Identity, Integration, and Citizenship in Post-Communist Ethnic Kin Policies

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Since the 1990s, at least 11 post-communist states have created laws granting special recognition to ethnic kin abroad. These “compatriot” policies – to borrow a term commonly used in some of these states to refer to ethnic kin, whether citizens or not – provide legal recognition and some form of benefits to people who can prove their ethnic or national origin from a particular state, or in some cases origin from territory that state once held. This recognition is sometimes referred to as “external quasi-citizenship.”¹ The benefits from these policies include some of the civil, economic, and social rights of citizenship such as preferential access to education, less burdensome visa requirements for work or visits than other foreigners receive, or fast-track options for gaining citizenship. They also include programs for the preservation and promotion of languages and cultural practices in ethnic kin communities living abroad. They do not include political rights of citizenship, such as the right to vote or run for office.²

My core perspective on these policies is developed from Brubaker’s notion of “groupness as an event,” that is, that the creation of identity and ethnic or national categories, is a dynamic project.³ Recognition bestowed on populations outside the state’s borders belongs to what Varadarajan conceptualizes as the “domestic abroad,” the extension of the state and its categorization of society into the international arena.⁴ In the post-communist cases that I examine, compatriot laws are rooted in the notion that

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² States with policies specifically recognizing non-citizen ethnic kin include (in order of appearance of the law) Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Russia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ukraine, Poland, Serbia, Croatia, and Georgia. Programs and laws regarding ethnic kin are not absent in other post-communist states, but I am limiting my focus to those explicitly recognizing non-citizen ethnic kin in their laws and targeting these individuals for specific engagement programs and benefits.
nationality “sticks” regardless of border changes, individual exit, or in some cases, birth and a life lived entirely in a different state. The character of this recognition is then moderated by 1) the dominant interpretation of national belonging by the state’s elites and the degree to which ethnic kin abroad challenge or accept this interpretation, 2) historical factors that have resulted in ethnic conflict or notable populations living outside the states borders, and 3) the state’s varying needs over time in the international political and economic development arenas.

A number of other states with high levels of emigration, including India, Pakistan, and Ethiopia, have also created laws to engage emigrants and their descendants in the economic and cultural life of their homelands. These laws create a similar form of external quasi-citizen status to those found in post-communist countries. In developing states, these are frequently interpreted as a development strategy. States cultivate ties with diaspora who are earning more abroad, and theoretically can contribute significantly to the development of their homelands. Indeed, a large literature has grown around arguments about the impact of diasporas and diaspora engagement policies on economic development.5

The post-communist context, however, provides an important opportunity to examine a wider range of factors that inspire compatriot policies, and to examine how the policies diffuse over time. These policies have recently gained notoriety due to the separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine, in which Russia has repeatedly invoked the

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importance of defending its compatriots. However, the phenomenon is relatively common in the post-communist region and is not unique to states seeking to expand their territory. At the fall of communism, eastern bloc and former Soviet countries were faced with enormous economic and political transitions that required redefinition of most parts of society. Ethnic kin in neighboring states and further abroad were viewed as crucial to this process. As the post-communist states began adopting specific policies to ethnic kin abroad, they also emulated one another and adapted policies to local conditions. This has aided the rapid diffusion of these policies throughout the region.

**Slovakia and Croatia:**

Slovakia and Croatia have both developed compatriot policies that create a specific legal status for ethnic kin abroad who are not citizens, as well as cultural preservation programs serving diaspora and ethnic kin populations. Slovakia was one of the earliest post-communist states to adopt a compatriot law, in 1997. Its policy defined a “Foreign Slovak” as a person “without state citizenship of the Slovak Republic, but [who] has Slovak nationality or Slovak ethnic descent and Slovak cultural-linguistic awareness.” Slovak descent is defined here as a direct line of descent to the third generation, but written statements by members of Slovak organizations abroad can substitute for written proof of this descent. Language proficiency must be at least at a passive level of knowledge.\(^6\) Between 1997 and 2005 the status was certified by issuance of an identity card, and rights associated with the policy were (originally) to include automatic temporary residence, a fast track to citizenship applications, the right to schooling and

\(^6\) Law No. 70 “On Foreign Slovaks and on Changes and Additions to Several Laws,” 14 February 1997, Articles 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6.
employment on the same level as citizens, the right to buy and sell property (not allowed
to all foreigners), and for certain categories of elderly people, transportation discounts.⁷ A
new version of the law, passed in 2005, replaced the cards with certificates, included
Slovaks with citizenship living abroad, created a central office to manage compatriot
policy, and shifted the main focus of the policy to providing aid for organizations
abroad.⁸

Croatia is one of the most recent cases to adopt a compatriot policy. Its policy,
created in 2011 with explicit input from the policies of several states before it, is broader
in inclusiveness.⁹ The legal status of “Croatian without Croatian Citizenship” can be
acquired “by Croatians outside the Republic of Croatia without Croatian citizenship, their
children (born and adopted) and friends of the Croatian people and the Republic of
Croatia who nurture Croatian identity and promote Croatian cultural unity.”¹⁰ Affiliation
to Croatia is to be proven through documentation showing commitment to Croatian
identity, such as recommendations from Croatian associations or membership certificates
for Croatian organizations abroad. This is a much lighter requirement than that for
diaspora who wish to acquire external citizenship, which requires documented proof of
Croatian descent. According to the law, people with the status of Croatian without
Croatian Citizenship are to be treated the same as Croatian citizens in the areas of
schooling, university education, employment, scholarships, health insurance, and other

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⁷ Ibid, Articles 5, 6.
⁸ Law No. 474 “On Slovaks Living Abroad and on Changes and Additions to Several Laws,” 23 September
2005.
Observatory, European University Institute, Florence. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.
Produced by CITSEE, Edinburgh University Law School. Revised and Updated February 2013, 19.
¹⁰ Act on the Relations Between the Republic of Croatia and the Croatians Outside the Republic of Croatia,
21 October 2011, Article 39.
areas yet to be determined.\textsuperscript{11} The policy also created the State Office for Croatians Outside of the Republic of Croatia and created an advisory council of appointed diaspora members.

