Dear members of the Penn Program on Democracy, Citizenship and Constitutionalism,

Thank you for reading! This is a first draft of the main paper/chapter of what will become my dissertation. Below a couple of points I’d appreciate feedback on, although all and any feedback is very much welcome.

I have been struggling with the theoretical framework for this paper/my dissertation, so feedback on the framing and its credibility/persuasiveness are greatly appreciated. Does the policy feedback literature centered in developed countries teach us anything relevant about developing countries? Is it a good idea to build on that literature? Do I make a fair job in discussing the contrast between this approach and the existing literature on clientelism?

I would present more descriptive statistics from my base and endline survey to support the claim that the main obstacle to personally making claims to the government are information and resources. Do you think the section "Intermediated Access in Yucatan" is convincing? What other data would you like to see?

The treatment in the intervention is bundled. That is a disadvantage in clearly understanding what is actually having an effect on what. However, the bundled quality also makes the intervention a lot more realistic. How do you evaluate that tradeoff? Ideas on how to address it?

Finally, I recognize the paper is longer than expected (there are also a lot of graphs and plots). You can easily jump the sample selection (4 pages) and the discussion (which is very preliminary).

Results and theory in this paper are preliminary, they are constantly being updated, please do not share this draft. And if you can, download the latest version of this draft here.
How the Experience of a Programmatic State Discourages Clientelism

Tesalia Rizzo
April 25, 2017

Abstract

In Mexico’s poor and marginalized communities, most citizens depend on clientelistic intermediaries to request the myriad universal government services and social programs available to them. Citizens face two main constraints in requesting these resources: first, they are rarely aware of the full menu of local welfare benefits available, and second, they lack sufficient experience and resources to navigate the bureaucracy. These serve as effective self-enforcing mechanisms for citizen dependency on clientelistic structures to request governmental goods year round. Lessening these obstacles by providing a non-clientelistic alternative to access the state should fundamentally change this clientelistic equilibrium. I find that citizens are not only more likely to make requests to the state, the mere possibility of a non-clientelistic avenue to make requests increases their disapproval of clientelistic practices. Evidence comes from a field experiment I conducted in 150 rural localities in the Mexican state of Yucatan. The intervention randomly introduces a community intermediary recruited in 75 of the localities, trained to inform and assist citizens in formally requesting government resources.

*Please note that the results in this draft are very preliminary. Please do not cite or circulate. The results presented here are based on a subset of the full data. There are currently several verification procedures underway, including a revision of handwritten records that help to match individuals before and after the intervention using survey data. The author does not believe the analyses will change when looking at the full dataset, but they may vary somewhat in future drafts.

†This project is mostly funded by an established grantmaker that prefers to remain anonymous. MIT-Gov/Lab also significantly contributed financially to this project. I am particularly indebted to Danny Hidalgo for providing financial support for this project and to Vicente Vargas, from ODP (Observatorio de Desarrollo Regional y Promoción Social) who funded the comisario survey. I am incredibly thankful to Lily Tsai, Danny Hidalgo, Chap Lawson and Adam Berinsky. I am also immensely grateful to Alondra Rodriguez for field management, research assistance and training. Also very thankful to members of Participando por México, Abraham González and Luis F. Fernández, ODP, and the team of gestores, supervisors and coordinators in Yucatan. Fernanda Guitierrez and Gustavo Guajardo provided superb research and field assistance. Please feel free to send any additional feedback or comments to trizzo@mit.edu.
1 Introduction

How do citizens embedded in clientelistic structures experience the state? In this paper, I explore how the way people access social welfare affects citizen’s political attitudes and behavior. Specifically I will focus on how clientelistic intermediation between citizens and the state affects how citizens view the state, their likelihood to make demands and their opinions on clientelistic exchanges.

Scholars with a policy focused research have long argued that the process of accessing policy benefits from the state goes beyond the mere experience of requesting and receiving a benefit (Campbell, 2003; Hacker and Pierson, 2014; Schattschneider, 1960). The interaction and experience with the state affects a broader set of political behaviors and beliefs, such as a sense of social citizenship and political participation. This literature assumes that beneficiaries are aware of the policy claim-making process and are able to learn from the procedural experience which contributes to the efficacy of their attempts to mobilize and defend their specific policy interests (Campbell, 2003; Hacker and Pierson, 2014).

However, theories of social citizenship have alerted to how different welfare system designs may impact participatory outcomes when experiencing government. In contrast to social security benefits in the US, public assistance programs targeted to the poorest and most marginalized citizens usually have the opposite effect on its recipients (Soss, 2002). In order to verify eligibility, means-tested and public assistance beneficiaries are often required to meet with caseworkers with a large degree of discretion and bias in deciding the beneficiary’s deservingness (Zacka, 2015). The experience of a case worker having discretion over a citizen’s benefits, undermines recipients’ feelings of agency and entitlement over benefits (Campbell, 2003).

In Mexico, informal and clientelistic relationships overwhelm how citizens (particularly the poor) make claims to the government. Partisan intermediation and high levels of discretion determines who gets what and when. A large percentage of local budgets

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in Mexico is destined to countless official, yet highly discretionary social and rural assistance programs with broad and mostly flexible eligibility criteria. Information about the myriad of existing local programs is usually unavailable to poor citizens who have scant monetary, time and even psychological resources to invest in unfamiliar and costly application procedures. Instead, citizens rely on more knowledgeable and politically savvy clientelistic brokers to access many governmental benefits. This is an especially serious problem at the local level where budgetary oversight is weak, program implementation is unstructured, and partisan misuse of funds is deeply entrenched.

How do clientelistic-intermediated avenues of attaining governmental benefits affect the relationship citizens build with their governments through policy? Although most of the literature on clientelism argues that vote-buying strategies undermine citizens’ ability to hold politicians accountable for their actions in office, we know surprisingly little about the impact that prevailing clientelistic structures have more broadly on citizen’s attitudes and participation behavior. In particular, there is a lack of understanding on how citizens experience the state in places where the only access they have is intermediated by politically motivated actors. I will argue that clientelistic intermediation not only undermines accountability mechanisms, as the literature suggests, but it significantly affects the likelihood that citizens make claims to the state directly.

In this paper, I study how the manner in which citizens experience the state affects attitudes towards clientelism and citizen claim making behavior. I find that even before a citizen receives a social welfare benefit, the possibility of accessing the state through non-clientelistic avenues increases their likelihood of requesting and to seek out information to make requests in the future. Additionally, the availability of non-clientelistic avenues significantly changes the way citizens evaluate clientelism. The evidence shows that income effects may not be the sole (or perhaps main) driver of clientelistic behaviors. I will argue that it is crucial to understand how citizens embedded in clientelistic and informal structures of distribution evaluate and understand clientelism itself when faced
with an realistic non-clientelistic alternative. This paper answers two related questions. When available, do citizens choose to take the non-clientelistic avenue? Second, provided with the possibility of a non-clientelistic means of approaching the state, does this impact their views about clientelism, does it change their motivation to engage with the state? I conducted a field experiment in the Mexican state of Yucatan designed to answer these questions and I find that citizens are more likely to make requests to the state when the non-clientelistic avenue is made available and that the mere existence of this avenue significantly and substantially reduces feelings of approval, acceptance and acquiescence of clientelistic practices.

