Trans-Species Pidgins

When Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing for his object. For there is a thing there is another thing. Every It is bounded by others; It exists only through being bounded by others. But when Thou is spoken, there is no thing. Thou has no bounds.
When Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing; he has indeed nothing. But he takes his stand in relation.

— Martin Buber, I and Thou

The dogs should have known what was to befall them in the forest that day they were killed. In a conversation she had with Delia and Luisa, back at the house shortly after we buried the dogs' bodies, Améria wondered aloud why her family's canine companions were unable to augur their own deaths and, by extension, why she, their master, was caught unaware of the fate that would befall them: "While I was by the fire, they didn't dream," she said. "They just slept, those dogs, and they're usually real dreamers. Normally while sleeping by the fire they'll bark, 'bua bua bua.'" Dogs, I learned, dream, and by observing them as they dream people can know what their dreams mean. If, as Améria suggested, their dogs would have barked "bua bua" in their sleep, this would have been an indicator that they were dreaming of chasing animals, and they would therefore have done the same in the forest the following day, for this is how a dog barks when pursuing game. If, by contrast, they would have barked "cuai" that night, this would be a sure signal that a jaguar would kill them the following day, for this is how dogs cry out when attacked by felines.¹

That night, however, the dogs didn't bark at all, and therefore, much to the consternation of their masters, they failed to foretell their own deaths. As Delia proclaimed, "Therefore, they shouldn't have died." The realization that the system of dream interpretation that people use to understand their dogs
had provoked an epistemological crisis of sorts; the women began to question whether they could ever know anything. Ameliga, visibly frustrated, asked, "So how can we ever know?" Everyone laughed somewhat uneasily as Luiza reflected, "How is it knowable? Now, even when people are gonna die, we won't be able to know." Ameliga concluded simply, "It wasn't meant to be known."

The dreams and desires of dogs are, in principle, knowable, because all beings, and not just humans, engage with the world and with each other as selves, that is, as beings that have a point of view. To understand other kinds of selves, one simply needs to learn how to inhabit their variously embodied points of view. So the question of how dogs dream matters deeply. Not only because of the purported predictive power of dreams, but because imagining that the thoughts of dogs are not knowable would throw into question whether it is ever possible to know the intentions and goals of any kind of self.

Entertaining the viewpoints of other beings blurs the boundaries that separate kinds of selves. In their mutual attempts to live together and to make sense of one another, dogs and people, for example, increasingly come to partake in a sort of shared trans-species habitus that does not observe the distinctions we might otherwise make between nature and culture; specifically, the hierarchical relationship that unites the Runa and their dogs is based as much on the ways in which humans have been able to harness canine forms of social organization as it is on the legacies of a colonial history in the Upper Amazon that links people in Ávila to the white-meatizzato world beyond their village.

Trans-species communication is dangerous business. It must be undertaken in ways that avoid, on the one hand, the complete transmutation of the human self—no one wants to permanently become a dog—and, on the other, the monadic isolation represented by what in the previous chapter I called soul blindness, which is the selfishistic flipside of this transmutation. To mitigate such dangers people in Ávila make strategic use of different trans-species communicative strategies. These strategies reveal something important about the need to venture beyond the human and the challenges of doing so in ways that don't dissolve the human. These strategies also reveal something important about the logic inherent to semiosis. Understanding these, in turn, is central to the anthropology beyond the human that I am developing. To tease out some of these properties, I've chosen, as a heuristic device to focus my inquiry, the following small but vexing ethnological conundrum: Why do people in Ávila interpret dog dreams literally (e.g., when a dog barks in its sleep this is an omen that it will bark in identical fashion the following day in the forest), whereas for the most part they interpret their own dreams metaphorically (e.g., if a man dreams of killing a chicken he will kill a game bird in the forest the following day)?

ALL TOO HUMAN

The ecology of selves within which the Runa, their dogs, and the many beings of the forest live reaches well beyond the human, but it is also one that is "all too human." I use this term to refer to the ways in which our lives and those of others get caught up in the moral webs we humans spin. I wish to signal that an anthropology that seeks a more capacious understanding of the human by attending to our relations to those who stand beyond us must also understand such relations by virtue of the ways in which they can be affected by that which is distinctively human.

I argued in chapter 1 that symbolic reference is distinctively human. That is, the symbolic is something that is (on this planet) unique to humans. The moral is also distinctively human, because to think morally and to act ethically requires symbolic reference. It requires the ability to momentarily distance ourselves from the world and our actions in it to reflect on our possible modes of future conduct—conduct that we can deem potentially good for others that are not us. This distancing is achieved through symbolic reference.

My intention here is not to arrive at a universal understanding of what might be an appropriate moral system. Nor is it a claim that living well with others—what Haraway (2008: 188–89) calls "flourishing"—necessarily requires rational abstraction, or morality (even though thinking about the good does). But to imagine an anthropology beyond the human that does not simply project human qualities everywhere we must situate morality ontologically. That is, we must be precise about where and when morality comes to exist. To state it baldly, before humans walked this earth there was no morality and no ethics. Morality is not constitutive of the nonhuman beings with whom we share this planet. It is potentially appropriate to morally evaluate actions we humans initiate. This is not the case for nonhumans (see Deacon 1997: 219).

Value, by contrast, is intrinsic to the broader nonhuman living world because it is intrinsic to life. There are things that are good or bad for a living self and its potential for growth (see Deacon 2012: 25, 322), keeping in mind that by "growth" I mean the possibility to learn by experience (see chapter 2).
Because nonhuman living selves can grow it is appropriate to think about the moral implications our actions have on their potential to grow well—to flourish.3

As with the symbolic, to say that the moral is distinctive does not mean that it is cut off from that from which it emerges. Morality stands in a relation of emergent continuity to value, just as symbolic reference stands in a relation of emergent continuity to indexical reference. And value extends beyond the human. It is a constitutive feature of living selves. Our moral worlds can affect nonhuman beings precisely because there are things that are good or bad for them. And some of those things that are good or bad for them are also, we might learn if we could learn to listen to these beings with whom our lives are entangled, good or bad for us as well.