Slovakia and Croatia had very different experiences during communism’s collapse. However, earlier historical periods in each country had already laid the foundation for particular patterns of state-diaspora relations. Each had, as poverty-stricken corners of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, experienced heavy emigration in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries. Nascent nationalism in each was thwarted when after World War I they became junior members of larger multinational states. Each finally achieved nation-state status during World War II – but as fascist, authoritarian regimes, both known for their brutality.\textsuperscript{12} The remnants of fascist supporters fled along with many other types of dissidents during the communist era, setting the stage for generally hostile relations with diaspora. This was compounded by suspicion from paranoid communist governments, which infiltrated and spied on diaspora groups. In the case of Croatia, even carried out assassinations against figures considered opposed to the regime, while a combination of anti-communist activists and regrouped fascist militant sympathizers carried out protests and sometimes violent attacks against Yugoslav targets in Western countries.\textsuperscript{13} Nevertheless, both countries actually maintained certain ties to their diasporas.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., Article 41.
In Slovakia, Matica Slovenská (founded 1863) and the Slovak League (founded 1907), both non-governmental cultural organizations, had long pursued Slovak nationalism aims among the diaspora and in Slovakia itself.\textsuperscript{14} These and other Slovak organizations were instrumental in supporting the creation of Czechoslovakia after WWII. During the communist era, Matica Slovenská came under government control, continuing to produce informational materials on communities of Slovaks abroad and to support Slovak communities in other countries behind the Iron Curtain, such as those in Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{15} Meanwhile, during the communist regime, a number of Slovak organizations abroad, such as the World Congress of Slovaks in the United States, actively supported the cause of liberation from the regime, and for Slovak independence.\textsuperscript{16}

In Croatia (part of Yugoslavia from 1945), ethnic ultra-nationalism became unacceptable after WWII. In the early years of communist rule, Yugoslav communists broke with Stalin and attempted to establish ties with the west. In this context, Matica Hrvatska Iseljenika (commonly known in English as the Croatian Heritage Foundation, CHF) was formed in 1951 to make ties with diaspora, and since then published a regular magazine, \textit{Matica}, for diaspora consumption. Despite generally hostile state-diaspora relations, the CHF worked, in the words of its current director, like a “little foreign office,” facilitating international ties and smoothing ties between the state and Croatian Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{17} It was only when ex-communist Dr. Franjo Tudjman, founder of the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Interview, March 1, 2014 (Prof. J. Botík); Interview, March 15 (Matica Slovenská, Executive Board Member); Stolarik, M. Mark, “Slovak Nationalism in the USA as Reflected in the Slovak-American Press, 1885-1918,” \textit{Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism} 31 (2004), 65-76.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Such as the series František Bielik a kolektiv, \textit{Slováci vo Svete} [Slovaks in the World] (Martin: Matica Slovenská, 1980).
  \item \textsuperscript{16} The Slovak National Council Abroad (founded 1947) became the World Congress of Slovaks in 1970. It was opposed to other diaspora organizations that advocated for democratic reforms within Czechoslovakia, but not for Slovak independence.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Interview, Director of Croatian Heritage Foundation, August 4, 2014.
\end{itemize}
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), who would become independent Croatia’s first president, embraced the diaspora in his cause for Croatian independence and statehood, that some came to perceive the diaspora as a positive force for Croatia.

**Beginnings of Compatriot Policies in Post-Communist Slovakia**

*Defining Slovak compatriots and their significance: steps toward a comprehensive policy*

Slovakia and the Czech Republic amicably split at the end of 1992. Newly independent Slovakia was then led by nationalist prime minister Vladimir Mečiar and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). Not only was the country creating a new national definition after splitting from the dominant Czechs, but with a large Hungarian ethnic population clustered compactly around the southern border, they had to (from the point of view of nation-state builders) secure Slovaks as the core ethnicity of the new state.\(^\text{18}\)

In this context, Slovakia’s new government began to form policy on Slovaks abroad. Their attempts reveal three major ideas behind this policy. First, Slovakia’s government defined national belonging ethnically, regardless of political borders. In the years of communism’s demise, there was considerable uncertainty about the stability of and nationalizing processes in other former communist states where Slovak minority populations had lived since the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, including Hungary, Ukraine, and the now-crumbling Yugoslavia. It was by no means clear that ethnic minorities would be treated with respect, and shared nationhood implies some form of protection or at least interest. A second factor was the perception that a symbolic gesture acknowledging Slovaks abroad who had fought for independence was required,

\(^\text{18}\) Hungarians make up approximately 10% of the population of Slovakia.
as well as correction of injustices such as criminal convictions and loss of property that had resulted from emigration during the communist era. The third main motivation behind the policy was strategic and would grow in prominence as Slovakia strove to repair its economy and join the European Union. The government hoped to utilize parts of these newly welcomed ethnic kin to develop Slovakia economically and politically, facilitating its integration into the global system from which it had been isolated for many years. Slovakia aimed for European Union membership early on, signing an association agreement in 1993 and submitting its application for EU accession in 1995.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Culture reports commissioned that year to tackle the issue of Slovaks abroad laid out all these motivations. Clippings from these reports illustrate the presence of each train of thought in early policymaking, and also reveal from which other states Slovak policymakers were taking their cues:

[**Ethnic Nationalism**] The proposed concept comes from a definition of foreign Slovaks as a specific, organic and indivisible part of the Slovak nation, living abroad. Slovakia therefore cannot and does not want to abjure its historical and moral accountability for the fate of compatriot communities of foreign Slovaks, for the preservation and comprehensive development of their national identity, the application of their human and minority rights…. [Slovakia] acknowledges the natural right of compatriots to their original homeland, or the land of their ancestors, and in this connection is obliged to gradually facilitate legal norms making it possible to truly exercise the aforementioned right…the prospective goal…is the gradual linking and reintegration of compatriot diaspora to the economic, cultural, social, and spiritual context of Slovakia.

