

Citizenship in an Era of Insecurity: Crime, Violence and the Implications for Democracy*

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November 4, 2012

Abstract

Throughout Latin America, democratization coincided with a nearly ubiquitous increase in crime and violence, placing “inseguridad” at the top of the agenda. The seemingly intractable rise in crime and violence in recent decades has posed a serious challenge to governability, while also generating broad-based distrust of police and low confidence in the state’s ability to curb crime and violence. Much scholarly research has focused on the dynamics of criminal violence and the responses of state actors, and analyzed the broad impact of these phenomena on democracy. Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to the ways in which these dynamics play out at the micro-level. The present paper asks how rising crime and violence, as well as increasing insecurity, have shaped citizenship in Latin America. The detrimental impact of crime and violence on the linkages between citizens and their state, as well as their corrosive effects on community life is implicit throughout the literature, but with little definitive evidence. Using LAPOP survey data, as well as qualitative data from dozens of community security meetings in Buenos Aires and São Paulo, this paper examines the impact of insecurity, crime, and violence on community ties, political participation and trust in institutions.

*Draft prepared for the Penn Program on Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism Graduate Workshop on Wednesday, November 7, 2012. This represents a very rough draft prepared days after returning to the US from 15 months of fieldwork in Latin America. Despite the messiness of this draft, I would like to thank workshop participants in advance for their helpful comments. Please do not cite or circulate. Not that you would want to at this stage.

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1 Introduction

Democratization in Latin America has gone hand in hand not only with increased crime and violence but also fear of crime or ‘inseguridad.’¹ Even in the case of Chile, by all accounts one of the region’s safest countries, “after 17 years of dictatorship and the continued use of force against the population, the return to democracy meant the consolidation of public perception of criminal insecurity” (Dammert and Malone 2003, 85). As will be discussed below, fear of crime is far from novel as an object of study;² but it has taken on new significance in the Latin American context. Transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule were accompanied in many countries by transformations in the nature of crime and violence, which have in turn generated new challenges to governability that may threaten the development of democratic institutions and processes. The challenges posed by the security question are compounded by the complex linkages between crime and violence on the one hand, and other structural problems facing the region including poverty, inequality, and informality (Adams 2011; Davis 2007).

If, as Cruz (2003) argues, the legitimacy of the region’s relatively young democratic states may hinge upon their performance in the provision of security, then investigating the effects of the seemingly intractable rise in crime and violence on democracy becomes of utmost importance, as evidenced by the extensive literature on the subject across a range of academic disciplines. The present paper aims to contribute to this ongoing debate by examining one aspect of the relationship between security and democracy, namely by asking how the recent rise in crime and violence in Latin America, as well as fear of crime, has affected the practice of citizenship. As will be discussed in greater detail below, one shortcoming of the literature that examines the relationship between crime, violence, and democracy is that it presents fairly robust evidence for the detrimental impact of crime and insecurity on democracy without indicating possible mechanisms through which those negative outcomes are produced. With this paper I aim to propose and test a series of hypotheses about one channel through which patterns of crime and violence may undermine democracy, by causing fundamental changes in the way individuals experience citizenship. For the purposes of this

¹The terms “fear of crime” and “insecurity” will be used interchangeably throughout this draft. However, in subsequent drafts, I hope to establish clearer conceptual distinctions between these terms. Kessler (2009) provides a helpful discussion of the differences between the two.

²As Cruz (2008) notes, however, studies about insecurity and its implications for democracy have been relatively rare in political science, at least for the Latin American cases

study, the practice of citizenship is operationalized as a set of attitudes and interactions between citizens and their communities, as well as between citizens and state institutions (particularly, though not exclusively, the police).