1.1 Summary of Experiment

The main source of evidence in this paper comes from a field experiment that took place in a total of 150 rural and margarinated localities in the Mexican state of Yucatan (from September 12, until December 20, 2016). Of the 150, 75 were randomly selected to receive treatment. In treated localities, we recruit a non-clientelistic intermediary from the community and control localities received no treatment. These intermediaries were hired and remunerated to provide a free service available to citizens in their localities that facilitates means of approaching the state to request a wide range of social assistance programs at the state level. The service is designed to involve citizens in the process of writing a request, collating the documents and sending them to the corresponding welfare office while promoting that any citizen can write a request. We provide citizens with all the necessary tools (bureaucratic information, self confidence and transportation costs) to make, follow and monitor requests to government on a wide variety of welfare benefits.

I collect a wide variety of both qualitative and quantitative data. For this preliminary version of my findings, I will concentrate on the survey data collected at the end of the intervention and show results from partially merged data obtained from a baseline survey
conducted before treatment was implemented.\textsuperscript{1}

\section{Clientelistic-Intermediated Experience}

Clientelistic relationships vary widely, from those of dominance and extortion (Cornelius, 1975; Roniger, 1987) to those of strategic negotiation (Baldwin, 2013). Most recent literature has heavily focused on the impact of vote buying on elections (Larreguy, Marshall and Querubin, 2016; Stokes et al., 2013), yet clientelistic practices and norms influence politics way beyond elections. In a wide variety of settings, client-patron or client-broker-patron relationships dominate how citizens access public goods and services throughout the electoral cycle (Auyero, 2001; Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Krishna, 2011; Manor, 2000; Scott, 1972; Zarazaga, 2014). This prevalence of clientelistic practices in multiple areas of citizens’ lives influences quotidian political life and interactions. Intermediation also likely shapes how citizens experience the state and their ability to learn from that experience.

Intermediaries come in many forms. An example from the US context is a caseworker helping a single mother access welfare benefits. Another example may be the ‘punteros’ or political brokers in the Argentinian case. More generally, an intermediary, following Scott (1972), is one who ‘serve[s] to arrange an exchange or transfer between two parties who are not in direct contact (...) [the intermediary] functions as an agent and does not himself control the thing transferred.’ (Scott, 1972, p.95). Unlike formal intermediaries, such as governmental employees, caseworkers or street level bureaucrats who receive a salary to provide a access to public goods and services, clientelistic intermediaries usually engage in a market exchange directly with a citizen. Clientelistic intermediaries possess superior knowledge of bureaucratic procedures or influential contacts in government that

\textsuperscript{1}Note that results in future drafts may change slightly, but not significantly. The unmerged observations were the product of data capturing errors. Unmerged status in the endline is, however, uncorrelated with treatment, or any main variables used in this analysis. Complete revision of the data is in process.
allows them to trade a good or service in return for citizens’ political support, assistance or money (Auyero, 2001; Cornelius, 1975; Krishna, 2011). Because the payment for services is provided by the citizen directly, the transaction usually leaves out citizen participation in the process of interaction with the state. The broker is paid to provide a good or service, not to facilitate access. It is in the clientelistic intermediary’s interest that a market for her services exists, so she must guard her superior knowledge and access to goods to ensure that what she offers cannot be easily obtained through other means. Note that this definition does not preclude street level bureaucrats, as well as other types of governmental employees, may also (and frequently do) engage in clientelistic intermediation.

Clientelistic-intermediated avenues to obtain state services hinders citizens’ ability to gather bureaucratic experience and knowledge of the state. Ignorance of the supply of governmental goods and services curtails individuals’ opportunities for involvement and interaction with the state, this is exacerbated when citizens also lack material and psychological resources to make claims (Campbell, 2003; Soss, 1999).

Furthermore the lack of a non clientelistic viable alternative to request benefits from the state serves as a self-enforcing mechanism for clientelistic practices, i.e., the social norms that regulate and sustain clientelistic exchanges such as reciprocity, fairness or legitimacy of the exchange (Gonzalez Ocantos, Jonge and Nickerson, 2014; Lawson and Greene, 2011). This further deepens the dependency on clientelistic exchanges and sustains societal quiescence of the practice (Auyero, 1999; Gaventa, 1982; Gonzalez Ocantos, Jonge and Nickerson, 2014).

Thus, reliance on clientelistic modes of exchange can affect individuals and communities beyond their ability to access public goods and services, they are also less likely to formulate formal demands to the government where individuals are unaware of their entitlements or unexperienced with the state, weakening citizens’ ability to hold their governments accountable (Pande, 2011; Stokes et al., 2013) and limit their political engagement (Abrahams, 1992; Mettler, 2005; Soss, 2002).
3  Emprical Setting

3.1  Requesting Welfare Programs in Mexico

Mexican states provide a great opportunity to test how alternative avenues of approaching the state impacts citizens attitudes and behavior towards clientelism. It is well documented that throughout the one party regime in Mexico (led by the Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI) a great percentage of the public budget was highly discretionary and centrally distributed using political parameters (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez and Magaloní, 2007; Fox, 1994; Langston, 2001). The slow waning of highly discretionary social policy came after the introduction of formula based sub-national transfers as well as means-tested welfare assistance in the early to mid 1990s (De La O, 2015). However, although national level expenditure came under greater scrutiny, sub national expenditure enjoyed much more relaxed auditing procedures. As can be seen in Figure 3.1, subnational states significantly increased the number of local social programs right as national level poverty alleviation programs like PROGRESA and Oportunidades (now Prospera) expanded in the early 2000s. These subnational social programs are usually financed by state, or co-financed using federal resources, but largely administered by state level authorities.

Although large scandals have sprung on the particularistic and clientelistic use of national level conditional cash transfer program, national programs are evaluated and scrutinized in ways local programs never are. The opportunity of discretion at the sub-national level is considerable. Despite the relatively small fraction of subnational state resources assigned to local social assistance in the country, subnational social programs compose the most commonly distributed discretionary good outside elections. These

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2 Social program count corresponds to a 2012 conducted by CONEVAL and Alianza por el Gobierno Abierto at: www.programasociales.mx

3 A large scandal surfaced in 2013 involving the secretary of finance of Veracruz, one of the largest states in the country. Audio and video was leaked where high level officials were negotiating political strategies for votebuying using the cash transfer program, then called Oportunidades.
goods range from food baskets, wheelchairs, blankets, construction materials, ecological toilets, small farming subsidies or art craft supplies for artisans. In fact, in poor and marginalized communities, goods from local programs may be the only available source of income for some and usually the only manifestation the state until the electoral season.\textsuperscript{4}

The abundance of unmonitored social and welfare policies at the state level currently provide a valuable resource for corrupt politicians and clientelistic brokers across the country.\textsuperscript{5} Although they are usually brokered by a partisan or clientelistic intermediary, subnational social programs have written operation and eligibility rules. In principle, there is no formal or legal impediment to anyone who wants to personally request a wide variety of social assistance or welfare programs directly at the town hall or state offices, however few citizens actually do, and those who directly request tend to be for reasons I explain below.

In the state of Yucatan, for example, around 10\% of the state budget is allocated to local welfare and assistance programs. This budget is spent on about 185 social assistance and welfare programs (data from the current state government, 2012-2018, click here for a full description.), none of which are properly audited or evaluated. Yucatan is the 12th largest state (out of 32) in the country and occupies the 11th position in poverty, yet is the 4th with the most social programs. The state has also been historically well above the national average of number of local social assistance programs (see Fig. 3.1.\textsuperscript{6} There are programs providing benefits that range from scholarships for continuing secondary

\textsuperscript{4}Colloquially called 'apoyos', roughly translating to 'small amount of help'.