[**Restitution for the Past**] Independent Slovakia, due to the invaluable significance that compatriots represent for the Slovak state, must for their sake as soon as possible deal with the residues of former disregard, indifference, undervaluing, animosity and rejection, which were characteristic under the former communist regime. Slovaks abroad must (as it is in many countries with considerable compatriot minorities around the world, for example in Poland, Hungary, Switzerland, Germany, etc.) occupy a worthy place in the political conception and practical steps of the Slovak Republic.
Slovaks Abroad command significant informational potential, invaluable experiences, and frequently have influential contacts and links with the leading technical, economic, social and scientific institutions and people in the countries where they live…Despite heterogeneous structures and often conflicting interests, they have overwhelmingly welcomed the birth of the independent Slovak Republic.¹⁹

In these early years, structures arose within various government ministries to deal with Slovaks abroad. The Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became the main organizers of compatriot policy, while the Ministry of Education and Matica Slovenská (now partially state funded but with independent leadership) focused on educational programs. In 1995, the Dom Zahraničných Slovákov [House of Foreign Slovaks] was created under the Ministry of Culture, with an ambitious goal to be a “cultural-presentational, informational-analytical, research and documentary, organizational-coordinating and service workplace for foreign Slovaks.”²⁰ It would become the model for the Office for Slovaks living Abroad (OSLA), which today exists as a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and administers Slovakia’s compatriot policy.

Law on Foreign Slovaks: Consolidating Identity and Atoning for the Past

The Law on Foreign Slovaks passed in 1997. This key legislation created the official status of “foreign Slovak.” Parliamentary debate surrounding the issue suggests that the

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¹⁹ Selections from the Správa o postavení zahraničných Slovákov a koncepcia spolupráce s nimi, Materiál na rokovanie vlády Slovenskej republiky. Ministerstvo zahraničných vecí Slovenskej Republiky, April 1993. [Report on the status of foreign Slovaks and concept of cooperation with them, Material for discussion by the government of the Slovak Republic. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic].
Ministry of Culture officials who proposed the law believed it would include nearly 3 million Slovaks abroad. They also indicated that they had consulted with Slovak organizations in Croatia, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, the USA, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Hungary, and Germany (though never indicated specific organizations), and that the law was a “great compromise” that tried to blend the greater demands of these groups with the interests of the Slovak Republic.\(^{21}\) There was little dissent in Slovakia’s government about the desirability of the law, in contrast to Croatia, where diaspora were associated clearly with a political party (the HDZ), and the later diaspora policy had a strongly partisan slant. In Slovakia, Mečiar’s nationalistic HZDS unsurprisingly supported the law, but communist successor party, Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) did also, as “moral debt” and a pathway to win back credibility.\(^{22}\)

In parliamentary debate, representatives expressed primarily ethnic and historical justice motives. Some also interpreted the symbolic power of this law in creating a new and expanded sense of the Slovak nation as the law’s most crucial benefit. According to one representative, “although it does not satisfy the demands and ideas of all foreign Slovaks, it is a real accommodating step on the part of the state. Perhaps it is not even so important how many benefits for them the law defines, but that it for the first time legally enshrines the concept of foreign Slovak, and that the culture of foreign Slovaks is understood as a part of Slovak cultural heritage.”\(^{23}\)

The concept of an ethnic nation requiring restoration did not go entirely unchallenged, however. Slovakia was by no means a mono-ethnic state. The country had yet to deal with some of the darker ghosts of its past, especially widespread support for

\(^{21}\) Minister of Culture I. Hudec, Parliamentary debate, 14 February, 1997.
\(^{22}\) Interview, March 22, 2014 (MZV representative).
fascism during World War II, and severe persecution of Jews, Roma, and other ethnic minorities. In the debate, only Hungarian representatives decried the ethnic nature of the definition of a “foreign Slovak.” Representative Bugár decried the idea of offering benefits and recognition “only to those who belonged and belong linguistically, culturally, and ethnically to the Slovak nation, [while excluding] from the offered benefits all of those former citizens, who had to leave the country for the same reasons as their colleagues belonging to groups of foreign Slovaks, but have a different ethnic origin” and called this feature the “the biggest mistake” in the bill.24

Another Hungarian representative stated: “I could not believe my own eyes, that I was reading the text of a government bill. I thought that someone planted the text of the Nuremburg laws in it, and was testing my alertness.”25 Yet another noted that “hundreds of thousands” of people of Czech, Jewish, German, and Hungarian ethnicities had been expelled from Slovakia between 1938 and 1949 in the interests of creating a “pure Slavic state.”26 Responses to these arguments against the heavily ethnic nature of the concept of foreign Slovaks were by and large dismissive. On the proposal that the Law on Foreign Slovaks should recognize and restore rights to people of many ethnicities who had been unjustly expelled from the country, 56% voted against, 16% for, and the rest officially abstained or simply did not vote.27

Another theme in the debate was the value of the law as restitution for the past regime’s treatment of dissidents who fled the communist regime. This theme was more readily embraced by those who were critical of the law’s ethnic orientation.

Representative Bugár, for example, described it as “gesture by the Slovak Republic for Slovaks living outside of the Slovak Republic, whom this country treated poorly.”

Another representative combined the ethnic and historical justice motives when she stated that, “At least in part we can in this way atone for our debt to those foreign Slovaks whom the totalitarian regime behind the iron curtain fully or at least in large measure prevented a return home, to their ethnic roots.” The law was intended to welcome people back to Slovakia and engage them with the country in some way, but it was clear even from this beginning stage that the actual demands of many groups of Slovaks abroad could not be met. Some compatriot groups, particularly those in Western Europe, sought much more than the Slovak state was prepared to concede, such as easy access to dual citizenship, the elimination of dual taxation, facilitation of property restitution claims, and voting rights. The law’s backers described some of these desires as “not entirely within the interest of the Slovak state.”

Nevertheless, most representatives were convinced of the law’s symbolic power, and it passed easily, with 88% in favor, 8% against, 4% not voting.

