Electric | Animal

Toward a Rhetoric of Wildlife

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... and already the knowing animals are aware that we are not really at home in our interpreted world.

—Rainer Maria Rilke, “Duino Elegies”

“EVERYWHERE ANIMALS DISAPPEAR,” writes John Berger. Or perhaps, everywhere one looks one is surrounded by the absence of animals. No longer a sign of nature’s abundance, animals now inspire a sense of panic for the earth’s dwindling resources. Spectral animals recede into the shadows of human consumption and environmental destruction. With the prosperity of human civilization and global colonization, ecospheres are vanishing, species are moving toward extinction, and the environment is sinking, one is told, into a state of uninhabitability. Arguably, modernity has cost existence its diversity, has strained the earth’s capacity to maintain life. It is a cliché of modernity: human advancement always coincides with a recession of nature and its figures—wildlife, wilderness, human nature, and so forth. Modernity sustains, in the brief compass of this text, the disappearance of animals as a constant state. That is, through a curious configuration to be analyzed in what follows, animals never entirely vanish. Rather, they exist in a state of perpetual vanishing. Animals enter a new economy of being during the modern period, one that is no longer sacrificial in the traditional sense of the term but, considering modern technological media generally and the cinema more specifically, spectral. In supernatural terms, modernity finds animals lingering in the world undead.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the cultural and epistemological disciplines, as well as various literary and artistic practices, became preoccupied with the transmission of ideas from one body to another, one forum to another, one consciousness to another. In many disciplines, animals—the figure of the animal—played a crucial role in the articulation of new forms of communication, transmission, and exchange. With the Darwinian revolution, Freudian psychoanalysis, and the advances of the optical and technological media, animals symbolized not only new structures of thought but also the process by which those new thoughts were transported. Animals—and their capacity for instinctive, almost telepathic communication—put into question the primacy of human language and consciousness as optimal modes of communication. This investigation seeks to gauge the effects of animal discourses on select philosophical and psychoanalytic texts, the history of ideas, various creative ventures, and theses on technology of this period.

Beginning with the classical oppositions that distinguish humanity from nature, technology from being, this study argues that such polarities may be read as harboring insights into the structures of scientific thought and artistic representation. Roaming between the two extremes, animals establish a third term with its own realm of being, knowledge, and communication. Animals form an essential epistemological category.

Despite the constancy with which animals have hovered at the fringes of humanity, principally as sacrifices to maintain its limit, the notion of animal being changed dramatically during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is perhaps especially true of the modern period, which can be said to begin with late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century technological advances and conclude in the devastation of World War II. Modernity can be defined by the disappearance of wildlife from humanity's habitat and by the reappearance of the same in humanity's reflections on itself: in philosophy, psychoanalysis, and technological media such as the telephone, film, and radio. During this period, the status of the animal itself began to change—at the very point that animals began to vanish from the empirical world. "Public zoos came into existence," Berger writes, "at the beginning of the period which was to see the disappearance of animals from daily life. The zoo to which people go to meet animals, to observe them, to see them, is, in fact, a monument to their disappearance." In its specular, zoological world, the modern animal evolved into a lost object that could then, in turn, be mourned. A new breed of animals now surrounds the human populace—a genus of vanishing animals, whose very being is constituted by that state of disappearing. The modern animal became, to borrow Jacques Derrida's expression, "a memory of the present."

Animal Phenomenology

In September 1992, researchers at Johns Hopkins diagnosed "a rare neurological illness known as paraneoplastic encephalopathy." The disease afflicted the patient's cognitive function and "was marked by a slight but very specific disruption in one category of information: she could not name or describe the physical attributes of animals." Over several months of observation, the patient could neither remember nor describe the visual appearance of animals; she could not conjure up their colors, shapes, sizes, or dimensions. She was, however, capable of describing these same attributes when they modified objects or ideas other than those of an animal nature, leading the researchers to believe that the phenomenon of animals designated—at least in this instance—an altogether unique repository of knowledge, one wholly distinct from that containing other kinds of information.
Aware of the deficiency in her knowledge, the patient actively sought to overcome it by expanding the framework of her consciousness—to suture the gaps in her knowledge by increasing her awareness of them. Sensing that her archives had been erased by the illness, the patient tried to reinscribe the attributes of animals in her memory and reproduce them later. Despite her attempts to memorize the features of animals, the patient could not recall any descriptions of specific animals without the aid of some visual cue. The damage was apparently permanent and irreversible, and her efforts only resulted in a heightened state of distress.

Although the appearance of the animal figure in this case may have been a mere contingency, its intrusion underscores the uncanny effect of animals on human thought and imagination. At once familiar and distant, animals have traditionally illuminated human existence. As David Clark notes: “If the thought of ‘the animal’ is in question, so too, inevitably, is the thought of ‘the human’ with which it has always been inextricably bound.” Paraneoplastic encephalopathy, appearing in the form of animal phenomenology, had forced the patient to accept the limits of her psyche: against the figure of the animal, she encountered the threshold of her consciousness. Unable to think beyond the limit established by the animal, the patient could only project her consciousness. The aporia had provided her with a view of the outside of her consciousness, a glimpse of the unknowable.