This is especially true when we begin to consider how this us that comprises us is an emergent self that can incorporate many kinds of beings in its coming configurations. We humans are the products of the multiple nonhuman beings that have come to make and continue to make us who we are. Our cells are, in a sense, themselves selves, and their organelles were once, in the distant past, free-living bacterial selves; our bodies are vast ecologies of selves (Margulis and Sagan 2002; McPail-Ngai et al. 2013). None of these selves in and of themselves are loci of moral action, even though larger selves with emergent properties (properties such as the capacity for moral thinking, in the case of humans) can subsume them.

The multispecies encounter is, as Haraway has intimated, a particularly important domain for cultivating an ethical practice. In it, we are more clearly confronted with what she calls “significant otherness” (Haraway 2003). In these encounters we are confronted by an otherness that is radically (significantly) other—without, I would add, that otherness being incommensurable or “incognizable” (see chapter 2). But in these encounters we can nonetheless find ways to enter intimate (significant) relations with these others who are radically not us. Many of these selves who are not ourselves are also not human. That is, they are not symbolic creatures (which means that they are also not loci of moral judgment). As such, they force us to find new ways to listen; they force us to think beyond our moral worlds in ways that can help us imagine and realize more just and better worlds.

A more capacious ethical practice, one that mindfully attends to finding ways of living in a world peopled by other selves, should come to be a feature of the possible worlds we imagine and seek to engender with other beings, just as to go about doing this, just how to decide on what kind of flourishing to encourage—and to make room for the many deaths on which all flourishing depends—is itself a moral problem (see Haraway 2008: 157, 288). Morality is a constitutive feature of our human lives; it is one of human life’s many difficulties. It is also something we can better understand through an anthropology beyond the human; semiosis and morality must be thought together because the moral cannot emerge without the symbolic.

The qualifier “all too” (as opposed to “distinctive”) is not value-neutral. It carries its own moral judgment. It implies that there is something potentially troubling at play here. This chapter and those that follow attend to this by opening themselves to the complicated ways in which the Runa are immersed in the many all-too-human legacies of a colonial history that affect so much of life in this part of the Amazon. These chapters, in short, begin to open themselves to problems that involve power.

**DOG-HUMAN ENTANGLEMENTS**

In many ways dogs and people in Ávila live in independent worlds. People often ignore their dogs, and once they mature into adults their masters don’t even necessarily feed them. Dogs, for their part, seem to largely ignore people. Resting in the cool shade under the house, stealing off after the bitch next door, or, as Hilario’s dogs did a few days before they were killed, hunting down a deer on their own—dogs largely live their own lives. And yet their lives are also intimately entangled with those of their human masters. This entanglement does not just involve the circumscribed context of the home or village. It is also the product of the interactions that dogs and people have with the biotic world of the forest as well as with the sociopolitical world beyond Ávila through which both species are linked by the legacy of a colonial history. Dog-human relationships need to be understood in terms of both these poles. The hierarchical structure on which these relationships are based is simultaneously (but not equally) a biological and a colonial fact. Relationships of predation, for example, characterize how the Runa and their dogs relate to the forest as well as to the world of whites.

Through a process that Brian Hare and others (2002) call “phylogenetic enculturation” dogs have penetrated human social worlds to such an extent that they exceed even chimpanzees in understanding certain aspects of human communication (such as different forms of pointing to indicate the location of
food). Accordingly, people strive to guide their dogs along this path in much the same way that they help youngsters to mature into adulthood. Just as they advise a child on how to live correctly, people counsel their dogs. To do this, they make them ingest a mixture of plants and other substances, such as agouti bile, known collectively as tsita. Some of the ingredients are hallucinogenic and also quite toxic. By giving them advice in this fashion, people in Ávila are trying to reinforce a human ethos of comportment that dogs should share.7

Like Ruma adults, dogs should not be lazy. For dogs, this means that instead of chasing chickens and other domestic animals, they should pursue forest game. In addition, dogs, like people, should not be violent. This means that dogs shouldn’t bite people or bark at them loudly. Finally, dogs, like their masters, should not expend all their energy on sex. I’ve observed people administer tsita to dogs on several occasions. What happened at Ventura’s house is typical in many respects. According to Ventura, before his dog Puntero discovered females he was a good hunter, but once he began to be sexually active he lost the ability to be aware of animals in the forest. Because soul-substance is passed to a developing fetus through semen during sex, he, like the expectant fathers I discussed in chapter 3, became soul blind. So early one morning Ventura and his family captured Puntero, fastened his snout shut with a strip of vine, and hog-tied him. Ventura then poured tsita down Puntero’s snout. While doing this he said the following:

chases little rodents  
it will not bite chickens  
chases swiftly  
it should say, “hua hua”  
it will not lie

The way Ventura spoke to his dog is extremely unusual. I’ll return to it later. For now, I’ll only give a general gloss. In the first phrase “little rodents” refers obliquely to the agoutis that dogs are supposed to chase. The second phrase is an admonition not to attack domestic animals but to hunt forest ones instead. The third phrase encourages the dog to chase animals but otherwise not to run ahead of the hunter. The fourth phrase reaffirms what a good dog should be doing: finding game and therefore barking “hua hua.” The final phrase refers to the fact that some dogs “lie.” That is, they bark “hua hua” even when there are no animals present.

As Ventura poured the liquid, Puntero attempted to bark. Because his snout was tied shut he was unable to do so. When he was finally released Puntero stumbled off and remained in a daze all day. Such a treatment carries real risks. Many dogs do not survive this ordeal, which highlights how dependent dogs are on exhibiting human qualities for their physical survival. There is no place in Ruma society for dogs-as-animals.

Dogs, however, are not just animals-becoming-people. They can also acquire qualities of jaguars, the quintessential predators. Like jaguars, dogs are carnivorous. Their natural propensity (when they haven’t succumbed to domestic laziness) is to hunt animals in the forest. Even when dogs are fed vegetable food, such as palm hearts, people in Ávila refer to it as meat in their presence.