In its early stages, then, Slovakia’s new policy toward its ethnic kin appears to have arisen out of three major motivations as it developed over several years from Slovak independence. During the formation of the actual Law on Foreign Slovaks in parliament, a multi-ethnic definition of Slovakia was rejected, and the law was defined as a restoration of rights and recognition for ethnic Slovaks alone.

Initially, many provisions of the law were not implemented because they required changes in other laws on social benefits, employment, and so on, which took

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several years. But it did create a relatively easy pathway to citizenship, imposing no residency requirement on holders of the status once they had arrived in Slovakia, and also allowed them to work without the special permits required of other foreigners.\textsuperscript{31} In the years after President Mečiar’s nationally oriented regime dissolved, Slovakia’s diaspora policy was further consolidated,\textsuperscript{32} and efforts made to better include the voices of Slovaks abroad in the process of formulating policy into the future. In 1999, the Parliament issued a programmatic declaration of support for Slovaks abroad.\textsuperscript{33}

Another initiative aimed to make Slovaks abroad part of a mutual project of state and ethnic kin. The establishment of the Stála Konferencia, or Permanent Conference of the Slovak Republic and Slovaks Abroad, in 1999, coincided with the publication of the National Council’s declaration. It has since become the most visible point of communication between diaspora groups and the state, although it is difficult to pinpoint concrete results of this activity.\textsuperscript{34} Finally, one more major change came in the form of an amendment to the Constitution to insert a clause mandating the protection and support of Slovaks abroad. The new Article 7a, introduced in 2000, states that “the Slovak republic supports the national consciousness and cultural identity of Slovaks living abroad, supports their institutions created for the accomplishment of this purpose, and [their] ties

\textsuperscript{31} Interview, March 22, 2014 (MZV representative).
\textsuperscript{32} Expressed, for example, in cooperative work by the ministers of culture and of foreign affairs: Milan Kňažko and Eduard Kukan, Návrh transformácie systému zabezpečenia vzťahov Slovenskej republiky k zahraničným Slovákom, Materiál na rokovanie vlády Slovenskej republiky, [Proposal for transformation of the system of securing connections of the Slovak Republic to foreign Slovaks, Material for discussion by the government of the Slovak Republic], Bratislava, 1999.
\textsuperscript{33} Deklarácia Národnej Rady Slovenskej Republiky [Declaration of the National Council of the Slovak Republic], Bratislava, July 6, 1999.
\textsuperscript{34} Vyhlásenie Stálej konferencie k otázкам vzájomných vzťahov a spolupráce [Declaration of the Permanent Conference on questions of mutual relations and cooperation], Bratislava, July 1999.
to their motherland.” Slovak compatriot policy was now backed by constitutional mandate and here to stay.

The Act on Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Croatians Outside the Republic of Croatia: From Partisan Politics to National Policy

Forging the State-Diaspora Relationship

Croatia’s pathway to a policy resembling Slovakia’s was very different. As in Slovakia, Croatian diaspora had been rooted in the country’s independence movement, but three factors initially pushed Croatia’s approach into a more extreme ethnonationalist position. First, Croatia’s independence was achieved through war rather than mutual agreement as in Slovakia. Second, the diaspora policy of the 1990s was rooted in ties made prior to independence between the HDZ political party and nationalist activists in the diaspora, so an interest in ethnic Croats abroad came to be associated in Croatian politics with just one political party. Finally, Croats also live compactly settled in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). For some nationalists, including this territory in a “greater Croatia” was an important political goal, and the Bosnian Croats became renowned for their intense nationalism during the conflict. While the territory did not become part of Croatia, it has remained a key interest of the state, and through Croatia’s generous external citizenship policy, ethnic-Croat politicians with Croatian citizenship in Bosnia

have maintained a degree of influence over Croatian policy toward diaspora and toward all Croats living outside of the Republic of Croatia.\textsuperscript{36}

The war for Croatian independence saw a surge in donations and other aid from diaspora. Afterwards, some former diaspora members returned to Croatia and those close to Tudjman often received political rewards, with positions in ministries including in the short-lived “Ministry of Return and Immigration,” which existed during the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{37} From being crucial players during the fight for independence and then capturing many political rewards afterwards, diaspora and returnee forces were eclipsed after the defeat of the HDZ in 2000. The new SDP government closed the Ministry of Return and Immigration, stopped a Bill of Returnees (which was to have been modeled on the Israeli Law of Return), closed certain consulate offices, and began to reduce the voting power of citizen diaspora.\textsuperscript{38} Even when the HDZ won back power in 2003, it was no longer able to rule without significant compromise to the SDP, which held a very different vision of the Croatian nation. The SDP sought to reduce diaspora Croat influence, and extend more influence to people permanently resident within Croatia. Ultimately, this resulted in a reduction in the number of parliamentary seats held by holders of external citizenship from 12 to 3, and an increase in seats allocated for ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{39}

\textit{Planning a Cohesive Compatriot Policy for the Future}

\textsuperscript{36} Hockenos, 2003; Winland, 2007.
\textsuperscript{37} Hockenos, 2003, 48.
\textsuperscript{38} Winland 2007.
The diaspora issue arose again long after the diaspora’s importance to the immediate survival of the state had faded. Despite the shift in Croatia away from nationalist politics, the persistence of highly-motivated small groups and individuals has kept alive the notion of the importance of Croats abroad. People for whom the problems of Croats outside of Croatia are of particular interest and even personal value have continued to pursue a commitment to Croats abroad, and have driven the development of Croatia’s current policy. A number of major activists inside and out of the government on this issue are people with experience as emigrants themselves, or come from Croatian populations outside of Croatia, in particular, Bosnia. While Bosnia has been a continual focus for Croatia because of its large Croatian-citizen population and its need for assistance after years of war, this law was eventually designed to formally tie Bosnian assistance policy to the broader issue of Croats abroad.