To the extent that the patient was diagnosed with a neurological disorder, the case raises fundamental questions concerning knowledge and consciousness, impelling one to view the patient’s struggle, at least in part, as brain against mind. As the medical examination progressed, the disparity between the workings of the brain and the desires of the mind came into sharper focus: the apparent inability of the mind to reach into certain areas of mnemonic, cerebral, and sensual data became increasingly clearer in the brain’s adamant blockage of the animal. From the standpoint of biology, the brain represents the material center of intelligent life. An animal’s intelligence is frequently measured by the capacities of its brain, which exists in the body as an organ. The mind belongs exclusively to human beings and establishes the unique subjectivity of each human organism: it is an abstraction and, like the soul, cannot be found within the human anatomy. The brain regulates a number of neurological and bodily functions, whereas the mind attends to only one: consciousness. That difference, according to Johns Hopkins neuroscientist Dr. John Hart Jr., greatly affects how human beings conceive knowledge. Hart, who also supervised and analyzed the aforementioned medical case, states: “There are separate systems in the brain to deal with different categories of knowledge. . . . The brain is not necessarily built the way your mind thinks it is.” In other words, while the brain works, the mind reflects: while the brain disperses knowledge (sensations, warnings, and other signals) throughout the body, the mind organizes that movement into subjectivity. Accordingly, the distinction between brain and mind rests ultimately in the question of agency: the brain possesses no agency for imagining itself as coherent, whereas the mind cannot conceal its own fragmentation, the areas beyond its reach. The longstanding dichotomy between the conceptual and biomechanical modes of cognition has influenced not only psychological and philosophical discourses on the mind but also, as this case confirms, approaches to neurobiology, psychobiology, and other sciences of the brain.

Hegel summarizes the mind’s desire to usurp the function of human determination and articulates the challenge that this imposed subjectivity presents to science:

It belongs to the nature of the mind to cognize its Notion. Consequently, the summons to the Greeks of the
Delphic Apollo, *Know thyself*, does not have the meaning of a law imposed on the human mind by an alien power; on the contrary, the god who impels to self-knowledge is none other than the absolute law of mind itself. Mind is, therefore, in its every act only apprehending itself, and the aim of all genuine science is just this, that the mind shall recognize itself in everything in heaven and on earth. An out-and-out Other simply does not exist for the mind.9

The very attempt to situate the mind as not only the highest law of science but also one that originates from within being, as the very condition of being, which is to say as subjectivity, exposes the underlying anxiety that the mind may not, in fact, originate within being: that consciousness may rather be the effect of some profoundly alien thought—a thought of the other, in the sense elaborated in recent philosophy. In the case of paraneoplastic encephalopathy described above, the possibility of knowing oneself as a unified self—of excluding any possibility of an other—was jeopardized by the appearance of an other. The animal other, despite its enure, made its presence known as an unknowable other, known only as unknowable to the mind.

The case itself may indicate that a third term or agent might be required to supplement the traditional mind/brain duality: something beyond the neurological/conceptual opposition, something precipitated by or resulting in the figure of the animal. It is not by accident, however, that the figure of the animal fulfills the function of such a third term: the animal is particularly suited to that task. Animals are exemplary vehicles with which to mediate between the corporeality of the brain and the ideality of the mind. Traditionally, they are held to be neither nonconscious like stones or plants, nor self-conscious like human beings. Animals, it is said, can act without reason, can exist without language. In this sense, animal being might best be described as unconscious, that is, as existing somewhere other than in the manifest realms of consciousness. Animal being can be understood as determining the place of an alien thought.

Animals are linked to humanity through mythic, fabulous, allegorical, and symbolic associations, but not through the shared possession of language as such. Without language one cannot participate in the world of human beings. For the patient in question, animals inhabit a separate world within the universe of human knowledge—a world that in the case of paraneoplastic encephalopathy is susceptible to permanent displacement. Rachel Wilder describes the disorder:

Tests over a period of several months showed that she [the patient] could, for example, talk in great detail about where animals live or whether they were pets, but she could not say what they look like.

Her impairment was only verbal and only in the category of the physical attributes of animals, in which she could not correctly answer questions about size, number of legs or colors of animals. Thus she could say that celery is green, but not that a frog or turtle is green.

She could, however, accurately discuss the physical attributes of any other object, and correctly identify an animal's attributes when the information was presented visually in pictures. For example, while she could say that the color of an animal was wrong in a picture, she had trouble naming its correct color.10

Evidently, the patient was aware of discrepancies and inaccuracies in the representation of animals but could not rectify them through language. Such disruptions in the patient's discursive capacities suggest that although human beings can
readily "perceive" the existence of animals, they are not always able to translate that perception into the linguistic registers that constitute human understanding. Animals seem to necessitate some form of mediation or allegorization—some initial transposition to language—before they can be absorbed into and dispersed throughout the flow of everyday psychology. The mechanism for such conversions between the animal and verbal worlds had collapsed in the stricken subject. During her illness, the patient lost the ability to realign and integrate nonverbal animal data into the virtual world of language. From the vantage point of the animals (although, in the absence of a verifiable subjectivity, the possibility of such a vantage point must also be carefully questioned), they were now suspended in a spectral beyond; they were destined to reside in the interstice between mind and matter, unable to migrate into consciousness. The patient died without ever regaining "consciousness of animals."

The case of paraneoplastic encephalopathy offers a useful entry point for this discussion, since it explores a phantom world that has haunted, throughout its long history, the domain of human subjectivity. Despite the distance of animal being from the human world, the uncanny proximity of animals to human beings necessarily involves them in any attempt to define a human essence. The effort to define the human being has usually required a preliminary gesture of exclusion: a rhetorical animal sacrifice. The presence of the animal must first be extinguished for the human being to appear. Although the determination of human autonomy in contrast to animality is not an especially unusual notion, the return of the animal, despite strenuous efforts to exclude it, is worthy of attention. The Johns Hopkins case suggests that some "unconscious" agency may be at work rigorously segregating animals from language and knowledge, and that those excluded animals nevertheless manage to return in the guise of a profound negativity. Temple Grandin, a scientist who grew up autistic, argues that autism, which is also a neurological disorder, can sometimes compel a person to "think in pictures" like an animal. According to Grandin, the oversensitivity that accompanies autism can result in a shift from the abstraction of linguistic signs to the precision of images: "I think in pictures. Words are like a second language to me. I translate both spoken and written words into full-color movies, complete with sound, which run like a VCR tape in my head. When somebody speaks to me, his words are immediately translated into pictures."