People also see dogs as their potential predators. During the conquest the Spaniards used dogs to attack the forebears of the Ávila Ruma. Today this canine predatory nature is visible with regard to the special ritual meal that forms part of the feast known as the aya pichca, which I discussed in the previous chapter. This meal, which consists of cooked palm hearts, is eaten early in the morning after the ghost of the deceased is sent back to where he or she was born, to reunite with the afterbirth. The long tubular hearts, which are left intact for this meal, resemble human bones (by contrast, when palm hearts are prepared for everyday meals they are finely chopped).9 Resembles bones, the palm hearts presented at this meal serve as a substitute for the corpse of the deceased in a sort of “mortuary endo-cannibalistic” feast, not unlike other feasts in other parts of Amazonia (and perhaps historically in the Ávila region as well; see Oberem 1980: 288) in which the bones of the dead are consumed by their living relatives (see Fonseca 2007). Those present at the meal held after we sent off Jorge’s ghost stressed that under no circumstances must dogs eat the palm hearts. Dogs, who see palm hearts as meat, are predators par excellence, for like jaguars and cannibalistic humans they can come to treat people as prey.10

Dogs, then, can acquire jaguar-like attributes, but jaguars can also become canine. Despite their manifest role as predators, jaguars are also the subreign dogs of the spirit beings who are the masters of the animals in the forest. According to Ventura, “What we think of as a jaguar is actually a [spirit animal master’s] dog.”

It is important to note that in Ávila these spirit animal masters, who keep jaguars as dogs, are often described as powerful white estate owners and priests. People liken the game animals these masters own and protect to the herds of cattle that whites keep on their ranches. In one sense, then, the Ávila
Runa are not so different from many other Amazonians who understand human and nonhuman sociality as one and the same thing. That is, for many Amazonians, the social principles found in human society are the same as those that structure animal and spirit societies of the forest. And this goes in both directions: nonhuman sociality informs understandings of human sociality just as much as human sociality informs that of nonhumans (see Descola 1994). Ávila, however, has always been part of larger political economies at the same time that it has been fully immersed in the forest’s ecology of selves. This means that Runa “society” also includes a sense of the fraught relations the Runa have to others in a broader colonial, and now republican, arena. As a consequence, the sociality that extends to the nonhumans of the forest is also informed by those all-too-human histories in which the Runa, over the generations, have become entangled. This, then, in part, is why the animal masters that live deep in the forest are white (for a further discussion of what exactly being “white” here means, see chapters 5 and 6).

Were-jaguars—runa puma—are also dogs. As Ventura explained it to me, with reference to his recently deceased father, when a person “with jaguar” (pumayu) dies, his or her soul goes to the forest to “become a dog.” Were-jaguars become the “dogs” of the spirit animal masters. That is, they become subservient to them in the same way that people from Ávila enter subservient relations when they go to work as field hands for estate owners and priests. A runa puma, then, is simultaneously Runa, a potent feline predator, and the obedient dog of a white animal master.

In addition to being emblematic of the Runa predicament of being simultaneously predator and prey, dominant and submissive, dogs are extensions of people’s actions in the world beyond the village. Because they serve as scouts, often detecting prey well before their masters can, dogs extend Runa predatory endeavors in the forest. They are also, along with the humans, subject to the same threats of predation by jaguars.

In addition to the linkages they help people forge with the beings of the forest, dogs allow the Runa to reach out to that other world beyond the village—the realm of white-mestizo colonists who own ranches near Ávila territory. Ávila dogs are woefully underfed, and as a result they are often quite unhealthy. For this reason, they are rarely able to produce viable offspring, and people from Ávila must often turn to outsiders to obtain pups. A human-induced canine reproductive failure, then, makes people dependent on these outsiders for the procreation of their dogs. They also tend to adopt the dog names that colonists use. In this regard, the names Pusaña and Huiqui are exceptions. More common are dog names such as Marquesa, Quitería, or even Tiwintza (a toponym of Jivaroean origin, marking the site of Ecuador’s 1995 territorial conflict with Peru). This practice of using the dog names preferred by colonists is another indicator of how dogs always link the Runa to a broader social world, even when they are also products of a domestic sociality.

As a link between forest and outside worlds, dogs in many ways resemble the Runa, who, as “Christian Indians,” have historically served as mediators between the urban world of whites and the sylvan one of the Auca, or non-Christian “unconquered” indigenous peoples, especially the Huaorani (Hudson 1987; Taylor 1999:193). Until approximately the 1950s the Runa were actually enlisted by powerful estate owners—ironically, like the mastiffs of the Spanish conquest used to hunt down Runa forebears—to help them track down and attack Huaorani settlements. And, as ranch hands, they continue to help colonists engage with the forest by, for example, hunting for them.

I should also note that the kinds of dogs that people in Ávila acquire from colonists do not for the most belong to any recognizable breed. Throughout much of Spanish-speaking Ecuador, such dogs are disparagingly described as “runa” (as in “sin perro runa”)—that is, as mutts. In Quichua, by contrast, runa means person. It is used as a sort of pronounial marker of the subject position—for all selves see themselves as persons—and it is only hypothesized as an ethnonym in objectifying practices such as ethnography, racial discrimination, and identity politics (see chapter 6). This Quichua term for “person,” however, has come to be used in Spanish to refer to mongrel dogs. It would not be too far a stretch to suggest that runa for many Ecuadorians refers to those dogs that lack a kind of civilized status, those sin cultura, or without culture. Certain kinds of dogs and a certain group of indigenous people, the Quichua-speaking Runa, according to this colonial primitivist logic, have come to serve as markers along this imagined route from animality to humanity.

Trans-species relations often involve an important hierarchical component; humans and dogs are mutually constituted but in ways that are fundamentally unequal for the parties involved. The domestication of dogs, beginning some fifteen thousand years ago (Savolainen et al. 2003), has been dependent, in part, on the fact that the progenitors of dogs were highly social animals that lived in well-established dominance hierarchies. Part of the process of domestication involved replacing the apex of this hierarchy in such a way that dogs would imprint on their human master as the new pack leader. Human-dog
relations are dependent on the ways in which canine and human socialities merge, and they are always predicated, in some measure, on the ongoing establishment of relations of dominance and submission (Ellen 1999: 62). In colonial and postcolonial situations, such as that in which people in Avila are immersed, this merger acquires renewed meaning. Dogs are submissive to their human masters in the same way that the Runa, historically have been forced to be submissive to white estate owners, government officials, and priests (see Mururuncu 1987). This position is not fixed, however. The lowland Runa, as opposed to some of their highland indigenous Quichua-speaking counterparts, have always maintained a relatively higher degree of autonomy vis-à-vis state authorities. They, and their canine companions, then, are also like powerful predatory jaguars that, for their part, are not just the servile dogs of the animal masters.