Bosnian presence in the Croatian government was crucial for the creation and passage of the Act on the Relations of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatians Outside the Republic of Croatia (hence forth, “Act”). For example, the current deputy head of the Office for Croats Outside of Croatia is a Croat of Bosnian origin, and had lived in Australia and New York before returning to Croatia in the early 1990s during the regime change. He and a team that included at least two children of returnees to Croatia were the main architects of the “Strategy For the Relations Between the Republic of Croatia and the Croatians Outside the Republic of Croatia” – the concept paper produced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and upon which the Act was eventually based.\(^{40}\) One of the main proponents of the law in the Croatian parliament was Dr. Ivan Bagarić of the HDZ, a Bosnian-Croat representative. His extensive work on the law was in part based on

\(^{40}\) Interview, Deputy Head of State Office for Croats Abroad, July 31, 2014.
knowledge specifically of the needs of Bosnian Croats.\textsuperscript{41} Indeed, the Bosnia issue features strongly in the parliamentary debates regarding the Act, and almost entirely dominates the final debate, in which the SDP did not participate.\textsuperscript{42} In addition, the law was developed with a certain amount of consultation from non-governmental diaspora organizations such as the Croatian World Congress, and with the advisory participation of returned emigrants or their descendants.\textsuperscript{43} Other activist supporters of strong diaspora ties have also long advocated for stronger and more cohesive government policy toward Croats abroad. These activists include Ante Beljo, the former head of the CHF, and Marin Sopta, a returnee from Canada who was closely associated with President Tudjman prior to Croatian independence.\textsuperscript{44}

While officially the 2011 Act was passed unanimously and there was little open or serious opposition to it,\textsuperscript{45} an SDP/HDZ divide played into the law’s development,\textsuperscript{46} and SDP support for it was not entirely wholehearted. In parliamentary debates, HDZ politicians largely laud the law’s potential, but criticism came from smaller numbers of SDP members. Some called its provisions, including the special status for non-citizens “romantic” but unfeasible,\textsuperscript{47} “bizarre” and ill-defined, “some sort of substitute or some

\begin{itemize}
  \item Communication with Dr. Ivan Bagarić, July 16, July 18.
  \item Rasprava prema aktu: Konačni prijedlog zakona o odnosima Republike Hrvatske s Hrvatima izvan Republike Hrvatske, drugo čitanje, P.Z. br. 857, October 14, 2011
  \item Interviews supporting this viewpoint included: Diaspora business and organization leader, July 1; Dr. Ivan Bagarić, July 16,18; former Ministry for Diaspora Official and activist, July 17; Diaspora Congress Organizer, Activist, July 28; Co-founder of Croatian Information Center, Former Director of the Croatian Heritage Foundation and Former Diaspora list parliament member, July 31; Official from the State Office for Croats Abroad, July 31; former external member of the Committee for Croats Abroad, August 27, 2014.
  \item Hockenos, 2003; Interviews, July 28, July 31.
  \item Interviews: June 10, July 16/18, July 17, July 28, Office for Croats Abroad Official, July 31; Croatian Heritage Foundation official, August 4.
  \item Interview, former Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official, August 12, 2014; Interview, SDP official involved in the law development, August 25, 2014.
  \item Tatjana Šimac Bonačić, Rasprava prema aktu: Prijedlog zakona o odnosima Republike Hrvatske s Hrvatima izvan Republike Hrvatske, prvo čitanje, P.Z. br. 857, July 14, 2011.
\end{itemize}
kind of category B citizenship.”\textsuperscript{48} They expressed concern that this law would privilege non-residents who have a poorly-defined affiliation with Croatia over people of all ethnicities actually living there. They also expressed skepticism that people who had chosen to leave the country should receive any special treatment, since Croats living in Croatia “do not have any backup country, nor, except a few, do they have any backup citizenship.”\textsuperscript{49} Moreover, the partisan association of Croatian diaspora and the HDZ still remained a sore point, with one SDP member suggesting that the proposed Croatian Card giving Croats from abroad specific benefits and discounts, would be nothing more than an “HDZ [membership] card.”\textsuperscript{50}

This shows that among many Croatian politicians, collaboration with Croats abroad was still perceived to be the province of the HDZ. At the same time, there was no political gain in opposing legislation to help Croats abroad. As one SDP member from the committee that developed the law explained, the SDP supported the law because to do so was largely politically neutral—it was not a central concern of voters or the country at that point—but not to do so could have had ultimately negative consequences for the image of the SDP, by making it easier for their opposition to accuse them of a lack of patriotism.\textsuperscript{51} In part, the SDP’s sensitivity on this subject originates from its status as the communist successor party, and the hostile relationship of the state during the communist era.

Nevertheless, the partisan division is not always so clear-cut. In order to achieve consensus, the law’s authors chose not to tackle one of the biggest concerns of those

\textsuperscript{48} Tanja Vrbat Grgić, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} Ingrid Antičević Marinović, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Interview, Social Democratic Party Headquarters, August 25, 2014.
diaspora members who hold Croatian citizenship: their level of representation in parliament. Additionally, differences in actual performance between the two parties when it comes to diaspora are not always perceived to be very large. While this deserves more study, several activists suggested that HDZ and diaspora enthusiasm for each other has been overestimated. Outside of the wartime crisis period when many diaspora members were providing crucial financing and aid to the state, the day to day administration of issues relating to Croats abroad—from possibilities for investment and requests for favorable property and residency laws, to tax and pension laws, to voting laws—has not differed quite as strongly as may have been expected, at least in the perception of some Croatian activists, scholars, and politicians.\(^\text{52}\)

Additional factors in the formation of Croatian compatriot policy include learning from other states, and the common problems that Croatia shares with other post-communist states: a mismatch of ethnicity and state borders, and the need to transform and develop their countries. Learning from previous cases was a logical step for Croatia. According to the primary authors of the Strategy and the Act, Slovenia, Slovakia, Ireland, Hungary, Israel, and Russia all served as models from which pieces of policy were extracted to fit Croatia’s specific circumstances.\(^\text{53}\) According to Bagarić, the most important example was Slovenia, because, in Bagarić’s words, “this was a model that was applicable in our case both due to similarities of the problems we have…and due to similarities between the societies in which we live (specifically, before 1990 we lived in the same state).” In addition, Ireland was a favored model: “I think that they have

\(^{52}\) Interviews: July 1, Member of Diaspora Council, July 16; July 28; July 31; Returned emigrant activist, August 26; Academic expert on Croatian diaspora, August 26, 2014.

