State-Building Failure in British Ireland & French Algeria

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No states have represented the ideal of successful national state formation more distinctly than Great Britain and France. No other states have suggested to so many that political stability over the long term is best achieved within seemingly "natural" borders, encompassing populations obviously destined to share a common political life.

But if states are not expressions of transcendent geographical, historical, or religious principles, but are political constructions, then patterns of change in their size and shape must be traceable, even in the British and French cases, to political processes and political struggles. Britain's failure to incorporate Ireland permanently, and France's similar failure with Algeria, help demonstrate the ultimately problematic nature of the shapes and sizes of states.

Comparison of the British and French experiences in Ireland and Algeria is especially interesting in light of the differences between them identified by many who have studied British and French political culture, British and French state formation, British and French imperialism, and British and French decolonization. Despite the many differences, the predicaments Britain and France created for themselves in Ireland and Algeria, the strategies they used to cope with those predicaments, and the ultimate causes for their failures are strikingly similar. State-building tasks accomplished elsewhere by the English/British and French states were attempted, but not accomplished, in Ireland and Algeria. I argue that these state-building failures were primarily due to the use of settlers in Ireland and Algeria who interrupted the successful application of cooptive techniques that helped to legitimize and stabilize central state rule in other outlying territories. This analysis lends support to theories which emphasize the responsiveness of political identity and loyalty to changing interests, and to those which stress the key role played by the gradual expansion of opportunities for political participation.
in the successful incorporation of most "subject peripheries" into dynamic European states. Explanation of outcomes in the British-Irish and French-Algerian cases also suggests the necessity to integrate study of state formation with theories of imperialism and decolonization.

The original purpose of this study had nothing to do with Ireland or Algeria. It was inspired by my interest in the outcome of Israeli policies toward the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 1967 Israel occupied these territories in a war fought with its Arab neighbors. Including the greater East Jerusalem area, the West Bank and Gaza Strip are currently inhabited by 1.4 million Palestinian Arabs and 110,000 Israeli Jews. The Jews have settled there since 1967. The campaign to settle these territories is seen by both opponents and supporters of the effort as intended to achieve the permanent integration of all or part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip into the State of Israel. In the ideological vernacular of Zionism, this is "building the Jewish state" in "Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District."

This attempt to expand—by settlement—the domain of a central state to include territory inhabited overwhelmingly by culturally distinct and politically antagonistic natives led me to wonder if other states had sought to accomplish similar objectives by similar means, and with what success. The British experience in Ireland and the French experience in Algeria suggested themselves as usefully similar "state-building" efforts, not only because of the relative size and perceived importance of these outlying territories for the British and French states, but perhaps mainly because in both these cases, as in the Israeli case, substantial settler communities lived among large native majorities—neither expelling, annihilating, or otherwise overcoming the demographic preponderance of the indigenous inhabitants.

The possible implications for Israel of this analysis of British and French state-building failures in Ireland and Algeria are not explicitly developed here. Nor is there discussion of how Britain and France finally managed to extricate themselves from most of Ireland and all of Algeria. These matters will be treated in a study now in progress which draws on the Irish and Algerian episodes in British and French political history to suggest hypotheses about the necessary and sufficient conditions for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. In this study I pose an analytically and chronologically prior question: Why did central state efforts to incorporate Ireland and Algeria on a permanent basis fail?

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Chapter One

SETTLERS AND THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF EUROPEAN STATE FORMATION

A number of explanations have been advanced to account for the formation of Western European states and their crystallization within particular boundaries. The attention devoted to this subject during the last ten to fifteen years can be traced in large measure to the difficulties that Third World countries have had institutionalizing sovereign state control over heterogeneously populated areas. These difficulties are commonly understood to contrast sharply with the well-documented success of older states of Western Europe in accomplishing equivalent tasks in the pre-modern era. The rise of peripheral nationalist movements in various European states has also encouraged scholars to analyze processes of national state formation as continuing and highly contingent phenomena.

Earlier approaches to this general problem focused primarily on the development of national affinities among the peoples of Europe. Karl Deutsch's work in this field was particularly influential. Deutsch explained "nation-building" successes in Europe by analyzing how the diffusion of new life styles, languages, and loyalties followed upon technological change and socioeconomic mobilization. From his perspective, the crystallization of new political communities was based on changing social formations setting the stage for the development or elicitation of new loyalties. More recent approaches have viewed the formation, expansion, and competition of nascent state units (i.e., centralized, territorial, administrative apparatuses) as playing the decisive role in the determination of the shape of political spaces in Europe and in the emergence, dominance, and/or disappearance of new "national" communities. In the work of Charles Tilly, Stein Rokkan, Juan Linz, and Samuel Finer, for example, the history of Western Europe from the late Middle Ages through the nineteenth
century is viewed as the struggle of relatively large numbers of potential “conquering cores” to survive and expand as larger and politically centralized states. From this perspective the explicandum of European political history is not only the development of a state system in Europe, but also the pattern of victory and defeat by various of these core areas. Thus Brittany, Burgundy, and Aquitaine, as well as the Île de France; Northumbria, Kent, and Mercia, as well as Wessex; and Aragon and Navarre, as well as Castile, are seen to have been candidates for leadership in the definition and construction of “nation-states.”

Analysis of this problem has led these scholars and their collaborators to focus on power projection capabilities of different potential core areas—e.g., demographic weight, administrative surplus in terms of financial organization and availability of skilled personnel, military and economic resources, high-echelon leadership skills, and ecological and geographic constraints and opportunities. These variables have been used to describe, compare, and explain the differential success of various state-building efforts. Emphasis on these factors has led to a view of the early state-building process as more or less indistinguishable from processes of conquest, subjugation, lordship, penetration, and control characteristic of imperial expansion. The similarity of these processes, recognized by earlier scholars such as Otto Hintze and Max Weber, generates, inter alia, some important terminological difficulties.

Michael Hechter’s study of the expansion of English political authority over the “Celtic fringe” of the British Isles requires him to face these terminological problems directly. What appears after the tenth century as a relatively unified English state must be seen from an earlier vantage point as a case of successful imperial expansion by the region of Wessex in the southwest. What appears by the nineteenth century as a united British state, including England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, is portrayed from the thirteenth to the early nineteenth century as a more or less successful process of English imperial expansion northward and westward. When, asks Hechter, should territorial aggrandizement by a state be considered “state-building” and when should it be considered “imperialism”?

Consistent with Weberian notions of state and empire as generically alike (i.e., descriptive of authority structures and not social formations), Hechter suggests that only in hindsight is it possible to determine whether state- or empire-building has taken place. If, after several generations, the indigenous population of the newly acquired territories ascribes legitimacy to the central political authority exercised over it, that acquisition will be deemed to be the kind of state-building conducive to the emergence of a nation-state—i.e., “national expansion.” If, after several generations, the indigenous population is still prone to consider the political authority exercised over it from the expansive core as illegitimate, then an “empire” has been formed.

Hechter goes on to describe “internal colonialism” as a variant of state-building resulting from assertions by the state-building core of cultural superiority over peripheral populations and the backwash efforts of uneven economic development. Contrary to the political, economic, and cultural integrative processes characteristic of national expansion, internal colonialism preserves and even strengthens the political significance of peripheral cultures located within the new, larger state boundaries.

Aside from the particular terminology adopted by Hechter and the validity (or lack thereof) that his model may have, he shares with most students of European nation-state formation the notion that only if new loyalties to territorially larger central authorities emerge can an instance of territorial aggrandizement or agglomeration be considered permanent and resistant to destabilizing separatist or other centrifugal forces. As Samuel Finer has put it in his characterization of European state-building: “Acquisition was one thing; retention was another.” Only, argues Finer, when the sentiments of indigenous populations became engaged in the fate of the ruling authorities could meaningful, long-lasting integration be said to have occurred.

Thus state-building is divided into two kinds of processes:

1) the acquisition, violent or otherwise, of new territory by a state-building core;

2) the elicitation within the new territory of loyalties and political commitments reflecting the ascription of legitimacy by the indigenous population to the authority structure emanating from the core.
From the perspective of the literature that Finer's work exemplifies, both kinds of processes must be viewed as contingent and problematic. Indeed many authors have commented on the scores of state-building failures that litter European history—the provinces that might have been able to play the role of a state-building core but did not. A good deal of consideration has also been given, although somewhat less explicitly, to the circumstances and policies which encouraged transfers of allegiance, loyalty, and legitimacy to conquering cores. Much of this work has been done on Great Britain and France, the two countries viewed most commonly as the great success stories of the European nation-state-building process.

The expansion of the domain of the medieval principality of Wessex over England, and then of England over the British Isles, and the gradual, disjointed, but ultimately successful assertion of control by the Île de France over territories stretching from the Netherlands to Switzerland, Italy, and the Pyrenees are seen as archetypical examples of the first kind of state-building process ("acquisition"). The political institutionalization of the British state throughout the United Kingdom and the construction of the single French republic, "one and indivisible," out of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious mosaic that was France are also presented as prime, if not as comprehensively valid, examples of the second kind of state-building process ("retention"). In light of the acknowledged success of these two state-building efforts, it is not surprising how often they are used to test or illustrate various models of the social, economic, military, and political dimensions of state formation and expansion.

My purpose here is similar except that the focus will be on episodes of state-building which, for Britain and France, turned out as failures rather than as successes—namely, Ireland for Great Britain and Algeria for France. These two cases are conveniently compared in this context, in part because of the perspective taken by the state-building literature toward the contingent, problematic, yet open-ended nature of the expansion of state authority. This precludes automatic classification of Ireland and/or Algeria as cases of specifically colonial or imperial expansion and control, rather than as candidates for permanent incorporation into the British and French states, along with other peripheral and culturally distinct regions.

In hindsight it may be tempting to conclude that Ireland and Algeria were simply too different culturally from the core of Britain and France, or geographically too remote, to have been integrated successfully into the metropolitan states. Certainly Gaelic Catholicism in Ireland and Islam and Arabic in Algeria provided symbol systems and affinities readily exploitable by separatist elements within these outlying territories. Certainly the physical separation of Ireland from Britain and Algeria from France complicated the projection of power from center to periphery.

But to explain why Ireland and Algeria were not incorporated into Britain and France, and to do so in a way that remains consistent with the perceptions of British and French state-builders and with an appreciation of the fundamentally political processes involved in determining the morphology of states, one cannot begin with notions of geographical or cultural determinism. State formation entails, as a matter of course, the reorganization of culturally connected loyalties and the elaboration of administrative networks that overcome as well as exploit geographical features and cultural barriers. Nor can the similar patterns exhibited by British-Irish and French-Algerian relations be explained unless the potential for state-building success—a potential that was not merely perceived but assumed by British, French, Irish, and Algerian elites—is taken seriously.

Drawing on the extensive secondary source material on the Irish and Algerian problems in British and French political history, I shall argue that one particular mechanism of expansion and territorial control used in Ireland and Algeria—i.e., large nonmilitary settler populations (constituting 5-30 percent of the population of the outlying territory), standing in privileged relationship to the central authorities but in numerically weak relation to the native population—explains the failure of British and French state-building in these two territories. More precisely, settlement in these two cases was a sufficient, albeit not necessary, condition for interruption of the processes of loyalty transformation and legitimization of central administrative authority identified by state-building theorists as necessary for successful state formation.
THE PURPOSE OF SETTLEMENT

Identification of the presence of settlers as a strategic variable preventing the successful incorporation of Ireland and Algeria into Britain and France is ironic in light of the original objectives of those who advocated the "plantation" of these two outlying territories. To be sure, the original thirteenth-century Anglo-Normans who settled in Gaelic Ireland did so to further their own individual feudal interests, without encouragement, plan, or backing from the English king. But the rulers of England soon found the tendency of these adventuresome lords to intermarry with the native Irish and assimilate important aspects of Gaelic culture to be detrimental to the security of England's western flank and its hold over the shifting portions of Ireland (known as the "Pale") that lay nominally within the realm of the English Crown. As early as 1557 the regime of Henry VIII determined that the garrisoning and control of Ireland could most efficiently be achieved through "the planting of colonies of settlers from England and the Pale—sturdy agricultural communities that would establish and defend their own economy—in the vicinity of garrisons [which] would cheapen their maintenance and add to their security."

Subsequent and more consequential efforts were undertaken by Elizabeth in the 1580s, the Stuarts from 1607-1640, and most comprehensively by Cromwell in 1652. Aside from logistical support for military forces stationed relatively far from the state-building core, the immediate purposes of these settlement schemes often included the satisfaction, through land confiscation, of debts incurred by the Crown in the course of its efforts to subdue risings by the native Irish. Thus, in the short run, settlement had a straightforward strategic and economic rationale.

But settlement also had a larger, less coherent justification. In the long run it was to serve as a cost-effective vehicle for the permanent incorporation of Ireland into the realm of English-British authority—to "establish such a strong population of English Protestants as would ensure the future loyalty and tranquility of Ireland." In theory at least, settlement was to contribute not only to the conquest of Ireland, but also to the consolidation of English

transform a region overwhelmingly populated by culturally and politically antagonistic natives into an integral part of the emergent British state was only vaguely considered or specified. Anglicization, eventual demographic preponderance, and replacement via extirpation were among the prevailing notions of settler-native relations. Although different combinations of these ideas, however contradictory, were entertained by the sponsors of settlement in Ireland, no clear or systematic rationale for plantation as a means to consolidate British rule over the natives of Ireland was adhered to, or even articulated, by successive governments.

Roughly the same was true of France's settlement of Algeria. The mid-nineteenth-century decision to establish European colonies in Algeria, and the late nineteenth-century policy of expanding and strengthening this settler population, were based on an image of Algeria as an unincorporated extension of France:

a prolongation of France across the Mediterranean where myriads of French settlers would make the Tell bloom with small farms and cosy villages, as in the western provinces of the homeland... a southern addition to compensate for the losses of the northern frontier...

Questions of whether, in the process of incorporating Algeria into the French state, the native Muslim population was to undergo extermination, expulsion, assimilation, or association, and of how the settlers were to contribute to one or more of these efforts, were never decisively answered. Still the image of the settlers as the key ingredient in France's absorption of Algeria was apparent as early as 1847 in the report of a group of French parliamentarians sent to Algeria to investigate possibilities for the future of the area. The author of the report, Alexis de Tocqueville, was convinced that only settlers could establish the permanence and indisputability of Algeria's integration into France. Although aware of the future dangers associated with systematic expropriation from and mistreatment of the natives, Tocqueville nonetheless concluded that "the peaceful establishment of a European population on the soil of Africa is the best way to consolidate and guarantee our rule." In fact he was never able to reconcile his theoretical commitment tc
One of the most important processes identified as contributing to the redirection of loyalty to new central authorities, and thereby to the successful incorporation of outlying areas into expanding states, has been the cooption of local elites and the eventual extension of rights of political participation to natives. The nature of the cooptive bargain and the form and extent of native political participation vary depending on prevailing patterns of authority relations in the peripheral territory and prevailing norms of political participation in the core. The essential element, however, is the state's trade of protection of local prerogatives and influence over centrally allocated resources for the legitimation of its authority, for loyalty, and for access to local resources. In this way the legitimacy of native institutions in outlying areas is widely seen to have been used by state-building cores to assist in the construction of larger geopolitical units.

The expectation that large settler populations implanted in peripheral regions would interrupt processes of elite cooption and expansion of political participation rights for natives derives from consideration of the peculiar predicament of a certain type of settler colony—the type implanted in Ireland in successive waves from the early sixteenth to the end of the seventeenth century, and in Algeria from the 1830s to the early 1900s. In each of these cases the settler community was physically close enough to the core territory, and politically close enough to core elites, to enjoy protection from, and support against, the natives at whose expense the colony was established. The settler colony was also large enough relative to the native population to be able to use core support to achieve and maintain its local dominance. Yet these settlers were too weak, relative at least to the potential for native political mobilization, to cut their ties to the core territory and still preserve their ascendancy in the outlying region.

Out of this distinctive combination of advantages and vulnerabilities, two somewhat contradictory imperatives flow—imperatives which can be expected to drive settler political behavior toward both the metropolitan core and the native population. One imperative is to preserve the tie with the core territory. For only this link affords that extra measure of coercive power protecting the settlers against and maintain the privileges associated with local ascendancy over the native majority. The contradiction between these two imperatives is what leads to the hypothesis that the process of native cooption and the extension of political participation rights, identified as conducive to the permanent integration of outlying territories into the political domain of a central state, will be interrupted by the existence of a settler community in such a territory. Whereas settler commitment to the permanence of the tie with the metropole, combined with their fear of native opposition, will lead them to emphasize the symbols of metropolitan rule and the integrity of the ties binding the peripheral area to the metropole, an equally strong commitment to their own local ascendancy will lead settlers to oppose policies and processes which, by effectively integrating the native population into the metropolitan political system, would thereby undermine settler hegemony in the peripheral area.

To evaluate the validity of this argument, a two-tracked comparison involving British-Irish and French-Algerian relations will be presented. British and French policies toward Ireland and Algeria will be compared to earlier “English” and “French” policies toward other outlying areas to see if the failure of British and French state expansion in Ireland and Algeria can be attributed to fundamentally different predicaments confronting the core governments in these areas or to fundamentally different objectives pursued by them. Combined with this diachronic analysis will be a cross-cultural comparison focussing on the objectives and consequences of settler political activity for cooptive and participatory native policies pursued by the metropolitan cores.

COOPTATION OF NATIVE ELITES AND STATE-BUILDING; ENGLAND, GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE FRENCH HEXAGON

**England.** In the earliest period of English state formation, King Alfred of Wessex and his successors (late ninth and tenth centuries) successfully incorporated Danish, Mercian, Kentish, and Northumbrian regions into a larger Saxon state. The state-building success of Alfred and his descendants, in welding seven pagan and Christian kingdoms into a Saxon state, is often obscured by the
The notion that Britain, as an island, provided a "natural" setting for a united state—protected from continental intrusion by the English Channel—was not brought about by the Saxons. In fact, the Saxon kings did not bring the entire island under their rule. Wales and Scotland, and the northern and western marches, were never brought within the domain of the Saxon state. Nor did the construction of "England" accomplish this result by overcoming internal cultural and political boundaries. It entailed as well a prolonged, difficult, and uncertain struggle against Scandinavian "state-builders" who conquered and held much of the largest British isle for centuries. For the Vikings the sea was not a barrier to political expansion, but an avenue. The coastline of northeastern England offered abundant natural harbors for their swift vessels, complicating the defensive task of slower land-based forces enormously. Thus the state-building success of Wessex and the Saxon kings can just as accurately, if not more accurately, be seen as a victory over geography than as a product of it.

When the Normans conquered England in the eleventh century, they did inherit a relatively elaborate, well-consolidated state encompassing most of the largest British isle apart from Scotland and Wales. But the English state captured by the Normans had not emerged as a natural result of geography or homogeneous culture. It was as much a product of political struggle, artifice, myth, and institutionalized interest as its successors. One key element in the success of this state-building effort was the cooptation of local elites. This was accomplished by fostering a class of landowners owing the validity of their land titles to royal endorsement and by extending opportunities to these and other native elites for participation in political and ecclesiastical hierarchies. These indigenous elites in turn paid formal homage to the Crown, helped enforce the king's peace and law in their areas of local preeminence, and abandoned claims to territorial autonomy.

