athenian surprised his interlocutors by claiming that the chorus of older citizens will be dedicated to Dionysus. At 666b-c the activities of that chorus are identified as those of a drinking party (*sumposia*), the institution

disparaged by Megillus in Book I (637a-b), so the Athenian's "defence" of the chorus of Dionysus is in effect his defence of drinking parties against the criticisms of Megillus.

671a5-b1 "a gathering (*sullogos*) of this sort inevitably becomes more boisterous as the drinking proceeds... an inevitable feature, we originally supposed, of these events as they take place nowadays."

(reading the MSS *gignomenôn* instead of Des Places' *legomenôn* in b1).

A "gathering (*sullogos*) of this sort "is a drinking party (*sumposion*), discussed in Book I at 637a-641b, with the growing boisterousness described at 649a-b. "As they take place nowadays" (*peri tôn nun gignomenôn*) reflects the Athenian's concession at 639d-e that such parties as they are currently conducted are largely indefensible (639d-e).

671b5-6 "sufficient to rule both himself and all the others"

This describes both the lack of self-restraint (ruling oneself) in the individual drinkers, and the incipient conflict and hostility between drinkers (671e7-672a2) that arises in the absence of a sober leader directing the proceedings.

(671b8-672d10) The benefits of Drunkenness

Having recapitulated (671a2-b7) the incipient lawlessness and lack of restraint in drinking parties that led Megillus to deride the practice in Book I (____), where even the Athenian has characterized these in a negative light, welcome only as occasions for practice at resisting them, the Athenian now casts those same features of drunkenness in a favourable light. The disorderly condition of the drinkers replicates in those no longer young the juvenile volatility that makes the young amenable to the shaping influence of musical training.

The restorative function of Drunkenness

The specifically restorative education role identified here for drunkenness has been under appreciated by commentators, so it is worth stressing that the argument of 671b8-672d10 presents drinking parties as a an institution for restoring shame and self control in adults, not for cultivating that condition in the first place. While the depiction of drinking parties in Book I, as forums for battling

shamelessness (____) mentions no age restrictions, the detailed account of paideia over the course of Book II has made it clear that those under 30 years old will be educated by participating in the chorus of the Muses and of Apollo, and that it is only those old enough to have lost the natural juvenile eagerness to participate in song and dance who will be “softened up” and made educable again in Drinking parties (see note on 671b8-c2 . Thus England on 671e2, Stalley 55, and Morrow 442 (discussed by Schöpsdau 337) are wrong to suppose that the Athenian is proposing drinking parties for the young as well as for the old. A failure to appreciate the restorative function of the drinking parties, and hence the central role to drunkenness in its activities leads Morrow 316 to propose that they are forums for cultivating the “finer music” attributed to the Dionysian chorus (and similarly Wilamowitz Vol. 1, 210 supposes that its activities are analogous to that of Plato’s Academy)—endorsed in part by Schöpsdau 337. If there is to be a role for that “finer music” in the drinking parties here endorsed by the Athenians, it will have to play a role in securing educational benefits from drunkenness. That role will be the same as for the chorus of the Muses and of Apollo: to select the music that is fit for to be sung in these choruses (and hence in the drinking parties that are the venue of the Chorus of Dionysus). See note on 671e1.

671b8-c2 “We said ... that when this happens the souls of the drinkers are like iron infused with fire; they become softer and more youthful, susceptible to the influence of a capable educator who knows how to shape them (*plattein*) them”

A reference to the theory of youthful volatility and the human susceptibility to the pleasures of harmony and rhythm introduced at 653d5-654e3 and repeated at 664e3-665a3, 672c1-d4, and 673c9-d6. See note on 653d6-7. The present passage makes a point not stated explicitly on those previous occasions: that the condition of juvenile volatility is also a condition of plasticity, of susceptibility to being shaped by a program of musical education. Thus the reference to the young soul as pliable at 664b5 and its nature as fiery at 666a5.

671c7-8 “and make him willingly do (*ethelein poein*) just the opposite”

On *ethelein* as “being willing” see note on 663b4-6.