Grandin links this capacity to animal thought, claiming that "it is very likely that animals think in pictures and memories of smell, light, and sound patterns. In fact, my visual thinking patterns probably resemble animal thinking more closely than those of verbal thinkers." If, as Grandin suggests, the capacity to think in pictures is a feature of animal consciousness, then the paraneoplastic encephalopathy may have been undergoing, like Kafka's Gregor Samsa, a kind of metamorphosis, a becoming-animal.

The paraneoplastic encephalopathy's systemic annihilation of animal traces from her field of consciousness, although remarkable in its specificity, reveals something about the history of human self-constitution: animals have often functioned as an ambiguous excess upon whose elimination human identity consolidates itself. For example, the doctrine of "universal" love that founds the Christian community, Marc Shell explains, does not extend to animals but rather is limited to the infinitude and universality said to exist within humanity's being. Tracing the exclusion of animals to early Christian rhetoric and its demarcation of sibling human beings from nonsibling (nonhuman) others, Shell writes: "Christians often conflated species with family... so it is not surprising that the argument that we
should tolerate others’ religious views because they are our kin, or ‘brother,’ should take sometimes the form of a claim that we should tolerate their views because they are our kind, or ‘human beings.’” In this vein, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno assert that Western humanist culture depends on the exclusion of animals, and that its historical progression culminates logically in the justification of mass murder. The National Socialist state, they argue, excused the elimination of Jews from the “German” populace by transforming them first into nonhuman or animal others, “to the condition of a species.” The atrocities of World War II derive from the anthropological foundation that separates humanity from animals.

The idea of man in European history is expressed in the way in which he is distinguished from the animal. Animal irrationality is adduced as proof of human dignity. This contrast has been reiterated with such persistency and unanimity by all the predecessors of bourgeois thought — by the ancient Jews, Stoics, Fathers of the Church, and then throughout the Middle Ages down to modern times — that few ideas have taken such a hold on Western anthropology.

As Adorno and Horkheimer insist, the idea of human superiority has been restated so frequently that it has become an unqualified truth. Although the discourse on humanity features the rhetorical exclusion of animal beings from the Lebenswelt of human ontology, within the broader range of epistemological disciplines and artistic practices animals have played a prominent role in the articulation of human identity.

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**Animality**

*The birth of this extreme emotion, which we designate under the name erotism and which separates man from animals, is without doubt an essential dimension of what prehistoric research can contribute to knowledge.*

—Georges Bataille, "The Tears of Eros"

The famous painting from the Lascaux cave, discovered in 1940 and dating from around 13,500 B.C., depicts humanity’s entry along with the animal into the world of representation: it is, ironically, a death scene. Among the elements of the painting is a dying man wearing what appears to be a bird’s head or mask and several other dying animals. Bataille describes the scene at length:

... [A] man with a bird’s face, who asserts his being with an erect penis, but who is falling down. This man is lying in front of a wounded bison. The bison is about to die, but facing the man, it spits its entrails horrifically.

Something obscure, strange, sets apart this pathetic scene, to which nothing in our time can be compared. Above this fallen man, a bird drawn in a single stroke, on the end of a stick, contrives to distract our thoughts.

Further away, toward the left, a rhinoceros is moving away, but it is surely not linked to the scene where the bison and the man-bird appear, united in the face of death.

As the Abbé Breuil has suggested, the rhinoceros might be moving slowly away from the dying figure after having torn open the stomach of the bison. But clearly the composition of the image attributes the origin of the wound to the man, to the spear that the hand of the dying figure could have thrown. The rhinoceros, on the contrary, seems...
independent of the principal scene, which might remain forever unexplained."16

“What can one say about this striking evocation,” Bataille asks, “buried for thousands of years in these lost, and so to speak, inaccessible depths?” In the end, Bataille concurs with the anthropological interpretation of that scene as one of expiation in which a shaman is seen atoning for the murder of the bison, adding that the Lascaux cave painting also marks the birth of “eroticism.”17 The birth of eros, the aspect of human existence that Bataille links elsewhere to mortality, entails the sacrifice of animals and an interchangeable relation between human and animal forms. The motifs of animal death, metamorphosis, and palingenesis have dominated ancient religious concepts from Greco-Roman sacrifice to Hindu reincarnation.20

The killing of animals, however, is not restricted to religion. Experiments on animal bodies for the purpose of anatomical comparison and medical knowledge date back to Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) and Galen (A.D. 129–199), although the first documented vivisections did not take place until the sixteenth century.21 The use of animals to advance knowledge has often aroused feelings of antipathy and discomfort in the human world, and today such practices continue to unsettle the social conscience. Still, the dissection of animals for biological and medical purposes derived a considerable measure of acceptance from the paradigmatic work of Aristotle, whose projects in zoology perhaps first validated—in a nonreligious context—the enterprise of animal sacrifice. A brief glance at Aristotle’s work reveals the importance given to the study of animals, and that emphasis has been retained throughout much of the Western philosophical canon. Richard J. Bernstein speculates that “an entire history of philosophy could be written simply by tracking what philosophers have said about animals.”22

Another classical figure, Aesop, employs animal surrogates to expose the moral mechanisms of the human world. Aesop’s fables, which are generally considered a precursor of the literary genres of fiction and pedagogical writing, rely heavily upon the satirical posturings of animals to depict various aspects of human nature.23 In this connection, one might also note the frequent recourse to animal beings in fairy tales. As with fables, fairy tales also tend to utilize animals for editorial or allegorical purposes. Regarding the similar, that is, instructional role of animal models in the social sciences, Donna J. Haraway writes:

Animals have continued to have a special status as natural objects that can show people their origin, and therefore their pre-rational, pre-management, pre-cultural essence. That is, animals have been ominously ambiguous in their place in the doctrine of autonomy of the human and natural sciences. So, despite the claims of anthropology to be able to understand human beings solely with the concept of culture, and of sociology to need nothing but the idea of the human social group, animal societies have been extensively employed in rationalization and naturalization of the oppressive orders of domination in the human body politic. They have provided the point of union of the physiological and political for modern liberal theorists while they continue to accept the ideology of the split between nature and culture.24

Through the figure of the animal, Haraway analyzes the development of gender politics and the exclusion of women (as well as aliens, cyborgs, animals, and other minority beings) on the grounds of ontology.25 In the related field of sociobiology, perhaps the most significant discussions of animal and human evolution are Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871). Taken together, Darwin’s interventions radically altered the place occupied by animals in
the biohistory of the earth, preparing the way for Freudian psychoanalysis and Mendel's genetics.

