INTRODUCTION

In classical Athens, the wealthiest citizens were liable to perform liturgies, a form of taxation that required them to finance various public concerns. These might relate to a festival, such as the training of a chorus (chorēgia), or the fleet, such as the command and maintenance of a ship in the fleet (triērarchia). More rarely, the liturgy might entail the advance payment of a tax, known as proeisphora. The liturgy system was one which ensured that rich citizens expended some of their resources in the interests of the community as a whole, and while it was burdensome (e.g., Xen., Oeconomicus 2.5–6), litigants in trials often attested their civic pride by citing their past undertaking of liturgic obligations, and citizens occasionally spent much more than they were required to in order to win popular favor. In 356, a wealthy citizen Megacleides was summoned to undertake the funding of a trireme. Instead of discharging the obligation, he went to trial, claiming that the rhetorician Isocrates should be liable for the trierarchy since he was the wealthier of the two (cf. Pseudo-Plut., Isocrates 18). Now an old man, Isocrates lost the case and had to assume the liturgy, or public service.

This historical trial becomes the pretext for the Antidosis, a fictional legal defense, which the author wrote when he was eighty-two (354–353), as Plutarch’s life of Isocrates informs us (838A). The title of the speech refers to the antidosis (“exchange”) procedure, according to which a citizen who unsuccessfully challenged another supposedly wealthier citizen to undertake a liturgy in his place was obliged to
exchange properties with the latter. Isocrates invents a prosecutor named Lysimachus, who is portrayed as a sykopht or habitual litigant. Lysimachus drags the now eighty-two-year-old rhetorician into court to defend himself against the charges that he corrupted the young of Athens through his teaching and has taught them how to argue unjustly (15.8)

In speech 15, this legal fiction is a vehicle for the rhetorician’s self-presentation: the speech is described as an image (eikōn) of Isocrates’ life, thought, and character (15.7). Furthermore, self-presentation has its conventions and commonplaces, even if these are to be subverted or assimilated to different contexts. The charges brought against the rhetorician are the same ones with which Socrates was charged in 399, and the rhetorician explicitly reworks portions of Plato’s Apology. Like Socrates, Isocrates is an individual who engages in “philosophy.” By “philosophy,” however, the rhetorician means the use of language to maintain order where an individual’s home, the city state, and Athens’ larger political interests are concerned; if logos is the basis of the political community, then “philosophy” helps to create and maintain this community as such (see 15.285). For him, the philosopher is the true “sophist” (sophistēs), who is not to be understood as the contemporary teacher motivated by greed and fame but as the true political wise man (sophos), for whom the paradigm is Athens’ great legislator Solon (15.235 and 313).

Such self-presentation is necessary in a world where rhetoric is of supreme importance, and “reality” is thus to be regarded as any set of images put into circulation by oneself and one’s supporters, and by one’s detractors, rivals, and enemies, whom Isocrates depicts as belonging to the contemporary rhetorical establishment. (The embedded, posthumous apology that Isocrates creates for the general Timotheus [15.101–139], one of his former students, demonstrates forcefully the destructive potential of the rhetoric of blame at Athens.) The self-

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1 Some scholars doubt whether an actual exchange of property was ever the outcome of such a legal proceeding, although indisputable evidence for the procedure comes from, e.g., Lys. 4.1.
2 See Momigliano 1971: 59.
characterization that the speech offers is that of the “quiet Athenian,”
the citizen who advocates political aloofness as responsible behavior in
an Athens troubled by the activities of sykophants and popular orators. But quietism itself is a politics of marginality, which marks out
the aristocratic and oligarchical members of the democratic commu-
nity to each other and to their fellow citizens.

Isocrates declares himself and his discourse unlike anyone and any-
thing else in the contemporary city, despite the fact that distinguishing
oneself from one’s audience runs against rhetorical instinct (cf. 143).
He is “like no other citizen” (144); has stood apart from all public
matters (145); and importantly, is unlike both contemporary sophists
and lay people (148). Moreover, the Antidosis is itself an atypical
speech in light of fourth-century speech genres. The defense begins
with the author claiming that the current speech does not resemble
any conventional lawcourt speech or any epideixis. It is novel and dif-
f erent, opening the rhetorician to the charge of being “out of place,”
“strange,” “unconventional,” which are all conveyed by the adjective
atopos (1; cf. 150). It is atypical because it deals with philosophy, that
is, with rhetoric and its several cultures. Later, at section 179 Isocrates
draws attention to the idiosyncratic and extraordinary nature of his
defense, for he is after all dealing with a situation that is unlike any
other. These statements are in keeping with, and insist on, the idea
that the activities of philosophy, its teachers, and practitioners are dis-
tinct from those of all other arts (cf. section 263) and therefore should
be judged on their own terms.

Through this speech Isocrates offers a characterization of rhetoric
that is distinct from the perception of it held by many contemporary
Athenians. For him, rhetoric is philosophy, that is, the ability to speak,
to reason, and to act. It is not an abstract and impractical activity such
as Isocrates judges the verbal quibblings of the Presocratic thinkers to
be. Rhetoric/philosophy does not rely on a fixed body of knowledge
(epistēmē) but on ability to guess and conjecture (doxa) at the right
opportunities. These skills allow the orator or the politician to say and
do what is necessary in any particular situation. Logos and the arts
associated with it are responsible for the advantages that human beings
have over other animals, for those that the Greeks have over the bar-
barians, and most importantly, for those that the Athenians have over
the rest of the Greeks. Rhetoric/philosophy has been the basis for the
military and cultural hegemony that Athens historically enjoyed because its historical leaders—Solon, Themistocles, and Pericles—were men endowed with skill in *logos*; it remains the basis for Athenian superiority, provided the city recognizes its importance to what it has been and could be.

Isocrates seeks to show that, as a teacher of rhetoric, he has been concerned with the overall welfare of Athens and its interests and has given far more to Athens than he has taken from it. This is the concern of the true sophist and not of the corrupt individual who goes by that title in fourth-century Athens. Isocrates is thus the individual who shows that the label “sophist” may be rehabilitated for the fourth century, once the public understands that the true sophist, like Solon, Cleisthenes, or Pericles, is one who works for the best interests of the democratic city. The *Antidosis* is the celebration of an overall intellectual and literary career that has made a genuine contribution to the political community. The rhetorician is the individual who claims to have taught the most important figures of the civilized world, justifying the boast of Athens to be the teacher of the Greek world.⁴

Modern readers have not generally understood that Isocrates’ eccentric self-fashioning does not by any means call into question the author’s identity as a significant figure in the history of rhetoric.⁵ After all, writers in antiquity and in the Renaissance deemed Isocrates the preeminent rhetorician of classical Athens. The Roman historian Vel-leius Paterculus goes so far as to call him the sole figure of note in the whole history of rhetoric, for in his view, before Isocrates and after his pupils there is nothing of note as far as the art of public speech was concerned: *Quid ante Isocratem, quid post eius auditores eorumque discipulos clarum in oratoribus fuit?* (Historia Romana 1.16.5). This flattering portrait may owe something to Cicero’s presentation of Isocrates as a “great orator and accomplished teacher” (*magnus orator et perfectus magister*), whose home virtually became a school and speech workshop (*officina dicendi*) for the whole of Greece (*Brutus* 8.30). Quintil-

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⁴ Cf. Pericles’ description of the entire city of Athens as the “teacher of Greece” (*Thuc.* 2.41.1).

⁵ In the twentieth century Isocrates has become a secondary figure in the historical and social (re)construction of Athens, perhaps precisely because he was Athens’ foremost speech artist. See, for instance, the less than flattering comments of Marrou 1956: 131 and de Romilly 1958: 101.
ian describes the rhetorician as “the most distinguished student of Gorgias,” notwithstanding disagreements between the two individuals (cf. *Institutio Oratoria* 3.1.13).

Lawcourt speeches were limited in length to what could be delivered in the space of one day. The *Antidosis* is an extraordinarily long speech and must have strained the fiction of the forensic setting. The structure of the work may be laid out as follows:

1–13 first (nonfictional) prooemium  
14–28 second prooemium  
29–51 the charge (graphê)  
52–83 defense with citation of (witness) speeches  
84–101 defense of rhetorical education  
102–139 defense of the general Timotheus  
140–166 interlude with reported speech by an associate and historical reflection  
167–214 encomium of philosophy (i.e., rhetoric)  
215–242 what is a sophist?  
243–269 encomium of philosophy continued  
270–309 discussion of philosophy and its education  
310–323 closing remarks

15. *Antidosis*

[1] If the speech I am about to read resembled speeches composed for the lawcourts or for display, I don’t think I would make any prefatory remarks about it. But because it is new and different, I must first declare the reasons why I chose to compose a speech so unlike the others; for if I do not make this clear, it may perhaps appear eccentric (atopos) to many.

[2] I am aware that some sophists speak ill of my occupation. They say that it is concerned with forensic oratory, and they act much as if someone were to dare to label Phidias,6 who made the statue of

6Phidias was the renowned sculptor (ca. 490–432), who is particularly celebrated for making the ivory and gold statue of Athena on the Parthenon (Pliny, *NH* 34.54 and Plut., *Pericles* 31). Because of his close association with Pericles, Phidias became the target of two lawsuits, the first, an unsuccessful one for embezzling gold from the Parthenon statue of Athena and a second one, for impiety
Athena, a “doll maker,” or were to say that Zeuxis and Parrhasius possess the same skill as scribes. I never defended myself against these petty attacks, since I did not think their babblings had any authority, and I thought I had made everyone aware that I chose both to speak and to write not about private disputes but about public matters of such great importance that no one else would attempt them, apart from those who had spent time with me or wanted to imitate these. So until this point in my life, I thought that because of this choice and my general noninvolvement in political affairs (apragmosynê), I was well regarded as far as all private citizens were concerned. Now at the end of my career, I am subject to an exchange over the matter of funding a trierarchy and to a trial in connection with it, and I sense that some people were not disposed to me as I hoped but were for the most part deceived about my affairs and were inclined to believe those who utter prejudicial things. Others, who know perfectly well how I spend my time, were jealous and experienced the same feelings as the sophists, and they delighted in those holding a false impression of me. They have shown their disposition in this way: when my opponent spoke completely unjustly on the matters under judgment, slandered the power of my speeches, and exaggerated my wealth and the number of my students, they judged the liturgy to be my responsibility. Thus I bore this expense, as is fitting for those who are not too put out by such affairs and are not in any way wasteful or heedless where money is concerned.

Perceiving, as I said, that more people than I had thought were mistaken about me, I turned my thoughts to how I could reveal to them and others in the future my nature, my life, and the education for representing himself and Pericles on the Parthenon. As a result of this second trial, the sculptor was cast into prison, where he fell ill and died.

Zeuxis of Heraclea (late fifth century) and Parrhasius of Ephesus (ca. 400) were famous painters. Pliny relates how in a contest Zeuxis painted grapes that were so realistic that the birds came to peck at them, while Parrhasius so effectively painted a curtain that the former asked him to draw it back. Parrhasius won the contest (for this story, see NH 35.36.65–72).

Lit., “those who inscribe votive tablets,” which were set up in temples to thank the gods for recovery from illness or other deliverance.

I.e., as my students.
(paideia) that is my preoccupation so that I do not allow myself to be
condemned without a trial on these matters, at the mercy of those
who habitually slander me, as is now the case. [7] I considered these
things and found that my only course of action was to write a speech
that would be (as it were) an image (eikōn) of my thoughts and my
life as a whole. I hoped that this would be the best way to make the
facts about me known and to leave this behind as a memorial, much
finer than bronze statues. [8] I saw that, if I were to attempt a eulogy
of myself, I would not be able to include everything I chose to cover
or speak in an acceptable manner without arousing envy. But I saw
that I could treat all the topics I wanted if I invented a lawsuit that
threatened me, a sykophant who had brought this charge to cause
me problems and who had invoked the slanders employed in the ex-
change suit, and then composed my arguments after the fashion of a
legal defense.

[9] With this in mind, I wrote this speech not at the prime of my
life but when I had turned eighty-two. For this reason it is necessary
to make allowances if it appears to be less vigorous than those I pre-
viously published, as it has not been easy or simple but laborious.
[10] Some of what I have written is suited to delivery in the lawcourt,
and some is not fitted for such disputes but is a wide-ranging discus-
sion and exposition about philosophy and its power. This is the sort
of thing which would benefit the young to hear as they embark upon
their studies and education. Moreover, much of what I wrote a long
time ago is combined with what I have recently said not in an illogical
or untimely fashion but as suits the present topic.

[11] It was by no means a small matter to have in view such a large
topic, synthesize and draw together so many different types of dis-
course, make later passages fit with earlier ones, and make them all
agree with one another. [11] Although I was of an advanced age, I did
not shrink from completing this speech, which was composed most
truthfully; as for its other qualities, let those who hear it decide.

[12] Those who read it should realize that they are listening to a mixed
discourse, encompassing all these different subjects, and they should
pay greater attention to what will be said than to what came before.

10 On “philosophy,” see Introduction to this volume and the Glossary.
In addition, they must not attempt to go through it all the first time but only as much as will not tire the audience.\textsuperscript{12} If you abide by these guidelines, you will be better able to see if I say anything worthy of my reputation.

[13] That was a necessary preface. Now read my defense, which purports to have been written for a trial, and seeks to make clear the truth about myself, and to make those who are ignorant aware and those who are envious pained even more by this disease—for I could not get revenge on them by any better means.

[14] I think\textsuperscript{13} that individuals who dare to blame others for the things they themselves are guilty of are the most wicked and deserve the harshest penalties. This is just what Lysimachus has done. For in his composition (\textit{syngegrammena}), he spoke more about my compositions than about all other matters, acting as someone who prosecutes another for theft from a temple but is seen with the gods’ property in his own hands. [15] I would have valued it if he really thought I was clever (\textit{deinon}), as he told you, for then he would never have tried to cause me trouble. But in fact, although he says I am able to “make weaker speeches stronger,”\textsuperscript{14} he despised me to such an extent that he expects to defeat me easily by telling lies when I speak the truth.

[16] Everything has gone against me: while others refute slanders through speech, Lysimachus has slandered precisely my speeches so that if I appear to speak successfully, I will stand convicted of the accusations he has made against my cleverness (\textit{deinotēs}). Yet if I speak less adequately than he has led you to expect, you will think less well of my conduct. [17] I ask you, thus, to withhold belief or disbelief from what he has said until you hear fully my side of the story. Bear in mind that there would be no need to allow the accused to make a defense if

\textsuperscript{12}Isocrates has in mind an audience that listens to the text being read out. Cf. 12.86 and possibly 12.200 for the rhetorician speaking of reading out speeches to a group of pupils. For silent reading, see Knox 1968.

\textsuperscript{13}Isocrates now begins the fictional speech with a second, fictional prologue (14–28).