\textsuperscript{5}An embarassing example of this type of discretion are the recent accusations to the ex governor (took leave, then became a fugitive, and was only recently captured) of Veracruz, Javier Duarte, who profited from social programs by creating ‘ghost’ businesses supposedly owned by local poor citizens. Unknowing citizens were promised food baskets and other small benefits in exchange for signing legal papers that credited them as owners of businesses with their home as the business’ fiscal addresses. The actual benefit for the ‘business owner’ was never delivered, and the resources were then redirected to other businesses owned by members of Duarte’s political and economic entourage. During more than three years, this abominable act of corruption allowed Duarte to deviate more than 700 million dollars of public money destined to help small busienesses in the state into his own pockets, that is more than the yearly budget for a small state like Tlaxcala (http://www.animalpolitico.com/2016/10/duarte-veracruz-empresas-fantasma-desvio-recursos/).

\textsuperscript{6}CONAPO marginalization index, 2010. www.conapo.gob.mx. Social program count corresponds to a 2012 conducted by CONEVAL. www.programassociales.mx
Figure 1: Sub national Social Programs in Mexico

and tertiary education to provision of construction materials, food baskets or sowing machines and other materials for building up small businesses. Other programs, such as the "Adjustment of Debts Program", provide financial aid of up to 80% of the total cost of utility bills to those who request it, with the sole condition of living in a state of "vulnerability". In fact, about 70% of state programs provide some direct "economic" support (in cash or kind) with vague and flexible eligibility criteria. There are more complex ‘productive projects’ that some citizens (mostly agricultural workers) may be eligible for and are usually highly politicized. However, those kind of projects are mostly federal and require significantly more technical assistance than the state level social welfare programs I will be focusing on.

All of these programs have to be written down, specifying target population and some basic rules of operations, this means that basically anyone who fulfills the criteria can legitimately ask for the good directly at the government’s office. Thus, if the possibility of direct access is available, why do some individuals access (or rather receive) local welfare benefits through a clientelistic structure which undoubtedly be more expensive in the long run? Citizens face two main structural obstacles in accessing the state directly: lack
of information and lack of resources needed to write and deliver a request.

First, the sheer volume of social welfare programs in the state makes it impossible for any citizen to be fully informed of all those for which she is eligible. Even when there is willingness or effort from the state level authorities to inform citizens about the range of programs available to them, promotional tasks are often left to municipal level authorities who halfheartedly inform citizens that live in urban centers or bias the information to their allies in the rest of the municipality. In far and marginalized rural areas, only the selected few close to the partisan broker or to well connected party leader will get word of any new welfare benefits.

Second, even when citizens know their eligibility to the supply of policy, they usually lack sufficient bureaucratic experience or the necessary economic, time and psychological resources to file requests. Most of these programs must be requested at the central offices in the state’s capital, but travel to the capital is an enormous cost to most citizens who would need welfare benefits.

In addition to the lack of information and the high monetary costs implied in making and sending a request to the state government, there are significant psychological costs, manifested in people’s insecurity to make a request, either due to beliefs about their educational or language abilities, past discrimination or plain disbelief in the system. Most applications for local social aid and assistance programs are simple and done in writing, and require only basic identification documents, but most people have rarely written one. For instance, Figure 2 for an example of a request for a sowing machine.
Figure 2: Application to the Ministry of Labor for a Sowing Machine

Writing a letter like the one shown in Figure 2 and gathering necessary documents may seem trivial but it can be a challenge to many people. Another example from Hacienda de Teya in Kanasin illustrates this case. I interviewed a teacher who worked in a larger town near by. She is the daughter of "Norma", a former party broker from the PAN (PAN is the center-right wing party in Mexico, it is also the second largest political party in the state).

Tesalia: Do you think people can go on their own and request aid? [instead of through the local intermediary/comisario]
Norma's Daughter: Yes, they can. But they are used to having someone in the middle. Actually, its more that people here have a trauma or complex that when people from another place come to
town and they have a higher education level than them, they believe they are superior and they immediately go to them for help. Doña Paty [a local leader] is like that, everybody knows she has studied [finished high school]. She knows how to talk eloquently and is very kind to them. That’s why everyone goes to her. Even people who could go to an office and ask, they don’t do it, I’m not sure if it is low self-esteem or what...

Fieldwork, organizations on the ground and even bureaucrats themselves admit that there are clear informational, monetary, time and even psychological costs implied for people in applying to social programs on their own, as well as basic ignorance of eligibility, availability of programs and challenging procedural aspects of applying.

3.2 Intermediated Access in Yucatan

The state of Yucatan has 106 municipalities. Each municipality has a palacio municipal, or town hall, usually located in the main populated locality of a municipality, also known as the cabecera municipal. The highest authority in any municipality is the Presidente Municipal or the mayor. Some municipios are composed of only one locality, in those cases the municipality and the cabecera municipal are the same, but many municipalities have rural populations that are not big enough to be a municipio on their own, so they are called comisarias municipales (similar to a municipal precinct).

The population in Yucatan is particularly spread out because henequen plantations (or haciendas) were the main economic activity of the state since 19th century (and highly lucrative). When the market for henequen collapsed in the mid 20th century, the areas around the haciendas remained populated by former henequen peasants and their families. These villages later became known as comisarias and subcomisarias municipales.

One way the Yucatan government has tried to address the challenge of information dissemination and limited accessibility to social assistance programs in its small cabeceras

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7What used to be known in the 19th and early 20th century as ‘pueblos libres’, i.e. with no hacienda activity, they are now called subcomisarias. These ‘administrative’ units are equivalent to a village but do not have any control over budget or policy. Also, if enough people in the comisaria are also co-protipriators of a communally owned land (known as ejidatarios), the comisaria must have an additional authority called comisario ejidal who functions as the elected representative of the ejidatarios.
and comisarias municipales has been through the figure of the Comisario Municipal or municipal precinct sheriff.\(^8\) By law, comisarias hold non partisan elections to elect a comisario every 2 or 3 years. These individuals in theory act as a link between the community and the municipal and state government promoting and informing citizens about government programs as well as channelling citizens’ demands to the appropriate governmental office. De jure, elections should be organized by members of the comisaria and are held after the municipal government is elected. Table 1 shows data from survey conducted to all comisarios in the experiment’s sample. The table shows the comisario’s stated partisan identification.\(^9\) The table shows that very few comisarios defect from the mayoral party. It is more likely that a comisario defects towards PRI, because PRI is governing the state.

In practice, comisarios are rarely isolated to local political interests. In fact, because of the timing of comisario elections (a few months after municipal elections take place), comisarios elected are usually sympathizers of the elected mayor’s political party. In the same survey conducted to comisarios, about 60% of the respondents reported having

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\(^8\) Although this figure is not unique to Yucatan, Guerrero, Chiapas and Tlaxcala have similar agents, it is not the norm in the country.

\(^9\) There are currently 6 parties governing municipalities in Yucatan. MORENA (a left-wing new party founded by defectors from PRD), PAN (a traditionally center right party), PRD (center-left political party), PRI (ideologically diverse, governed the country for 72 years), PANAL (non-ideological party composed mostly of teachers or of ex PRI members), PVEM (the ‘green’ party, although highly corrupted and not centered on environmental issues really)
actively participated in previous elections, a vast percentage of whom reported working as ‘vote promoters’ or party representatives in the polls.

