RACIAL ENFRANCISEMENT AS A DISTINCT ACT OF DEMOCRATIZATION: COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY, AND AUSTRIA

INTRODUCTION

Why do elites agree to give power to excluded groups that could shift the balance of power between different groups in society and political life? What informs their decisions towards this important political change? These are the serious questions and dilemmas that democratization literature has been tackling since its emergence as an organized body of work. Various explanations have been developed to provide answers to these questions in the context of working-class enfranchisement and women’s suffrage, but none of our theories can explain this with regards to the suffrage extension to racialized minorities. In this project, I seek to address this blind spot in democratization literature by tackling this question: Why did the United States and Germany extend the franchise to racialized minorities in the 1960s and 1990s whereas Austria retained their disenfranchising citizenship policy? My goal is to understand why elites holding key positions in representative institutions would choose to share their powers with others when this shift of power could alter the basic parameters of political life.

I will make an extensive literature review after discussing some conceptual clarifications and introducing the cases, but here I want to give a brief - an even a bit simplistic - overview of how the literature deals with the issue of enfranchisement. The literature on enfranchisement is a subset of democratization literature that focuses on historical cases showing the incremental progression of enfranchisement. This literature can be roughly organized around two competing frameworks: elite-based and bottom-up explanations. These frameworks were formulated to address the enfranchisement of economic classes and, to a lesser degree, women’s suffrage. However, they fall short of accounting for racial enfranchisement. Top-down accounts dealing with elite-based calculations focus on the sources of the variants of either negative inducement or positive inducements. The first strand of top-down accounts argues that elites preemptively extend the franchise to forestall an even more radical redistribution of material resources, aka revolution. The racial minorities under consideration are generally too few in number to lead a revolutionary process or even pose a credible threat for it. Hence, the cost of repression is less likely to outweigh the cost of concession for elites while dealing with racial minorities, unlike more populous segments of these societies such as workers, women, or those in poverty. The second set of elite-based explanations is concentrated more on the attempts of elites to attract support from these excluded populations for their military and political projects. But this explanation also fails to provide a convincing account of racial enfranchisement for the same reason; except for exceptional electoral and demographic configurations, these populations are not large enough to promise a
sweeping positive return to pro-reform actors. Additionally, taking sides with racialized minorities on such a controversial topic bears the risk of alienating some segments of the existing constituency. Because of this, I put forward that rational calculations might not be the most important factor behind the elite’s support for racial enfranchisement. The final group of accounts adopts a bottom-up approach and studies the growing efficacy of economic classes as a result of the modernization of the 18th and 19th-century capitalist economy. However, this is far from generating a fair assessment of racial enfranchisement in cases such as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Germany in the 20th century, long after the modernization of these economies. The same numerical issue poses an analytical problem to these button-up accounts because these groups do not constitute a large group equipped with necessary material resources to force their inclusion into the political system. All in all, this project seeks to distinguish the analytical space of racial enfranchisement in the process of democratization. Because racial enfranchisement often involves the extension of voting rights from a majority to a minority of the population, neither it’s determinants nor its consequences can be understood with frameworks developed to understand class-based extensions of the franchise from a minority to a majority (true for both manhood suffrage and to an extent also women’s suffrage).

Drawing on scholarship on notions of peoplehood, identity, and belonging this paper develops a framework for understanding racial enfranchisement as both a distinct act of democratization and a novel analytical category with potentially profound implications for the basic concepts, focus, and assumptions of the democratization literature. This framework emphasizes ideational rather than material factors in the decision to expand the franchise. Specifically, racial enfranchisement is understood as the result of a political project to reconstitute the identity of the political community. The emergence of a counter-elite group with a new and more expanded notion of democratic peoplehood will foster the opening of existing democratic institutions to newcomers, and their leverage over pro-status-quo groups in key veto player institutions is necessary for them to institutionalize their new conception through these radical political reforms of suffrage extension to racialized minorities.

In the following sections, I will firstly provide a conceptual assessment of exclusion in democratic regimes and then briefly talk about the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in the United States and the 2000 Nationality Law in Germany with regards to how each expanded the electorate along with the persisting disenfranchisement of racial minorities in Austria. Later on, I will discuss my case selection logic and research design. I will situate racial enfranchisement in democratization literature and underline the inadequacies of existing accounts to explain the puzzle at hand. Finally, I will seek to develop an alternative account.
DEMOCRACY AND EXCLUSION

For a decision-making process to be qualified as democratic, all the actors influenced by the final decision should be able to participate in this process either directly or through the representatives they commissioned (Lewis, 1965, pp. 64–65; Lijphart, 1999, p. 31). The degree of inclusion of the affected actors into the decision-making process directly determines the level of normative legitimacy that should be attributed to that decision (Young, 2002, pp. 5–6). The principles of political equality (Phillips, 2013; Rueschemeyer, 2004), inclusion (Caraway, 2004), or universal access to power (Wissenburg, 2013) have been little contested in ideal understandings of democracy (Cianetti, 2019, pp. 2–3). Moreover, many empirically minded students of democracy think that these principles are achieved to a great extent in contemporary democratic regimes. Tatu Vanhanen argues that “Nearly all countries have adopted the rule of universal suffrage” (Vanhanen, 2003, p. 65). Likewise, Norberto Bobbio claims that democratization can no longer be understood in terms of the suffrage extension after the enfranchisement of women and lowering of age threshold to 18 (Bobbio, 1987, p. 56). Alvarez et al. (1996) claim that universal suffrage is taken for granted and no longer a concern in established democracies after World War II. In the same vein, Munck and Verkuilen (2002, p. 11) state that de jure restriction on voting cannot be found in contemporary democratic regimes. These pervasive assumptions of adherence to the principles of political equality and universal suffrage, however, turn out to be weak when democratic regimes are exposed to more critical scrutiny and thus lead us to misleading conclusions regarding the degree of inclusion and boundaries of peoplehood in democracies. Most of the representative democracies have been – and still are – very creative in developing instruments of exclusion based on ascriptive characteristics (Alexander, 2012; Beckman, 2009), and so-called established democracies are not exempted from this situation (Hanchard, 2018).

This project seeks to examine the enfranchisement and inclusion of racial minorities in two so-called established democracies, which are the United States and Germany. Is the inclusion of racial minorities a puzzling development worthwhile for studying? Or is it an inevitable outcome of a long chain of developments? A conventional account of liberal democracy sees racism or racial exclusion inherently incompatible with its fundamental creeds which are believed to be universally applicable for all people irrespective of their race, color, class, and ethnicity. In such accounts, democracies are assumed to be essentially evolving towards a more inclusionary and equal direction by overcoming the inequalities that they inherited from pre-modern regimes. Hence, racially exclusionary practices are seen as accidental anomalies that are eliminated through the purposive flow of history towards universal equality and higher inclusion (Fukuyama, 2006). These expectations, however, do not align with abundant empirical realities. Racially exclusionary immigration laws have first been adopted by liberal North American democracies and have first been abandoned by ‘authoritarian’ Latin American regimes in the 1930s to be transmitted to the liberal democracies only after World War II as a result of geopolitical calculations (FitzGerald,
Therefore, equalitarian policies do not necessarily come from liberal democracies, and these regimes are embracing such policies not always for their ideological lust for freedom and equality. Corroborating the second point, women enfranchisement in the United States, Britain, and France at the start of the 20th century came true not thanks to the progressive ideas of elected officials towards women or suffrage but due to their electoral cost-benefit analysis (Teele, 2018b). Additionally, the history of racial inclusion in voting rights has not evolved in a constantly more equalitarian direction in some liberal democracies. In the United States, free Southern and Northern Black men lost their voting rights in the Jacksonian era of democracy (Keyssar, 2009). Freed Southern Blacks acquired their voting rights after the Civil War, but it was taken away in a few decades (Du Bois, 2014; Foner, 2019). It took one additional century for them to regain their right to vote in 1965 (Dudziak, 2011; Noel, 2012; Valey, 2009), which is currently threatened again through mass-incarceration (Alexander, 2012), gerrymandering (Lublin, 1999; McGann et al., 2016) and various voter suppression tactics (Anderson, 2016, Ch. 5; Hajnal et al., 2017). Non-citizen migrants have lost their voting rights in the wake of World War I and have not been able to get it back since then (Hayduk, 2006). Many indigenous populations were denied the right to vote for many decades even after they got full citizenship in 1924 (McCool et al., 2007). In other words, racial inclusion in the United States resembles an unsteady march rather than a linear progression (Klinkner & Smith, 1999). Jews in Germany had a similar kind of volatility ending with brutal persecution. Jewish men obtained political emancipation and equality with the 1871 Constitution, and as a highly educated and urbanized group, they were enjoying ‘more freedom than any other time in its history’ at the end of the World War I according to Panikos Panayi (2014, pp. 218–219). Nevertheless, uninterruptedly voting since 1871 (Shively, 1972, p. 1207), Jews were denationalized and deprived of all of their political rights via notorious Nuremberg Laws of 1935 (Nürnberger Gesetze), which was crafted with sustained attention to and inspired by the American model in the Jim Crow South (Whitman, 2017). The surviving Jews could regain their citizenship and voting rights only after the defeat of Nazis in World War II and the reinstitution of democratic rule in the Federal Republic of Germany. In 19th century Britain, Whigs expanded the electorate to middle classes and professionals while explicitly disenfranchising the Catholic farmers and many members of the English working class (Bateman, 2018). Furthermore, the expansion of political rights and the creation of representative institutions did not always mean the universal recognition of the political standing of all constituent groups. In the second half of the 19th century, the expansion of democratic rights and institutions to settler British colonies resulted in the differential exclusion of indigenous people from these newly granted entitlements (Evans et al., 2003, pp. 34–35). And finally, there is a striking continuity in discriminatory citizenship policies from classical Athenian democracy to the contemporary leading Western democracies (Hanchard, 2018; Kamen, 2013; Kasimis, 2018; Lape, 2010). Hence, democratic institutions do not always go in tandem with democratic principles. All in all, contrary to the conventional, liberal redemptive
accounts, exclusion of certain groups from the political community is not a rare phenomenon in democratic systems, and thus enfranchisement of these people is a significant development entailing empirical investigation (King & Smith, 2011).