\textsuperscript{14}The exercise of making “weaker speeches stronger” may have begun with Protagoras. It was one of the stock charges leveled against rhetoricians and sophists; see Arist., \textit{Rhetoric} 1402a24–28; Aristoph., \textit{Clouds} 112, 883–884; Plato, \textit{Apology} 18b8–9 (of which this is a direct echo).
it were possible to decide justly from the accuser’s words alone. At this point everyone present could tell if he spoke well or badly, but the jurors cannot easily know from the first speech alone whether he uttered the truth: rather, they would be satisfied if they could determine the just case from hearing both sides of the argument.

[18] I am not surprised that people spend more time on the accusations produced by deceitful individuals than on their own defenses or say that slander is the greatest harm. What could do more harm than this? It makes liars appear respectable, the innocent seem to do wrong, and jurors violate their oaths. All in all, it destroys the truth, gives the audience false opinions, and unjustly destroys any citizen it comes upon. [19] You must guard against such a thing happening to you, so that you do not fall into the conduct which you reproach in others. I think you are not unaware that the city has frequently regretted judgments based on anger rather than on proof, so that shortly afterwards it wanted to punish its deceivers and would have gladly seen those who were slandered emerge better off than before. [20] You must remember this and must not believe rashly the words of accusers nor listen to the defense case in a disorderly and prejudicial manner. It is shameful that although in other matters we are agreed to be the most merciful and gentle of all the Greeks, our behavior in court cases here patently contradicts this reputation.

[21] Elsewhere, when men judge a capital crime, a portion of the votes is set aside for the defendant, but with us the defendants are not even on equal footing with the sykophants. Each year we swear

15 Isocrates refers to the Heliastic Oath, which, ever since the time of Solon (Dem. 19.6), the 6,000 registered voters of the popular courts swore at the beginning of each year. The jurors vowed to uphold the democracy, to vote according to the laws and their conscience, and to give both prosecuting and defending parties a fair hearing when it was their turn to speak. Reference to the oath is also made at Dem. 19.17, 24.151, 39.1.40, 57.63; Hyperides 3.40; Aristoph., Wasps 725 and 919; also cf. Isoc. 8.11.

16 The most notorious example of such a judgment concerns the condemnation to death of the generals after the battle of Arginusae; see Xen., Hellenica 1.7.35 and Plato, Apology 32.

17 We know nothing else about the practice to which Isocrates refers.

18 This is another echo of Plato’s Apology (37a–b).
to listen to accusers and accused alike,¹⁹ but we compromise to such an extent that we accept whatever the accuser says, and we sometimes refuse to hear the voice of the defendant who tries to refute them.²⁰ Furthermore, we think that states in which citizens are put to death without a trial are uninhabitable, without recognizing that those who do not give equal consideration to both litigants do exactly this.²³ Most terrible of all is when someone on trial complains about those who slander him but does not have the same view of the matter when he judges another. Yet, reasonable men must be the sort of judges of others whom they would hope to have for themselves, for they realize that because people dare to bring false cases it is unclear who will stand trial and be forced to speak as I now do to those who are going to vote on him.

²⁴ Living an orderly life does not mean one can expect to live in Athens without fear. Those who choose to neglect their own affairs and concern themselves with those of others do not refrain from attacking those who manage their affairs soberly and bring only those who do wrong before you. Instead, they display their power by prosecuting the innocent and thus earn more money from those who have clearly done wrong.²⁵ Lysimachus understood this and put me on trial, thinking that the trial against me would earn him money from other sources. He expected that if he won against me, who he says is a teacher of others, his power would seem unassailable to everyone.²⁶ He hopes to do this easily, as he sees that you are too quick to accept charges and slanders and that I shall not be able to mount a defense equal to my reputation because of my old age and my inexperience in such contests.²⁷ I lived my past life without anyone accusing me of violence or injustice during either the oligarchy or the democracy; and it is clear that no one has sat as an arbitrator or juror concerning my affairs. I know not to harm anyone myself and not to seek revenge in court when I am wronged but to resolve our differences with the help of my opponent’s friends.²¹ None of this

¹⁹ See above, 18n. Athenian legal procedure was notable for permitting anyone who wished (ho boulomenos) to initiate a prosecution, providing favorable circumstances for sykophants and a theme for a common aristocratic complaint.

²⁰ Dem. 45.6 provides one, admittedly rare, example of a prosecutor speaking so convincingly that the defendant was not listened to.

²¹ I.e., by informal arbitration.
helped me, but even though I have lived to such a great age free from reproach, I now find myself in just as much danger as if I had wronged everyone.

I am not at all disheartened by the magnitude of the potential penalty, but if you are willing to listen with goodwill, I am optimistic that those who have been misled about my activities and those who were persuaded by those who wished to slander me will quickly change their minds about these matters, while those who consider me the sort of person I really am will be more firmly convinced.

[29] As I do not want to burden [you] with a lengthy preface to my argument, I shall leave off here, and instead I shall attempt to instruct (\textit{didaskein}\textsuperscript{22}) you in the things about which you will vote.

Now read the charge (\textit{graphe}). . . .\textsuperscript{23}

[30] On this charge the prosecutor tries to accuse me falsely of corrupting the young by teaching them to speak well and of gaining the upper hand in the lawcourts contrary to the interests of justice. In the rest of his speech he makes me out to be unlike anyone who has ever frequented the lawcourts or spent time in philosophy. Moreover, he says that my students were not only laypersons but also public speakers, generals, kings, and tyrants, that I took great sums of money from them, and that I continue to do so even now. [31] This is the sort of accusation he makes, for he thinks that his exaggerated claims about me, my wealth, and the number of my students will stir envy among his audience and that my legal activity will stir you to anger and hatred. When a jury experiences these emotions, they give litigants a very hard time. But on the first charge he has gone too far, and on the others I think I can easily show that he tells complete lies. [32] I think you should pay no attention to the speeches that you earlier heard from individuals who want to slander and slur me. Do not believe

\textsuperscript{22}Litigants often used didactic language to describe the legal discourse and process, presenting themselves as teachers instructing their jury-pupils. This terminology is particularly poignant, given the speaker's defense of himself as a teacher. Isocrates presents himself as instructing the city state in the role and value of the teacher of rhetoric (also 58, 89, 197), and the jury-audience as learning from him (cf. 40, 178).

\textsuperscript{23}The actual text of the charge, which in real cases was read by the court clerk, and of all other literary evidence in the trial, is omitted from the speech. In some, especially later, legal speeches these texts are preserved.
what was said without proof and judgment or give credence to opinions which these men have unjustly implanted in you. Rather, consider me such as I am on the basis of the present accusation and defense alone. If you make your decision in this way, you will appear to judge well and lawfully, and I will be completely vindicated.

[33] I think the danger in which I currently find myself is the best evidence that no citizen of Athens has been harmed by my cleverness or by my compositions. If anyone has been wronged and even if he kept quiet about it all this time, he would not let the present occasion pass without being here either to accuse me or to testify against me. Since someone who has never heard a negative word from me has put me in such grave danger, surely those who have suffered wrong would try to get back at me. [34] It is neither plausible nor possible that I have wronged many and that those who have fallen on hard times because of me should keep quiet, should not dare to accuse me, and in fact should be gentler when I am in danger than those who have suffered no injustice, when they only need to show what they have suffered to obtain the greatest revenge from me. [35] And yet no one before or now will be seen to have brought such a charge against me.

Accordingly, if I were to agree with the prosecutor and admit that I am the cleverest of all men and a writer of harmful prose such as no other has been, I would deserve a reputation for honesty rather than punishment. [36] One might plausibly credit good fortune when someone is better at speaking or acting than others, but everyone ought rightly to praise my character for using my natural ability well and with restraint. 24 Even if I can speak like this about myself, I shall never be seen to have concerned myself with those [lawcourt] speeches. [37] You will recognize this from my activities, from which you can better learn the truth than from my detractors. I think everyone knows that all men generally spend time where they have chosen to make their living. [38] Thus you would see men who make a living off your contracts and the lawsuits connected with them virtually living in the lawcourts, whereas no one has ever seen me at the Council-
board (*synedrios*), in preliminary hearings, at the courts, or before the arbitrators. I keep utterly away from all this, more than any other citizen. [39] Second, you would find that these men can earn money only in your city, for if they were to sail anywhere else, they would be deprived of their livelihood. I, in contrast, have means—exaggerated by that man—which come entirely from outside Athens. [26] Moreover, those who are themselves in difficult circumstances or want to create trouble for others associate with these men, whereas my associates are the more leisured of the Greeks.

[40] You have heard my accuser say that I received many valuable gifts from the king of Salamis, Nicocles. And could any of you believe that Nicocles gave me these so that he might learn forensic oratory, when as ruler, he judged the disputes of others? [27] From what my accuser has himself said, you will easily understand that I do not concern myself with litigation over contracts. [41] Indeed, that those who compose speeches for others who have cases in the lawcourts are legion is apparent to everyone. Yet as many as there are, none of them have ever been seen to deserve students, while I have received more, as my accuser says, than all those who devote their time to philosophy. So how could it be plausible that those whose daily business is so different are thought to be involved in the same activities?

[42] Although I can point out many differences between my life and that of people who concern themselves with lawsuits, I think that I would most quickly dispel the view that I resemble them if someone were to demonstrate that my students do not engage in the activities which my accuser has spoken of, and that I am not terribly accomplished (*deinos*) in contract suits. [43] Now that the former charge against me has been refuted, [28] I think that you are looking to change

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25 The *synhedrion* was the board made up of the six junior archons, or Thesmothetae, who fixed the dates of trials and assigned courts to the magistrates (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 59; Dem. 21.47). These archons were originally selected to write down the regulations (*thesmia*) for deciding disputes, probably before the time of Draco; see Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 3.4 and Gagarin 1981: 71.

26 According to Pseudo-Plutarch, Isocrates did not charge his Athenian students fees (*Isocrates* 838–839).

27 See 2.1–4.

28 I.e., that Isocrates engages in litigation and forensic rhetoric.
your minds and want to hear what other kinds of speech I have been concerned with that have given me such a great reputation. I do not know if it will help my case to declare the truth: for it is difficult to assess your attitude. Still, I shall speak frankly to you. [44] After all, since I have often said that I would have all the citizens know about my life and my discourses, I would be embarrassed in front of my associates if I now did not display them to you but was found to be concealing them. So pay attention, as you are about to hear the truth. [45] You must first learn (mathein) that there are as many kinds (tropoi) of prose as of verse.29 Some authors have spent their lives investigating the genealogies of the demigods; others have interpreted the poets; others sought to compose histories of wars, while still others, whom they call antilogicians (antilogikous), devote themselves to question and answer. [46] It would be no small task for someone to count all the forms (ideai) of prose. So I shall pass over the others and mention only the one which is my concern. Some people experienced in the forms I have mentioned did not choose to write speeches for private contract suits but ones of a political character pertaining to Hellas to be delivered in panegyric assemblies.30 Everyone would agree that these are more like musical and rhythmical compositions than those uttered in the lawcourts. [47] They set out events with a more poetic and complex style and seek to employ grander and more original enthymemes,31 and in addition, they dress up the whole speech with many other eye-catching figures of speech (ideai). The whole audience enjoys when they hear these as much as poetic compositions, and many wish to study them, for they think that those who are at the forefront of this kind of com-

29 Lit. “compositions with meter”; see 9.10n.
30 I.e., the sort of speech to be delivered before a panhellenic assembly at Olympia. Examples include Isocrates’ Panegyricus (4) and the funeral orations of Gorgias and Lysias.
31 In general literary usage, the enthymeme is a piece of reasoning or an argument (see, e.g., 9.10; also Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus 292, 199); for Aristotle, the enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism constructed on the basis of probabilities (see, e.g., Arist., Rhetoric 1354a10–16; 55a6–10; 57a13 and 16; 1394a27 and 32; 1395b21).
position are much wiser and better and can be more useful than those who are eloquent in legal matters. [48] They recognize that the latter have gained their experience in legal contests through political meddling, but the former have developed their skill in the speeches which I just described through philosophy. Moreover, those who appear to be skilled in juridical speech are tolerated only on the day they happen to be pleading, whereas the others are well regarded and highly respected in all public gatherings all the time. [49] In addition, if the former are seen twice or three times in the lawcourts, they are hated and criticized, whereas the latter are more admired the more often they appear and the more people hear them. Finally, those who are skilled (deinoi) at legal speeches have no ability for those other speeches, while the others, if they wished, could quickly pick up forensic pleading. [50] When they consider these things and realize that this is by far the better choice, they wish to share in this culture with which I have associated myself and which has given me a much finer reputation. You have heard the whole truth about my “power,” or my “philosophy,” or my “pastime,” however you wish to label it.

[51] But I also wish to set out a more demanding standard for myself than for others and to utter a bolder speech than suits my age. If my speech is harmful, I expect to receive no mercy from you, and if it is not superior to everyone else’s, to receive the gravest punishment. And I would not have made such a daring promise unless I were about to demonstrate this to you and make your verdict easy.

[52] This is how it is. I think the best and most just defense is one which instructs the jurors as best it can about the matters on which they vote, so that they do not wander in their purpose or doubt who speaks the truth. [53] Now, were I being tried for some crimes I had committed, I would not be able to offer them to you to see; you would have to conjecture on the basis of the arguments in order to decide what happened as well as you could. But since I am accused for my speeches, I think I will better be able to show you the truth. [54] I shall present to you the very speeches I have spoken and written so that you will not conjecture but will know clearly what they are like when you vote on them. I could not declare them all from beginning to end, since the time allotted to me is short. But, like fruits, I shall try to offer a sample of each. When you have heard a small portion of
them, you will easily recognize my character, and you will learn the power of all my speeches.

[55] I ask those of you who have often read what I am now about to say not to seek new speeches from me at this time nor to think me tedious if I utter what has long been in circulation among you. If I spoke them to make a display (epideixis), I would reasonably be guilty of this; but as I am now under judgment and in peril, I am forced to use them in this way. [56] I would be most ridiculous if, when my accuser charges me with writing the sort of speeches that harm the city and corrupt the young, I defend myself through other means, when by presenting the speeches themselves I can absolve myself of the slanders spoken against me. For this reason I ask you to make allowances and be my allies. For the sake of others [i.e., those who are not familiar with his speeches], I shall proceed by offering a brief preface so that they may follow the argument more easily.

[57] The first speech I shall present to you was written at the time when the Spartans ruled Greece and we [Athenians] were in a wretched state. It summons the Greeks to a campaign against the barbarians, and it challenges the Spartans for the leadership. [58] Having this as my theme, I show that Athens was responsible for all the good things which the Greeks have. After I have rounded off the narrative of these benefactions in order to show even more clearly that leadership of Greece belongs to Athens, I try to teach (didaskein) that it is much more fitting for the city to be honored for the dangers it endured in war than for its other benefactions. [59] I thought I could relate these things myself, but now old age impedes me and causes me to cut short my account. In order not to be utterly exhausted while I still have much to say, begin from the place marked and read the discussion of the leadership of Athens: 33

32 The Panegyricus. In this and other works, Isocrates declares a panhellenic program, which urges the Greeks to unite in a military campaign against the barbarian. For the idea that the general Timotheus enacted a panhellenic ideal, see below, 15.107–134; see also the encomium of Agamemnon at 12.74–87 for the Trojan War as a forerunner to a contemporary panhellenic campaign. See Too 1995: 130–148.

