creates subhuman “peoples” who are enslaved, tortured, and murdered. But we also need to consider how this machine affects nonhuman animals and investigate the man/animal dichotomy from both sides and not just the side of humanity. Even in Agamben’s critical analysis of the man/animal split, he engages the category of animal from within the category of human in order to diagnose the ways in which some humans are exploited by others. With this complex form of what I am calling “animal pedagogy,” we learn something about the category human by exploiting its relation with the category animal. And with the exception of the tick whose pleasures and mysteries Agamben imagines, animals themselves are irrelevant to this analysis.

Still, Agamben’s final prescription of a Shabbat of both animal and man has profound consequences for animals as well as humans. If the category of the human has been used to justify all sorts of atrocities inflicted on humans by humans, it also has been used to justify all sorts of atrocities inflicted on animals by humans. Perhaps demonstrating, as Agamben does, the violence at the heart of the concept of humanity that justifies man’s inhumanity to man in terms of the exclusion of his own animality can also highlight the violence of considering animality a characteristic in need of exclusion. Moreover, Agamben’s insistence on framing the philosophies of humanity and the perpetuation of the man/animal dichotomy in terms of the politics of power shows how what appears to be “innocuous” scientific discovery becomes, or is part of, deadly political maneuvering.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Psychoanalysis as Animal By-product

Freud’s Zoophilia

Man has not all that much reason to be proud of being the last to appear in creation, the one who was made out of mud, something no other being was worthy of, and so he searches for honorable ancestors, and that is where we still are—as evolutionists, we need an animal ancestor.


In nearly every essay he wrote, Freud mentions animals: animal examples, animal anecdotes, animal metaphors, animal idioms, and, of course, animal phobias. Cataloging the animals that appear in his texts begins to look like a zoological compendium of species running from apes to wolves and at least (by my count) eighty other animals in between, including beetles, caterpillars, crayfish, donkeys, emus, fox, frogs, giraffes, gnats, herring, jaguars, kangaroos, lizards, moths, opossum, oysters, porcupines, ravens, snails, starfish, tigers, toads, wasps, and whales. Animals play a central part in the imaginary of the father of psychoanalysis. Moreover, animals are the beating heart that pumps blood into the body of Freud’s most important psychoanalytic concepts, including the primary processes of displacement and condensation, the castration complex, the Oedipal complex, anxiety, neurosis, and the family romance. My thesis in this chapter is that Freud’s use of animals both sets up and undermines his Oedipal story and family romance. At almost every level, animals are involved in defining the uniquely human psyche and creating its dynamics through the “science” of psychoanalysis. Both the nuclear family that serves as the milieu for the psychosocial drama acted out by human beings and the “family of man” are drawn from these various uses of animals, as examples, metaphors, and central players in phobias. At the same time, however, the relationship between humans and animals articulated by Freud, particularly in Totem and Taboo, undermines what he calls there the “real family” with its Oedipal drama. At the very least, his analysis of kinship, which comes through anthropology, is in tension with the psychoanalytic family, and
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Freud goes to great lengths at the end of that text to try to explain how we get from primary kinship with animals to the family of man, specifically the patriarchal family, which grounds psychoanalytic theory. Furthermore, in the narrative of Totem and Taboo (and the science of kinship on which it is based), the notion of kinship based on shared blood is born from sharing the flesh and blood of animals ritually sacrificed. The notion of human kinship is based on a fundamental sacrifice of animal kinship at both the literal and symbolic levels. As the menagerie of animals in Freud's writings make evident, these sacrificial lambs and scapegoats reappear to haunt the imaginary of the father of psychoanalysis and of humankind more generally.

It becomes clear when examining the work of Freud, Lacan, and Kristeva that the animal is reduced to the natural world, which is imagined as being opposed to the world of culture or language, the symbolic realm, which is definitive of humanity. As psychoanalysis teaches us, however, the distinctions and exclusions that we take to be essential to our identities are always retroactively constituted as original. That is, the circular and repetitive temporality of the primary processes of the unconscious creates our psychic reality in relation to complex relations with the world and others which are always infused by imaginary and symbolic operations. Just as a cigar is never just a cigar, the animal is never just an animal. The very conceits of animality and the natural world against which psychoanalysis defines the uniquely human world of the psyche and symbols are—if we apply the psychoanalytic logic to its own discourse—fantasies, even if foundational fantasies. Animal difference and sexual difference, both cornerstones of psychoanalysis, are themselves constructs already steeped in imaginary and symbolic operations retroactively placed at the origin of psychic life. What we take to be original to the imaginary and symbolic operations of the psyche turn out to be products of them. My aim in this and the next chapter is to show how close readings of the discourses of psychoanalysis reveal textual sore spots where the animal or feminine figures escape from their natural enclosures and bite back.

Which Comes First, the Father or the Animal?

Although animals show up throughout Freud's Interpretation of Dreams (the text in which he introduces the concepts of condensation and displacement), it is in Totem and Taboo that we learn that the very operations of condensation and displacement central to the human psyche develop through our relation with animals. Specifically, totemism involving animal totems and the taboos they engender give rise to substitution and representation, the operations defining humanity.

Freud's Zoophilia

The move from "savages" to civilization is the result of a literal sacrifice of the father-animal by the brothers in the primal horde, which involves a symbolic sacrifice of the animal and the substitution of "father," followed by the literal killing of animals in rituals that turn that primal murder into sacrifice. In this complicated movement, it becomes clear that a substitution of animal and father is at the heart of totemism as well as Freud's analysis of totem and taboo. Moreover, implicitly at least, the sacrifice of animals—or we could say the exclusion of animals from those who can be murdered—guarantees and renews the brothers' commitment not to murder one another. In other words, killing animals prevents us from killing humans, but only after the father displaces the animal (or, the animal becomes the father). The logic of this "after," however, like the logic or temporality of psychoanalysis itself, is repetitive and circular. As we will see, Freud uses the animal phobias in his discussion of animal totemism in order to domesticate the animal and thereby turn it into a father. Elissa Marder describes how the substitution of the father with an animal that figures so prominently in Freud's conclusion has been prefigured by Freud's invocation of the animal phobias to make his case:

It is important to point out that Freud invokes the existence of the animal phobia as proof and symptom of the fear of the father well before he presents the famous narrative of the primal murder at the end of the text. More specifically, at the level of his argument, the introduction of "animal phobias" creates a textual divide, or threshold, between what he designates as pre-historical and/or primitive culture . . . and the infamous derivation of the murderous foundation of patriarchal "civilization" with which the text ends. (Marder 2009b)

The human comes into being only by making a father out of the primal animal (totemism), which is possible only because the taboo against murder makes him into a father, which in turn is the result of the animal's displacement by a father. So the "father" in this primal scene, the father on whom the Oedipal situation, the laws of civilization, and the possibility of representation that makes us human, are founded was "originally" an animal. As Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks points out, the murder of the father is "the moment not only of the institution of the prohibitions against murder and incest, but of the very notion of the humanity of the separation between human and animal, of their interrelation" (2009, 103). This separation is dependent, however, on the substitutability of man and animal.

In his reading of Totem and Taboo, Lacan suggests that the primal father "originally" must have been an animal, since before the band of brothers' murder, they were "cannibal savages" operating without guilt, society, or any prohibitions,
because these were instituted through the original murder and ensuing festival (cf. Freud 1939, 240). In reference to Lacan's reading of Freud's Totem and Taboo, Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks maintains:

Lacan's assertion that the primal father must have been an animal, insofar as the so-called animal is characterized by a satisfaction that knows no bounds, also raises the question of the animal as such as a mythic creature, a grammatical function that must be posited to grasp the organization of (sexual) meaning — given the implications of thinking through the primal father as an animal for the institution and significance of the moral law, the question of the existence of the animal as an ontic category becomes impossible. (2003, 104)

Seshadri-Crooks's argument is that Lacan's reading can help us see how the animal functions as a transcendental signifier to produce the law. In this way, the animal as a mythical being who does not and cannot exist — the being whose satisfaction knows no bounds — structures meaning systems, including kinship relations, that constitute both civil society and the notion of humanity. She also points out that Lacan is critical of Freud because this myth of the primal animal cannot in itself explain the displacement of animal for father because it is a prerequisite for the very category of father and all other denotations of kinship. Lacan contends that "the primordial father is the father from before the incest taboo, before the appearance of law, of the structures of marriage and kinship, in a word, of culture" (Lacan 1987, 88). In other words, what could possibly mean to talk about a father before kinship relations as we know them? This question is relevant to Freud's analysis, since early in Totem and Taboo he repeatedly claims that "savages" did not have a concept of kinship through blood relations but through clan relations mediated by their identification with totem animals. If early kinship is defined as identification with a totem animal, as Freud maintains, then there is more evidence that the so-called primordial father must have been an animal (symbolically or literally, which may amount to the same thing). Lacan insists that patriarchal kinship relations and the ensuing incest taboo and Oedipal complex cannot be explained by the primal horse and its murderous act. Only the names or designations "father," "mother," "brother," "sister" can make sense of the incest taboo with which Freud concludes his text. The incest prohibition is meaningless without some such kinship relations, on the one hand, and the incest taboo institutes a particular form of kinship, on the other. In Freud's analysis, patriarchal kinship is the result of the primal horse and the subsequent substitution of an animal for the father in rituals designed to both renounce and repeat his murder.

The substitution of the father for an animal is part of repeated displacements going from animal to father and back to animal in Freud's text. Indeed, Freud's theory of the foundational role of the taboos against incest and patricide — prohibitions that correspond to the Oedipal complex — depends on the substitution or displacement of animal for father, and vice versa. The series of displacements is complicated. Crucial to Freud's analysis is his identification of children, "savages," and neurotics, which at critical points in his argument becomes a substitution of one for the other. Although in a very few passages Freud qualifies his comparison of these three groups, overall his entire thesis and conclusion depend on it (see, e.g., 1913, 31, 66, 99). Like psychoanalytic temporality, Freud's explanation of the onset of civilization and the Oedipal prohibitions moves back and forth among primitive men, children, and neurotics without regard for linear time or history (despite Freud's remarks that suggest a history with an origin and in our own links to primitive ancestors). Freud makes several moves in this series of displacements, one of which is to propose that "savages" are contemporary ancestors from whom we can learn something about our own psychic dynamics. This move follows an analysis drawn from anthropology, especially the work of G. J. Frazer and William Robertson Smith, which tells Freud that primitive men regarded animals as their contemporaneous ancestors.7 Quoting Frazer that "the totem animal is also usually regarded as the ancestral animal of the group," Freud observes that "originally, all totems were animals, and were regarded as the ancestors of the different clans" (1913, 106, 107). He argues further that "totemism constitutes a regular phase in all culture" (108). He agrees with the anthropologists that primitive men regarded themselves as the same species as their animal ancestors; that like children (and neurotics, particularly phobics), they did not distinguish between humans and animals. Along with the claim that early clans did not distinguish themselves from animals, what is striking about Freud's analysis is that it seems to follow the same logic as the totemism he describes. Only now, instead of animals as contemporary ancestors, we have the savage clansmen as contemporary ancestors. In Freud's theory, the savage man who takes an animal as his ancestor takes the place of the animal. In other words, all existent tribal cultures are contemporary ancestors who are exempt from history and continue to represent us our own prehistoric form and from whom we can learn about our past and our present. The first paragraph of Totem and Taboo explains the notion of contemporary ancestors as well as the correlation between primitives and neurotics:

Prehistoric man, in the various stages of his development, is known to us through the inanimate monuments and implements which he has left behind... and through the relics of his mode of thought which survive in our own manners and customs. But apart from this, in a certain sense he is still our contemporary. There are men still living who, as we believe, stand very near to primitive man, far nearer than we do, and whom we therefore
regard as his direct heirs and representatives. Such is our view of those whom we describe as savages or half-savages; and their mental life must have a peculiar interest for us if we are right in seeing in it a well-preserved picture of an early stage of our own development.