How can we make sense of the coexistence of democratic principles and exclusionary practices under so-called democratic regimes? The main reason for this seeming discrepancy actually lies in the instability of the conceptual category of regime and attachment of the qualifier of democracy to this concept. I detect two non-exhaustive sources of conceptual instability relevant to this project. Firstly, because the adjective of ‘democratic’ is often used to qualify the core logic a political regime acting within a given state boundary, a well-functioning democratic order requires universalistic legality that can be invoked by anyone regardless of their spatial position in the country. However, territorially and functionally democratic and authoritarian characteristics and practices coexist side by side in different regions of many countries (Behrend & Whitehead, 2016; Gibson, 2013; Giraudy, 2015; O’Donnell, 1993) such as Argentina (Behrend, 2011; Chavez, 2003; Gervasoni, 2018; Gibson, 2005), Mexico (Cornelius & Hindley, 1999; Herrmann, 2010), Russia (T. V. Lankina & Getachew, 2006; McMann & Petrov, 2000), India (Beer & Mitchell, 2006; Heller, 2000; T. Lankina & Getachew, 2012), Brasil (Borges, 2007), so and so forth. Thus, citizens’ access to the means of contestation and participation sometimes shows a great degree of variation across subnational units of many countries (Dahl, 1971, pp. 12–15), which undermines the validity of state-based regime classifications prevalent in democratization studies. This conceptual flaw is crucial for this project for a very practical reason as well since I will be studying the United States and the 1965 VRA as one of my cases. After the collapse of first reconstruction attempts, a racially exclusionary, one-party sub-national regime was reinstituted in the ‘Solid South’ (Gibson, 2013; Goldberg et al., 2008; Hill, 1994; Key, 1949; Mickey, 2015). Southern representatives created a white-supremacist nation and political system and exercised disproportionate influence in national politics (Bateman et al., 2018). This racially hierarchical system was demolished only in the 1960s together with the Voting Rights Act which led to the democratization of American polity. Secondly and relatedly, binary classification of democratic and authoritarian regimes considerably limits our ability to grasp the intricacies of these systems due to the internal homogenization inherent in its logic. The conception of regime tends to homogenize everything in these regimes as democratic or authoritarian, but regimes are institutional collages and aggregation of different spheres of activities (Capoccia & Ziblatt, 2010, p. 938). Hence, different shades of authoritarian and democratic features might coexist side by side regardless of how we qualify the totality of this collage. Indeed, disaggregation of regimes into different institutions and spheres of activities is more consistent with historical experience. Historically, democracy did not emerge as a singular coherent whole at one moment of entire regime change, but rather as a set of different institutions at different time points for different purposes. Some of them, in fact, counteract democracy, but they all still come together to form
this institutional collage to which we retrofit the term of democratic regime (Capoccia & Ziblatt, 2010, p. 931). For example, in the first wave, democratizing elites pursued electoral safeguards while designing electoral institutions in a way to limit participation and persist existing power dynamics. Hence, inclusionary and exclusionary safeguards might go hand-in-hand with the contradictory process of democratization and they might together become a part of the new democratic order (Ahmed, 2013, p. 2). In this study, I examine the people-making processes as an important sphere of contestation in the process of democratization.

Democratization should be studied as a process of creation of representative and accountable formal institutions as well as a deliberate political project for the reconstitution of political communities who are entitled to be represented in these institutions. Nevertheless, this latter dimension of democratization has been undertheorized especially relative to the first element in the comparative politics of democratization. A certain set of groups are the primary beneficiaries of public policies, and their consent is necessary for the survival or stability of the regime itself. However, the conceptions of these groups or communities are not necessary to include every member of society. Rather, the notion of peoplehood undergirding representative institutions is deeply contested among different political coalitions who are seeking to promote different understandings of political community. These coalitions might be guided by various material or ideational interests or expectations, but the outcome of these pursuits will be the persistence or change in the composition and identity of people whose votes will decide on who will rule for the interest of whom. Therefore, contrary to teleological accounts of democratization substantiated on a static conception of peoplehood where formal democratic institutions are working in a way to be more inclusive and representative of a preconceived notion of demos, the dominant understanding of political community is dynamically constructed and thus the boundary between who is included into and excluded from the peoplehood is determined by the power configuration among contending political projects. Inclusion and exclusion go hand in hand in the process of democratization (Bateman, 2018). The inclusion of one group in a certain period of time will not guarantee their position in the democratic system since this is determined by the outcome of future competition between rival political coalitions (King & Smith, 2011; Smith, 1997). This situation is more critical for racialized minorities because in most cases the controversy on the notion of peoplehood revolves around the racial or ethnic character of demos (Mann, 2005). When the exclusionary coalition of political and social actors prevail against the inclusionary forces during the era of founding or later stages of the evolution of the regime, they can create or recreate the representative institutions along with their narrow imagination of demos by disenfranchising racialized minorities. However, this racialized conception of political community is open to contestation and excluded racial minorities can be enfranchised under the configuration of a certain set of circumstances, that will be investigated in this project. Below, I will describe two instances
of racial enfranchisement respectively in the United States and Germany as well as a case of continuing racial disenfranchisement of racialized minorities in Austria.

RACIAL ENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE US AND GERMANY & PERSISTENCE OF EXCLUSION IN AUSTRIA

August 6, 1965 was one of the most iconic days in the history of the United States. After several decades of the strenuous Civil Rights Movement, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act (VRA). This landmark, federal legislation was designed to prohibit the rampant racial discrimination in voting, most prevalent in the Southern states, and reinforce the protections guaranteed in the 14th and 15th Amendments. The Act includes numerous nationwide and special provisions to battle the disenfranchisement of Black racial minorities through various legal and extra-legal tactics. The first generation of VRA reforms dealt with ‘vote denial’ practices such as literacy tests, poll taxes, all-white primaries, and English-only ballots. These were intended to either prevent racial minorities from voting or to render their votes invalid. Starting in the 1980s, the second generation of reforms focused on ‘vote dilution’ tactics such as at-large elections, gerrymandering, majority-vote requirements, anti-single-shot laws, the substitution of elected officials with appointed ones, and annexation of outlying districts with majority white population. Such tactics were deployed to curb the significance of minority voters in the districts where they were allowed to vote (Tokaji, 2005). These legislative acts led to immediate improvements in the enfranchisement and representation of African Americans and other racial minorities.

By the end of 1965, 250,000 new Black voters had been registered, of which more than thirty percent were registered by federally appointed examiners. By the end of 1966, nine of the thirteen Southern states had more than fifty percent of the Black population registered (Our Documents—Voting Rights Act (1965), n.d.). In the states covered by the legislation, the registration rate for Blacks rose from 29.3% to 52.1% between 1965 and 1967 (Tokaji, 2005, p. 702). Because of VRA amendments intervening in the dilutive practices of redistricting in Southern states, the number of black-majority districts increased. This led to an increase in the number of Black citizens serving in the state legislatures of eleven former Confederate states. Between 1965 and 1985, that number rose from three Black men serving on state legislatures to 176 (Grofman & Handley, 1991, p. 112). The nationwide records corroborate this clear upsurge in the descriptive representation of Black citizens. The number of African American representatives nationwide had a dramatic increase between 1970 and 1980, from 1,469 to 4,912 (Pitts, 2008, p. 919), and the same momentum has sustained itself to present. This is evident in the presence of
around 10,500 Black representatives currently around the country, according to U.S Census Bureau statistics.¹

The growing rate of enfranchisement has not been limited to Black citizens. The cycle of reforms, starting with the VRA, led to higher rates of registration for language minorities. This was due to the cancellation of English-only ballots and bilingual election requirements enacted by Congress in 1975, which were amended in 1992. As a direct outcome of language assistance, registration and turnout among American Indians have risen around 50%, up to 150% in many places. Likewise, the Hispanic registration rate, which was 34.9% in 1973, has nearly doubled, thus increasing the number of Hispanic representatives in six covered states (Arizona, California, Texas, New Mexico, Florida, and New York) from 1,280 in 1973 to 4,532 in 2006. Similarly, Asian American registration and turnout have considerably increased, 58% and 71% respectively, thanks to the 1992 amendments of the initial law. There has been an increase in the number of elected Asian American representatives from 120 in 1979 to 346 in 2005 (Tucker, 2006, p. 233-234). All this considered, we can easily suggest that the 1965 VRA and subsequent electoral reforms not only enfranchised millions of minority citizens but also bolstered their descriptive representation in key elected positions nationwide.