33 In keeping with the forensic fiction, Isocrates instructs the clerk to read the speech.
[AN EXCERPT FROM Panegyricus: 4.51–99]  

[60] One can easily learn (katamathein) from what has been read that the leadership rightly belongs to this city. Consider among yourselves, if you think I corrupt the young by my words rather than persuade them to be virtuous and undertake dangers on behalf of the city. Should I be justly punished for what I have said? Or shouldn’t I instead receive your deepest thanks? [61] I have praised the city, its ancestors, and the dangers of that period, and as a result, those who previously wrote on this theme destroyed all their speeches, embarrassed by what they had produced, and those who are now supposed to be skilled (deinoi) no longer dare to speak about these things but instead find fault with their own ability. [62] Nevertheless, as matters stand, some of those who cannot compose or say anything of note will be found to be practiced at criticizing and disparaging the texts of others. They will say that these things have been said “in a pleasing manner”—they are not generous enough to say “well”—but that speeches which denounce our current mistakes are much more useful and more powerful than those which eulogize our past deeds, and likewise, those which advise what we must do are better than those which narrate our history.  

[63] To prevent such comments, I shall cease defending what I have written 35 and shall present to you a passage from another speech as long as the previous excerpt, from which it will be clear that I have devoted great care to all these issues. The beginning of the speech is concerned with the peace of the Chians, Rhodians, and the Byzantines. [64] After I demonstrated that it benefited Athens to end the

34 A translation of Panegyricus is found in this series in Isocrates, Volume Two. This portion of the speech celebrates Athens’ ancestors as the benefactors of others from long ago (54), helping among others the sons of Heracles against Thebes (58–61). Athens was superior to all, including Argos, Thebes, and Sparta (64). It celebrated victories over the barbarians (Scythians, Thraceans, Amazons, and Persians, 66–70); it fought and won in the Persian War (71). Its soldiers deserve the highest praise (75). Rivalry between Sparta and Athens guaranteed the Greeks victory over Persia (85–98). Athens should have the leading role in a war against the barbarian.

35 The idea that one’s speeches require help, ideally from their author, is found also at Plato, Phaedrus 275d–e.
war, I criticized our control over the Greeks and our naval supremacy,
showing that it did not differ from tyranny in its actions or outcomes;
and I recalled what happened to the Spartans and all the others as a
result of it. [65] After these topics, I lamented the fortunes of Greece
and advised Athens not to allow this situation to continue. Finally, I
summoned the city to justice, reproached its errors, and counseled it
on the future.

Begin where I discuss these matters, and read this section to the
audience:

[66] [Excerpt from On the Peace, 8.25–56 and 132–145, is read.] 36

[67] You have now heard two speeches. I wish also to read a brief
selection from a third, so that it may become even clearer to you that
all my speeches pertain to virtue and justice. The one I am going to
present is for the Cyprian Nicocles, who was king at that time, and it
advises him how he should rule his citizens. It is not written in the
same manner as those that have been read. [68] In the others, the
preceding and following parts always agree and are linked together,
but in this one, the opposite occurs: by keeping parts discrete and
separate, as if I had made different headings, so to speak, I try to
express each piece of advice succinctly. [69] I made this my subject
because I thought that by informing his thinking I would benefit him,
and I would also make my principles clear in the quickest way. Also
on this occasion I have chosen to present this work to you for the
same reason not because it is my best composition but because it will
make clear how I normally deal with both ordinary citizens and rulers.
[70] It will be evident that I have spoken to Nicocles as suits a free
citizen and an Athenian and have not deferred to his wealth or power.

36 A translation of On the Peace is found in this series in Isocrates, Volume
Two. These passages argue for peace and an end to the Social War (which con-
cluded 355) with the former allies who now want their independence (25). The
speaker observes the injustice of Athens taking what rightfully belongs to others
(34) and cites the city’s ancestors as a model of good political behavior. The first
portion from the speech concludes with a critique of the contemporary syko-
phants (52–56). The second portion (132–145) urges the city to select good leaders
to replace the sykophants (133). The speaker reminds his audience that the fate of
Athens is also the fate of all Greece (136). He repudiates tyranny in closing (142).
In fact, I defended his citizens and urged him, as far as I could, to create a government as mild as possible for them. And if whenever I speak with a king, I do so on behalf of his subjects, I would surely exhort those who live under democracy to consider the interests of the people.

[71] In the preface and opening words, I censure monarchs, because, although they ought to cultivate practical understanding (phronēsis) more than others, they are less well educated than ordinary citizens. After discussing these points, I urge Nicocles not to be lazy, not to regard taking up the kingship as if it were a priesthood, but to disregard pleasure and pay attention to public affairs. [72] I also try to persuade him to treat it as a terrible matter if he sees worse men ruling the better classes, and the foolish giving orders to the more sensible. And I add that, insofar as he disparages others’ stupidity more vigorously, so much more so should he cultivate his own understanding.

So start where I have stopped, and read the remaining section of this speech to the jury.

[73] [Excerpt from To Nicocles, 2.14–39, is read.] 38

[74] These speeches are enough citation at length, although I won’t refrain from citing small sections of my earlier writings but will quote something if I consider it appropriate to the present occasion. It would be curious if, when I see others using my words, I alone were to avoid using my speeches, especially now when for your benefit I have chosen to cite not only brief portions but whole sections. I shall do as circumstances require.

[75] Before these texts were read out, I said that if I were to employ

37 I.e., not to treat kingship as a casual undertaking; most priesthoods required only occasional ritual duties.

38 This passage from To Nicocles (2) is translated above. It begins with the idea that the best people in the state should be rulers (14–15). It proceeds to argue that subjects should be well treated (15–16), and that to ensure that the king does the best for his nation, he must write laws, change them, or borrow them from other nations (19). The selection goes on to describe the king’s relations with and obligations to the gods (20), to friends (21), to foreigners (22), and to other states (24–25). It warns him to be wary about friendships (27), to govern himself well (29–32), and to assume kingly behavior (33–39).
harmful words, I would deserve to be punished and that if I did not speak better than anyone else, I would merit the harshest penalty. If some of you thought my words were boastful and exaggerated, I trust they would no longer justifiably hold this opinion. I think that I have fulfilled my promise, and the speeches that were read to you are as I promised at the beginning. [76] But I want to plead briefly on behalf of each of them, and make it even clearer that I spoke then, and now continue to speak the truth about them.

First, is any speech more moral or more just than one which praises our ancestors in a manner worthy of their virtue and their deeds? [77] Second, is any speech more public-minded and more suited to Athens than one which demonstrates that, because of our benefactions and the risks we have undertaken, the hegemony should be ours, rather than the Spartans? Third, what speech could be about finer and greater deeds than one which exhorts the Greeks to a campaign against the barbarians and counsels us to have a united purpose?

[78] I have discussed these things in the first speech; in the later ones, I treat matters that are less important but no less valuable or beneficial to Athens. You will know the power of these speeches if you set them beside others by authors who are well respected and considered useful. [79] I think everyone would agree that the laws are responsible for the most and greatest goods in human life, although their use can only benefit public affairs and personal contracts. If you were to be persuaded by my words, you would govern the whole of Greece well and justly and in the best interests of Athens. [80] Sensible men must be concerned about both Athens and Greece, but of the two, they should prefer the greater and worthier. Second, they should recognize that countless Greeks and non-Greeks are able to write laws, but few have the ability to speak about what is beneficial in a manner that Athens and Greece deserve. [81] For these reasons, we should value those who make it their business to write speeches of this kind more than those who legislate and inscribe laws, insomuch as their products are rarer, more difficult to create, and require a more acute mind, especially at the present time.

[82] When humankind began to exist and settle in cities, it was natural that people had similar goals. Now that we have progressed to the point that speeches that are delivered and laws that are established are innumerable, and the oldest laws and the most novel speeches are
praised, the task requires a different approach. [83] Those who choose
to legislate have at hand a multitude of established laws; they have no
need to seek others, but they need only to gather together those that
are well regarded elsewhere—which anyone who wishes could easily
do. Those engaging in oratory have a very different experience, since
most [topics] have been taken up. If they say the same things as their
predecessors, they will appear to be shameless babblers, but those who
seek novel topics have great difficulty finding something to say. For
this reason I say that both should be praised but especially those who
can accomplish the more difficult task.

[84] It should be evident that I am more truthful and useful than
those who claim to turn people toward self-restraint and justice. For
they exhort people to a virtue and to a wisdom unrecognized by oth-
ers and debated over by themselves, whereas I exhort them to one
acknowledged by everyone. [85] They are pleased with themselves
if they can attract pupils into their company by their reputations,
whereas I shall never be seen inviting anyone to follow me; instead, I
try to persuade the whole city to undertake activities which will lead
to their own happiness and will free the rest of the Greeks from their
present evils. [86] How is it reasonable that an individual who exhorts
all citizens to better and more just leadership of Greece could corrupt
his students? Would anyone with the ability to compose such dis-
courses try to invent wicked speeches about wicked matters, especially
when he has benefited from his discourse, as I have? [87] When my
speeches were written and published, I achieved a good reputation
among many and gained many students, and none of them would
have remained with me if they had found me to be other than they
had expected. In fact I have had many pupils, some of them spend-
ing three or four years with me. None of these will be found to have
faulted their experiences with me, [88] but at the end, when they were
about to sail back to their parents and friends, they so valued the time
spent with me that we parted with regret and tears.

Should you believe those who know well my speeches and my char-
acter? Or someone who knows nothing about me and has elected to
bring a false accusation against me? [89] That man has reached such a
degree of evil and daring that he has charged me with teaching people
to speak in ways that will give them an unfair edge, though he pro-
duces no evidence of this. He persists in saying that it is terrible to
corrupt the young, as if anyone disputed this, or as if he had to prove what everyone acknowledges rather than simply showing (lit. “teaching,” didaskein) that I have committed this crime. [90] If someone were to arrest him as a slave trader, a thief, or mugger, and did not show that he had done any of these things but merely related how terrible each of these crimes is, he would say that his accuser is mad and raves, and he thinks you will not notice that he himself uses such arguments. [91] But I think that even the most ignorant know that for accusations to be credible and authoritative, they must be applicable only to those who have committed crimes and not to those who are innocent. But he has disregarded this point, delivering a speech that has no relevance to the accusation. [92] For he ought to show the speeches by which I corrupt my students, and name the students who have become worse through association with me. As it is, he has done none of these things; instead, having omitted the most valid means of accusation, he has tried to deceive you.

In contrast, I shall make my defense on grounds that are relevant and just. [93] A little while ago I read my speeches to you. Now I shall identify those who spent time with me from my youth to old age, and from those of you who are my contemporaries, I shall produce witnesses to what I say. Eunomos, Lysitheides, and Callippus were among the first to study with me; after them, Onetor, Antikles, Philonides, Philomelos, and Charmantides. [94] Athens has crowned all these with gold crowns not because they were greedy for other people’s belongings but because they were good men and spent much of their own wealth on the city.

Make what you will of my relations with these men. For what concerns us, things are all in my favor. [95] If you regard me as their

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[39] Some of the pupils Isocrates mentions in this section are prominent enough to be mentioned by other writers of the period. For Eunomos, see Lys. 19.19, where he is named as a guest and friend of Dionysius of Syracuse; for Onetor, one of the richest Athenians, see Dem. 30.10; for Philomelus, an associate of Meidias, see Dem. 21.174 and MacDowell 1990: 391–392, Lys. 19.15, and Davies 1971: 549; for Lysitheides, son of the banker Pasion, see Davies 1971: 356–357 and MacDowell 1990: 377 (and also for Callippus); for Antikles, son of Memnon, see Davies 1971: 309; for Philonides, the brother of Onetor, see Davies 1971: 423; and for Charmantides, who was victorious as choregus in dithyramb at the Thargelia before 366, see Davies 1971: 573.
adviser and teacher, you ought to be more grateful to me than to those you feed in the Prytaneum for their achievements. Each of these has proven himself to be a fine citizen, whereas I have provided the large group I mentioned a moment ago. If I was responsible for none of their accomplishments but they were simply my friends and associates, I think even this is an adequate defense against the charge I face. For if I pleased those who have received gifts for their achievements, and have a different opinion (gnōmē) from this sykophant, how could I reasonably be judged to be corrupting those in my company? I would be the most unfortunate of all if I alone did not receive the same assessment as others who are judged better or worse on the basis of their activities and associations but instead were to have the same reputation as those who are discredited for their activities and associations, even though I spent my life with men like these and have conducted myself beyond reproach until this point in my life. I would like to know what fate I would have suffered if one of my associates had been a man like my accuser. Although I hate all such people and am hated by them, I nonetheless find myself in this predicament.

Nor would that argument justifiably harm me, which some of those who are completely prejudiced against me would perhaps dare to state, that I have kept company with those whom I mentioned only to be seen talking with them, and that I have many other meddlesome students whom I am hiding from you. Yet I have an argument which will refute and absolve me of all these slanders. If some of those who have associated with me have behaved well toward Athens, toward their friends, and toward their own households, I ask you to praise them and not give thanks to me; however, if they turned out to be wicked and the sort of men who denounce (phainein) others, indict (graphēsthai) them, lay charges, and desire their goods, then punish me. What offer could be less invidious or more fair than

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40 Cf. Socrates’ request to be fed in the Prytaneum, or public mess hall (Plato, Apology 36d7), where Olympic victors, distinguished generals, and certain families, such as the descendants of the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton, were fed at public expense. Socrates is in turn citing Xenophanes (early 5th century), who laments the honoring of athletes above those who benefit the community through their wisdom (poem 2 West).

41 Denunciation (phasis) and indictment (graphē) were two types of legal action.
this one, which does not argue about good citizens but volunteers to pay the penalty if some have turned out to be wicked? I do not speak these words emptily, but I yield the floor to my accuser or to anyone else who wishes, if he has something to say in this regard—not that there aren’t some individuals who would gladly perjure themselves against me, but since they would immediately be revealed to you, the penalty would be theirs, not mine. [101] I do not know how I could make my point more clearly on the charge against which I defend myself and on the issue of not corrupting my associates.

Lysimachus mentioned my friendship with Timotheus, and he tried to discredit both of us.42 He was not ashamed of speaking slanderous and completely scandalous words about a man who had died and had been responsible for many good things for Athens.43 [102] I thought that even if I had been clearly proven to have done wrong, I would be saved by my association with him, but since Lysimachus tries to use this association to harm me when it rightly should help me, I am obliged to speak about these matters. Because Timotheus’ accomplishments are of quite a different order, I did not mention him at the same time as my other companions. [103] My accuser did not dare say anything incriminating about the others, but he devoted more energy to the case against Timotheus than to the one against me.44 Moreover, my other students were in charge of a few things,

42 Isocrates offers a favorably biased characterization of his former student, the statesman and general Timotheus (cf. 7.120); a very different picture is given in Dem. 49. Born ca. 414, he was elected general in 378 and served with great success in the war against Sparta. In 374, while preparing an expedition for Corcyra, he was deposed and prosecuted for betraying the city’s ally (Dem. 49.9, 13; Lys. Fr. 228). He then served as a mercenary, commanding Persian forces in Egypt, but returned to Athenian service in 366. His aggressive actions led Athens’ allies to revolt in the Social War (357–355). After a disastrous naval battle, he was impeached and fined an enormous sum. He went into exile in Calchis, where he died before 352.