If that supposition is correct, a comparison between the psychology of primitive peoples, as it is taught by social anthropology, and the psychology of neurotics, as it has been revealed by psychoanalysis, will be bound to show numerous points of agreement and will throw new light upon familiar facts in both sciences. (1913, i)

Freud imagines a contemporary ancestor who provides a "well-preserved picture" of our own early development and from whom we not only learn about ourselves but also develop the sciences of man. What we might call the "myth" of this contemporary ancestor is identified with both children and neurotics and acquires an explanatory power that becomes a cornerstone of the human sciences that concern Freud. Much like the mythical power of the totemic animals of primitive men, Freud's mythical contemporary ancestor gives us insight into the contemporary psyche and haunts the imaginary of the sciences of man. Moreover, this mythical ancestor who represents a kind of living fossil through which we see ourselves "proves" both that we are civilized because we are not primitives and that this animistic and animistic past lingers at our most vulnerable spots, namely, children and neurotics. This analysis raises the specter of our animal past while reassuring us that we have evolved beyond it. It also implicitly posits our civilization as the telos of those primitives (and animals), even if they are our contemporaries. To see other contemporary (or past), but less technologically advanced, cultures as examples of our own past, contemporary ancestors, or living fossils is extremely problematic in that it assumes that all cultures should be measured in terms of Western culture, that all cultures have Western culture as their telos, and that our notions of progress and futurity should be shared by all. These assumptions engage in pernicious types of displacement that substitutes us for them, and vice versa, and erases differences by reducing all cultures to our standards. What becomes clear is that Freud is arguing that the contemporary psyche resembles the totemic psyche of primitive man as its telos and that our civilization resembles totemic social organizations as their telos and also that Freud's own analysis follows a sort of totemic logic by which mythic contemporary ancestors become powerful harbingers of our own destiny.

Along with the problematic implicit substitution of savage ancestors for animal ancestors, many explicit substitutions are at work in Freud's text. Freud moves easily between children's attitudes toward and relationships with animals and those of primitive man. For example, in analyzing what he calls the "return of totemism in childhood," Freud remarks:

There is a great deal of resemblance between the relations of children and primitive men towards animals. Children show no trace of the arrogance which urges adult civilized men to draw a hard-and-fast line between their own nature and that of all other animals. Children have no scruples over allowing animals to rank as their equals. Uninhibited as they are in the service of their bodily needs, they no doubt feel themselves more akin to animals than to their elders, who may well be a puzzle to them. (1913, ii6-27)

This passage suggests that the hard-and-fast line between humans and other animals is drawn through socialization, especially through the taboos that separate us from animals. But it should also make us wonder whether the kinship relations that structure psychoanalysis—father, mother, child—haven't already effaced "earlier" kinship relations with animals, a kinship that children still keenly feel.

Throughout Totem and Taboo and his later essays on anxiety, Freud slips between totemism and childhood animal phobias. For example, in a central passage from Totem and Taboo in which he is trying to ground the Oedipal complex by combining anthropology and psychoanalysis, he moves from discussing the case of a little boy's fascination with fowl back to the anthropological discussion of totemism, all while trying to establish the "return of totemism in childhood." First, Freud mentions one of his own cases, that of "Little Hans" whose horse phobia Freud diagnoses as a fear of castration at the hand of his father. Freud maintains that the displacement of the fear of the father onto the horse allows the boy to cope with his ambivalent relation with his father by splitting his father into what we could call a good father and a bad father, the horse substitute. In some sense, Freud observes, this is a case of "reverse totemism" because the little boy fears the horse and only later comes to admire and identify with it. In the second case, that of "Little Árpád," a patient of Ferenczi's, the boy has an ambivalent attitude toward chickens: he identifies with the cock, wants to marry the hens, enjoys their slaughter, and dreams of a "fricassée of mother" (1913, i30-31). Freud sees in this fowl phobia a clear-cut Oedipal wish accompanied by ambivalence toward both parents. Even though in this "positive" case of totemism, the boy wants to kill and eat his mother and not his father, Freud concludes without doubt that "these observations justify us, in my opinion, in substituting the father for the totem animal in the formula for totemism" (1913, i33). He justifies psychoanalysis through which he has shown that animal phobias are motivated by castration fear that makes it expedient for the male child to substitute a fierce animal for his beloved (yet hated and feared) father, on the one hand, and evidence from anthropology that primitive men describe their totem animals as substitute fathers, on the other (1913, i33). He describes the substitution of a large animal for father as a "natural" one even as he himself substitutes humans for
wolves in the primal scene of the Wolf-Man's fantasy and thereby domesticates the wolves.

Freud's refusal to accept the wolves as wild animals and his insistence that what the patient actually saw was either sheepdogs or his parents having sex domesticates the Wolf-Man's fantasies and the so-called primal scene. Deleuze and Guattari claim that "the wolves never had a chance to get away and save their pack; it was already decided from the very beginning that animals could serve only to represent coitus between parents, or, conversely, be represented by coitus between parents" (1987, 28). Freud turns the wild wolves into domestic dogs or humans, just as he does with the Rat-Man's rats, and even with Little Hans's horses which become even more domesticated in the figure of the father. Furthermore, Freud reverses the gaze of the wolves from the Wolf-Man's dream and maintains that the child is looking at the wolves (sheepdogs or doggie-style parental surrogates) rather than the other way around (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 28). The wildness of the wolves indicated by their hungry gaze is replaced by a child's look that reduces the wolves to storybook characters or zoo animals. Following Deleuze and Guattari, Gary Genosko concludes:

In breaking the eye contact between the child and the wolves of his dream through the reversal of positions and the associative shift onto dogs, Freud accomplished a full-blown domestication of the scene. The gaze of the other is emptied, symbolically of course, becoming an unseeing look like that of zoo animals, objects for our inspection. (1993, 614)

Much like the Wolf-Man's wild dreams and fantasies, wild animals become domesticated so that they can be put into the service of psychoanalytic interpretation and psychoanalytic theory. Or conversely, psychoanalysis domesticates wild fantasies just as its own fantasies and discourse domesticate wild animals. Freud's development of psychoanalysis is built on hundreds of examples of domesticated animals; Lacan's theories are often based on animal studies that cage and experiment with animals; and the power of Kristeva's notion of abjection comes from domesticating and domesticated animals. Indeed, for Freud, the contemporary Oedipal family is born out of the concurrent domestication of animals and the father. Freud even compares human civilization to the "domestication of certain species of animals" (see "Why Was," 1933).

Gary Genosko points out that on several occasions Freud invokes the image of a "nature reserve" to describe the realm of fantasy. The "nature reserve," or preserve, of fantasy is a place where the imagination can run wild even in the context of civilized society. Genosko states that the image of the nature preserve allows for a wild space within the domesticating tendencies of psychoanalysis:

Freud suggests to us that fantasies that are informed by wildness and wilderness, especially the experience (cognitive and emotional) of nature reserves, produce a crack in the near-ubiquitous domestication of life, and thus provide for the child's and adult's enchantment of their relations with animals, some of whom were never domesticated or remained "wild."

As much as psychoanalysis shows signs of domestication, it also leaves room for potential escape routes into the paradomestic. (1993, 629–30)

We could say that Freud's "invention" of psychoanalysis with its unconscious is itself the production of a "nature reserve" where desires and images run wild within the larger confines of the psyche. Despite the best efforts of psychoanalysis to tame this region of the psyche, at the same time psychoanalysis operates on the principle that the unconscious necessarily remains inaccessible to consciousness; that there is always something that remains unconscious and thereby undomesticated and wild. But it is illuminating to consider the tension between the fundamental undomesticatability of the unconscious and the ways that Freud's texts (and his practice) attempt domestication, particularly for our purposes here, through the domestication of animals and the substitution of tame animals for wild ones, especially the substitution of the most domestic of animals (the human-animal, the father), for other animals such as horses or wolves.

Perhaps what is most striking in Freud's series of substitutions is that he is "surprised" when he "discovers" that the father is behind both children's animal phobias and primitive totems (1913, 156). Freud maintains that just as the substitution of animal for father is "natural" for children, so too it is natural for primitive men: "Indeed, primitive men say the very same thing themselves, and, where the totemic system is still in force today, they describe the totem as their common ancestor and primal father" (1913, 131). Here we see how quickly Freud moves from ancestor to father, even though as he has already argued, primitive men have a radically different conception of kinship, which includes all members of their clan and their totem animals. Freud justifies applying the logic of totemism to animal phobia by claiming that what remained in the background of anthropology—that primitive men describe their totem animals as ancestors—takes the foreground in psychoanalysis. In a footnote, he says that he arrived at this idea after Otto Rank mentioned a dog phobia in a young man who acquired his illness after "he thought he had heard from his father that his mother had had a severe fright from a dog during her pregnancy" (1913, 132). Earlier in the text, quoting Feuer, Freud described one theory of totemism based on the distribution of paternity to an animal by a pregnant woman who does not make the causal connection between sex with a man and the birth of a child: "Thus totemism would be a creation of the feminine rather than of the masculine mind: its roots
would lie in the sick fancies of pregnant women. . . . Such maternal fancies, so
natural and seemingly so universal, appear to be the root of totemism” (1913,
138). Freud sees the dog that frightens the young phobic’s mother during her
pregnancy as analogous to the animals to whom primitive women attributed
maternity. In the imaginary of the young phobic, the dog takes the place of his
father, and therefore Freud finds reasonable the fluid movement from animal
totem to animal phobia. He takes the attribution of maternity as the starting point
of totemism and animal phobias.