Adopting the viewpoint of another kind of being to a certain extent means that we "become" another kind "with" that being (see Haraway 2008: 4, 16-17). And yet these sorts of entanglements are dangerous. People in Avila seek to avoid the state of monadic isolation that I've been calling soul blindness, by which they lose the ability to be aware of the other selves that inhabit the cosmos. And yet they want to do so without fully dissolving that sort of selfhood distinctive to their position in this cosmos as human beings. Soul blindness and becoming an-other-with-an-other are opposite extremes along a continuum that spans the range of ways of inhabiting an ecology of selves. There is a constant tension, then, between the blurring of interspecies boundaries and maintaining difference, and the challenge is to find the semiotic means to productively sustain this tension without being pulled to either extreme.\textsuperscript{17}

**Dreaming**

Because dreaming is a privileged mode of communication through which, via souls, contact among radically different kinds of beings becomes possible, it is an important site for this negotiation. According to people in Avila, dreams are the product of the ambulations of the soul. During sleep, the soul separates from the body, its "owner,"\textsuperscript{18} and interacts with the souls of other beings. Dreams are not commentaries on the world; they take place in it (see also Tedlock 1992).

The vast majority of dreams that are discussed in Avila are about hunting or other forest encounters. Most are interpreted metaphorically and establish a correspondence between domestic and forest realms. For example, if a hunter dreams of killing a domestic pig he will kill a peccary in the forest the following day. The nocturnal encounter is one between two souls—that of the pig and that of the Runa hunter. Killing the pig's nocturnal domestic manifestation therefore renders soulless its forest manifestation to be encountered the following day. Now soul blind, this creature can be easily found in the forest and hunted because it is no longer cognizant of those other selves that might stand to it as predators.

Metaphoric dreams are ways of experiencing certain kinds of ecological connections among kinds of beings in such a manner that their differences are recognized and maintained without losing the possibility for communication. This is accomplished by virtue of the fact that metaphor is able to unite disparate but analogous, and therefore related, entities. It recognizes a gap as it points to a connection. Under normal waking circumstances, the Runa see peccaries in the forest as wild animals, even though they see them in their dreams as domestic pigs. But things get more complicated. The spirit animal masters who own and care for these animals (which appear as peccaries to the Runa in their waking lives) see them as their domestic pigs. So when people dream they come to see these animals from the spirit masters' point of view— as domestic pigs. Importantly, the spirit animal masters are considered dominant kinds of beings. From the perspective of these masters, the literal ground for the metaphorical relationship between peccary and domestic pig is the animal-as-domesticate. What is literal and what is metaphorical shifts. For the animal masters, what we would think of as "nature" (i.e., the "real" forest animals) is not the ground (cf. Strathern 1980: 185); peccaries are really domestic pigs. So one could say that from the perspective of an animal master, which is the dominant one and therefore the one that carries more weight, a hunter's dream of a pig is the literal ground for which his forest encounter with a peccary the following day will be a metaphor. In Avila the literal refers to a customary interpretation of the world internal to a given domain. Metaphor, by contrast, is used to align the situated points of view of beings that inhabit different worlds. The distinction between figure and ground, then, can change according to context. What stays constant is that metaphor establishes a difference in perspective between kinds of beings inhabiting different domains. By linking the points of view of two beings at the same time that it recognizes the different worlds these beings inhabit, metaphor serves as a crucial brake that the Runa impose on the propensity toward blurring that is inherent to their way of interacting with other kinds of beings.
CANINE IMPERATIVES

Dreams, recall from the previous chapter, confirmed the identity of the predator that killed the dogs. Hilario’s dead father’s puma was the culprit. But América’s question remained unanswered. Why did the dogs fail to augur their own deaths? She felt that the dogs’ dreams should have revealed the true nature of the forest encounter with the jaguar.

How could América presume to know how her dogs dreamed? In order to address this, it is important to first understand in more detail how people in Ávila talk with their dogs. Talking to dogs is necessary but also dangerous; the Runa do not want to become dogs in the process. Certain modes of communication are important in this delicate cross-species negotiation, and it is to an analysis of these that I now turn.

It is due to their privileged position relative to animals in the trans-species interpretive hierarchy that constitutes the forest ecology of selves that the Runa feel they can readily understand the meanings of canine vocalizations. Dogs, however, cannot, under normal circumstances, understand the full range of human speech. As I indicated earlier, if people want dogs to understand them they must give the dogs hallucinogenic drugs. That is, they must make their dogs into shamans so that they can traverse the boundaries that separate them from humans. I want to revisit in more detail the scene in which Ventura advised his dog on how to behave. While pouring the hallucinogenic mixture down Puntero’s snout, he turned to him and said:

1.1 *accha-tu tiu tiu*
roden-ACC chases

1.2 *nds aga ama ani ngia*
chicken NEG IMP bite-3FUT
it will not bite chickens

1.3 *sichu tiu tiu*
strong chase
chases swiftly

1.4 “*hua hua*” mi-n ni
“hua hua” say-3
it should say “hua hua” (the bark made when dogs are chasing animals)

1.5 ama liha nga
NEG IMP lie-3FUT
it will not lie (i.e., the dog should not bark as if it were chasing animals when in reality it is not)

I am now in a position to explain why this is an extremely strange way of speaking. When advising their dogs people in Ávila address them directly but in the third person. This appears to be similar to the Spanish *usted* system whereby third-person grammatical constructions are used in second-person pragmatic contexts to communicate status. Quichua, however, lacks such a deferential system. Norwithstanding, the Runa tweak Quichua to improvise one. That they are using grammatical constructions in new ways is most evident in line 1.2. In Quichua *ama* is typically used in second-person negative imperatives, as well as in negative subjunctives, but never in combination with the third-person future marker as it is being used here. I am dubbing this anomalous negative command a “canine imperative.”

