Muslims Need Not Apply?:
Religious, Ethnic, and Gender Discrimination in the U.S. Labor Market

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Abstract
Anti-Muslim discourse has become a regular feature of the current U.S. political climate, prompting scholars of race and religion to call for more attention to the racialization of religion. However, these accounts often assume that all members of a religious group face similar levels of discrimination. This article presents the first large-scale audit study of anti-Muslim discrimination in the U.S. that incorporates an intersectional framework including religion, ethnicity, and gender. Fictitious resumes were sent to 1,000 entry-level job openings in eight cities across the U.S. The study finds wide variation in callback rates among different groups of Muslims. Arab Muslim men have the lowest callback rate of any group, but white women face the largest penalty for being Muslim, highlighting the discrimination faced by many non-Arab Muslims. Unlike white Muslim women, white Muslim men face no penalty for being Muslim, which demonstrates the necessity of interpreting the racialization of religion through the lens of gender. Finally, the degree to which geographic location and labor market sector explain varying levels of discrimination underscores the need for greater emphasis on social context in intersectional approaches to discrimination.

During the last few years, Muslims have increasingly become targets of controversy in the United States. The storm over the place of Muslims in American society intensified following the attacks on September 11th, 2001 (Cainkar 2002; Cimino 2005; Peek 2010), though debates took a backseat during the economic recession of the late 2000s. The rise of ISIS as a global force starting in 2014 renewed debates about Islam in the U.S., with some commentators labeling Islam as a violent religion incompatible with American values. Most recently and significantly, the election of Donald Trump as president of the U.S., whose campaign included...
proposals to create a national registry for American Muslims and whose first week in office produced an executive order banning refugees from seven Muslim-majority nations, provides clear evidence of the ways in which Muslims are often used as scapegoats for American fears about social problems.

Some scholars see these trends as evidence that the category “Muslim” often operates more as a racial identifier than a religious one (Fadil 2016; Foner 2015). Two assumptions undergird many of these discussions, particularly those occurring in the public sphere: that all Muslims face discrimination by virtue of being Muslim, and that different groups of Muslims experience racialization in similar ways (Bayoumi 2006; Fadil 2016; Meer 2013; Selod and Embrick 2013). Instead, theories of intersectionality suggest that racialization occurs in different ways for different groups of people (Choo and Ferree 2010; Collins 2015; McCall 2005). In particular, the co-constitutive character of religion and gender necessitates a focus on how gender shapes the racialization process for Muslims and members of other religious groups (Avishai, Jafar, and Rinaldo 2015; Schnabel 2016; Sullins 2006). However, intersectional approaches often neglect the ways that social context interacts with stereotypes to shape the effects of group membership differently in different settings (Kim 2017; McDowell and Carter-Francique 2017). Informed by and expanding an intersectional perspective, this study asks: How does anti-Muslim discrimination vary across different groups of Muslims? More particularly, how does gender shape the racialization of religion? Finally, how does social context shape the levels of discrimination Muslims face?

This study employs correspondence audit methodology to measure anti-Muslim discrimination using an intersectional framework incorporating religion, ethnicity, and gender, submitting fictitious resumes to 1,000 job openings in eight cities across the United States. The
experiment reveals that many Muslims face discrimination in the job market, though not all do. The results also show how ethnicity and gender shape the extent to which being Muslim hurts job chances, with different groups of Muslims facing widely varying degrees of discrimination, from no discrimination to high levels of discrimination. These findings reveal the danger of discussing Muslims as a homogeneous group, not just in terms of theology and religious practice but also in how they experience racialization and associated discrimination. Furthermore, they demonstrate that racialization of religion must be understood through the lens of gender. Lastly, the results highlight the importance of an under-theorized aspect of intersectional approaches: the ways that norms in various social contexts shape the effects of identities in varied ways in different settings.

**Religion, Ethnicity, and Gender in the U.S.**

Much of the growing body of research on discrimination in sociology has focused on race, class, and gender (Browne and Misra 2003; Galinsky, Hall, and Cuddy 2013; Quillian 2006), with less focus on religion (Wilde and Danielsen 2014). However, recent controversies around Islam in the U.S. demand more attention to anti-Muslim discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal for employers to discriminate against individuals because of their religion or lack thereof, as well as requiring employers to make reasonable accommodations to the religious beliefs and practices of their employees.

Despite legal protections, many of the country’s estimated 3.3 million Muslims (Mohamed 2016) report experiencing discrimination in their daily lives, perceptions that make it difficult for Muslims to feel they belong in their own communities, let alone their nation (Greenhouse 2010; Peek 2010; U.S. EEOC 2015). Even though the vast majority of American Muslims say they want to assimilate (72%), over half say it is more difficult to be Muslim in the
U.S. since 9/11 (Pew 2011). Relatedly, half of American Muslims say the most important problems facing Muslim Americans are negative views and discrimination (Pew 2011).

As with all self-reports, it is possible that some of the negative treatment Muslims perceive as religious discrimination is not, in fact, related to their religious identity. Still, research has documented multiple types of concrete anti-Muslim discrimination in the form of negative media representations (Alsultany 2012; Bail 2012), hate crimes since 9/11 (Disha, Cavendish, and King 2011; Kishi 2017), or workplace discrimination (Greenhouse 2010; U.S. EEOC 2015). Limited research demonstrates that Muslims face employment discrimination as well. Two recent studies, one in New England and one in the American South, found that Muslim job applicants were significantly less likely to get called back for job interviews compared with equally qualified candidates whose resumes did not mention religion (Wallace, Wright, and Hyde 2014; Wright et al. 2013). Though these studies measured employment discrimination against American Muslims, both focused on a single element of a person’s background—his/her religious identity—to determine how it affected employment prospects. While these findings reveal a lot about anti-Muslim discrimination, they leave readers with the assumption that all Muslims face similar levels of discrimination.

While religion and race are not interchangeable, they are mutually constitutive, a phenomenon that has sometimes been neglected by both sociologists of race and sociologists of religion. In studies of religion, white Protestant definitions of religion have often dominated measures and theories of religion, frequently without reference to the ways in which typical definitions of religion are racialized (Bender et al. 2012). When race is discussed, it is most frequently in relation to African American religion or to the rise of multiracial churches (cf. Edwards 2008; Nelson 2004), leaving whiteness largely unanalyzed (Sue 2006). Similarly,
sociologists of race have placed limited emphasis on religion, often viewing it as a chosen rather than an ascribed characteristic and therefore less rigid, or as carrying less social significance than race due to secularization (Pasha 2017). However, the increasing presence and salience of Islam both in the U.S. and Europe has created more conversation between scholars of religion and scholars of race (Bayoumi 2006; Fadil 2016; Jamal 2005; Read 2015). In public life, the use of the term “Islamophobia”—a concept that typically signifies not just religious fear but racial fear as well—has become much more widespread, indicating increased recognition that religious identity can, and often does, operate in ways more akin to racial status (Gottschalk and Greenberg 2007; Meer 2013; Rana 2007; Taras 2013).

