Beyond Paternalism: Native Nations, Missionaries, and the Making of American Empire in Indian Country

Lori Daggar

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"Missionaries of excellent moral character should be appointed to reside in their nation, who should be well supplied with all the implements of husbandry and the necessary stock for a farm.

These men should be made the instruments to work on the indians..."

—Henry Knox, 1789

In 1880, author Robert Sutton invited his readers on a historical tour of Auglaize County, Ohio. In his history of its county seat, Wapakoneta, he centered on Quakers' efforts to instruct Shawnees in the ways of "civilized" agriculture at a mission site founded there in 1807. He noted that the mission grist- and sawmill remains stood behind a grocery store on the Auglaize River, that "A. Scott" bought and harvested the lands that Friends cleared for their farm school, that the town's Euroamerican immigrants used the logs of the Shawnees’ Council House in the construction of their dwellings, and that those same logs provided the wood for his own desk. Shawnees’ and Friends' Wapakoneta thus built the Euroamerican town of Wapakoneta, Ohio. By focusing on Friends' efforts to render the Shawnee nation "civilized," however, Sutton missed the larger story: missionary labor, international politics, and federal funds wrought the economic transformation of Indian Country and the United States.

Agricultural mission work in Indian Country built the U.S. imperial state by both creating and fueling its emerging capitalist economy. The missions were part of the federal government's

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2 Robert Sutton, History of Auglaize County, Ohio. With the Indian History of Wapakoneta, and the First Settlement of the County (Philadelphia: Collins, 1880), 71,73.
"civilization plan" among the Indians, and they bolstered agricultural, textile, and manufacturing markets in lands that were, from the U.S. perspective, peripheral and foreign. They supported the federal effort to generate revenues, and they required goods and labor. Indeed, by contributing work and wares toward efforts to civilize Indian peoples in the early national Ohio Country—on lands, moreover, such as Wapakoneta that were still in Indian hands—missionaries, Indian agents, blacksmiths, merchants, and textile manufacturers together facilitated the economic transformation of a fertile land that banned slavery, and they built an American empire.

Such work required an effective state. Most scholars point to postal roads, the military, and government administrators as significant facilitators of the U.S. state-building project, and because of their association with cultural transformation, missions do not receive similar attention. Indeed, histories of U.S. Indian policy connect the civilization plan to little more than nineteenth-century paternalistic notions of "benevolence" that were born from the popular contemporary linkage of Natives' "savagery" and imminent extinction. Understanding the U.S. federal state in the early republic as a "government out of sight," however, enables us to think creatively when evaluating state power: the small U.S. state gleaned its power by recruiting, deploying, and taking advantage of non-state actors such as the Quakers for policy initiatives that supported a quest for capital. Missionaries legitimized both Federalist and Democratic-Republican claims to "benevolence" and, in turn, rendered Indian policy consistent regardless of party politics and masked the economic state-building consequences of U.S. Indian policies.3

By recruiting and paying private religious citizens for its civilizing efforts, the United States bolstered these citizens' ability to carry out their religious and political agendas in Indian Country and ensured that Friends remained powerful actors on the republic's national stage; Friends' recruitment by the federal government was due in large part, however, to Indian Country politics. Scholars of the "New Indian History" demonstrate that missions and boarding schools provided spaces within which Native peoples both resisted and adopted, when it suited them, certain aspects of Euroamerican cultures. This emphasis on cultural persistence within the mission context coupled with too little analysis of the early U.S. state in the same, however, obscures both the extent to which Native nations forced the early U.S. state to acknowledge their sovereign power as well as missions' importance as political and economic spaces. Combining state-centered analysis with the ethnohistorical methods of the "New Indian History" reveals that federal revenues required peace in Indian Country; peace required compromise; compromise required experienced diplomats and brokers who possessed a reputation for fair dealings with the Indians. Native nations' sovereign power rendered missionaries, most often Quakers, crucial to these international politics of empire building in the earliest years of the republic, and it ensured that missionaries and Native nations shaped the contours of the U.S. capitalist empire. Such were the negotiated realities of American imperialism.4

Just after the U.S. military victory over the Ohio Country's allied Indian nations and the subsequent ratification of the 1795 Treaty of Greenville that ended, temporarily, the war for the region, the United States attempted to "civilize" its vanquished foes. Official rhetoric proclaimed civilizing policies to be part of an effort to "save" Native Americans from "extinction," and in 1796 Secretary of State Timothy Pickering supported Baltimore Friends' desire to do their part by assuming the roles of agricultural instructors. Secretary of War Henry Dearborn was inspired likewise by "the benevolent disposition" of Friends and was "induced to ask whether it is probable that suitable characters for the above mentioned purpose could be found in your society...on condition of receiving a reasonable compensation from the public." Friends' historical alliances with Indian nations since the late seventeenth century, particularly with the Delawares, bolstered their reputation for friendship in Indian Country, and it made them attractive partners for the United States during the early years of the nineteenth century.5