At this point, however, it may surprise Freud’s readers that the easy substitu-
tion of one for the other leads him to what he suggests is a startling realiza-
tion:

The first consequence of our substitution is most remarkable. If the totem animal is the
father, then the two principal ordinances of totemism, the taboo prohibitions which
constitute its core—not to kill the totem and not to have sexual relations with a woman
of the same totem—coincide in their content with the two crimes of Oedipus, who killed
his father and married his mother, as well as with the two primal wishes of children, the
insufficient repression or the re-awakening of which forms the nucleus of perhaps every
psychoneurosis. (1913, 132)

The substitution of animal phobia for animal totemism, and of neurotics for sav-
ages, leads to the “remarkable” discovery that Oedipal desire is what drives both.
After moving back and forth between these two, interpreting both the animal
ancestor of totemism and the phobic’s terrifying animal as a displaced father and
using one interpretation to shore up the other, it is indeed remarkable that Freud
begins the last section of Totem and Taboo as follows:

At the conclusion, then, of this exceedingly condensed inquiry, I should like to insist that
its outcome shows that the beginnings of religion, morals, society and art converge in the
Oedipus complex. This is in complete agreement with the psycho-analytic finding that the
same complex constitutes the nucleus of all neuroses, so far as our present knowledge
goes. It seems to me a most surprising discovery that the problems of social psychology,
too, should prove solvable on the basis of one single concrete point—man’s relation to his
father. (1913, 356, italics added)

What about man’s relation to animals, the relation that led to this mythical father?
Readers of Freud’s Totem and Taboo will not be surprised that he finds the father
behind both totemism and phobia, since throughout the text his series of substitu-
tions guarantees that he will find what he is looking for in the end (and in the
beginning). What might be more surprising is that the reader doesn’t have to look

far to see behind this father the repeated appearance of animals. Animals serve a
definitive role in the theory of substitution or displacement and in the theory of
the Oedipal complex with its family romance and blood kinship. They also put
the teeth in Freud’s theory of the castration complex.9

Eat or Be Eaten

In the major cases of animal phobia that Freud analyzes and repeatedly invokes
throughout his writings, from the “Analysis of Phobia in a Five Year-Old Boy”
(1909a) on, he identifies the threat posed by the animal with the father’s castra-
tion threats, and the boy-child’s fear of being bitten by the animal in question
is interpreted as a fear of castration.10 For example, in his analysis of Little Hans
(the Five Year-Old Boy), Hans is afraid that a horse will bite him. Likewise, both
the Rat-Man and the Wolf-Man get their names from the animals that they fear
will bite or devour them.

The Rat-Man is named for his famous story of an “Eastern” punishment in
which rats used their teeth to bore into the anus of the victim (1909b, 166). It
doesn’t take long for Freud to discover that one of the imagined victims of this
punishment is the patient’s father. The rest of the analysis turns on the patient’s
relationship with his father, his father’s disapproval of his sexual relations, and the
patient’s imagined punishment associated with sex. Later in his analysis, Freud
links the rat phobia to anal erotics associated with the patient’s childhood
plagued by worms. The rats come to represent many things, including money,
disease, the penis, and children. The association between rats and children in-
volves, among other things, the fact that when he was a child, the patient liked
to bite people. In developing this interpretation, Freud identifies the turning point
in the analysis when the patient recounted a visit to his father’s grave:

Once when the patient was visiting his father’s grave he had seen a big beast, which he had
taken to be a rat, gliding long over the grave. He assumed that it had actually come out
of his father’s grave, and had just been having a meal out of his corpse. The notion of a rat is
inseparably bound up with the fact that it has sharp teeth with which it bites and gnaws . . . he
himself has been just such a nasty, dirty little wretch, who was apt to bite people
when he was in a rage, and had been fearfully punished for doing so. (1909b, 215–16)

This scene of that rat/child feasting on the body of the father prefigures Freud’s
primal hordes, which fears on the body of the father, first literally when the
“brothers” were still animals and then figuratively when they become human and

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their meal becomes another sort of animal. The Rat-Man's phobic fantasies involve being devoured by rats or his father being devoured by rats as a sort of punishment levied for his father's cruelty and the patient's own sexual indiscretions.

The Wolf-Man also is afraid of being devoured by animals. Although the fear of being devoured or bitten by wolves is central to Freud's analysis, the patient reports other animal phobias—butterflies, caterpillars, swine—with some involving similar fears.11 In the case of the Wolf-Man, Freud interprets the dread of wolves as a father substitute that threatens to devour the patient, just as he had seen a wolf devour seven little goats in a fairy-tale book with which his sister used to torment him as a child: "Whenever he caught sight of this picture [of a wolf] he began to scream like a lunatic that he was afraid of the wolf coming and eating him up. His sister, however, always succeeded in arranging that he see this picture, and was delighted at his terror" (1926, 10). Freud surmised that in the cases of the Wolf-Man and Little Hans, their father used to pretend to want to gobble them up (1926, 104). He likens this to another case of a young American whose father read him stories about

an Arab chief who pursued a "ginger-bread man" so as to eat him up. He [the patient] identified himself with this edible person, and the Arab chief was easily recognized as a father-substitute. . . . The idea of being devoured by the father is typical age-old childhood material. It has familiar parallels in mythology (e.g. the myth of Kronos) and in the animal kingdom. (1926, 105)

Freud's allusion to the animal kingdom suggests that children see animals eating one another and become afraid that they, too, might be eaten by an animal.

We might also wonder whether children see themselves eating animals and become afraid that the animals may bite back, that they fear that they too might be edible. It seems that this may follow from Freud's remarks about children's identification with animals. In some of his most famous case studies involving the fear of being bitten or eaten by animals, the patient, like the Rat-Man, is identified specifically with animals' biting. Recall Freud's conclusion that "children have no scruples over allowing animals to rank as their full equals. Uninhibited as they are in the savoring of their bodily needs, they do not feel themselves more akin to animals than to their elders, who may well be a puzzle to them" (1923, 127).12 Children's tendency to bite one another is presumably one of the bodily impulses they share with animals. This equality between children and animals makes them (like Freud's savages), cannibals, at least in their imaginaries. They eat their own kind and easily become afraid of being eaten by them. In a certain sense, all fear is linked to the fear of being eaten, the fear of becoming the eaten rather than the eater, becoming passive rather than active.

The opposition between eating and being eaten operates throughout Freud's metapsychology under the guise of the opposition between activity and passivity. As we know, for Freud, activity is associated with masculinity, and passivity is associated with femininity. In the case of the animal phobia and the fear of being devoured by the father, Freud sees a hidden wish: the desire to be in the feminine or passive position in relation to the father in a sexual way. Extrapolating from the cases of Little Hans and the Wolf-Man, in his later work on anxiety Freud concludes that "it shows that the idea of being devoured by the father gives expression, in a form that has undergone regressive degradation, to a passive, tender impulse to be loved by him in a genital-erotic sense" (1926, 103). In his earlier analysis of the Wolf-Man case, he argues that the patient witnessed animal coitus, performed by either his parents having sex "doggie" style or sheepdogs having sex.13 A central factor in Freud's supposition is that the patient must have seen his mother's genitals (or some version of female genitals) and his father's (or the animal's) "violent" movements in relation to them. The young patient saw this scene as both threatening and exciting. (As we know from Freud's writings on fetishism and elsewhere, the "castrated" female genitals make the threat of castration seem real.) According to Freud, the Wolf dream suggests that the patient wanted to submit to his father's violence/passion in the way that his mother had.14 In other words, he wanted to adopt the passive position in relation to his father. Freud makes explicit the connection between the wolf phobia, the fear of being eaten, and the passive position of the mother in relation to the father:

His relation to his father might have been expected to proceed from the sexual aim of being beaten by him to the next aim, namely, that of being copulated with by him like a woman; but in fact, owing to the opposition of his narcissistic masculinity, this relation was thrown back to an even more primitive stage. It was displaced on to a father-surrogate, and at the same time split off in the shape of a fear of being eaten by the wolf. (1918, 64)

Freud goes on to describe three simultaneous sexual trends in the Wolf-Man's relation with his father:

From the time of the dream [about the wolves] onwards, in his unconscious he was homosexual, and in his conscious he was at the level of cannibalism; while the earlier masochistic attitude remained the dominant one. All three currents held passive sexual aims: there was the same object, and the same sexual impulse, but that impulse had become split up along three different levels. (1918, 64)

In sum, the Wolf-Man had adopted a passive feminine position in relation to his father by splitting his father in the figure of the wolf, which he feared would eat
him. Yet at some level, he wanted to be eaten by his father and thereby adopt the passive feminine position in relation to him.

Throughout his discussion of animal phobias, Freud's analysis suggests a strong association between cannibalism and sex, an association that he does not explore, however. In his discussions of Little Hans, the Rat-Man, and the Wolf-Man, the fear of being eaten or devoured accompanies sexual desire. In the case of Little Hans, the patient is afraid of being bitten by the horse/father as punishment for his desire for his mother. In the case of the Rat-Man, the patient fantasizes rates/rats/himself eating his father and identifies with biting rats. In the case of the Wolf-Man, the patient is afraid of being devoured by wolves, which he also identifies with his father, but at the same time he associates the wolves with sex and a desire for his father. In each of these cases, biting or being bitten, eating or being eaten, is linked to repressed sexual desires. Freud specifically identifies the fear of being bitten with a castration threat, proposing that the fear is one of castrationism by the father, who, like Kronos, threatens to eat his young. The association between cannibalism and sex in the animal phobias suggests an alternative primal scene in which the young patient—the Wolf-Man in particular—may have seen or imagined his parent's oral sex act as an act of cannibalism. The mother's "castration" could be imagined to be the result of the father's cannibalism, which is in keeping with the link between the father and biting, gnawing, or devouring animals. The boy's ambivalence comes from terror yet desire "castration" from his father, who threatens to bite or eat his penis. In an important sense, then, it is the fantasy of cannibalism or the dog-eat-dog world of animals—recall that children don't distinguish between humans and animals—that gives the castration threat its teeth. Recall, too, that for Freud, cannibalism is an essential element of the totemic meal that inaugurates humanity and human civilization defined against animality and animal nature. I will return to the role of cannibalism and the totemic feast later in this and the next chapter.

Trotting Out the Animal Phobias

As we have seen, biting, eating, and devouring anchor Freud's theories of both the castration and Oedipal complexes. They are also central to the dynamic theory of anxiety he develops in his 1915 essay, which turns on the reactivation of passivity or, in terms of the animal phobias, a reversal between biting and being bitten, or eating and being eaten. In "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (1926), Freud claims that his new theory of anxiety, which he now sees as the result not of repression but of the return of the repressed, puts "neurosis on all fours with phobias" (1926, 127, italics added). Throughout this lengthy examination of inhibitions and anxiety, and his other work from this period on anxiety, Freud repeatedly returns to animal phobias in order make his case. Little Hans, the Wolf-Man, and the Rat-Man, along with Little Árpád (who suffers from a chicken phobia—the fear that he will be bitten by a cock—guess where), take center stage in Freud's later theory of energetics. It seems that whenever Freud needs an example to prove his point, he turns out the animal phobias.