Data from the citizens in these localities obtained from the baseline survey verifies this claim, 85% of our sample argued that their comisario is an active member of a political party. Additionally, respondents feel like comisarios are highly discretionary on their jobs. For instance, 65% stated that the comisario was discretionary in his job as local representative, reporting that he benefited only his friends and family and not the community as a whole. Unsurprisingly, this percentage varies widely across people who said they were ‘close’ to the comisario. These data suggest that even ‘official’ intermediaries are usually perceived to behave in discretionary and clientelistic ways. Interestingly, when asked about the mayor, comisarios answered the complete opposite: 68% of the comisarios assure that the mayor benefits everyone equally, and only 25% suggests the mayor benefits only their friends.

Figure 3: Who does the comisario help out in the community? By relationship between respondent and comisario.

Data from a baseline survey in the localities sampled, extensive fieldwork, as well more than 100 voter and elite interviews in comisarias across the state reveals that comisarios are frequently imposed by a local elite, either the municipal party or local elites like jefas de manzana\textsuperscript{10} or some other municipal level party member. Sometimes, the comisario

\textsuperscript{10}Block chiefs or jefas de manzana, as they are known in Mexico, are usually in charge of mobilizing one
acts as a mere figurehead and the party broker runs business as usual. Other times, a party broker runs as comisario and, if the elected mayor shares their party, she is very likely win.

There are also likely to be other types of brokers operating in localities. To map out the brokerage structure in each of the localities in the study, the survey presented respondents with a vignette that described the actions of a partisan broker. The prompt read: "Mariel is an active member of a political party but is not member of government. She has contacts in government that tell her about governmental goods that arrive to her locality. When the goods arrive she distributes them to whoever she wants. She is active all year round, but especially during political campaigns." After the prompt, the respondent was asked if there was someone like Mariel in their communities, if that person was active all year round or only during elections, how many people like Mariel lived in their community and whether they thought the local authority (comisario or presidente municipal) was like Mariel. After this prompt, 45% of respondents said someone like that did exist in their localities, 45% said nobody like that existed, and about 10% said they did not know (see Figure 4). However, I find that in all localities, at least 5% of those sampled (at least 2 people) said that there is at least 1 person like Mariel.

Figure 4: Graphical Representation Existence of Partisan Brokers (Baseline Data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Someone like Mariel (45% respondents)</th>
<th>None like Mariel (45% respondents)</th>
<th>DK 10%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only during campaigns (66%)</td>
<td>All year (33%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comisario/Mayor is like Mariel?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (57%)</td>
<td>No (33%)</td>
<td>DK (10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

or more blocks of houses during elections, and are commonly associated with the PRI. As members of the PRI, they are the lowest tier of the party structure.

11In Spanish: “Mariel es una persona muy conocida en una [comisaría/comunidad]. Ella es miembro activo de un partido político, pero no es parte del gobierno. Debido a sus contactos en el gobierno, Mariel se entera de apoyos que llegan a su comunidad. Cuando llegan, sólo le ayuda a las personas que ella quiere. Ella es muy activa todo el año, pero especialmente durante las campañas electorales.”
An example from my fieldwork illustrates the role of clientelistic intermediation in distribution of subnational welfare benefits. Rosalia is a citizen of Bolon locality in the municipality of Uman. She received new toilet for her house, a well known state level program that intended to eliminate open defecation. When I asked her how she managed to get this benefit, she answered (paraphrased):

**Rosalia:** It is not a fair process (...) all of us [who got the benefits] were already selected before they [the government] announced there were going to give out benefits. I got it [the benefit] this time, but I know many people who wanted to request it and couldn’t. The people who gave out the goods are from PRI [talking about the comisario and municipal bureaucrats] and most of the people who got the benefit were from PRI too. Actually, the reason the PRI lost this last election is because the leaders [comisario and brokers] only distribute goods between themselves or their party members. They should give it to everyone who needs it. Even if one doesn’t get everything, we should all get something. They gave out material to built cement floors, water tanks for home, toilets, houses and most of it went to the leaders and to their people, most of which already have these things. The current comisario is also horrible, I think if one wishes to be comisario, then the people should choose him.

The data from my baseline supports Rosalia’s assessment, as can be seen in Figure 5, showing the distribution of those who requested and received the toilet program, run by a the state administration, currently governed by PRI. Although many people received toilets, we see that PRI sympathizers disproportionally receive toilets and PAN sympathizers were disproportionally denied the benefit. In fact, when I interviewed a bureaucrat at the local ministry of development, he boasted with pride about their system of distribution of toilets and other infrastructure projects, saying (paraphrasing, August 2016):

"We don’t decide centrally who gets what. We are very close to the people, we encourage the comisario or presidente municipal to make a committee that creates a list of people who should be beneficiaries of this benefit. If either of them is uncooperative —as they sometimes are when they are from the opposite party— we know people on the ground who are natural leaders and can make these lists for us."
Oftentimes, people do not distinguish between comisarios and party brokers, as this example illustrates, Rosalia refers to ‘them’, including the comisario, as the party brokers. She is not alone, usually both are from the same group of people and not infrequently, the party broker becomes comisario (or the other way around).

Another case clearly illustrates how being in the party broker’s favor can open many doors, but being an outsider can severely limit access and resources to request benefits from the state. Leonida, who lives in the locality Oxholon, Uman, is a Mayan woman who, together with a larger group of women, communally owns a small orchard where they grow crops to sell in the market. I interviewed Leonida’s daughter, her daughter in law and neighbor while they were cleaning their crops. Although they seemed knowledgeable about the available rural assistance programs, when asked the type of benefits people like them had access to, they immediately bring up the problem of the comisario acting as a partisan broker.

**Leonida’s daughter**: The truth is we don’t know how to do an application. We would ask him [the ex-comisario], where do we take the application? He won’t tell us. Only they [referring to the ex-comisario’s family and friends] know where to take it.
Leonida: [says silently] the man helps people write applications and then he takes it where
they process them.
Tesalia: Where? To the government?
Both [loud]: Who knows! We don’t know where he goes!
(...)
Leonida: He lives next door, have you gone to talk to him?
Tesalia: No, should I? [They all nod]
Leonida’s daughter: If you ask him, ‘how do you do an application...’ maybe he will tell
YOU, but when we ask him... we get nothing!

Finally, one could think that even when there are clientelistic and partisan avenues
to accessing the state, many citizens do go directly to the government to request help
when they need to. In the baseline survey, I asked respondents how likely they would
be to go to the municipal government (their closest level of government) to request help
or information in the future. A bit more than 80% of my sample responded not likely at
all or just a little bit likely. When asked why they wouldn’t go to the municipality, a vast
majority mentioned as the first reason ‘they do not listen to me’ or ‘they don’t respond’.
Although the probability of going directly to the municipal government are in general
low, they are significantly higher for those who have gone to the municipality before.
Direct previous experience with the government correlates with people’s likelihood to
seek out government again in the future (this relationship holds even after controlling for
socioeconomic confounders as well as evaluation of the mayor).

The baseline data also asked individuals to state all the requests they had done in the
past year, and whether they had received help in requesting them from the comisario, a
party broker, the mayor, and others or if they had done the request personally. Although
respondents could receive help from multiple people, of all the people who did request
something, only a third said they made the request personally. What is interesting about
these people however, is that they are on average wealthier, more educated, more politi-
cally active and informed and are less likely to speak mayan. Citizens who request goods
personally are also much more likely to report that people should feel obligation to recip-
rocate a political party for gifts done in exchange for support. It is, however, unrelated to
the citizens’ partisanship identification.