As a consequence of Native politics, then, the War Department most often recruited Friends' for its civilizing policies, and their labor in the Ohio Country, like that of other missionaries, was part of the early republic's diverse spectrum of work. Philadelphia Friends labored among the Senecas in western New York, while Baltimore Friends brought their knowledge of agriculture to the Ohio nations. Baltimore Quakers' brand of mission work was a product of their experiences in their urban home and its capitalist economy, and they endeavored to create a godly society on earth through labor rather than conversion. They brought to their...
efforts older notions of the civilizing power of trade with European empires in North America and combined these with their own developing ideas of what it meant to be civilized, industrious, and moral in America. Farming, they determined, offered the best means of eradicating Natives' savagery. For their work they received pay—in both cash and land—from the federal government in ways similar to the tax benefits, grant money, and funds granted to other voluntary organizations in the nineteenth century and beyond. Though Friends' compensation was piecemeal at first, the Civilization Fund of 1819 institutionalized their pay and guaranteed that missionaries received $10,000 annually.6

Friends' agricultural mission work was a product and producer of the Ohio Country's evolving economy. The physicality of Friends' efforts—as well as that of their Native pupils—in clearing fields, harvesting crops, and building cabins and agricultural infrastructure in the Ohio Country was similar to that performed by other early EuroAmericans on the ground. Indiana Territory Governor William Henry Harrison, for example, reported in 1801 that he had purchased a farm "of about 300 acres joining the town which is all cleared," was "engaged in fencing it," and hoped to "begin to build next spring" if he was able. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Ohio Country's economy was built upon the rules of neighborly reciprocity and the politics of collective economic advantage: Euroamerican families sent members to community events such as logrollings in order to assist new arrivals in the difficult work of clearing and building on farmland. The civilization plan in the Ohio Country brought together Quakers and members of Native communities to transform the landscape, and it thus modeled regional

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economic practices. It was not strictly a policy created by top-level officials but rather one that was shaped by those charged with bringing civilization to a particular land.⁷

After obtaining federal officials' advice regarding the particulars of their trek, Baltimore Friends embarked on their journeys to the Ohio Country and subsequently contributed to the business that was westward travel. Friends contributed to the capitalist development of a number of Quaker and non-Quaker towns between Baltimore and Ohio or Indiana by feeding local economies that profited from an increasing stream of provision-seeking travelers. The Ohio River was the primary artery westward, and towns such as Marietta and Wheeling reaped the profits. Indeed, one Friend traveling near the Scioto River remarked that “the people in the town endeavoured to supply them & make them pay well for it.” Friends purchased wares but also hired boatmen and guides—both Native and non-Native—based upon recommendations received through word of mouth at various towns along the journey. In 1804, Quakers Gerard T. Hopkins and Philip Dennis hired “an old Indian and his Squaw” to take them across a river via canoe on their way to found Baltimore Friends’ first Ohio Country mission. Stephen, the Native man, successfully transported the Quakers despite the fact that he “accidentally fell overboard” after “some Packers who on their way to Fort Wayne” gave him “to [sic] much Whiskey.” Whether Stephen drank "to much" or not, Hopkins’ mention of whiskey-toting “packers” offers a glimpse

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of the hustle and bustle of settlements positioned on the increasingly worn routes toward Indian Country.\textsuperscript{8}

Though traveling Friends made up a small percentage of westward-bound immigrants, they contributed to a regional project that had national economic consequences. Small-town profits spurred migration to and settlement in the region, and this, so federal officials hoped, translated into land sales and federal tax revenues. Indeed, since the land ordinances of the 1780s, federal government officials endeavored to divide the Ohio lands into townships and expedite their sale. Land sales continued slowly, however, and the government failed to reap its desired revenues even after the 1787 Ordinance opened the lands to large speculation. Congress initiated a system of credit with the Frontier Land Bill in 1800 in an effort to attract smaller purchasers, but such a scheme ultimately failed to open the lands to small buyers who too frequently failed to pay off their debts.\textsuperscript{9}

While the federal government struggled to articulate the best means of reaping revenues from settlement in the region, land speculators such as John Armstrong and William Wells (the latter was a speculator in the 1790s and an Indian Agent for the U.S. in the 1800s) turned a profit by buying extensive tracts and offering loans to individuals with signed contracts. Indeed, Wells' correspondence reveals not a lack of settlers but rather a lack of legitimate settlers in the region: speculators were well aware of both squatter politics and the credit problems that plagued hopeful land-buyers. Wells informed Armstrong that he encountered "numbers of people"


wanting "to purchase lands but they are mostly poor, destitute of money, and wish to purchase on long credits." As a result, "the sales of lands at Cincinnati were very small, when we consider the number of settlers, and the immense quantity of superior lands there offered for sale." With legitimate settlement and land purchases, speculators and the government alike hoped to both reap revenues and manage squatters.  