Here is the challenge: in order for people to communicate with dogs, dogs must be treated as conscious human subjects (i.e., as *Yoos*, even as *Theos*); yet dogs must simultaneously be treated as objects (i.e.) lest they talk back. This, it appears, is why Ventura uses this canine imperative to address Puntero obliquely. And this also seems to be part of the reason that Puntero’s snout was tied shut during this process. If dogs were to talk back, people would enter a canine subjectivity and therefore lose their privileged status as humans. By tying dogs down, in effect, denying them their animal bodies, they are permitting a human subjectivity to emerge. Canine imperatives, then, allow people to safely address this partially individuated, emerging human self about the partially deindividuated and temporarily submerged canine one.

The power-laden hierarchical relationship between dogs and humans that this attempt at communication reveals is analogous to that between humans and the spirit masters of animals. In the same way that people can understand their dogs, animal masters can readily understand the speech of humans; the Runa need only talk to them. Indeed, as I’ve observed on several occasions, in the forest people address these spirits directly. Under normal circumstances, however, humans cannot readily understand animal masters. Just as dogs require the hallucinogenic mixture tiita to understand the full range of human expression, people ingest hallucinogens, especially *ayahuasca*, so that they can
converse normally with these spirits. They use this opportunity to cement bonds of obligation with the spirit masters so that these, in turn, will allow them to hunt their animals. One important way of establishing such bonds is through the spirit master's daughters. Under the influence of hallucinogens, hunters attempt to cultivate amorous relations with them so that they will help them gain access to game meat via their fathers.

The relationship between these spirit lovers and Runa men is very similar to that between the Runa and their dogs. People give advice to their dogs in the third person and, in addition, tie their snouts shut, making it impossible for their dogs to respond. For related reasons, a spirit lover never allows her Runa partner to address her by name. Her proper name should be voiced only by other beings from the spirit master realm, and never in the presence of her human lovers. As one man told me, "One does not ask their names." Instead, men are only allowed to address their spirit lovers with the title señora. In Ávila this Spanish term is used to refer to and address white women regardless of marital status. By prohibiting Runa men from addressing them directly, the animal master's daughters can protect their privileged perspective as spirits and, in a sense, also as whites. This is analogous to the ways in which people communicate with their dogs so as to protect their own special position as humans. At all levels, then, the goal is to be able to communicate across the boundaries that separate kinds without destabilizing them.

INTERSPECIES SPEECH

People use oblique forms of communication, such as canine imperatives, to put brakes on processes that threaten to blur the distinctions among kinds of beings. Yet the language that they use when talking to their dogs is simultaneously an instantiation of the same process of blurring. Accordingly, I have begun to think of it as a "trans-species pidgin." Like a pidgin it is characterized by reduced grammatical structure. It is not fully inflected, and it exhibits minimal clause embedding and simplified person marking. Furthermore, pidgins often emerge in colonial situations of contact. Given how in Ávila dog-human relations are entangled with Runa-white ones, this colonial valence seems particularly appropriate.

Indicative of its status as a trans-species pidgin, Runa dog talk—in a manner that is similar to the way Juanicu's were-jaguar compadre both spoke and
the bureaucratic apparatus of the state in the microcosm of the community and serve as the link between the village and the state. As I explore in the final chapter of this book, the contours of the self in Ávila are as much the product of the relations people have with nonhumans as they are the product of these sorts of intimate (and often paternalistic) encounters through which a larger nation-state comes to be manifested in their lives.

THE CONSTRAINTS OF FORM
The human-canine trans-species pidgin, like motherese, is oriented toward beings whose linguistic capabilities are in question. Although people in Ávila go to great lengths to make their dogs understand human speech, how they communicate with their dogs must also conform to the exigencies of those species that cannot normally understand human speech, with its heavily symbolic mode of reference. My cousin Vanessa, who accompanied me on the unpleasant but trip over the Andes into the Oriente (see chapter 1), finally got to visit Ávila with me. Not long after arriving at Hilario’s house, however, she had the misfortune of being bitten on the calf by a young dog. The next afternoon, this dog, herself a fresh arrival (having been recently brought by one of Hilario’s sons from across the Suno River where this son works as a field hand for colonists), bit her again. Hilario’s family was quite disturbed by this behavior—the dog’s “humanity” was at stake and, by extension, that of her masters—and Hilario and his other son Lucio therefore gave the dog the hallucinogenic tata mixture and proceeded to “give her advice” in much the same way that Ventura had counseled Puntero. On this occasion, however, they took the drugged dog, with her mouth securely tied, and placed her snout against the same spot where she had bitten Vanessa the day before. While they were doing this Hilario said:

5.1 amu amu amu canina
[She, Vanessa, is a] master, a master and is not to be bitten

5.2 amu amu amu imagata caparisa
[She is a] master, a master, a master, and there is no reason to bark

5.3 amu amu amu caninga
It will not bite the master

Here, as visible in line 5.3, Hilario employs the same negative “canine imperative” construction that Ventura used. On this occasion, however, this phrase and the series of utterances in which it is embedded are entangled with an earnest nonlinguistic and nonsymbolic effort at communication with the dog. Whereas the negative canine imperative—“it will not bite”—responds to the challenge of speaking to the dog in such a way that, under the influence of hallucinogens, she can understand but not respond, the reenactment of the act of biting Vanessa serves as another form of negative canine imperative, here, however, not in a symbolic register but in an indexical one. As such, it responds to a different but equally important challenge: how to say “don’t” without language.