43 There were constraints against speaking ill of the dead. Hyperides informs us that the penalty for slander (kakegoria) against the dead is 1,000 drachmas; also cf. Isoc. 20.3; Lys. 10.2; Dem. 21.88, 40.49; and MacDowell 1978: 127–128. Demosthenes (20.104) attributes this piece of legislation to Solon (cf. Plut., Solon 21).

44 See 15.129 and note for the trial of Timotheus.
although they managed what had been entrusted to each of them so
deftly that they acquired the honor of which I spoke a little while ago;
he, on the other hand, was in charge of many great affairs over a long
time. Accordingly, it would not be fitting to speak about Timotheus
together with the others, but it is necessary to separate the two subjects
and arrange them in this manner.

[104] You must not regard this portion of the speech about Timo-
theus as irrelevant to the present situation or think that I digress from
the case. When ordinary citizens have spoken as they should in de-
fense of their actions, they sit down to avoid seeming to overdo it; but
those deemed to be political advisers and teachers must defend their
associates, just like themselves, especially if they are being tried on this
charge [i.e., liturgy evasion], as in my case. [105] Thus it might be
enough for someone else to state that it is unjust if he shares the blame
for any wrong Timotheus may have committed when he acted, since
he did not share in the gifts and honors voted to him, and no speaker
proposed that he deserved praise for being Timotheus’ adviser. Justice
requires that he have a part in his rewards or that he not share in his
misfortune. [106] I, however, would be ashamed to say this; instead, I
make the same proposal about him as about the others: if Timotheus
was a bad man and committed many wrongs against you, I ask to be
party to this, to be punished, and to suffer just like the guilty. But if
he is shown to be a good citizen and a general unlike any other we
know of, then I think you should praise him and thank him, but with
regard to this case, you should judge my actions as you think just.

[107] I can say this in general about Timotheus, considering all
his actions, that he captured by military force more cities than any
general ever has, either from Athens or from the rest of Greece; and
when some of the cities were captured, the whole adjoining area was
forced to join the side of Athens, so great was the power of each city.
[108] Who does not know about Corcyra lying in the most strategic
and fairest spot among the cities near the Peloponnesus, about Samos
among the Ionian cities, about Sestus and Crithotes among those in
the area of the Hellespont, and about Potidaea and Torene among
those in Thrace? He gained possession of all these and gave them to
you without great expense, without mistreating our existing allies, and
without forcing you to pay heavy taxes. [109] Instead, for the sea
expedition around the Peloponnesus the city gave him only thirteen tal-
ents and fifty triremes, and with these he took Corycra, a city which had eighty triremes. At about the same time he defeated the Spartans at sea and forced them to make a peace, which brought such a change to each of the cities [110] that from that day we commemorate it each year with a sacrifice because no other peace has so benefited Athens.45 After that time no one has seen a Spartan vessel on this side of Malea, or a land army passing through the Isthmus, and one can see that this is the reason for their disaster at Leuctra.

[111] After these achievements, he marched to Samos, which Pericles, a man with the greatest reputation for wisdom, justice, and moderation, had seized with two hundred ships and a thousand talents.46 Timotheus captured it without any additional help from you or the allies. He besieged it for ten months with eight thousand light shield bearers and thirty triremes, and he paid for all these from the war spoils. [112] If you know of anyone else who has accomplished such a deed, I will admit that I am foolish to try to give exceptional praise to someone who has done nothing that surpasses the achievements of others. After he left Samos, he captured Sestus and Crithotes and forced you to pay attention to the Chersonesus, which you had previously neglected. [113] Lastly, he captured Potidaea, on which Athens had previously spent two thousand four hundred talents, using the wealth that he himself together with Thrace's contribution provided. And in addition he defeated all the Chalcideans. If I must speak not on each individual point but in summary, he made you masters (kyrioi) of twenty-four cities, and he spent less than our ancestors did on the siege of Melos.47 [114] Just as it was easy to enumerate his accomplishments, so I wish to describe briefly the circumstances in which each of them was carried out, the state of Athens' affairs, and

45 A reference to the Peace of Callias (371), which all but gave Athens control of the sea and limited Sparta to land.
46 Timotheus captured Samos in 366 with a force of some 8,000 peltasts and thirty triremes in an operation that lasted just under a year. The comparison between Timotheus and Pericles, a subject of praise at 16.28, emphasizes the greatness of the former’s achievements. For Pericles’ campaign against Samos, see Thuc. 1.116—117.
47 For an account of the events leading up to the siege and the siege itself, see Thuc. 5.84—116.
the power of the enemy. The benefits you received and his reputation among you would thus be much greater. Yet because it is such a large topic, I shall omit this.

[115] I think you would like to hear why some of the men among you who are well regarded and are thought to possess military ability were not able to capture even a village, whereas Timotheus, who had no great physical strength and no experience in military campaigns around the world but was simply a citizen among you, accomplished such important things. The account of these things incurs resentment but is worth presenting. [116] Timotheus surpassed the others in that he did not hold the same views as you about the affairs of the Greeks and their allies and how they should be managed. You vote for generals who are physically strongest and who have had considerable experience on foreign campaigns, thinking that these qualities will allow them to do what is necessary. But Timotheus used men like this as his company leaders and brigade commanders, some of whom became famous and served the city well as a result of accompanying him on campaign.48 [117] But he himself was astute in the matters which a good general must know about.

What are these things, and what power do they have? About this I must not oversimplify, but I need to give a clear account. First, to be able to determine against whom war must be waged and whom one should have as allies. This is the first principle of generalship, and if one errs in this matter, the war will necessarily be unsuccessful, difficult, and a waste of effort. [118] With regard to these kinds of decisions, not only has there been no person like him but no one has even been close. And one can readily recognize this from his achievements. Although he undertook the majority of his wars without Athens’ support, he won all of them, and he seemed to all the Greeks to have done so justly. Could anyone provide a clearer or better demonstration of his strategic thinking than this?

[119] What is the second requirement of a good general? He must bring together an army suited to the current enemy, organize it, and use it advantageously. His actions themselves have shown that he knew

48 “some of whom . . . on campaign”; the Budé text contains this clause, which the Loeb edition omits, following the authority of the traditionally most reliable manuscript.
how to employ an army effectively. He surpassed all others in providing magnificent and worthy equipment—and none of the enemy would dare say otherwise. Moreover, for enduring the hardships and deprivations of campaign and finding adequate resources, who of his fellow soldiers would not judge that Timotheus excelled in both these respects? For they are aware that he found himself in dire straits at the beginning of the war as a result of not receiving anything from the city; however, he was able to reverse this situation, by being victorious in the war and paying full wages to his men.

[121] Now, although these matters were important and urgent, someone might praise him even more—and deservedly—for what followed. While he saw that you have regard only for men who threaten and terrify other city states and continually cause revolts among the allies, he did not follow your views; he did not want to win a reputation at the expense of the city. Instead, he reflected (ephalosophei) and then acted so that no Greek city would fear him, but all would feel secure except those which acted unjustly. [122] He knew that those who are afraid hate those who make them feel this way and that Athens became the most prosperous and the greatest city through its friendships with others, whereas through hate, it came close to falling into the worst disaster. Perceiving this, he routed the enemy with the power of Athens and then by his own character gained the goodwill of others; he believed that this strategy was greater and finer than the destruction of many enemies and numerous victories in battle.

[123] He made certain that no city should have the slightest suspicion that he was plotting against them. Accordingly, whenever he was about to sail past any which had not given its contributions, he sent word ahead to the leaders, so that when he was suddenly seen outside their harbor, he would not throw them into fear and confusion. [124] If he happened to weigh anchor in their territory, he did not allow his men to loot, or steal, or pillage homes but took the same care that no such thing should happen as do masters of property. He was concerned not that he would have a good reputation among his men but that Athens would have one among the Hellenes.

The contribution was paid into the Allied Treasury, to be distributed at the discretion of the Council of allied states; see 7.2; Xen., Hellenica 6.2.9; and Dem. 49.49. In the fourth century, “contribution” (syntaxis) replaced “tribute” (phoros) and its negative associations with the past empire of Athens.
Moreover, he treated captured cities more gently and lawfully than any other ally had done, thinking that by showing himself such toward the enemy, he had given the greatest proof that he would never venture to wrong the others. Because of the reputation he gained from these actions, many cities that were badly disposed toward you received him with their gates thrown wide open. He created no distress among them, but when he departed, he left them just as he had found them governed when he went in.

In summary, although many terrible things regularly afflicted the Greeks at others times, under his generalship no one could find any cities that suffered revolutions, or changes in their constitutions, or slaughters, or exiles, or any other intolerable evil. During that time such disasters abated to such a degree that of all those we can remember, he alone made this city blameless among the Greeks. It is truly necessary to regard him a good, even the best, general and not someone, like Lysander, who achieved similar success by an act of good fortune because no one else happened to have the opportunity, but as someone who always acted correctly and showed good sense in many various and difficult matters. That was the way things turned out for Timotheus.

I think that many of you are surprised at what I have said and regard my praise of him as a condemnation of Athens, since he captured so many cities but did not destroy a single one and was put on trial for treason. And again, when he submitted his accounts (euthynai), and Iphicrates assumed responsibility for the actions, and

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50 During the battle of Aegospotami (405) Lysander captured 171 Athenian ships and executed all Athenian prisoners, who totaled about 3,000 men, and liberated other prisoners: see 4.119, 18.59; Ath. Pol. 34.1; Xen., Hellenica 2.1.1–29; Diodorus Siculus 13.104–106. He then swept across the Aegean, and his fleet blockaded Piraeus.

51 Timotheus, Iphicrates, Menestheus (Iphicrates’ son), and Chares were commanders in the campaign against Byzantium in 357. At the battle of Embata, probably in the winter of 356/5, Chares continued an attack that the other generals abandoned because of a severe storm. He was defeated, and on his return to Athens charged the others with treason and acceptance of a bribe from the Chians and Rhodians; cf. Dinarchus 1.14 and 16–17; Diodorus Siculus 16.21.4; Nepos, Timotheus 3.4–5. The trial instigated by Chares is thought to have been motivated by political rivalry to remove Timotheus and his more careful approach. See, e.g., Moysey 1987.
Menestheus submitted the account of expenses, the city acquitted them, but it fined Timotheus a sum of unprecedented magnitude. [130] That’s how it was.

Still I want to say a word on behalf of Athens. If, looking to justice itself, you take thought in these matters, what happened to Timotheus must seem to everyone terrible and harsh. But if you factor in the ignorance that all men have, and the envy that arises in us, as well as the confusion and the disorder in which we live, you will find that none of these things occurs unreasonably or lies outside of human nature; and Timotheus contributed some part to being improperly understood in these things. [131] He did not hate the common people, nor was he a misanthrope, or arrogant, and he did not have any other such vice. But because of his greatness of mind, which was suited to generalship but inappropriate to day-to-day demands, everyone thought he was guilty of all the faults I have mentioned, for he was as unsuited by nature to the cultivation of other men as he was talented in his management of public affairs.

[132] Often he heard me say such things as: 52 “those who wish to engage in public life and be well liked must choose the best and most useful deeds, and the truest and most just words; in addition, however, they must consider carefully how they can be seen by others to say and do everything graciously and benevolently, for those who give little thought to these matters appear to their fellow citizens to be rather difficult and intolerable. [133] You see how the mob (hoi polloi) is by nature disposed toward pleasure and that they love those who attend to their pleasures rather than those who do the right thing and those who cheat them with a smile and friendliness rather than those who benefit them with gravity and dignity. You have never concerned yourself with these things, since you think that if you deal with matters outside Athens fairly, the citizens here will be well disposed toward you. [134] This is not the case, but the opposite generally happens. If you gratify the people, they judge everything you do not according to how things actually are but in whatever way helps your cause; they will
overlook mistakes and will exalt your success to the heavens. Goodwill
(eunoia) makes everyone behave in this fashion.\footnote{See de Romilly 1958.} You seek to
acquire by every means the goodwill of other cities toward Athens,
and you think it the greatest good, but you do not realize that you
must secure it from Athens for yourself. You are responsible for most
of our good fortune, but you have a lower standing than those who
have done nothing worthy of note.\footnote{Isocrates feigns rhetorical ineptitude in keeping with self-representation as
someone who does not frequent the lawcourts, e.g., 15.4; also cf. 15.153 and 310.} That makes sense, for they
cultivate public speakers and those who are able to speak well in pri-

cate gatherings and those who pretend to know everything. You, on
the other hand, not only neglect these men but also declare war on
those of them who at any time have the greatest success. Do you stop
to think how many men have fallen upon misfortune or have lost their
civic rights because of these men’s lies? How many of our ancestors
are without name, although they were more virtuous and noteworthy
than those who are the subjects of poems and tragedies?\footnote{See de Romilly 1958.} The latter,
I think, had poets and speechwriters to sing their praises, but the
former had no one. If you trust me and have any sense, you will not
despise such men, whom the common people generally trust in mat-
ters concerning both citizens and overall affairs of state. Rather, you
will make them your concern and cultivate them so that you will have
a good reputation with regard to both your deeds and their words.”

\footnote{Isocrates feigns rhetorical ineptitude in keeping with self-representation as
someone who does not frequent the lawcourts, e.g., 15.4; also cf. 15.153 and 310.}

When Timotheus heard this, he said that I was right, but he
was unable to change his nature. He was a gentleman (kalos kagathos)
worthy of both Athens and Greece, but he could not adapt himself to
such men who are hostile to those who are superior by nature. As a
result, the orators have assumed the task of inventing many false ac-
cusations against him, and the people that of accepting what they say.
\footnote{See de Romilly 1958.} If I had the opportunity, I would gladly offer a defense against
them, for I think that when you have heard me, you would hate those
who persuade Athens to be angry at Timotheus as well as those who
dare to criticize him. As it stands, I shall leave these things and return
to speaking about myself and the current situation.

\footnote{Isocrates feigns rhetorical ineptitude in keeping with self-representation as
someone who does not frequent the lawcourts, e.g., 15.4; also cf. 15.153 and 310.}
to organize my words. Perhaps, I must speak about matters as they happen to come up. Thus the topic that occurs to me is one I thought I should clarify for you; however, I will not conceal from you that someone else advised me not to mention it. [141] When Lysimachus brought this charge against me, I thought about these very issues, as each of you might, and I examined my life and my accomplishments, spending the most time on what I thought I ought to receive praise for. When one of my associates heard me, he had the courage to say the harshest thing of all, that, although the things I mentioned deserved recognition, he himself particularly feared that they might irri-
tate the majority of those who heard them.

