A prominent theme in twentieth and early twenty-first century moral philosophy is that a full and accurate picture of the ethical life must include an important role for the emotions. The neglect of the emotions has been a major point of criticism raised against the dominant consequentialist, Kantian, and contractualist theories by virtue ethicists such as G.E.M. Anscombe, Alisdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum, and Michael Stocker. Bernard Williams and Susan Wolf also develop a similar line of criticism as part of their arguments against the supremacy or priority of moral values as conceived by utilitarianism and other "impartialist" theories.

There are a number of reasons why it might be a mistake for moral philosophy to neglect the emotions. To name just three:

1. It seems obvious that emotions have an important influence on motivation, and that proper cultivation of the emotions is helpful, perhaps essential, to our ability to lead ethical lives.

2. It is also arguable that emotions are objects of moral evaluation, not only because of their influence on action, but in themselves. In other words, it is a plausible thesis that an ethical life involves feeling certain ways in certain circumstances and acting from certain feelings in certain circumstances.

3. Finally, a more contentious thesis, but certainly worth considering, is that some emotions are forms of ethical perception, judgment, or even knowledge.

The bulk of this chapter surveys the Ancient ethical tradition that inspires the virtue ethicist’s critique, revealing versions of each of these three theses in one guise or another. After briefly considering the medieval transformations of the ancient doctrines, the remainder of the chapter focuses on the third, more contentious thesis, distinguishing several versions of it in the moral philosophies of the 17th and 18th century and indicating some contemporary exemplars as well.

First, let us clarify what we mean by “emotions.” While the category of emotion has imprecise and disputed boundaries, paradigm instances include anger, fear, joy, love and hate. As the notion is invoked today, it includes feelings of affection, animosity, attraction and revulsion that are distinct from bodily sensations yet are intimately bound up with feelings of pleasure and pain. So understood, it corresponds roughly to the ancient psychological category of the “passions” (*pathê*; singular *'pathos'*), which
Aristotle demarcates as encompassing “appetite (epithumia), anger, fear, daring, spite, delight, liking, hatred, yearning, admiration, pity” (EN II 5, 1105b21-2). While many theorists in the present day distinguish between desires and emotions, and certain thinkers in the Christian and early modern tradition follow the Stoics in distinguishing between “passions” and what they take to be nobler sentiments, the ancient category of the pathe encompasses all these items, and hence it will be the starting point of this study.

I Emotions in Ancient Moral Philosophy

PLATO

While Plato does not use ‘pathos’ as a general term for the range of attitudes that Aristotle and later writers demarcate with this term, he clearly recognizes a category with roughly the same boundaries and takes it to be of ethical and epistemological significance. He consistently groups emotions such as fear, anger and grief together with certain desires, pleasures and pains. For example, in the Phaedo, “pleasures and desires, pains and fears,” are attributed to the soul’s involvement with the body. The Republic lists “sexual feelings, anger, desires of every sort, and all the pains and pleasures in the soul that accompany all our actions” as arising from the non-rational part of the soul (606d1-3). Likewise, in the Timaeus, love, fear, anger “and the like,” along with a general attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain, are said to result from the embodiment of an otherwise purely intellectual soul. In the Laws, the non-rational principle of human action is described as issuing in “pleasures and pains, angry feelings, and passionate desires (erotas)” (645d6-8), while in Philebus, “anger, fear, lamentation, love, jealousy, malice and the like” (47e1-3), are invoked as “pains of the soul.”

A persistent theme across these works is that the passions, if improperly cultivated, preclude the achievement of knowledge. While the Phaedo and Timaeus make this point about theoretical knowledge, our discussion will concern dialogues whose focus is ethical knowledge and the virtues.

The Protatoras

Even in Protagoras, a dialogue that does not invoke a distinction between rational and non-rational parts of the human psyche, the passions are identified as potential spoilers of the epistemic quest. Here Socrates

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1. On the difficulties involved in translating pathos as “emotion” see Konstan 2006, ch. 1.
3. Phd. 83b6-7, 81a-84a; cf. Tht. 156b, Rep. 430a.
4. Tim. 42a-b, 69c-d; cf. 88b.
denies that a person can knowingly do what is wrong when under the influence of "anger, pleasure, pain, love, or fear and the like"—a phenomenon described under the general label "being overcome by pleasure". The agents in such cases, Socrates argues, are like observers who overestimate the size of physical objects in the foreground (356a-357b); they mistakenly believe that the present pleasure they elect to pursue is greater than the longer-term pleasure they would get from eschewing it. With pleasure the only criterion of goodness allowed in the argument, it follows that the agent mistakenly thinks the action he performs is better than the alternative (357e). The details of the argument are tortuous, and the ethical hedonism on which it depends is anomalous in the rest of Plato's dialogues. Nonetheless, we can identify two assumptions at work in the argument that are relevant to our investigation of the passions.

First of all, the argument is evidently intended to apply to the person acting on emotions such as anger, fear, and love (352b-e), and not just to one being seduced by the prospect of bodily gratification. Second, the argument presupposes that the passions in question involve a judgment or belief of sorts. The person who finds a prospect pleasant thereby supposes (in some sense) that it is worth pursuing; otherwise the passion would not impugn his claim to know that the option is wrong. Whatever the criterion of choiceworthiness at play—be it pleasure or something else—the argument crucially depends on the assumption that the option taken by the agent appears to him to have more of it than the alternative. This appearance or "seeming", integral to the emotion, cannot, on Socrates' account, coexist with the knowledge, or even belief, to the contrary. A person who knows, or even believes, that an action is wrong will not be pleased at the prospect of doing so, or pained at the alternative (358c-e); for example, the courageous person, who acts on his knowledge of the good, does so without fear (359c-360d). Versions of this thesis are consistent across Plato's other treatments of the passions.

The Republic

The psychology of the Republic famously distinguishes two non-rational parts of the soul that must be ruled by reason—the so-called "appetitive" (epithumetikon) and "spirited" (thumoeides) parts—but offers no systematic explanation of how the lists of "passions" canvassed in other works and in Book X relate to those parts.

The appetitive part of the soul is paradigmatically portrayed as the seat of bodily appetites (for food, drink, and sex), as well as desires for an unspecified range of additional objectives as varied as gazing at corpses,

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5 Protag. 352b7-8, d8-e2.
6 Protag. 352e6-353a6, c2, 354e7, 356a1, 357c7, e2.
7 Scholars disagree over whether Socrates is genuinely espousing hedonism in the dialogue. See Rudebusch 1999, p. 129n4.
acquiring gold and silver, and taking part in philosophical discussion. The characteristic feature of appetitive attraction is that its objects are expected pleasures.\(^9\) The characteristic manifestation of the “spirited” (\textit{thumoeides}) part of the soul, by contrast, is in anger (\textit{thumos}), whence its name.\(^10\) Also identified as the seat of shame, disgust and revulsion (439e-440a) as well as esteem or respect (553c4-5; 572c) and envy (586c), it is the part that “seethes” at injustice and seeks to resist, ward off, or avenge it.\(^11\)

As these manifestations of the spirited part are paradigmatic cases of emotions, some scholars have proposed that the spirited part is the seat of emotions in the strict sense, while the appetitive part is the seat of non-rational desire.\(^12\) However, fear is presented as an aversion to pain coordinate with the appetitive attraction to pleasure (\textit{Rep.} 413b-d, 430a; cf. \textit{Phd.} 83b6-7) and in \textit{Republic} X grief is criticized as a pleasurable indulgence (605c-606b), to be resisted with the same array of “spirited” resources—shame, disgust, and anger—that are arrayed against the carnal appetites of Leontius in Book IV.\(^13\) Alternatively, one might suppose that some emotions are appetitive and others spirited.\(^14\) However, the complaint about grief as a pleasure-directed impulse in \textit{Republic} X is there generalized to apply to anger (the signature activity of the spirited part) and indeed to all the other passions (606d).

It seems likely that Plato is not concerned in the \textit{Republic} to classify the passions in terms of his tripartite soul. Nonetheless, he does closely associate with the spirited part a particular kind of feeling of great ethical importance. The musical education that channels the vigour of the spirited part in service to social norms trains the young guardians to discriminate and take pleasure in what is fine (\textit{kalon}) and to recognize and be pained or disgusted at what is shameful (\textit{aischron}) (401d-402d, 403c). These feelings of pleasure and pain, even if they do not appear on standard lists of emotions, are of central interest in Plato’s ethical philosophy. They are the medium by which the soul resists inappropriate impulses (as in the case of Leontius), and in the fully perfected soul, they “follow reason” completely: one’s loves and hates coincide with what reason judges to be fine and shameful.

In such a case, however, these feelings of pleasure and pain are not directed at what a cognitive faculty has independently identified as fine and

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\(^9\) Bodily appetites: 436a, 439d, 580e; non-bodily appetites: 439e-440a, 548a, 560c-d; pleasure as the object of appetite: 436a, 439d, 559d. On the way in which appetites are non-rational, see Lorenz 2006.

\(^10\) \textit{Rep.} 436a, 439e; on ‘\textit{thumos}’ as a label for anger, see 440a5, c2

\(^11\) \textit{Rep.} 440c-d; 442b7; cf. \textit{Stsm.} 307e-308a; \textit{Tim.} 70b; \textit{Laws} 731b.


\(^14\) a view with considerable popularity, we shall see, in among medieval philosophers.
shameful; rather, the feelings are an essential part of a person’s cognitive grasp, and developing conception, of what is fine and shameful. The account of musical education in Book III makes it clear that the training that yields a passionate love for what is kalon cultivates the capacity to discriminate fine and shameful behaviour and characters; it yields beliefs about what is fine and good that are a necessary preparation for the knowledge of these matters that the philosopher will eventually develop.¹⁵ A recurring theme throughout the Republic is that inappropriate feelings of pleasure, pain, fear and desire distort our judgments about what is good and worthwhile – hence the requirement that potential guardians be tested for their ability to retain their “law-inculcated beliefs regarding what is terrible…” in the face of pleasures and pains,¹⁶ and the criticism of tragic poets who, by eliciting inappropriate emotions, inculcate the illusion that certain kind of action is admirable when in fact it is disgraceful.¹⁷ In Republic, no less than Protagoras, moral knowledge is incompatible with inappropriate feelings of pleasure and pain.