Three and a half decades after the sweeping VRA reform in the United States, Germany underwent a similar kind of political change. By relinquishing its long-lasting ethnic citizenship policy, Germany enfranchised millions of racialized minorities who had lived in the country for at least two generations. In his seminal study on comparative historical trajectories of citizenship policies in Germany and France, published in 1992, Rogers Brubaker underscored that the granting of citizenship to immigrants was unthinkable in Germany (Brubaker, 2009, p. 185). Although its historical roots harkened back to the introduction of *jus sanguinis* policy in Bavaria in 1818, the German 1913 Nationality Law concretized and institutionalized the understanding of the community of descent (Howard, 2008). This law, adopted to preserve Germandom both abroad and at home, allowed Germans living abroad (*Auslandsdeutsche*) to retain their citizenship eternally and transmit it their descendants while explicitly denying the right to citizenship to the growing immigrant population of Germany (Brubaker, 2009, pp. 115–122). Easily manipulated for genocidal purposes by the Nazi regime, this ethnocultural law survived the post World War II constitutional-making in West Germany. Its purpose was to provide a legal foundation for the return of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans dispersed around Eastern Europe and citizens of East Germany. Nevertheless, due to the recruitment of millions of ‘guest workers’ in the mid-1950s and their unexpected permanency in the country, the gap between population and citizenry widened due to the very demanding naturalization requirements coded in that nationality law.

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When he achieved naturalization as a German citizen in the late 1980s, Turkish descendant Mehmet Erdem joined a small group of non-ethnic German citizens. In 1986, only around 8,000 of nearly two million ethnically Turkish migrants living in Germany, approximately 0.5% of them, were naturalized. This also was the case for other migrant groups (Aktürk, 2011, p. 115-116). By the end of 1998, the number of migrants in the country, most of whom were non-citizens and thus not enfranchised, rose to 7.3 million - around nine percent of the total population (Green, 2000, p. 105). This entrenched citizenship policy has started to change with the rise of the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party after the 1998 general election. Declaring that “Our national consciousness depends not on some ‘law of descent’ of Wilhelmine tradition but on the self-assured democracy we now have”, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder proposed an ambitious call for the reformulation of blood-based citizenship law. The government was highly confident in its ability to smoothly enact this bill after acquiring a hegemonic majority in both chambers of the legislative branch. However, after the issue slipped from elite circles to public discussion, it triggered a reactionary mobilization and public opinion against liberalization. In the midst of high public sentiment against migrants, the CDU-CSU coalition started to court with the public and ignited an uproar over the issues of dual citizenship and Germany’s changing stand on immigration. They started a signature campaign to counter the reform and it attracted an unexpectedly high degree of public endorsement. It garnered the support of five million people in just six weeks (Hansen & Koehler, 2005, p. 641). This enormous public mobilization demotivated the government from fostering a sweeping reform and urged them to moderate their proposal. This eventually led to the liberalization of citizenship and naturalization requirements without the provision of dual citizenship (Howard, 2008, p. 50-52). Therefore, due to the interaction of public reaction and elite competition, the scope of the 2000 German Nationality Law has been restrictive, which resulted in the granting of citizenship to and thus enfranchisement of a limited portion of disenfranchised migrant groups. Between 2000 and 2010 more than 1.3 million non-ethnic Germans have been naturalized and acquired the right to vote in Germany, which makes up less than 20% of eligible migrants due to the emotional and material burdens emanating from dual citizenship conundrum (Green, 2012). Even so, the new *jus soli* principle enacted with the 2000 Nationality Law grants automatic citizenship to newborn children of migrants and thus leads to the enfranchisement of new racialized minority groups in the long run. Overall, although the short-term quantitative impact of the 2000 Nationality Law remains limited in terms of expanding the electorate, this is still a significant improvement from prior disenfranchisement and political exclusion of millions of non-ethnic Germans based on primordial ties and thus can be identified as racial enfranchisement.

While significant political change with regards to the political inclusion of racial minorities was taking place across the border, Austria instead was bolstering the exclusionary elements of its citizenship policy (Ludvig, 2004). The principle of *jus sanguinis* dominated Austrian nationality
laws since the 19th century. Especially in the second half of the last century, the country shifted from a country of emigration to a country of immigration. Birth in the country neither guaranteed citizenship for children of immigrants nor could that status serve as a legal justification for them to seek citizenship through naturalization. Labor shortage became a salient matter in Austria after a period of significant economic growth in the late 1950s. Therefore, Austria started to make worker recruitment agreements with then Yugoslavia and several Mediterranean countries, such as Spain and Turkey, thus doubling the percentage of foreign nationals in the country, from 1.4% in 1961 to 2.8% in 1971. The incumbent social democratic government (SPÖ: Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs) proposed a constitutional amendment in 1973 to facilitate the naturalization of guest workers and their descendants. However, the government was heavily criticized in the parliament for courting voters, and the provision was eventually rejected by the Constitutional Committee (Cinar & Waldrauch, 2006, pp. 26–27). The principle of temporary admission of guest workers largely shaped the legal framework for the entry, residence, and employment of these foreign nationals, and the issue of integration did not arise to the public agenda until the early 1990s. Nevertheless, after the rapid increase in the share of guest workers in the country between 1989 and 1993, as a result of the economic boom, the government took several measures such as employment quotas and annual immigration quotas to curb the share of the foreign population in Austria. Contrary to the expectations, tightening immigration and residency procedures considerably increased the number of citizenship applications among the guest workers by underscoring the precarity of their status and making the naturalization an escape option from any potential expulsion. This unexpected consequence escalated the anti-immigrant and anti-naturalization sentiments in the political scene. SPÖ-ÖVP (Österreichische Volkspartei) coalition drafted a tightening bill in 1998 by introducing the language proficiency requirement for the first time, extending the residency requirement for facilitated naturalization from 4 to 6 years, and harmonizing the administration of naturalization across the federal provinces to prevent the facilitating interpretation of the clause on ‘special reasons’ which was actually interpreted in favor of foreign nationals by the Viana province in the early 1990s (Cinar & Waldrauch, 2006, pp. 37–42). However, these restrictive regulations again failed to diminish the increase in the number of citizenship acquisition. Upon this failure, the government carried out a series of amendments to the law to further tighten the conditions for naturalization such as harsher general conditions for discretionary naturalization with regards to the residency rights, legal standing and financial capabilities of immigrants, stricter conditions for language proficiency and proof of knowledge about the country, the introduction of a new and ambiguous clause on general integration towards the country and Europe, extension of the duration of the marriage and uninterrupted residence for foreign spouses married to an Austrian national, and higher fees for naturalization application (Cinar & Waldrauch, 2006, pp. 51–53).
How have these enormous political changes occurred? What were the forces making it possible? Given the granted and self-proclaimed democratic status of the American and German political system even before these cycles of political inclusion, how can post-VRA and post-2000 Nationality Law developments change our key analytical frameworks in democratization literature? To provide fruitful answers to these important questions, I will theorize the 1965 Voting Rights Act and following legislations in the United States and the 2000 Nationality Law in Germany as forms of “racial enfranchisement” and locate them in the literature on comparative politics of democratization as a distinct act of democratization. Here, I need to underline two key points determining the scope of my claims. Firstly, I do not argue that these reforms consolidated the positions of these groups in these political orders. Rather, the stability of their inclusion is likely to be threatened with the possible hegemony of an exclusionary coalition. Just after the 1965 VRA, Conservative elected officials, in fact, started to take subtle measures to weaken the VRA (Rhodes, 2017), paving the way for 2013 Shelby County v. Holder decision and subsequent erosion of several VRA protections especially in the jurisdictions with a history of disenfranchisement (Hajnal et al., 2017; Hicks et al., 2015). Thus, the democratizing impact of these political reforms is temporally limited. Secondly, I do not have any intention to claim that racial exclusion in these societies is fully resolved by the political inclusion of these racial minorities. Political inclusion does not necessarily lead to the progression in the resources and opportunities of racial minorities. In other words, political inclusion does not always translate into a significant improvement in other spheres of lives, and this is unfortunately what we find in the cases of the United States and Germany in the post-reform period (Koopmans et al., 2019; Quillian et al., 2017).

Below, I will review the literature on suffrage extension with regards to whether existing accounts of enfranchisement can conceptually and empirically resolve the puzzle under consideration. Later on, I will talk about my case selection logic and research design. Following that, I will develop my preliminary theoretical expectations and discuss the potential data sources and methods to collect and analyze them.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND ENFRANCHISEMENT

Democratization or suffrage extension has never been a happy story of the opening of existing institutions to new social groups by idealistic political elites. Many competing explanations have been developed to account for this contingent political change. On the one hand, there exist two different elite-based explanations in the literature; one set of explanations focuses on the negative inducements motivating elites such as their fear from more radical distribution of material resources whereas the other group of accounts focuses more on sources of positive inducements for elites such as their expectation to attract support for some military or political projects. On the other hand, the third set of accounts adopt a bottom-up approach and attribute the primary agency for change to excluded groups who could force their inclusion into the political
community. Because these explanations are formulated to tackle mostly with working-class enfranchisement and less common with women suffrage; and since their foundational assumptions are shaped by the specificities of these large societal groups, they cannot adequately deal with the enfranchisement of racialized minorities as a different group in general and racial enfranchisement in the US and Germany in particular.