Through the provision of security, states establish the context in which citizenship is exercised. Hinton (2006) reminds us of the Hobbesian view that “people’s need for protection from the predatory activities of others is what leads them to consent to the state” (6). The provision of security is therefore one of the state’s primary functions, and it is that security which allows citizens to engage in the community and political activities that are constitutive of citizenship. In settings where the state cannot adequately protect citizens from crime, and in which communities are marked by generalized high levels of fear of crime, the right to life and to physical integrity (without which the exercise of citizenship becomes quite difficult) as well as the right to assemble, freedom of expression, and access to information become highly constrained in practice, even if they are officially recognized by law. A society’s security conditions on the ground therefore play an important role in determining whether formal democratic institutions translate into local-level (and individual-level) democratic practices.³ Analyses of perceptions of insecurity in Latin America make frequent reference to the deterioration of community ties and withdrawal from public life and public spaces (Fruhling 2009; Varat and Garland 2006), without theorizing further about the linkages between the actual provision of security, perceptions about the provision of security, and citizens’ participation in community and political life. Drawing upon data from the AmericasBarometer 2010 survey and forty community-level meetings about security in São Paulo and Buenos Aires,⁴ this paper intends to fill an important gap by theorizing about and testing the relationship between security and citizenship.

³Leeds (1996) presents a compelling contrast between great strides made in democratization at the national level in Brazil on the one hand, and, on the other, favelas characterized by state neglect and police repression, as well as the rise of local drug-trafficking organizations, which combined to restrict severely social organization and democracy at the community level.

⁴Due to time constraints, this draft will only include qualitative data from three community meetings in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and São Paulo. I hope to finish analyzing the remaining meetings for the next draft of the paper.

2 Security Under Democracy: The Construction of “Fearful Citizenship” in Latin America

It would be difficult to overstate the significance of crime and fear of crime for Latin America’s citizens and governments. Indeed, the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey⁵ shows that crime is most likely to be cited by citizens as the most important problem facing their country, even over the economy, unemployment, and poverty (see Table 1⁶). Note that if we consider Crime, Violence and Insecurity together, this set of issues is considered the most serious problem facing their country by one quarter of Latin American citizens. As can be readily observed in Figure 1, the emphasis placed on these issues varies dramatically by country. The main takeaway from the data presented here is the high degree of salience of the issue: insecurity appears to be an overarching concern in most Latin American countries (with Nicaragua, Peru and Bolivia as notable exceptions), even in countries such as Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica, where crime rates remain comparatively low.


The furor over insecurity in the region is based on the empirical fact of rising crime rates in the region since democratization, although, as Fruhling (2009) notes, media coverage of crime has helped shaped perceptions (29). Studies of insecurity in Latin America often cite the increase in crime rates since democratization, including an increase in the homicide rate (homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) for Andean countries from approximately 22 to more than 50 between 1984 and 1994 (Fruhling, Tulchin, and Golding 2003, 95). Survey data cited by Acero Velasquez (N.d.) shows that victimization rates throughout the region remain high (even in countries where they have decreased) with about a third of respondents reporting that they have been the victims of crime (14); at the same time, 2004 surveys showed that large proportions or majorities of crime victims admit that they did not report crime to the authorities, ranging from 39% in Uruguay to 75% in Mexico (15).

⁵Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org.

⁶Table 1 reports spontaneous single responses to the question “What is the most serious problem facing the country?” Results from 2010 AmericasBarometer survey.

Table 1: Most Important Problems Cited by Latin American Citizens 2010

Issues	Percentage of respondents
Delinquency / Crime	18.8
Economy	15.4
Violence and Insecurity	6.8
Poverty	6.2
Corruption	6.3
Inflation/High prices	3.4
Politicians	1.9
Education	1.7
Inequality	1.5



The data presented here demonstrate rather compellingly that insecurity is important to large proportions of Latin American citizens; political leaders ignore this issue at their own peril. As Saín (2002) has observed, “issues pertaining to public security became politically relevant when the growing sensation of insecurity in the population began to achieve weight in public opinion and to affect the electoral performance and future electoral fortunes of various provincial and national leaders” (9).