The Philebus

The Philebus concerns the role of pleasure in the good life, and some find here the first definitive mapping out of the category of the emotions.¹⁸ Without giving a general name to the category, Plato singles it out as “fear, anger, and everything of that sort” (40e) and more expansively as “anger, fear, lamentation, love, jealousy, malice and the like” (47e1-3). While the emotions are hardly the focus of his discussion, he mentions them as instances of a broader category: pleasure and pains that are “of the soul” as opposed to “of the body.” While displaying no interest here in the psychology of virtue, the partition of the soul, or the role of pleasures and pains in ethical knowledge, he does reiterate two points about the emotions that we have noted in other dialogues. First, he invokes them as examples of pains that are mixed with pleasures – repeating the point made in Republic X that grief, anger, and the like are pleasant to indulge (Phlb. 47e; Rep. X 606d). Second, he cites “fear anger and everything of that sort” as examples of pleasures and pains that can be false (40e)—a difficult doctrine whose interpretation need not concern us here¹⁹ beyond its clear implication that the emotions have cognitive status.

The Laws

The Laws, Plato’s last sustained discussion of moral psychology and politics, concurs with the Republic on the points that properly channeled feelings of pleasure and pain, while not amounting to moral knowledge

¹⁵ III 401e-402a, 402c; cf. VII 522a, 538c
¹⁶ 413a-e, 430a-b, cf. 431c
¹⁷ X 600e-601a, 602c-d, 603b-606b
¹⁸ Fortenbaugh 2002, pp. 10-11, 34.
¹⁹ For a recent discussion see Harte 2004.
(phronesis), are a necessary proaideutic to its acquisition (653a-c), and that our feelings of pleasure and pain are intimately related to our ethical judgments: “when we think we are doing well (eu prattein), we are pleased .... and when we are pleased we think we are doing well” (657c). Indeed, the “greatest ignorance” (amathia) occurs when our feelings pleasure and pain are at odds with our rational judgments (689a). As in Republic, incorrect feelings are presented as a cognitive, not merely affective, failure.

In contrast with the Republic, the Laws does not distinguish between spirited and appetitive parts of the non-rational soul. Instead, the part of the soul that must be trained to follow reason is generally characterized as the seat of pleasures and pains and their “anticipations” (elpides) (644c-d)—evidently intended to include emotions such as anger and love (645d), and fear and daring (644d, 647a-c; cf. 632a). A pervasive theme in the dialogue is that while pleasure and pain are natural objects of attraction and aversion for us, our happiness (and the success of social cooperation) requires us to be selective in our pursuit and avoidance of them. While reason is accorded the task of selecting which pains to endure and which pleasures to resist (644d, 636e), two “anticipations” are singled out as its “assistants” (645a) in this project of resistance (646e-649c). One is a species of boldness (tharros), and gives reason the force to withstand the pull of inappropriate pleasures and pains. The other is shame, a species of fear, which tempers that force in the service of social ideals. It is to be inculcated by the same cultural media that in Republic serve to “gentle” the thumos of the young guardians: a life-long curriculum in music, poetry, and dance that will inculcate in the citizens a taste for the ethical life. As in Republic, the virtuous citizens in Laws will be pleased by fine actions and good characters, and disgusted at and repelled by their opposites (654c-d, 655d-656b).

ARISTOTLE

Aristotle follows Plato in taking virtue to be a matter of the soul’s non-rational part following the rational part. Although in a number of contexts he follows Plato’s division of non-rational desire into appetite and spirit, he ignores the Platonic distinction when giving his own account of virtue of

pace Bobonich 2002, pp. 198-99 who takes the amathia to be distinct from ignorance.
22 636d-e, 732e, 782d-783a.
23 An interpretation defended in Meyer (forthcoming).
24 Laws 653c-654d, 664b-d, 672e-673a.
25 DA 414b2, 432b5-10; MA 700b22; Rhet. 1369a1-4; EE 1223a26-7, 1225b24-26; cf. EN 1111b10-12.
character—referring to the relevant non-rational part indifferently as the seat of appetite (epithumia), desire (orexis), or “affections” (pathemata), and consistently using ‘pathos’ (passion) as a general term to refer to its activities. His illustrative lists of the pathē conspicuously include feelings characteristic of both Platonic non-rational parts (for example, appetite and anger) and conclude with the general characterization of the pathē as “involving pleasure or pain”—thus reflecting the psychology of Plato’s Laws rather than the Republic’s distinction between spirit and appetite.

Since it is Aristotle’s moral philosophy that is most often invoked by contemporary critics as a theory according a central role to the emotions, it is worthwhile to clarify precisely the role he accords to the pathe in virtue of character. A few negative points may be in order here as a corrective to potential misunderstandings of his view. First of all, although Aristotle explains that the virtues are dispositions (hexeis) that determine when and how we will experience the pathe, he clearly does not think that a virtue of character is simply a correct disposition of the passions. None of the eleven virtues of character that he enumerates in EN III.6-V and EE III-IV concerns feelings or passions alone—even those that are billed as such in Aristotle’s thumbnail sketch of their domain. For example, courage, while initially billed as the virtue concerning fear and confidence, evidently determines not only when a person will experience these feelings, but also how he will act—for example, whether he will stand his ground, put up a fight, or flee; hence Aristotle’s frequent refrain that virtue concerns “passions and actions.” Moreover, he insists, a genuine virtue of character is a disposition of our capacity for choice (prohairesis). He explicitly refuses the label ‘virtue’ to dispositions governing passions alone on the grounds that they do not involve choice.

Nor is it the case, in Aristotle’s view, that the virtues of character are individuated by different pathe. One might be misled by his remarks in EN II 5 and EE II 3 into expecting that each virtue of character concerns a distinctive passion or passions — in the way that courage concerns fear and confidence, temperance concerns appetites for bodily pleasures, and

26 Although he does not thereby deny that the rational part itself has desires. See Lorenz 2009, p. 183.
27 EN 1102b30, 1105b20; EE I 1, 1220a1-2.
28 EN 1105b21-3 (quoted above); EE 1220b12-14, Rhet. 1378a19-21.
29 Here we agree with Fortenbaugh 2002 and take issue with the widely influential argument by Cooper 1996a that the distinction between spirit and appetite is crucial to understanding the psychology of virtue in Aristotle.
30 EN 1105b25-1106a2; cf. EE 1220b8-20.
31 See Lorenz (2009).
32 EN 1107a33-1108a31; EE 1221a15-b3.
33 Fear and confidence: EN 1107a33-b1; cf. EE 1221a17-19; fight or flight: EN 1111a11-b3.
34 EN 1104b13-14, 1106b16-1, 1107a4-9, 1109a22-4; cf. EE 1220a31.
35 EN 1106a3-4, b36, 1117a5; EE 1227b8, 12228a23-4.
36 EN 1108a30-b10, 1128b10-35; EE III 7, esp. 1234a23-6.
mildness concerns anger. It turns out, however, that it is only these three virtues whose domain Aristotle marks out with reference to a distinctive passion. The remaining virtues are demarcated by reference to types of action (e.g., spending money) or objects of pursuit (e.g. honour). All the same, Aristotle insists that even the latter virtues involve appropriate feelings of pleasure and pain. A truly generous person not only gives an appropriate sum of money, but does so with pleasure, just as a truly temperate person is pleased at abstaining from inappropriate indulgence. It is the mark of the virtuous person quite generally "to be pleased and pained as one should."37

Not just any pleasure experienced when acting appropriately is the sign of a virtuous disposition for Aristotle. For example, the pleasure of exacting (or anticipating) revenge is not evidence of courage.38 Taking our cue from Aristotle’s comments that the generous person will be pained if he “happens” to have spent money on something that is “contrary to what is right and fine,”39 we may suppose that the signature pleasure of virtue is pleasure in the fine (kalon), and that the correlative pain has the opposite, the shameful (aischron), as its object. While such pleasure does not have a distinctive name, and thus does not occur as a distinct item on Aristotle’s lists of the pathe, he regularly uses philia or stergein (love or liking) to invoke the requisite pleasures and uses ‘hate’ (misein) or ‘hatred’ (miso) to refer to the corresponding pain— the same language that Plato uses, especially in Laws, to describe the pleasures and pains to be cultivated by the moral educator.41

The inadvertent wrongdoer who is pained upon realizing what he has done satisfies Aristotle’s requirement that truly involuntary action be painful or regretted.42 Similarly, the pain of the reluctant agent shows that her action is “mixed”— that is, performed voluntarily but under necessity or

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37 Giving and abstaining with pleasure: EN 1120a25-6, b 30; 1104b3-5 abstaining being pleased and pained as one should: EN 1104b12, 1105a7; 1121a3-4; Pol. 1340a15.
38 1116b23-1117a9.
39 EN 1121a1-4.
40 EN 1172a22-3; 1179b24-5, b30-31; cf. 1179b9. On the connection between liking (philia) and taking pleasure (chairein) see 1117b28-31; 1175a31-6. By contrast, in the Rhetoric 1382a12-13 and Politics 1312b32-4 Aristotle denies that hatred (miso) is painful—on which see Fortenbaugh 2002, p. 105-107 and 2008; Leighton 1996, p. 232 n14; Striker 1996, p. 301n13 and Dow 2011, pp. 53-5.
41 Laws 653b2-c4, 689a5-b2, 908b6-c1 cf. Laws 727e3-728a1, Rep. 401e4-402a4, 403c6-7. Aristotle describes the requisite pleasures and pains in terms evoking the emotional repertoire accorded by Plato to the spirited part of the soul: it reflects what the person admires (agapan) or is impressed at (timan) or takes seriously (EN 1120a31-2, 1120b13, 1121b1; cf. 1124a10-12), or what he is disgusted at or objects to (duscherainein) (1179b29-30; cf. 1128a8-9, b 1-3). Burnyeat 1980, pp. 79-80 develops this point in detail.
42 EN 1110b11-12, 18-22, 1111a20-21 – a requirement rooted in Aristotle’s conception of force as a paradigm for involuntariness (Meyer 1993, pp. 83-4).
constraint (EN 1110a11-13). While the latter agent might perform an action that is kalon, her failure to take pleasure in it shows that she is not responding to it as kalon, since whatever a person takes to be kalon appears to her as pleasant.\footnote{EN 1104b35-1105a2, cf. 1113a31-2.} Indeed, her pain reveals that she opts for the action as a necessary evil – as do the soldiers who stand their ground in battle from fear of punishment or lack of opportunity to flee (1116a29-b2) or the intemperate person who refrains from self-indulgence under constraint (1104b3-5).\footnote{Others have interpreted the agent’s pain at 1104b6-7 as due to internal conflict. (Burnyeat 1980, p. 77, following Grant 1885 ad loc). However this would make the action a case of enkrateia (self-control; see EN VII), not the intemperance (akolasia) that Aristotle explicitly says it is.}