Acemoglu and Robinson provide an emblematic story of a negative inducement hypothesis. They argue that existing elites make cost-benefit calculations to analyze whether the cost of repression or cost of concession is higher for them. Democracy emerges in the situation of mid-level inequality because 1) poorer segments of the population will be less likely to challenge the existing system in the case of little inequality, and 2) elites will be more likely to aggravate repression in the case of high inequality due to the possibilities of losing a lot if a revolution erupts or if citizens acquire de facto and de jure powers (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). In a similar but more sophisticated account, Boix examines economic equality, capital mobility and, organizational capacity of the excluded groups as the main factors informing the decisions of the elites to enfranchise new segments of the society. He argues that increasing economic equality will decrease the cost of tolerating mass democracy for the elites since it will lessen redistributive pressures. Similarly, increasing the mobility of capital will make it harder for the capital to be taxed and expropriated. Therefore, compared to rentier states relying upon highly immobile commodities (Ross, 2001), modernized economies with higher human capital and mobile capital are more likely to transit to democracy (Boix, 2003). Moreover, the same hypothesis brings about the expectation that social groups relying upon fixed capital such as junkers in Germany (Gerschenkron, 1989), Southern plantation owners in the United States (Acharya et al., 2018), or Afrikaners in South Africa (Wood, 2000) are more likely to be hostile to democracy. Boix’s last point focuses on shifting the balance of power within society. As the poorer segments of the population organize around unions and parties, or in other words, as they overcome their collective action problems, the cost of repression for the elites will increase, and they will be more likely to allow democratization (Boix & Carles, 2003). Finally, as also examined in the literature, these two studies take the fear of revolution (Przeworski, 2009) or popular threat (Aidt & Jensen, 2011) as important impulses in shaping the decisions of elites for suffrage extension.

In parallel with the mainstream reading of democratization in the literature, these accounts focusing on pragmatic calculations of redistribution adopt a class-based perspective and see the society as the aggregation of competing classes with contradicting interests. Although this outlook can provide more or less an accurate picture in accounting for the extension of suffrage to working-class men or recent waves of democratic transitions, they are incapable of telling much about racial enfranchisement at least for a few reasons. Firstly, whereas the main concern for elites with regards to working-class enfranchisement is the redistribution of economic resources or the protection of the capitalist system (Ahmed, 2013), the calculations are likely to be more complex for the elites
when it comes to racial enfranchisement. Because the enfranchisement of racialized minorities carries the potential to radically alter the racial construction of political order and leads to the redefinition of which racial groups can have a voice in representative institutions and processes, a reconceptualization of peoplehood is likely to play a crucial role in addition to the redistribution of material resources. Secondly, these accounts see democratization as a wholesale regime change, but racial enfranchisement requires the expansion of the popular basis of already existing representative institutions, rather than their creation in the first place. The political changes in the US and Germany under investigation can be viewed as the democratization of unevenly defined, and narrowly-functioning democratic institutions instead of their initial founding. 1965 VRA or 2000 Germany Nationality Law did not necessitate the creation of new representative institutions but rather were amounted to the incorporation of hitherto excluded racial minorities into existing democratic mechanisms. One can argue that the Voting Rights Act in the United States required the creation of certain monitoring and reinforcement mechanisms in federal, state, and local levels. However, these institutional inventions can best be registered as the modification of existing representative institutions, rather than a complete regime change. Additionally, causal mechanisms put forward in these frameworks fail to explain the puzzle examined in this proposal. The United States or Germany in the late 1990s did not experience a radical change in income inequality, which was serious enough to urge the elites to alter their repression-concession calculations, but this did not prevent racialized minorities from acquiring secured voting rights. Furthermore, the argument on capital mobility has no relevance in Germany because it already had a very modernized economy way before the issue of changing nationality law and enfranchising former guest workers arose to the public agenda. It had more applicability in the United States where former plantation owners were adamant supporters of Black disenfranchisement, but even though their agricultural economic model has been mostly shattered, they did not change their positions towards racial exclusion. In other words, the modernization of the Southern economy did not result in the moderation of anti-Black prejudice before Civil Rights Movements (Acharya et al., 2018). Last but not the least, the simple numerical reality of the racial minorities under consideration nullifies two more important assumptions of these explanations. Since these groups are too few in number, less than 10% in both countries, they are unlikely to pose any viable threat for revolution or radical redistribution of material resources in other means. And relatedly, even though the organizational capacity of these groups has relatively increased before their enfranchisement, they were still far from becoming the game-changer.

The second set of arguments focus on the existing elite’s attempts to appeal to broader masses and attract their support for some military and political projects. In their panel study, Ingesson et al. find a positive correlation between conscription and male suffrage extension in times of war. To gain legitimacy in the eyes of those who sacrifice their lives for the country, political elites historically tend to expand voting rights to male citizens (Ingesson et al., 2018).
Similarly, Hicks shows that involvement in an external conflict increases the likelihood of female enfranchisement in post-conflict period in the 20th century due to the changing popular sentiments in favor of women as a reward for their involvement in the war effort (Hicks, 2013), as also corroborated by anecdotal evidence like Wilson’s historical speech after World War I. Several studies draw a connection between World War II and the subsequent wave of racial inclusion in the 1950s and 1960s of the United States. In his seminal study, Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal outlined the fundamental contradictions between the objective of the war effort to defend the democracy from the dictatorial Nazi regime relying upon the idea of racial hierarchy and ongoing suppression of Black Americans in Jim Crow South. He called America to work out this dilemma and apply the principles of racial equality (Myrdal, 2017). Historian Pete Daniel argues that World War II made the Civil Rights Movements possible by removing the structural and ideational barriers before racial opening (Daniel, 1990). Similarly, Klinkner and Smith points out World War II as the major catalyst for post-war racial advancement by leading to the massive mobilization of African Americans, increase in the ability of civil society actors to pressure on the government, and growing legitimacy of equalitarian rhetoric (Klinkner & Smith, 1999). Although the accounts of Daniel and Klinkner and Smith rely upon the implicit assumption of a liberalized public opinion after World War II, Steven White demonstrates through a novel public opinion dataset that white opinions towards civil rights policies such as federal intervention in anti-lynching cases, the integration of the armed forces, and the abolition of segregation did not undergo as high degree of liberalization (White, 2019). Additionally, as a result of several dynamics triggered by the war, interracial collective violence peaked during the times of war in the United States, including – but not limited to – World War II (Robinson, 1943; Schaich, 1975; Sitkoff, 1971, 661). Moreover, war-related accounts leave an important temporal dimension of the puzzle unaddressed. Why did the reform under consideration come true in 1965, not before or after? Furthermore, warfare or related factors is far from becoming a necessary condition for racial enfranchisement. Germany did not have any direct involvement in external conflict after World War II and it did not have major policy change with regards to conscription in the same period, but its stance toward nationality law and racial enfranchisement has radically changed in the late 1990s.

Another variant of this second group of accounts focus on elites’ attempts to mobilize excluded groups for their political projects. In many historical instances, fracture within elites urged some parties or groups of elites to extend enfranchisement to the putative sympathetic groups to strengthen their basis in key policy domains or upcoming elections. As Lavador and Oxoby shows, elites divided along economic cleavages utilized suffrage extension as an instrument

2 Woodrow Wilson actually believed in the supremacy of men over women and saw politics as the area of men, but he, even if reluctantly, supported female enfranchisement after World War I by saying that “women have been working alongside the men during the war. For that reason, they deserve the vote.” For a short video on that issue, visit: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=85XAQoSu-M8
to shape implemented policies of industrialization and growth in a way to favor their own constituencies in the first waves of enfranchisement in 19th century (Llavador & Oxoby, 2005). In his seminal study, Schattschneider argues that rising competition between political parties led to enfranchisement of new groups because parties searched for additional constituency groups to enhance their advantage in the electoral contestation, which is corroborated by the still-ongoing massive disenfranchisement of Black Americans through some legal and extra-legal tactics in the ‘Solid South’ run by a political monopoly in 1960 (Schattschneider, 1960, pp. 98–100). In her analysis of womanhood suffrage, Dawn Teele refines this assertion by saying that political elites will foster the expansion of electorates only when they need this additional support and when they are more or less certain about the flow of this support to them not to their competitors (Teele, 2018b, pp. 32–33). Even though they imply widely different things from elite competition, it is still worth mentioning that foundational studies of transition literature examine the link between elite fracture and attempts of sideliner elites to strengthen their positions by opening the system to broader masses in the context of contemporary cases of democratic transition or suffrage extension (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 2013; Przeworski, 1991). Despite their merit in accounting for many instances of enfranchisement from different temporal and spatial domains, these explanations of elites’ attempt to appeal to excluded groups for their own political interests complicate the picture on racial enfranchisement a bit further.