The growing salience of crime and insecurity, the question of how best to address them, are further complicated by the fact that citizens’ perceptions of police and government performance

in providing security remain highly negative (see Figures 2 and 3 in the Appendix), a fact which can have alarming implications for the future stability of democracy in the region (see Figure 4, Appendix). When one considers these findings, demonstrating low levels of trust in the police, alongside the analysis by Brinks (2008) and Chevigny (1999, 1995) which demonstrate societal tolerance for excessive force against marginalized sectors, an important tension emerges. Police institutions are viewed as ineffective at their job, yet there appears to be an implicit demand for police violence and increased authority. Chevigny (1995) attributes this contradiction to citizens' growing sense of powerlessness in the face of rising crime and insecurity. Holston and Caldeira (1998) argue that the contradictions presented by the institutionalization of democratic politics, growth of violent crime, institutional delegitimization of police and courts, and societal support for "authoritarian measures of control" negatively affect the civil dimension of citizenship (in TH Marshall's terms). They argue that "The civil [dimension] differentiates society from the political system by defending the former from abuses of the latter; however, it also integrates the two by utilizing state power against the relations of inequality and domination within society itself" (Holston and Caldeira 1998, 264).

The relationship between citizens and state institutions charged with providing security, therefore emerges as an additional dimension for our analysis. Indeed, police institutions play a key role in structuring citizenship. As can be discerned by titles of classic and recent works focused on the police, which tell us that police represent "the state on the streets" (Hinton 2006) and "streetcorner politicians" (Muir 1979), police-citizen interactions matter. The nature of interactions between "citizens and their police" (Tulchin and Ruthenburg 2006) is indicative of how the state views its citizens, as well as the reverse. As Ungar (2002) observes, "Few other agencies carry out policy with such constant and direct interaction with the population..." (65). Therefore, arguably more than any other institution, police organizations embody the concerns expressed by O'Donnell (1993) in his discussion of "brown areas," a metaphor that captures the highly uneven reach of the state across its territory and population. O'Donnell (1993) argues that many new democracies are characterized by a troubling degree of arbitrariness and unevenness in the application of state laws, a quality that engenders inequality in the exercise of political rights, and which leads to what he terms "low-intensity citizenship" (1361).

The focus on the effects of insecurity on the relationship between citizens and state institutions

- particularly the police - in this study is based on the belief that police shape citizenship in fundamental ways. Police are tasked primarily with enforcing compliance with the law. In a democratic setting, this implies equal application of the laws for all groups of citizens. Yet, if we define police forces as entities that regulate social relations and reflect existing distributions of power (Bayley 1975, 328), an important tension emerges. Kinnane (1979) highlights the ambiguity inherent in policing: “We have never been able to decide whether our police are an instrument of general social order or a means of controlling lower-class, poor, immigrant, black, or otherwise ‘bothersome’ groups” (7). Thus, policing often implies the unequal application of the laws, a condition found in consolidated and developing democracies alike. Even in the case of the former, “where the police have moved away from serving as exclusive protectors of the interests of the state to encompass the role of public servant, we find that the police still constitute a socially divisive force, adding to latent structural tensions present in society” (Hinton 2006, 3). Relations between police and residents of housing projects or other impoverished communities in cities across the United States, for example, attest to the uneven application of the laws across societal groups and the reproduction of inequalities (see Wacquant 2001; Goffman 2009; Kinnane 1979, chapter 6). Police force is borne disproportionately by poor and minority communities. Thus, Rio de Janeiro State’s black residents⁷ constitute 8.4% of its population, yet 29.8% of those killed by police and 26.8% of those wounded (Telles 2004, 167); and in New York City, blacks and Latinos were 85% of individuals stopped by police in 2009 (with 90% of such stops resulting in no further action by police), despite making up just over half of the city’s population.⁸ Such disparities taint relations between police and significant portions of the population. For instance, residents of Whitman Park in Camden, NJ (“the most violent neighborhood in one of the nation’s most dangerous cities”) are hesitant to report crimes to the police due to deep-seated distrust resulting from what they view as police corruption, racial profiling, and excessive use of force⁹; and residents of poor neighborhoods in Santiago, Chile complain of frequent police stops, rough treatment and low police responsiveness (Fruhling 2009, 71).

As Ungar (2002) puts it, “Citizens come into contact with state administrators far more than

⁷This includes only those classified as *preto*, black; it does not include those classified as *pardo*, or mixed-race.