Regarding this challenge of how to say “don’t” without language, Bateson noted an interesting feature of communication visible among many mammals, including dogs. Their “play” employs a kind of paradox. When, for example, dogs play together they act as if they are fighting. They bite each other but in ways that are not painful. “The playful nip,” observed Bateson (2000c: 180), “denotes the bite, but it does not denote what would be denoted by the bite.” There is a curious logic at work here. It is as if, he continues, these animals were saying, “Those actions in which we now engage do not denote what those actions for which they stand would denote” (180). Thinking of this semiotically, and here I follow Deacon (1997: 423–5), whereas negation is relatively simple to communicate in a symbolic register, it is quite difficult to do so in the indexical communicative modalities typical of nonhuman communication. How do you tell a dog not to bite when the only secure modes of communication available are via likeness and contiguity? How do you negate a resemblance or a relation of contiguity without stepping outside of strictly iconic and indexical forms of reference? Saying “don’t” symbolically is simple. Because the symbolic realm has a level of detachment from indexical and iconic chains of semiotic associations it easily lends itself to meta-statements of this sort. That is, via symbolic modalities it is relatively easy to negate a statement at a “higher” interpretive level. But how do you say “don’t” indexically? The only way to do so is to re-create the “indexical” sign but this time without its indexical effect. The only way to indexically convey the pragmatic negative canine imperative, “Don’t bite” (or, in its Runa trans-species pidgin deferreral form, “It will not bite”), is to reproduce the act of biting but in a way that is detached from its usual indexical associations. The playful dog nips. This “bite” is an index of a real bite, but it is so in a paradoxical way. Although it is an index of a real bite and all its real effects, it also forces a break in an otherwise transitive indexical chain. Because of the absence of a bite, a new relational space emerges, which
we can call "play." The nip is an index of a bite but not an index of what that bite is itself an index. By re-creating the attack on my cousin, Hilario and Lucio attempted to enter into this canine play logic, constrained as it is, by the formal properties characteristic of indexical reference. They forced the dog to bite Vanessa again but this time with her snout tied shut. Theirs was an attempt to rupture the indexical link between the bite and its implications, and in this way to tell their dog "don't" through the idiom of a trans-species pidgin that, for the moment, has gone well beyond language.

It is never entirely clear whether and to what extent animals can understand human speech. If dogs could readily understand humans there would be no need to give them hallucinogens. The point I wish to make is that trans-species pidgins really are middle grounds (See also White 1993; see also Conklin and Graham 1995). It is not enough to imagine how animals speak, or to attribute human speech to them. We are also confronted by, and forced to respond to, the constraints imposed by the particular characteristics of the semiotic modalities animals use to communicate among themselves. Regardless of its success, this attempt reveals a sensitivity on the part of people in Ávila to the formal constraints (see Deacon 2003) of a nonsymbolic semiotic modality.

THE CONUNDRUM

I want to return for a moment to the discussion, from this book's introduction, taken up again in the previous chapter, of the admonition to never look away from a jaguar encountered in the forest. Returning the jaguar's gaze encourages this creature to treat you as an equal predator—a Yav, a Thou. If you look away, it may well treat you as prey, soon-to-be dead meat, an It. Here too, in this nonlinguistic exchange, status is conveyed across species lines through the use of either direct or oblique modes of nonlinguistic communication. This too is a parameter of the zone in which canine imperatives operate. Jaguars and humans, then, enjoy a sort of parity according to people in Ávila. They can potentially entertain each other's gaze in a trans-species but nevertheless, to some extent at least, intersubjective space. For this reason some people maintain that if they eat lots of hot peppers they can repel the jaguars they might encounter in the forest because eye contact will burn the jaguar's eyes. By contrast, eye contact with beings of higher levels is prohibitively dangerous. One should, for example, avoid such contact with the demons (supaijuna) that wander the forest. Looking at them causes death; by entertaining their gaze one enters their realm—that of the nonliving.

In Ávila this sort of hierarchy of perspective is reflected in modes of communication. Literal communication takes place when one being can entertain the subjective viewpoint of the other. "Higher" beings can readily do this vis-à-vis lower ones, as is evident by the fact that people can understand dog "talk" or that spirits can hear the supplications of people. "Lower" ones, however, can only see the world from the perspective of higher beings via privileged vehicles of communication, such as hallucinogens, which can permit contact among souls of beings inhabiting different realms. Without special vehicles of communication, such as hallucinogens, lower beings understand higher ones only through metaphor, that is, through an idiom that establishes connections at the same time that it differentiates.

We can now address the conundrum with which I began this chapter: if metaphor is so important in Runa dreams and in other situations in which the differences between kinds of beings are recognized, why do the Runa interpret the dreams of their dogs literally?

In a metaphorical human dream, people recognize a gap between their mode of perception and that of the animal masters. Through dreaming, they are able to see how the forest really is—as the domestic gardens and fallows of the dominant animal masters. This, however, is always juxtaposed to how they see the forest in their waking life—as wild. People in Ávila interpret dog dreams literally because they are able to see directly the manifestations of how their dog's souls experience events thanks to the privileged status that they enjoy vis-à-vis dogs. By contrast, regarding the onerous ambulations of their own souls, which involve interactions with dominant beings and the animals under their control, humans do not usually enjoy this privileged perspective. And this is why their dreams exhibit a metaphorical gap.

TRANS-SPECIES PIDGINS

In dog dream interpretation the gaps that separate kinds of beings, gaps that are often ad infinitum respected, collapse, at least for a moment, as dogs and people come together as part of a single affective field that transcends their boundaries as species—as they come together, in effect, as an emergent and highly ephemeral self distributed over two bodies. América's epistemic crisis reveals the tenuous nature but also the stakes of such a project. Dog dreams do
not belong only to dogs. They are also part of the goals, fears, and aspirations
of the Runa—"the dogs’ masters and occasional ‘cosmonautical’ companions—
as they reach out, through the souls of their dogs, to engage with the beings
that inhabit the world of the forest and beyond.

The sorts of entanglements I have discussed in this chapter are more than
cultural, and yet they are not exactly noncultural either. They are everywhere
biological, but they are not just about bodies. Dogs really become human (bio-
logically and in historically specific ways) and the Runa really become pumas;
the need to survive encounters with feline semiotic selves requires it. These
processes of “becoming with” others change what it means to be alive; and
they change what it means to be human just as much as they change what it
means to be a dog or even a predator.

We must be attentive to the danger-straight, provision, and highly tenu-
ous attempts at communication—in short, the politics—involved in the inter-
actions among different kinds of selves that inhabit very different, and often
unequal, positions. Such attempts are inextricably tied up with questions of
power. It is because Thou can be spoken when addressing dogs that dogs must,
at times, be tied up. "Every It is bounded by others." Negotiating this tension
between It and Thou is inherent to living with others is a constant prob-
lem as people in Ayilia struggle to take a stand "in relation" to the many kinds
of other beings that inhabit their cosmos.