The 1926 essay "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" is exemplary of how Freud uses animal phobias to prove his theories. He begins the essay with the theoretical overview of his new "economic" theory of anxiety: "Anxiety is not newly created in repression; it is reproduced as an affective state in accordance with an already existing mnemonic image" (1926, 93). So it is not repression per se but the return of the repressed that causes anxiety. Freud trotts out Little Hans' horse phobia to prove his point: "Let us start with an infantile hysterical phobia of animals, for instance, the case of 'Little Hans,' whose phobia of horses was undoubtedly typical in all its main features" (1926, 101). As we know, Freud interprets Little Hans' fear that the horse will bite him as the fear of castration from his father. Freud's "unexpected" finding is that in both Hans and the Wolf-Man, the motive force of the repression was fear of castration. The idea contained in their anxiety—being bitten by a horse and being devoured by a wolf—were substitutes by distortion for the idea of being castrated by their father. ... But the effect of anxiety, which was the essence of the phobia, came not from the process of repression, but from the libidinal cathexes of the repressed impulse, but from the repressing agency itself. The anxiety belonging to the animal phobias was an untransformed fear of castration. It was therefore a realistic fear, a fear of danger which was actually impending or was judged to be a real one. It was anxiety which produced repression and not, as I formerly believed, repression which produced anxiety. (1926, 108; cf. 1926, 86)

The animal phobias prove that the fear of castration is fundamental to masculine anxiety and leads to both repression and regression in the form of the phobia in which the castration threat becomes the threat of being bitten and the father is replaced by an animal.

In the next section of the essay, Freud begins by saying that the choice of the animal phobia may have been "unlucky" because not all neuroses carry with them anxiety (1926, 111). But it isn't long until Freud again returns to the animal phobia: "Let us go back to infantile phobias of animals; for, when all is said and done, we understand them better than any other cases" (1926, 124). What Freud then describes is the temporality of anxiety as one of both expectation
and repetition (a repetition that he later identifies with animal instinct, see 1932, 106). More than the "danger situation," what causes anxiety is the expectation of danger, specifically the "helplessness" experienced while waiting for it (1926, 166). This helplessness or passivity leads to the compulsion to repeat as a way of trying to master the situation through an active reenactment:

A danger-situation is a recognized, remembered, expected situation of helplessness. Anxiety is the original reaction to helplessness in the trauma and is reproduced later on in the danger-situation as a signal for help. The ego, which experienced the trauma passively, now repeats it actively in a weakened version, in the hope of being able itself to direct its course. It is certain that children behave in this fashion towards every distressing impression they receive, by reproducing it in their play. In thus changing from passivity to activity they attempt to master their experiences psychically. (1926, 166)

Anxiety and the compulsion to repeat that anxiety are the result of an interplay between activity and passivity. Freud's energetic theory is based on this movement between masculine and feminine, active and passive, eating and being eaten. Freud concludes his own later summary of the theory of anxiety in "Anxiety and Instinctual Life," but now discussing the relationship between aggressive instincts (e.g., the boy's Oedipal hatred of his father) and sexual instincts (e.g., the boy's Oedipal desire for his mother): "It is like a prolongation in the mental sphere of the dilemma of eat or be eaten which dominates the organic animate world. Luckily the aggressive instincts are never alone but always alloyed with the erotic ones." (1955, 111). This passage suggests that "eat or be eaten" applies to both aggressive and sexual instincts and, furthermore, that the two are essentially linked by the formula "eat or be eaten." The animal phobias with little boys both fearing and desiring to eat and be eaten, as they have seen animals (and perhaps their parents) doing, makes this clear. The mental, like the physical, world is a doggie-eat-doggie world.

She's Some Kind of Animal!

At this point, it seems that there is a tension between the active and passive roles of father and mother in Freud's account of the animal phobias and his account of totemism. As we know, Freud compares animal phobias to totemism and throughout his writings compares primitive men and children, especially in their proximity to animals. In the animal phobias, however, if the mother is in the position of being eaten, so to speak, and the father is in the position of eating,

how does that jibe with Freud's story of the primal horde of brothers eating their father? In Totem and Taboo, the father is put in the position of the eaten (the passive feminine position), and the son is in the active masculine position of eating. Of course, in both totemism and animal phobia, the animal takes the place of the father, or vice versa. Although the mother remains closely associated with the animal (both in the Wolf-Man's primal scene as Freud imagines it and throughout Freud's writings on the mother), it is the father who is replaced by a specific animal: horse, rat, wolf. As we learn in Totem and Taboo, this primal sublimation of an animal for the father is the inauguration of society and representation, but the mother is no more than a possession of the father and then subsequently of the brothers. In the case of the father, then, the sublimation is made explicit and is therefore a sign of civilization (or, we might say, the difference between the savage and the neurotic), but in the case of the mother, the identification with animality remains implicit, unsublimated, and beyond either representation or the social. In the terms of Totem and Taboo, the father/animal substitution is the result of the activity of the brothers and not of the mothers or sisters, even though Freud speculates that it has its origins in the "sick fancies" of pregnant women who imagine they were impregnated by animals—a fantasy in which the father/brother plays no part at all (1913, 148).

The seemingly contradictory role of women/animals is particularly interesting in that what is uncanny about the animal phobias seems to be the reactivation of the passive position rather than the activity itself. Freud's analysis of the uncanny helps elucidate the connection between the uncanny and the reactivation of the passive or feminine position (and its link to the reactivation of the animal). In his essay "The Uncanny," Freud discusses the uncanny effect of Hoffman's Sandman story as revolving around a fear of castration. In the story, a student named Nathaniel has a fear of having his eyes zipped out by the "Sandman," a figure with whom his childhood nurse threatened him if he didn't go to bed. According to the nurse, this wicked man throws sand into naughty children's eyes so that their eyes jump out of their heads and he can carry them back to his own children, who "sit up there in their nest, and their beads are hooped like owl's beads, and they use them to peck up naughty boys' and girls' eyes with" (1919, 228). Although Nathaniel's phobia is not explicitly identified as an animal phobia, there is an obvious connection to the fear of birds pecking out his eyes. Later we learn of Nathaniel's terror at finding out that the "girl," Olympia, whom he sees through his window, is actually an auromazon with empty eye sockets, which are about to be filled with real human eyes. It is seeing Olympia's missing eyes (like seeing the "castrated" female sex) that has the uncanny effect on Nathaniel, who realizes that his love object is actually an object. Freud suggests that what is truly uncanny
about Olympia is the reactivation of passivity, that a passive or dead object appears alive. Witnessing the return to life of the lifeless doll is terrifying and yet compelling. Freud interprets the effect of this reactivation of the passive feminine as reactivating Nanthaniel's passive feminine attitude toward his father. "This automatic doll can be nothing else than a materialization of Nanthaniel's feminine attitude towards his father in his infancy" (1919, 23). An uncanny sensation is produced when something that should be passive becomes active or something domesticated becomes wild, whether that something is a girl or an animal.

It is telling that in the etymology of the German word Heimlich (which means "home," or the opposite of Unheimlich, "uncanny") with which Freud begins his essay on the uncanny, we learn that Heimlich denotes "tame," as in tame animals versus wild animals (1919, 222). The appearance of wild animals in the midst of domestic ones can produce an uncanny effect, particularly if the animal in question is a tame or domestic animal become wild, a passive animal become active, like Little Hans's horse. The same holds true for girls and women; they are expected to be passive, so when they are not, their unexpected activity produces an uncanny effect. We are surprised when domestic girls or animals become wild and bite back. For the male child, according to Freud, the threat of biting is always directed at the penis and brings with it the castration complex. Interestingly, he describes the function of the castration complex as inhibiting and limiting masculinity and encouraging femininity (see Freud 1926; cf. 1915, 134). Earlier, in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," Freud described how the drives can pass from active to passive in terms of both their aims and their objects, and loving becomes being loved, biting becomes being bitten, and eating becomes being eaten. It is as if the subject's own activity is projected outward and now, instead of assuming an active position in relation to the world, the subject assumes a passive position. The castration complex, which Freud often associates with the fear of being bitten or devoured, encourages passivity or the feminine position. The subject's assumption of the passive feminine position is correlative with imagining another in the position of the active masculine position, as if the threat of punishment or feelings of ambivalence lead the subject to imagine his or her own urges to bite or to eat turning on him from the outside. Since the infant's first relationship with eating comes through the maternal breast or mother's milk, we might wonder why the fantasies of being bitten, eaten, or devoured (which Freud interprets as castration threats) don't come from the mother. I will discuss Melanie Klein and Julia Kristeva's theories of the devouring and abject mother in the next chapter. For now, I want to consider two other distinguishing features of the animal phobia as Freud explains them.

First, in his interpretations of Little Hans, the Rat-Man and the Wolf-Man, Freud finds that in each case, the animal phobia is linked not only to fear of castration from the father, or a desire to take the mother's place in copulation, but more specifically to the wish to have children. If they want to take their mother's place in the sexual relation to their father, they also want to take her place as a mother. In a sense, they want to give birth to themselves. In this regard, Freud's analysis implies that these boys imagine doing away with their mother (not—or in addition to—that their father) and mothering themselves. They want babies from their father, and they appear to identify with babies from their father. These babies are abject offspring, which, as we will see, Kristeva reinterprets as jettisoned from an abject mother. Freud, however, returns the wish for a child back to the father and the boy's incestuous desire for him.

In the case of the Wolf-Man, Freud interprets an episode with an enema as follows:

The necessary condition of his re-birth was that he should have an enema administered to him by a man. (It was not until later on that he was driven by necessity to take this man's place himself.) This can only have meant that he had identified himself with his mother, that the man was acting as his father, and that the enema was repeating the act of copulation, as the fruit of which the excrescent-baby (which was once again himself) would be born. The phantasy of re-birth was therefore bound up closely with the necessary condition of sexual satisfaction from a man. So that the translation now runs to this: only on the condition that he took the woman's place and substituted himself for his mother, and thus let himself be sexually satisfied by his father and bore him a child—only on that condition would his illness leave him. Here, therefore, the phantasy of re-birth was simply a mutilated and censored version of the homosexual wishful phantasy. (1918, 100)

Freud interprets the patient's fantasies about being back in the womb and identifying with his mother as about the father's and the patient's homosexual desires for him. Notice that the mother assumes the passive posture of being satisfied by the father and that the boy imagines himself submitting to the father in the same way. Freud goes on to say that whether the neurotic's incestuous desires are directed at his mother or his father is correlated with whether the "subject's attitude is feminine or masculine" (1918, 102). Even what seems to be the boy's fantasy of giving birth to a child—to himself—is reinterpreted by Freud as passive, perhaps because the "act" of giving birth is feminine and therefore, by-nature, passive. In his writings on anxiety, using the animal phobia as his proof, Freud goes to great lengths to discount Rank's thesis that the castration fear is founded on the primal separation from the maternal body through the trauma of birth. Freud insists that castration is primary—even more so than birth trauma—and that even the fear of death and war trauma takes us back to the threat of castration.
as the first cause of anxiety (cf. 1916, 197–90). The fears or traumas of birth, death, war, and loss of love (this is how Freud translates the castration threat in females) all are reduced to the castration complex. Freud's arguments to this effect continually return him to the animal phobias.