⁸See New York Civil Liberties Union. “Stop and Frisk Practices.” Available at <http://www.nyclu.org/node/1597>

⁹See David Kocieniewski. “Scared Silent - So Many Crimes, and Reasons to Not Cooperate.” *The New York Times*, 30 December 2007.

with judges or elected officials, and whether those administrators deal with citizens in a law-abiding way is central to popular perceptions and support for democracy...” (17). Attitudes toward the police may therefore be generalized toward the state as a whole. Even in limiting our analysis here to the police alone, it is clear that the unevenness of state presence, as manifested in the lack of uniformity in the application of the laws by police - and the distrust and distance it engenders - creates “brown areas” and “low-intensity citizenship,” as posited by O’Donnell (1993, 1358) himself. Police agencies thus structure citizenship by “determin[ing] the practical content of political rights” (Tanner 2000, 102) by reinforcing social inequalities through its enforcement of the law on the one hand, while also providing the conditions that either ensure or constrain the daily exercise of citizenship.

3 The Causes and Consequences of Insecurity in Latin America and Beyond

Latin America is widely recognized as the most violent region in the world. For instance, its homicide rate in 2000 was 27.5 per 100,000, a figure more than five times the global average (Moser, Winton, and Moser 2005, 127). Such averages mask considerable variation across and within countries, ranging from a rate of 2.6 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Chile between 1990 and 2000, to a rate of 64.1 in Colombia during that same period (Dammert and Malone 2003, 86). As Davis (2007) has noted, “Crime, insecurity, and police impunity in the major cities of Latin America - most notably Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Buenos Aires, and Mexico City - remain at unprecedented levels, standing as among the most serious problems facing the continent’s urban citizenry” (58). As a result, an abundant literature has emerged in recent years to address policymakers’ and citizens’ urgent demands for solutions to the region’s worsening security problem.

Scholars have been quick to point out the highly complex and multi-faceted nature of violence and crime and their causes. Adams (2011) identifies a range of factors that she views as “drivers of chronic violence including globalization; social inequality, poverty, and social exclusion; emergence of illicit trade, primarily drug trafficking; “disjunctive democracies; declining or low social capital; and the legacy of prolonged armed conflict in some countries. Similarly, Davis (2007) has also traced issues of urban violence and insecurity in Latin America to processes of contested state formation,

the rise of authoritarianism followed by a limited democratic transition, late industrialization, and the combined impact of these processes on the power of the police and the predominance of informality in the urban economy (57).

Despite the complexity of phenomena such as crime and violence, the literature on insecurity in Latin America provides numerous clues as to the factors that shape fear of crime and insecurity. As Kessler (2009) notes, the classic fear of crime literature has identified factors such as age and gender as individual predictors of fear of crime, with the paradox that those most likely to express fear (women and the elderly) are also least likely to be victimized. Scholars studying security issues in Latin America have tended to look beyond individual characteristics. Davis (2007) cites media attention to crime and violence as a factor that may help to “foment a habitual recourse to violence in all domains of social life (63). She also argues that police may also contribute to citizens sense of fear and insecurity by “producing a climate of fear and privileging the use of force as the single most legitimate means for remedying the problems of criminality, thereby ‘normalizing violence as a response to violence (63). Dammert and Malone (2002) also place responsibility for fear of crime and insecurity with the police. Analyzing survey data for several Argentine cities, they find strong evidence to support their argument that “high levels of corruption and low levels of confidence in the police have led citizens to feel defenseless before criminality these two variables have led Argentines to become more fearful of criminality, since they doubt the efficacy of the democratic institutions that are supposed to protect them (285) ¹⁰ Evidence to support their claims can also be found outside of Latin America. Following a review of studies of fear of crime in Europe, which showed that lack of trust in the police and the justice system were strongly correlated with fear of crime, Bergman and Kessler (2008) note that “at the local level, the feeling of insecurity, crime and distrust of the police reproduce one another” (216).

Other scholars have looked beyond institutions to explain insecurity. Drawing on literature that documented that “individuals threatened by various social and economic insecurities register higher levels of support for punitive policies” (Dammert and Malone 2003, 81) the authors hypoth-

¹⁰It should be noted that a 2003 study by the authors conducted in Chile did not find a statistically significant relationship between attitudes toward the police and fear of crime. Their findings could well be specific to the Argentine case, which has one of the highest levels of insecurity in the region despite also having one of the lowest rates of victimization (As cited in Bergman and Kessler (2008), a survey of 42 countries found that Argentina had the second highest levels of fear of crime, after South Africa (213)); Argentina has one of the lowest levels of confidence in the police and high levels of incidence of corruption (Dammert and Malone 2002, 285).