Runa-dog trans-species pidgins do more than iconically incorporate dog
barks, and they do more than invent new human grammars adequate to this
risky task of speaking in a way that can be heard across species lines without
invoking a response. They also conform to something more abstract about the
referential possibilities available to any kind of self, regardless of its status as
human, organic, or even terrestrial, and this involves the constraints of cer-
tain kinds of semiotic forms. When Hilario attempted to say “don’t” without
language he could only do so in one way. He and his dog fell into a form—one
that is instantiated in but also sustains and exceeds not only the human but
also the animal. It is toward an analysis of these sorts of forms, how they per-
meate life, how, given the appropriate constraints, they so effortlessly propa-
gate across radically different kinds of domains, and how they come to acquire
a peculiar social efficacy that I turn in the next chapter.
20. See Kohn (2002b: 108–41) for a more extensive discussion and many more examples of perspective in everyday Avila life.


22. For descriptions of these tree causeways, see Descola (1996: 157).

23. "Saqu' inu." No further information is provided.

24. For descriptions of this call, see Emmons (1990: 223).

25. This woman was already a grandmother, so this form of flirtatious joking was not seen to be threatening. Such jokes would not be made in reference to younger, recently married women.


27. Quichua carac charm; Latin Clusia toratana dermerychnon, Loricaridae.

CHAPTER 3


2. Cara carilla ishurin.

3. Quichua yaqawna, with the ability to think, judge, or react to circumstances.

4. Quichua jichitam, to reflect on, attend to, or consider.

5. See Pérez (CP 1.054).

6. See Kohn (2002b: 349–54) for the Quichua transcription of Ventura’s exchange with his father’s puma.

7. See Kohn (2002b: 358–61) for Quichua text.

8. He uses the word chita (chi'ha) to refer to the wounded animal, instead of jis (the third-person pronoun used for an animate being regardless of gender or status as human).

9. On laughter as a way of fostering the sort of intimate sociability that is characteristic of Peruvian society, see Overing and Passe (2000) and Overing (2000).


11. "Yinuta muma llaquina." The verb llaquina means both sadness and love in Avila. There is no specific word for love in Avila Quichua, although there is in Andean Ecuadorian Quichua (Joyosa). In the Andean dialects with which I am familiar, llaquina means only sadness.

12. Also known as aya bado or aya tukana.

13. "Cai risaqui yacuta upusin." Also known as aya bado or aya tukana.

15. "Yinuta yawarucu sarangui, astilla samumuchu.

16. The place where the afterbirth is buried is known as the papa usoni, the house of the afterbirth.

17. Ureca buccifera, Urticaceae. This is closely related to the stinging nettles, which among other things are used to keep living beings away (by blocking the path of dogs and calves). It is believed to have a hallucinogenic effect on the people of this area.

18. "Huqquin, singa tamarin."
1. Unlike animals they are expected to eat cooked food.

2. According to some, they have souls that are capable of ascending to the Christian heaven.

3. They acquire the dispositions of their masters; mean owners have mean dogs.

4. Dogs and children who become lost in the forest become “wild” (Quichua quita) and therefore frightened of people.

5. See Obersch (1980: 66); see also Schwarz (1997: 162–63); Ariel de Vidas (2002: 536).

6. In fact, mythic man-eating jaguars are said to refer to humans as palm hearts.

7. See Fausto (2007); Cnudde (2007). These are known in Avilá as “forest masters” (nasha amaguma) or “forest lords” (nasha caragungu).

8. Colonial categories used historically to describe the Runa, such as Christian and murnu (same; Quichua munuru), as opposed to infidel (nuru) and wild (guma), however problematic (see Usenbeeck 2005: 165), cannot be discounted because, in Avilá at least, they continue to constitute the idiom through which a certain kind of agency, albeit one that is not so overtly visible, is manifested (see chapter 6).

9. I thank Manuela Carneiro da Cunha for reminding me of this fact, to which several Avilá oral histories that I have collected attest. See also Blanding (1997) for eyewitness written accounts and photographs of such expeditions.

10. The term runa is also used in Ecuadorian Spanish to describe cattle that are not an identifiable breed. It is also used to describe anything that is considered poetically as having supposedly “Indian” qualities (e.g., items considered shabby or dirty).

11. See also Haraway (2003: 41, 45).

12. Descens, regarding the Achuar, refers to this form of isolation as the “colonialism of natural idioms” (1989: 443). The emphasis he gives to the failure in communication thus implied is appropriate given this chapter's subject matter.

13. Wilks and Petkučevič’s (2007) discussion of Siberian Yakutir hunting traits in great detail this threat to human identity posed by relations with animals. The solutions the Yakutir find are different; the general problem—the challenge of living socially in a world populated by many kinds of selves—is the same.

14. For examples of this canine lexicon, see Kohl (2009: 21 n. 16).

15. As in chapter 1 I follow in this chapter Nuñolís (1988) in her linguistic conventions for parsing Quichua. These include the following: ACC = Accusative case; COR = Coreference; FUT = Future; NEG = Negative Imperative; SUBJ = Subjunctive; 2 = Second person; 3 = Third person.

16. Uituba refers to the class of small rodents that includes mice, rats, spiny rats, and mouse opossums. It is a euphemism for si; the class of large edible rodents that includes the agouti, paca, and agouty.

17. Here is another example from Avilá, not discussed in the body of this chapter, of giving advice to dogs using canine imperatives while administering itac.

18. Quichua duna, from the Spanish durina.

19. Regarding how humans can bring about human subjectivities in animals by denying them their bodies, compare reports and legends of Runa men undressing themselves before fighting off jaguars they encounter in the forest. By doing so, they remind jaguars that beneath their feline bodily habitus, which can be “diverted” like clothing, they too are humans (see chapter 6).

20. According to Janis Nuñolís, Quichua speakers from the Pastaza region of Amazonian Ecuador refer to or address these spirits in songs using third-person future constructions (pers. comm.). This is another reason for suspecting that the use of “señora” to address spirit lovers in Avilá is related to the use of “canine imperatives.”

21. As in the following example: Chase-3 FUT sup-COR
desiring/wishing will chase

22. See also Taylor (1996); Vieires de Castro (1998).

23. On distributed selfhood, see Pelice (1988: 165); and for a somewhat different take see Gell (1998).

24. For the semiotic constraints of extraterrestrial grammars, see Deacon (2003).
11. In an otherwise identical series of myths these apostles replace the well-known culture hero brothers Cuiluar and Dzicuri of other Upper Amazonian Ruma communities (e.g., Orr and Hudson 1971).