While Plato emphasizes the role of musical education in shaping these pleasures and pains– a point that Aristotle acknowledges (1104b11-13), Aristotle himself stresses the importance of habituation: we become brave by performing brave actions, and temperate by performing temperate actions, and so on.\footnote{EN III.12, 1119a25-7, VII 1148b15-18, 1154a33} While such practice will not on its own train us to delight in the actions as fine (a job for which Plato’s program of cultural education is better suited), neither will cultural education on its own redirect or eliminate the fears, appetites, and aversions that might incline one in the opposite direction; for this, practice at performing right actions is necessary.\footnote{A point widely endorsed, although with considerable variety as to the details: Fortenbaugh 2002, pp. 9-12, 94-103 and 2008 passim; Sherman 1989, pp. 166-171, 184-5; Nussbaum 1994, pp. 80-1; Cooper 1996b, pp. 246-7; Leighton 1996, p. 206-17; Striker 1996, p. 291; Sihvola 1996, p. 115-21; Konstan 2006, p. 20-38, 43-5; Dow 2010.} Aristotle concedes that some fears may be ineliminable by habituation (1115b7-12)). Yet, with the exception of these limiting cases (with which we will see the Stoics are better equipped to deal), Aristotle conceives of virtue of character as a disposition in which (inter alia) the entirety of a person’s affective apparatus is directed towards what is kalon and away from its opposite.

Like Plato, Aristotle takes these feelings to have a cognitive dimension.\footnote{Rhetoric 1356a15-17, 1378a19-20; Politics 1339b1, 1340a14-17; EN 1098b3-4.} That emotions affect our judgments is his reason for paying attention to the pathe in his treatise on Rhetoric; in the Politics, he echoes Plato’s claim that the musical training that cultivates our pleasure in what is fine and our disgust at what is shameful also shapes our ability to discriminate between fine and shameful actions; and in the Ethics, he points out that habituation gives us the “first principles” of ethical reasoning.\footnote{EN 1104a18-b2,1105a17-19, b5-18. On the difference between Aristotelian and Platonic habituation see Sherman 1989, chapter 5.} Thus only the person whose feelings and desires are properly directed will have a correct grasp of the goal to pursue in his actions, and thus only he
will have knowledge (*phronesis*) of what he should do. The *akratic*, whose decision to do the right action is opposed by a recalcitrant desire, does not know, in the fullest sense, that what he is doing is wrong, Aristotle explains in *EN VII 3*, thus endorsing a version of Socrates’ infamous pronouncement in *Protagoras*.50

In the Stoics we will find an even more strongly cognitive status assigned to the *pathe*, but first let us consider the Epicureans.

**EPICUREANISM**

According to Epicurus, the prime function of philosophy is to cure the human soul of *pathos* (Usener 221, LS 25C). The ‘pathos’ he has in mind, however, is neither emotion in general (as in Aristotle’s use of the term), nor defective emotion (as on the Stoics’), but rather suffering.51 In keeping with his central doctrines that pleasure is the goal of life, that the most important pleasure is freedom from pain, and that distress of the soul far outweighs bodily pain in determining the quality of one’s experience,52 it is specifically mental distress—painful emotions—that he targets for therapy. Paramount among these, in Epicurean teaching, is fear. The famous “four-fold remedy” (*tetrapharmakon*) targets for elimination the four principal human fears: fear of death, fear of the gods, fear that happiness is out of our reach, or that unendurable suffering will befall us (KD I-IV). The therapy it directs at these emotions is cognitive -- correcting the false beliefs it takes to underlie them (e.g. that there are gods who meddle in human affairs, that death is an unpleasant experience, or that strong bodily pains are long lasting).53 It is worth noting that these are false empirical beliefs, in contrast to the false normative judgments that (we shall see) are central to Stoic analyses of the *pathe*.54

Other Epicurean therapies, less well attested in our sources, concern other painful emotions. Among these is anger, understood as typically involving the beliefs that one has been wronged, and that retaliation will be

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49 *EN* 1140b11-20; 1142b33, 1144a29-b1, 1144b30-33, 1151a12-15.

50 The precise nature of the ignorance that Aristotle attributes to the akratic is disputed but need not concern us here. On the state of the dispute see Price 2006.


52 On these doctrines see Meyer 2008, p. 102-115.


54 By contrast, Annas 1992, p. 190 interprets Epicurus as holding that painful and pleasant emotions involve positive and negative evaluations of their objects. The crucial text, however, says only that our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain amount to a perception that pleasure is good and that pain is bad (Cicero, *On Moral ends (=Fin.)* I 30).
While the Epicureans are unanimous in targeting the latter belief for correction, they do not agree on whether anger itself is to be extirpated. As a form of mental distress it would seem, by Epicurean standards, a proper target for elimination, but some forms of anger (those informed by accurate beliefs about the nature and source of the injury—for example, whether the perpetrator acted voluntarily), were considered “natural and necessary” by many Epicureans, meaning both that they are necessary for achieving happiness, and that they are ineliminable by habituation. Also natural and necessary on their view is sexual desire—when purged of the “empty opinions” that have disastrous consequences on one’s prospects for achieving ataraxia—and even grief.

Pleasant emotions, by contrast, play an important role in Epicurean happiness. While those arising in connection with “vain and empty opinions” are to be extirpated, those involved in, for example, gratitude and friendship loom large in the best human life—not least because of their usefulness in outweighing the unavoidable pains attendant upon natural human experience. No version, however, of the “pleasure in the kalon” emphasized by Plato and Aristotle figures in Epicurean ethics, presumably as a result of their insistence that virtue has purely instrumental value.

THE STOICS

While Aristotle is the first to use the term ‘pathe’ to designate the emotions, it is only with the Stoics that we find a systematic and explicit theory of the pathe and their relation to moral judgment. Their account takes place in the context of a distinction between four different motions in the soul that register the prospect (or presence) of apparent goods and evils:

- Reaching (orexis) in response a prospective apparent good;
- Swelling (eparsis) in response to a present apparent good;

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58 On these points (anger, sexual desire, grief) our textual evidence is slight (see Lucretius III, IV.1037-1287; Philodemus, On Anger and On Death) and scholars are divided on how radical a project of extirpating painful passions Epicureanism advocated. See Gill 2006, p. 158-9. On sexual passion in Epicureanism see Brennan 1996, Tsouna 2007, pp. 44-7 and Armstrong 2008, pp. 94-7.
59 Vatican Sayings 17, 19, 55; Letter to Menoeceus 122; DL X 22, 118.
60 Cicero, Fin. I 25, 35.
61 Andronicus, On the Passions; Stobaeus, Eclogae 2.7.10-10d (Wachsmuth (=W) 2.88-92; Pomeroy 1999); Cicero TD 3.22-5, 4.11-22; DL 7.111-116. Other ancient sources on the Stoic doctrine are collected in Long and Sedley (=LS) 1987 §65 and in Graver 2002, pp. 203-214.
• Shrinking away (\textit{ekklisis}) from a prospective apparent evil;
• Contraction (\textit{sustole}) in response to a present apparent evil.

These motions, which we experience as located in the region around the heart,\footnote{Galen, \textit{Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (=}Plac.\textit{)} 3.7 (SVF 2.900).} do not exhaust the impulses (\textit{hormai}) of the soul, but are rather kinds of affective response.\footnote{Graver 2007 is a magisterial exposition and defense of this point (also noted by Sandbach (1975) 61). By contrast, Inwood 1985, pp. 144-5, 146-7, 157 takes \textit{orexis} and \textit{ekklisis} to be generic impulses of pursuit and avoidance while only \textit{eparsis} and \textit{sustole} are affective reactions (this appears to be the view of Brennan 1998, pp. 30-32, and Meyer 2008, pp. 161-4. The Stoics, however, identify many “practical impulses” that are not reachings, swellings, shrinchings, or contractions—Stobaeus, \textit{Eclogae} 2.7.9-9a (W 2.87). Long and Sedley 1987, Vol 1, p. 420 take stretching, swelling, shrinking etc. to be marks only of excessive impulse; but this conflicts with the Stoic definitions of the \textit{eupatheiai} as reasonable (\textit{eulogon}) versions of these very motions (DL 7.116, Cic. \textit{TD} 4.12-13).} The soul’s “reaching” (\textit{orexis}) for a walk on the beach is not simply (or even necessarily) an impulse that brings about my perambulation on the sand, but rather a felt yearning for, or an attraction to, that prospect. Similarly, my soul’s shrinking away (\textit{ekklisis}) from the expected agony of a scheduled root canal is not an impulse that keeps me away from the dentist’s office, but rather a psychological agitation at that prospect. Thus later writers refer to these motions as \textit{perturbationes} and \textit{adfectus} (affect).

The Stoics take these affective responses to be entirely natural,\footnote{Cic. \textit{TD} 4.12-13; Epictetus, \textit{Discourses (=}Diss\textit{)} 3.3.2 (LS 60F1).} but appropriate (\textit{hathekon}) only when directed at genuine goods and evils. For the Stoics, virtue and its activities are the only goods, while vice and its activities are the only evils. Thus these are the only appropriate objects for affective response.\footnote{Thus Frede 1986, p.107 and Graver 2007, pp. 35-60. By contrast, Inwood 1985, p. 175 (criticized by Brennan 1998, pp. 56-7) proposes that the Stoic sage will have appropriately “reserved” affective responses to indifferents. Cooper (2005) (criticized by Kamtekar 2005) concurs.} Such natural objects of pursuit as health, financial security, social standing, and the like, are not good (and their contraries not bad); rather both are “indifferent.”\footnote{Virtue is the only good: DL 7.102; Cic, \textit{Fin} 3.11, 21, 26-29; indifferents: DL 7.104-107; Stob. Ecl 2.7.7 / W 2.79-85.} So even though it is often appropriate to select these objects as targets of pursuit ("preferred indifferents") or avoidance ("dispreferred indifferents"), and to take action accordingly, it is inappropriate to respond to them as if they were good or bad—for example, to be upset at the prospect of losing a limb or a loved one, or to yearn for job security or a good night’s sleep. The Stoics reserve the term ‘\textit{pathe}’ for these inappropriate affective responses.