Great Britain. In the long process of English incorporation of Wales into a larger British state, from the thirteenth through the sixteenth century, repeated military conquests were attended by the gradual formation of a class of Welsh gentry loyal to the Crown. The loyalty of these local elites to the central government sprang from the fact that their position and prestige was based on the accumulation of land purchased or leased from the Crown, their participation in the judicial and administrative institutions of England's rule of Wales, and the access they enjoyed to networks of influence and wealth within England itself. This cooptive policy was most vigorously and successfully implemented in the context of King Henry VIII's promulgation of the "Act of Union" between England and Wales in 1536. Tudor efforts were directed toward consolidating the authority of the reformed state in Wales by "entrusting local government to Welshmen," in particular to a new class of Welsh landowners created by the judicious distribution of lands expropriated from the Catholic church. The Tudor state traded "membership in the House of Commons, ecclesiastical and legal appointments in England, [and] education in the new grammar schools" for political loyalty and submission to a process of Anglicization which destroyed the linguistic basis for Welsh separatism. Indeed, from the point of view of contemporary Welsh nationalists, it was this "defection (as it now seems) of the Welsh gentry which broke the continuity of the national tradition."

The union of Scotland with England, sealed finally in 1707, reflected the proto-capitalist power arrangements in Scotland and the oligarchic participation norms of England. The Scottish Parliament, representing the combined interests of Scotland's religious, landed, and commercial elites, ratified an Act of Union which traded claims to Scottish sovereignty for full partnership in the rule of Great Britain, including equal access to markets within the British Isles and abroad. From time to time lingering Jacobite loyalties and religious differences provided the basis for separatist outbreaks against the union with England. In her explanation of why such sentiments atrophied, the Scottish historian Rosalind Mitchison points to "the extension of the privileges and rights of the landed class in Scotland in the eighteenth century." This group, and the lawyers, judges, and civil servants associated with it, came gradually to see consolidation of the authority of the British state in Scotland "as increasing the security of landed society" against the remnants of feudalism. By the early nineteenth century, according to Mitchison, the bargain struck by Scottish elites with the English state in 1707 was paying off for wider circles of Scotsmen. As a result the meaning of "patriotism" had changed: "It had become
the patriotism of a class, or of two classes, upper and middle. Scots in the more privileged world now looked to the English connection not as a means of enabling them to improve their own country, but to support them in their privilege.”

Political reforms in the 1830s, by increasing the Scottish electorate from 4,500 to 65,000, substantially broadened Scottish participation in the British political system. What impetus toward separation yet remained was thereby submerged as the apparatus of British patronage in Scotland was replaced as a fundament of political identification by the opportunities which Whig and Tory politicians in Scotland now had to advance their fortunes by allying themselves with their English counterparts.

The cooptation of local Saxon and Danish elites by the expanding kingdom of Wessex cannot alone explain the success of English state-building. Nor does the cooptation of Welsh and Scottish elites by British state-builders itself account for the successful expansion of the British state’s authority over the largest British isle. But protection of the rights of native inhabitants and cultivation of local elites, who were themselves committed to preservation of larger political units, and were perceived by wider strata of the local population as proper and valuable links to the larger political community, did play key roles. In both Wales and Scotland such policies made it easier to strengthen the ties binding these areas to England by gradual expansion of political participation opportunities, and made it more likely that when social mobilization at the mass level occurred, its cultural, economic, and political consequences for the integrity of Great Britain as a whole would be centrifugal, not centripetal.

The French Hexagon. Cooptation of local elites in outlying areas and in rival state-building centers can also be seen as a key ingredient in the history of French state formation. In his work, Samuel Finer puts special emphasis on this factor. His analysis of the successful expansion of the Capetian kings from their base in the Île de France is less concerned with the particular events leading to the acquisition of new territory by the early French state-builders than with the factors determining the eventual stability and continuity of French political integration. Laying heavy stress on the centrality of clientelist politics in the incorporation of surrounding regions into the realm of the embryonic French state, Finer characterizes it as a “piecemeal aggregation of numerous territorially bounded subsystems.” His general argument is that native elites abandoned efforts to restore territorial sovereignty when they decided “to acquiesce in the reduction of their own subsystems and compensate for it by acquiring control of the disposition of the prince’s resources.”

As late as the eighteenth century, according to Finer, local magnates in newly acquired principalities traded fealty to the French king and military support in time of royal decree for legitimization of their noble status, legal authority to call upon their own clients for military support, and access to the royal court and the offices, status, and pensions associated with it.

In Finer’s view Capetian France emerged in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries as a master system [consisting] of a number of largely autonomous subsystems ... linked to the common centre (which controls a subsystem of its own) through the leaders of these subsystems—the magnates; these were the link pins. The system only functioned as a system as long as these were in place; in human terms as long as the king could ’manage’ the princes.

Encouraged by the availability of substantial support from dynastic rivals based in England, the territorial magnates of Brittany, Aquitaine, and Normandy led secessionist revolts that broke their integrative bargains with the Crown. These struggles, ending with the reestablishment of the French crown’s authority over most of contemporary France, were the basis for the Hundred Years’ War.

But the war’s end did not bring with it the destruction or exclusion of local elites from governance of the realm. Instead the Crown implemented what it hoped would be more effective cooptive policies. Explaining the reconstruction of the kingdom of France from the chaos of the Hundred Years’ War, Finer ascribes decisive significance to the linkages established between the royal court, with its network of functionaries, and the panoply of indigenous feudalist authority structures. In return for their loyalty to the French sovereign, the provincial nobility were exempted from new property and head taxes. Local parliaments (estates-general) were
created, affording wider opportunities for indigenous elites to participate in local and “national” affairs. In their capacity as viceroys, responsible for enforcing peace and order in their portions of the realm, regional princes commanded not only their own locally recruited military forces, but also elements of the royal army garrisoned in their domains.

As the king accumulated wealth and lands through strategic marriages, convenient deaths, and arbitration of feudalist succession struggles, the nobility gradually traded acceptance of an expanding hierarchy of royal administrators, and abandonment of local sovereign claims, for official recognition and enhanced access to the bounties available via the royal court. Acquiescence in the expanding role of the royal administration was partially due to the fact that, for a long time, candidates for the most important posts were “invariably ... drawn from the very great territorial Houses, supported by their own grand and petty clientele, and by the driving forces of the province—its estates, its parlement, its municipalities, as well as the gentry.” Eventually King Louis XIV broke the potential power of the territorial magnates by turning their governorships into honorific posts, requiring their presence at the Court, and appointing men solely dependent on the Crown for their status, wealth, and influence to administrative posts responsible for justice, finance, and public order in all the areas of France.

Perhaps the region most brutally integrated into France was the Midi, particularly that portion of the South from Provence to the Pyrenees referred to as Languedoc, or “Occitania.” It is therefore instructive to note how prominent a role historians have ascribed to cooptive royal policies in their explanation of that area’s permanent absorption into the French state.

Citing the sharp linguistic break between the French-speaking “North” and the Occitan-speaking “South,” as well as an array of cultural and political differences distinguishing the relatively urbanized, cosmopolitan, fragmented, Roman law-oriented South from the feudalist, rural-dominated, centralized, religiously orthodox North, Joseph Strayer argues that “the North and the South of what is now France were, in the twelfth century, two different countries, as different as France and Spain are today.”

These differences were accentuated even further by the emergence in Languedoc of the Albigensian movement, the most serious heretical threat to the dominance of the Catholic church to emerge before the sixteenth century. Preoccupied with the difficulties of consolidating his rule of the North, the French king, Philip II, only reluctantly agreed to the pope’s demand that he sponsor a crusade against the Albigensians. The leader of the French armies, Simon de Montfort, conducted a savage campaign that included large-scale massacres, long sieges, and a series of bloody victories over rebellious local armies supported by a populace apparently unwilling to be reconciled to French rule. After almost a decade of fighting, during which he made largely unsuccessful efforts to encourage his soldiers from the North to settle in the South, Montfort was killed. The settlers from the North who did establish themselves in the newly conquered areas were intolerant of the local language, customs, and laws, and excluded the local elites from any meaningful role. Consistent with my overall argument, this settlement effort impeded rather than facilitated consolidation of French control. Turbulence returned to the South, and the French hold over the area grew tenuous. According to Strayer, Montfort failed to achieve the integration of Languedoc into France because “while Simon was a great soldier, he was a mediocre politician. He had conquered a principality, but he had not created the institutions that would hold it together, nor the loyalties that would enable his son to continue his work.”

In 1226 another large French army was sent south under the command of King Louis VIII. Overawing most of the area’s inhabitants, this expedition set the stage for a treaty with Count Raymond of Toulouse in 1229 signalling the “consolidation of the Capetian position in the South.” Under the terms of this treaty, Count Raymond received royal recognition of his title, permission to maintain control of his lands during his lifetime, and reconciliation with the Church. In return, fealty owed to Raymond of Toulouse was now owed to the brother of the king of France, to whom the count’s sole heir (his daughter) was wed. Just as important, the North chose to exercise its rule of the South not through settlers and the wholesale replacement of local feudal custom by Northern practices, but via an array of royal officials and judges, most of whom were appointed from the ranks of local elites. According to Strayer,
as long as the men of Languedoc paid their rents and taxes, and obeyed royal orders about suppression of heresy, regulation of trade, and currency controls, as long as they furnished soldiers for the royal army and accepted the decisions of royal courts, they were allowed a large degree of autonomy. They had their own language, their own law, and their own universities. No one tried to make them speak French or adopt French rules of procedure, contract, or inheritance. Simon de Montfort had tried to make Languedoc accept some of the principles of French feudal law—the royal officials who took over his conquests were wiser.\textsuperscript{31}

Thus in the long, indeed tortured, struggles of state-builders in Britain and France to unite disparate, often recalcitrant provinces into integrated political units, success was due in large measure to arrangements permitting local elites and, gradually, larger numbers of natives to participate in political processes organized by state-building cores, and to identify their interests and their regions’ interests with the consolidation of central control. In this context it is not surprising that failures of British and French state-building in Ireland and Algeria are partially traceable to the absence of such arrangements.

Chapter Two

SETTLERS AND THE FAILURE OF BRITISH STATE-BUILDING IN IRELAND

In a book entitled \textit{A Discoverie of the True Causes Why Ireland Was Never Entirely Subdued}, published in 1612, Sir John Davies lists the times that English monarchs in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries sought to extend the protection of their law to the Gaelic Irish. Royal decrees to this effect are quoted from the reigns of Henry II, John, Henry III, and Edward III. Noting that “for the space of 200 years at least, after the first arrival of Henry the second in Ireland, the Irish would gladly have embraced the Lawes of England, and did earnestly desire the benefite and protection thereof,”\textsuperscript{1} Davies then asks why this did not occur—i.e., why (“untill the Beginning of his Maiesties happie Raigne,” i.e., 1603) the Gaelic Irish were treated as “aliens” or “enemies” rather than as “subjects.” This question is central to Davies’s argument that England’s failure to fully integrate Ireland in the first four hundred years of formal rule was due not only to the lack of thoroughness with which the island was militarily subdued, but more importantly to the absence of effective “civil government” affording equal protection of the king’s law to the Irish natives.

Explicitly absolving the English crown of responsibility for the malintegration of Ireland, Davies places the blame for repeated failures to “reform” English rule in Ireland during this period on the shoulders of the Old English settlers and their descendants:

For the troth is, that those great English lوردes did to the uttermost of their power, crosse and withstand the enfranchisement of the Irish.... I must still cleare and acquit the Crown and State of England, of negligence or ill policie, and lay the fault vpon the Pride, Courteousnesse, & ill Counsell of the English planted heer,
which in all former ages haue bin the chiefe impediments of the final Conquest of Ireland.²

Davies is very specific in his assessment of the interests that led the Anglo-Norman lords to oppose the full “communication” of English law to the Gaelic Irish, however necessary it might have been for Ireland’s final incorporation into the realm of the king of England.

They did feare, that if the Irish were received into the Kings protection, and made Liege-men and Free-subiectes, the state of England woulde establish them in their possessions by Graunts from the Crowne; reduce their Countries into Counties, ennable some of them; and enfranchise all, and make them amuseable to the Lawe, which woulde haue aribged and cut off a great part of that greatnesse which they had promised vnto themselves; they persuaded the King of England, that it was vnfit to Communicate the Lawes of England vnto them; that it was the best policie to holde them as Aliens and Enemies...³

Thus the real inclusion of the Gaelic Irish as subjects of the English king, and the status and authority that could and would thereby be granted to native elites, were rightly perceived by the Old English lords (as they would subsequently be perceived by the Protestant Ascendancy) as intolerable threats to their privileged economic and political position in Ireland.

In the 1520s, along with the plantation of Ireland with a new sort of Protestant settler, King Henry VIII launched what became known as his “new departure.” Tudor rule of Ireland was to be strengthened as part of the general policy of Henry VIII and Thomas Cromwell to bind Wales, Ireland, and the northern marches of England more securely to the British state. Based on “sober waies, politque driftes, and amiablie persuasions founded in lawe and reason,”⁴ this policy was designed not only to regularize relations between the Crown and the Anglo-Irish lords, but to permit the cooptation of the Gaelic Irish as well. English law would be extended, in fact and not just in theory, to Gaelic areas of Ireland, thereby transforming the ruling chieftains of the Irish tribes “from a warrior oligarchy into civilian landowners.”⁵ The coptive intent of the policy as applied to Ireland has been described as follows:

The Gaelic and Gaelicised area was to be assimilated to the colonial one, more or less intact—constitutionally and jurisdictionally at first, and gradually culturally also. The ‘Irish great landlords’ were to receive noble status and a title of inheritance in their possessions under royal patent, and to ‘enjoy all the prerogatives of the king’s parliament, as other lords doth’. Lesser lords would receive a patent and knighthood, thus assimilating them to the colonial gentry class. All of this would be accompanied by assimilation within the crown’s jurisdictional system also. They would attend parliament in virtue of their status, and participate in the administration of the crown’s judicial machinery as justices of the peace in their localities.⁶

Although Henry’s new departure was noted with lively interest by various Gaelic lords, the plan was never implemented. Brendan Bradshaw ascribes “a major part in the abandonment of the king’s proposal” to the intervention of several high-ranking representatives of the Pale nobility—administrators of the most heavily settled and securely held area of Ireland, west and north of Dublin.⁷

In the 1540s Anthony St. Leger, Henry’s new deputy in Ireland, launched a program of “surrender and regrant” designed to attract Gaelic lords to pay homage to the English king, accept English in place of their traditional Gaelic titles, and substitute English land law and inheritance practices for their native traditions. In return the king promised to regrant surrendered lands to the nobles, with all the assurance of their ownership of their lands that royal patents could provide, and to postpone collection of royal revenues until civil order was established. In addition, as I have indicated was the case in Wales, lands expropriated from suppressed Catholic monasteries were to be distributed with an eye to strengthening a gentry class owing title, status, and loyalty to the English state.⁸ A procession of Gaelic and Gaelicized Anglo-Norman lords did make their way to the king’s parliament in Dublin to declare their allegiance under these terms, but the cooptation of Catholic elites in this manner was strenuously opposed by representatives of the “loyal English” in Ireland. Though the “New English” settlers received a very large proportion of the lands expropriated from monasteries within the Pale, they criticized St. Leger’s efforts to
include Irish magnates and tribal chiefs in the distribution of these lands, and his cautious approach to the suppression of monasteries outside the Pale. Their leaders drew up a list of 140 charges as part of a smear campaign against St. Leger and those of his aides associated with the cooptation policy. Accusing St. Leger of being more favorably disposed "to Irishmen than to the King's subjects," the Palemen eventually succeeded (after the death of Henry VIII) in replacing him with a royal deputy more amenable to their views. The result was a hardline policy of exemplary punishment, the wholesale confiscation of land in the counties of Leix and Offaly, and the eventual establishment of settlements of English colonists there.

Before proceeding, it is particularly instructive to note how different were the consequences of the suppression of the monasteries in Ireland, where settlers were present, than in Wales, where they were not. In Wales, as noted, monastic lands were the basis for an effective cooptive policy toward native Welsh landowners. In Ireland, on the other hand, although the policy was intended to have the same consolidating, legitimizing effect, and although indigenous elites were quite willing to participate, the policy had only limited and temporary success. Instead it was exploited by the new English settlers for purposes directly contrary to the legitimization of English rule in Irish eyes. As Bradshaw concludes:

The Henrician phase of land confiscation and reallocation between 1536 and 1547 coincided with the first appreciable settlement of New English in Ireland in the modern period. While other factors explain the reason for their appearance, the availability of land as a result of the confiscations is undoubtedly the explanation for why they now stayed.... [T]he grant of confiscated lands transformed yet another wave of transitory officials and army personnel into permanent settlers.... The principal demographic significance of the Henrician monastic confiscations is that they inaugurated the modern phase of English colonisation in Ireland.

Thus it was that by the middle of the sixteenth century, in the wake of Henry VIII's break with Rome and the Anglicization of the Tudor state, a new sort of English settler had begun to exercise decisive influence in the administration of the "Irish Lordship."

These were the English-born civil servants sent by the Tudor monarchs to accompany their deputies in Dublin. Dominating the Irish Council in Dublin, they advocated an end to conciliatory cooptive policies advanced under the terms of Henry VIII's new departure, lobbied for the replacement of royal deputies perceived as "soft" on the Gaelic Irish, and pushed hard for the plantation of various parts of Ireland with New English settlers, the expropriation of Gaelic-owned land, and the expulsion of large numbers of the Gaelic Irish. The Protestant fervor of these new settlers, and the ease with which they could arrange effective challenges to existing land titles, seriously threatened the "Old English" (Catholic) aristocracy.

Although the lands and status afforded leading Catholic families by St. Leger protected them from destruction, they fought a losing battle for the next century to maintain both their Catholic faith and their political preeminence in Ireland. Identifying proudly as Englishmen loyal to the English crown, they only sporadically identified with the plight of the Gaelic Irish. On the other hand, refusing to abandon their recusant beliefs and seeking to protect their vast land holdings, they came into direct conflict with the New English Protestant settlers in Ireland and the powerful Protestant political forces taking control in London.