Firstly, racial enfranchisement is an instance of democratization and growing accountability of existing representative institutions, and thus takes place in political contexts already marked by a certain degree of elite competition. Hence, focusing on elite fracture would add little analytical leverage for our topic. Thus, we need to rather ask what kind of forces push some segments of already divided elites to seek for enfranchisement of excluded racial groups. Actually, elite calculations of positive electoral return or need for extra electoral support, which is already assumed in some explanations of this kind such as the studies of Schattschneider and Teele might respond to that need, but their expectations largely contradict with the course of developments in the US case. Democratic Party elites were the primary political actors fostering the racial enfranchisement of Blacks in 1960s, but VRA came in during a tumultuous key party realignment that would make a reliable cost-benefit calculation harder for the Democratic Party. Just as it would potentially attract new voters, it would also push away some others who are opposed to racial enfranchisement and Black inclusion. Also, VRA was enacted thanks to the considerable degree of support from both parties and their representatives. The defection rate was even lower among the Republicans than the Democrats. Thus, it is hard to explain the VRA by focusing on the electoral calculations of the Democratic Party. In Germany, on the other hand, several mid-term and more proximate developments undermine the possibility of expected positive electoral return for the reformers. Firstly, the unification of Germany in the early 1990s not only diminished the electoral potential of the enfranchised minority group but it also led to the
broadening of the likely anti-reform social groups given both the growing emphasis on ethnic German identity and the post-unification economic shocks engulfing eastern Germany during the 1990s (Lindlar & Scheremet, 1998). Also, CDU-CSU coalition organized a public signature campaign against the reform proposal and mobilized millions of people in a short period of time on the eve of the 2000 German Nationality Law, which could easily be interpreted as the signal of the multitude of public uproar over this reform by pro-reform SDU-Greens coalition, but they did not choose to retreat from the reform plan. Additionally, the American case seems to reverse the causal relationship put forward in these studies, because the enfranchisement of Blacks in the 1960s paved the way for the emergence of a competitive political system in the South due to the shift of Southern whites motivated by racial antagonism and conservatism (Valentino & Sears, 2005) from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party, not vice versa (Aldrich & Griffin, 2018). Furthermore, although it largely fits with the evolution of the case of German, the agency for change exclusively attributed to pragmatic political elites by these accounts do not match with the American case because Democratic Party leaders were last to move for racial enfranchisement in the 1960s. The process of racial realignment which has more or less completed with the integration of Blacks into the Democratic Party and adoption of a racially-conservative position by the Republican Party in the mid-1960s has already started in the 1930s, but Democratic Party elites have been almost the final supporters of this sweeping enfranchisement. Rather than taking the lead for this momentous change, national Democratic Party leaders rather responded to the changes already happening beneath them such as the transformation of American liberalism, changing trends in mass opinion (Schickler, 2016), and intellectual realignment (Noel, 2012). Hence, we cannot attribute the agency and motivation for 1965 American racial enfranchisement exclusively to the existing elites and their calculation to include who are likely to vote for them. Finally, as pointed out above, racial minorities under consideration are not large enough to promise a considerable degree of electoral support. To the contrary, propelling the extension of suffrage to hitherto disenfranchised racialized minorities will be amount to a radical shift in the conception of peoplehood undergirding the political order and democratic institutions; thereby potentially alienating majority group voters who are motivated to sustain their racial primacy and psychological wage and thus likely to act upon this racial resentment by abandoning the party promoting the inclusion of these minorities. In other words, since the project of expanding the electorate will alter the social image that pro-reform party holds (Dancygier, 2017; Mason, 2018), supporting these reforms bears the risk of losing votes as occurred in the United States.

A final set of arguments on suffrage extension is interested in bottom-up pressure, namely the extraction of political rights by the mobilization of excluded groups. Contrary to elite-based

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3 Actually SDU-Greens coalition decided to give up on the dual citizenship provision included in the initial draft of the reform proposal after the massive mobilization of anti-reform groups, but they sustained their commitment to the naturalization reform.
accounts which generally - but not fully - focus on recent waves of democratic transitions, bottom-up accounts tackle with historical experiences of democratization in 19th century Europe and 20th century Latin America (Collier, 1999; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992), and take economic classes mostly working-classes as their main democratic agents (Therborn, 1977, 1979). Studies adopting a bottom-up approach put economic classes in the center of their analysis. They focus on the balance of power between different classes and class coalitions in evaluating the prospect for democratic change in a given country (Collier, 1999, p. 10; Moore, 1993; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992, pp. 5–6). Challenging the claims linking democracy to the rise or presence of a strong bourgeoisie (Dahrendorf, 1980; Moore, 1993), Rueschemeyer et al. argue that working classes played a crucial role in forging democratic regimes (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). The rise of mass democracy and electoral institutions in 19th century coincided with the rise of an industrialized economy (Polanyi, 2001), the formation of working classes (Marx & Engels, 2002), and their organization into unions and socialist parties (Przeworski, 1986); thus turning working-class into the key actor propelling the suffrage extension. Various explanations were developed to account for the rise of the proletariat as an important democratic agent. Rueschemeyer et al. argue that capitalist transformation of the economy changes the balance of power between pro-democratic and anti-democratic actors by enlarging middle and working classes, facilitating their organization, and weakening landed elites (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). Similarly, Mitchell contends that the rise of the carbon economy turned working class into indispensable actor both by promoting the rise of mass politics thanks to the switch from solar energy to coal and transition from scattered to concentrated settlement and by providing to the working class the capability to sabotage the flow of coal (Mitchell, 2009).

Existing accounts viewing enfranchisement as the outcome of bottom-up pressure eloquently underline the structural circumstances shaping the paths of democratization and provide a fairly accurate picture of working-class integration into democratic institutions, but the relevance of their arguments in discussing racial enfranchisement is rather weak. Extension of suffrage to the working-class with the elimination of tax and property requirements before voting rights did not go hand in hand with the enfranchisement of racialized minorities in leading Western democracies. These minority groups were, indeed, explicitly disenfranchised (Bateman, 2018). Thus, there is not a robust association between the extension of suffrage to working-class and racial enfranchisement. Additionally, racial animosity played a pivotal role in many cases of the formation of working-class identity (Roediger, 1999; Saxton, 2003). Hence, the bottom-up pressure emanating from working-classes does not necessarily include the demands for the incorporation of racial minorities, a great majority of whom would easily be placed into the working-class category if objective income and occupational criterion were the main basis of classification. Furthermore, radical structural transformations leading to the indispensability of the working-class are not present in the enfranchisement of racialized minorities in the 1960s of the
United States or the 1990s of Germany. Thus, necessary circumstances helping racialized minorities to defeat exclusionary political actors by themselves were mostly absent in the time period of the cases we examined in that study. Empirical scrutiny of the processes of racial enfranchisement in Germany and the United States point out several political elites as important—although not the sole—actors facilitating this process. Hence, bottom-up accounts should be made more sophisticated with the incorporation of elites into the framework. Moreover, as discussed above, racial enfranchisement connects the discussion of voting rights to the definition of peoplehood. Hence, overly materialistic accounts of bottom-up pressure cannot deal with the ideational change necessary for racial enfranchisement. There is not an analytical obstacle before the incorporation of ideational elements into bottom-up accounts, but existing frameworks have mostly disregarded this issue so far. Last but not the least, the same numerical specificity of racialized minorities stands as an important rebuttal to this sort of accounts because these groups are too few to succeed in this manner.

All in all, existing explanations of suffrage extension—whether they are elite-based accounts of pragmatic calculations or bottom-up accounts of extraction—cannot conceptually and empirically deal with racial enfranchisement as a new analytical category and the empirical puzzle of suffrage extension to racialized minorities in the United States and Germany for a few important reasons. Firstly, racial enfranchisement under consideration here takes place within the countries where fundamental representative institutions were already present. Hence, it should be framed as the democratization and growing accountability of these institutions which contradicts the conceptual assumption of wholesale regime change prevalent in some branches of democratization literature (Capoccia & Ziblatt, 2010). Secondly, existing accounts see the integration of new groups into democratic institutions as a process predominantly shaped by material incentives and interests. Such approaches limit our understanding of democratization not only by disregarding the ideational elements of democratic politics such as the negotiation of the definition of peoplehood and its embodiment in democratic institutions which is the most crucial aspect of racial enfranchisement but also by taking economic classes as the exclusive agents of mass politics to the disregard of racialized minorities which cannot be easily consumed within the conceptual framework of class politics especially in the cases of racially-constructed working-class identity. Hence, racial enfranchisement as a separate and significant analytical category and its empirical cases should be extensively studied to better grasp the ideational aspects of enfranchisement and consider widely disregarded actors as relevant agents of democratization literature. Thirdly, the extant literature on suffrage extension seems to be stuck with the bifurcation between elite-based and bottom-up accounts. Racial enfranchisement as a broad topic and the empirical cases examined in that study can potentially provide a coherent framework to commensurate these rival frameworks because they involve not only ideas, interests, and institutions but also elites and civil society actors as crucial elements. As will be widely-discussed below, they involve both the
bottom-up mobilization and contestation of dominant construction of peoplehood undergirding existing institutions and collaboration between civil society actors and certain segments of elites who see the creation of a new political order with a new representative and institutional make-up at least not detrimental but preferably more expedient to their political interests and who are capable of propagating this far-reaching political change within key veto-player institutions.