esize that fear of crime in Chile may in fact may be driven by other economic, social, and political insecurities. The authors argue that “crime has become a convenient scapegoat for citizens. Citizens can channel all their insecurities into fear of crime, as crime is a more tangible phenomenon than are other economic, political, and social insecurities” (Dammert and Malone 2003, 82). The authors find strong evidence of a significant relationship between fear of violence and fear and victimization on the one hand, and an “insecurity scale that combines insecurity on a number of issues including educational opportunities for children, quality of life, economic stability, political stability and human rights (83).¹¹ These factors, combined in the insecurity scale, had a stronger relationship with fear of crime than did other factors believed to be important in other studies, such as victimization and media exposure. Bergman and Kessler (2008), meanwhile, argue that the strongest determinant of individual “sensation of insecurity is what the authors refer to as “ecological pressure: “individuals perception of the degree of criminal frequency that exists in the neighborhoods they inhabit. (210) That is, living in a neighborhood where people perceive crime to be high and more dangerous than other neighborhoods leads individuals to be more fearful of becoming a victim of crime themselves.

In addition to the search for causes, the bulk of the literature on crime, violence, and insecurity in Latin America has focused on identifying the consequences of these phenomena, particularly with regard to democratic stability. Scholars have not hesitated to attribute a range of outcomes to Latin America’s security challenges, including decreased government legitimacy and support for democracy and the rule of law (Cruz 2003, 2008); support for authoritarian security measures and police powers (Chevigny 1995); diminished support for human rights and the rule of law (Adams 2011); loss of public space, segregation of social classes, and the privatization of security (Caldeira 2000); and the loss of financial, human, and social capital (Moser, Winton, and Moser 2005).

Studying the consequences of crime and insecurity for Latin American democracy is of dire

¹¹These findings are particularly important because they underscore the intimate linkages between security and other rights and quality of life issues essential to democracy. They also highlight that the definition of security is much broader than issues of crime and police, and that crime and violence shape and are shaped by social conditions such as education, health, transport, and urban space. One of the key findings of my fieldwork in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia has been the recognition by policymakers and ordinary citizens alike that responses to crime and violence require solutions to pressing social and economic problems. A key element of the Colombian governments security policy, for instance, was the creation of a High Presidential Advisors Office for Citizen Security and Coexistence (*convivencia*), whose function it is to coordinate actions among nearly 20 national ministries (including education, health, transportation, housing, etc.) and entities and municipal governments intended to reduce crime and violence but also improve social conditions for vulnerable populations.

importance. In contrast with the fear of crime literature which focused on cities in “consolidated” democracies, Latin American governments have had to build democratic institutions in settings marked by levels of fear and criminal violence that threaten to undermine them. As Cruz (2003), many countries, including El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, must do so without having had any prior experience with democracy. In this regard, the findings of recent literature on crime and insecurity have been far from encouraging. Adams (2011) identified a series of social transformations resulting from chronic violence, among them: support for non-state justice (including lynching); opposition to human rights; scapegoating of youth, migrants, and others; social isolation, reduced use of public space, and weakened local democracy; and greater prevalence of gender-based violence (35). Bergman and Kessler (2008) similarly argue that the “significant rise in crime rates and fear has generated substantive changes in urban space, as well as in the interactions, forms of life, patterns of socialization, and political attitudes” (209).

If the consequences of crime, violence, and insecurity are complex and broad-based, so are the solutions required to address them. The literature on crime and insecurity has also provided some small clues about the types of solutions that may help governments resolve the seemingly intractable problems associated with insecurity and fear of crime. Cruz (2008) finds that citizens’ evaluation of government performance in the provision of security was an even more important predictor of support for democracy than insecurity (228). This suggests that improving the perception of police and government performance in the area of security may be one way to reduce the negative impact of insecurity on democracy. Bergman and Kessler (2008) also cite earlier studies of European cases that found that increasing police patrols, community policing, and greater articulation between social and security policy can help increase confidence in the police and reduce fear (216).