As the preceding passage indicates, the Wolf-Man has fantasies of having abject children or excrement babies. In the case of the Rat-Man, Freud discovers that one of the main reasons his patient does not marry "his lady" is that she cannot have children and that he was "extraordinarily fond of children" (1909b, 216–17). The Rat-Man also refers to psychoanalysis as "the child" who would solve his problems but whom he also imagines kicking (1909b, 311, 313). In Freud's theories of female sexuality, according to which most "female troubles" can be cured by having a child, the Rat-Man could again be interpreted as preferring a feminine phase. Freud discusses the Rat-Man's attachment to children in the context of interpreting the rats as children. The rats of his obsessional fantasy are identified with himself as a biting child and the children that he wishes he could have. Here again, children (and the patient as a child) are identified with something dirty or disgusting. In the case of the Wolf-man, it was excrement, and in this case, it is dirty rats. The Rat-Man also has a fantasy of shitting into other children's mouths and copulating with an excrement penis (see 1909b, 286, 287). Many of the Rat-Man's fantasies and obsessions involve excrement—for example, one of his recurring obsessions and wishes is not to wash, which of course would make him rattier.

The desire for children is even more central to the case of Little Hans, who is "mummy" to his imaginary children until he is convinced that boys can't have babies, and consequently he becomes their father (e.g., 1909a, 96). He insists that he will have a baby girl like his sister Hanne, but he doesn't want his mother to have any more babies and wishes his sister were dead (1909a, 87, 72). His father repeatedly tells him that babies are delivered by the stork. (Note that Little Hans was most afraid of horses with cabs, which his father called "stork boxes" and which Freud associated with Han's mother's pregnant belly.) At one point, Hans claims that he laid an egg and out of it came a little Hans, whoupon he asked his father, "Daddy, when does a chicken grow out of an egg? When it is left alone! Must it be eaten?" (1909a, 83). Little Hans imagines giving birth to himself by laying an egg, but he also seems worried that in order to give birth, one may have to eat the egg. He wants to have his mother to himself, but he also wants to be his own mother or mother to his own children. Like the Wolf-Man and the Rat-Man, Little Hans imagines shit babies, which leads Freud to suggest that there is a symbolic equivalence between shit babies/penises (money, rats, etc.). It is noteworthy that this equation supports his theory that having a child resolves penis envy in women. Discussing Hans, Freud concludes:

Freud comments that this wish to give birth to a baby/toddler is not in itself what causes Han's phobia; rather, Hans suspect that his father had something to do with conception, knows that his father comes between him and his mother (especially in terms of whether or not he gets to sleep in bed with her), and hates him for it. According to Freud, Hans's ambivalent feelings for his father are displaced onto the horse—more precisely, the hatred is placed there so that the love can be reserved for his real father. But because his fear of horses is triggered by the birth of his sister and his fear seems mostly directed toward the "stork box" that delivers the dreaded sister, both mothers and sisters may be at least as important, if not more important, than the father in explaining Han's phobia.18

Sadistic and Seductive Sisters

Through the birth of Little Hans's sister, we have moved from Freud's images of Kronos eating his babies and the phobic's fear of being eaten by his father to the phobic's fantasy of shitting babies and thereby taking the place of his mother and giving birth to himself (and to his sister). For Hans, his sister seems to be the ultimate little shit baby. The Rat-Man, too, has frequent associations between his sisters and excrement, rats, filth, lice, disease, and so on. In association with his excrement-eating dream, which I mentioned earlier, he says to his sister Julie: "Nothing about you would be disgusting to me" (1909b, 287). It becomes clear in Freud's analysis, however, that his patient's phobias and fantasies are as much connected to his two sisters as they are to his mother and father. The Rat-Man seems caught between his incestuous desire for his younger sister Julie and his guilt over the death of his older sister Katherine. In addition, it is the Wolf-Man's
sadistic sister who torments him with frightening storybook pictures of wolves that send him into screaming fits.

Discussing the Wolf-Man, Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok suggest that in Russian, his mother tongue, the word for six (Shiest)—as in six wolves—is closely related to the word for sister (Sistra) (1986, 37). They claim that the Wolf-Man’s wolf dream includes a “sister” of wolves that indicates that his phobia is directly related to his sister, whom they maintain he has incorporated into his own identity (1986, esp. 79). They maintain that what the Wolf-Man witnesses as Freud’s so-called primal scene is not intercourse between his parents but incestuous relations between his father and his sister and that this is the traumatic sight causing his phobia (1986, esp. 76). Like Hans and the Rat-Man, the Wolf-Man too has fantasies of debasing his sister and usurping her dominant position. The incestuous scene is traumatic in part because he is left out of it: he is not the object of his father’s desire. It is noteworthy that Freud does not consider that his Russian patient had seen and recounted seeing real wolves and not just storybook wolves, domestic sheepdogs, or his parents having sex “doggie style,” as Freud surmises (see Genosko 1993). In other words, while debating the status of the Wolf-Man’s witnessing the primal scene, Freud considers the reality of the sex act in humans behaving like animals, domesticated dogs and sheep, but he does not consider the reality of the wolf in the life of his patient, even though the patient saw wolves and wolf carcasses shot by his father (Genosko 1993, 63). Gary Genosko also points out that the patient had seen Anna Freud’s dog while visiting Freud and that he remarked that the dog resembled a wolf and that the dog was named “Wulf” or Wolf (1993, 61–12).

Returning to Freud’s analysis of the Wolf-Man’s sister, we see that his patient’s sexual development, fantasies, and phobias are directly linked with her. Freud describes how after their rivalry in early childhood—and his sister’s seductions of her young brother—when reaching puberty, the patient and his sister became “like the best of friends” (1918, 22). After the patient made a pass at his sister and she rejected him, Freud recounts that he subsequently seduced a house servant with the same name as his sister and that all his love objects were substitutes for his beloved sister (1918, 22). He continued to choose servant girls, however, according to Freud, because at the same time he wanted to debase his sister. Immediately following his analysis of his patient’s sister substitutes, Freud discusses the patient’s reaction to his sister’s death, which Freud says was surprising, given how much he loved his sister and how little he grieved for her. Freud discovers, however, that the patient weeps at a poet’s grave, a poet whom his father associated with the patient’s sister. Freud concludes that the patient’s grief is displaced because of his ambivalent relation to his sister, which is characterized by both unconscious incestuous love and jealousy. It is also noteworthy that in Freud’s account, it is after the young patient’s rejected sexual advances toward his “Nanya,” or nanny, that he becomes cruel to animals. As Freud describes it, even his sexual curiosity about Nanya is piqued by his sister; and through them both he “learns” about both castration and sexual desire. In addition to his concern with castration, which became associated with animals in fairy tales, how he became occupied with where children came from, particularly in relation to a story in which children were taken out of the body of a (male) wolf (1918, 35). Like Little Hans, the Wolf-Man’s phobias are linked both to a wish that males could have babies and to his sister. Like the Rat-Man, his sexuality is shaped in relation to his animal phobias as well as his desire for his sister(s) and their deaths. Freud diagnoses the Wolf-Man’s cruelty to animals as a result of his rejected sexual advances and his budding awareness of castration, which Freud reasons is linked to his regression and his “anal impulses” (1918, 26). These impulses lead him to “be cruel to small animals” to catch flies and pull off their wings, to crush beetles underfoot; in his imagination he liked beating large animals (horses) as well” (1918, 26). Although Freud’s final message about this case returns us to castration threats levied by the father against the son, threats that lead to ambivalence and the displacement of hatred onto animals, lumping behind these animal totems we once again find a sadistic, seductive, and eventually dead sister.

Although these sisters repeatedly show up in his patient’s dreams, fantasies, and stories, their central part in the familial drama drops out of Freud’s conclusions about his animal phobias, which continue to revolve around the Oedipal family romance. Moreover, the role of the sister disrupts Freud’s easy slippage between animal phobias and totemism, characteristic of both his work on the animal phobias and his account of the origin of civilization in Totem and Taboo. Although all of Freud’s phobias’ animal fears are intimately linked to their sisters, the sisters have no role in the story of the primal horde—the band of brothers—who kill their father and “marry” their mother, thus fulfilling the Oedipal prophecy of psychoanalysis. Here, too, the kinship relations that interest Freud are those among brothers, son, and father, determined by their struggles to sexually possess women, usually figured as mothers rather than sisters. Freud’s interpretation of totemism shares with his phobias’ fantasies an implicit concern for paternity. By seeing all women in terms of motherhood and associating sexual desires for women with desires for their mothers, Freud repeats the phobias’ concern with where babies come from. Women as mothers, bird givers, and possessors of children are desired by brothers/sons in order to substitute themselves for the father and, as we have seen, not only father themselves but also give birth to themselves. The death of the sister provides fuel for the phobic fantasy of taking her place as the
one who can identify with the mother as the birth giver and possessor of children. In Freud's descriptions of animal phobias, we might say that the sisters bite back and disrupt Freud's neat analyses of castration and oedipal complexes.

Really Strange Kinship or the Oedipal Family as “Real” Family

It is not just in the animal phobias, however, that the sisters bite back. In Totem and Taboo, Freud's notion of kinship has as its telos the Oedipal family which is undermined by the anthropological accounts of the history of kinship that he uses to produce it. As we know, Freud's psychoanalysis revolves around the Oedipal family with its family romance, in which the children have and repress desires for their parents, desires/repressions that can lead to neurosis. We also discover in Totem and Taboo, however, that the nuclear family with one mother, one father, and one or more children was not the original organization of the family. Rather, as Freud makes sure to point out several times, the primitive peoples discussed by the anthropologists on whose work he draws, defined their kinship relationships not in terms of family but rather in terms of their totem animal. The relations between children and their parents were radically different from the ideal of the nuclear family. Instead, children were raised by groups of adults who identified themselves as kin. Sometimes Freud suggests that all the adult women were viewed as mother and all the adult men as father, and all the children in the group were viewed as siblings (e.g., 1913, 6–7). Recall that Freud quotes Frazer: “The totem bond is stronger than the bond of blood or family in the modern sense” (1913, 3). Later, he repeats the sentiment without quoting him: “The totem bond is stronger than that of the family in our sense” (1913, 102). In the first few pages of the text, Freud poses the “riddle” of the family: “The riddle of how it came about that the real family [wirklichen Familie] was replaced by the totem clan must perhaps remain unsolved till the nature of the totem can be explained ... replacing real blood-relationship [nur Blutsverwandtschaft] by totem kinship” (1913, 6, italics added; see also 1940, 12). By “real family” Freud means blood relations defined as the nuclear family. Because most of Totem and Taboo offers various anthropological accounts of group marriage, totem clans, and forms of kinship not linked to consanguinity, the riddle is not how the real family became a totem clan but how the totem clan became the so-called real family. In an important sense, the text is Freud's attempt to explain the domestication of the family, especially the father, through the domestication and sacrifice of animals.