[142] “Some people,” he said, “turn so savage and hostile because of envy and lack of resources that they make war not against evil, but against good deeds. They hate not only the most reasonable men but also the best activities; and in addition to their other vices, they con-
gregate with other criminals and show them sympathy, while destroy-
ing those they envy if they can. [143] They do these things not because they are ignorant of the issues on which they vote; rather, they hope to do injustice and do not expect to be caught. They think that by saving those who are like themselves they are helping themselves. I have said these things to you so that forewarned you might handle the situation more effectively and use more secure arguments before the jurors. But now what decision can you expect such men to take if you describe to them a life and deeds that are not in the least like theirs but are such as you are trying to describe to me? [144] You prove that the speeches you composed do not deserve blame but the greatest gratitude, that some of those who had been close to you committed no crime or misdemeanor, but others were crowned by Athens for their virtue, and that you yourself have lived from day to day such a decorous and orderly life as no other citizen I know of, and moreover, that you brought no suit against anyone nor were you brought to trial except in the matter of the exchange, and that you were never party to trial or served as witness for anyone else. Indeed, you have not done a single one of the things that all those in public life do.

[145] “In addition to these personal eccentricities, you say that you avoided positions of authority along with the benefits these bring, and all other public matters, but you numbered not only yourself but your son too among the twelve hundred taxpayers and liturgists. Three times already you have funded a trierarchy, and you discharged
other liturgies more splendidly and lavishly than the laws require. [146] Don’t you realize that those who hear this account but themselves do just the opposite will be irritated and will think you are arguing that their lives are not respectable? If they saw that the resources to support the liturgies and the rest of your affairs came through hard work and struggle, they would not think about it in the same way; but they think that the income you receive from foreigners is much greater than what is actually paid, [147] and they believe that you live more comfortably than others, even those who engage in philosophy and in the same profession as you. They perceive that most of these—except those who have a passion for your way of life—produce rhetorical displays (epideixeis) for the public assemblies and private gatherings, where they compete with one another, make exaggerated promises, argue, and find fault with one other, omitting no abuse. [148] But they trouble only themselves, and they let their listeners laugh at their speeches, or occasionally praise them, but most often hate them or feel however they wish about them. You have no part in all this but live differently from the sophists and from private citizens, whether rich or poor. [149] Reasonable and sensible people might perhaps admire you for this, but others who are less talented and who generally are more upset at the honest success of others than at their own misfortune, can only be annoyed and resentful. Since this is how they feel, consider what you should say and what you should omit."

[150] As he was making this speech, I thought, and even now think, that those who are irritated by hearing me present myself to Athens as a liturgist who does what is ordered are the strangest and most difficult of all people. I do not need to enter my lot for public office, receive the benefits Athens gives to others, or, for that matter, defend and prosecute cases. [151] I have organized my life not for the sake of wealth or out of arrogance, and I do not look down on those who do not live as I do myself. I loved peace and the quiet life (apragmosynē), [56]

55 Nearly all Athenian magistrates were chosen by lot from a group of applications; cf. 7.25.
56 Apragmosynē, which characterizes the lifestyle of the fourth-century “quiet Athenian,” serves as an aristocratic code, standing in opposition to polypragmosynē, which most often denotes the meddling of sykophants and ambitious public figures. Note that for Thucydides’ Pericles, speaking before the rise of the “new politicians,” to be “undoing” is the same as being useless (cf. Thuc. 2.40.1).
and in particular I saw men who live this kind of life enjoying a good reputation both here and elsewhere. I thought that such a life was sweeter than the life of those who are always occupied and was, moreover, more suited to the activities in which I initially engaged. [152] For this reason I chose this way of life. I did not accept benefits from the city, for I thought it would be terrible if I got in the way of someone else who was forced to support himself in that way and through my presence someone was deprived of life’s necessities when I could maintain myself on my own private means. For these reasons, I deserve your praise rather than criticism. [153] Now I really do not know where to turn or what I could do to please such people. If I always made it my task not to wrong, or bother, or trouble anyone and by these same actions I trouble some people, how could I satisfy them? What course remains except that I will appear unfortunate, and such men will seem ignorant and ill disposed toward their fellow citizens? [154] It is silly to try to defend myself against men who think completely differently from others and are harder on those who do no wrong than on those who do. Evidently the more respectable one shows himself to be, the less effectively he argues his case among these men.

But to the others, I must speak about Lysimachus’ slander that I possessed great wealth; otherwise his account will be believed and will land me in more and larger liturgies than I could undertake. [155] As a rule, you will find that none of the so-called sophists has earned much money. Some live their lives meagerly, others very modestly. The one who earned the most was Gorgias of Leontini. 57 He spent

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57 Other contemporary and later texts insist on the great material success and wealth of Gorgias: e.g., Plato, *Hip. Maj.* 282b4–9; Diodorus Siculus *12.53.1* (= Diels-Kranz 82 A 4) reports that Gorgias earned 100 minas from his pupils; cf. *Suda* g 388. Athenaeus (505d–e) recounts an anecdote in which Plato remarks upon seeing the sophist that “the handsome and golden Gorgias comes” when he sees the sophist, making it apparent that with Gorgias, the importance and wealth of the teacher have displaced the value of his teaching. Gorgias was the author of works including *Encomium of Helen*, *Palamedes*, and *On Not Being*. Ancient sources depict Gorgias as the teacher of Isocrates (see Introduction to Isocrates), but this later linking of the two rhetoricians as teacher and pupil respectively is
time in Thessaly, when the Thessalians were the most prosperous of the Greeks; he lived a long time and was concerned with making money. [156] Since he had no fixed residence in any city, he had no public expenditure and did not have to pay taxes; moreover, he never married and had no children, and thus was not subject to this unremitting and costly liturgy. Yet even with such an advantage in saving more than others, he left behind only a thousand staters. [157] So where the wealth of others is concerned, you must not believe those who criticize at random, or think that the incomes of sophists and actors are equal, but rather compare those in the same profession with one another, and assume that those of the same ability in each area will have similar wealth. [158] Thus, if you compare me with the one who earned the most, and set me against him, you clearly will not be making an unreasonable conjecture about such matters; nor will you find that I have managed my public and personal affairs badly, since my living expenses were less than I paid out for liturgies. Those who are thriftier in their personal lives than in their public expenditure rightly deserve praise.

[159] As I speak, I realize to what extent the city has changed and that people in public life now regard these matters quite differently than people in the past. When I was a child, having wealth was thought to make one so secure and dignified that nearly everyone claimed to have more money than they really had, for they wanted the prestige of wealth. [160] But now one must carefully prepare a defense against being rich as if it were one of the worst crimes, if one wants to remain secure. Those who appear to be prosperous are considered

due largely, if not wholly, to biographical convention: see Too 1995: 235–236. Isocrates mentions the older sophist on two other occasions (15.268 and 10.3) and in each case is critical or dismissive.

Isocrates extends the language of liturgy to a broader context of commitment or benefit to the city. This extended use of the liturgy vocabulary is important in helping him to highlight his own rhetorical career as a form of public service.

[59] A stater was a gold coin worth about twenty-eight drachmas.

For payment to dramatic actors, who could also receive prizes from public funds, see von Reden 1995: 146–147.
much worse than those openly doing wrong, for the latter are either let off or pay small fines, while the former are totally ruined. And we would find that many more have been stripped of their wealth than punished for their crimes.

[161] Why must I speak about public matters? I myself suffered no small setback in my own affairs as a result of this transformation [of Athens]. At that time I was beginning to recover my own wealth, since in the war against the Spartans, the entire family fortune was lost, which my father had used to support his own service to the city and to educate me with such care that I became more prominent and better known among my fellow students and comrades than I am now among my fellow citizens. [162] When, as I mentioned, I began to attract some students, I thought that if I could acquire and preserve more wealth than those who had embarked on the same career, I would acquire a distinguished reputation for philosophy and for greater orderliness in my own life. But things have turned out just the opposite. [163] For if I had been worthless and had preserved nothing, no one would bother me, and if I had openly done wrong, I would have lived safely, at least from the sykophants. Now instead of the reputation I anticipated, contests, dangers, envy, and slanders besiege me.

[164] At present Athens takes such pleasure in oppressing and denigrating respectable people, allowing the wicked to speak and act as they want, that Lysimachus, who has chosen to make his living from sykophancy and from doing harm to some citizen each day, has come before you to accuse me. But I, who have never done anyone any wrong, have kept away from sykophancy, and have instead benefited from foreigners, who think they have been treated well, find myself in this great peril, as if I have done something terrible. [165] Those who have any sense should pray to the gods that most of our citizens could have this ability to take money from foreigners and with it make themselves useful to the city, as I have done. Among the great absurdities in my situation, the worst would be if those who had given me money were to be so grateful that even now they continue to watch out for me, whereas you, on whom I have spent my resources, were to punish me. [166] It would be even more terrible if our ancestors honored the poet Pindar for just a single expression in which he named Athens “the bulwark of Greece,” gave him the title “friend of the city”
(proxenos), and granted him a gift of ten thousand drachmas,²¹ while I, on the other hand, who have praised the city and our ancestors much more finely, should be unable to live the rest of my life safely. [167] I think that I have said enough in my defense about this and the other accusations.²² But I shall not hesitate to tell you truthfully how I feel about my present predicament, and how I initially felt about it. At first I was very hopeful that I could defend my personal activities successfully. [168] I had confidence in my past life and deeds, and I thought that I had many valid arguments about them. But when I saw not only that those who are customarily hostile to everyone were upset by the culture of discourse but also that many other citizens were opposed to it, I feared that my personal situation would be overlooked and that I might incur some harm from the popular prejudice against the sophists. [169] After a while, as I began to deliberate and consider what I should do in this situation, I stopped being afraid and upset; this was not unreasonable, since I took account of the probable outcome and comforted myself. [170] I knew that those of you who are fair, to whom I would direct my remarks, would not be satisfied with opinions that arose unjustly but would follow the truth and be persuaded by those whose words were just. And I believed I could show by many arguments that philosophy had been unjustly slandered and that it should more rightly be cherished than hated. Even now I continue to hold this view. [171] It is not surprising if certain fine pursuits have been overlooked and unrecognized, or some people have been deceived about them. In fact, we could find the same situation holding true for ourselves and for countless other matters. For our city is responsible for many of the benefits enjoyed by its citizens and by other Greeks, both at present and in the past, and it abounds in many delightful pleasures. Yet

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²¹ Pindar, born ca. 518 at Thebes and died ca. 446, was a professional poet who wrote victory poems for the athletic competitions. The line cited is preserved as Pindar Fr. 76. Pindar was rewarded with the role of proxenos, or public guestfriend, who in his own city welcomes and helps visitors from the appointing city, in this case Athens.

²² Isocrates now moves from the specific charges to the issue of his teaching. From here to 214 he discusses what rhetorical education consists of, explaining what is required for someone to become a good orator and in the process, showing why the promises of the professional teachers are misleading.
it has this serious problem. [172] Because of its size and the number of
inhabitants, it is not readily understood as a whole or in detail, but like
a swollen river, it carries along whoever or whatever it picks up, and it
gives to some people a reputation that is completely inappropriate. That
is what has happened to this form of education (paideia).

[173] You must bear these things in mind and not judge any matter
without discussion, and when you are jurors, you must not behave as
you do in personal matters, but you must be precise on each point
and seek the truth. Remember the oaths and laws under which you
have assembled to pass judgment. The discussion and the judgment
in which we are engaged concern not small matters but the most im-
portant ones; and you will cast your vote not only about me, but
about a career that attracts many of the young. [174] I think you must
know that older citizens hand down the affairs of the city to the
young, their successors. Since this cycle always continues, the condi-
tion of the city necessarily depends on how the young are educated.
Thus sykophants cannot be in charge of such an important matter,
and those who refuse to give them money must not be punished, nor
should those who give them money be allowed to do whatever they
want. [175] If philosophy does in fact have the power to corrupt the
young, you must not only punish whomever any sykophant brings
into court on a charge, but also get rid of all those who spend time in
this pursuit. If the opposite is true, however, and it benefits and im-
proves those who study it and makes them more valuable, then you
must stop those who spread slanders about philosophy; you must de-
prive the sykophants of their civic rights; \(^{63}\) and you must advise the
young to engage in this activity rather than other pastimes.

[176] If it was my fate to face this charge, I would have much pre-
ferred to find myself in this predicament at the height of my abilities.
Then I would not be discouraged but would have been better able to
defend myself against the prosecutor and to advocate the cause of phi-
losophy. But now although philosophy has enabled me to speak rea-

\(^{63}\) Isocrates suggests that sykophants should be punished with atimia, which
was otherwise automatically incurred for such offenses as mistreating one’s par-
ents, failing in military duties, certain sexual offenses, and squandering one’s pat-
rimony. This penalty entailed loss of the right to address the Assembly and Counc-
il, entry to holy places, and participation in public rites.
sonably well about other matters, I fear that I have not discussed philosophy itself as well as other matters that were less important to me. [177] And yet, I would be content—I must speak the truth even if my words sound foolish—to end my life once I had spoken as the subject deserves and had persuaded you to realize what the pursuit of discourse (hoi logoi) actually is. I would prefer that to living a great deal longer and seeing it treated by you as it is now. [178] I am aware that I shall speak far less well than I would like; nevertheless, I shall try as far as I can to give an account of its [philosophy’s] nature and power, how it is similar to other arts, how it benefits those who pursue it, and what kinds of claims we make for it. When you learn the truth, I believe you will more readily deliberate and decide about it. [179] If I seem to be giving a speech quite unlike those customarily uttered among you, I ask you not to be annoyed and to make allowances. Understand that those who advocate a case that is unlike any other must speak about it with words that are equally unusual. So having tolerated my manner of speech and my outspokenness and having allowed me to use up the time allotted for my defense, then cast your votes as seems just and lawful to each of you.

[180] Like the genealogists, I wish to speak first about the culture of discourse (hē tôn logōn paideia). It is agreed that our nature is composed of body and soul. No one would deny that of these two, the soul is superior and more valuable, for its task is to deliberate about matters private and public, while the body’s is to serve the soul in carrying out its decisions. [181] In light of this, some of our ancestors long ago saw that although many arts existed for other matters, none had been established for the body and soul, and when they had invented two disciplines, they handed them down to us: physical training for the body, of which gymnastic is a part, and philosophy for the soul, which I shall be discussing. [182] These two disciplines are complementary, interconnected, and consistent with each other, and through them those who have mastered them make the soul more intelligent and the body more useful. They do not separate these two kinds of education but use similar methods of instruction, exercise, and other kinds of practice.

[183] When they take on pupils, physical trainers instruct their students in the positions that have been discovered for competitions, and those whose concern is philosophy pass on to their pupils all the
structures which speech (logos) employs. 64 When they have given them experience and detailed knowledge of these, they again exercise the students and make them accustomed to hard work, and then force them to synthesize everything they have learned in order that they may have a more secure understanding and their views (doxai) may be better adapted to the right moments (kairos). 65 It is not possible to learn this through study, since in all activities, these opportune moments elude exact knowledge (epistēmē), but in general those who are particularly attentive and can understand the consequences most often apprehend them. 66 Watching over their pupils and educating them in this way, both kinds of teachers can lead them to become better and more capable, whether in their intellect or their physical conditions. But neither has that knowledge by which he could make anyone he wished an adequate athlete or orator. He may contribute some share, but as a rule, real ability is found only in those who excel both in native talent and in training.