Still, with a few exceptions (Heath and Martin 2013; Galonnier 2015), much of the discussion of the racialization of religion has been theoretical rather than empirical (Bayoumi 2006; Fadil 2016; Selod and Embrick 2013). Much of this theorizing contains two assumptions: 1) all Muslims face discrimination by virtue of being Muslim, and 2) different groups of Muslims experience racialization in similar ways. For instance, while increased attention has been paid to ways in which the category “Muslim” functions as both a religious and a racial category, there has been little to no research on white Muslims, particularly in the U.S. (Alam 2012; Franks 2000; Galonnier 2015). Instead, some discussions imply that all Muslims are black or brown, or assume that white Muslims are racialized in ways that are similar to black and brown Muslims—in other words, that the category of Muslim means similar things for different groups of Muslims (Alam 2012; Bayoumi 2006; Meer 2013; Selod and Embrick 2013).

Instead, theories of intersectionality suggest that racial formation occurs in different ways for different groups of people (Choo and Ferree 2010; Collins 2015; McCall 2005). An intersectional approach provides a contrast to additive and multiplicative understandings of
discrimination, ones in which the addition of new marginalized identities inevitably leads to ever higher levels of marginalization (Hancock 2007; King 1988). Instead, intersectionality recognizes that an identity that, by itself, leads to marginalization may have an unexpected effect when it intersects with other elements of an individual’s background.

In particular, the co-constitutive character of religion, race, and gender (Avishai et al. 2015; Schnabel 2016; Sullins 2006; Wilde and Danielsen 2014) suggests that any studies of anti-Muslim discrimination should examine how race, ethnicity, and gender shape the experiences of Muslims. For instance, Arab Muslims are the ethno-religious group frequently associated with terrorism in media and public discourse (Cainkar 2002; Cimino 2005; Disha, Cavendish and King 2011; Gottschalk and Greenberg 2007; Malvern and Koreas 2014). While most of the world’s Muslims are Asian rather than Arab, this is not true in the U.S.: Arab Muslims make up the largest group of American Muslims (25%), followed by South Asian Muslims and African American Muslims (Pew 2011). To understand possible religious discrimination against Muslims, it is therefore necessary to consider how discrimination might vary depending on whether a person is Arab or not.

In another example, in media and public discourse, it is often assumed that Muslim women will face more discrimination than Muslim men, both because of their greater visibility as Muslims (for hijabis, at least) (Abbas 2015; Ghumman and Ryan 2013; Mahmud and Swami 2010) and because women often face more discrimination in than men in American society.

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1 While “Arab” is a culturally constructed category that varies across time and place, this article uses the definition of Arab adopted by the U.S. Census Bureau, which considers someone Arab if the person reports ancestral ties to Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and/or Yemen (Asi and Beaulieu 2013). When this article uses the term “Arab,” it refers to someone with clear ancestral ties to one of these countries, or whose ethnic and cultural heritage can be traced to the Arab World (e.g., an Arab name).
(England 2010). However, different stereotypes are associated with Muslim men compared with Muslim women—with men depicted as terrorists and women as oppressed victims in need of saving (Abu-Lughod 2013; Malvern and Koureas 2014; Williams and Vashi 2007)—so the intersection of religion and gender may create different results than expected from an additive approach to discrimination. Indeed, researchers in Sweden recently found that Arab male candidates faced more hiring discrimination than equally qualified Arab women (Arai, Bursell, and Nekby 2016), a finding highlighting the insufficiency of an additive approach to discrimination and, therefore, the need for an intersectional approach—particularly one incorporating gender—in seeking to develop a full and accurate account of anti-Muslim discrimination.

Finally, the degree to which people hold negative stereotypes and attitudes about Muslims likely varies in different social contexts. For instance, knowing Muslims makes Americans less likely to hold negative stereotypes about them (Telhami 2015). Because a higher percentage of Muslims live in large urban areas (Bagby 2012), employers in these areas may be more likely to actually know a Muslim, perhaps resulting in less anti-Muslim discrimination in large urban areas. Furthermore, Republicans are much more likely to express negative attitudes about Muslims than are Democrats (Telhami 2015); perhaps Muslims will experience more discrimination in regions heavily populated by Republicans.

In addition, stereotypes often have different effects in different institutional contexts, such that the impact of a particular set of identities may be different in some settings compared with others (Kim 2017; McDowell and Carter-Francique 2017)—an insight that has been under-recognized by intersectional approaches. For instance, while a working-class background is typically considered a disadvantage rather than a privilege, in certain institutional contexts, being
working-class may be an advantage, such as in the job market for “dirty jobs” like refuse collection or street cleaning, where employers might see middle-class and upper-class candidates as insufficiently masculine to perform the work due to stereotypes about gender and class (Slutskaya et al. 2016). In another example, while black women often face disadvantages compared with black men in the job market (McDowell and Carter-Francique 2017), in criminal justice contexts, being a woman is often an advantage for African Americans due to stereotypes of black male criminality (Steffensmeier, Painter-Davis, and Ulmer 2017). Finally, while Native peoples face discrimination in many settings, research has demonstrated the ways in which they face particular discrimination in health care settings, where stereotypes about Native drug addiction lead to negative treatment from health care practitioners (Goodman et al. 2016).

Thus, while an intersectional framework has the potential to expand understandings of the racialization of religion and of anti-Muslim discrimination more specifically, it also remains limited by the typical focus on identities without an emphasis on how those identities and associated stereotypes interact with the social and institutional context to produce different results in different settings. Drawing on and expanding an intersectional framework, this study asks: How does anti-Muslim discrimination vary across different groups of Muslims? More particularly, how does gender shape the racialization of religion? Finally, how does social context shape the levels of discrimination Muslims face? This article demonstrates that, far from being treated as a homogeneous group, different groups of Muslims in the U.S. face quite different levels of discrimination. It also shows that the racialization of religion cannot be understood as a monolithic process. Instead, it is indelibly shaped by gender. Lastly, it demonstrates how social and institutional context helps explain why some groups of Muslims face more discrimination than others.
Methods

Because of their ability to directly measure hiring discrimination, both correspondence and in-person audits have become well-established and frequently employed during the last decade and a half, particularly by sociologists (cf. Correll et al. 2007; Gaddis 2015; Pager 2003; Tilcsik 2011) and economists (cf. Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Weichselbaumer 2015). While both are well-regarded, each type of audit has strengths and weaknesses. In-person audits allow researchers to measure discrimination at multiple stages of the job process, both the initial application and the interview, which can more fully reflect the extent of discrimination different groups face in actually obtaining a job offer. On the other hand, correspondence audits provide a much more controlled experiment and therefore more reliable results, since using resumes rather than concrete human beings enables the researcher to completely control all possible sources of variation among the different applicants.