671c8-d2 “Against the shameful boldness that is entering him, such laws will launch the finest fear combined with justice”

This fear, about to be called shame (671d2-3) is first mentioned in Book I and recommended as a means to combat the boldness (*tharros*) of anti-social behaviour (646e-647b). It is described as “involving justice” (*meta dikés*) at 647c8.

671d5-7 “Those undisturbed (*athorubous*) and sober commanders of the inebriated will be guardians and assistants of these laws”

A reference back to the sober leaders of drinking parties invoked in Book I at 640d-e as analogues to the military leader who is undisturbed (*mê thoruboumenos*) by fear (640b3; cf 672a2-3); the office of “guardians of the laws” (*nomophulakeis*) will be introduced at 752e-755b; see also note on 632c4.)

671d9-e1 “he who cannot willingly obey (*ethelein peithesthai*) his leaders....”

On willingness and persuasion see note on 663b4-6. Here *peithesthai*, which encompasses both persuasion and obedience, has the latter sense, while at 663b2-6 the same locution *ethelein peithesthai* is translated “persuaded to do willingly”.

671e1 “those over sixty years of age”

This age designation would put the “sober commanders” of the drinking party beyond the upper age specified for the chorus of Dionysus at 664d1-2: “those over thirty and up to sixty”, whose performance context has been identified as a drinking party (666b, 671a-e). This would imply that the all-important role of providing wise supervision to drinking parties does not belong to members of the Chorus of Dionysus. Thus Schöpsdau identifies these “over sixty-year-old” leaders with “those beyond that” (*tous meta tauta*) at 664d2-3 who are assigned the task of telling stories, rather than singing in the Chorus of Dionysus. However, the Athenian nowhere explicitly marks sixty as a *terminus ante quem* for membership in the Chorus of Dionysus. At 664c-d, his concern is to include all citizens in the communal project of affirming the doctrines of beneficial music, and “those beyond that” at 664d2-3 are explicitly specified by inability, not by age (see note ad loc). Klinias’ question at 665d “will those over thirty.... and even up to sixty really perform a chorus in his honour?” expresses surprise at the extension of Dionysian activities to include 60 year olds, and would be equally applicable to those even older. At 670a-b no upper limit is given to the age range, only an indication that the membership goes “beyond fifty”, which is consistent with the age designation in the present passage. On the variation with

which the Athenian specifies the age range of that chorus, see Morrow 318 and Schöpsdau ad 664d5-665d6.

While England (seconded by Schöpsdau ad 671d5-e3) rightly notes that the sober leaders of the unsober first mentioned in Book I at 640d are implied to be older than the drinkers they supervise, this poses no obstacle to supposing that both the drinkers and their sober leaders are members of the chorus of Dionysus. The age range of that chorus is unusually broad (see note on 664d1-2) and the Athenian has already made discriminations within it, singling out the older members as the practitioners of the “finer music” specified in 667b-670e: the wise judges who select the compositions that are suitable for choral performance must have “reached fifty” (*pentêkontoutas*, 670b1), alternately specified as “having reached sixty” (*hexêkontoutas*, 812b9-10). These passages imply a leadership role for older members of the chorus over its younger members (cf. “leaders of the younger singers”, 670e1), and one might reasonably ask whether the leadership function extends to acting as the sober superintendents of the drinking parties in which other members of this chorus perform. The Athenian never says so, and indeed, has done practically nothing to integrate the accounts the Dionysian chorus as (A) practitioners of that finer music; and (B) participants in a drinking party (see notes on 664d1-2 and on 667b1-3). An affirmative answer to this question would connect (A) and (B), and provide a rationale (otherwise missing) for identifying (A) as distinctively Dionysian: the older members who, according to (A) select the music to be performed by younger members would be *eo ipso* providing the requisite guidance to the drinking party in (B). If on the other hand, the sober leaders of the inebriated are even older than the members of the Dionysian chorus, we must suppose that the wise judges in their cups, are in need of an even wiser leadership, a point for which the Athenian has as not prepared his audience. (Contra Schöpsdau’s proposal to identify that leadership with the elderly described at 664d2-3 as no longer able to sing, the latter are hardly specified in terms that imply superior wisdom). It is entirely possible that the designation “over sixty” in the present context is simply a misremembering by the Athenian (or by Plato) of the designation “beyond fifty” at 670a5 for the age of the practitioners of (A), just as their designation as having “reached fifty” (*pentêkontoutas*) at 670b1 is later misreported at 812b9-10 as having “reached sixty” (*hexêkontoutas*).