To appreciate why it is inappropriate to respond affectively to “indifferent” objects, even when it is appropriate to pursue them via other kinds of impulse, it is helpful to note that, for the Stoics, genuine goods are...
worth pursuing independently of circumstances. Thus they are “worth persisting in” (emmeneta) even when circumstances change. Indifferent objectives, by contrast, are worth selecting only in certain circumstances (for example, one’s health is not worth preserving when a tyrant is conscripting able-bodied men into his army). On this picture, an impulse appropriately directed towards a good objective would be stable—persisting even in the face of variations in the circumstances—while an impulse appropriately directed towards an indifferent would be reserved and flexible—ready to be withdrawn as circumstances (or information about them) change. Now it is a familiar feature of experience, often noted by the Stoics, that affective response lacks this flexibility and responsiveness to new information: the pathe are like bodies in free fall, unable to be called back or redirected once launched at their objectives. An angry judge, for example, may continue to desire the execution of a prisoner even after evidence establishing his innocence belatedly comes to light (Seneca, Ir. 1.18.3-6). In this inertia and unresponsiveness to circumstances, the psychic movements of reaching, swelling, shrinking, and contracting respond to their objects as if these were genuine goods or evils—without the flexibility and reserve appropriate to the pursuit of contingently worthwhile objectives.

Affective responses are therefore “excessive,” “too vigorous,” and inappropriate when directed at “indifferent” objectives. Pathos is the general term the Stoics use for such responses, which they classify into four genera:

- appetite (epithumia)—an excessive “reaching” (orexis) of the soul;

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67 DL 7.102-4; Stobaeus 2.7.5o (W2.75), 2.7.11f (W 2.98); cf. Sextus Adversus Mathematicos 11.22-26.
68 Stob. 2.7.11f (W 2.98)
69 DL 7.102-109; Stob. 2.7.7 (W 2.79-85).
70 Such things are “worth selecting” (lepton), but not “worth choosing” (haireton): Stob. 2.7.5o (W 2.75); 2.7.7 (W2.79), 2.7.7c (W2.82.5); cf. Cic. Fin. 4.72. On “selection” (ekloge) see Inwood 1985, pp. 198, 238-240; Brennan 1998, pp. 35-6.
71 Seneca On Anger 1.7.4; Cic TD 4.41; cf. Galen, Plac. 4.2.10-18 (LS 65I); Stob. 2.7.10a (W2.89-90 / LS 65A8). While scholarly consensus takes this “runaway” feature to be distinctive of the pathe (see Inwood 1985, pp. 165-172; Graver 2007, pp. 35-60; we take the view that it is a general feature of affective response (which is perfectly appropriate in the face of genuine goods and evils.) The appropriately reserved impulse that can be called back whenever reason decides is not an orexis, eparsis, ekklisis, or sustole (as Inwood 1985, pp. 174-5 allows it can be) but a “selection” (ekloge).
72 at least as long as they last, which is only as long as the beliefs they involve to are “fresh” (Cicero TD 3.75, 4.14, 4.39; cf. Stob 2.7.10b (W 2.90)). On “fresh” see Inwood 1985, pp. 147-55; cf. Graver 2002, pp. 117-119; 2007, pp. 40-46.
73 On the “reservation” (hupexairesis, Latin: exceptio) of the Stoic sage (Epictetus, Diss. 2.6.9-10; Stob. 2.7.11s (W 2.115 / LS 65W), see Inwood 1985, pp. 112, 119-26, 165-73—with criticisms by Brennan 2000; Sorabji 2000, pp. 219-220; and Cooper 2005, p. 211n14.
74 Cicero TD 4.12-13, DL 7.110-111, Stob. 2.7.10 (W 2.88-89).
• pleasure (*hedone*)—an excessive “expansion” (*eparsis*) of the soul;
• fear (*phobos*)—an excessive “shrinking away” (*ekklisis*) of the soul;
• distress (*lupe*)—an excessive “contraction” (*sustole*) of the soul.

When directed at genuine goods and evils, by contrast, affective responses constitute *eupatheiai* (“good feelings”— Latin, *constantiae*), which only the sage experiences.\(^{75}\)

• wish (*boulesis*)—a reasonable (*eulogon*) reaching of the soul
• joy (*chara*)—a reasonable expansion of the soul
• caution (*eulabeia*)—a reasonable shrinking away of the soul

Each “good feeling” is directed at virtue, vice, or an objective intimately related with these.\(^{76}\) For example, the sage experiences “joy” in the activities of temperance and is “cautious” to avoid shameful or impious behaviour.\(^{77}\) There is no “good feeling” involving contraction (*sustole*) of the soul because the sage, being stably virtuous, will never be have anything bad happen to him.\(^{78}\)

So defined, the *pathe* are “pathological” affective responses and there is no question of training them to accord with correct reason, as Aristotle and Plato taught—a doctrine that came to be known as *metriopatheia* among later philosophers. Instead, the Stoics preached *apatheia*: the wise person will be without *pathe*.\(^{79}\) However, not all of the affective responses that Plato

\(^{75}\) DL 7.116, Cicero, *TD* 4.12-13; Andronicus, *On the Passions* 6 (SVF 3.432). Stobaeus does not use the generic term *eupatheia*, but includes the species identified by Diogenes and Andronicus among the activities of virtue (Eclogae 2.7.5b (W2.58 / LS 60K), 2.7.5k (W 2.73 / LS 60J) 2.7.9a (W 2.87).

\(^{76}\) We follow Graver 2007 and Brennan 1998 and 2005 in taking the *eupatheiai* to be restricted to impulses directed at virtue, vice, and closely related objects, rather than as the class of appropriate impulses quite generally (including those directed at indifferents). The latter interpretation, suggested by Cicero’s exposition in *TD* 4.12-13, goes back at least as far as Plutarch (*On Moral Virtue* 449a-b) and Lactantias, *Div. Inst.* VI 15 (SVF 3.437)—as noted by Sandbach 1975, pp. 67-8 and Cooper 2005. Other recent proponents include Long and Sedley 1987, Vol. 2, p. 407; Nussbaum 1994, pp. 399-401; and Meyer 2008, pp. 162-165. The major anomaly for such a view is that the Stoics recognize no *eupatheia* consisting in reasonable “contraction.”

\(^{77}\) Andronicus, *On the Passions* 6. On the joy of the sage, see Seneca *Epistle* 59.2. Although all the species of “wish” (*boulesis*) attested here and in DL 7.116—cf. Stob 2.7.5b (W2.58 /LS60K1), 2.7.5c (W 2.69)—are friendly interpersonal attitudes, friendship, for the Stoics, is intimately bound up with virtue (DL 7. 94-7, 124; Stob. 2.7.11c, 11m (W 2.94-5, 2.108); Graver 2007, pp. 173-190; Vogt 2008, pp. 148-160.

\(^{78}\) On that rationale, one might doubt that the sage needs caution to avoid wrong-doing (see Brennan 1998, p. 60 n. 29)—hence the attractiveness of an alternative tradition of the *eupatheia* that posits confidence (*tharros*) as the normatively correct response that replaces fear in the sage (Cic. *TD* 4.66; Stob. 2.7.5b, 5g). See Graver 2007, pp. 213-220.

\(^{79}\) Cicero, *On Moral Ends* 3.35; DL 7.117.
and Aristotle attribute to the virtuous person will count as *pathe* on the Stoic view. In particular, the pleasure in the *kalon* and pain at the *aischron* invoked by Plato and Aristotle as marks of the properly cultivated soul have virtue and vice as their objects, and thus coincide roughly with the Stoic *eupatheiai*. Indeed, the "caution" of the Stoic sage would seem to amount to the "hatred" (*misos*) of the *aischron* that Aristotle invokes. One might therefore wonder whether the Stoic doctrine of "freedom from passion" is any more than a verbal disagreement with Platonic and Aristotelian *metriopaetheia*. However, even granting that the Stoic sage is not without *pathos* in Aristotle’s sense of the term, there remain two substantial Stoic disagreements with Aristotle and Plato over the emotions.

The first becomes evident if we descend from the generic classification of the *pathe* and *eupatheiai* to the specific. At the generic level it is plausible to claim that the three kinds of *eupatheiai* are appropriate versions of the same affective responses (shrinkings, reachings, swellings) of which the *pathe* are inappropriate versions. But if we turn to the specific kinds of *pathe*—for example anger (as a species of the pathos genus appetite) and fear of failure (*agonia* – a species of the pathos genus fear)—we find no appropriate version of these emotions acknowledged by the Stoics. This is because the species of *pathe* are individuated by their objects, and all of these are "indifferent" on the Stoic valuation. Anger and *agonia* are directed at revenge and defeat, respectively, and neither of these is the appropriate object of affective response on the Stoic view. The Stoic sage, unlike the Aristotelian, will experience none of the species of *pathe* classified into the four Stoic genera. The only objects to which the Stoic sage is attracted, by which he is delighted, and from which is repelled, are virtue, vice, and objectives intimately related to these.

A second substantial disagreement concerns the division of the soul. Aristotle and his followers, like Plato before him, take the *pathe* to issue from a non-rational part of the soul that is distinct from the properly rational part. The Stoics, by contrast, maintain that the *pathe* are simply false judgments by the rational faculty itself. They are judgments, according to the Stoics, because they are impulses (*hormai*), and all impulses consist in the assent (*sunkatathesis*) by the rational faculty to an impression (*phantasia*) that something is "appropriate" (*kathekon*). The Stoics make it clear that an agent in the throes of *pathos* not only judges the object of his passion to be good (or bad), but judges it "appropriate" to reach, shrink, swell or contract in response to it. So conceived, the passions are not simply feelings that

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80 A criticism common in later antiquity (see Dillon 1983) and articulated more recently by Rist 1969, pp. 26-7 and Sandbach 1975, p. 63.
81 Stob 2.7.10b (W 2.91 / LS 65E); DL 112-113.
82 Stob. 2.7.10 (W 2.88); Seneca, On Anger 1.8.3. Galen reports that Posidonius, a later Stoic, dissented from this view (Plac. III & IV). See Cooper 1998.
84 Stob. 2.90, 7-18, Cic. TD 3.25, 3.76, Andronicus On the Passions. 1/ LS 65B
we passively experience. They are as voluntary as any action we undertake because we judge it to be appropriate.