Despite the growing popularity of audit studies, only a small number have examined discrimination based on religious background (Adida, Laitin, Valfort 2010; Pierné 2013; Wallace et al. 2014; Wright et al. 2013), and even fewer have examined religious discrimination specifically in the U.S. (Wallace et al. 2014; Wright et al. 2013). The two U.S.-based studies did not vary the ethnicity of their applicants, instead holding it constant (Wallace et al. 2014; Wright et al. 2013). They found discrimination against Muslims, but because they focused solely on religious affiliation, these studies did not reveal whether and how religious discrimination may vary based on other factors like race, ethnicity, and gender.

This study utilizes a correspondence audit approach to measure actual, rather than perceived, discrimination against different groups of Muslims. As part of the audit, 1,000 resumes were submitted to 1,000 actual job postings from September 2015 to August 2016.
There were 10 fictitious job candidates in the study, primarily selected using Social Security Administration and Census data. Six had male names (Christopher Smith or Youssef Ahmed) and four had female names (Jessica Smith or Fatima Ahmed), allowing for variation in gender.\(^2\)

Five candidates had white-sounding names (Christopher or Jessica Smith), while the other five had Arab names (Youssef or Fatima Ahmed).\(^3\) Four of the resumes did not signal any religious identity, four signaled Muslim identity, and two signaled evangelical Christian identity. While gender and ethnicity were signaled via applicants’ names, religious identity was signaled by citing the applicant’s experience as a volunteer with a student organization (e.g., Penn State Student Association, Penn State Muslim Student Association, or Penn State Evangelical Christian Student Association) in a section of the resume titled “Leadership Experience.” This is the most common way in which religious identity is signaled as part of correspondence studies (Adida, Laitin, Valfort 2010; Pierné 2013; Wallace et al. 2014; Wright et al. 2013).

These variations allowed for the measurement of how religion, ethnicity, and gender each distinctively impacted job prospects as well as how they interacted with each other to affect candidates differently. The white evangelical Christian applicant was included to ensure that any

\(^2\) While this means there were a limited number of resumes submitted for each candidate/subgroup (approximately 100), this is not uncommon in audit studies. For instance, Pager’s (2003) classic study examining race and criminal record had similar numbers in each subgroup she examined (e.g., 150 white applications, half with criminal record and half without, equaling approximately 75 in each subgroup). In her study, number of callbacks in each subgroup likely ranged from 25 to as low as 5. However, chi-squared tests still found significant differences between groups in her study, even with small sample sizes.

\(^3\) Surveys conducted with Amazon Mechanical Turk workers were used to verify that these names effectively signaled white identity and Arab identity respectively. More than 90% of the time, MTurk users identified the white names as “white” (N=72). Despite possible lack of familiarity with common Arab names, MTurk users identified the race/ethnicity of these names as either Arab/Middle Eastern or Muslim (as discussed in this paper, many people equate “Muslim” with “Arab”) more than 70% of the time, even without any other information (N=72). Other than “Arab” or “Muslim,” no other subgroup (i.e., white, black, Asian) came anywhere close (the highest was 8%), suggesting that the names did not signal something other than Arab to the vast majority of users.
measured discrimination against Muslims was not due merely to the inclusion of religious information on the applicant’s resume. The Arab evangelical Christian candidate was included to test whether being explicitly Christian would counteract any penalty Arab Americans might face due to assumptions that they were Muslim, despite the fact that many Arab Americans are Christian (AANM 2009). The 10 fictitious applicants and their characteristics are listed in Table 1.

[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

In addition to measuring how religion, ethnicity, and gender interact in shaping applicants’ job prospects, this study seeks to examine how social context shapes discrimination, such as how discrimination varies by region and city size. Job searches were conducted in eight cities in four regional locations: in the North, Philadelphia, PA (large city) and Buffalo, NY (smaller city); in the South, Atlanta, GA (large city) and Birmingham, AL (smaller city); in the Midwest, Chicago, IL (large city) and Detroit, MI4 (smaller city); and in the West, Los Angeles, CA (large city) and Sacramento, CA (smaller city). Including four regions around the country allowed for examining whether regional religious and political differences might be associated with differential hiring practices towards Muslims (Hill 2006), while including both larger and smaller cities enabled measurement of whether discrimination is lower in large, “global cities” (Sassen 1991), which are often assumed to be more cosmopolitan and open-minded (Beck

4 Unlike the other locations, Detroit was chosen because its metro area includes an unusually high proportion of Muslims, allowing for exploration of whether a higher Muslim population was associated with level of discrimination against Muslims. However, the number of applications in each of the 8 individual locations was not large enough for meaningful comparisons between the individual locations. Muslim callback rates in Detroit were similar to those in the wider sample, so it is not likely that the inclusion of Detroit skewed the overall results in any direction.
The study focused on entry-level positions for recent college graduates in the U.S., in part because using recent college graduates made it reasonable to include volunteer experience (where religious identity is signaled) on the applicants’ resumes. In addition, many other audit studies also apply to entry-level positions because higher-level positions are not typically listed in public job forums, but are instead filled through in-company promotion or social networks. As in other audit studies, the goal was to give fictitious candidates backgrounds and qualifications that made them competitive enough to get called back relatively often, but to avoid making them so outstanding that they would all be called back for most jobs, regardless of their religion, ethnicity, or gender, since the latter situation would make it difficult to measure any tendency to discriminate. Because of this, candidates’ qualifications included a solid GPA (3.5) from a strong but not elite public university, a degree in a field with a broad skill set relevant to many entry-level jobs (economics), broad but relatively common work experience for college students (internship in a legal office and retail experience), and experience with leadership in several volunteer organizations. As the Appendix shows, the overall callback rate in the study was 16%, a similar rate to many other audit studies (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Tilcsik 2011).