In any case, the Athenian’s emphasis on the present context is not on the credentials of the leaders of drinking parties, but on the benefits to the inebriated of a properly conducted drinking party. Nor is he here concerned, as he is concerned in 664b-d, to specify the age range of the three choruses.

671e5-6 “drunkenness and recreation (*paidiá*) of this sort”

Here, as at 666b, drunkenness at a drinking party is described as a kind of recreation (*paidiá*); however, at 667e5-6 the term is used for pleasures with no significant benefit or harm at stake, and at 673e8 wine is forbidden to be used for recreation. *Paidia* (recreation) is also translated “play” at 673a; on the range of the term see note on 635b5. See note on 667e5-6.

671e7-672a21 “unlike today, when they part as enemies”

As a result of the hostility that will arise from the loss of self restraint in individual drinkers, each of whom thinks himself fit to rule over the others (described at 671b3-6; see note).

672a5-6 “not a blanket (*haplós*) condemnation of Dionysus gift”

Megillus gave such an unqualified condemnation in Book I at 637a-b; criticized on methodological grounds at 638c-640a.

672b4-5 “driven out of his mind”

More literally, “had the mind (*gnômê*) of his soul (*psuchê*) destroyed”. The condition contrasts with the *nous* and *phronêsis* invoked in 672c and recalls the “manic” (*emmanê*) condition of youth at 666a7. See note on 671b8-c2.

672c1-5 “every creature that develops a degree of intelligence (*nous*) when it grows up ... when it has not yet acquired its proper intelligence (*phronêsis*) ... raves and shouts at random (*ataktôs*) and ... jumps about in disorder (*ataktôs*)”

The Athenian here connects the madness associated with drunkenness and the cult of Dionysus, to the juvenile animal drive to jump and cry out, originally invoked at 653d5-654e3 as one of the sources of choral dance (see note on 653d5-7). With this new emphasis, he stresses the lack of orderliness in those natural juvenile motions (not mentioned in the original statement, but invoked at 664e and 666a), which contrasts with the order (*taxis*) embodied in harmony and rhythm. The latter is the other root of choral dance invoked at 653d5-654e3, which he is about to invoke at 672c9-d3. Here the order to be instilled by choral dance is explicitly linked to *phronêsis*, on which see note on 653a7. On Dionysus see note on ____.

672c6-7 “we said these are the origins (*archas*) of music (*mousikê*) and athletics (*gumnastikê*)”

The reference is back to 653e-654a, which identifies the roots of choral dance. “Athletics” (*gumnastikê*) is not in fact mentioned in that context. Its explicit mention here anticipates the Athenian’s upcoming introduction of the topic (672e). He will soon state that dance is a kind of “athletics” (673a), and identify, as the origin of athletics (673c9-d6), one of the two roots of choral dance invoked in 654a: the natural juvenile impulse to bodily movement. On the translation of *gumnastikê* as ‘athletics’ see note on 673a8-10.

672c9-d3 “that in the case of us humans this origin (*tên archên tautên*) gives rise to (*endedôkenai*) a sense of rhythm and harmony, and that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus among the gods are responsible for this?”

Alt: “... that a sense of rhythm and harmony yields this origin...” (Schöpsdau).