Much ink has been spilt over questions of when and whether and to what extent the Catholic descendants of the Anglo-Normans who settled in Ireland from 1189 to the end of the fifteenth century should be considered "English" settlers or "Catholic" natives. Polemically and historiographically, much rides on answers to these questions. For my purposes the Old English, the Anglo-Norman aristocracy, or the Anglo-Irish (however they are referred to) may be understood, as Davies understood them, as settlers, up until the Tudor period. From the introduction into Ireland of the New English (Protestant) settlers in the sixteenth century, until the late seventeenth century, the political identity and significance of the Old English was rather fluid, emphasizing at some times its Catholic aspect, implying at least the potential for common cause with the Gaelic Irish, and at other times its English aspect, emphasizing its preparedness to distance itself from the "disloyal" masses of Ireland if that is what circumstances demanded. Treated as Catholics under the terms of the Cromwellian and Williamite land settlements in the
middle and end of the seventeenth century, the Old English had, by the eighteenth century, more or less disappeared as a separate element in the Irish political equation.12

The influence and importance of the new “Protestant interest” in Ireland was reflected in the severity with which Elizabeth I’s deputies crushed rebellions in the 1580s and 1590s, the pressures felt by the Crown to punish recusants, and the unprecedentedly large plantation projects undertaken in this period. But the prominence of plantation during Elizabeth’s reign, and the ruthlessness of her reconquest of Ireland, should not obscure the early successes her deputies had in attempting to create a new class of Gaelic landowners in the west of Ireland, to bolster royal authority there, and to undercut the position of dangerous Irish overlords. The plantation of settlers in Ireland was a primary reason why these policies did not have the same long-term integrative effects that similar Tudor policies had in Wales. Many children of these new Gaelic-Irish landowners found it impossible to defend what they had thought were secure claims to land ownership against policies of plantation and settlement pushed forward in the early 1600s.

Crowned king after the death of Elizabeth in 1603, James I initiated a policy of reconciliation with the Catholics of Ireland—both Gaelic and Old English. He granted virtual full pardons to the leaders of the Irish rising of 1596-1603, maintained them in positions of local authority, suggested the lenient application of recusancy laws against Irish Catholics, and postponed the implementation of various plantation schemes out of concern that injustices not be done to native proprietors.13 Such policies were consistent with the analysis and advice of Sir John Davies, whose disquisition on Ireland was written during his service as Attorney General for Ireland under James I (1606-19).

Davies advocated a gradual, deliberate policy of acculturation. To make the Irish “become English,” he told the king,

required the assertion of the primacy of central government, the establishment of a national system of jurisdiction parallel to that of England, the introduction of fixed units of landholding, the encouragement of arable farming, and the adoption of English laws of property and inheritance.14

Plantation per se was not necessary to Davies’s scheme. But pressures to proceed with settlement of Ulster were strong—the Counter-Reformation was in full swing, Protestants already in Ulster lobbied hard for opportunities to expand, and the king needed the patronage that could be generated by the expropriation of Irish land for distribution among Scottish and English undertakers. Henry Howard (first Earl of Northampton) was an influential privy councillor in James’s court who, during Elizabeth’s reign, had already become interested in the plantation of Ireland as an important source of royal patronage. Northampton thought that not only could plantation of Ireland be lucrative, it could also serve “to reduce the state of Ireland to obedience.” The establishment of a colony “would provide benefits to Irish and English alike.” It would draw all the wild Irish that dwell now dispersed in woods ... or wander up and down without any certain dwelling, to dwell in towns ensconced, to suffer themselves to be united to the English by law and mutual commerce and trade and to set them to husbandry.15

Both Northampton and James may have been encouraged to believe that settlement could serve as a vehicle for, rather than an obstacle to, the political pacification of Ireland by Sir Francis Bacon, another royal advisor and certainly the leading intellectual in the king's company. Soon after he was crowned king in 1603 James received a plan from Bacon urging the conciliation of Irish Catholics as a means to guarantee the political unity of England and Ireland. Bacon was appointed attorney general in 1613, a privy councillor in 1616, and lord chancellor in 1618. During this period he had ample opportunity to apply in Ireland the ideas he had developed earlier about the requisites for successful colonization of peripheral territories.

According to Bacon, who much admired the successful colonization ventures of the Romans, the plantation of outlying territories with settlers was the most important, and ultimately the most profitable, task that a great country could undertake. But Bacon pointed out that the success enjoyed by the Romans was due to their willingness “to grant naturalization (which they called Jus Civitatis) and to grant it in the highest degree to foreign natives. “And this,
not to Singular Persons alone, but likewise to whole Families; yea
to Cities, and sometimes to Nations." He advised that natives be
used "justly and cautiously, with sufficient Guard nevertheless...[S]end oft of them over to the country that plants, that they may see
a better condition then their owne, and recommend it when they
returne." It was in this respect for, openness to, and integration of
native customs and institutions that Bacon saw the key to plantation
as a successful means of territorial expansion.

Consistent with Bacon's ideas, a royal commission was estab-
lished in 1608 for the plantation of Ulster. Sir John Davies was
one of its members. Acquiescing in the seizure of much of the lands
of the great Catholic families in Ulster, Davies stressed that the
plantation should proceed in a manner such that, according to Aidan
Clarke,

The severity of the treatment of leading [Catholic] families
[would] be offset by greater leniency towards others, so that 'the
contentment of the greater number may outweigh the displeasure
and dissatisfaction of the smaller number of better blood,' while
at the same time the more influential of the Irish [would] receive
sufficient land to give them a vested interest in the settlement.18

Encouraged by Bacon, Northampton, and Davies, James hoped
to implement the settlement of Ulster in ways which would generate
royal revenue but still protect native rights. It was anticipated that
approximately one half the land in each county would remain in
Gaelic hands. English and Scottish settlers, farming their lands
productively and interspersed among the Gaelic Irish, would exert
over time an Anglicizing influence and thereby establish English
political control of Ireland on a lasting basis.19

Such may have been the theory behind the Stuart plantation
of Ulster. In practice, however, not only in Ulster but elsewhere
in Ireland, early seventeenth-century settlement efforts led to
sweeping expropriations of native land, aggressive segregationist
policies toward Catholics, and greater hostility to English rule among
both Gaelic and Anglo-Irish Catholics.

With whatever feeling of satisfaction the plantation policy
might be regarded in England as offering a hopeful solution of the
Irish problem, in Ireland it provoked widespread indignation, not
merely on the part of those on whose ruin it was based, but
amongst those whose loyalty to the English Crown had never been
called seriously in question. To the old settlers of Anglo-Norman
origin the new plantations constituted a grave political danger.20

In fact, consistent with patterns identified earlier, it was the
settlers themselves who scuttled Stuart policies of tolerance and
cooperation toward Gaelic and Anglo-Irish Catholic landowners-
landowners who might have served as the basis for the institutional-
ization of English rule had their property been protected and their
rights secured. New English settlers were the driving force behind the
plantation of areas outside of Ulster during this period. Certain of
them profited enormously from opportunities that arose for the
accumulation of expropriated land.

Sir Arthur Chichester, lord deputy in Ireland during this
period, was "an extremely able official," according to a detailed
study of patronage and policy implementation in the government of
James I. Accepting responsibility for overseeing the settlement of
Ulster, Chichester repeatedly warned of how "great and difficult"
the pacification of Ireland by means of plantation was likely to be.
He foresaw correctly that royal policies of protection of native
political, religious, and property rights, and gradual Anglicization,
would be difficult to carry out in the face of settler pressures to
establish and protect their local ascendancy.21 He warned, again
correctly, that "neglect of the Irish would provoke rebellion."22
Reporting to the privy council, Chichester argued that in the dis-
tribution of land "the natives and servitors were greatly neglected."
He called for a royal "commission of oversight" to be sent to Ireland
to supervise the plantation scheme and enable the king to punish
settlers who did do respect his wishes relating to native policy.23
But as Chichester had feared, effective oversight of the settlers was
not possible. The intensity of their commitment to their own ascen-
dancy in Ireland, the political influence they wielded in London, and
the distraction of the king and his councillors from events in Ireland
made the implementation of plantation a mockery of its intention.

Protestant settlers in Ireland were rather easily able to exploit
English hostility toward Catholic Spain, and official papal claims to
Ireland, to give policy a stress on the repression of recusancy and
the segregation of the Gaelic Irish rather than on their gradual Anglicization. Indeed, although the introduction of Protestantism to Ireland was a clear and obvious state interest, the settlers were particularly ill-suited as proselytizers. They were "too sure of their own superiority to excite interest or support, and too colonially minded to work wholeheartedly for the radical transformation of the church that success would accomplish." Indeed the settlers quickly and naturally developed an interest in preserving religious distinctions between themselves and the native Irish. They "took more pains," it was said, "to make the land turn protestant than the people."24

Although a protestant Ireland was plainly desirable in the abstract, the privileges and opportunities invested in colonial status were of more immediate concern, and a sense of the practical inexpediency of widespread conversions created a private protestant colonial interest which ran counter to public objectives.25

With Protestant settlers in charge of land surveys and registration, "the ways in which catholic landowners could be mulcted were as various as the ways in which protestants could enrich themselves."26 In 1615 King James ordered that deeding arrangements agreed upon with Catholic landowners in the 1580s be formalized. The order was never implemented. Aidan Clarke attributes this failure to opposition and sabotage by settlers serving as administrators who coveted the lands in question.27 Protestant settlers pushed for and exploited the application of a variety of technical requirements regarding the documentation of land ownership. Acting as "discoverers" against Catholics in whose titles or leases some defect could be found, Protestant settlers thereby gained leasehold rights or title to the lands in question.28 In 1622 Sir William Parsons, the surveyor general of Ireland and a leader of the New English, gained control of the judicial machinery handling the leasing and inheritance of land. Under his direction "a new severity towards Catholics" was introduced making it even more difficult for Catholic heirs to sue for their estates and take possession of them. Even those plantation undertakers who found it profitable to lease their lands to natives did so according to a system of "short leases and high rents [which] typically ensured that the Irish derived minimal benefit and little stability from the relationship, and nourished their hostility."29

Chichester's warnings came true. With corruption widespread, Crown policies in Ireland foundered. As a result of settler control over the implementation of Irish policy, "James' policy of interspersed planting was converted into a new predatory form of surrender and regrant directed towards the enrichment of the New English."30 A royal commission appointed to investigate the matter blamed the "comprehensive failure" of James's policies in Ireland, including his effort "to deal fairly with the native Irish," on the machinations of the New English settlers.31

In fact the plantation under James I neither solved the "Irish problem" by reducing the country to loyal obedience nor contributed substantially to the king's coffers. The undertakers to whom most of the land seized from the Irish was allocated chronically failed to live up to the terms of their contracts. When Charles I ascended to the throne in 1625, his government was dissatisfied with the state of affairs in Ireland. Both the Gaelic and Anglo-Irish Catholics were restless—irritated by religious persecution and fearful of constant harassment by settlers eager to expand their holdings by finding artificial "defects" in the titles of Irish landowners. The Irish government itself was near bankruptcy. England had, meanwhile, begun an expensive naval war with Catholic Spain as part of the European-wide struggle for religious and national supremacy that was the Thirty Years' War. A year later war threatened with Catholic France as well. In this context Charles's policy toward Ireland was governed by central state interests—to transform the country from a drain on state revenues to a source of funds, and to reduce the threat of Spanish invasion via Ireland by increasing the political loyalty of Irish Catholics to the English state.

In September 1626 Charles responded to Catholic Irish declarations of loyalty and of willingness to contribute to the war effort by offering twenty-six concessions, or "graces," protecting the rights and lands of Catholics in Ireland in return for financial and military contributions to the struggle against England's Catholic enemies. But the New English objected to training and arming Irish Catholics and to the general approach to the Catholic Irish, as at least potentially loyal subjects, which the graces reflected. The Protestant bishops of Ireland condemned the royal proposal of toleration for Irish Catholicism, and soon the project was dropped.
Another list of fifty-one graces was drawn in negotiations between the king’s lord deputy in Ireland, Henry Falkland, and the Anglo-Irish nobility. In return for three annual “subsidies” (tax payments to the king) of £40,000, the graces were implemented, but without the promised protection of Catholic lands. Planter interests were responsible for this key omission. The Protestant settlers in Ireland also succeeded in preventing the suspension of recusancy fines and the extension to Catholics of rights to hold political office.

In 1629 a treaty of peace was signed with France and a year and a half later with Spain. Under attack by Protestants in Ireland for his conciliatory policies toward Catholics, Falkland was discredited in the king’s eyes and recalled. The governance of Ireland was entrusted to its lord justices, Henry Boyle and Adam Loftus, two leaders of the New English settlers who embarked on a severe, if mostly exemplary, anti-Catholic policy and the development of proposals for the plantation of additional areas in the west of Ireland. For J.C. Beckett, an historian with strong sympathies for Irish Protestants, the episode of the graces is offered as illustration of “the difficulty of winning support from recusants without undermining the confidence of protestants.”32 Aidan Clarke has put the point more strongly: “The hope that the government could be moved to a conciliatory acceptance of the pluralist character of the colony in Ireland, so recently triumphant, . . . [fell] victim to the single-minded sectionalism of the protestant settlers.”33

In 1632 Charles, still desperate to make Ireland a paying proposition, and willing to deal tolerantly with Catholics to achieve that end, appointed Wentworth, his trusted and thoroughgoing lieutenant, as lord deputy. In the remaining ten years of Stuart rule of Ireland, before the outbreak of the Civil War, Wentworth (named the Earl of Strafford in 1640) did bring regular, if rigorous, government to Ireland. His absolutist, if not tyrannical, methods alienated both Catholics and Protestants, but his insight into the failure of settlement as an instrument of English rule was profound. He considered the New English settlers who staffed the administration of the Irish government to be “a company of men the most intent upon their own ends that ever I met with.”34 In 1633, explaining the complex tactics he was using to increase royal revenues from both Catholics and Protestants, Wentworth made it plain to London how different the political role of settlement in Ireland had become from what had been intended: “The truth is, we must there bow and govern the native by the planter, and the planter by the native.”35

During the Civil War in Britain, the Gaelic Irish, joined later and temporarily by the Old English Catholics, rose against the New English and more recent Scottish settlers. Much was made of atrocities committed against the Protestant settlers. These stories inflamed Cromwell and his army. After a bloody campaign of conquest and massacre, Ireland was subjugated, and Britain was faced yet again with the task of establishing its control of the country on a permanent basis.

The Cromwellian solution was plantation, but plantation on an unprecedentedly massive scale, to be accompanied by retributive laws mandating death for half of all Irish Catholic males, comprehensive confiscations of Catholic land, forced emigration, and wholesale transplantation of Catholics to the island’s barren western province. Hence the slogan—“To Hell or Connaught!”—British rule of Ireland was to be made permanent this time, not by coopting native elites and legitimizing rule by the central state, but by reducing the native population, depriving it of leadership, and establishing a decisively large Protestant majority.36

Such was the intention—by drastic methods to expand effectively and permanently the authority of the British state over Ireland. Indeed, as a result of new plantation efforts, the grant of confiscated land to Cromwellian soldiers, and reductions in the Catholic population through war, starvation, disease, and emigration, Protestants in Ireland increased from approximately 100,000 in 1641 to 160,000 in 1652 (from 5 percent of the population to nearly 20 percent) while the amount of Irish land in Protestant hands rose from 41 to 78 percent.37 Dreadful enough for Irish Catholics in its implementation, Cromwell’s radical approach to state-building in Ireland was in fact substantially moderated. Hundreds of executions were carried out—not thousands or tens of thousands. Large numbers of Catholics were transplanted to Connaught, and thousands more forcibly “transported” from Ireland altogether, but a solid Catholic majority remained, not just in Connaught, but in each of Ireland’s four provinces.38 The failure of Cromwellian plans to implement a “final solution” to the
Irish problem is attributable in great measure to the protection afforded Catholics by the New English settlers (referred to, in the wake of the “newer” Cromwellian-English settlers, as the “Old Protestants”).

Protesting against the ideologically driven, fanatically anti-Catholic policies of the Cromwellian army, the settler community persuaded Henry Cromwell, Oliver’s son and his deputy in Ireland, to spare Irish Catholics from the rigorous implementation of the original scheme entailing depopulation through executions, transplantation, and transportation. Though ironic in light of the dominant pattern of settler-sponsored policies toward the natives of Ireland, which tended to deprive natives of benefits offered by the central state, the successful efforts made in the 1650s by the Old Protestant settlers on the natives’ behalf are perfectly understandable if the argument advanced here is kept clearly in mind. Settlers implanted in outlying territories as vehicles for the consolidation of state power develop autonomous interests in the consolidation and enhancement of their local political and economic privileges. Given the demographic preponderance of natives over settlers, however, and absent questions about metropolitan commitment to permanent rule of the territory, the first concern of the settlers in the cases under consideration (Ireland and Algeria) must be to prevent native entry into the political arena of the central state, and thereby protect local settler paramountcy. For a brief period in the 1650s, however, the subjugation of Irish Catholics seemed so complete, their power so utterly broken, and the permanence of British rule of the island so unassailable that the interest of the Protestant settlers in protecting their economic and political domination of Ireland led them to adopt a less antagonistic attitude toward the native population.

Temporarily convinced that Catholics could never again threaten Protestants in Ireland, militarily or politically, and secure in the knowledge that the Draconian confiscations of land had thoroughly eliminated Catholic landowners as rivals for political leadership, the Old Protestant settlers opposed genocidal state policies which would have eliminated from their estates the landless Catholics whose labor was needed to make the settlers’ landholdings profitable. Hence the settlers used their relative monopoly on in-

formation about Ireland, their access to and involvement in the Cromwellian government in Ireland, and their status as the “survivors” of Catholic atrocities to slow and ultimately help prevent the implementation of Cromwellian plantation schemes that would have solved the Irish problem by virtually eliminating the Catholic Irish. Once again, the settlers acted as an obstacle to the permanent consolidation of British rule in Ireland—this time not by harming but by helping the Catholic natives.

Nonetheless, the effects of the Cromwellian conquest and land settlement were drastic and lasting. The Catholic leadership, including the Old English nobility, was destroyed. The dominant position of the Protestant community was firmly established—a position that easily survived the collapse of the Protectorate and the restoration of the monarchy in 1660.

The only serious threat to its ascendancy encountered by the Protestant community for the next two hundred years came under the brief reign of a Catholic king—James II. King of England from 1685 to 1689, James II brought a dramatic, if temporary, reversal in the fortunes of Catholics and Protestants in Ireland. Catholicism was not only tolerated, it was honored. Catholic sheriffs were appointed in almost every county. An Irish Parliament, including only one Protestant deputy, was convened in 1689. Most significant, however, was the active discussion of a revision of the Cromwellian land settlement that would have restored vast tracts of land to their former Catholic owners.

But the threat to Protestant ascendancy, though real, was brief. In 1688 William of Orange launched the “Glorious Revolution” as a Protestant coup d’estat against his Catholic father-in-law. The civil war in Ireland ended with the Treaty of Limerick, setting the stage for a return to familiar patterns of native-settler-metropolitan relations.

To speed the end of the war and reassure the Catholics of his Irish kingdom, William agreed to terms of Irish surrender that protected Jacobite landowners from forfeiture of their estates and promised religious toleration to all Catholics in Ireland. But the Protestants of Ireland strongly opposed the relative leniency of King William toward the Catholic population of the island. Even when in 1697 the now wholly Protestant parliament in Dublin...
Corruption and the Treaty of Limerick led to the omission of any mention of religious tolerance in the treaty. This omission prevented the native majority from participating in political affairs. By 1700, only a small portion of the kingdom was left in the hands of Roman Catholic landlords, and the pressure of the penal laws during the eighteenth century reduced this proportion to a smaller extent.