Although the literature on crime, violence, and insecurity in Latin America, and reflections and tests of the relationship between those phenomena and democracy have been a frequent exercise, significant limitations remain. While many scholars have theorized about and demonstrated empirically the social and political consequences of insecurity, we still know relatively little about the mechanisms through which these processes occur. The channels through which insecurity and fear of crime lead to decreased legitimacy or support for democracy, for instance, have been suggested but not tested empirically and theorized insufficiently. Moreover, many scholars have described dire consequences of insecurity for citizenship and social relationships, without theorizing about

or providing evidence of the underlying mechanisms. This paper represents a first step towards exploring the micro-level processes through which the experience of citizenship becomes curtailed as a result of insecurity and fear of crime. An initial theory and hypotheses will be outlined in the next section.

The following subsection reviews the literature on fear of crime, which is based primarily on the United States and predates the literature on Latin America by several decades. Although the current draft of this paper will not engage in a discussion of the distinctions between insecurity and fear of crime, it is essential to note that they are not identical nor interchangeable. As Kessler (2009) helpfully clarifies, “insecurity does not cover all crimes, not even all violent crimes, and at the same time may refer to actions and subjects considered by certain groups to be threatening yet which nevertheless do not infringe upon any law” (11). Dozens of community meetings and interviews with community leaders and police officials carried out during my fieldwork confirmed this distinction. In Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Colombia, homeless individuals, youth hanging out in the streets, and prostitutes were identified consistently as agents of insecurity without being associated with crime *per se*.

An additional distinction worth highlighting is that between victimization and fear of crime, a point that is perhaps best highlighted by the case of Chile, with some of the region’s lowest crime victimization rates and some of the highest levels of fear of crime (Dammert and Malone 2003). Indeed, insecurity or fear of crime, “has never been a reflection of crime rates, is mediated by different levels of acceptability of crime in each society and exhibits a relative autonomy: it tends to increase as victimization rises, but once it is installed as a social problem, it does not decline even if crime rates do so” (Bergman and Kessler 2008, 210).

3.1 A Closer Look at Fear of Crime

Lit review will be completed for next draft

4 Theory and Hypotheses

The city of *rumba* cannot stay up all night, minors are subjected to curfews; all citizens are imbued with paranoia and one of the primary conditions of coexistence (*convivencia*) disappears: trust, exacerbating the tendency toward the dissolution of

the social linkages of solidarity... This increases even more the illegitimacy of the state to offer alternatives that will establish trust and citizen security. Residents will seek refuge in private spaces and individual outings; they will assume defense mechanisms that modify daily conduct, restricting even more social relations, giving way to the city of suspicion and distrust, privatizing security, in such a way that only through self-defense can each person guarantee their life, honor, and property. It is a circular process, which destroys the social fabric and makes even more difficult the appearance of full citizens... (Aldana 2004, 169)

Scholars have not been shy about highlighting the negative repercussions of crime and insecurity for citizenship and social relations, as demonstrated by the extended quote above about Bogotá, Colombia. This section aims to outline an initial theory about the micro-level processes through which citizenship begins to erode as a result of increased crime, violence, and insecurity. For the purposes of this paper, citizenship is understood in terms of community life and citizens' relationship with state institutions, though the concept of citizenship is of course much broader, as is the potential for insecurity to impact other dimensions of citizenship. In the hypotheses presented below and the qualitative and quantitative analysis, citizenship will be operationalized in terms of a set of interactions with and attitudes toward the state and one's community. With respect to attitudes toward and interactions with fellow citizens, the focus will be: 1) trust in one's neighbors; 2) community involvement; 3) use of public/community spaces and attitudes toward one's community; and 4) diversity of interactions. Attitudes and interactions with the state, meanwhile, will be defined in terms of: 1) attitudes toward local and national government; 2) trust in criminal justice institutions (including the police); 3) petitioning the government to resolve problems; 4) preferences for private solutions.¹²

The (very preliminary) argument advanced by this paper is that, in keeping with the literature cited above, insecurity and fear of crime limits individuals' sphere of citizen activity. Though they may not withdraw completely from community and public life, they begin to restrict interactions with others both temporally and spatially, such that they interact chiefly with other residents in the closed condominiums described in Caldeira (2000). In other words, citizens come to engage with an increasingly homogenous group, while distancing themselves from people of other social classes or ethnic/racial groups. Similarly, they begin to undertake private security measures and interact less with the police and other local state officials responsible for providing security. The

¹²The next version of the theory will need to take into account efficacy at the individual and community levels.

distance created among citizens and between citizens and the state decreases trust and limits the circulation of information about crime and insecurity (except from the media).