**CASE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN**

As I stated above, my main question is why do democracies extend the franchise to racialized minorities, and I will conduct a comparative historical analysis of racial (dis)enfranchisement in the US, Germany, and Austria to answer this question. The table below summarizes the logic of why I pick these three cases for my empirical investigation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The US</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Change</td>
<td>Hard</td>
<td>Hard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Civil Rights Movement</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Legacy of Slavery/Feudality</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War-Related Factors</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitical Calculations (Cold War)</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political System</td>
<td>Majoritarian E-L</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Orientation of the System</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Enfranchisement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: Comparison between the US and Germany
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Source of Controversy</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship policy</td>
<td>&quot;Guest workers&quot; of mostly Turkish-origin</td>
<td>&quot;Guest workers&quot; of mostly Turkish-origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of Minority Groups</td>
<td>The EU</td>
<td>The EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Norms/Pressure</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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| Table: Comparison between Germany and Austria |

The historical trajectory of established democracies showed that it has never been easy to enfranchise racialized minority groups and integrate them into the political community. In most cases, the definition of peoplehood and who is entitled to have a say in democratic institutions were developed in state-building and nation-building processes of these countries, and it entails a radical rupture in entrenched self-definition and continuous political traditions of these countries to accommodate former constitutive others (Blacks in US case) and newcomers in several Western and Northern European cases. The United States and Germany are two important cases carrying out this radical change in the post-World War II period. Given that there are at least 3 veto player institutions (legislative enactment, executive reinforcement, and positive judicial review) involved in these processes of political change (Hofhansel, 2008; Howard, 2008; Joppke, 2001; Tsebelis, 1995; Valelly, 2009), these cases represent as hard cases for explanations of racial enfranchisement. For this reason, I argue that Germany and the United States stand as fruitful cases for a comparative historical analysis based on a “most different” case selection. They differ in many important respects that are theoretically relevant for existing explanations. The United States was founded as a settler colony. Although the country has had the fundamental representative institutions since its founding, these institutions acquired a racialized element since they were relied upon the idea to persist the colonial difference between white ruler and non-white subjects (Marx, 1998). Hence, this case belongs to a different family of cases together with many other settler colonies where the main tension is whether the representative institutions founded with an explicit racial objective could transform themselves and politically include the groups as constitutive others. However, the story in Germany is quite different. Due to the specificities of unification and nation-building patterns, Germany adopted and institutionalized an ethnic conception of citizenship. Even though it has been bitterly manipulated for genocidal purposes during Nazi rule, the country did not change its blood-based citizenship policy in the post World
War II context. Quite ironically, since the great majority of non-ethnic Germans have been killed during massive Nazi persecution, this exclusionary notion of peoplehood did not pose a significant degree of challenge to the legitimacy of the democratic system in the country because there remained a little gap between ethnos and demos of the country. However, the arrival of millions of guest workers to Germany starting with the mid-1950s widened the gap between the democratic peoplehood and permanent members of German society and emerged as a new epistemological point for the evaluation of the democratic system in the country. Hence, Germany can be classified in a different set of cases that have hard times in readjusting their existing political institutions to the growing diversification of their societies. Therefore, although the starting points and sources of democratic tensions in these two countries were widely different, they underwent a similar process of political change by enfranchising racialized minorities.

Additionally, these two cases show variation with respect to several relevant factors discussed in related literature. Several bottom-up factors and social movements are discussed to play a crucial role in different cases of democratization in different parts of the world. Relatedly, many explanations of Black enfranchisement in the United States in the 1960s pointed out effective Civil Rights Movements as the main catalyzer of this breakthrough political change (Lee, 2002; McAdam, 2010; Piven, 2006). Nevertheless, we do not see an effective social movement or insurgency disrupting the course of politics in Germany before the enfranchisement of non-German immigrants. Hence, comparing these two cases will allow us to control this putatively important factor and test its validity across different contexts. Furthermore, as discussed above, several explanations of democratization and suffrage extension focus on the modernization and industrialization of the economy and related factors and developments as the primary engine of political inclusion (Acemoglu & Robinson., 2006; Aidt & Jensen, 2011; Boix & Carles, 2003; Mitchell, 2009; Moore, 1993; Przeworski, 2009; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, Huber, & Stephens, 1992; Ziblatt, 2008). Nevertheless, although these two cases have been modernized and industrialized way before the enactment of political reforms under investigation, the processes of capitalist development played out differently in these countries. Although land-based slave economy was to quite extend abandoned in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th century, thus leading to the expectation of a shrinking economic class committed to racial suppression, racist organization of social and political life have been reproduced via massive segregation and several extra-legal tactics throughout the entire Jim Crow era. Hence, the burden of a primitive slave economy has sustained itself in shaping political institutions until the Voting Rights Act. Nonetheless, we cannot talk about the persistence of such a legacy in Germany effective enough to become a crucial contextual factor shaping the (dis)enfranchisement of racialized minorities. The arrival of guest workers to Germany, the emergence of a gap between the popular basis of German political institutions and racial make-up of the society, and eventual enfranchisement of the racialized minorities all came true in an already industrialized economic context. Therefore,
this variation also turns these countries into comparable cases. Furthermore, various studies point out the link between warfare and suffrage extension in the history of democratization (Hicks, 2013; Ingeesson et al., 2018). Similar to these studies, various explanations were formulated to discuss the likely link between Black enfranchisement in the 1960s and different factors related to or activated by World War II (Kruse & Tuck, 2011; Saldin, 2010; White, 2016, 2019). In a parallel fashion, many scholars investigated how Cold War geopolitics informed the decisions of many actors involved in the reform process in the United States (Anderson & Anderson, 2003; Borstelmann, 2009; Dudziak, 2011; Klinkner & Smith, 1999; Plummer, 2003; Skrentny, 1998).

Although the Federal Republic of Germany was geopolitically a very significant player in the Cold War rivalry, its ethnic citizenship policy has been entrenched to this period unlike the United States and the reform of naturalization could come after the end of the Cold War. Thus, this difference across cases makes the similarity in outcomes further noteworthy. Finally, these two countries reflect distinct motivations orienting their political systems. According to Lijphart’s typology, the United States is a majoritarian democracy with regards to executive-legislative relations and thus puts much more emphasis on efficiency at the expense of representation whereas Germany, as a typical consensus democracy, is much more concerned with bolstering representation in the democratic system (Lijphart, 1984). Since this typology consists of various important institutional designs such as the electoral system, party system, and government type, these different democratic political systems inevitably bring about changing patterns of electoral calculations, which is put forward as an important factor in shaping how existing elites approach the enfranchisement of certain groups. So, this variation in the design of political institutions will allow us to control this important phenomenon as well. All in all, I select Germany and the United States as very different cases that culminate with a similar outcome, and thus I am deploying the logic of method of agreement according to Mill (1843) or most different design in Gerring’s terminology (Gerring, 2001, 213-215).

Furthermore, I will add a second level of comparison to my research design by comparing Germany and Austria as the most similar cases which end up with widely different outcomes. As discussed above, Germany underwent a profound political change in the late 1990s and opened the door for the naturalization and enfranchisement of ‘guest workers’ whereas Austria went in the reverse direction by bolstering the exclusionary and disenfranchising elements of its nationality law in recent decades (Ludvig, 2004). Why do these two neighboring countries follow a different path? I argue that this outcome is puzzling and worthwhile for a careful comparison because there are significant similarities between these two cases. Firstly, the minority groups that these countries are dealing with have a similar standing in these societies. Germany and Austria initiated their guest worker programs in a relatively close time period and attracted minorities with similar ethnic backgrounds. Actually, Turkish-origin, Muslim ‘guest workers’ seem to be the main source of anxiety and contestation in these two cases. Nevertheless, Germany could, even if partially,
eliminate the barriers before the inclusion and enfranchisement of this racialized group while Austria further entrenched their exclusionary citizenship policy. Additionally, many studies underline the relevance of international factors such as international norms and pressure as important sources of change in citizenship policies (Joppke, 2007; Joppke & MacGilvray, 2005). Although Germany and Austria are the members of the EU and subject to similar international trends and pressure, they did not follow a similar path as might be expected by these accounts. Hence, the method of difference in these cases seems to be a fruitful comparison in that respect as well. Furthermore, given that diffusion mechanism is put forward as an important determinant of democratization (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; Elkin, 2011; Gleditsch, 2009; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; O’Loughlin et al., 1998), territorial contiguity of Germany and Austria should have been expected to promote Austria to change their citizenship policy after the enactment in Germany. Nevertheless, Austria went in the reverse direction. Hence, we can test the relevance of diffusion accounts for our puzzle by comparing these two cases. All in all, the dissimilar paths that these two similar cases took turn them into fruitful cases of a most similar comparison. Therefore, I seek to adopt an integrative case selection design combining most similar and most different designs, as suggested by Skocpol and Somers (1980, 183-186).

