working papers
No. 22. "Rhetoric and the Constitution of Social Relations," Michael
Herzfeld, 1988. At the level of rhetoric itself, imputations of rhetoric are a mark of
social unpleasantness. In ordinary usage, the term implies pretension,
bombast, even deliberate dishonesty. As a result, the social sciences
have generally treated rhetoric as an epiphenomenon on a real world to
which it blocks access. Yet the consequent refusal to take rhetoric
seriously is symptomatic of precisely what rhetoric does best: it
backgrounds its own rhetoricity. Thus, all claims that social science
should be free of rhetoric, that it should make modesty its watchword,
are as rhetorical and immodest as anything they oppose. They suffer from
the ultimate self-deception of positivism, the illusion of pure, direct,
unmediated knowledge. And this conceit, as Vico points out with delicate
subversion in the New Science (1744), is what makes the
pretensions of scholarship and those of politics so hard to tell apart.
This paper is a prolegomenon to the contrary argument that, in some
intellectually productive sense, all social interaction is
rhetorical, and that the denial of its rhetoricity perpetuates a
separation of expression from structure that is logically incompatible
with the recognition of agency in the creation of social relations. My purpose here is not to document the rhetoricity of social science,
which is a relatively trivial instantiation of the larger problem, albeit
a useful one inasmuch as it challenges our complacency. It is, rather, to
sketch the necessary presuppositions for a rhetorical account of social
relations in general. Such an account (I would only label it a "theory"
unless we can agree to extend that label to indigenous exegetical
traditions as well) must be conceived as what Bourdieu (1977) has called
a "theory of [social] practice," an examination of the part rhetoric
plays in the active constitution of social relationships, and especially of
the relationship between cultural form, performance, and
the creative deformation of structures and normative patterns . It
must be an explanation of how "emergent" social structure (Bauman 1977;
Karp 1980; Giddens 1984) can be creatively modeled and explored through
the daily interactions of sentient human beings. Click here to order a copy from the author.