64 The language of gymnastics had been used to describe the art of rhetoric as early as Aeschylus, whose Furies refer to each rhetorical point they score in the trial of Orestes as a wrestling “fall” (Eumenides 589, 600); for the analogy with wrestling, see also Protagoras’ work entitled Kataballontes [Logoi] (= Overthrowing [Arguments]) and the Hippocratic work On the Nature of Humans 2 (in Gagarin and Woodruff 1995: 166), and in the fourth century, Plato, Gorgias 464b–c, Republic 410b–c. In the following sections Isocrates explores similarities of training, practice and discipline; in particular, just as the gymnastic teacher instructs in bodily forms (schēmata), so the teacher of rhetoric instructs in verbal forms (here ideai, but commonly in the language of rhetoric, schēmata).

65 The orator requires doxa, often translated as “opinion,” rather than a fixed body of knowledge (epistēmē), in order to be able to respond to the discursive situation and his audience; cf. also 13.8, 13.17, 15.271; Plato, Gorgias 463a7. For discussion of rhetorical doxa, see Cooper 1985.
tation (empeiria). After this, whatever the profession, they will become accomplished and far outstrip others. [188] Both teachers and students have their own parts to play: in particular, the pupils’ responsibility is to bring the requisite natural ability, and the teachers’, to be able to educate these kinds of students, but common to both is practical experience (empeiria). Teachers must meticulously oversee their students; students must resolutely follow what they have been taught.

[189] That is what I have to say about every art. If someone, leaving aside the other arts, should ask me which of these plays the greatest role in education in speaking, I would respond that nature (physis) is paramount and stands far ahead of everything else. Someone must have a mind capable of inventing, learning, working hard, and memorizing; a voice and clarity of speech that has the capacity to persuade audiences not only by what he says but also by his harmonious diction; [190] and furthermore, courage that does not signify shamelessness but prepares the soul with moderation (sôphrosynê) so that it has as much confidence in addressing all the citizens as in deliberating with himself. Doesn’t everyone know that even if such a person does not acquire a thorough education but only a general education that is common to all, he would be such an orator that in my view no Greek could equal him?

[191] Furthermore, we know that if men whose natures are inferior to these apply themselves to practice and training, they become better, not just than they were but also than those who are naturally talented but are too complacent about themselves. Each of these [i.e., nature and training] would make one gifted at speaking (legein) and at acting (prattein), and both in the same person would make him unsurpassable by others. [192] I know this about nature and experience; however, I cannot deliver such a discourse about education (paideia), for its power is not equal or similar to theirs. If someone should hear everything about oratory and he were to have more precise knowledge of it than others, he would be a more pleasing composer of speeches than most, but when facing a crowd, if he did not have this one thing—daring—he would be unable to speak.

[193] Let no one think that before you I moderate my claims but that when I converse with those who wish to spend time in my company, I claim all power for it. To defend myself against such a charge, when I embarked on this profession, I published a speech I had writ-
ten in which I clearly criticized those who make exaggerated promises, revealing my own views. [194] I shall omit my accusations of others, for they are too much for the present occasion, but I shall repeat for you what I said about my own view. I begin here:

[AN EXCERPT FROM Against the Sophists, 13.14–18, IS READ.] 66

[195] The style of this passage is more elegant than what I read before, but its intention is to make the same point as those passages, and this should be the greatest proof for you of my honesty. Clearly I did not boast or make exaggerated claims when I was younger, and now that I am older and have benefited from the profession, I make philosophy a modest activity. I have used the same words in my prime and in my retirement, both when I was confident and when I am in danger, both to those who wish to be my students and to those who are to cast their votes on me. I don't know how anyone could prove himself more true or just on the subject of philosophy. [196] Let this passage then be added to what I have said before. I am aware that I have not yet said enough to change the minds of those hostile to me, and many more arguments of all sorts are still needed for them to change the view they now have of me. [197] So I must continue to teach and speak until one of two things happens, either I change their views or I prove that the slanders and accusations against me are false.

The charges are of two types. Some say that the activities of sophists are all foolishness and trickery, since no such education has been invented through which a person might become more skilled (deinos) at speaking or more adept at public affairs, but that those who ex-

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66 Against the Sophists is translated in this series in Isocrates, Volume One. In this section of the treatise Isocrates articulates his own views as to what is required for rhetorical/philosophical education to succeed. Natural ability explains why some people have rhetorical skill despite lack of formal training (14); training, however, makes them even better. Without natural ability, there is no hope (15). The student must find a responsible teacher, who must be able to offer instruction on invention, disposition, and adornment of the speech (16). The student requires great diligence and a tenacious and imaginative mind to learn the different types of speech; the teacher must expound his teachings as precisely as he can and offer himself as an example (17–18). This passage has been interpreted as offering a theory of imitation or mimêsis; cf. Shorey 1909 and Russell 1979.
cel in these areas are naturally superior to others. [198] Other critics agree that those who undergo this training are more skilled but maintain that they are also corrupted and become worse, for when they gain this power, they begin plotting to get the property of others. I am quite confident that I can make it apparent to everyone that neither group speaks soundly or truthfully.

[199] First, notice that those who say this education is nonsense very patently themselves make no sense. They disparage it as deception and trickery that can offer no benefit, but they think that the moment students arrive to spend time with me they should be better than before, [200] that when they have spent a few days with me, they should be clearly better and wiser with regard to discourse than those who are older and more experienced, that when they have spent only a year with me, they should all be good and accomplished orators, that the lazy should be no worse than the diligent, and that those without natural talent should be as good as those who have robust minds. [201] They expect this, though they have not heard me make such claims, nor have they seen any of these results in other areas of training or education. We acquire knowledge through hard work, and we each put into practice what we learn in our own way. From every school only two or three become competitors, while the rest go off to be private citizens.

[202] How could we not conclude that people are stupid if they dare to demand from this pursuit—which they deny is an art—powers not present in the recognized arts and think that greater benefits should come from an art they do not believe in than from those that seem to have been precisely founded? [203] Sensible people should not have conflicting judgments about similar matters, or reject an education which accomplishes the same things as most arts. Who among you does not know that many who have been under the influence of the sophists have not been deceived or affected, as these say? [204] Didn’t some of them turn out to be competent competitors, while others were able to teach, and those who wished to live as private citizens were more gracious in their interactions than previously and became more acute judges and advisers than most? How then could we despise an activity which has the capacity to turn those who engage in it into men like these? [205] Everyone should agree that as far as all arts and crafts are concerned, we think that the most skilled are those
who turn out students who work as much as possible in the same way. This will also prove to be the case with philosophy. [206] All those who have had a true and intelligent leader would be found to have so similar an ability in discourse (*hoi logoi*) that it becomes obvious to everyone that they received the same education. If they had no common character or basic technical training instilled in them, they could not have achieved such a similarity.\(^{67}\)

[207] All of you here could name many of your classmates who seemed extremely stupid when they were children, but when they became older, excelled in intellect and speech to a greater degree than they fell short as children. From this especially, one could recognize the great power of practice (*epimeleia*), for it is clear that in childhood, all of them used the mental capacities they had from birth, but when they became men, they surpassed their contemporaries and transformed their intellects, because while others lived lazily without purpose, they devoted their attention to their affairs and to themselves. [208] Wherever some men became better through their own effort, how could they not far surpass themselves and others if they have taken on an older and more experienced mentor, who has learned some things from others and found out other things himself?

[209] In addition to these, there are other reasons why everyone would naturally be surprised at the ignorance of those who so casually dare to despise philosophy. First, although they know that all pursuits and arts are acquired by practice and hard work, they think that these have no power where the training of intellect is concerned. [210] Then, although they agree that no body is so weak that it cannot be improved by exercise and labor, they do not think the soul, by nature superior to the body, can become finer as a result of education and the proper training. [211] Furthermore, although they see that some individuals are skilled at making horses, dogs, and most other animals braver, or gentler, or cleverer, they think that no such education (*paideia*) has been discovered to develop these same qualities in human beings. [212] Instead, they condemn us all to such misfortune that they would agree that every other being becomes better and more useful through our intellect, but they dare to declare that we who have

\(^{67}\) Cf. Cicero, *De Oratore* 2.94.
this intellect by which we make everything else more valuable could not help each other at all to become better.

[213] The most terrible thing of all is that every year in spectacles they see lions being more gentle toward their trainers than some men are toward their benefactors; and bears rolling around, wrestling, and imitating our knowledge. [214] Yet they cannot ascertain from these examples how much power education and training have, or that these would improve our natures much more rapidly than those of animals. Consequently, I do not know which should properly astonish us, the gentleness in the most aggressive wild beasts or the savagery present in the souls of such men.

[215] One might say more about these things, but I fear that if I go on too long about matters on which most people agree, you will think that I have nothing to say on the issues in dispute. So having stopped here, I shall turn to these others, who do not simply despise philosophy but criticize it much more bitterly and transfer the evils of those who claim to be sophists but who really do something quite distinct from those whose activity is not at all the same. [216] I am speaking not for all those who claim to be able to educate, but only for those who justly have this reputation. If you are willing to hear me to the end, I think I shall clearly demonstrate that those who accuse me have fallen far short of the truth.

[217] First, I must identify the needs and the motives that lead people to do wrong. If we define these well, you will better understand whether the charges against me are true or false. Thus I assert that everyone does everything for pleasure, profit, or honor. For I do not see that people desire anything apart from these things. [218] If this is the case, it remains only to consider which of these I could acquire by corrupting the young. Do I derive pleasure at seeing or learning that they are evil, or have the reputation of being evil among the other citizens? Who is so insensitive that he would not be hurt to hear such criticism of himself? [219] I would certainly not be admired or have such a high reputation if I turned out such students; instead, people would despise and hate me more than those who are guilty of other wicked crimes. Even if I should ignore this, I would not maximize my profits, by directing education in this way. [220] I think everyone must know that the sophist’s fee is the finest and greatest when some of his pupils become intelligent gentlemen (kaloi kagathoi) and are
honored by the citizens. Such students inspire in many the desire to share their education with them, whereas the wicked repel even those who previously were intending to study with their teacher. So who could fail to know the better course, when these situations are so far apart?

[221] Someone might perhaps venture to respond to this, that through their lack of discipline (akrasia) many men do not follow their reason, but neglecting what is beneficial, they rush toward pleasure. I agree that many people, including the self-styled “sophists,” have such a nature. [222] Nonetheless, no such person is so undisciplined as to admit students of this kind. He would not be able to share in the pleasures which he would get from their lack of discipline (akrasia), and he would receive as his reward the greatest part of the notoriety that results from their evil. Next, we should ask whom they would corrupt and what sort of people they would get as their students? This is an issue worth examining. [223] Are they already corrupt and wicked? But who would try to learn from someone else what he knows by his own nature? Or are they respectable and eager to do useful things? No such person would venture to converse with those who utter or do evil. [224] I would like to learn from those who are angry at me what they think of those who sail here from Sicily, Pontus, and other places to be educated? Do they think these students travel here because they lack evil men at home? Yet one could find an abundance of men everywhere who want to conspire in evil and wrong-
doing. [225] Or do they pay a lot of money to become criminals and sykophants? Yet those with this intention would prefer to take other people’s money than to pay any of their own to others. Furthermore, who would waste money for the sake of evil, when they can do evil whenever they want without paying anything? No one needs to learn such deeds; he only has to do them.

[226] It is evident that people travel by ship, pay money, and go to all sorts of trouble because they think they will become better and that their educators here will be more intelligent than those at home. All Athenians should be proud of this and value those who are responsible for the city’s reputation in this. [227] Still, some people are very unreasonable; they know that the visitors who come here and those who supervise their education do nothing wrong but are among the most politically uninvolved (apragmonestatoi)70 in Athens; they keep themselves apart, are concerned only with themselves, and interact with one another. [228] Furthermore, they live their daily lives in the simplest and most orderly manner, they do not study speeches concerning private contract disputes or those that attack others, but only those that men everywhere respect. Nevertheless, knowing all this, those men dare to slander them and say that they undergo their training in order to profit unjustly from legal disputes. [229] Which individual would want to live a more moderate life than others if he cultivated injustice and wrongdoing? Have those who say these things ever seen anyone delaying and storing up wickedness rather than immediately exercising their natural inclinations? [230] These things apart, if dexterity in speech makes for having designs on other people’s property, then everyone who is a capable speaker should be a meddler and sykophant, for the same cause generally produces the same result in everyone.

[231] As it is, you will find that among those who are currently in public life or just recently deceased, the ones who are most concerned with speech (logoi) are the best of those who step up to the speaker’s platform. Among our ancestors, moreover, beginning from Solon, the best and most renowned orators were responsible for the greatest goods in Athens.71 [232] When Solon was in charge of the people, he

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70 See above, 151n.
71 For Solon and Cleisthenes, see 7.16n.
enacted legislation, arranged public affairs, and ordered the state so well that even now the constitution organized by him is revered. Later, Cleisthenes persuaded the citizens of Amphictyon to lend him the god’s money when he had been driven from Athens by the tyrants. He led the people back to power, drove out the tyrants, and established that democracy, which has produced the greatest goods for the Greeks. After him, Themistocles became the leader in the Persian War and advised our ancestors to leave Athens. Who could persuade them to do that without extraordinary skill in speech? He advanced the affairs of the city to such a degree that after being homeless for a few days, they became rulers of the Greeks for a long time. Finally, Pericles, a fine popular leader and the best orator, so enriched the city with temples, monuments, and every other such adornment that even now visitors think Athens deserves to rule not only the Greeks but everyone else too. In addition, he brought to the Acropolis no less than ten thousand talents. Not one of these men who had done such great things neglected speech (logoi); rather, they paid much more attention to it than to other things. As a result, Solon was included among the Seven Sophists and thus had the label “sophist,” which is now dishonored and placed on trial before you. And Pericles was a student of two of these sophists, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and Damon, who was considered the wisest citizen of his time.