The federal deployment of Friends complemented this quest for legitimate regional settlement and revenues. And not simply because farming required less land than hunting and thus would free Native people to sell their lands to the United States. The Northwest Indian War was a still-fresh memory to many Americans—particularly in Ohio and Indiana Territory—and Friends' work offered a means by which the federal government could deal peacefully with "the Indians." Friends' work targeted, in particular, Native nations' young men, and those men were often in fact and certainly in the Euroamerican imagination the warriors who wrought bloody havoc among settlers and their property. Many government officials, Friends, and settlers hoped Natives’ “transition” to farm life would secure peace. With peace—or with the illusion of peace—secured by diplomats and educators who enjoyed a positive reputation among the region’s Indian nations (as opposed to the generally suspect reputation of government officials) would come, in the minds of many, regional stability; with that would come increased land sales, settlement, and state and federal tax revenues.  

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Agricultural missions in Indian Country contributed to this U.S. plan for peace, but also wrought the economic transformation of the Ohio Country by connecting valuable lands with the region's expanding markets. Baltimore Quaker Phillip Dennis, newly arrived in Indiana Territory in 1804, embarked upon the first of Friends’ agricultural efforts there by forming "Dennis's Station” for the benefit of Miami, Eel River, and Delaware Indians on the Wabash River, thirty to forty miles southwest of Fort Wayne. Friends later formed at least two other sustainable missions at Captain Lewis Town (Lewistown) and Wapakoneta both among the Shawnees in western Ohio. The Miami chief Little Turtle chose to position Dennis's Station or "Little Turtle's Farm School" at a location several miles away from the village in which the theoretical pupils lived, likely in an effort both to assert control over the Quakers' work and keep the Euroamerican men at a distance. The mission was just south of the Forks of the Wabash—a valuable location where the Little River joined the Wabash in Indiana; indeed, the United States purchased the spot after Miamis' partial removal in 1826 and began construction on the Wabash and Erie Canal just one year later. Though it took over twenty years for the United States to claim ownership of the spot, Dennis's work of clearing and fencing fields, producing crops, and constructing a cabin for his residence, not only showcased for the local Miamis and some Delawares the intricacies of becoming a “proper” agriculturalist, but offered an opportunity to expand an agricultural market at a lucrative location. Dennis's work in lands that lay beyond U.S. territorial control benefitted the U.S. economy, but it also offered the Miamis access to labor that further developed their valuable lands.12

By the end of 1804, only one Delaware family relocated to Dennis's farm school lands, but for some Native peoples, Quakers' value was not in their instruction but in their ability to

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12 For the founding of Dennis’ Station see Gerard T. Hopkins journal, 1804, HSP; see also “Minutes, 1795-1815, Baltimore Yearly Meeting Standing Committee on Indian Concerns,” vols. 1 and 2, SW MR-B79, Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA, 87. These minutes are hereafter cited as BYMIC.
produce crops; if Friends’ efforts “taught” Native Americans anything, then, it was how to hire, deploy, and manage Euroamerican workers. Indeed, despite Dennis's seemingly limited success in sharing his agricultural techniques, his work generated interest. He offered his colleagues in Baltimore hope for the future by noting "that 55 Eal river Indians had been at his station, who acknowledged that his corn was equal to any they had ever seen on the Wabash.” The Quaker's optimistic remarks were, in part, an attempt to raise funds from among his fellow Baltimore Friends for future mission work in Indian Country, but they also likely reflected the reality that some of the region's Native peoples embraced Friends' efforts. In 1808, for example, when the Miami chief White Loon complained to Friend Elisha Tyson that some Quakers and government officials were being dishonest, he contended that they worked their own fields for profit and that the corn that was raised "was all gone when" his "people went down to receive it." Upon Tyson's inspection of the mission, the White Loon proclaimed, "You expected to find your young men working in our fields; instead of which you found them working in a field by themselves, we would like it much better if they would work in our fields." White Loon recognized that together, Quaker and Native laborers could offer immense economic advantages. By 1816, Baltimore Friends' mission among the Shawnees at Wapakoneta, for example, yielded "between 7000 & 8000 Bushels" of corn, and they "found many of [the inhabitants] at work, in their fields" with "a considerable portion of them...becoming industrious" and raising poultry. Friends took satisfaction in such victories among "heathens," even as their agricultural "instruction" offered Native peoples tangible rewards.13