A difficult sentence, which continues to elaborate the theory of 653d5-654a3 (see note on 672c1-5). The “origin” (*tên archên tautên*) is the condition of disorderly juvenile movement identified in the previous paragraph (672c6) as the “origins” of music and gymnastics. The Athenian has made it clear in the original statement of the theory that (i) all animals have this “origin”, but (ii) only humans have a sense of harmony and rhythm, and (iii) that they do is a gift from the gods (653d5-654e3; cf. 673c-d). Both (ii) and (iii) are acknowledged in the present context. Schöpsdau concludes on this basis that the juvenile animal condition cannot be the origin of the human sense of harmony and rhythm; thus he construes the latter as the subject rather than the object of the verb, and interprets the sentence as meaning that the human sense of rhythm etc. yields the origins (*archai*) of music and athletics mentioned in c6. However, the Athenian there identifies those *archai* as the juvenile animal condition and so Schöpsdau cannot avoid the unpalatable consequence that the sentence, on his construal, claims that this juvenile condition arises from the sense of harmony and rhythm. The problem is better solved by recognizing that the origin (*archê*) need not be a causally sufficient condition (thus England: it is like the field in which the later capacity grows). So construed, the sentence fits the Athenian’s larger point in the present context, which is to identify the educational benefits of drunkenness by noting that it replicates the juvenile condition of disorderly motion. The educational significance of that juvenile condition is not that it inevitably gives rise to our sense of harmony and rhythm, but that it is a crucial factor in the process whereby music cultivates the human soul—a process in which other causal factors play a role as well.

672d8-9 “given to us for the sake of instilling shame (*aidôs*) in the soul and health and strength in the body”

The Athenian has only explicitly argued for the claim about the soul. The mention of effects on the body (cf. its use for “bodily training” at 674b4) may anticipate the discussion of athletic training that he is about to introduce (672e1-673d9).

(672e1-673d9) Athletics (*gumnastikê*) distinguished from music

*The Athenian here notes that “athletics” (*gumnastikê*) is a topic that must be still be discussed. It is “one half” of choral music, insofar as the latter involves the motion of the body (dance), but the preceding discussion of choral music has focused on the latter’s vocal aspects (*mousikê*), and its role in cultivating the soul. The physical aspects of dance make it a kind of athletic training, along with the military training that Book I notes is the focus of Dorian education (cf. 625a, 636a-c). These two types of “athletics” will be treated at length only in Book VII (dance) and VIII (military training). On the translation of ‘*gumnastikê*’ as ‘athletics’, see note on 673a8-10.*

672e5 “choral performance (*choreia*) as a whole amounts, in our case, to education (*paideusis*) as a whole”

A theme of Book II has been that education (*paideia*) is the condition of having correctly nurtured pleasures and pains (653a) and that it is produced by a process that centrally involves choral performance. Here that process is called *paideusis* (“educating”). On “in our case” (*hêmin*) see note on 653a1.

672e8-673a1 “gesture (*schêma*) is its distinctive feature”

On dance as manifest in gesture (*schêma*), while song is manifest in tune (*melos*), see 654e-655b.

673a3-5 “...the motion of the voice, which reaches the soul (*mechri tês psuchês*), we said this was education in virtue (*hôs arêtes paideian*), and ventured to call it “music” (*mousikên*).

Reading the MSS *hôs arêtes paideian*, with Des Places and Schöpsdau. The phrase, although difficult, reflects the restricted scope of “education” (*paideia*) demarcated in Book I 643d5-644b5), which excludes training in trade skills, and includes to the training that is directed “toward virtue” (*pros areten*, 643e3-5; see note on 653a1). On music as what cultivates *paideia*, the “initial virtue” (see 654a.

673a7-8 “the movement of the body, which we called dance when done as recreation (*ha paizontôn orchêsin eipomen*),...”