Language

Arguably the most sensitive arena in which human subjectivity struggles for dominance is that of language in general, and speech in particular. Most surveys of Western philosophical thought affirm (with a few very important exceptions) the consensus that although animals undoubtedly communicate with one another, only human beings convey their subjectivity in speech. That is, human speech exceeds its function as communication and actually performs, with each utterance, the subject.26

Although proponents of structuralism in linguistic and literary theory moved the emphasis of subjectivity from human speech to the “text,” the logic of the subject remained intact. Derrida, the most prominent critic of the structuralist assumption that textuality—the system of semiotic signs grounded in language—institutes the place of the subject, argues that the text produces an entirely other discursive site, the trace (truit) of an other’s discourse that can never be reduced to the subject.27 The figure of the animal frequently stands, for Derrida, in the place of such alterity.

The philosophy of Jacques Derrida remains, throughout this work, crucial to the discussion of animal being. Beginning with his theses on language, Derrida’s deconstructions of Western metaphysics have contributed many key philosophical concepts that will be used throughout this study. In the opening remarks to his presentation at Cerisy-la-Salle in 1997, where he spoke to the subject of the “autobiographical animal,” Derrida claims that although he has not addressed, in his work to date, the question of the animal as such, he has nonetheless been talking about nothing but animals.28 Inevitably, Derrida has turned his attention toward the question of the animal. Beyond his own thoughts on animal being and the metaphysical disruption it causes, Derrida has introduced the philosophemes that make an investigation of the animal as such possible. This study pursues many of Derrida’s themes—*differance*, supplement, trace, frame, graft, parasite, and dissemination, to name only a few—as it tracks the figure of the animal through the terrain mapped by conceptions of language. It seeks to uncover the traces of animality that are embedded in language, arguing that the animals that Descartes vehemently censured as irrational machines or speechless “automata” nonetheless remain inextricably linked to the discourse on human language. Although lacking the capacity for human speech, animals remain essential to its constitution.29

The important role of animals in the metaphysics of speech is also an antithetical one. The economy of human subjectivity and speech is restricted: only human beings are capable of speech, which, in turn, founds the human subject. Animals enter that tautology as a phantasmatic counterpoint to human language. The animal voice establishes an imaginary place of being beyond the threshold of human discourse. It is in the vehicle of speech, the “system of speech, or the system of truth,” Derrida explains, that humanity founds the transcendental principles of its own existence above and in contradistinction to that of animals.30 Derrida describes the connection between language and humanism, language and the subject, and offers a line of escape from the seemingly closed economy in which those terms are bound:

The idea according to which man is the only speaking being, in its traditional form or in its Heideggerian form, seems to me at once undischageable and highly problematic.
Of course, if one defines language in such a way that it is reserved for what we call man, what is there to say? But if one reinscribes language in a network of possibilities that do not merely encompass it but mark it irreducibly from the inside, everything changes. I am thinking in particular of the mark in general, of the trace, of iterability, of difference. These possibilities or necessities, without which there would be no language, are themselves not only human. It is not a question of covering up ruptures and heterogeneities. I would simply contest that they give rise to a single linear, indivisible, oppositional limit, to a binary opposition between the human and the infra-human. And what I am proposing here should allow us to take into account scientific knowledge about the complexity of “animal languages,” genetic coding, all forms of marking within which so-called human language, as original as it might be, does not allow us to “cut” once and for all where we would in general like to cut. . . . And this also means that we never know, and never have known, how to cut up a subject.\(^{31}\)

For Derrida, the sacrificial cut that implements subjectivity cannot be placed unproblematically between humanity and animal, between beings that do and do not have language in the traditional sense. The locus of animality itself functions as a cut that lacerates the discourse of the subject. The field of animal being cannot be severed from that of the subject because neither field is constituted apart from one another.

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**Umwelt (Environment)**

As scientific understanding has grown, so our world has become dehumanized. Man feels himself no longer involved in nature and has lost his emotional “unconscious identity” with natural phenomena. . . . No voices now speak to man from stones, plants, and animals, nor does he speak to them believing they can hear.

---CARL JUNG, "APPROACHING THE UNCONSCIOUS"

It is interesting that Jung should choose in 1961 the term dehumanized to describe humanity’s elimination of animals from the immediate environment. Jung’s lament for the displacement of animals through scientific progress is itself a commonplace sentiment, yet the idea that the disappearance of animals effects a dehumanization of “our world” is a reversal of the sacrificial structure discussed earlier. According to Jung, the dislocation of animal being lessens the fullness of our world and not the animal’s. The absence of animal being weakens the humanity of the human world. Jung’s statement reverses the terms of animal sacrifice: it is now the human world that suffers from the exclusion of animals, whereas before, it was precisely the removal of animals that allowed human beings to establish their autonomy. In the modern era, human beings miss the animals that no longer make themselves heard in the world. Jung’s logic points toward a crucial feature of modernity, mourning.

Sigmund Freud’s explanation of the causes that lead to mourning (and also to melancholia, an “incomplete” form of mourning) help chart the movement of humanity away from the animal and interpret the symptoms of mourning that such separations produce.\(^{32}\) A common anthropological myth seeks to explain the development of animals and human beings as distinct entities. To the extent that human beings once considered animals to be intrinsic to their environment and existence, the two forms of being—animal and human—were undifferentiated. Human beings did not yet exist apart from animals.
As the burden of survival lessened, human beings began to develop an awareness of themselves and to recognize the animal as a foreign being. Humanity began to constitute itself within a world of human differences, and subsequently, the animal was metamorphosed into another creature. In turn, the animal came to inhabit a new topology of its own, and humanity was left to mourn the loss of its former self. The mourning is for the self—a self that had become dehumanized in the very process of humanity’s becoming-human.