Wapakoneta was, in many ways, the most successful of Baltimore Friends' missions, largely because it was the beneficiary of U.S. capital investment. Located just north of the 1795 Treaty of Greenville line that separated Indian Country from the United States in Ohio, agricultural instruction at the Shawnee town offered an opportunity for the U.S. to reap economic benefits from foreign lands. In 1807, Quaker William Kirk agreed to bring civilization to the Shawnees there for "one thousand dollars, as pay" along with a budget of $6,000 "on condition" that he would "undertake the Superintendency and...procure the necessary Assistants and labourers, together with such implements of husbandry and horses as [his] proposed system embraces." With federal support, then, Kirk, along with his brother and other Friends, set about instructing the Shawnees at Wapakoneta.14

Kirk's mission, like all the agricultural missions, was a labor-intensive venture that fostered economic development. The Quaker kept Secretary of War Henry Dearborn informed of Friends' progress and, in doing so, revealed the vast amount of physical work that he, his Quaker employees, and the Shawnees performed. After several months in Ohio, he had "placed all the young men among the Shawnees (except while three of them were imployed in making a small improvement for a few Dellawares...)" and had high hopes that he was "likely to succeed as fast as the most Sanguine could have expected as they work constantly with my young men." Together, Shawnees and Friends "built several Cabins," "made Rails & fenced in about one Hundred Acres of Ground," "cleared about thirty" more "& planted in Corn better then two Hundred Acres." Such work transformed the landscape but also expanded regional markets: Friends noted in 1813, for example, that 3,000 bushels of corn were sold that season and that,

14 Henry Dearborn to Henry Drinker, October 24 1806, Miscellaneous Letters Sent by the Secretary of War, 1800-1809, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War (National Archives Microfilm Publication M370, roll 2), Record Group 107, National Archives Building, Washington, D.C. (hereafter M370).
"when Peace is restored in that Country, these People will be more than Ever disposed to pursue the farming business."\textsuperscript{15}

Federally funded crop production in Indian Country benefitted Indians and Euroamericans alike. Because the War Department funded its civilization project, in part, by allocating annuity funds toward agricultural tools, in essence, Native nations paid Friends and government officials to clear their fields, build mills, plant corn, fence lands, and build the roads that connected their crops with Euroamerican markets. With missionaries providing them with the agricultural infrastructure and labor that connected their lands with diverse markets, Native peoples sought to reap the benefits of a diversified, increasingly global economy. In a report concerning Tecumseh's visit to the Shawnees at Wapakoneta in 1810, for example, Indian agent John Johnston informed Governor Harrison that "[Tecumseh] made no impression on the Shawanese, and went away much dissatisfied at their not coming into his views...I indirectly encouraged their emigration westward, and told them that their annuity should follow them. They appear determined to remain, and are much attached to the town and the improvements, which are considerable." One should analyze such statements with care, but given that the Shawnees' appreciation of the town's "improvements" opposed Johnston's stated desire to push them west, it appears that the Shawnees at Wapakoneta did actually value the results of Friends' labor.\textsuperscript{16}

Though William Kirk departed the Ohio Country in 1808, regional Indian agent John Johnston encouraged Friends to continue the work at Wapakoneta, and in turn revealed the extent to which the U.S. government valued Friends' agricultural mission project. Friends agreed

\textsuperscript{15} William Kirk to Henry Dearborn, July 20th 1807, Letters Received (Main Series), 1801-1889, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War (National Archives Microfilm M221, roll 8), Record Group 107, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
to sustain the mission site, and they secured the necessary permissions to do so from then Secretary of War William Eustis in 1810. Eustis informed Johnston that "the Government has consented to relinquish...the public property at that place to [Friends'] discretion and management" and that "the Government is to be at no expense hereafter in conducting this establishment." Friends' correspondences and minutes never mention any qualms about accepting these formerly Miami lands, and by allowing them use of public property, the War Department saved Friends the cost of buying land for their missions and minimized federal costs. It allowed the government to pay for services in a currency that was, at the moment, much more readily available than government cash: land. For a government concerned with revenues, it was an ideal arrangement. The deal also no doubt pleased agent John Johnston who, prior to the agreement, argued that abandonment of the settlement at Wapakoneta would "give a stroke to the buisness in this country from which it will not soon recover." He explained that, "all the Tools necessary for the purpose of Farming on a large scale is on the spot," that "a waggon road from the Settlements in ohio to the Town is cut out," and he knew "of no place in the Indian country where money could be so usefully expended as with the Shawanoes at Kirks Settlement."  