The implicit contrast is between bodily movements done in play or recreation (*paidia*), here given the label “dance” (*orchêsis*), and those done for a more serious (or painful) purpose. The former are the “playful” juvenile movements described as “leaping and bounding as if dancing (*hoion orchoumena*) with pleasure as they play together (*prospaizonta*)” at 653e1-3; the “recreation” involved in dance is also invoked at 657c3-d7, where *paidia* is translated ‘recreation’ (see note on 667e5-6). The seriously intended bodily movements will include the physical training and military exercises that dominate Dorian education, (whose painfulness is emphasized 633b-c). The Athenian, who allows that dance insofar as it involves rhythm (672e7-8) is a part of music, here points out the features that it has in common with military training, and thus make it a part of *gumnastikê*. By contrast, Brisson-Pradeau (361n114) propose that the *paizontôn orchêsin* (“la danse de ceux qui s’amusent”) is dance that is not joined with choral song. Rather, it is playful movement that is not necessarily rhythmic.

673a8-10 “when such movement leads to virtue of the body, let us call the discipline directed (*entechnon agôgên*) toward that condition (*epi to toiouton autou*) ‘athletics’ (*gumnastikê*)”

This definition of *gumnastikê*, as directed at virtue or excellence of the body (*sômatos arêtes*, a8), serves to distinguish it from *mousikê*, which has just been defined as cultivation of the soul (*arêtes paideian*, a 4). See note on 672c5-6, 673a7-8. The Athenian has no use here for the point made in *Rep.* III that athletics also cultivates the soul (410b-c). ‘Athletics’ is an admittedly imperfect rendering of *gumnastikê*—since the range of the Greek term includes military exercises, athletic competition, as well as dancing—but it has the advantage

that, like both *gymnastikê* and *mousikê*, it applies not just to an activity but a discipline.

673b5 “Sir, you are taking to Cretans and Lakedaimonians here!”

On the importance placed on athletics in Cretan and Spartan institutions, see Book I 625c-d, 633a-d.

673c6-7 “considerably more experienced in this discipline (*technê*) than in the other one”

A reference to the criticism in Book I that the Dorian states lack adequate institutions for training pleasures (635b-d) and hence for music in general (642a). The use here of ‘*technê*’ (discipline; alt: ‘skill’) to refer to both music and athletics reflects the reference to the latter as a “discipline leading” (*entechnon agôgên*) to virtue at 673a9.

673c9-d1 “Now this kind of recreation (*paidia*) in turn (*au*), originates in the natural habit of all animals to jump about...”

The “recreation” (*paidia*) in question must be “athletics” (*gumnastikê*), which has just been announced as the topic of discussion (thus Schöpsdau; see also note on 673d7-8). Against this, one might worry that in 673a7-8, only one kind of *athletics*, dance, has been identified as a ‘recreation’ (in the phrase *paizontôn orchlesin*) – the other involving hard, often painful, work—see note ad loc. However the Athenian has earlier shown his willingness to count the frolicking movements of young animals as a kind of play and dance (653e, a passage that gives the context for 673a7-8). Even though these do not count as a dance (*orchêsis*) in the strict sense here identified (as involving rhythm, which only humans have), they are clearly instances of the kind of bodily movement distinct both from non-recreational hard physical training). It is these juvenile movements that the Athenian here invokes as the origin (*archê*) of all athletics.

Even though his subsequent remarks (d7-8) indicate that the present paragraph invokes the two “parts” of choral dance (*choreia*): *mousikê* and *gymnastikê* already distinguished at some length at 672b-673b, it does not merely recapitulating those earlier remarks (as Schöpsdau claims), for the Athenian goes beyond that earlier discussion by identifying the juvenile animal impulse to movement as the origin of athletics. 672c-d, by contrast, treats the disorderly manifestation of that impulse as a necessary preliminary to the introduction of order through song and dance.

673d7-8 “we have gone through the one part of it and will try to go through the other...”

These “parts” are the two halves of choral dance (*choreia*) distinguished at 672e1-673b4 as music, the subject of the previous discussion, and athletics, (*gumnastikê*), still to be discussed. This gives additional support to construing “this kind of recreation” in c9 as athletics (see note on 673c9-d6).

The Athenian will not in fact address the topic of athletics until Book VII and VIII (dance: 795d-796e, 813a-816d; hunting: 822d-824b; military training and athletic competition: 829b-c, 830a-835b). On the range of activities included in *gumnastikê* (athletics) – see note on 673a7-8.