This study used slightly different details for each of the four geographic regions to avoid potential employer bias against prospective employees living far away from the employer location, which could have resulted in a lower overall response rate for all candidates. Thus, the

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5 The four global cities were selected in part based on A.T. Kearney’s (2015) list of “global cities,” which they select based on five dimensions: business activity, human capital, information exchange, cultural experience, and political engagement. While Philadelphia was one of the new inclusions for 2015, it was selected rather than the other two cities in the Northeastern U.S. (Boston and New York) because it was the only one of the three that has not experienced a major terrorist attack by Muslim extremists. Selecting one of those two cities may have affected the study’s findings in unpredictable ways.
resumes included a different college based on the region of application (a large public university ranked between 40 and 65 by U.S. News and World Report in 2015), as well as a home address, work, and volunteer addresses matching the regional location. Thus, though there were 10 fictitious applicants, 40 total resumes were submitted because the contact information, university attended, work address, and volunteer experience address varied based on the region of the job search. For instance, when submitting resumes to jobs in Atlanta and Birmingham, all 10 applicants included exactly the same details as each other except for applicant name and religion, though their university (e.g., the University of Georgia) and home address information (i.e., Athens, GA) was different from applicants in other regions.

Other than variation in the applicant’s name and religion, the university name, and the address information for the candidate and the businesses, all other details of the resumes were exactly the same, including organization names, dates of experience, and objectives.\footnote{The one exception was that applicants worked at Baskin Robbins during high school, but there was no Baskin Robbins in the Southern location used for high school work experience (Birmingham), so Cold Stone Creamery was used for the resumes in the South. Both companies are fast food ice cream establishments.} This meant that the resumes were even more equivalently matched than in many other audit studies. Many correspondence studies use a paired resume submission strategy, in which researchers send two or more resumes to the same employer but with different details on the resumes, enabling researchers to send out many resumes quickly.\footnote{This approach also allows the researcher to ascertain whether any single employer behaves in a discriminatory fashion. However, few academic audit studies seek to determine whether single employers are engaged in discrimination, since the purpose of such studies is not to catch and prosecute specific employers but rather to document discrimination in the labor market as a whole. So for academic studies, this is not a real benefit.} However, this approach has been criticized by some audit researchers because of the greater likelihood that employers will realize they are part of a research study (Weichselbaumer 2015). Because the paired strategy runs the danger of
alerting employers and of affecting their hiring decisions due to resume differences, this experiment used the more conservative approach of a randomized submission strategy, submitting only one resume to each job posting.

To search for job openings, two online job sites were used: CareerBuilder.com and Indeed.com. To avoid sampling bias, an application was submitted to any entry-level job ad in the “customer service” category on each website, provided that the requirements matched the profile of the fictitious applicants (recent college graduates with little work experience) and that the company had not already been applied to previously by another of the study’s applicants. In practice, the customer service category included many types of entry-level jobs, in fields including banking, clerical, finance, government, hospitality, insurance, marketing, media, retail, sales, shipping, and warehousing (these are the categories used in similar, earlier studies—see Wright et al. 2014).

For some of the jobs, candidates could simply submit their resumes directly on the job search website. For others, the employer required that applicants complete an application on the company’s own website, which was acceptable as long as the employer did not require a good deal of additional information beyond the resume. For each job opening that met these requirements, a candidate was randomly selected using a random number generator, and that candidate’s resume was submitted for the application. Each applicant was assigned a fictitious email address and phone number so employers could contact them for interviews. While these responses were recorded to construct the dependent variable, the researcher did not respond to employer emails or voicemails. In addition to submitting resumes and documenting employer responses, publicly available information on the job openings themselves and on the employers (for example, from company websites) was collected and stored using Evernote.
Variables

The main dependent variable (callback) was a dummy variable indicating whether the applicant had received a positive response from an employer asking for an interview or a similar next step in the hiring process. The five main independent variables were Muslim, Christian, None, Arab, and Female. Muslim, Christian, and None were dummy variables based on the religion signaled on the applicant’s resume. Arab was a dummy variable indicating whether the candidate had an Arab name, and Female was a dummy variable indicating whether the candidate had a woman’s name. Three interaction variables were also included in the analysis: Muslim x Arab, Muslim x Female, and Arab x Female. To examine variation in discrimination across social context (specifically, regions and large versus small urban areas), there was one dummy variable for each region (North, South, West, Midwest) and a dummy variable (major city) that indicated whether the location was one of the four “global” U.S. cities (i.e., Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia) as opposed to one of the four smaller cities (i.e., Birmingham, Buffalo, Detroit, Sacramento).

Two additional variables were included as controls: 1) whether the application required information on the candidate’s legal status to work (for the experiment, when asked, we always indicated that the candidate had the ability to work legally); and 2) whether the application required information on the candidate’s criminal record (for the experiment, when asked, we always indicated that the candidate had no criminal record). In both cases, employers might be more likely to call back a candidate if they are certain the candidate can work legally and has no criminal record—though a significant increase would only occur if employers subconsciously assumed a candidate did not have legal work status or had a criminal record when information about legal work status and criminal record were not required and therefore not provided. Initial
statistical tests included Pearson’s chi-squared tests on crosstabulations examining callback rates for candidates from different religious, ethnic, and gender groups. Further testing involved the use of logistic regression models that regress these independent variables on the overall callback rate for each candidate.

**Findings**

Both due to prior research and to the vitriol against Muslims in current American public discourse, the expectation was that all Muslims would face discrimination compared with their non-Muslim counterparts. Muslims were called back for 15% of the jobs to which they applied, whereas non-Muslims were called back 17% of the time, so while this expectation was technically correct, the difference in callback rates was too small to be statistically significant. As Table 2 demonstrates, the variable “Muslim” was not statistically significant in the logistic regression analysis (see Appendix for descriptive statistics).

[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

This finding runs counter to theoretical expectations as well as common sense expectations based on public discourse and public opinion polling. Based on these results alone, one might assume that Muslims do not face discrimination in the entry-level job market in the U.S., and that perhaps anti-Muslim discrimination has been overstated. However, as the following discussion shows, this overall finding obscures a great deal of complexity regarding how anti-Muslim discrimination works in practice.

**The Variability of Anti-Muslim Discrimination and the Racialization of Religion**

Though there were no significant differences in the overall callback rates of Muslim candidates compared with non-Muslim candidates, the results of the experiment found that Arab candidates, regardless of gender and religion, were significantly less likely to be called back for
an interview (13%) compared with white candidates (19%) with the same qualifications. Furthermore, as Table 2 shows, the results of the logistic regression analysis reveal significant discrimination against Arab applicants, even when controlling for multiple other variables. In seeking to explain the magnitude of effects in logistic regression models, the margins command in Stata is widely used for making results simpler to interpret by calculating the probability of the event occurring while holding all other variables in the regression model at their means (Williams 2012). When holding other variables at their means, an Arab person’s probability of being called back for a job (12.5%) is 6.5 percentage points lower than a white person’s probability of receiving a callback (19%), a difference that is statistically significant and is comparable to levels of discrimination faced by black candidates compared with white candidates (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004) and gay candidates compared with heterosexual candidates (Tilcsik 2011).