[Table of correlations here - still thinking how to visualize these correlations]

It seems clear that both anecdotally and through survey measures, citizens’ likelihood to approach the state directly depends on their previous experience, knowledge about how the ‘system’ works but also on their available material resources. Although it is less clear how partisanship factors into citizens’ decision to approach the state, discretion (or perceived discretion) of the intermediary does correlate negatively to personal engagement with the government. Although at first glance, we could argue that people do not approach the government because their expectations of response are low, we see that having experienced the state first hand correlates with respondents likelihood to approach government again in the future. I argue that clientelistic-intermediated access to the state inhibits citizens from experiencing first hand, impacting a variety of factors that influence citizens’ likelihood and ability to make future requests to their governments.
Chapter 4: Experimental Design and Estimation

The experiment takes place in 150 localities in Yucatan where I randomly selected 75 to receive treatment, and 75 pure control (see Section 5 for details on sampling units and randomization). The intervention introduces 75 intermediaries or what we call *gestores ciudadanos* into 75 localities who will work from September 12 until December 12 2016 in the Mexican state of Yucatan.

Treatment was implemented at the locality level (more about sample selection on Section 5). A baseline survey was implemented in both treatment and control localities on a random sample of citizens (more detail on the data in Section 5.2). When implementing the baseline, in the treated localities, the survey enumerator invited the surveyed individual to visit the *gestor ciudadano* by reading them out a text explaining our project and giving them out a flyer as an invitation (see flyer text here). In addition to the survey, official data at the locality level on numbers of requests will be used to measure the treatment effects at the locality level.\(^{12}\)

Individuals surveyed in treated units who were also encouraged to go to the gestor ciudadano allow me to measure intend to treat effects. A complier population is defined simply as whether the citizen in a locality knew about the the *gestor ciudadano* as measured in the endline survey will allow me to measure two stage least squares estimates (instrumenting meeting with gestor with being encouraged to visit the gestor in the baseline survey). I will show results that both consider assignment to treatment (locality level) as an instrument for meeting the gestor using data collected in the endline as well as the intent to treat effects, both controlling for pre-specified covariates (listed on online appendix).

The *gestor ciudadano* is trained to provide information about eligibility and help eligible beneficiaries request and apply for state level social programs free of cost and bias. In

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\(^{12}\)I have baseline numbers for the total requests at locality level. As for the endline data by locality, I expect to have it by the end of 2017. I am allowing government to collect and systematize data before requesting endline data through FOIA requests.
practice, the gestor ciudadano’s job consisted on knocking on all doors in her locality\textsuperscript{13} inviting people to make use of the service. When citizens were interested, the gestor would help with writing the requests (always together with the applicant), help collate relevant documents and give the applicant all relevant contact information to the ministry to which she was making the request.

A key component of this intervention is creating a platform to systematize and easily update information on the more than 180 social assistance programs available for the citizens of Yucatan. We are using a 800 page PDF document uploaded by Yucatan officials describing all social programs and summarizing it into a handbook that will provide intermediaries with a list of social assistance programs for which an individual is eligible, given their characteristics (demographics, social security information, etc.) and explain—in familiar terms—the specifics on how to apply. In the final version of this handbook consisted of the 43 programs that were still available at the time of the intervention for the year (the official document is available here, our handbook is available here).

In the main specification I will use for my dependent variables, I estimate intend to treat effects on the randomly selected individuals surveyed in the baseline and endline. Individuals in the treated localities received an invitation to approach the gestor.

The main specification is the following:

\[
Y_{i,l} = \beta_0 + \beta_{itt} D_{i,l} + \mu_k X_{i,l} + \alpha_m + \epsilon_{i,l}
\]

Where \(Y_{i,l}\) is the outcome variable for individual \(i\) in locality \(l\). \(D_{i,l}\) is an indicator for being invited to get treatment in treated localities (this takes a value of zero in control localities). \(X_{i,l}^k\) is the \(k\)th pre-treatment control, \(\alpha_m\) are municipal party level dummies because the sampling strategy blocked by municipality party. Standard errors \(\epsilon_{i,j}\) are robust standard errors clustered at the locality level.

\textsuperscript{13}Their locality was divided into areas of more or less equal number of houses. Using a simple lottery procedure, we randomly assigned the order in which the visits to each section should be done by the gestor in order to minimize intra-community issues of why some people were visted first than others.
Because I will observe who ended up going to our broker, I can estimate the treatment effect among the complier population by instrumenting for the treatment using the invitation to attend the gestor’s services using the same set up.

5 Sample Selection and Data

5.1 Sample Selection

Yucatan is divided into 106 municipalities which is the lowest public elected office. Within municipalities there are historically defined geographic units called localidades. These may be cabeceras, comisarias or very small rural villages. Yucatan has about 2506 localities, that vary widely on their population size. Most are very small: 1627 localities have a population of less than 10 individuals, 214 have between 11 and 100 individuals. While most of the population is concentrated in the state capital called Merida (about 40% of the state’s population) Relative to other states in the country, a significant percentage of citizens still lives in rural cabeceras or comisarias.

In Yucatan, like the rest of Mexico, there are many types of clientelistic and non clientelistic intermediaries. Their operations and logic varies conditional on their geographic and social environments. In urban areas, clientelistic intermediaries usually work at electoral precincts, which by law always have a similar population size (around 1500 voters per precinct). Precincts are a simple way to organize neighborhoods in urban areas. However, in smaller cities or rural areas, where population size is much smaller, electoral precincts are made up of a variety of different communities that add up to the minimum or acceptable population size of an electoral precinct. These collection of villages are usually many different comisarias and each has their own specific brokerage structures.

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14 Because many localities were created many decades, or even centuries ago, migration to the capital has emptied many of them. The census still considers them locality as long as there are people living in them.

15 In Yucatan, each municipality has on average 6 electoral precincts (without counting the capital, Merida, that has 472 precincts). Precincts have on average 1,819 citizens and 417 households (based on the 2010 Census), with a maximum of 25,240 and a minimum of 54 citizens (interquartile range 969 - 2042).
Sampling rural precincts would confound interesting variation and introduce potential political bias correlated with locality size. The sample of interest in our case is the ‘natural’ community or localidad where a comisario is elected or alternatively where a broker operates, and not an arbitrary clustering of localities made by electoral precincts.

There are two downsides to selecting localities and not electoral precincts. First, I will be unable to identify the population’s electoral preferences. Many localities may be in the same precinct, but may also have radically different electoral preferences. However, this is also a reason to select localities over precincts, as introducing a programmatic *gestor ciudadano* into a precinct with multiple villages and even opposing loyalties and conflicting leaderships may be problematic. The second downside is that most localities are too small to be considered in this sample, significantly reducing our sampling frame. I was interested in sampling localities that are not directly connected to a large urban center, with a population large enough to be of interest but not too large as to overwhelm our hired gestor.

To capture all eligible localities within each municipality, I first selected all localities that fall in a population between 500 and 5,000, these summed up to 272 localities. I then eliminated the localidades around the capital city of Merida (falling to 215, encompassing 87 municipalities) because highly urbanized localities vary widely in the type of brokerage structures they have, increasing pretreatment variation on what I believe to be a strong predictor of treatment effects. Also, urban areas have significantly better access to state level programs. I also eliminated localities where there was more than 25% of individuals who did not speak Spanish.\(^{16}\)

This procedure summed a total of 190 unique localities. I then divided all localities by the political party that won the last 2015 elections at the municipal level to create 4 blocks (those that were won by PRI, by PAN, by PRD or MORENA and those won

---

\(^{16}\)Maya speaking communities represented a serious logistical challenge. First, we only had one enumerator who spoke fluent Maya out of 30. Second, we did not have the necessary infrastructure to provide a full training to intermediaries in Maya.
by others) within which pairs were selected. From here I sampled 150, or 75 pairs that were as similar as possible on a series of covariates that are theoretically predictive of our outcome.  