12. Urban writes about this in terms of the contiguity of “culture,” not of self.

13. In the flow of time in the mind, the past appears to act directly upon the future, its effect being called memory, while the future only acts upon the past through the medium of the self” (CP 1:325).

14. This is in reference to the Tupian Omagua.

15. See Gianetti (1997: 128); Oberon (1931: 260); Wawrin (1927: 335).


17. "Cohayuy, "with breasts," was how Venkara referred to Rojas’s granddaughters, before explaining that in the master’s realm, Rosa would die forever, never to die again, without suffering, like a child” (“Huñih huñih causgapa, mana mas huñihgapa, mana tormento, huñihausiintulli”).

18. This probably refers to the barred antshrike.


20. For more such examples, see Kohn (2002a: 242–43, 462 n. 54).

21. Ginsberg’s "haddish" does mention death.


23. Regarding the abandonment of shorts for long pants among the Tena Ruma, see Gianetti (1997: 253).

24. Wawrin similarly reports that men who encounter jaguars are not afraid of them and can do battle with them, “fighting one-on-one as equals” as if they were men because they know these jaguars were once men (Wawrin 1927: 335; see also Kohn 2002b: 370).

25. Cudíma refers to a gown traditionally worn by Cofán as well as western Tulcanan Siona and Socoya men.

26. See Kohn (2002b: 272–73) for an early colonial Arí area example of the use of clothing to confer power.

27. "Pacuchina, camba yachaita japingapa.”

28. See Kohn (2002b: 281) for eighteenth-century Amazonian strategies of appropriating white clothing as equipagente.

29. My thinking about survival has been greatly influenced by Lisa Stevenson’s work.

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agamben, Giorgio

Ariel de Vidas, Anath

Anstin, J.L.

Avendaño, Joaquín de

Bateson, Gregory


Bennett, Jane

Carrithers, Michael  

Cavell, Stanley  


Chakrabarty, Dipesh  


Chow, Timothy K., et al.  

Chuquim, Carmen, and Frank Solomon  

Clerey, David  

Colapietro, Vincent M.  

Cole, Peter  

Celani, G.A.  

Cedellin, Beth A.  

Cedellin, Beth A., and Laura R. Graham  

Coppinger, Raymond, and Lorna Coppinger  

Cordey, Manual  
Descola, Philippe

Diamond, Cora

Duranti, Alessandro, and Charles Goodwin

Duckheim, Estéfani

Ellen, Roy

Emerson, Ralph Waldo

Emmons, Louise H.

Evans-Pritchard, E.E.

Faraco, Carlos

Field, Steven

Figueroa, Francisco de
1986 (1667) Informe de Jesuitas en el Amazonas. Iquitos, Perú: IAP-CETA.

Fine, Paul

Fine, Paul, Italo Measoni, and Phyllis D. Coley
Foucault, Michel

Freud, Sigmund

Gell, Alfred

Gianotti, Ennio

Ginsberg, Allen

Gow, Peter


Grabber, David

Hay, Glassman

Haraway, Donna


2008 When Species Meet. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Hare, Brian, et al.

Hemming, John

Hertz, Robert

Heyman, Richard W. and Hannah M. Buchanan-Smith

Hill, Jonathan D.

Hilke, Steven L. and William L. Brown

Hofmeyer, L. Jeppe

2008 Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton, PA: University of Scranton Press.

Hogue, Charles L.

Holbrook, Martin

Hoselton, John Edwin

Ingold, Tim

Irving, Dominique

Janzen, Daniel H.

Jiménez de la Espada, D. Marcos

José, José

Keane, Web
Macdonald, Theodore, Jr.

Mignui, Juan

Mandelbaum, Allen

Marchheim, Bruce
1991 The Language of the Inka since the European Invasion. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Margulis, Lynn, and Dorion Sagan

Maroni, Pablo

Marquis, Robert J.

Martin, Bartolomé

Mauss, Marcel

McFall-Ngai, Margaret, and et al.

McGuire, Tamara L., and Kirk O. Wimberley

Mercier, Juan Marcos

Moran, Emilio F.

Mullin, Molly, and Rebecca Cassidy
Muratorio, Blanca

Nadasdy, Paul

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and R. J. Hollingdale

Nuckolls, Jan B.


Oxbode, Suzanne

Oberem, Udo

Ochoa, Todd Rainón

Orúñez de Pazo, Pedro

Ott, Carolyn, and John E. Haidelsdon
1971 Cuillurquas Cuentos de los Quiquas del Oriente ecuatoriano. Quito: Hauen.

Ott, Carolyn, and Betsy Wrinley

Orton, James
1876 The Andes and the Amazon; Or, Across the Continent of South America. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Oscalati, Gaetano

Overing, Joanne

Overing, Joanne, and Alan Passe, eds.

Parmentier, Richard J.

Pedersen, David

Pérez, Charles S.


Pickering, Andrew

Perras, Pedro I.

Raffles, Hugh


Ramírez Dávalos, Gil

Rappaport, Roy A.

Reeve, Mary-Elizabeth

Requena, Francisco
1952 [1779] Mapa que comprende todo el distrito de la Audiencia de Quito. Quito: Emilio Rulickevich.

Riés, Anselm

Rivel, Laura

Roth, Lisa

Rogers, Mark

Sahlins, Marshall


Salomon, Frank
Sjostrom, Paul

Strathern, Marilyn

Suzuki, Shinryu

Tausig, Michael

Taylor, Anne Christine

Tedlock, Barbara

Tembourgh, John

Ting, Anna Lowenthal

Tuan, Terence

Tyler, Edward B.

Urban, Greg

Uzendański, Michael

Venekatesan, Subhonya, et al.

Vilaça, Aparecida

Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo

von Uexkull, Jakob

Waxin, Marquis Robert de

Weber, Max

Weissman, Mary J.

White, Richard

Whitten, Norman E.
INDEX

1985 Siona and Guna: The Other Side of Development in Amazonian Ecuador.
Urban: University of Illinois Press.

1997 Willerslev, Rane

2007 Willis, Christopher, et al.

Yurchak, Alexei