At first glance, this might lead to the conclusion that ethnicity matters more than religion in shaping employment prospects, with Arabs facing more discrimination than Muslims. However, there are several reasons why this conclusion might be incorrect. First, an applicant’s name is the first thing an employer would notice, and therefore has greater potential to shape an employer’s response than the information about religion contained at the bottom of the resume under volunteer experience. Second, discrimination against Arab applicants may also be a measure of discrimination against Muslims, since many people assume Arabs are Muslim. Surveys conducted using Amazon Mechanical Turk workers to test whether the names being used for this experiment adequately signaled Arab ethnicity provide limited evidence that employers may be assuming that applicants with Arab names are Muslim. When presented with the names Youssef Ahmed and Fatima Ahmed, and asked “what is this person’s race/ethnicity?,”
approximately 15 percent of respondents answered “Muslim” (N=72). Much higher percentages of respondents identified the names as “Arab” or “Middle Eastern,” and the survey sample size is small, but the results nonetheless suggest that a substantial minority of employers may have assumed that applicants with Arab names were Muslim. In these cases, the discrimination Arab candidates faced (even those without “Muslim” listed on their resumes) may have in fact been due to anti-Muslim sentiment.

These results clearly demonstrate the need for an intersectional approach to understanding anti-Muslim discrimination, particularly the intersection of religion and ethnicity, as theories of the racialization of religion would suggest. If we look only at the results showing that there are no significant differences in the callback rates of Muslims versus non-Muslims, we might conclude that Muslims do not face labor market discrimination. However, the anti-Arab discrimination displayed in Table 2 suggests a more complex story. And as Figure 1 clearly demonstrates, the picture looks even more complicated once ethnicity and gender are both taken into account.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]

As Figure 1 shows, Arab Muslim male candidates had the lowest callback rate of any group (8%). Compared with white women with no religion listed, who were called back 25% of the time, the difference is large: 17 percentage points. In other words, white women with no religion listed were 3 times as likely to be called back for a job compared with equally qualified Arab Muslim men. This finding stands in contrast to additive approaches to discrimination, which would predict that Arab Muslim women would have the lowest callback rate of any group. Instead, surprisingly, Arab Muslim women were called back 19% of the time—the exact same
callback rate as white men with no religion listed, the group that many theories of discrimination would have predicted to have the highest callback rate of any group.

Figure 1 also demonstrates that the degree to which being Arab hurt an applicant’s job chances varied by other characteristics. Specifically, ethnic differences in callback rates were significant for two groups: Muslim men, and women with no religion listed. For both subgroups, being Arab resulted in significantly lower callback rates. As Figure 2 demonstrates, Muslim men who were white were called back 21% of the time, while Muslim men who were Arab were only called back to 8% of the jobs to which they applied, making white Muslim men 2.5 times more likely to be called back than equally qualified Arab Muslim men.

[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]

Things work quite differently for women, though, demonstrating the importance of using a gendered lens in theories of racial formation. As Figure 3 shows, the largest negative impact of being Arab, even greater than for Arab Muslim men, was experienced by women with no religion listed: white women in this category were called back 25% of the time, whereas equally qualified Arab women with no religion listed were called back only 10% of the time, a difference of 15 percentage points. Such a large penalty for being Arab might lead to the expectation that being Arab is even worse for women than for men. However, changing the candidate’s religion produces completely different results. Unlike Muslim men, Muslim women do not face a statistically significant penalty for being Arab.

Of course, for many of these findings, it is difficult to know whether different callback rates are evidence of religious discrimination, ethnic discrimination, or some combination of the two. Due to the frequent conflation of religion and ethnicity, it is difficult—if not impossible—to disentangle the effects of ethnic versus religious discrimination when looking at the results of the
logistic regression analysis, for example. However, by examining differences in Muslims vs. non-Muslims specifically among white candidates, whose names are not identified with Muslim-ness or foreign-ness, we can better isolate the effects of being Muslim from the effects of ethnic discrimination.

**White Muslims and the Role of Gender in Discrimination**

Because white-sounding names do not signal potential Muslim-ness or foreign-ness, examining callback rates among white Muslims makes it possible to 1) disentangle the effects of religion and ethnicity on callback rates, and 2) see whether employers notice Muslim identity when it is signaled under volunteer experience. If they do not, there will be no differences across Muslim/non-Muslim subgroups, a finding that would indicate that this study’s method for signaling Muslim identity—one used by multiple other studies—is ineffective.

The callback rates for white Muslims reveal three insights. First, not all Muslims face discrimination solely for being Muslim, something difficult to document for Arab candidates since discrimination based on Arab identity may or may not be evidence of anti-Muslim discrimination as well. As Figure 1 shows, being Muslim has no negative impact on white men in the entry-level job market. White men with no religion listed were called back 19% of the time, and white Muslim men were called back 21% of the time, a difference that is not statistically significant. The privilege accorded to white men appears to erase any potential concerns about their being Muslim, at least in the context of applying for entry-level jobs in the U.S. This finding is somewhat surprising: theories of racialization would predict that all Muslims would experience discrimination, even those from more privileged racial backgrounds. Furthermore, white Muslim men report experiencing discrimination more often than many other groups of Muslims (Zainiddinov 2016). Superficially, one might take this as evidence that
employers simply did not notice that the applicants were Muslim. However, the results for white women clearly show the opposite.

[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]

Second, the findings in Figure 4 highlight the importance of gender in understanding how the racialization of religion occurs. Though white men face no negative repercussions for being Muslim (at least in this context), white women face the greatest penalty specifically for being Muslim (i.e., holding ethnicity and gender constant) of any subgroup in this study. White women with no religion listed were called back at a higher rate than any other subgroup (25%), most likely because the type of job to which applicants are applying (entry-level customer service jobs) are low-status, low-paying occupations that are more typically occupied by women (England 2010; Rivera and Tilcsik 2016). In contrast, white women who were Muslim had a callback rate of only 14%, making them almost half as likely to be called back compared with their non-Muslim counterparts (p<=.05).

Third, the difference of 11 percentage points in the callback rates of white women who were Muslim versus those who were not explicitly Muslim demonstrates that employers did indeed notice that the Muslim applicants were Muslim—this was the only difference in the two resumes, so it is the only variable that can explain the lower callback rates. In other words, even though Muslim identity was located in a part of the resume that was less prominent than other sections, employers clearly noticed when Muslim identity was being signaled.