Using this procedure I found 94 eligible pairs and randomly assigned treatment and control between them. Despite the small resulting sampling frame, balance on relevant pre treatment covariates — and several proxies for one outcome variable— turned out exceedingly well (see appendix for more details). The sampled localities are mapped in Figure 7, where green are control units and red dots are control units.

---

17 Population, number of inhabited houses, distance in km to the cabecera, percentage affiliated to Prospera, percentage individuals affiliated to the state program for food security, affiliated to the elderly pension, percentage individuals received direct assistance from ‘Asistencia Ciudadana’ state level program, member of Cruzada contra el Hambre federal program, is part of the Programa para el Desarrollo de Zonas Prioritarias, poverty index (from CONAPO), a dummy for whether it is a cabecera or not, minutes on car to Merida (Yucatan state capital), percentage of individuals who speak Mayan and no Spanish.

18 To minimize risk of spillover I ran a simple algorithm that would find combinations of control/treatment pairs that maximize the number of controls that were at least 8km distance (20 min in car at an average 40km/h). The result was 56 pairs with sufficiently far away controls, and 27 that were close to 1 treatment unit. I then consulted with local experts on the selection of these 94 pairs. I was recommended to remove 9 problematic localities that constituted 5 pairs, resulting in 89 pairs. Several other pairs were then further removed after discussing logistics with the survey firm (see appendix for details).
5.2 Data

The main data source I will use in this paper is the endline survey that measures outcomes and baseline survey that measures all controls.\(^{19}\)

The baseline survey, in addition to obtaining relevant baseline covariates, was designed to capture in great detail claim making behavior by respondents, like the number of requests they have made, who helped them in that process, did they receive it or not. It also captures in detail their relationship to comisarios, mayors and local political brokers (the degree to which they believe they are partisan or universalistic), attitudes towards the state, redistributive preferences and political participation.\(^{20}\) The endline survey is de-

\(^{19}\)The dissertation includes a series of additional data sources, like a survey done to comisarios, observational data from the period of implementation and additional data collected for a second part of the project to be continued from mid March to mid May.

\(^{20}\)Not all of this information is presented here both for space and time reasons.
signed to capture outcomes on a wide variety of topics and included additional questions on clientelism. The survey was administered in tablet computers and was programmed with Qualtrics. To explore the baseline questionnaire (the treatment version that includes one extra prompt at the end), please click here. To explore the endline questionnaire (both treatment and control are the same), please click here.

The number of interviews (survey respondents) per locality were selected as follows. In all localities below 1800 inhabitants, I surveyed 20 respondents, in those localities above 1800 inhabitants, a 1.1% sample of the population was determined.21

6 Results

[Preliminary]

6.1 Outcomes

In this version of this paper, I will look at four main groups of outcomes described below:

REQUEST MAKING BEHAVIOR: The baseline survey listed 19 popular social welfare programs (or type of benefits) to the state and asks respondents whether in the past year they have requested and received, requested and been denied or requested but have not yet heard back from government. I find that on average, each individual in the sample has requested 1.2 social programs in the past year (median=1, max=18). The endline survey asked respondents the same question, but narrowing the time span to the past 3 months. I’ve operationalized request making as a dichotomous variable that indicates whether

21Fixing 20 respondents for all localities below 1800 is done to guarantee certain level of precision for intra community estimates, based on power calculations holding the number of localities fixed at 150. Furthermore, if we assume that population size is uncorrelated with some measure we are interested in calculating, for example brokerage networks, then the fixing procedure is unbiased. Although we can reasonably expect population size is in fact correlated, this correlation would be negligible among communities below 1500 inhabitants, as it would be between villages of 1,500 and 5,000 or more.
individuals made a new request of any kind of program or other. When analyzing this variable, I will also control for baseline levels of number of requests. Another important detail to note, is that by mid November (during the time of implementation) many government offices had stopped receiving requests with the exception of several very popular programs from the rural development ministry and a local institute that promotes Mayan culture. The first provided a wide range of agricultural tools, the second provided supplies for artisans and hammock makers. Being that these two broad sets of programs were the most popular during the intervention I will create a second variable just analyzing these two sets of programs, also as an indicator variable of whether a respondent made any requests.

LIKELIHOOD TO REQUEST IN THE FUTURE: The endline survey includes a question that captures how more likely respondents would be to request something in the future. Because not all individuals need or want to request something at a given moment, the survey asks individuals how likely they are to seek out information on how to request something in the future were they to need it. The survey asks how likely they are to a) go directly to a state level ministry, b) go directly to the municipal level government, c) call on the phone or d) use the internet. For easier interpretation, I calculate dichotomous variables of each of these questions that take the value of zero if the respondent said ‘not likely at all’ and one if the respondent said either ‘A little’, ‘Somewhat’ or ‘Very likely’.\(^{22}\) I will use these measures individually and then create an additive index which adds all four categories. I do find that coding this variable in a different way nullifies the results, however, this coding approach is justified as the variation in this variable is not in degree of likelihood. I present results for the alternative coding in the appendix.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS CLIENTELISM I use two questions to operationalize this variable.

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\(^{22}\)Baseline levels suggest variation is actually happening between the ‘Not likely at all’ and the rest of the categories. This is also consistent with my observation of the survey implementation.
The first measure for attitudes towards clientelism is based on Lawson and Greene (2011) question on reciprocal feelings towards clientelistic behaviors. One of two variations was randomly shown to respondents. The versions are the two options in brackets. The answers vary from ‘Very obligated’ to ‘Not obligated at all’. I will use two versions of this variable, one is continuous, another will be dichotomous, where 0 is ‘No obligation at all’, and 1 is any degree of obligation. The prompt reads:

“Imagine a person called Julia/Julio who is a citizen like yourself and lives in a community like your own. Mariel (gets Julia/Julio on a list for a bathroom like the ones the government id giving out)/(manages to get the road paved in Julia/Julio’s town). In your opinion, how much obligation should Julia/Julio feel to support a Mariel’s political party?”

The second measure shows respondents vignettes depicting a variety of actions that a partisan broker (Mariel) has hypothetically done in the past. All the actions depict a classic clientelistic scenario. The respondent is then asked to rank these actions from very bad (1) to very good (5) (Muy mal, mal, ni bien ni mal, Bien, Muy bien). A similar version of this question is included in the baseline survey, but questions vary slightly (for purposes of a separate analysis). I will include these pre treatment values as covariates for better precision (although results are unaffected). The wording of this outcome are below:

1. Mariel used her contacts to help a friend get a bathroom from the government.

2. Mariel asked her political party to organize taxis and buses to take her people to the polling station on election day.26

23Other questions I included but did not pre register were degree of obligation a government should feel to a voter who supported them in the polls or not (apoyar1 and apoyar2), and finally two questions measuring tolerance to clientelistic exchanges with varying degrees of conditionality and need.

24The prompt describing Mariel came earlier in the survey and read: “Mariel is an active member of a political party but is not member of government. She has contacts in government that tell her about governmental goods that arrive to her locality. When the goods arrive she distributes them to whoever she wants. She is active all year round, but especially during political campaigns.”