To the objection that human experience provides abundant evidence that we become angry, afraid, and so forth without assenting to the appropriateness of these feelings, the Stoics respond by distinguishing the pathos strictly speaking from certain involuntary movements of the soul or “bitings” that might accompany or be caused by the impulsive impression. For example, the initial jolt one experiences upon the impression that one has been wronged, or that one’s life is in imminent danger, is to be distinguished from genuine anger or fear. The latter are impulses that “rush out” only upon being assented to.\(^85\) Compare, for example, the affect involved in feeling upset in spite of one’s considered judgment that nothing terrible has happened and the very different affect involved in thinking “Woe is me!” in the same circumstances.

This doctrine of “first movements,” as it came to be called, would prove to be of considerable interest to early Christian writers, who incorporated it into the doctrine of sin\(^86\)—without, however, endorsing the Stoic denial that the first movements are genuine pathe. Indeed, Augustine objects that once it is acknowledged that the sage will experience such “first movements,” it is mere terminological perversity of the Stoics to deny that the sage will experience passions.\(^87\) This would be a fair objection if the main point to the Stoic doctrine of apatheia were to deny affective response to the sage. But we have already seen that this is not the case. Rather, at least one central motivation for the doctrine of apatheia is the core Stoic thesis that the sage never makes a false judgment. Since the Stoics take certain affective responses to be false normative judgments—about what is good and bad, and about what it is appropriate—it is reasonable for them to single out these responses and deny them to the sage. In reserving the label pathe for this class of feelings, they mark them off both from those affective responses that constitute knowledge (the eupatheiai of the sage) and from those that fall below the level of judgment (the “first movements”).\(^88\)

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\(^85\) Seneca 2.1.4; Gellius \textit{Noctes Atticae} 19.1; Cic \textit{TD} 3.83. While it has been argued that this doctrine is a development by later Stoic writers (Sorabji 2000, pp. 70-75 and Rist 1969, p. 41, with a nuanced assessment of earlier scholarship in Inwood 1985, pp. 175-81), Graver 2007, pp. 85-108 makes an effective case for its origins in early Stoicism.


\(^87\) Augustine, \textit{City of God} (=\textit{CD}) 9.4.

\(^88\) On the \textit{eupatheiai} as knowledge: Cicero, \textit{TD} 4.80; Brennan 2005, pp. 97-110.
II Emotions in Early Christianity and Medieval Philosophy

Stoic views of the passions continue to be influential, even if not widely endorsed, into the middle ages. Among Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists in late Antiquity, a version of the sage’s apatheia (freedom from passion) is accorded to the fully perfected soul that has become assimilated to the divine, while the synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonic doctrine that had come to be known as metriopatheia (moderation of the passions) is the goal for the tripartite soul in ordinary life.\(^{89}\) A similar dichotomy found expression in early Christian writers such as Clement and Origen in Alexandria and Evagrius in the monastic tradition: here apatheia is the goal for those who aspired to a higher, ascetic ideal.\(^{90}\) Nonetheless, both traditions, like Stoicism, allow that those achieving apatheia will still have certain feelings – most notably agape (love) and hope and the “spiritual senses” that constitute knowledge of God.\(^{91}\)

Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE) inherits both these traditions and articulates an account of the emotions that will prove to be dominant in Western Europe until the twelfth century.\(^{92}\) Transforming the Stoics’ four-fold classification of the passions into a classification of affective response quite generally—desire (cupiditas), delight (laetitia), fear (metus), sadness (tristitia) (\(CD\) 14.6)—he interprets all such responses as expressions of love (14.7). In his version of metriopatheia, the passions are good and admirable when they express love of God, but pernicious when informed by love of mundane objects (14.7, 14.9). A good Christian in the present life will experience appropriate passions of all four kinds, but in the world to come will experience only versions of desire, delight, and a kind of “tranquil fear” reminiscent of the Stoic eupatheia “caution” (14.9; cf. 9.5)—thus returning to the condition of Adam and Eve before their original sin (14.10). It is the fallen condition of humanity that makes sadness and fear appropriate passions in the present life (14.9), and it is in punishment for Adam and Eve’s transgression that we are susceptible to the involuntary “first movements” (14.12, 15, 19). Augustine conceives of these as painful and disturbing feelings—especially of fear, anger, and sexual arousal—that arise in spite of and even in opposition to our will.\(^{93}\) For Augustine, as for other early Christian appropriators of this Stoic doctrine, the “first movements” involve (or are) sinful thoughts and the prescribed remedy is thoroughly

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\(^{89}\) See Dillon 1986; Knuttila 2004, pp. 87-103. In contrast to Aristotle’s view that the emotions should have appropriate intensity and objects, metriopatheia was typically understood by these thinkers as a condition of considerably diminished emotional intensity.


\(^{91}\) Clement, Stromata 6.9; Origen, Contra Celsum 1.48.


\(^{93}\) CD 14.15-19; see Sorabji 2000, pp. 400-417.
Stoic: refuse assent, thereby preventing the initial movements from developing into strong and uncontrollable passions.\textsuperscript{94}

By the 12th century, the Augustinian analysis of the passions as forms of love has absorbed the fourfold Stoic classification to yield a more fundamental dichotomy into those passions that are expressions of love, and those that are expressions of hate, with the four Stoic genera (hope now replacing desire) sorted into these two fundamental categories. In a further twist, not found in Augustine, these two categories now tend to be identified, respectively, as “concupiscible” and “irascible”—Latin terminology for Plato’s appetitive (\textit{epithumetikon}) and spirited (\textit{thumoeides}) parts of the soul.\textsuperscript{95} The source for this Platonic strand in the doctrinal mixture is the widespread practice in late antiquity of dividing the soul first, as Aristotle did, into passion (\textit{pathos}) and reason, and then further dividing the “passionate” part (quite contrary to Aristotle’s own practice) into \textit{epithumia} and \textit{thumos}.\textsuperscript{96} This Platonic division of the non-rational part of the soul persists as a tenet of the new Aristotelianism that arises in the mid-twelfth century when the works of Avicenna, Averroes, and Aristotle become available in Latin translation.\textsuperscript{97} The central question addressed by theorists of the passions remains, which passions are concupiscible and which are irascible?

Earlier thinkers in the period take the concupiscible passions to be reactions to apparent goods and irascible passions to be responses to apparent evils; thus hope and joy, given their positive valence, belong to the concupiscible faculty, while the negative valence of fear and sorrow locates them in the irascible.\textsuperscript{98} While the terminology here is Platonic, the conception of the “irascible” part would be unrecognizable to Plato. Later thinkers take the defining mark of an irascible passion to be difficulty in achieving (or

\textsuperscript{95} Isaac of Stella (1100-1169), \textit{Letter to Alcher on the Soul} (\textit{Patrologia Latina} (= PL) 194:1877b-1879b) §§4-6 and Anonymous, \textit{On the Spirit and the Soul} (PL 180:779-830, §§4, 13, 46), both translated in McGinn 1977, where “concupiscible” and “irascible” appetites are rendered “positive appetites” and “negative appetites”. By contrast, Augustine invokes a Platonic division of non-rational impulse into \textit{libido} and \textit{ira} at CD 14.19, but does not use it to classify the passions; indeed, he classifies \textit{ira} as a kind of \textit{libido} (14.15).
\textsuperscript{96} On the later classical tradition see Vander Waerdt 1985. This hybrid division of the soul, along with a rudimentary attempt to sort the passions into “spirit” and “appetite”, appears in chapters XVI-XXI of Nemesius, \textit{On Human Nature}—a 4\textsuperscript{th} century CE work widely excerpted by later Christian writers and attributed to Gregory of Nyssa, which was translated into Latin twice in the 11\textsuperscript{th} and 12\textsuperscript{th} centuries (Sharples and Van der Eijk 2008, p. 4). See Knuuttila 2004, pp. 103-110; Brungs 2002, ch. 1 and 2008, pp. 171-177.
\textsuperscript{97} On Avicenna’s use of the distinction see Knuuttila 2004, p. 222; Brungs 2002, pp. 33-40.
\textsuperscript{98} John Blund, \textit{Treatise on the Soul} (1210), and Alexander of Neckham (1157-1217) following Isaac of Stella (1100-1169) and a tradition of thought going back to Jerome and Gregory in the monastic tradition. Brungs 2002, pp. 40-52; Knuuttila 2004, pp. 228-230; King 2010, pp. 172, 175.
avoiding) its object. Thus the Franciscan Jean de la Rochelle and, following him, Albert the Great classify hope and anger as irascible appetites, and desire and sorrow as concupiscible—a view that becomes orthodoxy in Scholastic Aristotelianism when it is taken up by Thomas Aquinas in his magisterial taxonomy of the passions (ST IaIIa 22-48). While the latter criterion for the “irascible” more accurately reflects Plato’s own conception of the “thumoeides” part of the soul—its incorporation into an avowedly Aristotelian psychology is a distinctively medieval synthesis.

On the moral and epistemological status of the passions, even if not on their classification, the Scholastic tradition has many points of continuity with its Classical roots. Aquinas explicitly follows Augustine in advocating metriopatheia rather than Stoic apatheia (IaIIae 24.2). Like Plato and Aristotle, he takes moral virtue to require not the elimination but the proper direction of the passions (59.2-3)—although the theological virtues he invokes involve feelings (most notably love of God) that he declines to classify as passions in the strict sense, since they are activities of the will (intellectual appetite). Even as activities of the sensible appetite, however, the passions have a significant cognitive component, since evaluative judgments by ratio particularis are integral to their causation.