Though divided between Anglicans and Presbyterians, the Protestant majority in Ireland shared a common interest in suppressing the native Irish Catholic political participation. In this, they were extraordinarily successful. Yet at the outset of the eighteenth century, their perception of English policy toward the native Irish was that it was being pampered and Protestants ill-treated. Blaming unrest in Ireland on the English government’s overly lenient policies, the Protestant parliament initiated and successfully implemented penal legislation in the early 1700s, which made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the descendants of remaining Catholic landowners to maintain their families’ estates intact. Primogeniture by Catholics was banned, as was education and the long-term leasing of land. A series of restrictions were placed on voting rights for Catholic landowners until, in 1728, Catholics were deprived of the franchise altogether. In spite of numerous limitations placed on Catholic economic activity, Catholics managed to produce a substantial merchant and artisan class in eighteenth-century Ireland—a group that maintained a very low political profile, at least until the 1780s. But for the great mass of Irish Catholics, even allowing for lapses in its enforcement, Lecky’s characterization of the overall purpose and effect of the penal code is apt:

The penal code, as it was actually carried out, was inspired much less by fanaticism than by rapacity, and was directed less against the Catholic religion than against the property and industry of its possessors. It was intended to make them poor and to keep them poor, to crush in them every germ of enterprise, to degrade them into a servile caste who could never hope to rise to the level of their oppressors. The division of classes was made as deep as possible, and every precaution was taken to perpetuate and to embitter it.44

In fact, the weakness of the Catholic majority in Ireland in the eighteenth century was so overwhelming that it triggered an important shift in the prevailing pattern of settler-native-central government interaction. No longer fearing native unrest as a threat to its control of the island, the English state saw considerable less reason to cater to Irish preferences—Protestant or Catholic. Despite urgings by leaders of the Protestant ascendancy that Ireland be united to Britain on the same commercially and politically advantageous terms as the Scottish Parliament had won in 1707 for Scotland, an Act of Parliament passed in London in 1719 rejected the settlers’ appeals, declaring that “the said kingdom of Ireland, hath been, is, and of right ought to be subordinate unto and dependent upon the imperial crown of Great Britain, as being inseparably united and annexed thereunto.”45 Thus the eighteenth-century politics of Ireland were dominated not by central government efforts to consolidate its rule, settler efforts to suppress natives, and native struggles for rights and/or autonomy, but by native quiescence, British exploitation, and Irish Protestant opposition to British economic policies, which sharply discriminated against Irish exports—particularly wool. The native Irish Catholics were largely excluded from these struggles.

This pattern of Anglo-Irish relations came to a head at the end of the eighteenth century. The example of the American colonists’ revolt against British rule, and the drain which it produced on British military resources, set the stage for renewed demands by the Protestant community in Ireland for political autonomy, if not independence, from Great Britain. In 1782 the Irish Parliament (still purely Protestant) was given the right to legislate for Ireland without the participation of Westminster. The executive arm of the Irish government remained, however, under direct British ministerial control. But in this fertile political climate, the long dormant Catholic majority of Ireland also began to express itself. A secret society known as the Defenders spread among Catholics throughout Ireland in the late 1780s and 1790s. It sought to protect
Catholics against the violence of similar Protestant organizations, took revenge against oppressive Protestant landlords, and, vaguely inspired by the revolutionary success of the Levellers in France, agitated for a variety of sweeping changes in the distribution of land, wealth, and political rights in Ireland. Meanwhile the Catholic commercial class organized a Catholic Committee to present petitions to the Irish Parliament and to London for reform of the penal code. In December 1792 a Catholic Convention, with elected representatives of Catholic communities all over Ireland, convened in Dublin and sent a petition directly to the king for repeal of what was left of the penal code.

The reemergence of the Catholics as a political force that might challenge the Protestant ascendancy, and the very real specter of revolutionary France using Ireland as a base for the invasion of Britain, helped shift British settler-native relations back to patterns similar to those preceding the 1690s. Once again London sought ways to tie Ireland firmly and stably to Great Britain by extending rights to Catholic natives. Once again Protestants, jealous of their local hegemony, sought to forestall such measures. In 1791 the Irish Parliament unanimously rejected a Catholic petition for alleviation of remaining disabilities. But against a background of French military victories on the Continent, and based on English perceptions of a Catholic majority loyal and docile throughout the eighteenth century, London exerted strong pressure on the Irish Parliament to promulgate relief bills for Catholics as a means of ensuring their loyalty in the coming war with France.

Such bills were forced through the Irish Parliament in 1792 and 1793 against the determined opposition of the leaders of the Protestant ascendancy. Along with the abolition of almost all remaining restrictions on Catholic economic activity, education, and inheritance, the 1793 bill extended the franchise to Catholic freetholders. But the Parliament rejected suggestions that Catholic gentry be permitted to serve as legislative deputies. Although large numbers of middle- and upper-class Protestants had come to believe in the loyalty of Catholics and the deserving nature of many of their claims, the forced passage of these bills and the growing demands of the Catholics triggered a backlash among all Protestants—gentry and peasants, Anglicans and Dissenters. One Protestant response to fears of Catholic resurgence, and of the overthrow of their hegemony and their near-monopoly of land ownership that such a resurgence portended, was the formation of the fiercely anti-Catholic Orange Order. Moreover, although the relief bill of 1793 made Catholics in Ireland eligible for a wide variety of posts and occupations, the entrenched power of Protestants in guilds, township councils, courts, and the like prevented this new legal reality from having much of an impact on the actual participation of Catholics in the public life of Ireland.

Once more, with the appointment of a Whig minister, William Fitzwilliam, as lord lieutenant in Ireland in 1795, the British government moved toward a further, if not complete, removal of Catholic disabilities in Ireland. But the personal opposition of King George III to Catholic emancipation, intra-coalition politics in London, and strenuous protests by leaders of the Protestant ascendancy led to the recall of the energetic and liberally inclined Fitzwilliam. The “castle clique” of ranking Protestant aristocrats and the growing number of Protestant gentry identifying themselves with the Orange Order were also instrumental in subverting British efforts to integrate Catholics into the newly created Yeomanry militia. In May 1797 a Catholic Relief bill was defeated in the Irish Parliament by a vote of 155 to 84. By the end of 1797 most Catholics had come under the influence of the republican and separatist organization known as the United Irishmen. Led by Protestant (mostly Dissenter) Irish nationalists, the United Irishmen established close links with France and waited for the arrival of French military aid to launch their rebellion against British rule of Ireland. In these circumstances Catholic-Protestant relations polarized further.

The rebellion itself, in May 1798, was a botched affair. Informers betrayed the leadership of the movement, turning the uprising into a series of easily suppressed local disturbances. Only in the southeast did Catholic peasants, organized within Defender societies and led by local clergy, rise in significant numbers. But British troops, assisted by the Orange-dominated Yeomanry and using particularly brutal methods, crushed the rebels. A fleet of thirty-five French ships attempted to land in the southwest of Ireland in late 1796, but the ships were blown from their moorings by gale winds. A small French army arrived late in the summer of
1798 and won one engagement with the British, but was soon defeated by overwhelming British forces.

In the disturbed aftermath of the rebellion, with agrarian crime reaching unprecedented dimensions, martial law imposed, and fears of French invasion still high, the British government brought forward a radically different proposal for the solution of the Irish problem—i.e., the problem of permanently and stably integrating Ireland into the British state. That proposal was union—the full legal, economic, and political amalgamation of Ireland and Great Britain, not just under one crown, but under one legislative and fiscal system as well. As noted earlier, London had emphatically rejected the idea when advanced early in the eighteenth century by the Protestant ascendancy in Ireland. At that time Irish Protestants had been secure in their overwhelming domination of the Catholic majority, but anxious to eliminate economic restrictions placed on Irish trade. Now British leaders, concerned to solidify the connection of Ireland to Britain in the wake of the recent uprising, faced with the continuing threat of French intervention, and hopeful that through union Catholics could be accommodated without antagonizing Irish Protestants, pressed union upon a Protestant ascendancy worried that the emancipation of Catholics within the larger British political arena would spell the end of their privileged position in Ireland.

Prime Minister William Pitt, through his chief deputies in Ireland, Castlereagh and Cornwallis, promised Irish Catholics that Emancipation (as the granting of rights for Catholics to sit in Parliament came to be known) would be put into effect as soon as the union was implemented. In response the Catholic middle classes and clergy in Ireland supported the British government’s proposals. The Protestant ascendancy, in the main, opposed them, as did most Orange lodges throughout Ireland. Those Protestant leaders who favored union did so with the understanding that it would not be accompanied by Catholic emancipation. With a great deal of skill on Castlereagh’s part, and even more bribery, the Irish Parliament first defeated and then passed the government’s proposal that it abolish itself. In its place Ireland sent thirty-two peers to the House of Lords and one hundred deputies to the House of Commons, thus constituting a United Parliament in Westminster to legislate for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

But Catholic hopes were dealt a severe blow when, after the formal implementation of Union in January 1801, the government failed to keep its promise of Emancipation. As soon as the Union was established, the Protestant opponents of the scheme joined with those leaders of the ascendancy who had favored it to reorganize the defense of their dominant position in Ireland. Now, under the banner of a Union, sacred and eternal, whose integrity Catholic emancipation would threaten, Irish peers and the Orange Order lobbied hard in England to mobilize “no-popery” opinion, stiffen opposition to the measure by the king, and encourage high-ranking, sympathetic peers to act on their behalf against Emancipation. Distracted by what they perceived as weightier events, Pitt and his associates succumbed to pressure from Irish Protestants and the anti-Catholic inclinations of the king. No bill was passed allowing Catholics to enter Parliament. Emancipation was granted to Irish Catholics only after thirty years of struggle, and even then at the price of the suppression of the political organization that had achieved it (Daniel O’Connell’s Catholic Association) and the removal of the franchise from most Catholic voters—the forty shilling freeholders.

Thus was the union of Ireland and Great Britain prevented from solving the Irish problem by legitimizing British rule among the Catholic majority. Over and over in the first several centuries of English rule, in response to the “new departure” and “surrender and regrant” policies of Henry VIII, under Elizabeth, James I, and Charles I, during the brief reign of James II, following the Treaty of Limerick with William, and finally in response to Pitt’s promises in 1800, native leaders of the Irish Catholic majority had presented themselves to the central government as willing partners in a cooptive bargain that would have helped legitimize and stabilize English/British state-building efforts in Ireland. Once again, and this time perhaps decisively, central government efforts to consolidate state rule over Ireland by coopting native elites and extending full political rights were interrupted by efforts of settlers bent on blocking native political participation for fear of losing their local preeminence.

The long delay in granting rights of political participation to Catholic elites, the nationalist character that O’Connell’s extended struggle for those rights assumed, the grudging manner in which the
government finally yielded, and the sectarian prejudice that Orange propaganda against the measure had fostered in Britain pushed Irish Catholics into a political posture from which the loosening of ties to Britain was consistently viewed as the solution to their problems. Hence the movement for Repeal of the Act of Union that dominated Irish politics in the early 1840s, the Home Rule movement that occupied center stage from 1874 until 1913, and finally the independence struggle, waged in explicit form from at least 1916 until—and beyond—the secession of southern Ireland in 1921.

Chapter Three

COMPARING THE IRISH AND ALGERIAN CASES

Consideration of France's debacle in Algeria and the British experience in Ireland as cases of "state-building failure" requires that the integration of Algeria and Ireland into the French and British states not be seen as a priori impossible. The approach adopted here, consistent (as noted earlier) with the approach of most contemporary scholarship on state formation in Europe, sees the evolution of national boundaries not as the reflection of a historically determined ethos, or as the result of any natural geographical imperatives, but as the product of expansionist and integrative policies of state-building elites who are both constrained and prodded by the similar efforts of neighboring state-builders. Accordingly, no territory acquired by a national state and declared part of its domain can automatically be classified either as a "colony" or as a "province." Following Hechter (see p. 2-3 above), only the institutionalization of state authority in and over a territory, associated with its legitimization in the minds of generations of inhabitants, can justify classification of that territory as successfully integrated state domain.

Comparison of the Irish and Algerian cases as state-building failures thus takes seriously the notion that the endpoints of state expansion and contraction are neither historical nor geographical given. The contention that the geographical separation of Ireland from Britain and Algeria from France itself explains the failure to integrate those "subject peripheries" into the British and French states loses much of its force when it is remembered how many contemporary states include areas separated from the "mainland" by ocean water as integral parts of their territories. These include Greece, Denmark, Italy [Sicily and Sardinia], the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Britain [Northern Ireland], the United States [Hawaii and Alaska], Canada, and France [Corsica].
Indeed for many students of both Ireland and Algeria, and for those settler and metropolitan spokesmen who consistently advocated permanent rule, it was the proximity of, and not the distance from, these territories to Britain and France that seemed decisive in determining the character of their political relationships. Thus, according to Gustave de Beaumont, Tocqueville’s travelling companion, it was Ireland’s “geographic location” that “irrevocably joined” it to Britain. In 1834 Sir Robert Peel rejected any discussion of Irish proposals to “repeal” the Act of Union, under which Ireland, in 1800, had officially been integrated into the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Geography, according to Peel in his speech before Parliament, made political unity between Britain and Ireland a necessity and an inevitability:

Look at the map. Look at the geographical position of the British Islands, their relative position to the Peninsula, to France, to that great empire which is rising in the West on the opposite shores of the Atlantic; ... do not you feel convinced, by the evidence of the sense, that there exists an obstacle to Repeal, more powerful than any that mere argument can suggest? Oppositum natura.

Thirty-five years later John Stuart Mill similarly argued that “the mere geographical situation of the two countries makes them far more fit to exist as one nation than as two.” During the great Home Rule debate of 1886 over granting political autonomy to Ireland, when the geographical separation of Ireland from Britain was raised in support of the measure, Sir Randolph Churchill vigorously objected. Referring to Home Rule as “Repeal” in order to denigrate the proposal, Churchill ridiculed the idea that geography suggested anything but the necessity and inevitability of political union between Britain and Ireland:

The third ground upon which the Prime Minister based his proposal was undoubtedly a most original ground. He based his third argument for Repeal upon the existence of St. George’s Channel. ... You have had in this House important and long debates on the principles of the Union. Every argument for and against has been applied with every amount of ingenuity which can be imagined; but this is the very first time in the history of these debates that the argument of geography has been summoned to the aid of Repeal. And the Prime Minister, with a daring which nobody but he could employ, has taxed the argument of geography, that tremendous weapon of defence which has always been on the side of the Union, and has used it as an instrument of Repeal.

As for Algeria, both Léon Gambetta, an ardent anti-imperialist, and Jules Ferry, a leader of French imperialism, were convinced that the geographical relationship between Algeria and France implied the incorporation of Algeria—and perhaps the Maghreb as a whole—into the French body politic. In much the same way, Eugène Etienne, and the Algerian colonists whose interests he represented, believed that “the Mediterranean was only a small river which separated French departments.” Such sentiments echoed Lucien Prévost-Paradol, who in 1868 had concluded his influential book La France nouvelle by conjuring an image of France ensuring its eternal greatness by “solidly establishing eighty to one hundred million Frenchmen on both banks of the Mediterranean.”

Similarly, the image cultivated by France in the twentieth century was of a country through which “the Mediterranean runs, as the Seine runs through Paris.” It was geography, according to Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, that for French colonialists made their rule of Algeria permanent:

The vision of a Greater France ... allowed colonialists to believe that the French Empire, though much smaller and poorer than the British, was yet in one important sense superior to it. Britain’s Empire would never be more than a collection of overseas territories remote from the metropolis. But France possessed an empire on the southern shores of the Mediterranean which would forever remain an indissoluble part of the metropolis.

The official view, espoused in a study of France and its empire in the 1940s, was that Algeria was “so close” to France and so much like “another Midi” that “we think of efforts toward separation as insane.”

The point is that geography does not speak with one final and decisive voice with respect to the shape of states. Rather, states are shaped by political processes and political strategies—processes which are constrained or encouraged by geographical and cultural
factors, and strategies which exploit or overcome them. From this same perspective there is no reason to believe that the integration of any outlying territory into the domain of a central state must be permanent once accomplished. Legitimacy is in the minds of the governed, and the process of delegitimization is also to be sought there. Indeed, from the standpoint of Breton, Occitan, or Corsican nationalists, present-day France remains malintegrated—a national state according to the international community, but an "internal empire" in the view of the ethno-national movements located in these historically "peripheral" regions. Similar claims are made about the United Kingdom by Welsh and Scottish nationalists and by the Catholics of Northern Ireland. Whether or not one sees French or British state formation as unsuccessful in some of the territories legally deemed France or Britain today, the mere existence of separatist movements reflects the general point that state-building, the nation-building and nation-destroying processes commonly associated with it, and state contraction are continuous, contingent phenomena. Aside from external factors, the strength or prominence of these processes can be linked to changing cultural, economic, and social conditions, the efficacy of political programs shaped and implemented by state elites, and the competition of rival political groups whose opportunities for accession to power within the state are linked to its territorial composition.

In part this view of state-building as a continuous process is adopted by Eugen Weber in his study of cultural, social, and political integration in nineteenth-century France:

The famous hexagon can itself be seen as a colonial empire shaped over the centuries: a complex of territories conquered, annexed, and integrated in a political and administrative whole, many of them with strongly developed national or regional personalities, some of them with traditions that were specifically un- or anti-French. . . . By 1870 this had produced a political entity called France—kingdom or empire or republic—an entity formed by conquest and by political and administrative decisions formulated in (or near) Paris.

Weber points out how often French officialdom in the mid- to late 1800s perceived the people and lands of peripheral territories within France, such as Savoy, Landes, Brittany, the Midi, and Corsica, in the same way they viewed overseas colonies. According to Weber, not until the forty years surrounding the year 1900 can it be said that the assortment of different regions and cultures that had come under the control of the French political apparatus was integrated into a modern nation-state. The same point was made in a different context by Jacques Soustelle, governor-general of Algeria under Mendes France and an ardent devotee of "Algérie française":

The policy of disengagement from Algeria can be explained for 50%, if not more, by racism. . . . It seemed self-evident and irrefutable to the ninnies of Auvergne and Normandy that a Frenchman, to be worthy of that title, could not bear the name of Abdel-Kader, or wear a tarboosh. This principle is the essence of silliness, for if it had been applied throughout the centuries to the successive ethnical contributions of which France is formed the borders of our country would be those of the king of Bourges.

Just as comparison of Algeria with other historically peripheral areas incorporated into the French state assumes establishment of a conceptual linkage among them, so does comparison of the French-Algerian and British-Irish cases assume an analytically strategic isomorphism. Before proceeding with analysis of the French-Algerian case, it is appropriate to stipulate just what fundamental parallels are seen to be present, and what important differences.

In each of the two cases a state-building core, having successfully legitimized its rule in several heterogeneous, peripheral areas, failed in its efforts to do the same in another culturally distinct territory. In each case the core state was governed according to the norms of parliamentary democracy. In each case the unincorporated territory was colonized with settlers whose purpose was to support and consolidate the extension of metropolitan state authority. In each case the settlers were substantially outnumbered by indigenous inhabitants, with their proportion of the population varying over time between 5 percent and 30 percent.