According to the logic of the text, the domestication of the family that engenders kinship through blood requires both the literal and symbolic sacrifice of animals. Kinship with animals once stronger than consanguinity in defining the family is sacrificed for the sake of human kinship, and this symbolic sacrifice of animal kinship for human kinship is performed through ritual and ceremonial sacrifices of animals. It seems that animal blood must be shed so that human blood can create the bond of kinship. As we have seen, in the totem clan, the totem animal is viewed as an ancestor, and the border between humans and animals, if there is one, is porous. Freud quotes Frazer: “The farther we go back, the more we should find that the clansman regards himself and his totem as being of the same species, and the less he distinguishes between conduct towards his totem and towards his fellow-clansmen” (1913, 104). Indeed, the clan shares in its relation with the totem animal the kinship among humans created through kinship with the animal, and the clan “believe themselves to be of one blood, descendents of a common ancestor” through their totem animal (1913, 105, italics added). In addition, the family is coextensive with the clan, which includes animals. The totem animal in particular holds a special place in the clan, insofar as like other members of the clan, he cannot be killed or eaten because killing and/or eating these animal ancestors is akin to murdering or cannibalizing other members of the clan. The tension in Freud's analysis becomes apparent when he introduces the idea of the primal horde or band of brothers. As we have seen, the distinctions “brother,” “father,” and “mother” carried radically different connotations and expectations before the rebellion of the primal horde against the primal “father.” In addition, the substitution of the father for an animal in the totemic festival that Freud identifies with the onset of totemism does not, as he implies, initiate the “real family” or kinship through consanguinity. Rather, an animal is substituted for the primal father, and in subsequent festivals the ritualistic sacrifice of an animal takes the place of the sacrifice of the father. But if this celebration that creates the kinship bond in the clan comes through identification with, and substitution of, the totem animal, then this onset of totemism works against Freud's notion of brothers, fathers, mothers, or the so-called real family defined in terms of blood and the Oedipal myth.

Perhaps this is why, as we have seen, in his conclusions, Freud claims to be “surprised” to find the Oedipal complex at the beginnings of humanity (1913, 157). Freud's surprise is uncanny, if not diagnostically, in that the Oedipal complex with its patrilineal tendency is, again as Nietzsche might say, the truth that Freud continually hides behind a bush and praises himself when he finds it. But it is surprising that Freud can find the “real” Oedipal family by tracing the outlines of the history of the family in the clan. If anything, this history demonstrates that the modern notion of the family is just one of the many possibilities for conceiving of kinship. Certainly, Freud's “discovery” that the Oedipal family is the real
family or that the real family is an Oedipal family unsettles the anthropological research on which he bases his case that the incest prohibition is definitive of kinship. It is unanswerably the Oedipal family relations are entirely inescapable to the point that the father is simultaneously a brother, an uncle, and a nephew. If the Oedipal family is the real family, then the categories that sustain that family, particularly the notion of father, become inherently unstable. Another of Freud's most important discoveries is the operation of the primary processes of the unconscious that enable, even require, displacements and condensations like this, especially when the father is concerned. As we have seen, these operations separate humans from animals only insofar as humans identify with animals. Humans are unique, then, owing to their ability to substitute animals for themselves, and vice versa. In this sense, we could say that humans become human only by virtue of their relationships, even identification, with animals.

At the end of Totem and Taboo, Freud struggles with the problem of how the patriarchal family reappears out of totemism. After all, the primal horde does away with the authoritarian father figure and redistributes his authority to all the brothers as the inauguration of civil society. How, then, does the authoritarian father, necessary to the patriarchal and the Oedipal family, reappear? The text suggests that it comes through the domestication of the father resulting from the domestication of animals. The very notion of god, which transforms totemism into theistic religion, is a domestication of animality. The animal is a father surrogate who is replaced by a "superior" father surrogate, the god, as the totemic feast becomes "a simple offering to the deity, an act of renunciation in favour of the god" (1913, 150). The god becomes the agent of the sacrifice.

This is the phase in which we find myths showing the god himself killing the animal which is sacred to him and which is in fact himself. ... At this point the psychoanalytic interpretation of the scene coincides approximately with the allegorical, surface translation of it, which represents the god as overcoming the animal side of his nature. (1913, 150).

The separation of god, animal, and man, which had not existed before or during totemism, appears alongside the domestication of animals. Freud repeatedly remarks on the blood kinship of god, animal, and man. For example, he points out, "The sacrificial animal was treated as a member of the tribe; the sacrificing community, the god and the sacrificial animal were of the same blood and members of one clan" (1913, 156). The blood bond affirmed through totemism becomes associated with a much narrower conception of kinship. In Christian religious rituals, it is celebrated through the Eucharist, in which the "blood of the grape," wine, is substituted for the blood of Christ. Animals lose their sacred
clock that as they become yoked to the plow and put into the service of man. As the digestion of man over animals increases, they no longer appear worthy of reverence or identification with the god. Now man himself must replace animals in the process of substitution that produces religion, culture, and art. Freud describes Christianity as the culmination of this process, in that the animal that was once substituted for the father becomes again substituted by man, the son of God:

"The original animal sacrifice was already a substitute for a human sacrifice—for the ceremonial killing of the father; so that, when the father-surrogate once more resumed its human shape, the animal sacrifice too could be changed back into a human sacrifice" (1913, 153). The father "has regained his human shape" through totemism's connection between animal and father, one consequence of which is that the changing conceptions of animals change the conception of the father (see Freud 1913, 156–57, 157–58). Still, for Freud, vestiges of primal totemism can be found in Christianity's Eucharist, which is a ritualistic and symbolic consumption of Christ's body and blood, recalling the totemic feast:

The ancient totem meal was revived in the form of communion, in which the company of brothers consumed the flesh and blood of the son... Thus we can trace through the ages the identity of the totem meal with animal sacrifice, with the anthropic human sacrifice and with the Christian Eucharist. (1913, 154)

The flesh and blood of an animal are replaced with that of the god (god become flesh and blood).

There Will Be Blood

In this history of animal sacrifice and meals made of animal flesh, the phrase "flesh and blood" that marks our modern sense of kinship harks back to animals, as they are the original flesh and blood. Certainly, in Totem and Taboo, the role of flesh, and, perhaps most remarkably, of blood is at every turn taken by animals in the construction of human kinship and the human sciences that analyze it. We could surmise from Freud's analysis of totemism that blood relations were originally relations with animals and that the bonds of blood kinship were originally formed by consuming or assimilating the flesh and blood of an animal. Discussing the nature of sacrifice, Freud says that:

whenever food is eaten in common, the participation in the same substance establishes a sacred bond between those who consume it when it has entered their bodies... This bond
is nothing else than the life of the sacrificial animal, which resides in its flesh and in its blood and is distributed among all the participants in the sacrificial meal. A notion of this kind lies at the root of all blood covenants. ... This completely literal way of regarding blood kinship as identity of substance makes it easy to understand the necessity for renewing it from time to time by the physical process of the sacrificial meal. (1913, 137–38)

The group shares in the flesh and blood and thereby is identified with that blood but also becomes co-opted in the sacred act of killing and eating. Blood relations assume this double meaning of sharing in, or eating, the body of the animal and in the acts of sacrificing it and consuming it, acts akin to murder and cannibalism if performed outside ritualized ceremonies. As Freud describes it, with the primal horde and band of brothers, this sacrifice becomes the crime of patricide, and so from that time forward, murder, incest, cannibalism, and bestiality are prohibited.21 Freud quotes anthropologist Robertson Smith, who calls these crimes “offenses against the sacred laws of blood,” and “in primitive society the only crimes of which the community as such takes cognizance” (1913, 143, italics added). To renew their bond, the brothers repeat the murderous act now domesticated through ritual animal sacrifice. Under any other circumstances, however, killing and eating the totem animal is a crime. It must be a communal act so that no one individual is responsible and every member of the tribe shares responsibility. “The rule that every participant at the sacrificial meal must eat a share of the flesh of the victim has the same meaning as the provision that the execution of a guilty tribesman must be carried out by the tribe as a whole” (1913, 136; cf. 146).

If all eat the flesh, the act is a sacrifice and not a crime. The blood tie, then, is established not only by consuming the flesh and blood of the animal but also by sharing in the spilling of its blood and tearing of its flesh.

Citing Robertson Smith, Freud argues that “there is no gathering of a clan without an animal sacrifice” and that “the sacrificial meal, then, was originally a feast of kinsmen, in accordance with the law that only kinsmen eat together” (1913, 135). Only kinsmen eat together, and they become kin through that act. Moreover, they come together as a clan, as kin, only by sacrificing an animal. In this sense, human kinship is dependent on the sacrifice of animal kin and eventually the sacrifice of animal kinship altogether. The developmental and anthropological accounts of the origins of humanity and civilization that Freud presents in Totem and Taboo can be read as a lesson in the foreclosure of animal kinship for the sake of human kinship, specifically the form of human kinship that we recognize as the family. Of course, our views of animals (and humans) continue to evolve, and the family may come to include beloved family pets and companion animals, which, if Freud is right, should also change our conceptions of maternity and sterility. Our notions of kinship and the familial relations among brother, sister, father, and mother are historical concepts open to continued transformations.

Certainly the importance of sharing a meal together as a central ritual of establishing family and community continues. In many regions of the world, especially the United States, sharing animal flesh is traditionally part of family and community rituals, which include Memorial Day or Labor Day barbecues, eating turkey at Thanksgiving or Christmas, and eating ham at Easter. Meat eating continues to be identified with particular (Christian) celebrations that bring people together as kin. Freud points out that “in our own society the members of family have their meals in common,” but he is quick to add, “The sacrificial meal bears no relation to the family. Kinship is an older thing than family life” (1913, 133). Freud emphasizes the distinction between kinship and the family as part of his argument that the Oedipal family with its strong father figure is a return of the pretotemic cultures and the dominant primal father who is killed and eaten with the onset of totemism and whose power is distributed to the brothers; that is, patriarchy becomes a fraternity.

Kinship defined through blood relations becomes more limited, and eventually animals and neighbors are excluded. Kinship is still described in terms of blood, but no longer as literally ingesting flesh and blood. The blood of the totem animal is considered sacred, which has the double sense of holy and unclean. The blood of this animal is not to be spilled or consumed outside the communal festival and ritual sacrifice. Furthermore, taboos on blood initiate the incest taboo that Freud identifies with the onset of totemism. Sex and mating must be between members of different tribes or different animal totem clans. Freud explains: “The totem is of the same blood as the man and consequently the ban upon shedding blood (in connection with defecation and menstruation) prohibits him from sexual relations with a woman belonging to his totem” (1913, 120; cf. Freud’s discussion of restrictions on blood in relation to gods, 1913, 253–34). Freud does not elaborate on the connection between the taboo against killing the totem and the taboos associated with defecation and menstruation, but this passage suggests that when blood is or becomes associated with women, it is or becomes taboo. As Freud describes it, the incest taboo originally was a blood taboo related to prohibitions against sex between blood kin and also to prohibitions related to women’s blood. At this point, we might say that the connection among animals, women, and blood thickens. I will return to the relation among taboo, animal, woman, and blood in the next chapter, when I discuss Kristeva’s notion of abjection.