### III Emotions in Seventeenth Century Moral Philosophy

**DESCARTES**

While Descartes announces that his account of the passions constitutes a break with “the ancients” (PA 1), there are many points of continuity between his own analysis and those of his predecessors. His main disagreement is with the Scholastics, whose faculty psychology he rejects, and along with it the distinction between irascible and concupiscible appetites (PA 68) that was central to medieval taxonomies of the passions. There is only one faculty of the soul, which Descartes, like the Stoics, identifies with the mind. The passions, he writes, are perceptions or feelings that (a) we

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99 On the “irascible” as difficult or arduous: Jean de la Rochelle (d. 1245), Summa de anima 2.107; Albertus Magnus (d. 1280), de Homine qq. 66-7; Thomas Aquinas (1124-1274), Summa Theologiae Ia 81.2, IaIIae 23.1; Brungs 2002, ch. 1; Gauthier 1951, pp. 321-338.

100 See Meyer (forthcoming).


“relate especially to the soul” (as distinct from feelings of hunger, which we relate to the body, or perceptions of colour or sound, which we relate to external objects) and that (b) are “caused, maintained and fortified” by movements of the animal spirits in the body (27), the latter affecting the soul via the pineal gland (30-37). Those animal spirits may and typically do also directly affect the body, as when fear readies the body to flee (38), but the “principal effect” of the passions is to “incite and dispose their soul to desire those things for which they prepare their body”, as fear inclines one to want to flee (40). Whether the soul accepts what the passion incites it to do is a matter for the will to decide (41, 144). Thus an activity analogous to Stoic assent plays a role in the causal trajectory of a passion, according to Descartes, although he follows his medieval predecessors in classifying as a passion the psychic movement that makes the recommendation, while the Stoics would classify it as a preliminary to passion.

Like Aquinas, Descartes also recognizes a class of feelings that arise from the actions of the will—most notably intellectual joy and sadness (91-93, 147-8). Phenomenally similar to the passions, and often arising in conjunction with them, he calls them émotions, which he distinguishes from passions on the grounds that the soul is active with respect to them rather than passive (i.e., moved by animal spirits). Intellectual joy, for example, is the enjoyment the soul has “in the good it represents to itself as its own” (91), and can coexist along with the passion of joy, but also with contrary passions—as for example when one enjoys being frightened at the theatre, or indulging in lamentation (147). Of particular importance is the joy that the soul can derive from its own virtue (148)—Descartes’ version of the pleasure in the kalon that Plato and Aristotle attribute to the virtuous person, and also akin to the Stoic eupatheia of joy. The importance Descartes attaches to this émotion lies in its power to outweigh in sheer magnitude the disturbances caused by the passions (148)—a version of Epicurus’ point about the primacy of mental over bodily pleasures in the fourth remedy (KD IV).

While Descartes’ interest in the passions is avowedly that of the natural philosopher rather than a moralist,104 he does endorse in passing his medieval predecessors’ rejection of Stoic apatheia. Not all passions are wrong—pity, compassion, and reverence, for example, are all important (PA 187)—although many passions need to be resisted (144).105 His accounts of individual passions and the strategies he recommends for controlling them show that he also follows his predecessors in taking the passions to be intimately connected to value judgments. The passions “fortify and perpetuate thoughts in the soul” (PA 74, 160) about whether or not their objects are “agreeable” (convenable) or “estimable;”106 and they exaggerate

104 AT XI 326, Preface to PA; reply to second letter 14 August 1649.
105 on mastery of passions in Descartes, see Brown 2002, pp. 261-2.
the strength of the reasons for taking the course of action they urge on the will (211). The principal strategy for resistance that Descartes recommends involves the cultivation of what his predecessors called “magnanimity” and that he prefers to call “generosity” (161).\(^{107}\) This is a complex passion that involves value judgments, highly reminiscent of the Stoic Epictetus, to the effect that the only thing of value is choosing well, and hence that only what depends entirely on our will is an appropriate object of concern.\(^{108}\) In sketching the value judgments suitable for controlling the passions, Descartes sometimes slips from Stoic to Peripatetic doctrine (according to which things other than virtue can have value), or even into Epicurean counsel against the prudence of cultivating “vain desires” (145). The eclecticism of his theory of value notwithstanding, the salient point is that Descartes takes passions to present and to be responsive to considerations about value.

The robustly cognitive status that Descartes accords to the passions is a point of continuity with the ancient tradition as far back as Plato and Aristotle, and even with the neo-Aristotelianism of Avicenna and the Scholastics. Unlike the ancients, however, and consistent with his stance as a ‘natural philosopher’ rather than a moralist, Descartes betrays no interest in articulating a position on the relation of the passions to moral knowledge. Other seventeenth-century philosophers are less reticent about the moral epistemology of the passions. Most notable among these is Spinoza, to whom we now turn.

SPINOZA

Spinoza embraces the thoroughgoing cognitivism of the Stoic theory of the passions. Like Descartes, he rejects the faculty psychology of the neo-Aristotelians: the only activities of the soul are ideas, which affirm or deny what is true or false (2p48-49),\(^{109}\) and “affection” (affectus, his most general term for emotions) is a kind of idea: “By affect I understand affectations of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these affections” (3d3). In defining the affects first in terms of bodily states and then in terms of ideas, Spinoza does not mean they have two constituent parts or even moments, one bodily and the other mental,\(^{110}\) for “a mode of extension and


\(^{108}\) PA 145, 152-161, 203; Letter to Porot Jan 1641 AT III 279 (quoted in Brown 2002, p. 259); cf. Epictetus, Encheiridion 1

\(^{109}\) See also Curley 1975, Della Rocca 2008, and Marshall 2008. In-text references to Spinoza’s Ethics are, unless otherwise noted by part, proposition (p), definition (d), scholium (s), and corollary (c).

\(^{110}\) In this regard, Spinoza is to be contrasted with Malebranche, who held that emotions have 7 moments, beginning with a judgment, moving through motivation, and ending with a series of sensations (The Search After Truth, V.3).
the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways” (2p7s). Bodily states as well as our ideas of those states, in his view, are but two parallel modes of a single substance (God, on his monistic metaphysics). The definition also invokes Spinoza’s conatus doctrine: “Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being” (3p6). Each mode has a “power of acting,” an increase in which contributes toward the mode’s perfection, while a decrease is a move away from perfection. Thus, focusing on the mode of ideas, one’s affects are representations of changes in our bodily states—that is, representations of either increases or decreases in one’s physical power of acting. At the same time, these representations are themselves changes in the active power of the mind.

Spinoza follows the Stoic classification of the emotions, but combines desire and fear into a single category (cupiditas), resulting in a tri-partite taxonomy of

- **laetitia** (translated as both “joy” and “pleasure”), a transition to greater power (3da2);
- **tristitia** (“sadness,” “pain,” or “unpleasure”), a transition to diminished power (3da3); and
- **cupiditas** (“desire”), conscious striving in accordance with the conatus (3da1).

All other affects – of which there are innumerably many (3p56) - are built out of these three. For example, “Love is nothing else but pleasure [joy] accompanied by the idea, of an external cause” (3p13s).

An affect in any of these categories can be either active (an activity of the mind) or passive (a passion, 3d3). As a physical mode, an affect is passive to the degree that it is caused by external sources; as a mental mode, it is passive to the degree that it is “inadequate and confused” (2p41). Since we are here most interested in the affects as potential forms of knowledge, we will focus on the mental mode. Suppose one experiences joy at a personal accomplishment—say, setting a new personal record in a race. As a mode of thought, this affect is a representation of one’s increase in physical power as a result of the win—the thought that one is stronger and faster than one was before, perhaps also that one merits admiration on the part of others, and so on. This thought is “inadequate and confused”, very roughly, because one’s body is not the sufficient cause for one’s physical increase in power. Other factors, such as the weather and the course conditions, are part of the story as well; however, we are incapable of adequately conceiving of causes external to our bodies, representing all external causes in terms of how they impinge on our bodies. When the runner feels joy at her success, then, she confusedly represents the entire explanation for her increase in physical power in terms of her bodily states, relying on inadequate conceptions of the weather and course conditions as somehow essentially tied to her physical state. This is what Spinoza calls the “first kind of knowledge” (2p40schol2)—“particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses”—
and it is “the only source of falsity” (2p41). Active affects, by contrast, are adequate and unconfused ideas. They represent a changes in physical power as they really are, not simply in terms of how they impinge on the body, and arise either from reasoning ("the second kind of knowledge") or from intuition (the "third kind") (2p39, 2p40schol2).

Not to put too fine a point on it, then, passive affects are false beliefs about the causes of one’s increases and decreases in physical power, while active affects are a matter of knowing about ourselves, the world, and our place in the world. To know these matters completely, in Spinoza’s view, is to have knowledge of God or Nature, which he calls the highest virtue (4p28, 4p36d). This state of knowledge Spinoza calls “man’s highest virtue” or “blessedness” (4App4). It is not a feeling that accompanies this knowledge, but rather it is the state of having this knowledge, acquired not through sense perception but through reason and intuition. As knowledge of what increases and decreases one’s powers of activity, it amounts, in Spinoza’s view, to knowledge of the good. Thus a passive affect is a false belief about the good, while an active affect amounts to knowledge of the good.

Among the active affects Spinoza counts courage, the pleasure of striving to preserve oneself purely under the direction of reason, and generosity, the pleasure of striving to unite with and benefit others, again purely under the direction of reason (3p59c). Another important active affect for Spinoza is the pleasure of knowing oneself and the operations of one’s affects, in particular knowing about the passive effects and how they operate upon us (5p15). The latter knowledge, itself an active affect, allows us better to control (even if not entirely expunge) the passive affects. Thus, as with the Stoics, we find in Spinoza an account of the emotions according to which most of them are false beliefs that can be controlled and countered by true beliefs about what is good and virtuous.

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111 An adequate idea, as Radnor puts it, “is one which, considered in itself, has all the internal signs of a true idea. Since a true idea is one which represents a thing as it really is, an adequate idea is one which, considered in itself, has all the internal signs of an idea which represents a thing as it really is” (Radnor 1971, p.352, Spinoza 2def4).