Such developments as a wagon road, however, involved not only workers to cut the road but oftentimes diplomacy. When Governor Harrison endeavored to build settlements near the Miami River in 1802 he remarked that the new towns would "totally be cut off from a communication with the seat of government unless we can have a new road; and the opening of those I presume ought not to be attempted without the consent of the Indians." Friends thus were important not only because of the agricultural instruction and physical labor they offered, but

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also because of their ability to conduct peaceful negotiations with many of the region's Native leaders. The civilization project was, by 1809, expanding—at least in the minds of those on the ground—into a project that explicitly aimed to promote not just subsistence farming among "poor Indians" but "Farming on a large scale;" it involved the civilizing of peoples and lands, and it required instructors and negotiators. "Indian country," some thought, could contribute to the development of United States territory, but it was not a simple task. Roads connected the farms with nearby towns, and the Indian factory system connected eastern manufacturers and developing regional centers such as Cincinnati with the rural interior. All of this often required "the consent of the Indians."18

The federal government's need to court Native authority while enacting its plans for economic development in the region thus required Friends to continue their roles, cultivated during the eighteenth century, as non-state diplomats in the region. Before Baltimore Friends Elisha Tyson and James Gillingham embarked on their tour of the Ohio Country to see the missions' progress, for example, Secretary Dearborn inquired "If Mr Tyson & Mr Gillingham should find it convenient, while on their visit to the Western Indians, to spend a day or two at Greenville, with a party of Indians at that place, under the direction of an Indian called the Prophet." Dearborn wanted "to have such enquiries made...as to the real views and Intentions of those people & especially of their leader." He also informed the Quakers that it would "be very desirable to have similar enquiries made among the Wiandots at Sandusky as to the actual Conduct & apparent views of that People, in relation to the Interests of the U.S." Such work was important in a region where a multitude of Native nations pursued their own political agendas—only some of which were pro-American. This international political landscape was further

18 Harrison to Henry Dearborn, Feb 26, 1802 in Esarey, Messages and Letters, 43-44.
complicated by the presence of British traders who often endeavored to turn Native nations against American interests.¹⁹

Friends' diplomatic and agricultural education work fostered peace and expanded agricultural markets, but they also supported the Indian factory system—and therefore the U.S. economy—by fostering a regional market for manufactures. The factory system aimed to wrest control of the fur trade from private traders, establish stores and an administrative hierarchy of Indian factors and agents in Indian Country, and secure Natives' economic "dependence" upon the U.S. government. The purveyor of public supplies and later the superintendent of Indian trade procured goods in the east or arranged their purchase in western towns like Cincinnati that were then sent to the factory stores for purchase by members of Native nations and for distribution as Indian annuities. This had the effect of providing goods for sale in bulk at prices that private traders could not match. At the same time, the factory system aimed to "instruct" Shawnees, Miamis, and others how to participate in a market economy and, by attempting to monopolize the sale of agricultural manufactures, linens, and other goods, it contributed to federal overtures of Native "dependence" on U.S. manufactures during the early nineteenth century. Along with Friends' labor, factories were connected with officials' desires to add to federal revenues and exert imperial authority in Indian Country through economic policy. Friends' missions thus expanded agricultural markets but also created an opportunity to expand U.S. manufacturing markets through the sale of agricultural implements, textiles, and other goods requisite for Natives new "civilized" life.²⁰

¹⁹ Henry Dearborn to Elisha Tyson and James Gillingham, March 24, 1808, M15, roll 2. For British traders see, for example, Harrison to Henry Dearborn, Feb 19, 1802 in Esarey, Messages and Letters, 38-39.
Tench Coxe, the Purveyor of Public Supplies during the first decade of the nineteenth century, was responsible for ordering the farm tools and other "articles necessary in aid of the plan of civilization" from manufacturers for the factory stores near his post in Philadelphia. As one of the first to procure goods for the federal Indian trade, he set the model for the later superintendents. Coxe was a strong supporter of manufacturing and industry, and he supported government regulation of "revenue and commerce." By ordering, obtaining, and shipping goods to various federal departments, most often the War Department, Coxe and his successors utilized the republic's rivers and fields to produce and ship goods that became central to the creation of an economy built upon the shared interests of agriculture and manufacturing. He did all of this without causing political stir because, in many Euroamericans' political imaginations, the factories and annuities were connected with the "Indian problem" and to the rhetoric of paternalism—not to federal economic policy.21