\(^{53}\) Dr. Ivan Bagarić, July 16, 2014.
concrete offices in the local community responsible for the Irish who want to return to Ireland as well as a policy of concern for the Irish in poverty around the world.”

The potential economic value of diaspora inclusion also played a role in the law’s development, although the question of diaspora contributions to the economy had been a sore point for quite some time. For example, some diaspora and returnee leaders had been deeply disappointed by perceived hostile attitudes among homeland Croats toward the economic success of “outsider” Croats, and as discussed earlier, resentment had built among homeland Croats who felt that Croats from abroad were coming in with foreign ideas to a country they did not fully understand or belong to. Croatian diaspora activists strongly emphasize their economic contributions and insist that this be rewarded with recognition and rights.  

Some of the motivation for Croatia’s policy came from the realization that Croatia has long been a sending state, with large waves of emigration throughout several historical periods, and that engagement with some of that “lost” population may be a way to recover perceived cultural and economic losses. It is also, as in Slovakia, an attempt to compensate for a current outflow of younger skilled workers. One former Ministry of Foreign Affairs official also characterized the policy as an attempt to modernize Croatia and push forward an incomplete transition from socialism, claiming that “we have accepted political ideas of transition, but economically still have a socialist mindset.” Croats with extensive foreign experience are thus expected to help perfect this transition and, if their connection and interest is kept by favorable laws, perhaps a privileged status

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54 Croatian Diaspora Congress, Opening Ceremony, June 23, 2014; Panel “Croatian Diaspora Here and Now,” June 23, 2014
55 Interview, July 17, 2014.
even for non-citizens, then they have potential to turn some of their attention and resources to the benefit of Croatia.\textsuperscript{56}

The policy as it ultimately was written under Bagarić’s direction, is intended to serve Croatia in an ever more globalized and mixed world, and to attempt to harness international experience and creativity from diaspora members for the benefit of Croatia:

I was and am convinced that the RH [Republic of Croatia] needs to be open to all people and especially for those who have Croatian roots. I think of the wealth and wonderful power which can come out of association with Americans (from the South and North), Europeans (from various European states), Australians….who speak different languages, have different cultural heritage and different knowledge and skills, and who moreover have the same roots (Croatian)... I simply believe in the unity of national power multiplied in the global framework.

From this perspective, then, policy for Croats abroad is created expressly for a world where nation-states may be challenged by transnational identity and activity, and where people will have multiple choices about where to place their loyalty. This policy facilitates the choice of a connection to a particular state, creating the potential for the “domestic abroad” to flourish. Coming amidst Croatia’s process of accession to the EU, it is not very surprising that officials who were creating this policy had a multinational, cooperative future in mind – despite the partisan bickering in debates over the law about the role of Bosnia and the HDZ.

\textbf{Reviewing 18 Years of Slovak Compatriot Policy}

Unlike Croatia, where a new compatriot policy is only in the beginning stages of implementation, Slovakia provides an opportunity to examine how the law developed

\textsuperscript{56} Interview, August 26, 2014.
under various forms of pressure. Since 1997 Slovakia has undergone enormous changes, including its accession to the European Union. This process involved a new freedom of movement that has spurred a large emigration from the country, which government policy has struggled to reconcile with its earlier focus on the older waves of emigration.\footnote{Reiner Martin and Dragos Radu, “Return Migration: The Experience of Eastern Europe,” \textit{International Migration} 50:6 (2012), 109-128. Also see statistics on Slovaks abroad compiled by the Office for Slovaks Living Abroad, at http://www.slovenskezahranicie.sk/sk//stranka/7/statistiky-a-odhady.}

After accession to the European Union, changes included the modification of the law to better conform to European standards, as well as the creation of the Office for Slovaks Living Abroad (OSLA) in 2005 as a permanent governmental coordinating body for diaspora policy, making, in the words of one representative, a “symbolic signal” of thankfulness for historical contributions of foreign Slovaks.\footnote{Representative F. Mikloško, Parliamentary Debate, September 22, 2005.} While debating creation of the OSLA, the theme of contributions by Slovaks abroad to the status of Slovakia among other countries appeared again:

Other modifications to the Law on Foreign Slovaks in 2005 resulted in a renaming of the law to the “Law on Slovaks Living Abroad,” reflecting the government’s desired inclusion of many new emigrants who still retained their citizenship, and changes to the way “foreign Slovak” status is administered. A key change was the specific inclusion of citizens living abroad, and a de-emphasis of those without Slovak citizenship. According to the Minister of Justice at the time of debates over the restructured law, D. Lipšic, called the purposed a “widening of the circle of persons who are considered to be Slovaks Living Abroad,” while gradually withdrawing from issuing cards or certificates proving this fact (they are, after all, redundant for those who already
hold citizenship). Although certification of “Slovak Living Abroad” status was not ultimately abandoned, the government’s project has shifted from defining the ethnic nation to dealing with the practical need to engage recent emigrants and seek to build the influence of the Slovak state in the world.

In a report looking back on its first year of operation, the OSLA lavishes praise on the Slovaks abroad for their promotion of Slovakia:

Slovak communities abroad work in various ways in the interests of Slovakia: [they] actively publicize Slovakia and work toward its general visibility; they present the culture of Slovakia and produce a great part of mutual integrated culture, they defend Slovakia’s interests in their own print and in the media of the countries where they live; they promote tourism; they create many ties, including economic ones; they organize various financial collections for cultural, religious and charitable institutions in Slovakia; they financially and organizationally support various delegations and students, both in political and sports visits from Slovakia, they work together with consular and diplomatic representatives of the SR [Slovak Republic], etc. Through these activities, Slovaks abroad create value representing hundreds of millions of Crowns [Slovakia’s currency prior to joining the Euro in 2009] and are attractive envoys of the Slovak Republic and its interests.