In Moses and Monotheism, Freud suggests that the power of women increased after the totemic overthrow of the primal father and thus began an era of
matriarchy (1939, 131). In part, that text is Freud's attempt to explain how matriarchy gave way to patriarchy and the return of the autocratic father. This later description of totemism makes it clear that the ceremonial meal substituting the totem animal for the murder and cannibalism of the primal father is attended by only male clan members. Although he maintains that totemism and the death of the primal father bring with them matriarchy and fertility, women are still absent from the ritualized remembrance of the distribution and assimilation of power by the brothers: "Once a year the whole male community came together to a ceremonial meal at which the totem animal (worshipped at all other times) was torn to pieces and devoured in common" (1939, 132). While the brothers gain their power by consuming the flesh and blood of their father/totem, the women's power in this story remains a mystery (see also the next chapter). In sum, all these arguments point to the historical and contingent nature of kinship and family relations.

In our everyday parlance, we are accustomed to thinking of our kin as our "flesh and blood." Reflecting on the literal meaning of "flesh and blood," which is tied to animal flesh, we realize that in terms of kinship, "flesh and blood" is a metaphor. After all, members of the same family have different types of blood and, we might say, different types of flesh: they do not literally share flesh and blood. Furthermore, the ways in which we think that family members share flesh and blood is limited to an association between the maternal body and animality. In and through the maternal body, flesh and blood are generated and transmitted to future kin (I will return to this connection in the next chapter). It is only in the maternal body that kin literally share blood, and even then, the circulation of blood, often of different types, is negotiated by the placenta, which acts as a sort of third party (see Oliver 1993). The adage "blood is thicker than water" suggests that we have greater ethical obligation—or at least more intense emotional bonds—to those with whom we share blood than to those with whom we share water, which may be read a metaphor for food. Sharing blood is more binding than sharing food. But as we have seen, in Freud's account based on nineteenth-century anthropology, the idea of sharing blood originated in the literal sharing of the flesh and blood of animals. Sharing the flesh and blood of an animal in the totemic feast cemented the bond of kinship among members of the clan. Shedding and consuming animal blood both signaled and produced identifications with the blood of the totem animal, which became the first form of kinship. We don't have to go far in our reflection on the metaphor of "flesh and blood" to see animal kin as the twin in the mirror of the "brotherhood of man" and human kinship.

Chapter Twelve

Animal Objects, Maternal Objects

Krislov's Senysis

A strange metaphor of contagion runs through Freud's Totem and Taboo, as if breaking taboos is a communicable disease. Animals and women are associated with this form of infection that threatens the community from inside. Freud describes a magical power attributed by primitive peoples to animals, objects, and persons, which can be contagious if not properly controlled through prohibitions. Since prohibitions correspond to desires that still exist in the unconscious, this magical power is, in effect, the power of temptation: "The magical power that is attributed to taboo is based on the capacity for arousing temptation; and it acts like a contagion because examples are contagious and because the prohibited desire in the unconscious shifts from one thing to another" (Freud 1913, 35). Like the totem animal and the taboo linked to it, the magical power is seen as sacred and threatening, holy and unclean. Freud identifies the magical power with what he calls "special individuals," "exceptional states," and "uncanny things," including priests and babies, menstruation, puberty and birth, and sickness and death, or anything associated with infection and contagion (1935, 22). It is this exceptional quality that makes these beings, states, and events "sacred" and "above the ordinary" as well as "dangerous," "unclean" and "uncanny." (Freud 1913, 22) Freud observes that something about the power of both women and animals is uncanny, specifically the dangerous power of animals and women to tempt men. It is the power of these "temptations of the flesh" to spread throughout the community that makes them contagious. Moreover, the infectious power of women and animals threatens what Freud describes as the brotherhood of man with a fall from
civilization back into animality. The temptations that Freud mentions involve breaking the taboos that separate man from animals, including those against incest, cannibalism, and bestiality.

The uncanny effect that Freud describes in relation to animals and women becomes explicit in the work of Julia Kristeva, whose notion of abjection and analysis of cultural prohibitions or taboos help elucidate the psychic stakes in identifying women with animals and both with contagion. Kristeva's *Powers of Horror* returns us to the fantasies of eating and devouring associated with both animals and women, particularly mothers. Her analysis enacts and reveals a slippage between maternity/femininity and animality on which psychoanalysis is based and is at the heart of the "sciences of man." In this chapter, I explore Kristeva's interpretation of the role of the mother in Freud's animal phobias and in the primal feast central to his *Totem and Taboo*. Throughout her discussions of Freud, Kristeva restores the figure of a powerful maternal authority, which she sees as remaining repressed in Freud's theories and in our culture more generally. As we will see, however, in uncovering this repressed maternal authority, Kristeva repeats the identification of mother and animal. Indeed, the force of her theory of abjection relies on the power over the human psyche held by animals and animality. Furthermore, because animals and animality in her texts are reduced to stand-ins for the mother and the maternal body, she erases animals as they exist outside human imaginary or symbolic systems. In Kristeva's writings, animals are symbols through which humans become speaking beings. In this regard, we could say that in psychoanalysis, animals become nothing more thanhuman by-products. The ambivalence toward animals and animality in the history of Western thought is evidenced in Kristeva's work by her attempts to return our own animality to theories of language. She does this by turning animals into symbolic substitutes for the very kinship relations that our relations to them engender. In other words, as with Freud, for Kristeva animals are significant as substitutes for, and constitutive of, human kinship relations. In her case, they mark the territory of the relation between mother and child.

Adding Women to the Science of Man

As Freud does, Kristeva relies on evidence from anthropology to make her case in terms of collectivities and individual psychology. And she too easily moves back and forth between the social and the psychological, social science and psychoanalysis. She uses the "sciences of men," particularly anthropology, to diagnose the human psyche, now figured in terms of sexual difference rather than the generic man. In her early work, anthropology appears as a description of "facts" on which she bases her own theories (cf. 1982, 65, 78). But as she assimilates "data" from anthropology into her own psychoanalytic and social theories, Kristeva criticizes anthropologist Mary Douglas for integrating "Freudian data" while "naively" rejecting Freudian premises (1982, 66). This discourse of facts and data is in tension with Kristeva's account of the role of the imaginary and symbolic processes in psychic life. What she takes as "fact" or "datum" obviously must be interpreted by her and the anthropologists whom she cites. Her acceptance of these supposed brute facts, however, is at odds with her later theory of narrativity and the role of fantasy in psychoanalysis and life. Like Freud and Lacan before her, Kristeva has an ambivalent relation to science. Sometimes she insists that facts are facts and that the analyst can discern universal truths from them, but at other times, she insists that all theory, including both science and psychoanalysis, are imbued with imaginary and symbolic constructs that depend on cultural valuation and ultimately on fiction (cf. 1982, 68).

Kristeva constantly interjects a personal discourse using the pronoun "I" at the same time that "I" appears as universal. But unlike Freud, she rarely explicitly discusses herself or her own dreams or fantasies. The following passage is an interesting example of Kristeva's ambivalence—or perhaps disavowal—of the status of the personal in her work, which despite its deeply personal tone claims to be universal:

My reflections will make their way through anthropological domains and analyses in order to aim at a deep psycho-symbiotic economy: the general, logical determination that underlies anthropological variants (social structures, marriage rules, religious rites) and evinces a specific economy of the speaking subject; no matter what its historical manifestations may be. In short, an economy that analytic listening and semanalytic (sic) deciphering discover in our contemporaries. Such a procedure seems to me to be directly in keeping with Freudian utilization of anthropological data. It inevitably entails a share of disappointment for the empirically minded ethnologist. It does not unfold without a share of fiction, the nucleus of which, drawn from actuality and the subjective experience of the one who writes, is projected upon data collected from the life of other cultures, less to justify than to throw light upon them by means of an interpretation to which they obviously offer resistance. (1982, 68, italics in original).

Note that Kristeva says "one who writes" to designate the universal writer rather than herself personally. Also, she claims that unlike the anthropologists who conduct empirical research on specific cultures and histories, she will be making universal claims that aim at the "deep" economy that crosses cultures and
The notion that ethnographic research gives us access only to a surface and contingent economy but that psychoanalysis gives us access to a deep and universal economy is, of course, suspect. It is noteworthy, however, that unlike Freud, Kristeva explicitly identifies the role of fiction in her use of anthropological data. So although she accepts the empirical research as fact, she simultaneously challenges anthropological interpretations of those facts and suggests that a deeper more universal interpretation requires a "share of fiction."

Inspired by Freud, and yet perhaps moving away from his commitment to the scientific status of psychoanalysis, Kristeva constantly turns to literature for evidence of her theories. Whereas Freud, and even more so Lacan, frequently uses examples of animals from biological or zoological sciences, Kristeva prefers literary texts. Aside from *Powers of Horror* with its reliance on anthropology, Kristeva rarely uses examples from either biological or social science. Indeed, her argument in *Powers of Horror* is that art and literature have taken the place of religion in the production of cultural meanings. What counts as evidence or proof changes dramatically with this move from science to literature, from empirical studies to fiction. Freud gives the first hints of this shift when late in his work, he calls instincts or drives the "mythology" of psychoanalysis. The theory of the instincts is so to say our mythology. Instincts are mythical entities, magnificent in their indeterminateness" (1932, 95). In this same text, "Anxiety and Instinctual Life," Freud justifies turning to philosophy (even while taking jobs at it) rather than science to develop the "science" of psychoanalysis (cf. 1934, 107). Freud himself often gives examples from literature, particularly Goethe and Shakespeare. And of course, the notion of the Oedipal complex, on which his theory is founded, is based on literature.

The movement from anthropology to literature is just as dramatic in Kristeva’s *Powers of Horror* as it is in any of Freud’s writings. For example, in just a few paragraphs, she goes from discussing religious rituals in India to Sophocles and Oedipus (cf. 1982, 81, 84–85). Without any regard for differences among cultures or religions, she moves easily between ancient Greek literature and contemporary ethnographic social science focused on South Asia. In this regard, Kristeva is right in saying that her work is in keeping with Freud’s use of anthropological research, which he employs in conjunction with references to Goethe and other literature, his case studies, and his own personal experiences and cultural observations. In fact, in an important sense, *Powers of Horror* can be read as Kristeva’s attempt to rewrite Freud’s account of the emergence and significance of religion using current anthropological data. She continues Freud’s "deep" research into the psychic economy underlying economies of exchange and kinship studied by contemporary anthropology. Focusing on the fear of contagion and defilement invoked by Freud in relation to both totemic religions and childhood animal phobias, Kristeva reinterprets this fear as a general one associated with abjection and its source in the maternal body.