The anthropological narrative is similar to the one that Freud presents in relation to individual human development. In Freud’s account, the place of the animal in the anthropological version is taken by the narcissistic object, or the preformed ego in the infantile state. As the infant begins to recognize the differences that separate its body from other things and beings, it makes a crucial distinction between self and other. The other forms from the residues of a self that emerges by excising what is other. The self recognizes the traces of a former correspondence with the other. Both stories conclude with a loss of the former self and the implementation of a phase of mourning. Taken to its extreme, Freud explains, the normative process of mourning can degenerate into a pathology, melancholia. In that case, the lost object—the former, pre-egoal self—is treated with ambivalence that frequently takes the form of hostility. For Freud, “The melancholic’s erotic cathexis in regard to his object has thus undergone a double vicissitude: part of it has regressed to identification, but the other part, under the influence of the conflict due to ambivalence, has been carried back to the stage of sadism, which is nearer to that conflict.”

Seen in this light, one can view the origin of animal sacrifice as a melancholic ritual, replete with sadism and ambivalence, which repeats the origin of humanity. It serves to affirm and renounce humanity’s primal identification with animals, and the need to overcome it.

This is not to say, however, that such an origin coincides with that of humanism, or what Michel Foucault in The Order of Things calls “the human sciences.” “Before the end of the eighteenth century, man did not exist... there was no epistemological consciousness of man as such.” For the present purposes, it is interesting to note that the invention of the idea of humanity, its appearance in the human sciences, was accompanied by an intensive investigation of the animal in those very sciences. At precisely the moment when the bond between humanity and animal came to be seen as broken, humanity became a subject and the animal its reflection. According to Jung, but also to a wide array of modernist writers to be discussed shortly, the sacrificial economy by which animals were negated entered a new phase during the modern era—a phase marked by melancholia. Jung writes of an abandoned humanity in the age of scientific or technological advance: “[Its] contact with nature has gone, and with it has gone the profound emotional energy that this symbolic connection supplied.” The animal, the representative subject of nature, no longer calls to humanity. It is this sequence of events—the appearance of a dehumanized human being and the disappearance of the animal—that will frame and focus the following text.

A world in which the connection between humanity and nature has been severed does not, however, necessarily result in a nonhuman world. On the antithesis to humanism, Jean-François Lyotard writes: “Dehumanized still means human—a dead human, but conceivable: because dead in human terms, still capable of being sublated in thought.” A semirevolution then: humanity is no longer at the center of a world that remains nonetheless human. By displacing animals from the phenomenal world, humanity disrupts the delicate balance between human beings and animals (among other forms of nature such as plants, insects, raw materials, land and water formations, diurnal and nocturnal dynamics, atmospheric condi-
tions, and so on)—a balance that had, in fact, constituted the very humanness of the human world. But, as Lyotard, following Hegel, insists, the human world can survive dialectically the absence of humanized beings. Dehumanized beings, human beings that have broken their primordial link to nature, are an ironic legacy of humanism. As for the animals, their disappearance does not release them from their bond with human beings in a human world. Even as absent beings, animals accompany the crisis in human ontology. Even in a dehumanized world, animals survive—although in a manner altogether different from that of human beings.

The human world, according to Giorgio Agamben, is “irreparable” in the sense of being “thus” and “not otherwise.” Following Spinoza, Agamben defines this deictic term: “The Irreparable is that things are just as they are, in this or that mode, consigned without remedy to their way of being.” The human world is thus irreparable. In contrast, the world of animals can never be “thus” or as such, remaining rather in flux, reparable, adjustable, and generally resistant to the thusness of the human world. It follows that the elimination of animals from the human atmosphere is irreparable from the perspective of modern humanity. Thus animals disappear; it is thus that animals disappear; it is inevitable that animals disappear. From the elusive vantage point of the animal, however, one cannot say it is “thus”—animals cannot say (for more than one reason) that they have disappeared.

Would we say of an animal that its world is thus-and-thus? Even if we could exactly describe the animal’s world, representing it as the animal sees it (as in the color illustrations of Ucskull’s books that depict the world of the bee, the hermit crab, and the fly), certainly that world would still not contain the thus; it would not be thus for the animal: It would not be irreparable.40

In this sense, the paraneoplastic encephalopathy’s erasure of the animal is interesting as a symptom of an irreparable world. It can be seen as the manifestation of an animal ontology to which human beings have no access—the irreparable loss of a once possible relation to animal worlds. Animals once contributed to the constitution of human ontology; now their absence contributes to a dehumanized ontology. Put another way, although animals have always haunted the topology of human subjectivity, the nature of the animal has shifted in the modern era from a metaphysic to a phantasm, from a body to an image, from a living voice to a technical echo.

What is unique to and thus problematic of the bestial paradigm resides in its parasitic relation to the two rival empires, humanity and nature. The sacrificial economy by which animals are linked to human beings has already been mentioned. In contrast, the relation of animals to nature is not unlike that of technology to humanity. Animals are often seen as grafis that help organize the body onto which they have been appended; they complete or realize the idea of nature. To employ Derrida’s logic of the frame or “parergonality,” animals at once establish and yet are excluded from the plenitude of nature. Furthermore, because they exist as the manifestations of a voiceless but omnipresent nature, animals emerge in this context as instruments of dissemination. As figures of nature that lack the capacity for speech and thus (self-) reflection and (self-) conception, animals are incapable of determining or regulating the discourse they put forth: they simply transmit. Animals are unable to withhold the outflow of signals and significations with which they are endowed. In Derrida’s paraphrase, although animals may hold a huge responsibility in the discourse of the other (here, of nature), they cannot represent the consciousness of their representations. That is, even as exemplary wild beings, animals cannot respond to the call of the wild “as such.” Derrida explains: “Animals are incapable of keeping or even
having a secret, because they cannot represent as such, as an object before consciousness, something that they would then forbid themselves from showing. Given the openness of animals, what Lyotard refers to as their "passivity," one must ask whether human beings have learned to read or decipher such animal disclosures. And to the extent that animals are incapable of maintaining secrets, mustn't one question not only the nature of their expression but also its figurative modalities, its expressive form? For if animals are indeed incapable of language, as most traditional philosophers argue (with the notable exceptions of Montaigne and Nietzsche), then mustn't one be attentive to the possibility that another communicative medium may in fact be operative in nature's animal provocations?