112 On the relation between reasoning and intuition see Brandom 2008.

113 Virtue more broadly characterized is simply the power of activity (4def8). Also see Kisner 2008.

114 At 4p8d Spinoza writes “We call good or bad that which is advantageous, or an obstacle to the preservation of our being; that is, that which increases or diminishes, helps or checks, our power of activity.” However, he also holds that what helps us to satisfy our desires is good, and that we sometimes desire things other than what strengthens our power of activity. There is thus a debate among Spinoza scholars as to whether Spinoza held a desire-satisfaction theory of the good. Kisner 2010 provides an overview of this debate and argues that, for Spinoza, satisfying our desires necessarily increases our power and vice versa, thereby resolving this apparent tension.
THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS

The seventeenth century also sees the rise of a new twist on the ancient tradition that properly cultivated emotions are necessary for moral knowledge. In contrast to the neo-Stoicism of Spinoza, which identifies passions (and their corrected counterparts) with the activity of intellect, the Cambridge Platonists, most prominently Henry More (1614-1687) and Ralph Cudworth (1617-1689), accept a sharp distinction between reason and emotion. Inspired by the Augustinian and Christian reworking of Neoplatonism, they take the emotion of love (when properly directed to worthy objects) –to be the source of a higher knowledge (non-propositional) than is possible through the use of reason alone.115

IV Emotions in Eighteenth Century Moral Philosophy

KANT AND THE MORAL SENSE THEORISTS

In the Eighteenth Century the “moral sense theorists” hold that it is not by reason but by the operations of a kind of “sense” that one grasps moral good and evil.116 Building on Shaftesbury’s work while embracing Locke’s empirical methods, Francis Hutcheson argues that we have a “moral sense” that perceives virtue and vice and also approves and disapproves of them. Immanuel Kant, in his so-called “Prize Essay” (1770), embraced a similar view, and throughout his career he appears to conceive of emotions as pleasurable and painful representations akin to perceptions. Of course, by the time of the Groundwork (1785), Kant no longer thinks that moral knowledge is due to the operations of a sense, but instead argues for the purely a priori rational apprehension of the moral law. Feelings, especially respect, continue to play an important, perhaps indispensable role in empirical moral motivation, but are not themselves ways of apprehending or knowing moral obligation (see Guyer 2010; pace Reath 2006).117 For Hutcheson and the moral sense theorists, by contrast, at least some emotions are a source of what is arguably a kind of moral knowledge.

116 Hutcheson distinguishes moral good from “natural good or advantage”, I 2.1.1, p. 117). In-text references to Hutcheson are to An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (I) and the Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions with Illustrations on the Moral Sense (E), by Treatise, Section, and Sub-section. Page references are to the Liberty Fund editions.
117 Kant’s views on the role of emotion in moral motivation are beyond the scope of the present chapter, but are the subject of a growing literature. See Denis 2000, Sorensen 2002 and Guyer 2010.
A sense, Hutcheson argues in An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, is a "Determination of our Minds to receive Ideas independently of our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleasure and Pain (Essay 1.1, p. 4). In addition to the 5 physical senses, he claims, we have 4 senses "of the mind": an Internal Sense or Sense of Imagination, a Public Sense, a Moral Sense, and a Sense of Honor. Each of these is a "Power" to receive pleasurable and painful sensations along with "Images" or apprehensions of a certain class of objects. The three senses most directly relevant to ethics are the Public Sense, by which we feel pleasure and pain at others’ well-being and suffering, the Moral Sense, by which we feel pleasure and pain at our own and others’ virtue and vice, and the Sense of Honor, by which we feel pleasure and pain at others’ approval and disapproval of us.

It is in terms of these pleasures and pains that Hutcheson defines the “Affections” or “Passions.” These are “Perceptions of Pleasure or Pain, not directly raised by the Presence or Operation of the Event or Object, but by our Reflection upon, or Apprehension of their present or certainly future Existence” (Essay 2.1, p.28). To be clear, Hutcheson is not talking about perceiving pleasure and pain, but rather perceptions that are pleasurable or painful; affections and passions are pleasurable and painful mental states caused by and directed toward the anticipation of or reflection upon direct sensations—hence they might be called “indirect sensations.” He illustrates the distinction with the examples of, first, the pleasure of viewing a beautiful house versus the pleasure of reflecting on the fact that one owns the house and can enjoy the pleasure of viewing it at any time and, second, the pain of an episode of gout versus the pain of anticipating its return (Essay 2.1, p.28).

Hutcheson adopts the basic taxonomy inherited from the Stoics by way of Cicero, identifying desire, aversion, joy, and sorrow as the four basic affections (Essay 3.2, p.63). Although he sometimes reserves “affection” for desire and aversion, conceived of as unfelt volitional states, as distinct from Joy and Sorrow, conceived of as “only a sort of Sensation” (Essay 3.2, p.49), he generally uses “affection” in the wider sense that encompasses unfelt volitional states (desire and aversion), non-volitional reflective or indirect sensations (joy and sorrow), and combinations of the two. Among the affections that are or include sensations, Hutcheson singles out a subset of “confused” and “violent” affections, which he calls “passions” in a restricted sense. These are “occasioned or attended by some violent bodily Motions” and “prevent all deliberate Reasoning about our Conduct” (Essay 2.2, pp.29-30). Although Hutcheson does not always follow this

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\[118\] In-text references to An Essay are by section and article number, with page references to the Liberty Fund edition.

\[119\] a point he urges against Malebranche.
terminological distinction, the contrast he indicates here between the calm and the violent is important to his moral theory, which instructs us to use reason and the calm affections to subdue and control the violent passions, ultimately giving precedence to calm universal benevolence.

The affections as Hutcheson describes them involve either “Apprehension” of good or evil (desire and aversion) or “Reflection” upon the actual or impending presence of good or evil (joy and sorrow, Essay 3.2, p.63). Here, “good or evil” is the prospect of causing agreeable or uneasy sensations, which include sensual pleasures, the pleasures of imagination, pleasures due to perception of public happiness, the pleasures of the moral sense, and the pleasures of honor (Essay 1.2, pp. 18-19). For our purposes, the important affections are those involved in the moral sense’s apprehension of moral virtue and vice. A person is virtuous insofar as she is motivated by benevolence. Partial benevolence is good, but universal benevolence is better—that is, gives rise to stronger and more pleasurable feelings of approval. These feelings of moral approval and disapproval are (arguably) a kind of cognitive apprehension, even if they do not amount to the kind of knowledge we can acquire through scientific and rational study of the world. Our moral sense is our power to perceive virtue and vice—that is, to receive the pleasurable and painful ideas of benevolent and malevolent motives. While some of these perceptions may be direct sensations, others are surely genuine affections, arising from reflection upon and anticipation of virtue and vice.

In 1955, William Frankena argued that Hutcheson is a “non-cognitivist,” meaning that he “regards ethical utterances as purely emotive, expressively or dynamically—as expressing and evoking emotions. But [he] insists that the emotion expressed or evoked is a unique moral emotion, not just any pro or con attitude, not even just the feeling of benevolence or sympathy” (Frankena 1955, p.366). Now, it is surely anachronistic to attribute any analysis of ethical utterances to Hutcheson, but the suggestion in broader terms is that Hutcheson is some kind of anti-realist about moral virtue and vice, and believes our feelings of approval and disapproval are purely subjective, reflecting nothing that is “really in” their objects. This widely respected interpretation derives support from the analogy Hutcheson draws between virtue and beauty, and from his repeated remark that beauty is a mind-dependent quality. For example: “[B]y Absolute or Original Beauty, is not understood any Quality suppos’d to be in the Object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any Mind which perceives it: For Beauty, like other Names of sensible Ideas, properly denotes the Perception of some Mind” (Beauty 1.17, p.14). On such a reading of Hutcheson, moral approbation and disapprobation cannot count as genuine

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120 In-text references to An Inquiry Concerning Beauty (“Beauty”) are by section and article number, with page references to the Liberty Fund edition of An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, in Two Treatises.
apprehensions of virtue and vice—instead, they are something more like projections.

While it is not our aim here to insist that the anti-realist reading of Hutcheson is definitely mistaken, we do want to point out an alternative interpretation that is also very plausible, and that gives approbation and disapprobation a more genuinely cognitive role. To be sure, Hutcheson does not think of virtue and vice as Lockean primary qualities—as is clear from the analogy with Beauty, and remarks such as “Approbation cannot be supposed an Image of any thing external” (Illustrations 4.1, p. 288). On the other hand, there are his repeated arguments against his egoist opponents (Hobbes, Mandeville, Locke), that it would be a capricious creator who made us care only about the interests that serve self-love, because then we would fail to be motivated by what is good. Even more to the point, there is his remark, added to the fourth edition of An Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas of Virtue of Moral Good: “The Perception of the Approver, tho’ attended with Pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct from this Pleasure; even as the Perception of external Forms is attended with Pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from this Pleasure” (note 47).

The best way to reconcile these remarks with the texts that appear to support the projectivist reading is to attribute two anti-Lockean theses to Hutcheson. First, secondary qualities are real and external to the person representing them, even if they are mind-dependent in the sense that they cannot be fully characterized without reference to an experiencing subject. Second, representation need not involve resemblance. The first thesis allows that beauty and virtue may not be “suppos’d to be in the Object ... without relation to any Mind which perceives it” while at the same time the pleasurable idea, approbation, represents “something quite distinct from this Pleasure;” a secondary quality, as the first thesis characterizes it, is distinct from its representation, and yet is not attributable to objects without mentioning minds. And the second thesis makes this realist account of secondary qualities consistent with Hutcheson’s insistence that approbation is not an “image of anything external” (i.e. emphasis on “image”)—representations of secondary qualities do not resemble them; they are not images.

If something like this interpretation is correct, then approbation and disapprobation, as Hutcheson conceives them, are representations of external though mind-dependent qualities—and when they succeed in representing the world the way it really is, they are genuine apprehensions of

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121 Also see Radcliffe 1986, p. 415. In-text references to Illustrations on the Moral Sense (“Illustrations”) are by section and article number, with page references to the Liberty Fund edition.
123 McDowell 1988 argues for these two theses, though not in connection with Hutcheson.
virtue and vice. Such “affects” would amount to a kind of moral cognition.

HUME

In Hume we find a more unambiguous non-cognitivism about the passions. He most often uses the term “emotion” to refer to a bodily disturbance or “motion,” i.e. pleasure or pain, while referring to the class of phenomena we call emotions as “passions”. The violent passions cause emotions, while the calm passions—often mistaken for reason—“produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by their immediate feeling or sensation” (T2.3.3.9). In Book II of the Treatise of Human Nature, “Of the Passions,” Hume develops a theory of the passions and examines the causes and effects of specific passions. He is particularly interested in what he calls the “indirect” passions—pride, humility, love, hatred—along with the moral passions of approbation and disapprobation.