These are the key isomorphic elements that make systematic comparison of the two cases possible, but it is the differences between
them, combined with a hypothesis that the similar outcome (state-building failure) in both cases can be explained by the disruptive effects of settler political behavior, that make the comparison worthwhile. What then are the major differences between the Irish and Algerian cases in spite of which settler political activity can be identified as crucial to explaining state-building failure?

One difference is the prevalence of nationalist political formulas in France for most of the period of French rule over Algeria (1830-1962) in contrast to centuries of British rule over Ireland during which feudal, religious, and dynastic ideologies were dominant in the political community. It has been persuasively argued, by Hannah Arendt and others, that incorporation of heterogeneous populated territories was made much more difficult by the advent of nationalism as an essentially exclusivist ascriptive political formula. From this perspective the parallel failures of pre-nationalist Britain in Ireland and post-nationalist France in Algeria are even more striking.16

Another difference between the two cases is that a wider cultural gulf would appear to have separated the Catholic or libertarian French-speaking citizens of nineteenth-century France from the Arabic- or Berber-speaking Muslims of Algeria in comparison to the cultural disjunction between English-speaking Anglicans and Dissenter Protestants in England and Gaelic-speaking Catholics in Ireland. In both cases the diffusion of the metropolitan language took place relatively rapidly, but in the British-Irish case, Latin and the Catholic belief system which both peoples had shared until the Reformation already located their respective elites in cultural systems that could—historically and conceptually at least—be identified with one another.

Yet in the British-Irish case, the cultural differences that did exist took on an importance that far exceeded any theological measurement of the religious gap between Protestants and Catholics. Apart from religious questions in the early centuries of their contact, negative English perceptions of the Irish focussed on some of the same social, economic, and cultural traits that distinguished many Algerian Muslims from the metropolitan French—tribal organization, feudal authority structures, transhumance, and "uncivilized" sexual practices (proprietary rights to brides by Irish lords and polygamy in Algeria). Thus Englishmen may well have had as "primitive" a view of the Irish as most nineteenth-century Frenchmen had of Algerian Muslims.16 But just as Irishmen could be classified as "West Britons" by Englishmen anxious to justify the integration of Ireland into the British state, so Frenchmen committed to integrating Algeria into France were able to identify an "Ibero-Ligurian race" which spanned the Mediterranean. This race had a North African branch which, according to a former French minister of colonial affairs in 1944, was seeking "progressively to merge itself with the people of France."17 These perceptions suggest the degree to which cultural distinctiveness is situationally defined and the difficulty of arriving at more than very general notions of how "alien" one people is from another.18

From this perspective it may be more salient to note that the Gaelic Irish and the English were in relatively intimate contact for some five centuries, while the French and Algerians were in close contact for only 120 years, than to attempt to determine how much wider the cultural gap was in one case than in the other. This contact is particularly important in regard to the differences in political participation patterns in the two metropoles. Not until the 1880s can Britain be said to have become a mass participatory democracy. Thus for hundreds of years its integrative policies toward Ireland were fashioned and implemented by a slowly expanding oligarchic elite whose image of appropriate political organization in Ireland was also oligarchic, and whose estimates of the political effects of integration were molded by oligarchic concerns.

In the French-Algerian case, however, French policies of integration of Algeria were proclaimed by the Second Republic in 1848, elaborated under the Second Empire (1852-1869), and then vigorously pursued during the Third Republic. By this time France was a rather thoroughly republican, mass participatory democracy. Accordingly, French policy toward Algeria was shaped by democratic notions of how political life there should be organized, and by estimates of the political effects of integration based on expectations of mass participation. To be sure, modern imperial and social Darwinist ideologies, prevalent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, helped to justify nongenitalitarian approaches to political participation in culturally distinct areas under French control, including Algeria. But the question of equal political rights
for the mass of natives in the outlying territory was important for a greater proportion of the period of contact between the French and Algerians than it was during the period of contact between the British and Irish. In the Irish case the question of Catholic emancipation did eventually become central in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It was resolved in favor of full political rights for Irish Catholics by the mid-1800s, although by then, as noted earlier, the political orientation of Irish Catholics had been decisively molded in a fundamentally separatist direction. But the question of Muslim political participation loomed large in the French debate over Algeria until the 1950s, and was most intense in the years from 1880 to 1936, when the modern political identity of Algerian Muslims was being formed. Thus the key question in the French-Algerian case, comparable to asking why the cooptation of native elites failed in Ireland, is to ask why efforts to extend political participation rights to masses of Algerian Muslims failed in France.

Yet France did make serious attempts to coopt native oligarchies, and exploit the ties binding the masses to them, as means of legitimizing the integration of the country into the central state. These policies were prominent until the 1870s, by which time, in addition to the republicization of the metropole, little remained of the religious, tribal, and administrative authority structures that had existed in Algeria before 1830, or of the proto-state that Abd el-Qadir had built in the course of his seventeen-year war against the French. The disappearance of these structures was the result of many factors, including the collapse of the fragile Turkish administration, the prolonged and bloody conquest of the country from 1830 until 1847, the exile and imprisonment of Abd el-Qadir, and the famines of the 1860s, which contributed to the reduction of the native population by 50 percent from 1830 to 1870. But of greatest importance in undermining cooptive efforts to legitimize French rule of Algeria was the successful settler campaign to expropriate Arab land and interrupt metropolitan and military efforts to support and protect local elites and cultivate the loyalty of the native population. The conflicts between the settlers and the central state that emerged in Algeria during this period resembled both the clash of metropolitan and settler interests in Ireland and the clash of interests that would underlie later struggles over native policy in Algeria.

Chapter Four

SETTLERS AND THE FAILURE OF FRENCH STATE-BUILDING IN ALGERIA

"The man most responsible for the successful conquest and "pacification" of Algeria was General (later Marshal) Bugeaud. He portrayed his firm but politic approach to the Arab problem as part of a long-term effort (he spoke in terms of centuries) designed to reconcile the Arabs to French rule.1 Indeed by the time of General Bugeaud's appointment as governor-general of Algeria in 1841, French policies toward Algeria were fashioned and criticized on the assumption of a shared commitment to the permanent transformation of most or all of the territory into French domain—a transformation in which massive colonization by European settlers was to play a key role.2

But if the ultimate goal was relatively clear, the means to achieve it were not. Debate over Bugeaud's policies in Algeria encompassed many issues, including the governor-general's royalist and autocratic sympathies, his inclination to implement projects without parliamentary approval, the expense and authoritarian tone of his programs for extensive military-agricultural colonization, and even his cruelty in battle.3 In retrospect, however, the most significant element within this swirl of controversy and accusation was the tension over native policy that emerged between the governor-general and army, on one side, and the growing population of European settlers (colonos) in Algeria, on the other.

In 1844 Bugeaud established the Arab Bureau—a cadre of officers to serve as "intermediaries between the military authority and the indigenous populations." These officers were charged to "supply information on the attitude of the populations and to assure the tribes 'just and regular administration.'"4 Fluent in Arabic and imbued with a sense of France's mission to protect and civilize their
wards, the officers of the Arab Bureaus were to govern through an officially recognized hierarchy of native intermediaries, including tribal, village, and religious elites. They bestowed titles such as sheikh, caid, aga, and khalifa on native notables who were thereafter to be considered officials of the French state. By trading recognition, protection, and status for cooperation in the administration of justice, the collection of taxes, and the enforcement of order, the French hoped to preserve and exploit for their own purposes the organizational network of local elites developed by Abd el-Qadir.5

However, although committed to the colonization and absorption of Algeria by France, the army and its Arab Bureau came into sharp conflict with the colons. Pressure by European settlers to “valorize” (realize the full value of) the resources of the native population—particularly to seize their lands—was perceived by the Arab Bureau officers as disruptive efforts to gain native loyalty to France. Subjected to bitter accusations of Arabophila in the colon press, the officers responded by branding sequestrations as “fundamental obstacles to pacification” and obstructing them wherever they could.6

In 1847 Bugeaud listed his administrative priorities, explaining that in the long run, acceptance of French rule by the natives would be the only guarantee of French success in Algeria:

It is generally believed that the administration of the ninety thousand Europeans of all nationalities is the main thing. I put first our domination over the Arabs, without which there is no security for the European population nor progress of colonization; as a second priority, for the same reasons, I place the government and administration of the Arabs; in the third place, colonization and the administration of the Europeans.7

But in the late 1840s, liberal metropolitan sentiment tended to favor the colonists, primarily because their objections to military rule were cast in republican terms, advocating extension of civil liberties to French citizens in Algeria and laissez-faire policies toward Algerian land. Since most lands in Algeria held in common by Arab tribes were treated as “state domain” by the French authorities, liberal prescriptions placing public resources at the disposal of private citizens meant despoiling the natives. Partly in response to pressure from the colons and partly as a consequence of the colons’ control of the civilian administrative apparatus in Algeria, a variety of legal and administrative reforms were implemented from 1847 to 1860 which greatly expanded the area and native population under civilian jurisdiction. This reduced the military’s ability to protect native lands from transfer to settler possession and Arab elites from dismissal by civilian authorities.

Throughout the 1850s the military’s Arab Bureau engaged in fierce struggles with the colons on behalf of its Arab charges. Meanwhile the colons pushed forward cantonnement (“compression”) schemes, managing to seize vast tracts of tribal and Muslim endowment (habous) lands. They excoriated the military for its leniency and encouragement of Arab enemies, its active involvement in the “feudalist” politics of intratribal and interclan rivalries, and its arbitrary treatment of settler interests.8 But during this same period Emperor Napoleon III made known his support for a more accommodating policy toward the natives of Algeria.

Napoleon III’s approach to Algeria was part of his overall desire to expand opportunities for French capitalism and enhance the greatness of France through large-scale state-supported development projects. The notion of a large “Arab kingdom” under French suzerainty, acting as a counterbalance to Ottoman power in the East and British influence in the West, also fit in with the emperor’s muscular foreign policy. Most importantly, Algeria was to be a southern frontier for France—what the American West represented at the time for the United States. In contrast to the demographic situation in North America, however, Napoleon realized that, regardless of the growth of its European population, Algeria would forever have a large native majority. Thus integration of Algeria into the French state on a permanent and stable basis meant reconciling the Muslim majority to French rule—not only through military conquests, but also through policies that would lead the local population and its leaders to view integration as in their interests and ultimately as legitimate.

In an important speech given in the first year of the Second Empire, Napoleon indicated the larger context within which his Algerian policy was formed:
I wish to conquer, by conciliation, the dissenting parties, and to bring together into the channel of one popular stream those various branches which are now lost without profit to any one. . . . We have immense uncultivated territories to clear up, routes to open, harbors to deepen, rivers to render navigable, canals to finish, our network of railroads to complete. We have, opposite Marseilles, a vast realm to assimilate to France.  

But the assimilation which the emperor had in mind was considerably different from that advocated by the European population of Algeria, numbering 210,000 in 1856 (including 93,000 Frenchmen). For the settlers, assimilation meant extension of French administrative practices, legal categories, and political rights to Algeria for the benefit of French citizens living there. Such policies would greatly facilitate transfer of native land to European ownership and strengthen the ascendant position which settler citizens enjoyed vis-à-vis noncitizen natives. For the government in Paris, however, assimilation meant strengthening the control exercised by the metropolitan government over events in Algeria in order to protect the natives from colon exploitation and establish cooperative relations with local elites. The history of French policy in Algeria during the Second Empire is dominated by colon opposition to central government efforts to implement formulas limiting colon influence and extending protection, rights, and opportunities to the native population. Although the settlers experienced setbacks from time to time, they were largely successful in preventing the emperor's schemes from coming to fruition, or in sabotaging the implementation of those they could not block.

From the advent of the Second Empire in 1852 to the beginning of the emperor's serious concern with Algerian affairs in 1858, the conflict between the military authorities in Algeria and the colonists over native policy had few repercussions in Paris. But underlying the issues of administrative prerogative, accountability, and jurisdiction which had arisen, there was a basic policy question of whether to pursue "gradual assimilation," permitting rapprochement between the two races" and recruitment and support of wider strata of native elites as state functionaries, or "full assimilation," which (as it was then interpreted) would give free rein to concessionnaires among the colons, resulting in cantonnement or refoulement (displacement) of the natives.10

From 1858 to 1865 Napoleon III became increasingly involved in the affairs of Algeria. In 1858 a special ministry—the Ministry for Algeria and the Colonies—was created. The emperor appointed his favorite nephew, Prince Napoleon-Jerome, as a sort of vice-roy in Algeria. Soon after his arrival in Algeria the prince was given a report by the colon-dominated Superior Council of Algeria. The report recommended vigorous pursuit of expanded colonization, "dismemberment of the Arab people," "dissolution of tribal cohesion," reduction in the status and power of native chiefs, strict application of French property laws to communally held land, and allocation of "surplus" native holdings for private (settler) use.11 The new viceroy responded sympathetically to Arab protests that following such recommendations would mean reduction of their position in the country to one the colons would consider equivalent to that of black slaves in North America. He criticized the colon attitude, warning the settlers that uniting the natives to France would not be achieved "by making the Arab laborers semi-serfs, attached to the land for the profit of the colons."12

After nine months, however, seeking greater things in Paris and frustrated by the intensity of colon opposition to the policies he was charged to carry out, the prince resigned his commission. Soon the ministry was abolished, and along with it the idea of a viceroy in Algeria. Following the prince's departure, the territory and native population under civil (i.e., settler) control more than doubled, numerous Muslim chiefs and judges were dismissed, "surplus" lands were expropriated for new settlement construction, native taxes were raised, and tribes were pushed back toward the desert. Observers at the time agreed that these practices were inducing a stupor among the natives that would soon turn into hatred.13

Quarrelling over native policy between military and civil authorities escalated into a virtual war of conflicting accusations and petitions to metropolitan authorities. Exasperated, Napoleon visited Algeria in 1860. Listening to complaints from both generals and civilian prefects, he came down squarely on the side of the military. To replace the abolished Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies, he appointed Marshal Pelissier to the recreated post of governor-general.
Settler problems were to be resolved, Napoleon declared, only with careful thought given to protect native property rights:

Our first duty is to be occupied with the welfare of three million Arabs which the fortunes of war have given over to our domination. . . . To elevate the Arabs to the dignity of free men, to educate them with all respect for their religion, to improve their existence, to enable them to draw from this land all the treasures which Providence has buried there.\(^{14}\)

The emperor’s involvement in Algeria’s affairs on behalf of the natives and his reinstatement of military rule triggered new colon attempts to secure a special constitution for Algeria. But the legislation developed in the French Senate included measures that could eventually have threatened the political ascendancy of the settlers, such as granting municipal political rights and naturalization privileges to Algerian Jews. In response, Governor-General Péliéssier, who had soon after his arrival fallen under the influence of the colons, submitted a complicated alternative scheme. Its complexity masked what was in fact the basic program of the colons, including massive land transfers, cantonnement, and obstacles to the extension of political rights to natives.\(^{15}\) Warned by former Algerian Governor-General Randon (now minister of war) of what lurked behind the elaborate proposal of Péliéssier, Napoleon quashed the scheme.

From 1863 to 1867 the emperor applied himself personally to the task of suppressing colon influence and reconciling native Algerians to permanent French rule. In an open letter to Governor-General Péliéssier dated February 6, 1863, he declared that the French nation would never renounce its conquest of Algeria and committed himself to integrate that territory into the French state. But he saw colon infringement of native rights as a serious obstacle:

It seems to me indispensable for the repose and prosperity of Algeria to consolidate the property in the hands of those who hold it. How, indeed, can we hope for the pacification of a country, when almost the whole of the population is disquieted respecting its possessions? . . . \(F\) or, I repeat it, Algeria is not a colony, properly speaking, but an Arabian realm. The natives have, like the colonists, an equal right to my protection; and I am as much the Emperor of the Arabs as I am Emperor of the French.\(^{16}\)

Several months later the French Senate passed legislation ending the categorization of communal Arab land as state domain and granting title in perpetuity to native-owned lands not already seized. Ignoring a flood of protests from the colon population, Napoleon, working closely with military and Saint-Simonian advisers, issued decrees in 1864 and 1865 formally placing settlers in Algeria under military authority, increasing Muslim and Jewish representation in general councils, and reducing the land area and native population under the effective control of the settlers by about 40 percent. But in spite of advice from Ismael Urbain and other architects of his Algerian policies to eliminate colons from positions of authority in Algeria, Napoleon left settler influence in the Algerian bureaucracy well entrenched. The military delegated many of its powers to civilian prefects. Registration of native lands proceeded very slowly.\(^{17}\)

In 1865, with settlers again clamoring for a special constitution for Algeria, the emperor decided on an extended visit to the territory. Again he sided with the military authorities in their continuing and bitter struggle with the colon population over native policy. He commended the army of Algeria, reminding them that “you were the first to have held out to the Arabs the hand of friendship and [have sought to treat] them with generosity and justice, as they are a part of the great French family.”\(^{18}\) While admonishing the colons to treat the natives “as compatriots,” he pardoned tribes that had recently revolted, freed rebel prisoners, and issued a proclamation to the native inhabitants (who had greeted him enthusiastically) seeking to assure them of his good will and his commitment to their rights:

You know my intentions: I have irrevocably put in your hands the lands that you occupy. I have honored your chiefs, and respected your religion. I want to increase your welfare and permit you to participate more and more in the administration of your country and in the benefits of civilization.\(^{19}\)

Upon his return from Algeria the emperor dispatched an eighty-eight-page letter to the new governor-general there, Marshal MacMahon, detailing the policies he wished implemented. The emperor desired to support a class of great native chiefs loyal to France, but distrusting the colon population and suspecting the Algerian administration which it dominated of deceiving him and
subverting his policies, he advocated the territorial separation of the settlers from the natives.20

A Senatus-Consultus (Act of the French Senate) for Algeria was passed in July 1865 giving expression to the emperor's policy and establishing the legal framework within which political rights for Algerian Muslims were to be determined for the next eighty years. As suggested in Napoleon's letter, Algerian natives were made French subjects, given rights to participate in local elections and the deliberations of municipal councils, and afforded the opportunity to become French citizens with the renunciation of their Muslim status. Other of the emperor's ideas, such as official recognition of the Muslim judiciary, streamlining of the colon-dominated civil administration, and tax reform, were implemented administratively. The civil service in Algeria was opened to natives, scores of whom were admitted to civil service training programs, where they studied alongside colonos. In addition to their eagerness to join the French civil service, evidence of native responsiveness to French policies designed to enhance opportunities for their political participation was manifested in the 1867 municipal elections, wherein 68 percent of Muslim voters and 70 percent of Jewish voters participated, compared to rates of 55 percent among French voters and 65 percent among other European populations.21

The colonos, however, objected to the extension of voting rights to "ignorant and fanatic" natives and raised a storm of protest.22 Unable to attack the emperor himself, they published his confidential letter to MacMahon and vilified those advisers known to have been involved in preparing it. According to Charles-André Julien, they combined with the governor-general (who resisted Napoleon's efforts to lure him from Algeria to another post) to confront "the Emperor's will" with "a solid wall of hostility and inertia."23 Military efforts to protect Arab land from colon speculators were stymied, while MacMahon himself suspended the implementation of a direct order from the emperor to permit natives to bid on land in public auctions.24

When a series of famines and epidemics hit Algeria in the late 1860s, the colonos convinced metropolitan public opinion that the government's policies and the Arab Bureaus were responsible. By their control of a special commission designated to investigate the causes of famine, the settlers were able to divert attention from the role which large-scale land seizures and heavy tribal indemnities had played in the plight of the native population. As support for the Second Empire began to erode in France, and Napoleon became increasingly distracted from Algerian affairs, the colon position gained strength in the Senate. Settler allies included clericalists receptive to colon charges that the Arab Bureau officers were animated by "anti-Christian" sentiments in their relations with the Muslims and republicans resentful of imperial policies which awarded Algerian natives special status and protected "aristocratic" or "feudalist" elites.