The present study examines these questions as they arise in philosophy, psychoanalysis, critical theory, and the technological media. In each instance, the book surveys the position of the animal and analyzes how it participates in that particular discourse or discipline. The first two chapters assemble a history of animal being in the fields of traditional philosophy, from Aristotle to Heidegger. The third and fourth chapters look at the ideas on animality that emerged from evolutionary theory and the advent of psychoanalysis, from the Darwinian to Freudian revolutions, and at contemporary critical theory. The text concludes with a brief analysis of photography and cinema, and the animal ghosts that haunt not only the inception of cinema (the protoanimations of Eadweard James Muybridge and Etienne-Jules Marcy) but also its subsequent theorization and practice. On route to the photographic media, the fifth chapter looks at the work of Lewis Carroll, Franz Kafka, and Akutagawa Ryunosuke—three authors representing three separate cultures, sets of conceptual problems, and literary projects—who can be seen as having played crucial roles in facilitating the transition to modernism by thematizing the animal.

The purpose in addressing these authors is to show how (1) the theme of animality plays an important role in their fiction, and (2) their work, in many ways, prefigures a move to (in the case of Carroll) and acts as a response to (in the cases of Kafka and Akutagawa) cinema. As a transition to the cinematic body, this section addresses the movement through three thematic regions that relate to animality and literature: language in Carroll, corporeality in Kafka, and madness in Akutagawa. The glimpse into modern literature concludes by addressing the special relationship between animals and literature (compared with that of philosophy and animals, psychoanalysis and animals, and critical theory and animals, respectively). Here, the text proposes that literature has always maintained a privileged relation to the nonliterary referent or to nonlinguistic writing, to media that problematize the notion of writing. The figure of the animal in literature makes such contact between the literary and nonliterary worlds visible. It is the rapport between language and animals in modernist literature that perhaps best points to the emergence of the cinema and its cryptic relation to the animal.

The final chapter presents a speculative reading of the history of modernism through the lenses of photography and film. Beginning with an interpretation of Muybridge's photographs of animals in motion, the conclusion argues that the elimination of animals from the immediate environment coincided with accelerated industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the rise of the technological media. Not only were animals thematized, they were also appropriated by the technological media for the symbolic and actual powers they represented—"horsepower" in engines, electrocuted animals in direct current, animated animals in early cinema. In fact, cinema perhaps best embodied the transfer of animals from nature to technology. In the writings of Soviet filmmaker and theorist Sergei Eisenstein, for example, the process
of editing, or montage, is frequently likened to a genetic code in which dominant as well as recessive links are made between convergent strings of information. Eisenstein, along with other early film theorists such as Germaine Dulac, often discusses the filmic process in biological and organic terms, strengthening the impression that the cinema was somehow expected to replace or supplant a rapidly declining animal presence. Animals were particularly useful in the development of technical media because they seemed to figure a pace of communication that was both more rapid and more efficient than that of language.

During the discussion of animal being and the technological media, the text addresses a number of psychoanalytic writings on photography and film. From the phenomenological speculations of André Bazin to the structural analyses of Jean-Louis Baudry and Christian Metz, the application of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis to filmic structures has provided a compelling examination of an otherwise insufficiently addressed medium. Particularly helpful in those theorizations is the attention paid to the relationship between the apparatus and the spectator/subject, between the editing process and human psychology. In the registers of psychoanalysis, a similarity between cinematic processes and those of the mind begins to take shape. Apart from the important role that condensation and displacement play in both the psychoanalytic and cinematic discourses, the structure of transference perhaps best confirms the rapport between film and the unconscious, between cinematic communication and animal being. Through readings of essential psychoanalytic texts on transference from Sándor Ferenczi to Lyotard, the text concludes that transference is precisely the modality in which language is circumvented for a more expedient connection between drives, points, thoughts, or instincts. It is, in fact, the mode of communication that philosophy accords the animal.

With the process of transference at its base, cinema is no longer a machine like other machines. Transference allows films to communicate. The transferential dynamic, according to Dziga Vertov and Eisenstein, establishes something like an unconscious in the topology of cinema. In that sense, cinema can be seen as a technological supplement of the subject. As such, cinema comes to resemble its counterpart in nature, the animal supplement. The alliance between animals and cinema brings together two poles of a traditional opposition, animals and technology. Not surprisingly, then, early cinema frequently thematizes animals. And thus while animals were disappearing from the immediate world, they were reappearing in the mediated world of technological reproduction. Undying, animals seemed to fuel the phantom thermodynamic engines that would run perpetually. Animals and their figures had come full circle in the modern era, from philosophy to technology. Animals had found a proper habitat or world in the recording devices of the technological media. The capacities of the technological media in general and the photographic media in particular to record and recall served as a mnemic supplement that allowed modern culture to preserve animals.