**Intersectionality and Social Context**

In addition to highlighting the importance of an intersectional understanding of anti-Muslim discrimination, the experiment’s results demonstrate a few of the ways in which social context matters for discrimination. Logistic regression analyses conducted with a Muslim sub-
sample (available on request) found that Muslims were not called back less in the South than in other regions or less in small cities compared with larger cities, despite expectations to the contrary. One possible explanation is that people in supposedly more progressive regions like the North or West actually hold more negative attitudes toward Muslims than they are willing to admit in polls. However, crosstabulations and chi-squared tests found that, in each region (North, South, Midwest, West), Muslims as a whole did not face significant levels of discrimination solely for being Muslim. These results imply that the lack of regional differences in callback rates is not due to hidden negative attitudes among Northerners, for instance; instead, they indicate that though many Southerners express anti-Muslim attitudes in polling data, those anti-Muslim attitudes may not be associated with concrete acts of discrimination against Muslims.

However, the results are a bit different when examining Arab candidates, which may provide some insight into how social context shapes some types of anti-Muslim discrimination, given the likely conflation of Arab-ness with Muslim-ness among some employers. Logistic regression analyses conducted with an Arab sub-sample including the same controls as in Table 2 (available on request) found that Arab candidates were called back significantly more often in major, global cities compared with smaller, regional cities (Coef: .75; p<=.05). This was in line with expectations that predicted more cosmopolitan, open-minded attitudes in major cities that might lead to lower levels of anti-Muslim discrimination. Regional results were less in line with expectations, though. While there were no significant differences in callback rates between the South and other regions, Arab candidates were significantly less likely to be called back in the West compared with the North (Coef: -1.16; p<=.01). Since both regions are typically considered more religiously, politically, and culturally progressive, this finding contrasts with expectations regarding how social context shapes the levels of discrimination faced by Muslims.
Discussion: Making Sense of Multiple Intersecting Identities and Contexts

Muslims as a whole did not face statistically significant discrimination compared with equally qualified non-Muslims, but this finding obscures two important facts. First, Arab candidates did face high levels of discrimination, and this may actually be a better measure of anti-Muslim discrimination. While callback rates among white women show that many employers did notice when resumes indicated that candidates were Muslim, the method for signaling Muslim identity was less prominent than candidate’s name, which is virtually impossible to miss. While some employers may not have noticed that a candidate volunteered with the Muslim Student Association, they almost certainly noticed that the candidate’s name was Youssef or Fatima Ahmed; it is likely that many employers assumed these candidates were Muslim based on their names alone. Thus, the anti-Arab discrimination documented by this study is likely evidence of some degree of anti-Muslim discrimination as well.

This interpretation aligns with a central idea in theories of the racialization of religion—that religion and race are entangled enough that it is difficult to tell them apart. While there are non-Muslim Arabs and non-Arab Muslims, for many in the U.S., the categories of Arab and Muslim are virtually equivalent. Given the predominance of anti-Muslim discourse and attitudes in the U.S. and the relative absence of explicitly anti-Arab sentiment, the most sensible interpretation of the study’s findings regarding anti-Arab discrimination is one guided by theories of racialization: that many employers are assuming Arabs are Muslim, and that discrimination is driven by religio-racial prejudice.

Second, though Muslims as a whole did not face significant discrimination, this does not mean that no Muslims face discrimination in the entry-level job market. Indeed, some Muslims did face hiring discrimination purely for being Muslim: specifically, white Muslim women had
lower callback rates than their non-Muslim counterparts. This provides indisputable evidence that some Muslims do face discrimination in the U.S. labor market. Furthermore, it serves as a reminder that Arab Muslims are not the only Muslims who face discrimination in the U.S.: at times, white Muslims do as well. This could be seen as further evidence of the racialization of religion—of the ways that being Muslim operates as a racial category, having negative impacts that outweigh the racial privilege often associated with whiteness, for example.

However, callback rates for white men present a challenge to such an interpretation. When Muslims were white men, they did not face anti-Muslim discrimination, at least in this particular sector of the job market. In other words, being Muslim does not always operate in racialized ways, trumping an individual’s racial or ethnic background. Instead, the racialization of religion must be understood as a process that is integrally shaped by at least two factors: gender and social context.

The results for white Muslims clearly show the importance of gender in understanding anti-Muslim discrimination. Being Muslim had entirely different effects for white men versus white women, with white women facing a strong penalty for being Muslim and white men facing no discrimination for being Muslim. While the results for Arab candidates are a bit harder to interpret due to the likely conflation of ethnicity and religion among Arab candidates, for Arab candidates, gender mattered as well, but in a different way: there were no differences in callback rates by religion among Arab men, but for Arab women, being Muslim was actually an advantage rather than a disadvantage in the job search process. In both cases, ignoring gender would have led to very incomplete, even inaccurate, conclusions about the racialization of religion and about anti-Muslim discrimination in the U.S.
Second, the puzzling quality of these results—that being Muslim was a strong disadvantage for white women but was an advantage for Arab women—highlights the need for theories of racial formation and of intersectionality to better account for how stereotypes shape the treatment of groups differently based on the social and institutional contexts in which that treatment occurs. For instance, the strong disadvantage faced by white Muslim women was somewhat unexpected, particularly since prior research demonstrates that white Muslim men report facing more anti-Muslim discrimination than white Muslim women (Zainiddinov 2016). Though this finding was a surprise, it can be explained in terms of backlash effects, “social and economic reprisals for behaving counterstereotypically” (Rudman and Phelan 2008:61). Whereas Arab candidates are adhering to social expectations and stereotypes by identifying as Muslim, white candidates are likely converts to Islam. For men, this may not be seen as a problem, since common notions of Muslim masculinity and of mainstream white masculinity in the U.S. (i.e., dominance, aggression, ambition) are not in strong conflict (Rudman and Phelan 2008).

Instead, white Muslim women may be viewed as rejecting important elements of American cultural expectations regarding white femininity. First, they may have become Muslim because of marrying a non-white man who was Muslim. People who marry someone from another racial or ethnic group are likely to face discrimination, perhaps white women in particular, given historic societal taboos around white women engaging sexually with men of color (Djamba and Kimuna 2014; Hodes 1993). Second, unlike with masculinity, there is very much a conflict between mainstream white American femininity and dominant notions of Muslim femininity. Namely, women in the U.S. are expected to perform gender in highly sexualized ways, objectifying their own bodies for the benefit of the male “gaze” or even, in an example of women’s internalization of patriarchal norms, the “girlfriend gaze” (Riley, Evans,
Stereotypes of Muslim women depict them as downplaying their sexuality to perform gender in ways that highlight modesty and maternal characteristics (Abbas 2015; Weitz 2001; Zempi 2016), images that stand in stark contrast to cultural expectations regarding white femininity.