In a final attempt to mollify the colonos, the French government put forward a special constitution for Algeria which satisfied many settler demands but still preserved Muslim property, the Muslim judiciary, and some political rights for natives. Supported by the army, but opposed by the governor-general and the colon-dominated government in Algeria, the scheme was defeated in an Algerian referendum in May 1870. Two months later war broke out between France and Prussia, ending the Second Empire and sealing settler control of Algerian affairs for many years to come.

In his path-breaking study of French policy toward Algeria during the Second Empire, Charles-Robert Ageron concludes that it is wrong for historians to condemn Napoleon III's policies. Emphasizing the vigorous and comprehensive approach to the political integration of Algeria advanced by the emperor and his advisors, he calls for a "complete revision" of the literature.25 For Ageron, whose massive study of French-Algerian relations from 1870 to 1922 is the standard work in the field, the factor that proved decisive in the failure of metropolitan integrationist policies in Algeria in later periods can be clearly discerned during the Second Empire. Then, as well as under the Third Republic, the dominant element interfering with metropolitan attempts to cultivate the loyalty of the natives and their leaders, protect their interests, and legitimize permanent French rule of the territory was the influence of the settlers. The colonos' oscillation between programs of "assimilation" and "autonomy" Ageron links directly to the changing political conditions within which they sought their overall objective of "a definite regime that would neither create opportunities for their acquired positions to be challenged, nor obstruct their future."27
Ageron is one of many analysts of French-Algerian relations who have used the combination of conflicting objectives sought by the colons to explain dramatic or puzzling changes in settler slogans and programs. Francis Jeanson characterized shifting settler inclinations toward separatism as nothing more than the obverse, the negative, of his supernationalism. ... In other words, Algeria has simultaneously to remain a colony, which entails the maintenance of an initial balance of forces based on the military power of the metropolis, and at the same time to escape metropolitan control as completely as possible ... hence the [settler colony's] remarkable oscillations between the vocabulary of patriotism and that of separatism.²⁸

John Humphrey has also noted the "fundamentally instrumental" attitude of the settlers toward incorporation of Algeria into France, and an "oscillation" between settler efforts to loosen and tighten ties to the metropole. This, he comments,

indicates a problematic at the heart of their enterprise. ... On the one hand, certain practical advantages resulted from remaining a constituent part of the French polity; in particular it was a logical basis on which to demand the extension of analogous civil rights. On the other hand, to ensure a "French life style" in the special colonial conditions of Algeria actually required different local arrangements and special institutions to supervise them and, for this reason, the settlers pressed to loosen certain ties with the Metropole.²⁹

Despite the essential contradiction between the settlers' desires for local paramountcy over the natives and for full integration into the metropole, they enjoyed considerable success in achieving them. But never were the colons more successful than in the first thirty years of the Third Republic. After the fall of the detested Second Empire, with its "indigenophile" inclinations, and the establishment of a republican regime, whose opposition to the authoritarian and militarist aspects of Bonapartism matched their own antipathy to military authority, the settlers emerged as the real rulers of Algeria. Reflecting the consensus of historians of the period that 1871 marked a decisive victory for the colons, Ageron made "Vac Victis" (Woe to the Vanquished) the title of the first part of his massive study Les Algériens musulmans et la France (1871-1919).

Decrees issued in December 1870 and February 1871 by the republican regime annulled regulations promulgated in the final weeks of the Second Empire which had established native suffrage in elections for departmental councils. These new decrees also subordinated generals to civilian prefects and severely limited the size and territorial scope of the Arab Bureaus. With the much-heralded arrival of thousands of new colonists from Alsace and Lorraine (territories lost to Prussia in the war of 1870), Algeria took on a new and deeper meaning for most Frenchmen. Heroes and pioneers in the eyes of the Paris government, the settlers not only enjoyed administrative domination over the army, but were soon to be granted full civil and municipal rights as Frenchmen in Algeria, direct administration of their affairs by various French ministries (rattachement), as opposed to supervision by the governor-general of Algeria and the war ministry, and a removal of restraints on the transfer of native lands to settler possession.

From 1871 to 1900, 1,147,000 hectares of Muslim land—one-and-a-half times that which had been seized in the previous forty years—were transferred to settler possession.³⁰ This included most of the fertile plains land. The massive transfer of land from native to settler hands helped generate a 260 percent increase in the number of European settlers in Algeria—from 283,000, or 10.4 percent of the total population in 1866, to 723,000, or 20 percent of the total population in 1896. The transfer of property was carried out either by sequestration or by "forced judicial sale."

Fearing the consequences of settler ascendency, and squeezed between their hungry clients' needs for food and the demands of French creditors for loan repayments, many of the great tribal chiefs of Algeria rose in rebellion against French rule in March 1871. Sheikh Mohammed Mqrami, the leader of the insurrection, had been among the most important of the chieftains loyal to the Second Empire. After several months of fighting he was killed and his forces defeated. With native policy now in the hands of the settlers, "punishment" was the order of the day—of a sort that would deliver native land to settler possession and destroy the prestige and power of that class of native chiefs and notables which the Second Empire had hoped would help legitimize French rule in native eyes.
An indemnity equaling eight to ten times the annual tax due was levied on tribes already impoverished and exhausted by years of famines, epidemics, and bad harvests. Even more crushing, however, was a punitive, more-or-less indiscriminate seizure of 574,000 hectares of land. For many colonists this massive sequestration served as a remedy for the Senatus Consultus of 1863, which had afforded natives opportunities for establishing permanent title to lands still in their possession, and which the settlers had seen as a direct obstacle to their desire for the cantonnement of native lands. More generally it was seen as a means of permanently reducing the economic and political base of the natives and of ensuring settler ascendency far into the future. Explaining the need to erase “the hope of shaking our domination” from the minds of the Muslims, the colon-controlled Superior Government Council of Algeria justified the expropriations by describing them as “a punishment capable of leaving a permanent trace; a seizure of property well justified by persistent and repeated return to crime will smite the spirit of the guilty sufficiently by subjecting them to an effective repression with consequences which cannot be wiped out.” According to Ageron’s calculations, the indemnities and sequestrations that followed the Moqran revolt deprived the native population of 70 percent of its capital resources.

Equally important for its effect on the position of natives in French Algeria and the destruction of indigenous structures of authority and prestige was the passage of the Warnier Law in 1873. Warnier was a leading colon spokesman and a longtime opponent of the Second Empire’s Algerian policies. He had strongly opposed the Senatus Consultus of 1863, with its provisions for the distribution of perpetual title to lands remaining in Arab hands—provisions which in fact had not been implemented beyond division of tribal lands. In his 1873 legislation, however, he had found a way to turn the “constitution” of Arab property to colon advantage.

The Warnier Law effectively abolished all forms of collective ownership of land and customary rights to priority purchase by co-owners. Tracts of land owned by scores or even hundreds of individuals could no longer be managed or preserved on behalf of all by patriarchal, communal, or tribal leaders. Instead each owner, no matter how small his share, was given the right to apply for a deed to his property. If speculators could induce even one co-proprietor to apply, every other member of the tribe, village, family, or other collective landowning unit would be required to do the same, or lose the land by default. The process which this law set in motion was fully anticipated by its framers. Natives were unable to contain the dissipatory forces within their families, villages, and tribes stirred by speculators who approached disaffected individuals with tempting offers, and they were confused by the intricate (and expensive) legal procedures necessary to preserve their holdings. The law operated as a “veritable juggernaut,” resulting in forced judicial sales which transferred 378,000 hectares of Arab land into colon hands.

As noted, one consequence of such wholesale transformation of land ownership patterns was to hinder metropolitan representatives seeking to legitimize French rule by depriving them of cooptable authority structures. Earlier the seizures of habous lands had given French authorities direct control of the appointment of religious officials. The Senatus Consultus of 1863 had then weakened the great tribes by dividing their lands among douars—village-type communities created by the French for administrative purposes—which often bore little relationship to existing solidarities. The destruction then wreaked on the tribes during and after the Moqran revolt (the minimum estimate of native deaths during the fighting is 200,000) largely ended the political significance of tribal leaders. The Warnier Law broke apart smaller kinship and local social structures as well. Now, with increasing numbers of Muslims displaced from traditional lands and employed as wage laborers on colon-owned farms and vineyards, native society lost most of what remained of its indigenous organization and leadership.

Some native “strawmen,” used by colon land agents to help generate land sales, and local notables now wholly dependent on the local French administration did acquire small holdings. They, along with some urban notables who had opposed the Moqran insurrection, formed the basis of a class of collaborationist natives known as the “Beni Oui-Oui,” who helped to enforce an elaborate array of restrictions on the travel and daily behavior of Muslims (the indigénat, codified between 1874 and 1881) and to collect special “Arab imposts” levied on the native population. They were also appointed to advisory posts in the local administration, but as long as
they were selected for their readiness to collaborate with the settlers, and not elected by native assemblies or chosen on the basis of the support and loyalty they commanded, they could serve only as instruments for controlling the native population—not as agents for legitimizing French rule.

During this period of unchallenged settler ascendancy, the French system of municipal government was exploited by the settlers as a further means to subjugate the native majority and extract resources. Metropolitan legislators had intended that native assemblies (djemmas) be constituted within the jurisdiction of settler municipalities. According to Humphrey’s study of the history of local administration in Algeria,

The guiding notion seems to have been that such assemblies should be consulted by the municipality before any decision to alienate or otherwise make use of a douar’s patrimony. In other words, they were to be protective mechanisms. Some more liberal reformers seem to have envisaged their eventual evolution into quasi-municipal institutions in their own right, providing a natural nucleus for indigenous solidarity.⁵⁷

But while settler municipalities—communes de plein exercice (townships with full authority)—were rapidly expanding their boundaries to include as many native douars as possible, they did so only in order to collect the heavy taxes required of the natives. These revenues, which Humphrey reports “accounted for between one quarter and a half of the typical communal budget,”³⁸ enabled some settler communities to enjoy a relatively luxurious standard of living, with high salaries for local officials and a balanced budget.³⁹ Beyond collection of the natives’ taxes, enforcement of the indigénat, and collection of fines, however, the municipalities ignored the indigenous population. Djemmas were seldom constituted, and where constituted, not consulted.

In large areas of the country where European settlement was too sparse to constitute full-fledged municipalities, the replacement of military with civil government entailed the establishment of communes mixtes (mixed townships). The pertinent legislation, passed in 1874, stipulated that within the jurisdiction of communes mixtes—unlike in communes de plein exercice—the resources of douars were to be independently managed by native assemblies. But the settlers strongly resisted anything which could lead to municipalities under the control of natives—-institutions that might eventually threaten colon ascendancy. Since the civil servants who administered the communes mixtes were drawn from a “civilian corps . . . recruited almost entirely from among French Algerians,” their opposition was effective. Again, the djemmas were rarely consulted, and the legislation fell into disuse.⁴⁰

From 1871 to 1891 the ascendancy of the European population in Algeria was as secure and complete as it ever would be. Native social, cultural, and political institutions were destroyed or degraded; most of the best land in the country was under colon control; the native population itself was destitute, intimidated, and largely illiterate. The settlers worked hard to block opportunities for natives to acquire French or traditional Muslim education, and approximately twenty-five times more money was spent per capita on schooling for European children than for native children. In 1890 less than 2 percent of native school-age children were being educated. At the turn of the century, out of a population of four million Algerian natives, there were fewer than five hundred high school students.⁴¹

Settler leaders such as Eugène Etienne, who had close ties with the founding fathers of the Third Republic and the leaders of the French imperialist movement, enjoyed wide discretion in their behavior toward Algerian natives. Their opposition to the Second Empire and their staunch support of the Third Republic’s establishment also helped protect them from the kind of critical parliamentary scrutiny their non-egalitarian policies might otherwise have led to.⁴²

But even during this heyday of settler predominance, tensions produced by the contradictory imperatives behind settler political behavior—the need to maintain close ties to the metropole for protection against the native majority and the need to prevent full integration in order to protect their local privileges—were apparent. Using the slogan and policy of full assimilation, the settlers had eliminated military authority, assured themselves of direct representation in the French parliament, established their civil liberties, introduced French property law, and gained control over local
branches of ministries responsible for Algerian affairs. On the other hand, the principle of assimilation had produced the Crémieux decree of 1870, which granted French citizenship en masse to the Jews of Algeria. For the settlers this was a dangerous precedent for the future naturalization of other natives of the “New France.” But it was difficult for the colons wholeheartedly to oppose this measure since it was followed by a native insurrection—i.e., the Moqrenti revolt—which required military reinforcements from the metropole for its suppression, clearly making the point that in the long run the very existence of the settler community in Algeria depended on metropolitan perceptions of Algeria as a “prolongation of France.”

The principle of assimilation was also employed by native representatives advocating equal treatment for all French subjects, by metropolitan indigenophiles, and by politicians and intellectuals dedicated to the transformation of the French empire into a transcontinental superpower. Supported by much of the metropolitan press, these elements sought throughout the 1880s to legitimize permanent French rule of Algeria by protecting native interests and extending rights of political participation to Muslims. Such arguments based on the principle of assimilation had convinced the French parliament to reduce the size of the Algerian delegation by half in 1875, thereby giving French citizens of the Algerian departments representation comparable to that accorded to citizens living within the hexagon, but the delegation was restored to its original size in 1884.

Indeed, from 1871 to 1888 metropolitan governments made repeated efforts to expand opportunities for Muslim participation in departmental councils. All met with fierce resistance. An unrelenting campaign was conducted by the colon press and by colon deputies in parliament to remove even the small number of Muslim appointees permitted to share in the deliberations of the councils. Although they failed in this, the colons did defeat a sustained metropolitan attempt to replace the Muslim appointees with natives chosen by election. The settlers also maintained strict control over lists of the very small number of Muslims eligible to vote in municipal elections. Settler pressure on and control of parliamentary investigative commissions sent to Algeria in this period led not only to the defeat of proposals to enfranchise additional categories of Muslims, but also to the adoption of legislation depriving Muslims of the right to participate in direct elections of mayors and substantially reducing their representation on municipal councils—from 33 to 25 percent. In 1883 settler agitation resulted in the closing of the only French-Arabic journal in Algeria—El-Montakheb—which had called for the protection of native rights and property under the banner of assimilation to France.

Thus settler efforts to prevent the expansion of political rights available to native Algerians were almost entirely successful, but this success was achieved only by vigilant, skillful, and constant struggle. In view of the very strong arguments for treating natives and settlers more equally if Algeria was seen as an integral part of the French republic, the colons by the 1880s had begun to shift their ideological and polemical ground. Less and less did they speak of assimilation. Increasingly they and their parliamentary and intellectual spokesmen spoke of association as a more appropriate relationship between France and Algeria. Taking into account what they described as profound differences in the capabilities of European and Arab peoples, they saw association as a framework within which withholding political rights from natives could more effectively be justified.

From 1891 to 1920 a new series of struggles ensued over native policy in Algeria. Colons were pitted against évolutés (French-educated natives), reformist governor-generals, and a metropolitan government increasingly anxious to tap native manpower for military service in Europe. Again the settlers saw their own slogan—now “association”—applied in ways they deemed dangerous. In one respect the colons were less successful in this period than they had previously been: some important reforms were passed. But given the stature and political resources of the metropolitan statesmen associated with the reform movement—Jules Ferry, Jules Cambon, Charles Jonnart, and Georges Clemenceau—the ability of the settlers to defeat most reformist proposals, and to delay, sabotage, or reverse the few that were implemented, is a convincing demonstration of their crucial role in the defeat of efforts to extend political participation rights to Algerian natives.

Metropolitan unease over the state of affairs in Algeria led to the constitution of a parliamentary commission of inquiry in 1892.
Headed by Jules Ferry, a former premier and a leading exponent of French expansionism, the commission spent fifty-three days in Algeria conducting an extraordinarily detailed and comprehensive study of government policies and colon-native relations. The report of the Ferry commission, framed within the language of association rather than assimilation, was a veritable indictment for malfeasance of the government of Algeria. Agnon notes how similar the Ferry commission’s findings were to the perspectives and favored approaches of Napoleon III. Ferry, who wished to protect and build upon native political and cultural forms, came to see the colon as the primary pathology underlying the problems that France faced in Algeria. Outraged by the hypocrisy, injustice, and immaturity of the settlers, he recommended satisfaction of most native demands—for alleviation of their tax burden, extension of their rights to vote for mayors of municipalities, revision of land laws, lifting of restrictions on their use of forests, expansion of opportunities for Muslim education, reform of the indigènes, and reinstatement of the Muslim judiciary. Ferry stopped short of endorsing native requests for wider voting and representational rights and for complete abolition of the indigènes, but the reforms he and his commission did recommend triggered a torrent of condemnation in the colon press and the same vigorous opposition in the parliament that previous such proposals had elicited.

The parliament accepted the report of the commission in full, but as a combined result of the colon opposition, Ferry’s death in 1893, and a period of distraction from Algerian affairs in France, none of the substantive reforms in native policy were adopted. The only recommendation that was implemented was the proposal that central government control of events in Algeria be enhanced, and native interests protected, by a strengthened governor-general endowed with wide discretionary authority and an end to the system of rattachements. The governor-general’s increased powers would, it was hoped, protect him against the undue influence of the settlers in Algeria, while the ending of rattachements would protect him from the pressures exerted by settler representatives in Paris.

Even this recommendation was not put fully into effect until the end of 1896. In the meantime Jules Cambon, a man strongly sympathetic to the Ferry commission’s conclusions, was named governor-general. Believing that “the first duty of the Governor-General is to strengthen the ties that bind the indigenous populations to France,” Cambon went on to characterize Algeria as too different from France to permit full assimilation but too important to be permitted self-government. He set out to put permanent French rule of the territory on a firmer footing. The metropolitan government, through the governor-general and his deputies, would act as arbiter in the clash of settler and native interests. Toward this end Cambon sought to implement by administrative decree a number of the reforms advocated by Ferry. He did manage to introduce changes in property laws, forestry use regulations, educational policy, and medical care that significantly benefited the native population, but failed in his attempts to establish native assemblies capable of safeguarding native interests on the municipal level.