Drawing on data from the 2010 wave of the AmericasBarometer survey, as well as qualitative data from participant observation in dozens of community security meetings in Buenos Aires and São Paulo.¹³, I set out to test the following hypotheses about the relationship between insecurity and citizenship.

Insecurity and the relationship to one's community. Scholars have found ample evidence to support the claim that victimization and insecurity “erode overall levels of interpersonal trust in the Latin American region” (Cruz 2008, 231). Following this literature, I also hypothesize that *the perception of insecurity reduce individuals' trust in their neighbors*. I further hypothesize that *insecurity also leads citizens to limit their sphere of activity, thus interacting with a less diverse group of people*. As Caldeira (2000) wrote about the residents of closed condominiums in São Paulo, “People who inhabit these spaces value living among selected people (considered to be of the same social group) and away from the undesired interactions, movement, heterogeneity, danger, and unpredictability of urban streets” (258).

A related hypothesis is that *insecurity leads individuals to view their communities and cities as less safe, leading them to restrict their sphere of activity temporally and spatially*. Ample survey evidence supports this hypothesis. Findings from a victimization survey conducted in several Argentine cities in 2000 cited in Dammert and Malone (2002) demonstrated that majorities of respondents in Argentinas five major metropolitan areas (CABA, GBA, Rosario, Mendoza, Crdoba) noted that they felt insecure in their own neighborhoods when it gets dark, and that they stay away from certain streets or areas in their own neighborhood after dark. Bergman and Kessler 2008 also cite a Gallup poll from 1999 conducted in Argentina, which found that 29% of respondents had stopped going out at night (210). Similarly, findings from a 1999 study financed by the Pan-American Health Organization demonstrated that 68.7% of those surveyed were afraid of being in downtown Santiago; 64% were afraid of being in the public transportation system (Dammert and Malone 2003, 85). The final hypothesis derives from the previous three: if individuals trust their neighbors less and limit their sphere of activity, I hypothesize that *insecurity will lead to diminished community involvement, understood as participation in community organizations and activities*.

¹³The current draft will be based on only four community meetings in Buenos Aires, São Paulo, and Montevideo.

Insecurity and citizens' relationship to the state. Following the literature cited above, I hypothesize that *insecurity will lead to decreased citizen satisfaction with local and national governments, which will be seen by insecure citizens as ineffective in protecting them from crime and violence.* More to the point, *insecurity will diminish citizens' confidence in the police and other criminal justice institutions.* Consequently, such *citizens will distance themselves from state actors and will seek out state institutions less in order to resolve problems.* As argued in much of the literature, *fearful citizens will prefer private solutions to their security problems,* whether through lynchings in Guatemalan villages or gated communities and closed condominiums with private guards in São Paulo and Buenos Aires.

5 Data and Methods

6 Preliminary Findings

6.1 How Citizens Express Insecurity: Evidence from Community Meetings in Three Cities

Over the course of fifteen months I carried out dissertation research on the subject of police reform and formal mechanisms of community participation in security in Buenos Aires Province (and City), São Paulo State, and Bogotá.

7 Concluding Remarks and Next Steps

8 Appendix




Figure 2. Results from 2008 wave of the AmericasBarometer survey. Respondents were asked, “If you were the victim of a robbery or mugging, how much would you trust police to capture the person responsible?” Above, percentage responding “A little” or “Not at all.”




Figure 3. Results from 2008 wave of the AmericasBarometer survey. Respondents were asked, “How much would you say that the current government is improving citizen security?” Answers were marked on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot). Above, percentage responding 1, 2 or 3.




Figure 4. Results from 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 waves of AmericasBarometer survey. Respondents were asked “Some people say that under certain circumstances, it would be justified if the military took power through a coup. In your opinion which situations would justify a military coup?” Circumstance shown here: “high delinquency.” Above, percentage responding that a coup would be justified.

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