Finally, in choosing something other than what is expected of them, white Muslim women are demonstrating agency: a characteristic often resulting in negative responses to women from other Americans (Butler and Geis 1990; Koch 2005; Heilman 2012; Rudman and Glick 2001). Specifically related to the social and institutional context in which this study occurred, entry-level customer service jobs typically prize employees who are submissive and conforming to norms rather than agentic: employees who will follow the directions of managers without questioning them, or who will adhere to the maxim “the customer is always right.” In sum, employers may be responding to white Muslim women negatively because they see them as rejecting their societal obligations (e.g., by marrying nonwhite men, refusing to perform gender in sexualized ways, or exhibiting too much agency) regarding what it means to be a white woman in the United States, and as inappropriate fits for the traditional and submissive social context of the entry-level customer service labor market.

In contrast to white Muslim women, Arab Muslim women were called back at higher rates than expected. Because prior research has uncovered discrimination against Arab Muslim women in a variety of contexts (Ghumman and Ryan 2013; Zempi 2016), this is likely best explained as a function of fit as well (Rivera and Tilcsik 2016): the jobs for which these candidates applied are entry-level jobs that require following the instructions and responding to the demands of managers. Unlike white women, for whom perceived lack of fit may have been an issue that led to lower callback rates for jobs requiring submissive, low-prestige work, Arab
Muslim women are stereotyped as quiet and submissive (Abu-Lughod 2013; Zempi 2016), cultural characteristics that may be a good fit for the skills that entry-level customer service jobs require. Furthermore, some Americans see Arab Muslim women as victims of oppression by a domineering male culture (Abu-Lughod 2013; Malvern and Koureas 2014), a stereotype that may actually garner sympathy from some employers and make them more likely to hire Arab Muslim women in some cases, particularly compared with Arab Muslim men.

Recall that Arab Muslim men were called back only 8% of the time, making them the only group called back in the single digits. Compared with the group called back the most often—white women with no religion listed (25%)—the difference is especially stark, with the latter group being called back more than three times as often as Arab Muslim men who were equally qualified for the job. These findings suggest that negative stereotypes, perhaps rooted in false stereotypes of Arab Muslim men as likely terrorists (Arai et al. 2016; Malvern and Koureas 2014), have real, negative impacts for Arab Muslim men in the job-seeking process.

In addition to demonstrating why an intersectional approach is necessary for understanding anti-Muslim discrimination and the racialization of religion more generally, the analysis shows that social context needs more attention from theorists of intersectionality, since the impact of intersecting identities differs in different social settings. While there were no statistically significant geographic differences in levels of discrimination against Muslims, there were some geographic differences in levels of discrimination against Arab candidates. Whether this was primarily the result of ethnic discrimination, religious discrimination, or both, these results show that the social context in which candidates are seeking jobs (e.g., contexts in which many people hold anti-Muslim attitudes versus ones where positive attitudes predominate) can shape the treatment they receive.
Furthermore, taking into account the social and institutional context in which discrimination is occurring (in this case, the entry-level customer service job market) helps make sense of why some groups of Muslims in this study experienced discrimination more than others, counter to findings in other social and institutional settings that show, for example, that Arab Muslim women face disadvantages due to their religious identity (Ghumman and Ryan 2013). Specifically, the skills required for entry-level jobs intersect with stereotypes about white Muslim women versus Arab Muslim women in different ways, so that Muslim-ness carried a penalty for white women but was an advantage for Arab women. In intersectional analyses, the social and institutional context should be prioritized as an additional intersecting variable, one that interacts with individuals’ various identities in shaping the degree to which they will face discrimination in a particular setting as opposed to another. In a sector of the labor market that expects leadership and agency rather than submission to the expectations of management, we might find very different patterns regarding the amount of discrimination faced by white Muslim women and Arab Muslim women, based on the stereotypes associated with each group.

In sum, these patterns demonstrate how essential it is to include an intersectional framework in seeking to understand discrimination against Muslims in the United States today, the necessity of a gendered lens for understanding the racialization of religion, and the importance of considering social context when explaining how and why discrimination against certain groups occurs in some settings but not others. These results clearly show the insufficiency of theories of the racialization of religion that do not account for gender and of additive approaches to discrimination, which assume that with each addition of a marginalized group identity, increased levels of discrimination will occur, regardless of social context.

**Conclusion**
During the 2016 presidential campaign, then-candidate Donald Trump promised to pass a ban on Muslims entering the United States and proposed creating a Muslim registry, even for American citizens. While there was significant outcry about both of these proposed measures, there was also support for them. In the end, Trump was elected as the 45th U.S. president, and has implemented some of his campaign promises aimed at restricting Muslim entry to the U.S.

Given this anti-Muslim climate, this study’s finding that Muslims do not always face hiring discrimination is somewhat encouraging. This finding indicates greater acceptance of at least some groups of Muslims in the job market than might have been expected given the current atmosphere. While Muslims certainly face other forms of discrimination that can be extremely damaging (e.g., negative public discourse and media portrayals, hate crimes, government surveillance), the ability of at least some groups of Muslims to find certain jobs without facing religious discrimination is important, since work enables economic integration and mobility.

On the other hand, this study does find evidence of employers discriminating against some Muslim candidates solely on the basis of their religion. The finding that white Muslim women face the largest penalty for being Muslim of any group reveals that, while many might assume Arab Muslims bear the brunt of anti-Muslim discrimination, certain groups of white Muslims are also penalized for being Muslim—perhaps to an even greater extent than other groups of Muslims.

Theoretical accounts of the racialization of religion highlight the ways that religious identity and racial identity can, at times, operate as one category. This research provides evidence for that. While the results showed that overall, Muslims did not face labor market discrimination purely for being Muslim, the study found that Arab candidates did—and that some employers may have assumed Arab candidates were Muslim. Not only does this provide
evidence that Arab Muslims may face discrimination purely for their religion (or, at the very least, their religo-racial identities), it also demonstrates that religion and race are difficult to disentangle, affirming basic insights of theories of the racialization of religion. While there has been much debate in recent years over the place of Muslims in American society, less of that debate has focused on Arab Americans. Recognizing the discrimination faced by Arab Americans helps with knowing how and where to devote energies and resources for preventing discrimination during a time when those energies and resources may be limited.