The colon press, departmental councils, and Algerian government officials vilified the governor-general as an “Arabophile” with an “unnatural passion for the Arabs” who would sacrifice the interests of the colonos to revive Napoleon III’s “Arab kingdom” idea. The settlers demanded Cambon’s recall, and in combination with the energetic parliamentary and extra-parliamentary efforts of a hundred deputies under the leadership of Eugène Etienne—the colon leader in the French parliament—they were able to obtain his recall in September 1896.

Although the settlers were successful in blocking many of Cambon’s reforms, and ultimately in gaining his removal, they were deeply disquieted by his efforts, leading to a shift in the thrust of settler political action in the mid-to-late 1890s. A sentiment favoring autonomy from France—the formation of an Algérie Libre, which had emerged earlier in the decade—gained ground. The growth of this sentiment was explained by several factors. First, the Ferry commission report and the Cambon governor-generalship had clearly demonstrated how the association concept could be interpreted as a formula for enhancing the position and prospects of Algerian Muslims vis-à-vis European settlers. Moreover, after twenty years of native prostration, colon fears of a Muslim uprising had subsided. Finally, the dramatic increase in the European population of Algeria had increased settler confidence in their ability to dominate the
Muslims without help from the metropole. The sentiment became expressed in demands for sharp reductions in the powers of the governor-general, for colon control over taxation and the Algerian budget, and in widespread anti-Semitic rioting. (The pieds noirs [lower-class European settlers] rioters identified with the anti-Dreyfusards in France and believed that Arabic-speaking Jewish merchants, with close ties to the Muslim population, threatened the livelihood of settler shopkeepers and businessmen. More importantly, the colonists viewed the Jews of Algeria, and the precedent set by their being granted naturalization privileges, as a dangerous threat to the future of their ascendancy in Algeria.)

In the years following Cambon’s departure, in response to muted colon threats of secession, new arrangements were made for the administration of Algeria that moved the territory as close to autonomy from France, under settler rule, as it ever was to come. In 1898 an assembly known as the Délégations financières (budgetary council) was created, comprised of forty-eight members elected by the settlers and twenty-one Muslims. Six of the Muslims were nominated by the heads of Berber clans, six were chosen by the governor-general to represent Saharan tribes, and nine were elected by five thousand Muslim municipal officials. Another new institution—the Conseil supérieur du gouvernement—was made up of fifty-three settler administrators and elected officials and seven Muslims. Given official recognition in December 1900 by a law according Algeria a special constitutional status and a budget formally separate from that of metropolitan France, these new arrangements, along with the political clout of the colon lobby in Paris, turned the governor-general into a virtual “prisoner of the European population.”

In this way the settlers constructed a set of political and administrative relationships with France ensuring that association would be at least as effective a vehicle for local hegemony as assimilation. But this could be so only as long as the settlers felt secure in the face of native discontent, and as long as the metropole viewed Algeria more as a burden to be ignored, if possible, than as an asset to be exploited for vital state interests. In the first decades of the twentieth century both of these conditions were undermined.

In the spring of 1901, two hundred peasants led by a local Muslim preacher killed a policeman and five settlers in the Oranais town of Marguerite. Although a number of metropolitan deputies identified colon oppression of Algerian natives as the root cause of the disturbance, the settler lobby was able to prevail. In the relatively long parliamentary debate over the “Marguerite affair,” Prime Minister Waldeck-Rousseau threw the support of the government behind a colon-sponsored resolution endorsing colonization. Giving official support to the notion of association, he blamed native unrest on misguided assimilationism. The only operative result of an official inquiry into the matter was the creation of a new system of “Moslem control tribunals” (tribunaux répressifs indigènes) to enlarge further the police powers of the colon-dominated Algerian government. The specter of native violence against settlers had been revived, and the ultimate reliance of the Europeans of Algeria on the military strength of the metropole was reestablished. Little more was heard of Algérie Libre.

Since the early 1880s French nationalism had found its most important expression in imperial expansion. As the geographical limits of that expansion were reached in the early 1900s, increasing attention was directed toward efficient exploitation of existing colonies. For France the problem of how best to exploit the areas under its control was posed most sharply and importantly in Algeria—which, ideologically and legally, not a colony at all, but a “prolongation of France.” Notions of mise en valeur (maximizing economic value) as applied to Algeria led to consideration of how its economic development and the education of its inhabitants could benefit the French economy. Even more important for many French leaders, resentful over the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, fearful of Germany’s military buildup, and keenly aware of the discrepancy between metropolitan France’s prewar population of approximately 40 million and Germany’s population of 65 million, was the military potential of Algerian Muslims as a recruitment pool. In this context French statesmen began to think seriously about how the empire, particularly Algeria and the other “white” North African territories, could be more usefully organized for the good of the French state. It was in this context as well that latent differences between colons and “colonialists” erupted.

In 1910 Adolphe Messimy, minister of the colonies in 1911 and
Muslims, but in 1918 the government threw its support behind an important program of political liberalization. The new prime minister, Georges Clemenceau, had three years earlier advocated relatively generous political reforms for Algerian Muslims. He now replaced the pro-colon Governor-General Lutaud with Charles Jonnart, a former governor-general known since for his reformist inclinations and political savvy. The program drawn up by Jonnart included another attempt to revive and invigorate the douar djemmas; equalization of Muslim and European taxes; establishment of a second electoral college to enable the vast majority of Muslims, without abandoning their "personal status," to vote for their representatives on municipal and departmental councils; permission for Muslim municipal councillors to participate in the choice of mayors; creation of a conseil d’Algérie (council general) in Paris that would give Muslim as well as colon representatives direct access to the central government; and significant reforms of the indigènats.57

There were two reasons for the French government’s keen and sudden interest in Muslim-oriented reforms in Algeria. One was the specter of Algerian-Arab nationalism, whose first public expression was noted at a Congress of Nationalities held in Lausanne in 1916.58 Of greater immediate importance, however, was the scale of French casualties in World War I. Threatened with a massive German offensive in the spring of 1918, Clemenceau ignored protests by Europeans in Algeria and sought the mobilization of every available Muslim, either for the army or for war work in French factories. In all, 3.6 percent of the Muslim population—about 173,000 men—were put into uniform, while 119,000 served as workers in France.59 The political reforms proposed were explicitly designed to increase the loyalty of Algerian natives to France—to integrate the territory more securely within the ambit of the French state and facilitate the recruitment of Muslim manpower. Accordingly the Clemenceau government made passage of the reforms a high priority, but in defending the proposals against objections by colon deputies, Jonnart cast the issue in long-range terms:

The conquest of Algeria has been completed; let us now strive to conquer minds. More and more the natives must see in us something other than policemen and merchants. Let them increasingly
see in us collaborators and associates, and may the signs of French goodwill be visible to all in that vast land.60

The government’s program was passed in January 1919, minus provisions for a conseil d’Algérie in Paris. Most Muslims were now enfranchised, but they were not eligible to vote for the deputies and senators representing Algeria in Paris. Their influence on the implementation of central state policies in Algeria was also severely limited because Muslims were restricted to one quarter of the seats on departmental councils. Still the colon press denounced the reforms as “a stunning blow traitorously struck.”61 Despite their disappointment with the new statute, educated native elites and tens of thousands of returning native soldiers sought to use their new rights as an opening wedge toward complete equality within the French political community.

In this effort, the French-educated Muslims of Algeria seemed to have an ideal leader. Khaled ben Hacemi ibn al Hadj Abd-el-Kader was, as his name suggests, a lineal descendant of that very Abd-el-Kader who resisted the French conquest of Algeria from 1830 to 1847. But Khaled had come to terms with French rule. He graduated from St. Cyr, fought Muslim rebels in Morocco, and was decorated and rose to the rank of captain while fighting on the Western front. He had identified himself with the Young Algeria movement before the war and in 1919 stood for election to the Algiers municipal council on a platform of mutual respect and equal treatment for Muslims and Europeans in a French Algeria. When he won, the Algerian administration took swift action to disqualify his victory—the first clear indication that the Jonnart reforms did not herald a new era of native political rights.

After another election victory in 1920, Khaled and his supporters did succeed in filling four seats in the Délégations financières, but this was virtually all he was to achieve. Having initially condemned the Jonnart formula, the colon press and European politicians in Algeria soon embraced it—limited municipal and departmental representation for Muslims, but citizenship and parliamentary voting rights only with renunciation of the applicability of the Muslim “personal statute” (which provided for polygamy and trial before Muslim religious courts in specified spheres for self-identifying Muslims)—as a new line of defense against further political reform. Abandoning their prewar associationism, the settlers branded Khaled and other Muslim advocates of citizenship “within the statute” as disguised separatists whose program would defeat France’s assimilationist objectives by institutionalizing the divisions between the two Algerian communities.62 Responsive to colon pressures and exaggerated warnings of Muslim lawlessness, the ultra-conservative postwar French parliament extended the indigénat and rejected all suggestions of further reform. A new governor-general, fully agreeable to the colon point of view, was sent to Algiers.

Those who have argued that France might have succeeded in converting Algeria into an integral and permanent part of the country have tried to identify the final opportunity that was missed by France. Ageron and Vincent Confer have identified the period immediately before and after World War I as the last period during which a generous, politically participative native policy might have succeeded in legitimizing French rule in native eyes.63 Others, including Julien and Pickles, have held that lasting integration could have been accomplished immediately after World War II, or even later.64 There is good reason, however, for treating the failure of the Blum-Violette reform bill of 1936-38 as the last meaningful opportunity to build Algeria into the French state.65

From the end of World War I until the emergence of the Popular Front government in 1936, the colons of Algeria enjoyed virtually complete authority over Algerian affairs. In 1925 a left-center government in Paris appointed Maurice Violette, a leading reformist politician, to the Algerian governor-generalship. A committed Jacobin, Violette believed in the assimilation of Algeria to France, and sought to preempt Arab-Muslim nationalist and separatist sentiment through political reforms, loosening the restrictions on naturalization, and large-scale educational and social welfare programs. But the colons used their control of the Algerian budget in the Délégations financières to block or eviscerate his every proposal. Despite strong support from the Muslim section, Violette failed to secure passage of his 1927 budget through the Délégations financières, and his attempt to use Muslim political strength against them infuriated the settlers, who came to view him as a kind of “anti-Christ.”66 The defeat of his budget, a vitriolic press campaign,
and intense lobbying efforts by colon senators and deputies resulted in his recall in November 1927. The new governor-general quickly assured the settlers he would "govern only in agreement with them."

After having been driven from office, Violette returned to France, where he was reelected to the Senate. In response to the panegyrics offered by the colons celebrating France's centennial in Algeria, he offered an elaborate bill detailing political, social, and economic reforms he deemed necessary. He also published a lengthy memoir entitled Can Algeria Survive?, but as David Gordon has suggested, it would more appropriately have been entitled Can French Algeria Survive? Condemning the settlers for sabotaging his efforts as governor-general, Violette warned that the infection of Arab nationalism and the eventual loss of Algeria could be avoided only by strengthening the loyal and French-trained elite of Algeria through political equality and mass education. He advocated naturalization with Muslim personal status, voting rights, and direct parliamentary representation for all native veterans, elected officials, and high-school graduates.

The native elite upon which Violette and supporters of his program put so much emphasis had grown considerably since the Young Algeria organization of the prewar era. In 1927 the Federation of Elected Officials was formed, drawing its membership from thousands of Muslims elected to municipal and departmental assemblies as well as to the Délegations financières. In its founding convention the federation declared parliamentary representation its highest priority and sent a delegation to Paris to exert pressure for reforms. Associated with the organization was Ferhat Abbas, a university graduate and French army veteran who developed quickly into an articulate spokesman. His eloquent responses to colon attacks on native culture and their slanted interpretations of Algerian history drew the admiration of educated natives and even some French administrators. Abbas advocated the complete integration of Algeria into a pluralist France and explicitly denied the existence of an Algerian "nation" destined for independence.

Beginning in 1925 another portion of the Algerian elite mobilized itself—the reformist ulama (Muslim clerics). Strongly influenced by the Salafiyya movement that swept the Muslim East in the early twentieth century, Abd el-Hamid Ben Badis and other like-minded clerics wanted Muslims to absorb enough from the West to strengthen Islam, but not enough to destroy it. They criticized Islam in Algeria as backward and superstitious. In 1931 they organized the Association of Reformist Ulama and founded a network of Muslim schools independent of the French administration. Ben Badis blamed French policy for the decline of Muslim education and the threat he saw to Algeria's Islamic character, but he did not call for an independent Algeria. His ambivalence toward Algeria's political relationship with France was evident in the masthead of Al-Muntaquid, the journal he and his colleagues began publishing in 1925—"An independent, national newspaper acting for the happiness of the Algerian people with the aid of democratic France." But after decrees sponsored by the Algerian administration closed several reformist schools and declared Arabic a foreign language, Ben Badis's faith in France faded. He never urged his followers to work directly for Algerian national independence, but he disagreed vigorously with Abbas's vision of Algeria as a purely French province. In 1936 he called for a free Algeria linked to France as a dominion.

Until World War II there was only one voice calling clearly and consistently for national independence for Algeria—that of Messali Hadj. With help initially from the Communist party, he founded a series of nationalist organizations, beginning in 1925 with Etoile Nord-Africain. He had some success among Algerian workers in France, but his program found little support in Algeria itself. In the Algiers municipal elections of 1937, Messali's list of candidates failed to win any of the twelve Muslim seats at stake. All were won by the reformist Muslim Congress.

The Congress, founded in Algiers in June 1936, was a vehicle for Algeria's educated native elite to express its enthusiasm over the victory of the Popular Front in the 1936 French elections. With Violette in the cabinet as minister responsible for Algerian affairs, Léon Blum's government issued a series of decrees benefitting Algerian Muslims. These included removing restrictions on the flow of Muslim workers to France, authorizing a minimum wage, and easing the application process for naturalization. But Blum overruled Violette by insisting that changes in the political rights of Algerian Muslims would not be made by decree. They would have to be submitted to Parliament for its approval.
A primary objective of the Muslim Congress was to support metropolitan reform efforts by urging what Malcolm Richardson has characterized as "a relentless assimilation of Algeria in the realm of politics and civil rights." The organizing committee for the Congress included the top leaders of both the Federation of Elected Officials and of the reformist ulama. Five thousand Muslims attended the Algiers meeting, including delegates from cities and towns in all three Algerian departments, representing locally organized committees "composed of the ulama, elected officials and representatives of the trade unions, the PCA [Communist Party of Algeria] and Messali’s Étoile." Going beyond the intentions of the organizers, the delegates passed a resolution calling not only for French citizenship with retention of Muslim status, but also for a single electorate and universal suffrage. Other motions hailed the reformist program of Léon Blum’s Socialist party and praised Violette in anticipation of the "vital reforms which Algeria awaits." A formal petition also approved by the Congress asked the French government to establish a compulsory and integrated educational system for all Algerian children and to permit a Muslim parochial school system alongside it. A land reform plan was also endorsed that would redistribute habous lands to Muslim peasants while leaving colon property intact. As Ben Badis put it in his speech before the Congress, "When French liberty was sleeping, we kept silence. Liberty has revived in France, and we intend to follow it."

Messali appeared at a Congress rally two months later to condemn the reformist goal of political assimilation to France and advocate Algerian independence, but his appeal—for the time being at least—found little support among Congress leaders. Dr. Bendjelloul, head of the Federation of Elected Officials and chairman of the Algiers meeting, dissociated the Congress from Messali’s nationalism and proclaimed his loyalty to France. Sheik El-Okbi, one of Ben Badis’s closest collaborators, denounced Messali’s work as "inimical to Islamic values." In Algiers El-Okbi had spoken for the vast majority when he decried French stereotypes and condescension: "They treat us as destouriens [separatists] or wahabites [Muslim fundamentalists] when we are and only want to be French Moslems."

In December 1936 the government laid what became known as the Blum-Violette reform bill before Parliament. Its most important provisions were for the grant of citizenship, including full voting rights within a single electorate to native veterans, elected officials, and high-school degree holders. These new citizens, numbering approximately 26,000 in 1936, would also be permitted to maintain their personal status as Muslims. The Federation of Elected Officials in Algeria and the executive committee of the Muslim Congress gave the bill their wholehearted support, but 302 of Algeria’s 304 European mayors joined in a declaration denouncing it.

Before parliamentary investigation committees, settler and native representatives argued their respective cases. The colonists warned that Muslims would take control of municipalities in rural areas, and complained that equal political rights with Muslims’ maintaining their personal status was contrary to the principle of equality before the law for all French citizens. Privately they expressed willingness to accept some reforms as long as the Joffre formula—a second electoral college for Muslims, and no citizenship without abandonment of personal status—was respected. On the opposing side, Muslim leaders insisted upon their commitment to gradualism, their loyalty to France, and the crucial difference between maintaining their Muslim identity, which they insisted upon, and pursuing nationalist-separatist objectives, which they renounced.

The debate dragged on into the spring and summer. The Muslim Congress passed a resolution expressing its "bitter disappointment" at the failure of the government to enact the Blum-Violette bill into law. But while warning of a nationalist upsurge should the reforms be defeated, Ben Badis and Congress leaders continued to support the bill—seeing it as a "test of French intentions." When the Blum cabinet resigned in the summer of 1936 to be replaced by another Popular Front government not so clearly committed to political reform in Algeria, three thousand elected native officials in the department of Constantine quit their jobs, vowing not to return until the Blum-Violette bill was passed.

But the Radical party, a key element in the Popular Front coalition, had strong ties to the settlers. Against its opposition it was difficult for Violette and the socialists to push the bill toward active consideration until Albert Sarraut, recently put in charge of North
African policy, announced his support for the measure. Sarraut’s associationist theories and his ideas about the need to organize the French empire for the greater good of the French economy had made him the most influential colonialist in France in the postwar period. Although as minister of the colonies he had opposed voting rights for natives, and was formerly a critic of Violette’s proposals, he now argued that the legislation was the only way to prevent separatist nationalism in Algeria. In Algeria Sarraut discarded his associationism and, rejecting colon arguments, came out in favor of a Jonnart-style separate Muslim electorate with reduced representation:

By the creation of a special college, we will be saying to the Algerians: “You are different from us, you are another race. Keep away from French nationality.” “O.K.,” they will respond, “our race is not yours; we are a separate people. If you isolate us from your community, you force another nationality upon us: it is you who are pushing us towards a Moslem nationalism.”

Even if forty years hence, he added, Muslim voters predominated in Algeria, still the country would remain French: “We will remain there thanks to this law.”

The influence wielded by Sarraut was enough to bring the issue to a head. The colonists felt more seriously threatened than at any time since the Second Empire. Settler deputies made frenetic efforts to kill the bill in committee or saddle it with unfriendly amendments. Early in 1938 a new conference of Algerian [European] mayors threatened mass resignation, and a month later 225 of them quit their posts. In 1938 the settlers had formed armed militias, and now several of their leading representatives warned of civil war should the bill pass. The fury of their opposition deterred the tottering Popular Front government from pushing it to a vote. When the Daladier government announced its unwillingness to pursue Algerian reform in the face of such strong opposition, the battle was over—the settlers had again prevailed.