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72 The money came from the treasury of Apollo.
73 Themistocles commanded the Athenian navy at the battle of Salamis, during which the Athenians abandoned the city after dedicating it to Athena: see 4.96, 6.43; Lys. 2.33–43; Plut., Themistocles 10.2–3.
74 Thucydides (1.139.4) characterizes the Athenian general and leader Pericles as an extraordinary and preeminent Athenian orator: see 2.65.1 and Aes. 1.25. After the defeat of Persia Pericles oversaw a civic building program that saw among other things the construction of the definitive temple of Athena, the Parthenon, in 438; see, e.g., 8.126 and Plut., Pericles 13.
75 Here the Seven Sophists is the name given to the “Seven Sages,” a group of sixth- and fifth-century thinkers generally including Solon, who are mentioned in literary sources from the fifth century onwards; see, e.g., Herod. 1.27. See Momigliano 1971: 27–28.
76 Anaxagoras was credited with teaching that the sun is a stone, and the moon earth (cf. Plato, Apology 26d and Diogenes Laertius 1.16). As a result of his materialistic doctrines, he was prosecuted for impiety by Cleon, fined, and exiled (cf.
[236] Could there be a clearer demonstration than this that the power of speech does not turn men into criminals? No, it is those who have my accuser’s nature who, I think, continually engage in evil words and actions. [237] I can even show you where anyone who wishes may see the names of meddlers and others who are guilty of the charges my accusers bring against the sophists. They must appear on the tablets erected by the magistrates: sykophants and others who wrong Athens appear on those put up by the Thesmothetae; common criminals and their instigators appear on those put up by the Eleven; those who commit private crimes and bring unlawful charges appear on those put up by the Forty. [238] On many of these you will find the names of Lysimachus and his friends inscribed, but you will not find me or those who engage in the same activity as I on any of them. We keep to our own affairs in order to avoid suits in our court. [239] Isn’t it more fitting to praise rather than put on trial men who do not get involved in such matters, and who do not live without discipline, or engage in any other shameful activity? It is clear that we educate our students into the same sort of activities as occupy us.

[240] You will learn even more clearly from what I am about to say how far I am from corrupting the youth. If I were doing this, it is not Lysimachus or those of his ilk who would be upset on their behalf, but instead you would see the fathers and the relations of the students all upset, bringing charges, and seeking to punish me. [241] Instead, they bring me their sons, pay my fees, and rejoice when they see them spending the day with me, while the sykophants slander us and give us trouble. Who would be happier than these to see many of the citizens corrupted and depraved? They know that among people like that they have power, but they are ruined by gentlemen of intelligence, when they are caught. [242] Thus it makes sense for them to seek to root out all such activities which they think will make people better and less tolerant of their evils and sykophancies. But it is right for you to do just the opposite, and treat those activities to which they are most hostile as the finest of all.

Diogenes Laertius 2.7). Damon, who served as Pericles’ adviser, was known as one of the founders of ancient Greek music and had other fields of expertise: see Plato, Laches 180d.

77 Boards were set up in the marketplace on which public notices, and particularly the charges for a trial, were published for public knowledge.
Something extraordinary has happened to me. I will be honest even if some say I change positions too easily. A little before, I said that many gentlemen (kaloī kagathoi) were deceived about philosophy and were highly critical of it. Now I have assumed that the arguments I made are so clear and apparent to everyone that I do not think anyone is unaware of its power, or condemns me for corrupting my students, or feels as I accused them of feeling a little while ago. If I must speak the truth and say what is in my mind, I think all who envy me want to be able to think and speak well themselves, but they neglect these things, some through laziness, others because they downplay their own natural ability, and still others for various other reasons (and there are many). But toward those who apply themselves diligently and wish to acquire the things they themselves desire, they are irritated and jealous, they are upset, and they go through the same sort of experience as lovers. What more fitting explanation could one offer for their behavior than this? They praise and envy those who can speak well, but they fault young people who wish to achieve this honor, although there is no one who would not pray to the gods to be able to speak well himself, and if not himself, then his children and relatives. They claim that those who accomplish this through labor and philosophy—which they want to get for themselves from the gods—are neglecting their duty. Sometimes they pretend to mock them as being deceived and cheated, but then when they feel like it, they change and speak of them as able to profit from their expertise. When some danger befalls the city, they listen to their advisers who are best at speaking on public matters and they do whatever such men advise. Yet they think they should slander those who take the trouble to present themselves to be useful to the city at such times. They find fault with the ignorance of the Thebans and of other enemies, but they continually criticize those who seek to do everything they can to escape this disease.

This is a sign not only of their confusion, but also of their disrespect for the gods. They regard Persuasion (Peithō) as a god, and they see Athens sacrificing to her every year, but they claim that those who wish to share in the power that the goddess has are being corrupted by desire for something evil. Worst of all, although they...
assume the soul is more important than the body, despite knowing this, they welcome those who engage in gymnastics more than those who engage in philosophy. Surely it is irrational to praise those who engage in a lesser activity rather than a higher activity. Everyone knows that Athens never accomplished the remarkable deeds for which it is renowned through physical training, but that it became the most blessed and greatest of all the Hellenic city states through man’s intellect.

[251] Someone younger than I without the anxieties of this occasion might bring together many more of their contradictions. For instance, on the same subject one could say that if some people inherited a vast sum of money from their ancestors and did not serve the city’s interests but instead abused their fellow citizens and dishonored their wives and children, would anyone dare to blame those who were responsible for the wealth and not demand that the offenders themselves be punished? [252] What if others who have learned armed combat do not use their knowledge against the enemy but cause an uprising and kill many fellow citizens, or receive the best possible training in boxing and the pankration,79 but then instead of entering athletic contests, they hit everyone they meet? Who would not praise their teachers and then put to death those who made bad use of what they learned?

[253] Thus we should have the same understanding of speaking (hoi logoi) as we do of other matters, and not judge similar cases in the opposite way, or show hostility toward this facility, which of all human capabilities is responsible for the greatest goods. For in our other facilities, as I said earlier,80 we do not differ from other living beings, and in fact we are inferior to many in speed, strength, and other resources. [254] But since we have the ability to persuade one another and to make clear to ourselves what we want, not only do we avoid living like animals, but we have come together, built cities, made laws, and invented arts (techne). Speech (logos) is responsible for nearly all our inventions. [255] It legislated in matters of justice and injustice and beauty and baseness, and without these laws, we could not live with one another. By it we refute the bad and praise the good; through it, we educate the ignorant and recognize the intelligent. We regard speaking well to be the clearest sign of a good mind, which it requires,

79 Lit. “a complete contest”; an exercise involving both boxing and wrestling.
80 Sections 253–257 are cited verbatim from 3.5–9.
and truthful, lawful, and just speech we consider the image (eidolon) of a good and faithful soul. [256] With speech we fight over contentious matters, and we investigate the unknown. We use the same arguments by which we persuade others in our own deliberations; we call those able to speak in a crowd “rhetorical” (rhetorikoi); we regard as sound advisers those who debate with themselves most skillfully about public affairs. [257] If one must summarize the power of discourse, we will discover that nothing done prudently occurs without speech (logos), that speech is the leader of all thoughts and actions, and that the most intelligent people use it most of all.

Because Lysimachus perceived none of this, he dared to prosecute those who had their hearts set on an activity responsible for so many important benefits. [258] Why should we be surprised at him, when even some of those who are experts in argumentation bring similar charges against beneficial public speeches as those brought by the basest men? They are not ignorant of the speeches’ power, or of the speed with which they benefit those who employ them, but they expect that by slandering their discourse they will increase the honor of their own profession. [259] Perhaps, I could speak much more bitterly about them than they do about me, but I do not think I should either be like those who are destroyed by envy or blame those who do no harm to their pupils but are also less able to benefit others. Still, I shall say a few things about them, primarily because they have done so about me, but also so that you may better understand their power and may treat each of us fairly. [260] in addition to making clear that although I am concerned with political discourse (hoi politikoi logoi), which they say is quarrelsome, I am much gentler than they are.

If they always disparage me, I am not inclined to do the same but will speak the truth about them. [261] I think the leaders in eristic and those who teach astrology, geometry, and other branches of learning do not harm but rather benefit their students, less than they promise but more than others think. [262] Most men regard such studies as babbling and hairsplitting, since none of them is useful in personal or public life. Students do not remember them for very long because they do not have a bearing on our lives, or help with our activities, but are in every respect nonessential. [263] On this matter my view is not the same nor is it so different: I think that those who consider this education irrelevant to public affairs are correct, and those who praise it
also utter the truth. I have stated contradictory views on this issue because by their nature these subjects are not at all like the other ones we teach. [264] Other subjects naturally help us when we gain an understanding of them. But these do not benefit us even if we become specialists in them (unless we choose to earn our living from them), but they do benefit us when we learn them. [265] When we spend time in the detail and precision of astrology and geometry, we are forced to put our minds to matters that are hard to learn, and moreover, we get used to working persistently hard at what has been said and demonstrated to us, and we cannot let our minds wander. When we are exercised and sharpened in these matters, we are able to receive and learn more important and significant material more quickly and easily. [266] I don’t think we should call what does not at present benefit our ability to speak or act “philosophy.” Instead, I call such activity a “mental gymnastics” and a “preparation for philosophy” — a more mature subject than what children learn in schools but for the most part similar. [267] When children have worked hard at grammar, music, and the rest of education, they have not yet made progress in speaking better or in deliberating on public affairs, although they have become better prepared to learn the greater and more serious subjects. [268] I would advise the young to spend some time in these subjects but not to allow their natures to become withered up by them or stranded in the discourses of the older sophists, of whom one said the number of elements is infinite; Empedocles, that it is four, among which are strife and love; Ion, that it is not more than

81 The majority of manuscripts read “we get used to speaking (legein) and working on . . .”

82 “The older sophists” are the Presocratics and not the great political leaders, like Solon, Cleisthenes, and Themistocles, mentioned in 232–235. By using “sophist” in connection with these thinkers, Isocrates is attempting to give the noun a more positive connotation than it often has at this time.

83 The reference is to Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (ca. 500 – 428). In his work On Nature, he declared that all things were infinite with respect to their number and size.

84 Empedocles of Acragas (ca. 495 – 435) wrote a poem in two books entitled On Nature in which he taught that there were four elements, fire, water, earth, and air, which came together through love and were divided by strife.
three, \textsuperscript{85} Alcmaeon, that it is only two; \textsuperscript{86} Parmenides and Melissus, that it is one; \textsuperscript{87} and Gorgias, [that it is] nothing at all. \textsuperscript{88} [269] I think that such quibblings resemble wonder-workings, which provide no benefit but attract crowds of the ignorant. Those wishing to do something useful must rid all their activities of pointless discourse and irrelevant action.

[270] I have presented a sufficient account and advice on these matters. Concerning wisdom (\textit{sophia}) and philosophy (\textit{philosophia}), it would not be fitting for someone pleading about other issues to speak about these terms, since they have nothing to do with all other activities, but since I am on trial for just such matters and am claiming that what some people call “philosophy” is not really that at all, it is appropriate for me to define it and to show you what it is, when rightly understood.

[271] I understand it quite simply. Since human nature cannot attain knowledge that would enable us to know what we must say or do, after this I think that the wise (\textit{sophoi}) are those who have the ability to reach the best opinions (\textit{doxai}) most of the time, and philosophers are those who spend time acquiring such an intelligence as quickly as possible. [272] I can reveal which activities have such power, but I hesitate to do so because they are so very unexpected and so far removed from other people’s ideas. I fear that as soon as you hear them you will fill the whole courtroom with shouting and protest. But despite these feelings, I shall try to discuss them. I am embarrassed if I

\textsuperscript{85} Ion of Chios (fifth century) is credited with the idea that everything is made up of three things. Some of them are always at war, but when they come together, they produce offspring.

\textsuperscript{86} Alcmeon of Croton (fifth century) proposed that human affairs generally occur in opposing pairs; health was a balance—or not—of these opposites.

\textsuperscript{87} In his poem \textit{Truth}, Parmenides of Elea wrote of what \textit{is} as being all together, one and continuous. He is said to have come with Zeno to Athens, where he met the young Socrates. Melissus, the pupil of Parmenides, wrote a work entitled \textit{On Nature or on What Exists}. Paraphrases are preserved in the Pseudo-Aristotelian \textit{On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias}.

\textsuperscript{88} Gorgias, introduced as the successful but also irresponsible teacher of rhetoric at section 155, now appears a nihilist. This aspect of his thinking is represented by his work \textit{On Not Being}; cf. 10.3.
appear to some to be afraid of betraying the truth because of my old age and the short life I have left. [273] I ask that you do not decide ahead of time that I am so mad that being in peril I would choose to utter words contrary to your view, unless I considered them consistent with what I have already said and thought that I had true and evident proofs of them.

[274] I think that an art that can produce self-control (sôphrosynê) and justice (dikaiosynê) in those who are by nature badly disposed to virtue (aretê) has never existed and does not now exist, and that those who previously made promises to this effect will cease speaking and stop uttering nonsense before such an education (paideia) is discovered. [275] In my view, people improve and become worthier if they are interested in speaking well, have a passion for being able to persuade their audience, and also desire advantage (pleonexia)—not what foolish people think it is but that which truly has this power. [276] I think I can quickly show that this is so.

In the first place, someone who chooses to speak and write speeches worthy of praise and honor will not possibly select topics that are unjust or insignificant or that deal with private arguments but those public issues which are important and noble and promote human welfare. If he does not discover any such topics, he will accomplish nothing. [277] Then from the evidence relevant to his topic, he will select the most appropriate and advantageous. Someone who is accustomed to examine and evaluate such topics will have this same facility not only for the speech at hand but also for other affairs. As a result, those who are philosophical and ambitious in their devotion to speaking (logoi) will at the same time speak well and think intelligently. [278] Moreover, anyone who wishes to persuade others will not neglect virtue but will devote even more attention to ensuring that he achieves a most honorable reputation among his fellow citizens. Who could fail to know that speeches seem truer when spoken by those of good name than by the disreputable, and that arguments acquire more authority when they come from one’s life than from mere words. The more ardently someone wants to persuade his audience, the more he will strive to be a gentleman (kalos kagathos) and to have a good reputation among the citizens.

[279] Let none of you think that everyone else knows how it supports the cause of persuasion if one can please the jury, and that phi-
losophers alone are ignorant of the power of goodwill. They know this far more acutely than others. [280] In addition, they know that plausibility (to eikos), and inference, and all forms of proof contribute only that part of the speech in which each of them is uttered, whereas the reputation of being a gentleman not only makes the speech more persuasive but also makes the actions of one who has such a reputation more honorable. Intelligent men must covet this more than anything else.

[281] This brings me to the subject of advantage (pleonexia), which is the most problematic of the issues I have mentioned. If someone assumes that people gain advantages by stealing, misrepresenting, or doing something evil, he is under the wrong impression. No one is more disadvantaged in his entire life than such men; no one lives in greater poverty or in greater disrepute; and no one is more thoroughly wretched. [282] You should now realize that those who are most righteous and most devoted in service to the gods receive and will continue to receive more advantages from the gods, just as those who are most devoted to the interests of their family and fellow citizens and have the best reputation among them will gain more advantages from other human beings. [283] This is the truth, but it is, furthermore, helpful to speak in this way on the subject, since Athens is in such a state of confusion and chaos that some people no longer use words naturally but transfer them from the finest deeds to the basest activities. 89 [284] They call buffoons and those who can mock and imitate others “talented” (euphyeis), when this term rightly applies to those who are most virtuous by nature. 90 And they think that those who rely on a wicked nature and evil deeds to gain a little profit while acquiring an evil reputation are at an advantage, not those who are most righteous and just, who profit from good and not evil. [285] And they declare that those who neglect the necessities of life and admire the logical tricks of the ancient sophists do “philosophy,” having disregarded those who learn and practice what allows them to manage

89 Isocrates may have in mind Thuc. 3.82. Aristotle (Topics 112a32) treats the misassignments of words as a form of verbal attack.