Coxe communicated with businessmen in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and elsewhere and arranged for goods' shipment to and subsequent purchase in Indian Country. In 1810 he paid one man $837.42 for "ironmongery," another $111.90 for "50 axes & 40 grubbing hoes," and he offered $1,426.35 to "G. Gebler" for "axes, ploughs, etc." "Blacksmiths tools" from Philadelphian Nicodemus Lloyd and 120 medals from the silversmith Liberty Brown were also paid for with federal funds. In 1814, moreover, the Superintendent of Indian Trade John Mason informed then Secretary of War John Armstrong that "a considerable portion of Woolens can be bought at Cincinnati on pretty good terms." Trade in Indian wares, then, boosted the transforming economies of both the U.S. urban coast and the Ohio Country through the marriage of agriculture and manufacturing. Friends' work in the region supported this economic project—

the Fort Wayne factory store had nearly 500 hoes on-hand in 1806—and it contributed to the creation of a market for manufactured wares.22

Native nations and individuals purchased trade goods with their annuity funds, and because they possessed the power to transform U.S. officials' economic aspirations into real revenue, the goods' quality mattered. In 1802, Wyandots, Delawares, Shawnees, Ottawas, Chippewas, and Potawatomies obtained $1,000 per nation in the form of "Thirty Rifles, Thirty pounds of Powder, sixty pounds of Lead, one hundred small corn Hoes, and sixty small axes." Eel River Indians, Wyandots, Weas, Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and Kaskaskias received similar items but in proportion to their number such that each nation received $500 worth of goods. Offering such goods as Indians annuities translated rhetorical support of urban manufacturing into real federal financial backing: the purchase of goods aided manufacturers in the short term, while the potential to expand markets in Indian Country offered hopes for a new consumer base that included both Indians and, with regional peace, migrating Euroamerican settlers. Thus, when John Johnston complained that some wares were defective, Superintendent Mason informed him that "The Rifles you complain of were made in Philad...I request you will continue to make your observations on the goods sent, to forward samples, to describe the articles best suiting Indian Trade out of this much good will grow & every attention shall be paid in the soliciting." The stores' accounts thus reveal the extent to which Native nations' consumerism influenced the development of the U.S. capitalist economy.23

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23 Henry Dearborn to Israel Whelen, 4 March 1802, M15, roll 1; John Mason to John Johnston, Jan. 3, 1808, M16, roll 1.
Assisting U.S. manufacturing interests also, however, had the potential to generate federal revenue. Between 1807 and 1811, for example, the factory store at Fort Wayne made a profit of $10,502.77, making it the most profitable of the U.S. factories. The decreased military activity in Indian Country, in part the result of Friends', Indian agents', and Natives' diplomacy in the region, combined with these profits to render the factory system and missionaries' efforts worthwhile, co-constitutive investments prior to the War of 1812. In 1806, moreover, the factory's accounts reveal that more than one-third of the debts owed the store—$1,203.00—belonged to Native American individuals. The stores thus not only encouraged Native people to participate in the U.S. economy while increasing government revenue, but they also welcomed them—along with the Euroamericans who owned the remaining two-thirds of the debt—into a capitalist cycle of credit and debt. Though the factory system stores' success was inconsistent, stores and Indian agencies remained central to Indian policy throughout the nineteenth century, and their connection with officials' desire both to promote and define the growth of the U.S. economy and undermine private and foreign traders aligned with broader U.S. policy.

Coxe was a former Federalist, and though he became a Democratic-Republican by the time he directed the Indian trade, his desire to incorporate Indian policy into plans for centralizing federal power and creating a robust, diversified national economy are not, perhaps, surprising; that such work took place and continued during the administrations of Jefferson and Madison is. Regardless of political party, federal Indian policy aided in the creation and development of the U.S. state and American capitalist economy, both wittingly and unwittingly, precisely because it was central to Republican and Federalists' respective efforts to spread a culture of agrarianism in North America or build a strong centralized state. Here, rhetoric of paternalism mattered mightily. Missionaries' civilizing agricultural education efforts fit within

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24 For Fort Wayne accounts see Griswold, ed. *Fort Wayne, Gateway to the West*, 405-663.
the ideological space of Jeffersonian agrarian empire, while it also appeased those Federalists who argued that the federal government should take the lead on eradicating the "Indian problem." For this reason, Indian policy changed little as a result of the "Revolution of 1800."