In 1936 Ferhat Abbas had denied the existence of an Algerian nation. In 1943, speaking for three generations of évolutés who had struggled for political rights as Frenchmen, he announced that “the hour is passed when an Algerian Moslem will demand anything else than to be an Algerian Moslem.” In 1955 he joined the FLN.

Chapter Five

CONCLUSION

The scholarly literature is replete with comparisons of British and French state formation, British and French imperialism, and British and French decolonization. It is quite remarkable, therefore, that no systematic comparison of the British and French experiences in Ireland and Algeria has been published. This lacuna is perhaps related to the difficulties students of British or French history have had integrating the Irish or Algerian questions into their overall analyses. Despite the fact that most students of Irish history, as well as the majority of comparative political scientists, would characterize Britain’s historical connection to Ireland as fundamentally colonialist or imperialist, few historians of British imperialism include Ireland within the purview of their studies. On the other hand, most scholars who analyze British metropolitan political development treat Ireland and the Irish question as idiosyncratic, tending to dismiss it as, in one way or another, the “great exception.”

To a certain extent, Algeria is treated in the same way by students of France and French imperial history. Thus Manfred Halpern commented in 1949 that “Algeria, being in fact ‘neither a foreign country, nor a colony, nor France,’ has generally been given the kind of study appropriate to a country in limbo.” While numerous studies of Algeria and of Algerian-French relations have appeared, students of French political history have largely ignored France’s Algerian experience. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle’s essay on post-World War II French foreign policy, for example, argues that French politics is dominated by an “introversionism” whose “first and most important” source is “territorial satisfaction.” Duroselle is forced to dismiss the Algerian war as a strange exception, and the passions aroused by it a transient phenomenon, brought about by the unusual beliefs of “a very small group [of] sincere and
honest Frenchmen who consider Algeria French.” Only by ignoring the length, scope, and intensity of French commitment to its Algerian departments can he justify his observation that “no government in power since Louis XVIII has ever tried to go beyond [the 1815] frontiers except that of Napoleon III, and even for him ... only ... by pacific means.” Even Eugen Weber, whose analysis is based on an open-ended view of the processes by which the boundaries and identity of France were formed, discusses Corsica (formally joined to France in 1769) and Savoy (formally joined to France in 1860), but does not mention Algeria (formally joined to France in 1848). Peter Goureivitch, in discussing historical patterns of separatism in European states, argues that in France the economic and political dynamism of the center accounts for the absence of any serious territorial challenges to political integration. He is aware that Ireland stands as an exception to the application of this general argument to Britain, but he does not mention the equally problematic case of Algeria in his treatment of France. By omission at least, he would appear to classify Algeria’s separation from France as prima facie “decolonization” rather than “separatism.” At the same time, students of French imperialism (though usually not students of French decolonization) often omit consideration of Algeria as a colony, seeing it as legally, administratively, and ideologically an integral part of France.

The difficulties of classifying Ireland and Algeria, and the failure to integrate them into comparative treatments of British and French political history, have led some scholars to make serious misattributions or to miss important opportunities to extend or test their analyses. In his study of political integration and disintegration in Britain, Anthony Birch notes the Irish parallel with Algeria, but he seems to miss its implications. In his list of five major reasons “why English politicians have been so much less successful in developing political integration between their country and Ireland than between England, Wales, and Scotland,” he fails to mention the role of settlers. Although Hechter mentions the “special political cleavages characteristic of settler colonies” in explaining the evolution of Northern Ireland’s relationship to Britain, he insists that the secession of the South is understandable purely in terms of his model of dependent development. Tilly, by ignoring the Irish and Algerian cases of British and French state-building failure, misses a valuable opportunity to test a series of hypotheses about the requisites for successful state expansion. He overdraws a contrast between a French state, molding a homogeneous national community from heterogeneous territories and cultures, and an accommodationist British state, presiding over an integrated national “mosaic.”

Rokkan ascribes France’s approximation to “the ideal type of the ‘endoglossic’ homogeneous nation-state” to the efficacy of integrationist policies implemented by the French military and administrative apparatus, but he ignores its integrative failure in Algeria, where similar policies were pursued by those very institutions. Otherwise he might have noted that in areas successfully integrated into the French state, settlers were not used.

Rokkan’s general conclusion is also questionable—that because the successes of European state formation are unlikely to be repeated in the Third World, the European experience is only minimally useful in analyzing the political trajectories of the new states. Were Rokkan and other students of geopolitical development in Europe to consider such examples of state-building failures as Britain experienced in Ireland and France in Algeria, the insights developed might be relevant indeed to efforts at state formation and national expansion in the Third World. The Irish and Algerian cases, for example, have quite specific implications for Sri Lanka’s efforts to solve its “Tamil problem” by settling the Tamil area with Sinhalese, and for the Israeli effort to incorporate the West Bank and Gaza Strip permanently by settling Jews in those areas against the will of the native Arab majority.

Comparative treatment of the Irish and Algerian cases can also illuminate errors and missed analytical opportunities in the decolonization literature. In his study of European decolonization, Rudolf von Albertini rightly identifies the presence of settlers in Algeria as a decisive factor in preventing both complete integration, on the one hand, and peaceful disengagement, on the other. But to illustrate his point that settlers make a difference, he likens the French experience in Algeria to the British experience in Kenya. Given the relative insignificance of Kenyan decolonization in British politics, and the absence of any British attempt to integrate Kenya into the central British state, the comparison distorts the scale of
British and French difficulties with respect to these "colonies." Tony Smith has also advanced hypotheses to explain British success with decolonization compared to French difficulties. Some of his propositions would have been seriously challenged had he included British disengagement from (southern) Ireland in his analysis, but others would have been substantially corroborated—particularly his overall conclusion that if Britain had been forced to confront a problem similar to the French debacle in Algeria, it probably would have suffered disruption as serious as that suffered by France.

In Miles Kahler's systematic comparison of British and French decolonization, he attributes the relative ease of transition in the British case to fundamental differences in French and British political parties and political culture. But Algeria is dominant in Kahler's analysis of French decolonization, while Ireland is ignored in his consideration of the British experience. If many of the patterns of political conflict over decolonization in France, which Kahler attributes to French political culture and the structure of French political parties, and which he says were absent in the British case, can be found in the evolution of Britain's relationship with Ireland, it seriously challenges his general argument.

Interestingly, those in France in the 1880s who argued against the settler spokesmen for Algeria did not ignore the Irish example. According to both Ageron and Roberts, the most persuasive argument in their polemical arsenal was that if permanent French rule of Algeria were not legitimized by granting political rights to Muslims, who could thereby identify with and protect their interests within the French political system, Algeria would become "a new Ireland." Indeed it is the success of French settlers in preventing significant reforms that best explains why Algeria became the same sort of territorial incubus for France that Ireland had by the 1880s already become for Britain.

The general argument presented here has been that the decisive factor in the failure of governments in London and Paris to make Ireland and Algeria integral, permanent parts of the British and French states was the interruption by settlers of efforts to coopt native elites and extend political participation rights to wider native strata. True, metropolitan efforts toward such integration were not always energetic. For Britain until the 1880s and France until the 1950s, Ireland and Algeria were only sporadically issues that loomed large against the broad range of affairs that engaged their attention as world powers; but when vital interests—particularly security interests—were perceived to be at stake, integrationist metropolitan policies were vigorously pursued.

What accounts, then, for the ability of settlers in Ireland and Algeria consistently to stymie metropolitan-sponsored integrationist policies? Comparison of the two situations suggests four factors were involved.

First, settlers served as the conduit for most of the information about the outlying territory available to the politically relevant public in the metropole. This meant that settlers could easily undermine central state efforts to coopt native elites by fostering perceptions of Irish Catholic or Algerian Muslim natives as primitive, untrustworthy, alien, hostile, or otherwise undeserving.

Second, settlers were the natural recruitment pool for staffing administrative positions within the local state bureaucracy and the judiciary. For metropolitan civil servants or jurists, assignment to posts in Ireland or Algeria usually signalled that their skills were not deemed worthy of more important positions in some more congenial part of the home country. Settlers, on the other hand, valued these positions highly because they were conveniently located and because control over the implementation of policy was an important way to ensure that official policy would be interpreted and applied in accordance with the interests of the settler community.

Third, settlers knew and cared much more about metropolitan policies toward Ireland and Algeria than about any other issues. They were more intensely concerned about them than any other group within the metropolitan political system, and their understanding of the implications of subtle changes in policy was more sophisticated. Natives either were not represented at all or ineffectively represented in the metropolitan governments. Central state elites favoring cooptation of native elites or other measures to legitimize state authority among native inhabitants could seldom afford to pursue these concerns for very long. Effective settler use of single-issue tactics meant that official
reforms were often abandoned in exchange for settler support on questions of more immediate moment to the central government than the long-term legitimization of British or French rule in Ireland or Algeria.

A fourth (and final) source of settler power over political outcomes in Ireland and Algeria was their ideological and polemical flexibility. Strategically placed to exploit sentiments of expansive nationalism or imperialism in the metropolitan core, they yet maintained a steadfastly instrumentalist view of the linkage between the peripheral territory and the metropole. This perspective, springing from settler interests in protecting their privileges, provided the political and psychological basis for expedient adaptation to changing circumstances.

Thus when natives were perceived as dangerous by the settlers (as in early seventeenth-century Ireland or Algeria in the 1870s), they sought to strengthen the ties binding the outlying territory to the metropole by characterizing the two geographical areas as inseparable components of one state. On the other hand, when the native threat was seen to subside (as, for example, in the late eighteenth century in Ireland and the 1890s in Algeria), settlers sought to increase their autonomy from the metropole, and thereby their freedom of action with respect to native resources. In these contexts, Protestants in Ireland and Europeans in Algeria adopted an “anti-colonialist” stance in their relations with Britain and France. But these inclinations toward autonomy or even independence (in Protestant Ireland in the late 1700s, and among Algerian colons around 1900) could not be sustained in the face of the military threat posed by a preponderant native population—a threat that required the constant availability of metropolitan armed force. The cycle of native unrest, central state intervention, attempted reform by the metropole, and settler blocking of the reform attempt continued. Metropolitan governments responded to settler demands for integration and protection by offering increased economic opportunities, greater legal safeguards, expanded political participation rights, and higher social status to the natives. While native elites generally responded positively, often enthusiastically, to such overtures, settlers sought to defend their local ascendancy by fighting vigorously against integration of natives into the metropolitan political system. In these struggles they adopted slogans upholding the integrity and legal and cultural homogeneity of the metropolitan political community which they now, again, claimed emphatically to be their own.

Prevented from co-opting native elites or meeting native demands for political participation in Ireland or Algeria by settlers jealously guarding their local ascendancy, neither the British nor the French state could relieve threats to its interests associated with chronic native unrest by fully integrating the outlying territory with the central state. To be sure, many theories of state-building and national integration have identified processes other than elite cooptation and native political participation as determinants of success in the consolidation of central state authority in heterogeneous peripheries. These other processes include cultural homogenization through language diffusion, education, and religious conversion; economic interdependence resultant from expanding trade, investment, and commerce; and the extension of cleavages from the state-building core into the peripheral territories.16

It would be instructive, and supportive of the argument presented here, to examine how the presence of settlers also interfered with these other processes of state consolidation. Without pursuing the point further, it is worth noting Hechter’s argument that diffusionist-assimilationist processes in peripheral territories are blunted, and ethnicity mobilized in separatist directions, when racist or otherwise pejorative attitudes toward natives of the periphery are manifested in contacts between the core and the periphery.17 Given the settlers’s antagonistic relationship to the natives, and the need to justify their privileges in the eyes of the metropolitan populace, it is not surprising that such attitudes predominated among the settlers in both Ireland and Algeria. Because they were the “metropolitan” elements that had the most contact with Irish and Algerian natives, they were also the main sources of information for metropolitan opinion about Ireland and Algeria. George Bernard Shaw even argued that in Ireland Protestants and Catholics were “separated from each other by the same language.”18

With the failure to incorporate Ireland and Algeria as integral parts of the British and French states, the character of the problem
(as seen from London and Paris) changed—most clearly after the 1880s in Britain and the 1930s in France. Following the alienation of all significant native elements from the metropole, increasingly large proportions of the metropolitan elite came to see disengagement—not closer integration—as the key to alleviating the chronic stress associated with rule of these territories. But again the settlers stood in the way. Indeed it was only after the failure of state-building efforts in Ireland and Algeria that the full cost of settling these areas could be appreciated.

In brief, that cost included the introduction into the British and French political arenas of questions about the shape of the state and the identity of the community encompassed by it. State borders are fundamentally ideological. The ideological hegemony of particular borders for the inhabitants of a state permits them to take its shape for granted as natural, inevitable, unchangeable, and right. Such widely shared, unquestioned beliefs remove a number of fundamental, virtually intractable problems from the political agenda. The settlers, however, by preventing stable incorporation of Ireland and Algeria, helped create conditions that eventually broke the ideological consensuses which included Ireland within the United Kingdom and Algeria within the indivisible French republic.19

Because of the powerful influence of settlers in metropolitan politics, the contradictory imperatives which (I have argued) both drove and frustrated their ambitions translated into similar predicaments for metropolitan governments in both Britain and France. Just as settlers prevented permanent incorporation by blocking treatment of the native inhabitants of peripheral territories as equal citizens of the state, so did they eventually use the economic, political, ideological, and emotional influence they had cultivated in the metropole to ensure that neither Ireland nor Algeria could be disposed of in a straightforward, instrumental fashion. To relieve the British and French states of their Irish and Algerian burdens, those political systems would eventually come (in 1913 in Britain and from 1958 to 1961 in France) dangerously close to civil war and the breakdown of democratic institutions.

Chapter One


14. See, for example, the influential book by H.J. Mackinder, *Britain and the British Seas* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), pp. 11-12. See also Lewis Namier, who commented that “The historical development of England is based on the fact that her frontiers against Europe are drawn by Nature, and cannot be the subject of dispute... In short, a great deal of what is peculiar in English history is due to the obvious fact that Great Britain is an island” (*England in the Age of the American Revolution* [London: Macmillan and Co., 1930], p. 7). For radically different interpretations of the interaction between geography and English state formation (upon which my brief comments on the subject are partially based), see Christopher Brooke, *From Alfred to Henry III*: 871-1272 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1961), pp. 13-18, and George Macaulay Trevelyan, *A Shortened History of England* (New York: Pelican, 1959), pp. 83-84.


Chapter Two


2. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
3. Ibid., pp. 88-89.
5. Ibid., p. 47.
6. Ibid., p. 54.
7. Ibid., p. 77.
12. For a sample of the debates conducted about this matter and a brief survey of various points of view, see Aidan Clarke, "Colonial Identity in Early Seventeenth-Century Ireland," in Moody, Nationality and Pursuit, pp. 57-71.

Sir Francis Bacon, "Of Plantations," in ibid., p. 128.
Ibid., p. 188; Richard Bagwell, Ireland under the Stuarts (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909), vol. 1, pp. 71-75.
Peck, Patronage and Policy, p. 73.
Ibid., p. 92.
Ibid., p. 92.
Ibid., p. 227.
Ibid., p. 222.
Ibid., p. 222.
Ibid., pp. 207, 232.
Beckett, Making of Modern Ireland, p. 65.
Corish, "Cromwellian Regime," pp. 362-64, 386.
40. Ibid.


42. Beckett, Making of Modern Ireland, p. 149.


44. Lecky, History of Ireland, p. 152.


48. Senior, Orangeism in Ireland, pp. 59, 87.

49. McDowell, Ireland in Age of Imperialism, p. 684.

Chapter Three


8. Andrew and Kanya-Forment, Climax of French Expansion, p. 35.


13. Ibid., p. 493.


15. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1958), pp. 124-34. Arendt can only speculate about the answer to the "riddle" of "why in the initial stages of national development did the Tudors not succeed in incorporating Ireland into Great Britain as the Valois had succeeded in incorporating Brittany and Burgundy into France" (p. 127).


Chapter Four


48. Ibid., pp. 144-45.


51. Ibid., pp. 528-33.

52. Confer, France and Algeria, pp. 34-37, 54.


54. Confer, France and Algeria, pp. 48-56.

55. Charles Lutaud, governor-general of Algeria from 1911 to 1917, played a key role in blocking the passage and implementation of political reforms. See Confer, France and Algeria, pp. 81-82, and Ageron, Algériens musulmans et la France, pp. 1235-36.

56. Confer, France and Algeria, pp. 70-84.

57. Ibid., pp. 102-3.

58. Ibid., pp. 100-1.

59. Ibid., p. 96.

60. Ibid., p. 111.

61. Ibid., p. 113.


68. Richardson, “French Algeria between the Wars,” p. 149.

69. Gordon, Passing of French Algeria, p. 22.

70. In 1936 Abbas went so far as to deny the existence of an Algerian nation: “Had I discovered the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist and I would not blush as if I had committed a crime.... However, I will not die for the Algerian nation, because it does not exist. I have not found it. I have examined History, I questioned the living and the dead, I visited cemeteries; nobody spoke to me about it. I then turned to the Koran and I sought for one solitary verse forbidding a Muslim from integrating himself with a non-Muslim nation. I did not find that either. One cannot build on the wind” (Horne, Savage War of Peace, p. 40).


73. Ibid., p. 311.

74. Ibid., p. 274.

75. Ibid., p. 269.

76. Ibid., pp. 273-75.


78. Richardson, “French Algeria between the Wars,” p. 283.

79. Ibid., p. 273. See also Berque, French North Africa, pp. 275-78, for his description of the Algerian Congress.


81. Ibid., p. 325.

82. Ibid., pp. 325-26.

83. Ibid., pp. 326-36, 353-54.

84. Ibid., p. 351.
Chapter Five


10. Ibid., p. 600.

11. Study of the dynamics of British and French withdrawal from most of Ireland (in 1921) and all of Algeria (in 1962) will suggest the importance for Third World elites of developing self-consciously, if not explicitly, fluid and instrumentalist notions of the territorial scope of the states they seek to build. Such considerations are part of my current work comparing the Algerian and Irish problems in French and British political history to the political dynamics of the West Bank/Gaza/Palestinian problem in Israeli politics.


16. For illustrations of these models, including their application to the British and French cases, see:


   Re economic interdependence: Nairn, Break-up of Britain, pp. 12, 147, 209, 234, 356; Hechter, Internal Colonialism, pp. 43, 65, 197; Rose, Governing Without Consensus, pp. 64-65; Peter Gourevitch, "The Re-emergence of "Peripheral Nationalisms": Some Comparative Speculations on the Spatial Distribution of Political Leadership and Economic Growth," Comparative Studies in Society and History 21, no. 3 (July 1979): 305, 313;


18. Quoted in Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, p. 131.

19. For a detailed discussion of state borders as ideologically hegemonial beliefs, see Ian Lustick, "Becoming Problematic: Ireland and the Breakdown of Ideological Hegemony in Nineteenth-Century Britain" (paper presented at the 1985 meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans).
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