25It is important to note that not all clientelistic scenarios are about vote buying.

26Taxis and buses during election day are an example of what people call ‘acarreo’, or the massive mobilization of people to the polls, usually by political parties.
3. Mariel gave 500 pesos to a neighbor to vote for a political party.

4. Mariel handed out food baskets (the traditional vote-buying gift) before an election to support her political party.

PERCEIVED DIFFICULTY IN WRITING A REQUEST: This variable refers to the degree to which citizens believe it is hard to make a request on their own. Its operationalized by a survey question that asks citizens to rate how difficult they believe a request is from 'Very hard' to 'Not hard at all'. I dichotomize this variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>n</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>sd</th>
<th>median</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any request (endline, binary)</td>
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<td>0.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools and Artisan requests (endline, binary)</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>All requests (endline)</td>
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<td>0.78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All requests (baseline)</td>
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<td>1.24</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Likelihood Go Ministry</td>
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<td>0.50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Likelihood Go to Municipality</td>
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<td>0.49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Search Internet</td>
<td>2335</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Likelihood Call on Phone</td>
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<tr>
<td>Likelihood Additive Index</td>
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<td>1.54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity (4pt Scale)</td>
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<td>2.33</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity (binary, 1: Very, Somewhat or A little)</td>
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<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ For Vote (5pt scale)</td>
<td>2321</td>
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<td>0.72</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Basket for Vote (5pt scale)</td>
<td>2317</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bathroom to Friend (5pt scale)</td>
<td>2319</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxis on election day (5pt scale)</td>
<td>2309</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difficulty (4pt Scale, 4: Not at all difficult, 0: Very difficult)</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>sd</th>
<th>median</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$ For Vote (5pt scale)</td>
<td>2256</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Basket for Vote (5pt scale)</td>
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<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The total observations may change in analysis due to missingness in control variables. Binary variables indicate the values that were coded with the value 1, 0 for all other values.

6.2 Results

The main set of results are shown in Table 3 and Table 4. I find that citizens in treated communities are more likely to make any request, and the effects seem to be relatively larger when we look at the most popular programs that were open at the time of the implementation (Tools and Artisan goods). The ITT estimates shown in Table 3 show modest but consistent results, and are robust to the exclusion of control variables. The
effect on the Tools and Artisan requests is considerably higher among the population defined as compliers, which is also expected and coincides with what we observed in the field. These results are encouraging,\textsuperscript{27} especially considering the very short period we were in the locality and the initial levels of distrust we encountered. The results also show, again, modest but consistent estimates for likelihood of requesting in the future, operationalized using the survey questions explained in section 6.1. Also coherent with the context, we observe that in the two variables asking respondents whether they would search for information on the internet or by the phone, we observe no effect. In many of the localities we worked in, cellphone reception is spotty and internet is rare.

The combination of these results, provides relatively strong evidence that, even in this very short period of time, the availability of another avenue to make requests to the state impacts respondents (self-reported) behavior and likely behavior in the future.\textsuperscript{28}

Not all citizens in a community received treatment as defined by meeting with the gestor. It is difficult to argue that all citizens knew about the gestor’s work during the course of three months. Transmitting and promoting this kind of job to citizens who are unaccustomed to it was a communication challenge. Furthermore, it was difficult for one person knocking on each door of all the community. For these reasons, ITT estimates may be underestimating the treatment effect of having a gestor in a community. Therefore I conduct an instrumental variable analysis to calculate the average treatment effect among compliers. I define a complier population as those who responded that they had heard about the gestor’s job.\textsuperscript{29} Table 2 shows the number of people who reported having heard about the gestor. There is a very small number of respondents who reported knowing

\textsuperscript{27}Each respondent was asked if he had been helped to request the good, and by whom. Future versions will present additional data, both collected in the field and additional survey measures.

\textsuperscript{28}A behavioral measure, consisting on the number of requests that the government reported obtaining will be requested via FOIA once the second round of the experiment finishes.

\textsuperscript{29}Question asked if they knew about the job the gestor was conducting, and not about the gestor by name. In communities this small, everyone knows each other’s name. For this reason the question asked the following: “During the past 2 or 3 months, have you heard about a gestor ciudadano that works for (Partner Organization’s name) here in [locality name]. (If confused, explain:) The gestor was a person that informed your community about social programs from the government. Her work consisted in knocking on people’s houses, provide an brochure and provide information about requesting social programs.”
the gestor, these 39 people come from 24 different localities, which makes me think that respondents were confusing the gestor’s job with a someone in their village who does something similar, or more likely, there is some degree of measurement error or surveyor mistakes. We asked people to name the gestor (by full name or nickname) if they said they knew of the gestor, 70% of those asked identified the gestor.\textsuperscript{30}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Complier Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expressed attitudes may be a function of many things, social desirability bias, demand effects or other types of biases. True attitudes are relevant because they influence behavior, and arguably because they reflect moral standards used by people to judge their surroundings and their political environment. Even when we observe a form of clientelism like vote-buying, many times we have little idea of what the motivations are behind engaging in that kind of exchange. I find that expressed attitudes on two dimensions of clientelism change as a result of having a non-clientelistic avenue of approaching the state.

The first dimension is the sense of obligation citizens believe they should feel towards a particular political party that provides them with goods. Table 3 hows that the treatment shifts individuals towards feeling less reciprocal to a political party when given a benefit that the state should provide. The ITT effect is substantially important, it implies in both specifications an 10 to a 15\% standard deviation change, robust to exclusion of controls. More impressive is the complier average treatment effects shown in Table 4, which rise between 40 and 60\% of a standard deviation change. In other words, compli-

\textsuperscript{30}I have various measures of compliance and I oversampled compliers in the endline survey, as defined as the people that made requests through the gestor but were not in the random sample surveyed in the baseline. I plan to provide a variety of complier average treatment effects.
ers are about 30\% more likely to believe citizens should not feel obligation to reciprocate a political party with support for providing a public good.