The realities of Native sovereign authority, moreover, required U.S. officials to adopt policies—such as recruiting missionaries and ensuring that factories stocked high-quality goods—that often had the effect of bolstering U.S. power regardless of the various ideologies of sitting presidential administrations. U.S. power thus grew as a consequence of its economic policies in Indian lands.

The U.S. state used Native nations' lands to support its own economic development, and it dealt with these nations in the context of foreign affairs. The Secretary of the Treasury during the 1790s, Alexander Hamilton, supported a foreign policy that promoted a global U.S. reputation of strength and maximized government revenue. As a result, he advocated congressional regulation of foreign commerce in an attempt to ensure that the federal government reaped the financial benefits of global trade. The federal government pursued this same foreign policy in Indian Country. The 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act endeavored to control U.S. citizens' ability to buy and sell goods in Indian Country and prohibited Americans or individual U.S. states from buying Indian lands. The act—along with the similar acts that followed—should be interpreted as a key piece of legislation that attempted to bolster the power of the U.S. state in its dealings in Indian Country but also over its citizenry. Because the act asserted the power of the federal government to buy lands, issue trading licenses, and otherwise regulate commerce in Indian Country, it decreed that the federal state dealt with Indian nations, and that, in turn, rendered individual Native nations that state's diplomatic equivalent. Revenues and centralized power, then, were the primary goals of both Indian policy and foreign policy.
more broadly, and this remained the case beyond the nineteenth century, as places such as Hawaii, Alaska, and the Philippines became the new "Indian Country."  

Though Henry Knox declared Native nations to be "foreign nations" in 1789, the Constitution's "commerce clause" simultaneously recognized and undercut Native sovereignty by listing "the Indian tribes" as distinct from "foreign nations" and "the several States." The clause thus reveals the U.S. state's intertwined economic and imperial aspirations. Native nations were a unique political category and their economies offered opportunities for U.S. state growth, but the rhetoric of U.S. statecraft refused to acknowledge Native nations as wholly "foreign." The U.S. federal state's relations with Native nations' on the ground, however, reveal a different story. U.S. efforts to require Native peoples to carry "passports" according to the European model of passport documentation in the first decade of the nineteenth century underscores the fact that state officials treated them, in the real world, as foreign nations. Moreover, Chief Justice John Marshall's infamous 1831 ruling in which he declared the Cherokee Nation and all other Indian nations "domestic dependent nations," clearly explains that North America's Indian nations were considered and treated by the U.S. government as "foreign nations" prior to Cherokee Nation v. the State of Georgia:

They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsible in their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their community. Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those acts.

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Marshall went on to declare Native nations "domestic dependent nations" as a consequence of his reading of the U.S. Constitution, and as the result of his wondering "whether the Cherokee constitute a foreign state in the sense of the constitution." That document, at best, couched relations with Indian nations in vague terms and, at worst, endeavored to utilize Indian policy in the creation of a powerful state. Marshall, however, supported his ruling by appealing to the rhetoric of paternalism, writing, the Indians "are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." Thus, by 1831, the reason why Native nations were not foreign nations was because the United States said so—a claim that missionaries legitimated with their civilizing work. In legitimizing U.S. claims both to benevolence and guardianship, missionaries bolstered both the U.S. economy and federal imperial authority.26

Missionaries' agricultural mission work thus was central to U.S. state formation, economic development, and American imperialism. The sovereign status of Native nations during the first decade of the nineteenth century suggests that at least some United States government officials viewed them not only as sometimes-violent inconveniences but instead as potent political entities who, as such, necessitated policies of diplomacy, negotiation, or warfare. Thus, the civilization plan was not a policy dreamt up by the Washington administration to combat an internal nuisance, but rather it was one forced upon it due to the financial and human costs of developing a new nation-state in the midst of the many neighboring foreign nations which were hostile to the United States' dreams of a North American empire.