In conclusion, the text re-presents the thesis that animals have remained a compelling figure in the discursive structures of philosophy, critical theory, literature, and cinema, despite their secondary or supplementary role. Especially during the modern era, animals were transposed into the discursive and figurative arenas precisely because they offered a rhetorical "line of escape," as Deleuze and Guattari phrase it, from a history saturated with immutable linguistic and methodological modes of conception—a history, as it were, in crisis. And because they had been denied the status of conscious subjects, animals were now sought as the ideal figures of a destabilized subjectivity. Not only can the animal be seen as a crucial figure for the reading of that history, but the animal also serves as the very figure
of modernity itself. The animal can be seen, in fact, as the figure of modern subjectivity. Neither a regressive nor primitive figure, animal being founds the site of an excess, a place of being that exceeds the subject. In this sense, the paraneoplastic encephalopathy can be seen as the last subject of a recent history; the task of this text is to recover the traces of animality, to remember animals.

1 | Philosophy and the Animal World

Even inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance) do indeed reveal something, yet none of them is a name.

—Aristotle, "De Interpretatione"

The scene of the crime is the fourth story of a house in Paris. The occupants have been brutally slain and the Parisian police are scrambling for answers. Under the heading "Extraordinary Murders," the Gazette des Tribunaux gives notice of the affair: a widow and her daughter, Madame and Mademoiselle L'Espanaye, have been found bludgeoned, mutilated, and partially dismembered—the daughter forced into the chimney, the mother thrown from the window. The domestic assault appears to have extended even to the house itself: "The apartment was in the wildest disorder—the furniture broken and thrown about in all directions."1 "To this horrible mystery there is not as yet," the newspaper reports, "the slightest clue."2 Still missing are a perpetrator and motive, an explanation of the crime. The Gazette concludes: "A murder so mysterious, and so perplexing in all its particulars, was never before committed in Paris—if indeed a murder has been committed at all."3

Edgar Allan Poe's 1841 story "The Murders in the Rue Morgue" brings to the surface a quintessentially modern catastrophe: the domicile of humanity has been assailed from the outside, indeed by the outside. The social and architectural structures that protect the human world appear to have weakened, exposing those inside, like the L'Espanayes, to the dangers of the wild side. Poe's crisis begins with an
Notes

Introduction


02. The term <i>unabled</i> appears most notably in Bram Stoker’s 1897 Dracula. Michael Fried has suggested that the vampire can be seen as a super-animal, a being that dissolves the boundaries between human and animal existence. Moreover, Stoker’s Dracula also possesses the ability to turn himself into various animals as well as to communicate with them. Stoker’s supernatural figure can be read as following from the changed status of a modern animal being. Fried describes a series of painter-animal exchanges in Courbet’s work, from the “brushiness” of a horse’s tail to Courbet’s signature in the blood of a wounded animal (Fried, Courbet’s Realism [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990]).

03. Berger, "Why Look at Animals?" 21. Berger notes these founding dates for the following European metropolitan zoos: the London Zoo in 1828, the Jardin des Plantes in 1793, the Berlin Zoo in 1844” (21).


05. Rachel Wilder, “Rare Brain Disorder Sheds Light on How We Think,” Johns Hopkins Gazette, 14 September 1992, 1.


07. It is worth noting that another form of encephalopathy, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or “mad cow disease,” has raised further questions about the relationship between animals and human beings. The question of the transmission of this disease from animals to human beings focuses on the properties of the brain.

09. G. W. F. Hegel, “Philosophy of Spirit, Introduction,” in Hegel: The Essential Writings, ed. Frederick G. Weis, trans. William Wallace (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 226. Hegel’s own sympathies lie unquestionably with the agency of the mind. Further on, Hegel attempts to reconcile the self-constituting act and the self-sufficiency of the mind with its empirical counterpart, the natural organism: “Just as in the living organism generally, everything is already contained, in an ideal manner, in the germ and is brought forth by the germ itself, not by an alien power, so too must all the particular forms of living mind grow out of its Notion as from their germ” (“Philosophy of Spirit,” 230).

10. Wilder, “Rare Brain Disorder,” 1–3.


12. Ibid., 160.

13. Marc Shell, “Marranos (Pigs), or From Coexistence to Toleration,” Critical Inquiry 17 (1991): 320. For Shell, the rise of bullfighting in Spain and its evolution into a national pastime serves not only “to define the difference between human kind and animal kind” but also “to fix ideologically the difference between national and nonnational” (ibid., 316–19).

14. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1972), 175. Emmanuel Levinas writes of the metamorphosis that was forced upon him by the gaze of “free” human beings while he was incarcerated in a Nazi prison camp. “But the other men, called free, who had dealings with us or gave us work or orders or even a smile—and the children and women who passed by and sometimes raised their eyes—stripped us of our human skin. We were subhuman, a gang of apes. A small inner murmur, the strength and wretchedness of persecuted people, reminded us of our essence as thinking creatures, but we were no longer part of the world. Our comings and goings, our sorrow and laughter, illness and distractions, the work of our hands and the anguish of our eyes, the letters we received from France and those accepted for our families—all that passed in parenthesis. We were beings entrapped in their species despite all their vocabulary, beings without language” (Levinas, “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights,” in Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Seán Hand [Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990], 153). Levinas’s compelling remarks show how the exclusion from free or full humanity inexorably thrusts one toward a discourse of animality: removed from the flow of human existence, one is forced to identify oneself with and as an animal—as a being without language.

15. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 245. Nietzsche criticizes the perverse appropriation of the doctrine that separates humanity from animals in his scathing indictment of Wagner, Schopenhauer, and Voltaire. Accusing these three of masking their contempt for other human beings, notably Jews, as kindness to animals, Nietzsche dissected the proximity of the separatist logic to zoophilic behavior. “Wagner is Schopenhaurian when he preaches mercy in our relations with animals. As we know, Schopenhauer’s predecessor at this point was Voltaire who may already have mastered the art that we encounter among his successors—to dress up his hatred against certain things and people as mercy for animals” (Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann [New York: Vintage, 1974], 155). To this point, Horkheimer and Adorno add: “The Fascist’s passionate interest in animals, nature, and children is rooted in the lust to persecute. The significance of the hand negligently stroking a child’s head, or an animal’s back, is that it could just as easily destroy them. One victim is fondly stroked shortly before the other is struck down, and the choice made has nothing to do with the victim’s guilt. The petting demonstrates that all are equal in the presence of power, that none is being in its own right” (Dialectic of Enlightenment, 253). Accordingly, the otherness of the animal allows one to love the other with the same annihilating force that one excludes: love and hate are here facilitated by the ontological divide that separates human beings from all others—from animals, children, nature, Jews.