Finally, my case selection logic and research design hopefully speak to a recently burgeoning discussion on the organization of political science as a discipline. The development and organization of American Political Science in the 20th and 21st century has worked consistently against the inclusion of the United States in comparative research. Since its emergence as an organized subdiscipline of political science (Adcock, 2006), the emphasis within the field of American politics on the uniqueness on American institutions and history has become widespread (Hartz, 1955; Kingdon, 1999; Lipset, 1996; Schuck & Wilson, 2008; Shafer, 1991; Sombart, 1976; Turner, 1921).leading to the isolation of American politics from comparative perspectives (Morgan, 2013; Stepan & Linz, 2011, p 842). Robert Lieberman in his comparative study of racial inclusion points out a high cost of this isolation by highlighting the difficulty of disentangling the potential causal linkages in the situations of convergence of several putative causes towards the same outcome without achieving variation in different factors and outcomes (Lieberman, 2011, p 12-13). Indeed, many scholars have underscored the advantages of comparative and transnational approaches to the study of American politics on topics like democratization (Morgan, 2013), the development of electoral institutions (Ahmed, 2018), and race and ethnicity (Kuo, 2019). Moreover, the growing concerns regarding the stability of democracy in the United States has inspired many to reach for a comparative lens to understand recent political development (Ziblatt and Levitsky, 2018; Kuo, 2019). Yet, the endeavor to compare the United States with countries located in a different regional cluster, exposed to considerably dissimilar political and economic forces and legacies generates an important problem of commensurability between the United States and the other cases under comparison. In this project, I seek to develop a two-layered
strategy, combining most different (United States and Germany) and most similar case selection (Germany and Austria), to tackle that significant methodological question. This strategy is meant to parse out the “noise” in order to identify the dimensions along which commensurability can best be assessed and measured. For the first phase, I selected the second case (Germany) from another region in a way that these two cases will be comparable across the scope dimensions relevant for the main puzzle of the study. For the second phase, I integrated a shadow case from the same region of the second case (Austria) into the comparison in a way that the second and third cases will show commonality across many of the factors that should be controlled in the research design. This complementary, two-layered comparison will hopefully allow me not only to rigorously study the United States in a comparative area studies framework but also to examine variation in my overarching research design, cross-validate my inferences, and increase their reliability.

IDEATIONAL CHANGE, INSTITUTIONAL CONVENIENCE, AND POLITICAL CHANGE

Ideational and institutional explanations emerge as the two dominant, rival frameworks used to account for the evolution of public policy related to racial exclusion/inclusion of various kinds. On the one hand, ideational accounts, which enjoy a growing interest in recent decades after a period of neglect (Berman, 2001; Blyth, 1997, p 229), examine how cognitive paradigms, world view, norms, frames, and policy programs shape political and policy-making outcomes (Campbell, 2002). Ideas determine how actors define and express their goals and desires, interpret and judge events, and enable them to imagine a new state of affairs different from existing ones. On the other hand, institutional accounts focus on political institutions and their rules, procedures, and structures in explaining political outcomes. These sets of regularities shape policy choices by differentially allocating power and access to the power of various political actors and social groups and regulate how these power resources can be exercised. Isolated use of ideational and institutionalist explanations, however, leads to some analytical quandaries, the resolution of which requires a more integrated approach. Solely ideational frameworks cannot respond to a series of vital questions. What enables actors’ goals and desires to be converted into actual political outcomes? What constitutes the setting allowing the articulation of interests and their negotiation? Why does a certain idea achieve prominence among competing ones at a specific point in time? Likewise, exclusively institutional accounts, due to their primary emphasis on the examination of enduring features of political systems and regularized patterns of behaviors and structures as the key independent variables, are ill-equipped to explain important political change beyond the normalcy of politics. Additionally, institutional accounts generally take the interests, expectations, and goals of the actors as given, and seek to find out which outcome is more likely to prevail among putative alternatives. Nevertheless, these ingredients and hence the contemplated options are thoroughly shaped by prior ideational forces (Campbell, 2002, p 30-31; Lieberman, 2011;,
2002). Therefore, I seek to provide a more complementary framework to eliminate the aforementioned quagmires arising out of the exclusive application of ideational or institutional explanations. I argue that racial enfranchisement takes place only under the conditions of 1) the rise of a new political elite equipped with a more expanded understanding of peoplehood and 2) the primacy of these elites in key veto player institutions. Below, I will briefly discuss the two legs of my approach.

1. The Ideational Element: A New Discourse of Peoplehood

The ideational pillar of my approach focuses on the emergence of a political elite who develop a new conception of peoplehood different from – and more expanded than – what is embodied in representative institutions. Democratization is mostly studied as a process of creation of representative and accountable formal institutions (Huntington, 1993; Moore, 1993; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 2013; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). Nevertheless, this dominant frame of the literature generally overlooks the question of who is represented in these institutions. Leaving aside a few successful exceptions (Bateman, 2012; 2018), this question is mostly tackled by the students of democratic theory (Abizadeh, 2012; Erman, 2014; Espejo, 2011; Song, 2012). In the cases of racial enfranchisement in Germany and the United States, however, the notion of demos, whom representative institutions are accountable to, considerably expanded without any radical institutional transformation. Therefore, in this project, I define democratization as a successful and deliberate political project for the expansive reconstitution of demos or political communities that are embodied and entitled to be represented in representative institutions.

In order for racial enfranchisement to take place in a representative political system, there should emerge a coalition of actors – both elites and civil society groups or associations – who achieve to develop a counter-hegemonic notion of peoplehood. This new conception not only challenges the exclusionary origins and functions of existing institutions but also offers an alternative, a new vision of how the relationship between the political and state institutions and different social groups should be organized. This new ideology represents a novel imagination of the political community and a reformulation of citizenship and the rights and benefits associated with that category. Additionally, the organizing discourse of the pro-reform coalition includes a certain set of proposals of institutional reforms to materialize this alternative in practice.

New normative frameworks are not necessarily developed by political elites, but often formulated by social actors such as civic associations, movements, and intellectuals. Nevertheless, what matters more for our project is whether and when these ideas are adopted by certain segments of state elites irrespective of where they are originated. Is Germany a country of ethnic Germans? Is Austria a country of immigrants? Is the United States a white democracy? These were the major questions that consume the political domain and stand as the fundamental fault lines during the moments of contestation over the political community in three case studies of our research. Due
to the inevitable variation between the cases, public deliberation on the conceptualization of peoplehood will follow unique paths of evolution with the involvement of different sets of actors across these countries. Hence, I will deploy distinct strategies of empirical analysis while studying the ideational change or persistence in these three cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Prob. Of Change</th>
<th>Occ. Of Change</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969-1982</td>
<td>SDP/FDP</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Not occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1998</td>
<td>CDU/FDP/CSU</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Not occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2005</td>
<td>SDP/Grünen</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Occurred</td>
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Table: Governments in Germany

In Germany, major right-wing parties and coalitions such as CDU-CSU are potentially pro-status-quo actors with regards to the definition of nationality and peoplehood due to their conservative position and deep connection to the ethnic definition of citizenship and to the constituency groups attached to this notion. Their consistent opposition to the integration reform also proves this expectation. Left-wing SDP, however, emerges as a likely counter-hegemonic elite to expand the frontiers of citizenship and peoplehood due to its ideological position in favor of workers and organic relations with migrant workers through the German Labor Union where guest-workers became much more active members than their German counterparts and even assumed leadership roles. SDP created a coalition government with liberal FDP in 1969 and achieved to uninterruptedly stay in the power until 1982. FDP would also be seen as a potential supporter of this reform since they proclaimed to have an agenda to create a liberal democratic Germany and thus would be expected to oppose the segregated situation of millions of people. Although it could be expected that the SDP-FDP coalition would foster the reforms not only for their ideological agenda but also their electoral incentives to franchise a new group whose support is most likely to flow them, they did not take a strong pro-reform stance in this period. Rather, during the 1972-1973 economic crisis, hundreds of thousands of immigrant workers, most of whom were Turks, were immediately sent to their countries without offering any employment benefits and the coalition fully canceled the worker recruitment program in 1973. When the young wing of SDP demanded the granting of voting rights to these workers in local elections, the SDP leadership suppressed this bottom-up demand. The first Commissioner of Foreigners’ Affairs, Heinz Kuhn, a prominent politician from SPD, prepared what is called Kuhn Memorandum in 1979, declared Germany as a country of immigration, and proposed the naturalization of ‘guest-workers’. However, this proposal met some severe resistance from the political establishment of even his own party. Hence, otherwise seen as a natural ally of the workers, SPD could not develop a consistent pro-reform discourse and policy proposal for the integration and naturalization of so-called guest workers in its first and longest government term in post-War Germany. The reform
prospect was almost absent in the country when the pro-status-quo CDU-CSU achieved a
hegemonic majority in both chambers of the legislation between 1982 and 1998. Coming to the
power with an explicit agenda to curb the number of immigrants to its half, the coalition adopted
an ethnic conception of German nationhood throughout its incumbency. This view was also
publicly endorsed by a group of conservative scholars from different universities through what is
known as Heidelberg Manifesto. In this manifesto, these scholars strongly underlined that the
Constitution requires the lawmakers to keep the population ethnically, culturally, and linguistically
German. They even hold an inflammatory tone in their statement by claiming that the preservation
of German people is at risk and by framing the presence of immigrants as a demographic threat.
Amidst the political and intellectual popularity of exclusionary notions of nationhood and
citizenship, Greens entered into the political scene with powerful multicultural discourse. Not
shying away from qualifying the current policies and discourses against the immigration both as
the continuation of Nazi implementations and as the very image of apartheid in South Africa,
Greens, and its strong discourse put a liberalizing pressure on SPD and FDP. Greens also gave
important positions to the immigrant-origin politicians firstly in their local branches and later on
at the federal level. The interaction between Greens and SPD in the opposition and growing
pressure from the German Labor Union on SPD facilitated the ideational transformation among
SPD ranks. In 1994, the Council for Migration was created by left-wing and liberal academics and
they started to publish Annual Migration Reports to underscore the status of Germany as a country
of immigration for a very long time and demand for major reforms of the naturalization and
citizenship rights. Thanks to these political developments and intellectual activism, a new
discourse started to emerge in Germany in the 1980s and 1990s. When the SPD-Greens coalition
acquired a hegemonic majority in the legislative in 1998, this new discourse was eventually
legalized in a relatively short period of time; thereby allowing the immigrants to naturalize and
participate in elections. This short history of the political debate on the status of Germany and
migrants is intended to summarize the evolution of the views of the important political parties. The
major puzzle supplied by this sketchy account is ‘Why did SPD did not carry out the citizenship
reform between 1969 and 1982 and why did they come to the point to do it just after they assumed
the power, again in 1998?’ My preliminary answer to this question is that SPD lacked the necessary
discourse of nationhood and citizenship in its first period of government but could develop it in
the 1980s and 1990s. To empirically study the evolution of SPD’s position, I will closely read
party programs, legislative proceedings, contents of left-wing newspapers in the moments of
intensified public deliberations on the place of immigrants in German society. I will also look into
the key documents of this era such as BLK Report of 1977, Kuhn Memorandum of 1979,
Heidelberg Manifesto of 1987, and Annual Immigration Reports of the Council of Migrants.