Indeed, most of Indiana Territory Governor William Henry Harrison's correspondence dealt with the problems of Indian affairs for precisely that reason; Native nations threatened Harrison's dreams of an American empire whose economic heart lay in Ohio Country fields. Despite the reality of many Native Americans' opposition to U.S. imperialism, the governor informed his territorial legislature in 1805 that the region's benevolent Indian policies had secured Native nations' "entire dependence." Recognizing his territory's incredible potential and emphasizing peace, he remarked in that same speech before legislators that, "the mighty river which separates us from the Louisianians will never be stained with the blood of contending nations; but will prove the bond of our nation, and will convey upon its bosom, in a course of many thousand miles, the produce of our great and united empire." Indian affairs, statehood, and economic production were linked in Harrison's mind, and missionaries and their labor offered tangible—if weak in light of the reality—evidence of "dependence." The economic policy of civilization offered U.S. imperial claims in Indian Country a veneer of legitimacy.27

Natives' "dependence," for Harrison, meant increased land sales, "settlement and improvement," imperial "produce," revenue, and economic stability. Missionaries' labor offered a logical plan to ensure Native "dependence" and, with it officials hoped, economic power and imperial authority through the marriage of agricultural and manufacturing interests—both regionally but also nationally as articulated by Tench Coxe. Thus, Baltimore Friends' farm schools supported a market and aided in the distribution of farm implements, gave the federal government hope that those tools would, in fact, find use among Native populations, and they offered officials like Governor Harrison evidence of Native economic and, in turn, political "dependence." Such "evidence" would, officials hoped, encourage the settlement of the "right sort" of people in the Ohio Country and, in turn, boost land sales and increase revenues. These

27 William Henry Harrison to the General Assembly, Jul. 29, 1805, Esarey, Messages and Letters, 152-158.
points were crucial in the maintenance of the civilization plan in the Ohio Country, and they explain why, despite the limited success of the plan's *explicit* goals of assimilating Native people in the region, it endured and shaped U.S. Indian—and foreign—policy throughout the nineteenth century. Missionary labor was both a valuable investment and worthwhile short-term economic policy.

The U.S. civilization plan was, however, a double-edged sword. The United States attempted to use a cycle of credit and debt to ruin Native nations' economies by encouraging them to purchase goods at U.S. factory stores, but such efforts ironically had the accompanying effect of creating a situation in which both Native nations and individuals could check U.S. imperial plans. Many Native nations, communities, and individuals manipulated the civilization plan by wielding the economic paradigms of the U.S. capitalist empire for their own advantage. George Johnston's 1829 promissory notebook—a remarkable collection of receipts that record Wapakoneta Shawnees' names, debts, and the items they purchased—reveals that nearly all of the roughly 200 Shawnee debtors recorded therein, a Harvard graduate among them, failed to pay off their loans. These Shawnees secured items such as cloth, knives, bridles, and teakettles, and they did so to the detriment of Johnston's finances. If the U.S. civilization plan and the accompanying factory system of the first two decades of the nineteenth century was intended to drive Native peoples onto smaller plots of land or to drive them so far into debt that they would sell their lands, clearly, it was not working—or at least, not completely.28

At the same time, however, the later history of Friends' mission at Dennis's Station illuminates the contentious trajectory of both Natives' and state power as well as U.S. economic development. Neighboring settlers destroyed most of the original mission infrastructure at the start of the War of 1812, and such actions suggest that they viewed the site as an economic and

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28 George C. Johnston, Book of promissory notes, 1829-1831, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.
political threat. Thus, Native nations possessed the authority to shape both their political and economic future and U.S. imperial policy, but that power could also make them visible targets of an ambitious empire—an empire whose economy profited from economic growth in Indian Country.

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In a secret letter to Governor Harrison in 1803, President Thomas Jefferson described "the system of which [Native peoples] make a part." That "system," Jefferson wrote, was "to live in perpetual peace with the Indians," but also to "see the good and influential individuals among them run in debt" until they "become willing" to sell their lands. The Indian factories, he continued, would "enlarge our capital," and "our settlements will gradually circumscribe and approach the Indians, and they will in time either incorporate with us as citizens of the United States or remove beyond the Missisipi." Mission work, such as that undertaken by Baltimore Friends, made Jefferson's "system" functional. It attempted to secure "perpetual peace" through diplomacy, and they stimulated a market for agricultural tools and infrastructure that would, in Jefferson's mind, encourage Native debts and "enlarge our capital." These missions fostered economic development, the growth of federal power in Indian Country, and they offered a means of legitimating the still fictional U.S. claim to imperial authority in North America.29

Understanding the centrality of mission work in developing the U.S. economy and imperial state, then, forces us to interrogate the evolution of partnerships between the U.S. government and religious, voluntary, and non-governmental organizations, and it calls into question assumptions concerning the means by which the United States attempted to both "assimilate" populations and expand and develop its territory. It illuminates the ways in which

the U.S. state strove to consolidate and deploy power among its citizens, and it allows us to see how missions, missionaries, and their governmental and Native American partners—and mission work more broadly—transformed U.S. Indian policy, the federal state and economy, the North American landscape, and the global American empire.