While this research confirms some key insights regarding the racialization of religion, it also challenges assumptions that undergird some theorizing in this area. Some accounts of the racialization of religion assume that racialization occurs in the same way for different members of the same group. This study clearly shows the inadequacy of such assumptions. The results document wide variability in the levels of discrimination faced by different groups of Muslims, ranging from a penalty of 11 percentage points for white Muslim women to no religious discrimination faced by white Muslim men to a slight advantage to being Muslim among Arab Muslim women compared with Arab women who were not explicitly Muslim.

The high level of discrimination faced by Arab Muslim men in the U.S. job market is stark, if unsurprising. Negative stereotypes about Arab Muslim men as dangerous or, more specifically, terrorist, appear to have a significant impact on whether Arab Muslim men are called back for jobs. In many Arab Muslim families, which often include recent immigrants, men are the main breadwinners of the household, in line with the more traditional gender norms found in many non-Western societies (Read 2004). Thus, though this study did not find the same levels of discrimination against Arab Muslim women, that may not matter much to the well-being of Arab Muslim families if women are not working outside of the home. Instead, widespread hiring
discrimination against Arab Muslim men creates a major economic obstacle not only for the men themselves but, often, for their entire families as well. Conflicts in Europe provide an important lesson about the negative societal impacts that can result when a whole generation of Muslims face economic constraints based on discrimination and are therefore unable to achieve economic integration and mobility (Adida et al. 2016). Future research should explore whether Arab Muslim women might face more discrimination when they are seen—in other words, when employers or other gatekeepers to jobs or housing see visual images of or have in-person encounters with Muslim women, especially those wearing hijab.

Clearly, not all Muslims are understood or treated in the same ways, and not all are treated the way we might expect based on common assumptions about which Muslims face discrimination in public life. In this study, for white candidates, men faced no penalty for being Muslim, while women faced a large penalty for being Muslim. For Arab candidates, men faced no addition penalty for their Muslim-ness, while, for Arab women, being explicitly Muslim actually gave them a slight advantage over their non-Muslim counterparts. These findings emphasize the importance of an intersectional approach to understanding anti-Muslim discrimination and the racialization of religion more generally. Though this study focuses on Muslims, the co-constitutive character of religion and gender more broadly suggests that gender might have important effects on racialization for members of other religious groups as well. Theories of the racialization of religion should therefore prioritize a gendered lens in seeking to explain how and when religion operates as a racial category.

These findings demonstrate both the ways that gender differences led to different levels of anti-Muslim discrimination and the ways that religion, ethnicity, and gender are heavily intertwined: being Muslim had totally different effects for white Muslim women versus Arab
Muslim women. These differences are likely due to different stereotypes about what Muslim-ness means for white women versus Arab women; different societal expectations for white women versus Arab women; and a specific social context (the entry-level customer service job market) that places value on submissiveness and therefore appears to show preference for members of groups that are stereotyped as submissive.

As an intersectional framework suggests, this study shows that privileged and marginalized identities are not merely additive in how they impact a person’s experience of the world: instead, different combinations of identities may lead to advantages or disadvantages, depending on the cultural and social requirements associated with that context, and the stereotypes about various identities that exist in those specific contexts. Intersectional frameworks should therefore not only take into account how different identities and statuses combine with potentially unexpected results, but also how those identities and their associated stereotypes intersect with social and institutional norms to create different outcomes for different groups of people. Whether in the workplace or in other social settings, intersectionality must be understood as a dynamic, contextually situated phenomenon. Future research should adopt an intersectional framework whenever possible, particularly in studies of religion, race and ethnicity, and gender.

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Kim, Young-Mi. 2017. “Rethinking Double Jeopardy: Differences in the Gender Disadvantage between Organizational Insiders and Outsiders in Korea.” *Sociological Perspectives* 60(6):1082-96.


Figure 1. Religious Differences in Callback Rates, by Ethnicity and Gender (% Called Back)

Note: Religious differences in callback rates were significant only for white females (p<=.05) and for Arab females (p<=.10) (Pearson’s chi-squared tests).

Figure 2. Ethnic Differences in Callback Rates for Men, By Religion (% Called Back)

Note: Ethnic differences in callback rates were significant for Muslim men only (p<=.01) (Pearson’s chi-squared tests).
Figure 3. Ethnic Differences in Callback Rates for Women, By Religion (% Called Back)

Note: Ethnic differences in callback rates were only significant for women with no religion listed (p<=.01) (Pearson’s chi-squared tests).

Figure 4. Religious Differences in Callback Rates for White Candidates, by Gender (% Called Back)

Note: Religious differences in callback rates were significant for white females (p<=.05) but not for white males (Pearson’s chi-squared tests).
### Table 1: Applicants By Ethnicity, Gender, and Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th># of Applications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Christopher Smith</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youssef Ahmed</td>
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<td>Jessica Smith</td>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>None indicated</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatima Ahmed</td>
<td>Arab</td>
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<td>96</td>
</tr>
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<td>Christopher Smith</td>
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<td>94</td>
</tr>
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<td>Arab</td>
<td>Male</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Jessica Smith</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fatima Ahmed</td>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Smith</td>
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<td>Male</td>
<td>Evangelical Christian</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youssef Ahmed</td>
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<td>Male</td>
<td>Evangelical Christian</td>
<td>105</td>
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### Table 2. Odds Ratios for the Logistic Regression Predicting Employer Callback

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>SE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td></td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.27</td>
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<td>None</td>
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<td>1.04</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab x Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim x Female</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arab x Muslim</td>
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<td>.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major city</td>
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<td>1.66**</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td></td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
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<td>.70</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit possession of legal work status</td>
<td></td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit lack of criminal record</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McFadden’s pseudo $R^2$</td>
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<td>.027</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: N=998. Coefficients are expressed as odds ratios, so a ratio < 1 indicates a negative relationship. Reference category for religion is Christian, and for region is North. Models run with other dummies in the reference category did not produce significant results. * p <=.05; ** p<=.01; ***p<=.001 (two-tailed tests).
### Appendix. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
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<tr>
<td>Applicant called back for interview</td>
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<td>.368</td>
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<tr>
<td>Applicant Characteristics:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
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<td>.500</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>.490</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>.404</td>
<td>.491</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Christian</td>
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<tr>
<td>None</td>
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<td>.489</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location of Job Openings:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Major city</td>
<td>.632</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>West</td>
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<td>North</td>
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<td>Information Required in Application:</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal work status (1=required and yes; 0=information not required)</td>
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<td>.226</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Criminal record (1=required and no; 0=information not required)</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: N=1,000 except in the cases of the legal work status and criminal record variables (N=998 for both).