In contrast with the views we have reviewed to this point, Hume’s account of the passions emphasizes that they are non-representational. Hume quite explicitly thinks of representation as a matter of resemblance, and thus believes that the passions do not represent the world in either the robust Stoicist-Spinozistic sense (involving beliefs) or in the weaker Platonic-Aristotelian-Hutchesonian sense (involving cognitive apprehensions). In Hume’s terms, all passions are impressions rather than ideas.

In contrast to the impressions of sensation, the passions are impressions had in response to ideas or to other impressions. Hume thus calls them “impressions of reflexion” (T1.1.2.1). Although non-representational (for the reasons given above) they still have objects. Hume seems to hold that the passions are directed toward they objects they cause us to think about, or to which they direct our attention. The indirect passions, on which Hume lavishes his attention, have a complex “double” intentionality, one object being the cause (“that idea, which excites them”) and the other “that to which they direct their view, when excited” (T2.1.2.4). For example, when I contemplate the idea of a beautiful house, this idea causes a pleasurable impression, which is a reflective impression or passion. This passion could be simply the direct passion, call it something like

124 In-text references to the Treatise of Human Nature (T) are by Book, Part, Section, and Paragraph.
125 That the emotions have intentional objects is now widely accepted, so that even those who believe emotions are bodily states or perceptions of bodily states (the so-called “James-Lange” theory of the emotions, endorsed by Damasio 1994 and Prinz 2004, among others) feel obligated to provide an account of how such states can be about or directed toward objects. Although some philosophers argue that the intentionality of the emotions entails that they involve beliefs (Kenny 1963, Taylor 1985), there are many different theories of intentionality that avoid this implication (see Prinz 2004, Goldie 2000, Calhoun 2003).
aesthetic enjoyment of the house, which is both caused by and directed toward the house as a beautiful object. Alternatively (or additionally), the pleasurable impression could lead my thoughts, according to the principles of association developed in the first Book, to a related idea: that of the owner, who happens to be me. In this case, the pleasurable impression takes on a new dimension; it is now directed toward me. Now it is pride. In general, the indirect passions involve the mind’s movement from one idea to another, and from one impression to another. This “double impulse,” as Hume calls it, also characterizes the moral passions.

The moral passions—or “sentiments” as Hume tends to call them—are those involved in moral evaluation, and take character (virtue and vice) as their primary object. “To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character” (T3.1.2.3). While we do morally assess individual motives, passions, and actions, it is only because of a connection we assume or perceive between them and “stable and durable principles of the mind, which ... enter into the personal character” (T3.3.1.4). Virtue and vice are those character traits the contemplation of which causes a particular kind of pleasure or uneasiness. We feel approbation toward both “artificial virtues” like justice, fidelity, veracity, and integrity, because they are useful and “natural virtues” like benevolence, humanity, and friendship” (T3.3.1), because they are immediately pleasing.

In contrast with the almost obsessive detail of the sections on pride, humility, love, hatred and their subsidiaries, Hume’s account of the moral passions is surprisingly unclear beyond his unequivocal statement of two key points: that our sense of virtue and vice is not derived from self-interest (T3.1.2); and that it is not derived from reason (T3.1.1). On the question of whether the moral passions are direct or indirect, by contrast, Hume is surprisingly reticent. Indeed, in at least one passage he appears to identify the four, core indirect passions with the moral passions.

Pride and humility, love and hatred are excited, when there is any thing presented to us, that both bears a relation to the object of the passion, and produces a separate sensation related to the sensation of the passions. Now virtue and vice are attended with these circumstances. They must necessarily be plac’d in either ourselves or

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127 In fact, strictly speaking, Hume thinks there are two pleasurable impressions at work in pride, one “separate” from the passion and one a part of it. He doesn’t spell it out, but it seems the “separate” pleasure could be either an impression of sensation—if it is caused by looking at the beautiful house—or the impression of reflection, aesthetic enjoyment of the house—if it is caused by contemplating the idea of the beautiful house.

128 In the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, see Part 3, Section 2, on the artificial and natural virtues.

129 Though the conventional virtues arise because of self-interest, we do not morally approve them because of their contribution to our interests (T3.1.2).
others, and excite either pleasure or uneasiness; and therefore must give rise to one of these four passions. (T3.1.2.5)

On a closer look, however, he equates “virtue and vice” with only the causes of the person-directed indirect passions. Moreover, by “virtue and vice” here, he seems to mean the things we evaluate as virtuous or vicious, i.e. the character traits “plac’d” in persons. In other words, Hume identifies the objects toward which moral passions are directed as possible causes of pride, humility, love, and hatred. We thus feel proud or humble when it is pleasurable or painful to think about ourselves as possessors of admirable or despicable traits, and we feel love or hatred when it is pleasurable or painful to think about others as possessors of their admirable or despicable traits. The moral passions, by contrast, are directed not toward people as possessors of traits, but toward the traits themselves. ¹³⁰

The moral passions are revealed as distinct from the person-directed indirect passions because they are directed toward different, although closely related, objects. The distinctness of the moral passions cannot be only a matter of their objects, however. One might, for example, both admire and feel anxious about a competitor’s industriousness (T3.1.2.4). This is possible, Hume argues, because the two passions presuppose different perspectives: specifically moral passions arise when we consider a character “in general,” and abstract specifically from our own interests (T3.1.2.4). In other passages, he adds that these “peculiar sentiments” arise when we consider the effects a person’s character has on the people with whom she interacts (T3.3.1.17), and even upon herself (for example, T3.3.1.30). When it comes to evaluating our own characters, we look both to how we affect others, and how others evaluate us (T3.3.1.26). In general, the moral passions arise when we take a “common” point of view.

One might worry that this account of the moral passions contradicts Hume’s arguments that our moral sense is not derived from reason—for the effects of a person’s character on herself and other people are matters of fact discernable by reason. On Hume’s view, however, our observations of or thoughts about these facts lack all evaluative tenor until we have a passionate response, even if a very calm one. We respond to these facts by feeling the moral passions, because of the operations of sympathy. ¹³¹ These

¹³⁰ In contrast with the first book of the Treatise, where Hume despaired of analyzing personal identity, in the second and third Books he proceeds without these metaphysical worries, suggesting there are many things that pick us out as individual persons, including our character traits (See Baier 1991).

¹³¹ Hume seems to develop two different accounts of the pleasurable and “uneasy” responses we have when we think about characters and their effects on people. In the Treatise, he appeals to the operations of “sympathy,” an empathetic capacity to, we might say, “catch” other people’s feelings. In the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, he occasionally writes of sympathy as if it is an empathetic capacity, but mostly tends to equate it with benevolence and a feeling of “humanity”—i.e. a desire for other people’s happiness and aversion to their misery.
passions are not derived from reason, and so neither is our moral sense. Our moral passions, entirely non-representational impressions, are crucial to moral motivation, but cannot be forms of moral knowledge, in either of the senses we reviewed previously.

**V Emotions in Contemporary Moral Philosophy**

In contemporary taxonomies of theories of the emotions, it is standard to distinguish between “cognitive” and “non-cognitive” theories. These are, however, terms of art, and their meaning is not often clear. The canonical examples of non-cognitive theories claim inspiration from James and Lange, and hold that emotions are our experiences of bodily changes.\(^{132}\) Under the label “cognitive,” one usually finds two broad groups of theories. First, there are those that hold emotions are or essentially include beliefs about their objects.\(^{133}\) Second, there are those that hold emotions are importantly distinct from beliefs, but nevertheless have some of the marks of that part of the mental often described as having a mind-to-world direction of fit: for example, it often makes sense to talk about having reasons for the emotions one feels.\(^{134}\) As our historical survey has shown, the non-cognitive analysis of the emotions is a relatively recent development among moral philosophers we have surveyed, finding its first unambiguous expression in the eighteenth century. Among contemporary moral philosophers, those who accord an important but non-cognitive role to the emotions generally take their inspiration from Hume. Some couple this understanding of the emotions with a metaethical non-cognitivism about value: emotions project values onto the world; there is no good to be known or perceived, but our emotional responses to the world lead us to interpret things as good or bad (thus Blackburn 1998 and Gibbard 1992). Others adopt a metaethical subjectivism: the good is that which causes approbation, the bad, disapprobation (see Prinz 2004).

Cognitive conceptions of the emotions, by contrast, are revealed in our survey to have a pedigree dating back at least as far as Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. While there is insufficient consensus among contemporary interpreters of Plato and Aristotle to make it uncontroversial which of the two varieties of cognitive analysis best classifies their views on the emotions, the Stoics and Spinoza are clearly proponents of the first variety: emotions simply are moral judgments that are true and false in the same way as any other judgments. While such purely “intellectualist” conceptions of the emotions are rare among contemporary philosophers, a prominent and influential exception is Martha Nussbaum.\(^{135}\) Explicitly taking her inspiration from the Stoics, Nussbaum (2001) defends a “cognitive-evaluative”

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133 See Kenny 1963 and Taylor 1965.
135 Also see Solomon (1980), Neu (2000).
conception of the emotions as appraisals of things and events as good or bad with regard to one’s own flourishing, as well as judgments that these appraisals are justified. Unlike the Stoics, Nussbaum believes that many of our ordinary emotions (not just radically reoriented eupatheiai) are true beliefs about our good. Another important difference is that Nussbaum argues that emotions do not presuppose reflective self-consciousness or linguistic capacities (2001, ch. 2).

The second variety of cognitivism, on which emotions are a form of cognitive apprehension distinct from belief, is popular in contemporary philosophy of mind and moral psychology. Among moral philosophers, John McDowell (1988), who traces his roots to Aristotle, advocates a view very similar to the one we have attributed to Hutcheson, where certain emotions are cognitive apprehensions of real, yet mind-dependent, virtue and vice. Similarly, Michael Stocker (1996) strenuously argues against assimilating emotions to beliefs, but maintains that certain emotions are genuine apprehensions of value.

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136 See especially Calhoun 2003 and Goldie 2000. There are also hybrid theories conceive of emotions as blending cognitive, motivational, and bodily elements (For example, Greenspan 1988, Schachter and Singer 1962).


Vander Waerdt, P. 1985. ‘Peripatetic Soul Division, Posidonius, and Middle Platonic Moral Psychology’. Greek, Rome, and Byzantine Studies 26; 373-394