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In Austria, three major political parties dominated the political scene in the post-war period. These are left-wing SPO (Social Democratic Party of Austria), conservative OVP (Austrian People’s Party), and right-wing populist FPO (Freedom Party of Austria). Since OVP is ideologically attached to the ethnic character of the Austrian nation and claiming to represent the nationalist constituency groups, it is an unlikely pro-reform actor in facilitating naturalization for the immigrants. FPO is an unthinkable ally in that issue as a political party mobilized against the presence of immigrants in Austrian society. Hence, due to the ideological reasons and connections of the party with labor unions, SPO seems like the only potential counter-elite who can attempt to change the frontiers of citizenship and peoplehood. In the first years of their one-party incumbency between 1970 and 1983, they actually tried to pass this reform. SPO proposed a constitutional amendment in 1973 to facilitate the naturalization of guest workers and their descendants. However, the government was heavily criticized in the parliament for courting voters, and the provision was eventually rejected by the Constitutional Committee. They, later on, seem to abandon this agenda. Adopting pro-immigration discourse was erased from its political priorities to such an extent that SPO created a coalition with openly anti-immigrant FPO between 1983 and 1987. Between 1987 and 2000, SPO and OVP created a grand coalition that took additional measures to curb the number of immigrants in the early 1990s and passed a more stringent naturalization law in 1998, which was made even harsher by OVP and FPO coalitions between 2000 and 2007. For the Austria leg of this project, I will focus more on the 13 years of one-party incumbency of SPO and how they underwent such a radical policy shift from proposing naturalization to the so-called guest workers to reducing their numbers and hardening naturalization requirements. I will focus on key moments where the status of migrants and the definition of Austrian identity became the salient topics in the public and legislative agenda such as 1973 proposal reform, 1990-1992 attempts to curb migrant presence, and 1998 amendments of citizenship. To trace the evolution of SPO and left-wing intellectuals, I will rely on the close

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Prob. Of Change</th>
<th>Occ. Of Change</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1966-1970</td>
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<td>Not occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1983</td>
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<td>Likely</td>
<td>Not occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1987</td>
<td>SPÖ/FPÖ</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Not occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-2000</td>
<td>SPÖ/ÖVP</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Not occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2003</td>
<td>ÖVP/FPÖ</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Not occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td>ÖVP/FPÖ/BZÖ</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Not occurred</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007-2017</td>
<td>SPÖ/ÖVP</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Not occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017-2019</td>
<td>ÖVP/FPÖ</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Not occurred</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table: Governments in Austria
scrutiny of the legislative speeches and the content of major newspapers in these periods of intensification.

Contrary to Germany and Austria, it is hard to pinpoint a potential pro-reform actor for the political inclusion of Blacks in the United States. Before the Civil War and during the first decades of the Reconstruction era, the Republican party was the adamant supporter of Black political rights whereas the Democratic Party was the party of White supremacy. Nevertheless, especially after the end of Reconstruction, racial issues were not brought up by either of the political party except for rare anti-lynching discussions in the Congress as in 1921 and 1937. Economic concerns and positions constituted the fundamental source of party cleavage and ideological contestation until the 1950s (Noel, 2012). Responding to the demographic transformation in the electorate caused by the Great Migration, Clark Clifford suggested Truman that adopting a Black position would be a rational electoral strategy by making him an alternative in the eyes of the Black voters in the North against the more explicit positions taken by the Republican Party candidates and rising independent campaign of Henry Wallace. Following this suggestion, Truman took bold steps to create a pro-Black platform before the 1948 elections. Nevertheless, this electoral strategy turned out to be more divisive than initially expected and triggered a massive rebellion among Southern Democrats who pushed Strom Thurmond as a rival candidate (Sitkoff, 1971). After this Southern uproar, the Democratic Party platforms in 1952 and 1956 returned to the pre-1948 position (Johnson & Porter, 1973). In 1957, Republican President Eisenhower signed the first Civil Rights Act which created a federal commission entitled to reinforce voting rights. Democrats suddenly placed the issue of race in the center of their party platform in the 1960s, again leading Southern Democrats to hold back their support from Kenedy who was running against Republican candidate Nixon who also held a pro-Civil Rights position in his campaign (Noel, 2012, p. 159). In 1965, the Voting Rights Act was accepted in Congress by a considerable degree of support both from the Democratic Party and the Republican Party members. To study the United States empirically, As this brief history of two parties’ engagement with the issue of race demonstrated, it is crucial not only to examine how the long-silenced discussions on race returned back to political agenda but also to trace the evolution of the discourse on race and American democracy in both party cadres. To achieve that, I seek to rely on a close reading of party platforms, Presidential books, contents and OP-EDs of the major newspapers representing the views of both parties, and legislative speeches especially from the end of World War II to the VRA in 1965. I will detect whether the political actors admitted the incompatibility of enduring racial exclusion with American democracy and viewed a federally-reinforced act to solve this problem and how these tendencies were embraced in the key political branches and public deliberations through open coding of written sources and following roll-call vote patterns in that period.

All in all, this project will rely on archival research and analysis of legislative proceedings, party-programs, newspaper contents, judicial records, and other important documents. These
necessary texts will be collected via the databases of ProQuest Executive and Legislative Publications, Westlaw, Compilation of Presidential Documents, American Presidency Project, Chronicling America, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, GlobaLex, German Culture, and Media: Historical Newspapers in Illinois University, and Foreign Language News and Newspapers in MIT Library.

2. Institutional Pillar

Is the emergence of a counter elite armed with a novel normative framework of peoplehood sufficient for racial enfranchisement? Our response to this question brings us to the second and complementary pillar of our approach. The ascend of an alternative normative framework can by no means imply the resolution of disagreements or contradictions in the discursive domain of politics. Quite the opposite, looming of an alternative will generate an intensive moment of contestation over the social basis of a democratic regime and which groups of people should be taken as the source of justification and main beneficiaries of public policy. Different elite groups will be drawn to this public contestation with their own constructions of peoplehood. These elite groups hold different positions in political institutions that structure their efforts, tactics, and strategies and condition their prospect for successfully materializing their vision and motivation through the institutionalization of a new state of affairs or preservation of the status quo. Nevertheless, these positions, namely relative weight of competing elite groups vis a vis one another, are subjected to a periodical reshuffling in representative regimes relying upon the primacy of elections as the arbiter of disagreements and rivalries.

I focus on three political-institutional contexts to empirically examine the second pillar of my general framework. These institutions, also defined as key veto player institutions by Tsebelis (1995), are legislative, executive, and judicial offices and institutions the consent of which are necessary for any political change to take place. When pro-reform actors acquire disproportionate power vis-a-vis the pro-status-quo actors in these important institutions, then the institutional requirement of my framework is assumed to be met.

When these two pillars, namely the emergence of a counter-hegemonic political elite armed with a new and expansive notion of peoplehood and hegemonic position of these actors in key veto player institutions, are achieved, then the political change of racial enfranchisement takes place in a given country. However, if one or another of these two elements is not present or, in other words, when the temporal occurrences of these separate phenomena do not match, then the attempts of reform, even if they somehow emerge, are doomed to fail. Paul Pierson uses the metaphor of ‘earthquake’ to describe such processes of change where the outcome of interests unfolds in a short period of time, but it takes a slow-moving process for the explanatory factors to occur independently (Pierson, 2004, 79-80).
My project is inspired by the methodological tradition of comparative historical analysis. This long-standing research tradition asks big questions about large-scale outcomes, is interested in generating configurational accounts of how multiple factors interactively combine to lead to a particular outcome, adopts case-based research, uses process-tracing and mechanism-based explanation, particularly works with scope conditions which delineate the range of conditions determining to which cases the theory can apply, and deeply attentive to the temporal dimension of politics (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003, 10-16; Mahoney & Thelen, 2015, 3-39). Since I am mostly dealing with the unfolding of processes over different temporal domains in the United States, Germany and Austria and since I am seeking to achieve the contextualized comparison of these three cases around the presence or absence of racial enfranchisement, CHA research framework provides the best historical and comparative grounding for my project.
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