17. Ibid.


20. See, for example, Bataille’s Eroticism: Death and Sensuality, trans. Mary Dalwood (San Francisco: City Lights, 1986). In this work, Bataille glosses the traditional designation of the moment of jouissance as a “little death” (le petit morte) (170). In The Tears of Eros, Bataille adds: “If eroticism is viewed in the perspective of desire, independently of the possible birth of a child, it results in a loss, hence the paradoxically valid term ‘little death’” (45).

22. This comment was made during a discussion concerning the function of animal figures in philosophy. For a further analysis of the discursive complexity that permeates and impedes the construction of a history of philosophy, see Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).

23. Aesop himself has come to be seen in historical accounts as a monstrous figure: a deformed former slave and foreigner. Doubts remain as to the accuracy of this portrait, but clearly, in one form or another, Aesop has come to be identified with the bestial figures for which he is famous. See Fables of Aesop, trans. S. A. Handford (London: Penguin, 1954). Louis Marin explores the figure of Aesop and his relationship to speaking and eating in a chapter titled “The Fabulous Animal,” from Food for Thought, trans. Mette Hjort (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 44–54.


25. Although the question of gender is important to any consideration of the discourse on animality, identity, and being, the present text will not engage the subject, since it forms, in essence, a topology of its own: the issue of gender and human ontology deserves a singular and sustained focus, and cannot be adequately addressed from the margins of another locus. Comments on gender, as well as other relevant concerns that emerge from the figure of the animal—race, cybernetics, infancy, monstrosity, and extraterrestrial being—will be limited to the specific instances in which they arise. Haraway’s analyses of zoological research and women’s studies perhaps best address the issue of zoomorphology and feminism, and the ways in which the two disciplines intersect and collide. See also Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990).


30. Apropos of Lacan’s attempt to recapitulate the metaphysical lineage in the agency of the objet petit a, Derrida writes in “La Facteur de la Vérité”: “This link is more visible, if not looked upon more highly, in the conglomeration of statements about ‘animality,’ about the distinction between animal and human language, etc. This discourse on the animal (in general) is no doubt consistent with all the categories and operations of the bi- or tri-partitions of the system. And it condenses no less the system’s greatest obscurity. The treatment of animality, as of everything that finds itself in submission by virtue of a hierarchical opposition, has always, in the history of (humanist and phallogocentric) metaphysics, revealed obscurantist resistance” (in The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. Alan Bass [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987], 474n). Derrida is referring to passages in which Lacan distinguishes speech from language in the discourse of the other, which is ultimately a discourse of subjectivity. For Lacan, speech marks the human subject as such by “always subjectively including its own reply” (Jacques Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” in Écrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan [New York: W. W. Norton, 1977], 85). Derrida takes issue with Lacan’s system, claiming it reinscribes a residual and circular metaphysics that seeks to limit the universe of discursive exchange to that of human beings.


33. Ibid., 14:251–52.


35. Ibid., 308–9. Foucault writes: “[Man] is a quite recent creature, which the demurrie of knowledge fabricated with its own hands less than two hundred years ago; but he has grown old so quickly that it has been only too easy to imagine that he had been waiting for thousands of years in the darkness for that moment of illumination in which he would finally be known” (ibid., 308).


39. Ibid., 90.

40. Ibid., 93. Agamben makes a compelling point concerning human ethics and the transcendence of animal habits or habits, alluding to the etymological link between ethos and the animal den. On the notion of using oneself as the basis to bring oneself forth, or engender oneself, Agamben writes: “Perhaps the only way to understand this free use of the self—a way that does not, however, treat existence as property, is to think of it as a habitus, an ethos. Being engendered from one’s own manner of being is, in effect, the very definition of habit (this is why the Greeks spoke of a second nature): that manner is ethical that does not besmirch us and does not find us but engenders us. And this being engendered from one’s own manner is the only happiness really possible for humans” (ibid., 28–29).

41. Jacques Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay, trans. Ken Frieden (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 86–87. Derrida adds, however, that this view is built upon a “naive philosophy of the animal world” and pertains only to the secrecy of human language and consciousness. He points to “the possibility of a preverbal or simply nonverbal secret—linked, for example, to gestures or to mimicry, and even to other codes and more generally to the unconscious” (ibid., 87).

42. Jean-François Lyotard, “The Inarticulate, or The Differend Itself.” The text comes from a lecture given at the Whitney Humanities Center at Yale University in 1992. Lyotard defines “passivity” as a condition in which matter—affects, thoughts, sensations—pass through a body without being altered or transformed by subjective forces. Animals and infants, Lyotard claims, are most often identified with this condition.

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02. Ibid., 112.

03. Ibid., 134.

04. For a further discussion of Aristotle and animality, see Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). According to Sorabji, “a crisis both for the philosophy of mind and for theories of morality” was provoked when Aristotle “denied reason to animals” (ibid., 7).


06. Poe, “Rue Morgue,” 131 (emphasis added).

07. Ibid., 123–24.


09. Jacques Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay, trans. Ken Frieden (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). “Some would say, perhaps imprudently, that only man is capable of speaking, because only he can not show what he could show. Of course, an animal may inhibit a movement, can abstain from an incautious gesture, for example in a defensive or offensive predatory strategy, such as in the delimitation of sexual territory or in a mating ritual. One might say, then, that animals can not respond to the inquisition or requisition of a stimulus or of a complex of stimuli. According to this somewhat naive philosophy of the animal world, one may nevertheless observe that animals are incapable of keeping or even having a secret,