90 Cf. 7.49. Note that at 7.74 Isocrates says that he will cite less extensive passages from his prior works.
well their own homes and the city’s commonwealth \(^91\) — for which one must work hard, engage in philosophy, and do everything necessary.

Because you accept the arguments of those who slander this kind of education (\emph{paideia}), you have been driving the young away from such activities. \^[286\textsuperscript{]} You have led the most promising of them to spend their youth in drink, social gatherings, amusements, and games, while neglecting the serious business of self-improvement, and those with baser natures to pass the day in the sort of undisciplined behavior that no honest slave would have previously dared.\(^92\) \^[287\textsuperscript{]} Some of them chill wine in the Nine Fountains;\(^93\) others drink in the taverns, while others play dice in the gambling dens; and many hang out in the schools for flute girls.\(^94\) And none of those who claim to be concerned about these youths has ever brought those who encourage such behavior before this jury of yours. Instead, they harass me, although if anything, I deserve thanks for turning my students away from such activities.

\^[288\textsuperscript{]} The race of sykophants is so hostile to everyone that far from reproaching those who spend twenty or thirty minas to obtain women who will consume the rest of their household, instead they rejoice at their lavishness; but if someone spends anything on his own education (\emph{paideia}), the sykophants say they are being corrupted. Who could bring a more unjust charge than this against my pupils? \^[289\textsuperscript{]} Although they are in the prime of their lives, they disregarded the pleasures that most men of the same age desire, and although they had the option of taking life easy and spending nothing, they chose to pay out money and work. As soon as they left childhood, they knew what many older people do not, \^[290\textsuperscript{]} that in order to supervise this age correctly and properly and to start life in a favorable way, a person must tend to himself before attending to his affairs, must not hurry or

\(^91\) Protagoras had claimed to teach \emph{euboulia}, i.e., good management of one’s household (\emph{oikos}) and the city (\emph{polis}); see Plato, \emph{Protagoras} 318e–319a.

\(^92\) Cf. 7.48 on the pastimes of contemporary youth.

\(^93\) The Nine Fountains were most likely situated between the Acropolis and the Pnyx; see Thuc. 2.15.5.

\(^94\) See Plato, \emph{Symposium} 212c–d, for the association of flute girls with a dissipated lifestyle. Flute girls may have also doubled as prostitutes for young men.
seek to rule others before finding someone to oversee his intellect, must not rejoice in or pride himself on other good things as much as on those that the soul produces as a result of education. Surely one should not blame but rather praise those who use such logic, and regard them as the best and most prudent of their contemporaries.

[291] I am amazed that those who congratulate naturally able speakers for the fine talent they have been endowed with nonetheless still find fault with those who wish to become like these and accuse them of desiring an unjust and bad education. Does anything that is noble turn out shameful or wicked if one works to attain it? We will not find any such thing, and everywhere else we praise those who can acquire some benefit by their own effort, more than those who inherit it from their ancestors. [292] This is reasonable. It is better in all other matters and especially in speaking to gain repute not by good luck but by practice. Those who become skilled speakers by nature and luck do not aspire for what is best but are accustomed to use words as they come. On the other hand, those who acquire this ability by means of philosophy and reasoning do not speak thoughtlessly and are less careless in their affairs.

[293] As a result, it is appropriate for everyone, especially you jurors, to want many to become skilled speakers through education. For you excel and are superior to others not because of your attention to military matters, or because you have the best constitution, or are the most effective guardians of the laws your ancestors left to you, but because of that feature which makes human nature superior to that of other living creatures and the Greek race superior to the barbarians, [294] namely, a superior education in intellect and speech. Accordingly, it would be a most terrible outcome if you vote to condemn those who wish to surpass their contemporaries in the very things in which you surpass everyone else, and pile misfortune on those who obtain the kind of education in which you are the leaders. [295] You must not ignore the fact that our city is thought to be the teacher of all those who are skilled in speaking and teaching. ⁹⁵ And this is reasonable, for people see that the city makes available the greatest rewards for those who have this ability and provides the greatest number and

⁹⁵For the motif of Athens as the teacher of Greece, see Thuc. 2.41.1, 7.63, and Plut., Moralia 784b; cf. Plut., Lycurgus 30, for Sparta as the teacher of Greece.
variety of opportunities for exercising them for those who choose to compete and wish to engage in such activities. [296] Furthermore, everyone here acquires experience, which most of all produces the ability to speak. In addition, they think that our common dialect, and its moderation, our flexibility, and our love of language contribute significantly to our culture of discourse (*hē tōn logōn paideia*). Hence, they are right to think that all who have skill at speaking are students of Athens.

[297] Be careful to avoid becoming utterly ridiculous by condemning as something trifling this reputation that you have among the Greeks more than I have among you. You will clearly be convicting yourselves of the same injustice, [298] and you will have acted just as if the Spartans should attempt to punish those who practice military arts, or the Thessalians thought to punish those who practiced horsemanship. [97] You must guard against this so as not to make such a mistake about yourselves, or to make the speeches of the city’s accusers more credible than those of its encomiasts.

[299] I think that you are not unaware that some of the Greeks are hostile to you, and that others are as fond of you as they can be and lay their hopes of salvation in you. The latter say that Athens is the only city (*polis*), that the others are villages (*kómai*), and that Athens rightly should be called the capital (*astu*) of Greece because of its size and the resources we provide to others, and especially for the character of the inhabitants. [300] They say none are more gentle, more sociable, or better suited to someone who would spend his whole life here. People use such warm terms that they do not hesitate to declare that punishment by an Athenian man is more pleasant than favorable treatment through the savagery of others. Others dismiss this praise; they describe the bitterness and wickedness of the sykophants and accuse the whole city of being unsociable and cruel. [301] It is up to the jurors who are sensible to destroy those who are responsible for such words, because they heap a great shame on Athens, and to honor

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[96] Cf. 4.50; on the historical consistency of the Attic language, see Herod. 1.57–58.

[97] Isocrates here invokes three cultural stereotypes—Athenians as intellectuals, Spartans as militarists, and Thessalians as equestrians—all of which serve to affirm the superiority of Athens for pursuing intellectual, over the physical, arts.
those who contribute some part to the praise it receives, even more than the athletes who win in the prize competitions. [302] These men acquire a much finer and more fitting reputation for the city than athletes.\textsuperscript{98} We have many rivals in athletic competition, but in education, all would judge us winners. Even those with slight ability to reason should make clear that they honor men who excel in those activities for which Athens is highly regarded, and they are not jealous but agree with the other Greeks about them.

[303] None of these things ever concerned you, but you have failed to perceive your interests to such a degree that you prefer to listen to those who slander you than to those who praise you, and you think that those who cause many to hate Athens are more democratic than those who dispose their associates to think well of the city. [304] If you are sensible, you will stop this confusion. You will not, as you do now, either treat philosophy harshly or dismiss it, but you will accept that the cultivation of the soul is the best and most worthwhile activity. You will encourage young men with adequate wealth and leisure to pursue education and this kind of training. [305] You will value those who are willing to work hard and prepare themselves for service to the city. You will hate those who live dissolutely and think of nothing other than how they can extravagantly enjoy their inheritance, and you will regard them as traitors, both of Athens and of their ancestors’ reputations. If they see you treating either of these groups in this manner, the youth will gradually despise easy living and will be willing to attend to themselves and to philosophy.

[306] Recall the beauty of the magnificent achievements of our city and our ancestors. Reflect on them yourselves and consider who the man was who drove out the tyrants, restored the people, and established the democracy, who his ancestors were, and what kind of education he received;\textsuperscript{99} what sort of person defeated the barbarians at the battle of Marathon and gained glory from this feat for our city;\textsuperscript{100} and who after him freed the Greeks and led our forefathers to the leadership and power they obtained. After he understood the

\textsuperscript{98}For similar comparisons of intellectuals with athletes, see, e.g., Xenophanes 2 and Plato, Apology 36d.

\textsuperscript{99}Cleisthenes; see above, 232.

\textsuperscript{100}Miltiades, who is not previously named.
natural advantages of Piraeus, he built a wall around the city with the
Spartans objecting. And after him, who filled the Acropolis with
silver and gold and made private households teem with great pros-
perity and wealth? If you look at each of these individuals,
you will find that they did not accomplish these things living like
sykophants, or negligently, or like the multitude, but rather they ex-
celled and were preeminent not only in birth and reputation but also
in their ability to think and speak. In this way they became responsible
for all these benefits.

So it is only reasonable that with these examples in mind you
should examine this case in the interests of the people, that in their
private disputes, they may obtain justice and have their due share of
other public privileges, and you should cherish, honor, and cultivate
those who are superior by nature and education as well as those who
desire to be such. You know that leadership in noble and important
enterprises, the ability to save our city from danger, and the protection
of democracy are in the hands of such men, not sykophants.

Although many other arguments come into my mind, I don’t
know how to fit them in. I think that each of the points I am consid-
ering would by itself appear plausible, but to lay them all out together
would be tedious for me and my audience. I am anxious that the
length of what I have already said may have made you feel this way.
Our appetite for discourse is so insatiable that while we praise
timeliness (eukairia) and say nothing equals it, when we think we have
a point to make, we disregard moderation; little by little, we con-
tinue to add more until finally we abandon timeliness altogether. Still,
although I say this and understand it, I want to continue to speak
to you.

I find it difficult to watch sykophancy getting better treat-
ment than philosophy, the former accusing while the latter defends
itself. Who among our forefathers would have foreseen this state of
affairs, especially among you, who have a higher opinion of wisdom
than others? It was not like this with our ancestors: they admired

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101 Themistocles; see above, 233. For his construction of the long walls around
Piraeus, see Thuc. 1.93.

102 Pericles; see above, 234. Pericles moved the treasury of the Delian League
from Delos to Athens; cf. Thuc. 2.13.
those who were sophists and envied their students but regarded sykophants as responsible for most evils. This is the greatest proof. They considered Solon, the first citizen to be called a “sophist,” worthy to lead the city, and they made the laws harsher for sykophants than for other criminals. [314] They tried the most serious crimes in just one of the courts, but against these individuals, they admitted indictments (graphai) before the Thesmothetae, public prosecutions (eisangeliai) before the Council, and denunciations (probolai) in the Assembly, for they thought that those who practice this profession [i.e., sykophancy] surpass all other evils. 103 Others try to avoid detection when they do evil, [315] but these display their savagery, inhumanity, and contentiousness in front of everyone.

This is how they were viewed in the past; yet, far from punishing them, you use them as prosecutors and legislators for others, although you now have more reason than before to hate them. [316] Previously they injured their fellow citizens only in everyday matters of local interest. But when Athens increased in power and gained control of an empire, our ancestors became overconfident and grew jealous of the power of those aristocrats (kaloi kagathoi) who had made the city great; they came to desire wicked men, full of brashness, [317] thinking that their bold and contentious nature made them capable of preserving the democracy, but because of their base origins, they would not be ambitious, or desire other forms of government. 104 As a result of this change, what disaster has not befallen the city? What great evil have men of this nature not accomplished through their words and actions? [318] Did they not criticize those citizens who are most respected and best able to benefit the city for being oligarchical and of imitating Spartan ways? Did they not persist until they compelled their [victims] to become what they were accused of being? Did they not abuse our allies and bring false accusations against them, depriving

103 In this section Isocrates lists a series of legislative measures introduced by the historical leaders of Athens to curb the activities of the sykophants. He emphasizes the seriousness with which the activities of the sykophants were previously viewed.

104 I.e., unlike traditional aristocratic leaders who might wish to establish an oligarchical government.
the best citizens of their wealth and consequently inciting them to revolt from us and to desire friendship and an alliance with Sparta? Thus we found ourselves in war. We sat by, watching some of our citizens killed in battle, others captured by the enemy, and others lacking the necessities of life, as well as the democracy twice destroyed, and the walls of the fatherland torn down. But the worst of all is that the whole city was in danger of being enslaved, and our enemies inhabited the Acropolis.\footnote{105}

\[320\] Although I am carried away by the force of my anger and I have lapsed into arguments and criticisms that could last days, I perceive that my waterclock is running out.\footnote{106} Thus I have omitted most of the calamities brought about by these men, and put aside many of the points still to be said about their sykophancies. I will now mention a few minor points and then shall conclude my case.\footnote{107} I note that when others in peril come to the end of their defense, they beg and plead and bring out their children and friends, but I do not think anything of this kind is appropriate to a man of my age. Apart from holding this view, I would be embarrassed if I were saved through any means other than the arguments (\textit{logoi}) I have uttered and written. I know I have employed them righteously and justly with regard to the city, our ancestors, and especially the gods. Thus if the gods are in fact concerned with human affairs, I don’t think they will overlook anything that has happened to me.\footnote{108} For that reason, I do not fear anything you may do to me; instead, I am encouraged and have great

\footnote{105} The described calamities are the Peloponnesian War; the overthrow of the democracy by the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in 411 and then by the Thirty Tyrants in 404; the collapse of the long walls connecting Athens to Piraeus; and the Spartan occupation of the Acropolis.

\footnote{106} Legal cases could not last longer than a day, and litigants had to speak within the time constraints set by a waterclock. The amount of water granted to the speaker varied with the nature and value of the case; see Harrison 1971: 161–163, also 156. It was a commonplace for the speaker to acknowledge the constraints of time; see Aes. 2.126, 3.197; Dem. 43.8, 53.17.

\footnote{107} For the cliché devices that orators use to gain the jury’s sympathy, see Plato, \textit{Apology} 34c (which this passage directly echoes); Aristoph., \textit{Wasps} 568–574; Dem. 21.99 and 186–188; Arist., \textit{Rhetoric} 13543a.
hopes of reaching the end of my life whenever it is best for me. I take it as a sign that I have lived my life until this day as is fitting for men who are righteous and dear to the gods.

[323] That is my view. I think that whatever you decide will be beneficial and advantageous for me.

May each of you vote as he pleases and wishes.\textsuperscript{108}

**APPENDIX: SECTIONS 222–224 FROM THE LAURENTIANUS CODEX**

It is unfair to slander those who practice philosophy well because of undisciplined and wicked people. Even if some citizens are sykophants and evildoers, as my accuser is, it is not proper to think that everyone else is the same: each person must be judged separately. For this reason, I read my speeches to you and listed my students. I wished to show how different we are from others. You will find none of these things in our activities, speeches, exercises, or claims. My students associated with me for none of the same reasons as the others, for the latter seek to share in boasting, whereas my students seek to share in culture (\textit{paideias}). In addition, you would see that those who cause trouble in all the Greek cities and seek individuals to deceive are justly hated, while my associates who come from every place are truthful and serious. I would gladly ask Lysimachus what he thinks about those who sail here from Sicily, Pontus, and other places to me to be educated and whether he thinks they make this journey because they are short of wicked people where they come from? But one might find a great abundance of people everywhere who wish to conspire in evil and wrongdoing.

\textsuperscript{108}A final Platonic reference to \textit{Apology} 35d5–8. And there the similarities with Socrates’ end, for where Plato’s philosopher receives the death penalty, Isocrates and his philosophy can only be victorious in light of the speech’s fictional staging.