A second dimension explored in this set of preliminary results is on value judgements of common vote buying and clientelistic practices. The intervention did not take place during an electoral period, and we did not make it a priority to talk about vote-buying during the intervention. The emphasis was placed on the availability and possibility of requesting social programs that the state provides, such programs include, but are not limited to food baskets and bathrooms. Consistent with the design of the study, it is precisely in the answers to the two vignettes that refer to social programs where we see the most substantive treatment effects. The vignettes ask respondents to rate the hypothetical vignette as ‘Very bad’ to ‘Very good’ with a mid point of ‘Neither good nor bad’. Interpreting the scale is tricky, but the ITT effects we observe are substantial, of about 15 to 20\% of a standard deviation change. Among compliers, these results almost quadruple.
Table 3: ITT Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Control Mean</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<td><strong>Request Making</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Request (1: Requested)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>2071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools and Artisan Supply (1: Requested)</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>2071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Likelihood of Requesting in the Future</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1.98</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
<td>2071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Go Ministry</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>2071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Go Municipality</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>2071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Make a Call</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Obligation to Reciprocate</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity (Continous 4pt Scale)</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
<td>2039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity Binary (1:Very, Somewhat, A little)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>2039</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Clientelism Vignettes</strong></th>
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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>$ For Vote</td>
<td>1.87</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>2060</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food Basket for Vote</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>2055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bathroom to Friend</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
<td>2057</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taxis Election Day</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Perceived Difficulty in Writing a Request</strong></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty (4pt Scale)</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty (Binary)</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All standard errors are heteroskedastic robust and clustered at the locality level. The number of observations in column 4 may differ due to non response. ITT estimates were calculated using OLS regression of each dependent variable on treatment assignment indicator, 4 fixed effects for each blocking variable value, and a vector of pre-specified control variables. All likelihood variables are dichotomous and take the value of 1 if the answer is ‘Very likely’, ‘Somewhat likely’ or ‘A little likely’ and 0 when the answer is ‘Not likely at all’ unless otherwise specified. The likelihood index is an additive index of all likelihood measures. Two other additive indexes are presented for comparison, first one codes as 1 ‘Very likely’ responses from all likelihood questions and adds them, the second codes 1 ‘very’ and ‘somewhat likely’ and again creates an additive index. Reciprocity vignettes are evaluated on a scale from ‘Very Obligated to Reciprocate’ (4) to ‘Not obligated at all’ (1). The dichotomous version takes value of 1 for ‘Very Obligated’ and ‘Somewhat Obligated’ conditions, 0 otherwise. Vignettes are evaluated on a scale from ‘Very good’(4) to ‘Very bad (1)’. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
However, a very important and valid concern in interpreting the effects on attitudes on clientelism is the real possibility of demand effects or a social desirability bias differential in treatment and control groups. The former would imply that the treatment had no real effect. For instance, if respondents felt that the enumerator was somehow part of the team of the gestor and felt they had to respond what they thought the organization or researchers wanted to hear, then there would not be any treatment effect. The latter may actually suggest a different interpretation of the treatment effects, if there was really a larger social desirability bias in treated communities, this would be an indication of an impact on the level sensitivity around the topic caused by the treatment. Because neither can be verified, we’ll discuss their plausibility.

Although it is possible that citizens linked enumerators to the broader project, there are several reasons why the impact on treatment effects may be unlikely. First, both treated and control communities had a base and endline visit by the enumerators. These visits were pretty noteworthy, as most of these villages are not usually surveyed. The survey also asked respondents if they remembered the baseline survey and I notice no significant difference in responses between treatment and control localities. Second, not all vignettes demonstrate the same change in levels of disapproval, in fact the Taxi vignette, although having similar averages in the control group as the rest of the vignettes, shows no significant results and very small coefficients. The order of these questions was randomized, but they were all asked together. If the treatment effect were driven by demand effects, then they would spillover to coefficients for the Taxi vignette as well. Another interesting finding is that change is smaller and non significant in the vignette “$ for Vote”, where we would actually expect a higher social desirability bias then for vignettes related to social programs.

Finally, a last set of results relate to a measure of difficulty. This measure indicates whether citizens in treated communities were more likely to say that they found the procedure of writing a request was difficult. Again, results are modest, yet consistent with an
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>2SLS with Controls</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef</td>
<td>SE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Request Making</td>
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<tr>
<td>Any Request (binary)</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools and Artisan Supply (binary)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Likelihood of Requesting in the Future</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Index (1: Very, Somewhat, A little)</td>
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<td>0.40*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Obligation to Reciprocate</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity (Continuous 4pt Scale)</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reciprocity Binary (1: Very, Somewhat, A little)</td>
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<td>0.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clientelism Vignettes</td>
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<tr>
<td>$ For Vote</td>
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<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Basket for Vote</td>
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<td>Bathroom</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty (Binary)</td>
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Notes: All standard errors are heteroskedastic robust and clustered at the locality level. The number of observations in column 4 may differ due to respondents declining to answer or not knowing what to answer. The estimates were calculated using two stage least squares regression of each dependent variable on indicator for compliance which is instrumented by assignment to treatment, 4 fixed effects for each blocking variable value, and a vector of pre-specified control variables. All likelihood variables are dichotomous and take the value of 1 if the answer is ‘Very likely’, ‘Somewhat likely’ or ‘A little likely’ and 0 when the answer is ‘Not likely at all’ unless otherwise specified. The likelihood index is an additive index of all likelihood measures. Two other additive indexes are presented for comparison, first one codes as 1 ‘Very likely’ responses from all likelihood questions and adds them, the second codes 1 ‘very’ and ‘somewhat likely’ and again creates an additive index. Reciprocity vignettes are evaluated on a scale from ‘Very Obligated to Reciprocate’ (4) to ‘Not obligated at all’ (1). The dichotomous version takes value of 1 for ‘Very Obligated’ and ‘Somewhat Obligated’ conditions, 0 otherwise. Vignettes are evaluated on a scale from ‘Very good’(4) to ‘Very bad’(1). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
attitudinal change towards recognizing the possibility of independently making a claim to the state.

In general, the results presented, show modest but realistic changes in a range of indicators that suggest that introducing a non clientelistic avenue to access the state can change citizen’s perceptions, current behavior, expectations and potentially future behaviors. It is important to keep in mind that the experiment introduced a very minor intervention in the social context and history of citizens in these localities. One would expect that repeated exposure and social reinforcement would strengthen these results. For this reason, we have extended the intervention to April and May 2017.

A very plausible alternative story is that long term effects will be determined by governmental response. In that case, the change in attitudes expressed in this phase are likely to create priors that will interact with governmental responses. A follow up on these communities in a year will shed some light on what maybe long term effects on individual’s attitudes and behaviors towards the state.

7 Discussion

[In progress]

Changes in access and demand to governmental goods is relevant, but as political scientists we are also interested in changes in political behavior. E.E Schattshneider’s famously stated, "policy creates politics", and an important literature continued to study how this policy feedback impacts a wide range of political attitudes and behavior. However, even before a citizen becomes a beneficiary, the way individuals approach the state to request social policy has its own consequences. Even when approaching the state is not particularly difficult, being exposed to a clientelistic modes of access limits citizen’s procedural experience with accessing social benefits, expand misinformation and limit citizen’s ability to autonomously engage with the state. In contrast, experiencing programmatic
avenue to access the state should allay some uncertainty around beliefs of the state citi-
zens, and potentially provide sense of entitlement and, as others have argued, even in-
crease an individual’s likelihood to mobilize around specific policy interests (Hacker and
Pierson, 2014; Soss, 1999; Zucco, 2013).

In this paper, I argue that the experience of approaching the state is an essential part of
this policy feedback cycle, but admittedly constitutes only the first part of it. More
importantly, I find that even before citizens obtain policy benefits, the mere possibility of
accessing them through non-clientelistic avenues erodes attitudes of approval, acceptance
or even acquiescence towards clientelism.

The change in attitudes towards clientelism is also informative in the kinds of expecta-
tions and priors these citizens will now have about their political surroundings. A (hope-
fully) second endline survey intended to measure long term effects of the intervention
will take place in about a year with the intention of understanding how these attitudes,
and the behaviors attached to them, change after the government issues a response to
these requests.

7.1 Government Responsiveness

[This section will include findings the follow up study that will happen in summer on
how the government has been responding to these requests and what we might expect to
happen to citizens’ requests in the long run.]

7.2 Policy Implications

[This section will tackle with the policy implications of the paper: what are the challenges
in scaling up? Is the gestor doing the job that the state should be doing? Is that desirable?
I will argue that the gestor ciudadano job is not designed to be a permanent job, in that it
exposes citizens to the procedure of demanding and monitoring requests. In doing so, it
incorporates some procedural experience into the individual.}
8 Appendix

This section is constantly being updated. To see the latest version click here.
References


Zacka, Bernardo. 2015. When the State Meets the Street: Moral Agency and Discretionary Power at the Frontlines of Public Service PhD thesis.