When it comes to Slovaks abroad, the OSLA continues, government departments like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs use them to engage in “cultural diplomacy” to reap the benefits of “cooperation with compatriots in the presentation of the Slovak Republic abroad.” Further reports continued in the same vein.

Over the next few years, the OSLA and the ministries it coordinates, such as the Ministries of Culture, Education, and the Economy, began to focus on keeping newer

60 Parliamentary Debate, September 22, 2005. Ethnic and restitutional motivations have not disappeared, but a more strategic and cooperative approach has emerged to the forefront.
61 Správa o politike stárostlivosti o Slovákov žijúcich v zahraničí, Úrad pre Slovákov žijúcich v zahraničí (ÚSZŽ) [Report on the Policy of Care toward Slovaks Living Abroad, Office for Slovaks Living Abroad (OSLA)], 2007.
migrants connected to the state. Proposals were made for improving the internal labor market, to promote the return of Slovaks living abroad “as the most natural and best integrated human potential for Slovakia.” According to the priorities set by this policy, the Ministry of Economy planned to urge Slovaks living abroad, and Slovak organizations abroad, to work toward the “presentation of market opportunities and investment potential of the Slovak Republic in their country and to use their knowledge of the local conditions, mentality, and contacts in the…interests of the Slovak Republic and of Slovak entrepreneurial enterprises in the territory” as well as to participate in forums such as the Stála Konferencia.

The reports openly portray Slovaks abroad in an instrumental fashion, useful primarily for the promotion of their small homeland: “One can claim that the activity and events of Slovak groups and organizations abroad publicize Slovakia, and thus make for it a positive image in the world…It is obvious that Slovaks living abroad are a natural tool, which can be used even in the future for the promotion of our country.” Nevertheless, the reports do not include concrete evidence or assessment of the actual benefits to the state or society of diaspora engagement.

Additionally, Slovakia’s special “foreign Slovak” or “Slovak Living Abroad” status has significantly changed. First, the benefits of Slovak Abroad status tend not to attract the people that were profiled in the foundational Ministry of Foreign Affairs analyses—influential businesspeople with political connections—and they tend not to attract many people at all. The OSLA report from 2011 laments that,

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64 Správa, ÚSZZ, 2009.
The expectations that the Slovak Republic had in connection with the issuing of certificates has in great part not been fulfilled. While statistics and estimates of the number of our compatriots around the world speak of 2.2 million persons, then the number of applications for a Foreign Slovak Card (from the year 1997 to 2005) together with applications for issuing of the Certificate of Slovak Living Abroad Status (from 2006 to now) being approximately 15,000, is only a fragment of the whole number of all the Slovaks living in the world.

In the years prior to the OSLA’s existence, when a “foreign Slovak card” was granted, most applications came from poorer countries which then were on a slower track to join Europe: Romania, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, and Croatia. Of the nearly 7000 “certificates of Slovak Living Abroad status” issued since the Office’s establishment in 2006, almost 5000 were from Serbia and Ukraine. This suggests that most Slovaks choosing to come to study, work and do business in Slovakia by means of “Slovak Living Abroad” certification are those with fewer opportunities at home and fewer immediate resources to bring to the country, and may be using the law for the purpose of gaining residence and an easier pathway to EU citizenship.

Alongside the already low appeal of special Slovak abroad status, the significance of the benefits provided by status has fallen. The law required a large number of amendments to laws on residency, social benefits, employment, and schooling. However, for many years lack of adequate funding has kept those benefits marginal.

One of the most important activities of the OSLA is a system of project-based funding for the activities of Slovak NGOs abroad, which are assessed for their contribution to

66 Interview, March 22, 2014 (MZV representative).
67 Osvedčenie vydané, Štatistika od zniku USZZ [Certificates issued, Statistics from the establishment of the OSLA], table provided by the Office for Slovaks Living Abroad, March 2014.
69 Interview, March 22, 2014 (MZV representative), Interview, March 11, 2014, (Ministry of Education representative).
preserving and promoting Slovak culture.\textsuperscript{70} European pressures have also moderated the law away from providing ethnic preference. The government interprets Venice Commission recommendations to mean that preference can be given to ethnic Slovaks in the areas of culture and education, as long as it has the legitimate purpose of strengthening cultural ties. However, the OSLA is aware of potential changes and refers to international bodies such as the Council on Migration, Refugees and Demography of the Council of Europe, which has called for a systematic policy for European diasporas.\textsuperscript{71}

Importantly, Schengen zone rules do not recognize this special status as valid identification providing right to residency. Since Slovakia joined the Schengen zone as part of its accession to Europe, the card no longer provides automatic residency (certificate holders must still complete a residency application) or the right to apply for citizenship without length of residency considered – certificate holders now wait for 3 years of residency while other foreigners complete 8 years of residency.\textsuperscript{72} The Slovak government has even considered modeling the certificate system after that of Ireland, “where certificates have been given since the year 2010 and have only a declaratory character confirming the status of the applicant without acknowledging any kind of rights or direct benefits.”\textsuperscript{73} It is currently formulating a new overarching concept for the Slovak government’s approach to Slovaks abroad.\textsuperscript{74}

The changes and pressures of the integration processes that Slovakia’s leaders longed for in the early 1990s, and hoped that the diaspora would help them achieve, now