(673d10-674c7) The limited role of wine in social life

The Athenian here adds the “finishing touches” (ton kolophôna) to the discussion of drunkenness that has been the enduring (if often submerged) focus of his discussion since the topic was introduced in Book I (637a-e). While at 671a-672d he made good on his promise to identify the educational benefits of drinking parties he here rounds off that discussion by noting the very limited extent to which the practice of drunkenness (or even the consumption of wine) will be a part of social life of a well governed polity.

673e3 “as a serious matter” (*hôs spoudês ousês*)

In contrast with “as a form of recreation” (*hôs paidai*) at 673e8. On the recurring contrast between play and seriousness see note on 635b5.

673e5 “a practice for cultivating moderation (*tou sôphronein heneka meletês*)”

Cf. Book I, where drinking parties are presented as a forum for cultivating moderation, analogous to the battlefield as a forum for cultivating courage 647c-648e.

673e6-7 “not abstaining from them but cultivating mastery over them”

In Book I the Dorian societies are characterized as “abstaining” from pleasures. 634a-b, 635b-c, 637a-e.

673e8 “But if it treats it as a form of recreation (*paidia*)...”

(Rather than a serious matter, as at 673e3). At 666b5 drinking wine in a symposium is referred to as recreation (*paidia*), but the definition of *paidia* at 667e6-8 requires that no great harm or benefit be at stake, and the burden of the argument over Books II has been that drinking parties provide a “benefit of great magnitude worth taking very seriously” (652a). On *paidia* see note on 635b5.

673e9-674a1 “anyone who wishes to imbibe, whenever and with whomever he wishes, and in conjunction with any activity whatsoever”

In contrast with the drinking parties led by sober leaders who will direct the proceedings, prescribed at 640c-d, and reflecting the methodological point at 638c-e.

674a3-4 “I would go beyond even the Cretan and Lakedaimonian practice”

The practice of forbidding drunkenness (637a), but not banning wine altogether (see note on 637e3).

674a4-5 “and vote for the Carthaginian law that prohibits soldiers on campaign from tasting drink...”

Translation following Saunders 1972, Schöpsdau and Brisson/Pradeau, against England’s alternative: (to the Carthaginian law... I would add...). Presumably the long list of prohibitions down to 674b6 exceeds what one might reasonably understand the Carthaginian law encompass (cf. Aristotle *Oikonimika*, 1344a33), but the grammar of the sentence includes them all in the content of that law. Saunders 1972 agrees with Morrow 1960: 442:n150 that the Athenian intends these prohibitions to apply only in a city that, contrary to 673e3-5, treats wine as a recreation rather than a serious matter. However, the prohibitions are consistent with the restrictions on wine drinking and drunkenness articulated in the description of the three choruses at 666a-b, and the end of this paragraph

explicitly infers from the prohibitions a conclusion that applies to “any city” (674c2).

674a7-b3 “even in the city itself, no slave... nor any ...officials... ship captains... jurors on active duty... nor... any person about to participate in important deliberations...”

A list of participants in the civic life of the community (in contrast to the military context just discussed, 674a5-7). All those listed have a function to perform within the city, which presumably depends on their possessing the alert senses and unimpaired judgment which, the Athenian has emphasized at 645e, are compromised by drinking wine.

674b7 “no one in their right and lawful mind (*tois noun te kai nomon echousin orthon*)”

More literally: “no one with a correct (*orthos*) mind (*nous*) and law (*nomos*).”

A play on the common expression “have sense” or “be in one’s right mind” (*noun echein*), to which is added the connection between mind or intelligence (*nous*) and law (*nomos*) articulated at I 644c-d, 645b-c. On correctness and law, see 627d, 657b3, 659d2.

674c2-3 “Once all agricultural and dietary arrangements have been made (*takta*)”

These arrangements are discussed in Book VIII (842b-848c), without any mention of wine.