\textsuperscript{70} Groups frequently receiving funding include language schools, activities of the Slovak Catholic Mission, and small ethnic clubs. See http://www.uszz.sk/sk/schvalene-dotacie.
\textsuperscript{71} Správa, ÚSZZ, 2012.
\textsuperscript{72} Interview, March 22, 2014 (MZV representative), and March 5, 2014 (Ministry of Interior).
\textsuperscript{73} Správa, ÚSZZ, 2012.
\textsuperscript{74} Interview, Feb. 27, 2014 (OSLA Vice-Chairman).
draw into question the state’s general approach. With older Slovak communities assimilating, and new waves of educated, professional young people leaving the country, the focus of Slovak compatriot policy is shifting. It will likely focus less on engaging people who by virtue just of their ethnicity and cultural heritage “should” be part of the ethnic nation. Instead, Slovakia is likely to come to resemble classic sending states that try to engage their diasporas for promotional and developmental purposes. While government policy still lags in this area, however, other non-governmental organizations are stepping in to engage current Slovak diaspora. Organizations like LEAF, recently established in Bratislava, attempt to create stronger civic engagement within Slovakia among professionals, and to prevent their exit. Among those who already have established themselves abroad, LEAF focuses on mitigating the effects of “brain drain” by promoting what it calls “brain circulation.” This involves engaging Slovaks working abroad in high-flying business positions as mentors to younger people back in Slovakia, and by promoting Slovakia as one of many countries in which they might choose to engage their entrepreneurial skills or investments.\textsuperscript{75} It remains to be seen to what extent Slovakia’s compatriot policy will be relevant in the future.

**Conclusions and Implications**

From examining the Croatian and Slovak cases in detail, it appears that while their early post-communist experiences of violence and political partisanship were very different, they both had several common features creating conditions in which a compatriot policy became desirable. First, each state was part of a larger political entity prior to its independence, leaving some parts of an ethnic kin population in other states

\textsuperscript{75} Interview, March 12, 2014 (LEAF co-founder). www.leaf.sk.
once independence was achieved, and where uncertain conditions early on could not necessarily guarantee their safety or fair treatment. Second, each state was initially dominated by ethno-nationalist thinking that equates ethnicity and nationality. From this perspective, a disconnect between ethnic settlement and borders is potentially problematic. Third, each state had both a past and a present of high levels of emigration, and the need to fundamentally transform the way their states and economies functioned after independence.

In the cases of Slovakia and Croatia, the direction of this desired change and development included acceptance into the EU, and at least in the case of Slovakia it is clear that compatriot policy had to bend to some of the requirements of this membership. In Croatia, it appears that to at least some extent the reality of international integration – and the aim of making Croatia relevant and stronger in a new international environment – played a role in the conception of the Act on the Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Croatians Outside of the Republic of Croatia. Despite Croatia’s history of ethnic violence, its policy turned out remarkably similar to that of Slovakia, which experienced no ethnic violence. It is not entirely clear to what extent learning from prior cases like Slovakia, or from more peaceful neighbor Slovenia, may have affected the outcome of the policy, but it probably had some effect. The factors described above, and the effects of learning from previous policies, can also be examined in other cases of compatriot policy.

The experience of Croatia and Slovakia, especially when examined in comparison with a more prominent case – Russia – suggest certain implications of compatriot policies in this region. First, they represent a double-edged sword that can be used for cooperation
or conflict. Russia’s compatriot policy, passed in 1999, balances a fine line between territorial and ethnic understandings of the nation, given Russia’s imperial and later multi-ethnic Soviet past, and a broad definition of “compatriot” allows the justification of action to defend rights across borders. Defense of Russians and Russian culture has been a prominent theme in Russian interventions in Abkhazia, North Ossetia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine. However, Russia’s compatriot policy, like that of Croatia and Slovakia, also does help to support legitimate cultural projects and cultural preservation in areas where Russians are an ethnic minority. In the cases of Slovakia and Croatia, which have closer working relationships with most other European states, the administrative heads of compatriot policies occasionally meet and coordinate with each other\textsuperscript{76} and the provision of aid to minority groups abroad helps to ease the burden of the host state in supporting ethnic minority groups. Ultimately, these policies, regardless of their definition of the nation, can mean very different things under different surrounding political conditions.

Second, legal recognition in the form of certificates, cards, and special status, do not seem to affect large numbers of people in these states. Governments’ concerns remain dual citizenship policies. It was primarily because of the political impossibility of a dual citizenship policy that Russia pursued a compatriot policy in the 1990s,\textsuperscript{77} and in Slovakia granting citizenship to Slovaks outside of Slovakia was early on deemed to be against Slovakia’s interests.\textsuperscript{78} Croatia’s citizenship policy has allowed external citizenship based

\textsuperscript{76} For example, the Croatian and Slovak governments have worked together on this issue. In a working meeting in 2012 between the head of the OSLA and the Office for Croats Outside the Republic of Croatia, both concluded that due to the “high degree of economic migration within Europe” that states involved in this migration must create a system of supporting the linguistic and cultural identity of emigrants making up large communities within their new host countries. See http://www.uszz.sk/sk//2470/i-furdik-s-partnermi-z-chorvatska-o-politike-statnej-starostlivosti-o-krajanov/.


\textsuperscript{78} Slovak parliamentary debate, 14 February 1997.
on ethnicity since 1991, but the Croat without Croatian Citizenship status has been placed in the newer compatriot policy partly because of the recognition that so many other states where Croats may live do not allow dual citizenship and the reality that many descendants of emigrants have no way to prove their origins. As these cases suggest, compatriot policies may be a more likely option when states are motivated to include ethnic kin abroad but do not desire to face the politically more challenging route of negotiating dual or external citizenship rules with other states.

The post-communist region’s compatriot policies arise from several intertwined factors. The fall of communism was a period of rapid change that demanded transformations in all affected states, from concepts of the importance of ethnicity, to historical justice, to the role of cultural and economic integration with the West and with the many other transformed states of the region. High levels of emigration historically and in the present have existed in practically all these states. These shared factors have all created conditions for compatriot policies to arise, but the unique character of each policy is shaped by pre-existing relationships with diaspora, relationships with neighboring states, learning from prior policies, and by perceived national interests. On a global scale, these policies are a relatively recent phenomenon, and may increase along with the mobility of state populations. As scholars sift through the many factors that shape each compatriot policy, it will become more possible to compare them across regions and to understand their implications for the concepts of state citizenship and national identity.

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79 Ivan Bagarić, July 16, 2014.