Animal Phobia as Fear of the Unnamable

The first half of *Powers of Horror*, which sets out the theory of abjection, could be read as an account of the essential link between animal and mother in the constitution of the human psyche. In the first chapter, which begins with an epigraph from Victor Hugo about “beasts,” Kristeva describes the abject as what challenges borders, whether they are the borders of the individual or the social. On the level of the individual, the primary frontier is the border with the maternal body, and on the level of the social, the primary frontier is the border with the animal:

The abject confronts us, on the one hand, with those fragile states where map strays on the territories of animal. Thus, by way of abjection, primitive societies have marked out a precise area of their culture in order to remove it from the threatening world of animals or animalism, which were imagined as representatives of sex and murder. The abject confronts us, on the other hand, and this time within our personal archaeology, with our earliest attempts to release the hold of maternal entity, even before existing outside of her, thanks to the autonomy of language. It is a violent, clumsy breaking away, with the constant risk of falling back under the sway of a power as securing as it is stifling. (Kristeva 1982, 12–13, italics in original)

As Kristeva describes it, abjection is the result of the return of repressed ambiguity or ambivalence inherent in these "fragile" boundaries, which are as precarious as they are necessary. We all are "strays" in that because we straddle borders, we do not entirely belong to one side or the other.1 The abject is neither fish nor fowl so to speak, but the in-between that resists categorization. It is a separation within the inseparable, a division before there is one . . . or two. It is the first stirrings of the human psyche, or what Kristeva calls the "speaking being" and sometimes the "speaking animal" (e.g., 1982, 15).

She describes the abject as the most fragile and most archaic sublimation of an ‘object’ still inseparable from drives” (1982, 12). This not-yet-object still inseparable from the fledgling subject becomes the "object" of primal repression, which is aimed at a "something else" against which the being struggles to become human. Kristeva says that “in this struggle, which fashions the human being, the *min neris*, by means of which he becomes homologous to another in order to

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1 Kristeva, for instance, writes that: "The abject is neither fish nor fowl, nothing of the two, but the in-between that resists categorization. It is a separation within the inseparable, a division before there is one... or two. It is the first stirrings of the human psyche, or what Kristeva calls the 'speaking being' and sometimes the 'speaking animal' (e.g., 1982, 15)."
become himself, is in short logically and chronologically secondary. Even before being like, 'I am not but do separate, reject, object' (1982, 19). In regard to Freud's concern with the mimetic power of temptation, specifically the temptation to act like an animal, we might read Kristeva as pointing to a separation prior to imitation but one that still depends on the animal. Freud says, "What is in question is fear of an infectious example, of the temptation to imitate—that is, the contagious character of the taboo" (1971, 71–72). It is noteworthy in regard to the role of imitating animals that in Freud's account of animal phobia, particularly in the case of the Wolf-Man, the primal scene is characterized by the imitation of animal sex. The temptation is not just to eat animals but to act like them, which includes eating other animals.

Kristeva's analysis suggests that human beings separate themselves from animal beings so that they can imitate those beings in order to become human. Imitation requires prior separation. This circular logic of separation and imitation takes us back not only to Freud's analysis of animal totems in Totem and Taboo but also to Rousseau's concern with the power of imitation in the origin of language and in education and to Derrida's deconstruction of the role of imitation in Rousseau's theory of nature, all of which involve animals and what I am calling animal pedagogy. Recall that Derrida argues that imitation turns out to be original in Rousseau's account of language. In my earlier analysis, Rousseau's theory of language relies on animal pedagogy that links imitation to animals as our first teachers. Kristeva, however, identifies a relation with animals prior to this imitation, a relation characterized by abjection. She points to a separation from animals before the symbolic separation that results from imitation and our dependence on animals to learn language. As Derrida does, Kristeva finds another animal lurking behind the origins of humanity, a darker, more frightening beast, our dependence on which we disavow and abject. This abjection is the constant attempt, and constant failure, to separate from the primary "object," which is the (or an) animal on the level of society and the (or a) mother on the level of personal archaeology. In other words, abjection is a disavowal of the essential dependence on animals (or mothers) that enables separation and autonomy, which in turn enables imitation and through which we become speaking beings, human beings. Kristeva's theory of abjection can be read as an account of the primary disavowal that erases our dependence on animals from our psyches and discounts their roles in teaching us to be human. Abjection, then, is a disavowal of the animal pedagogy at the heart of humanity, or at least at the center of the human sciences, including psychoanalysis.

The second chapter of Powers of Horror explores the connection between abjection and animals by returning to Freud's discussion of animal phobias. Kristeva begins this chapter with an epigraph from Lautréamont that could serve as an example of how animals are used to delineate the outlines of man on the frontier of the animal: "A regal soul, inadvertently surrendering to the will of lust, the octopus of weakness, the shark of individual abjection, the box of absent morality, and the monstrous snail of idiocracity" (Kristeva 1982, 32). Kristeva does not comment on this passage, which she presumably invokes because it explicitly mentions abjection. As we will see, however, it is indicative of a tension between her analysis of Freud's animal phobias and the role of what she calls the "unnameable in that dynamic. It becomes obvious in passages like this one from Lautréamont that not only are animals given names but also those names are used to define the human soul against animal nature. This does not mean that these names do justice to, or even sublimate, those animal natures or animality itself, if there is such a thing; but that naming (as Derrida points out) can be another way of possessing animals, presiding over them, and disavowing our dependence on them, disavowing animal pedagogy. Conversely, as we will see, the "unnameable" and the "timeless" are names that Kristeva gives to animals and animality. Animals and nature are designated as being outside both name and time, as the constitutive outside that enables both; and animals and animality are associated with the inextricability of the bodily drives that exceeds and yet necessitates the symbolic in human beings. This theoretical dependence on the animal and animality that gives force to the theory of the drives and the theory of abjection remains implicit, if not entirely erased, in Kristeva's writings.

Kristeva's theory of abjection, however, can help explain how this process of disavowal works. In her discussion of animal phobia, for example, she identifies powers of mimesis, introjection, and projection that operate as psychic motors for what Freud interprets as fear of castration from the father. In her metapsychoanalytic move, Kristeva makes explicit the role of representation and semiotics that remain implicit in Freud's theory of animal phobia (and totemism) and also their theoretical underpinnings. In Powers of Horror, Kristeva argues that Freud's analysis of phobia gives us his clearest description of "the relation to the object, which is crucial for the constitution of the subject" (1982, 33). She examines the connection between fear and object suggested by animal phobia and concludes that the discovery of the object and the onset of language are plagued by fear, which she calls "the upsetting of a bio-drive balance" (1982, 33, italics in original). The infant comes in contact with the world and others and experiences its first waists in relation to them. These primary wants are not yet either desires or nameable but instead fall under the general category of "fear." In the case of animal phobia, specifically that of Little Hans, Kristeva maintains that the animal—a horse—stands in for a general fear that cannot be reduced to the fear of castration:
The phobia of horses becomes a hieroglyph that condenses all fears, from unnamable to namable. From archaic fears to those that accompany language learning, at the same time as familiarization with the body, the street, animals, people. The statement “to be afraid of horses” is a hieroglyph having the logic of metaphor and hallucination. By means of the signifier of the phobic object, the “horse,” it calls attention to the drive economy in want of an object—that conglomerate of fear, deprivation, and nameless frustration, which properly speaking, belongs to the unnamable. (1982, 35)  

According to this account, the phobic object stands in for the nameless and general fears associated with the infant’s first sense of wanting, its first sense of its own separation from the world and from others, and its first recognition of objects. In other words, the phobic object represents the bodily drives themselves and the infant’s frustrated and frustrating attempts to master them through language. Kristeva remarks that Little Hans has “stupendous verbal skill.” He is so “eager to name everything that he runs into the unnamable” and is left with the impression of meaningful experiences for which he has no language; or in Kristeva’s terminology, he has sense without significance (1982, 34). It is in this sense that she describes the horse as hieroglyph, a living symbol of what is most pressing to Hans but also what he cannot name. Unlike Freud, for Kristeva the horse is neither a substitute for the father nor a symbol of the boy’s fear of castration (although castration fear can evolve out of more primal feelings of want). Rather, the horse is a symptom of the weakness of the paternal function and the inability of the father to protect the boy from the outside world. The horse shows up because the paternal function necessary for language acquisition cannot keep up with the boy’s wants. We might say that the meaning or sense of his experience outstrips his ability to express it in words. Because the symbolic level of Hans’s experience is inadequate to the affective level, he adopts hieroglyphic symbols into which many different affects are condensed. Following Lacan, Kristeva identifies language and the symbolic level of experience with the paternal function and identifies wants or needs with the maternal function. We could say, then, that in phobia the paternal function does not adequately counterbalance what Kristeva calls the object mother. Words act like temporary “life preservers” on the uncharted and dangerous waters of bodily drives, which for the infant are anchored to the maternal body in ways that are pleasurable but also threatening (cf. Kristeva 1982, 37). This double aspect of being simultaneously threatening and compelling, fascinating or alluring, is characteristic of abjection. 

Kristeva describes the acquisition of language as a foundational fetishism through which words are substituted for things. On the deepest psychic levels, words are compensations for the loss of the maternal body and the want of bodily needs that first signal to the infant its separation from its mother: its primary “object.” Kristeva complicates any form of object-relations theory by insisting that before the maternal body can become an object, it must become an abject. She also maintains that the maternal body is a primal thing that remains locked in the “crypt of the psyche” of the child unless or until language can counterbalance or compensate for it (cf. 1982). She says, “The fetish becomes a life preserver, temporary and slippery, but nonetheless indispensable. . . . Because of its founding status, the fetishism of ‘language’ is perhaps the only one that is unanalyzable” (1982, 37). If we take her analysis back to Freud’s theory of fetishism, we realize that the foundational fetish is a substitute for the missing maternal phalus, which, following Lacan,Kristeva interprets as the sense of wanting and satisfaction associated with bodily drives in relation to the mother. In this reading, castration becomes an existential lack associated with feelings of unsatisfied want that, through language, give way to desire. If phobia revolves around castration fears, these are not so much specific fears about losing the penis as they are general fears about losing the means of satisfying one’s bodily drives; they are fears that one is separated from the world and others on whom one’s satisfaction or happiness depends. Words help reconnect us to the world and others and compensate for this fundamental separation. In regard to animal phobia, Kristeva observes that Little Hans is caught between maternal anguish and the inadequacy of paternal words. 

Eat and Be Eaten

In light of my analysis of the relationship among biting, eating, and devouring in all of Freud’s cases of animal phobia, it is illuminating to turn to Kristeva’s account of that relationship. Kristeva argues that fear hides an aggression, which at the earliest stages is an oral aggression related to both food and speech: “From the deprivation felt by the child because of the mother’s absence to the paternal prohibitions that institute symbolism, that relation [the symbolic language relation] accompanies, forms, and elaborates the aggressivity of drives . . . want and aggressivity are chronologically separable but logically coextensive” (1982, 39). The child feels aggression in response to its fear of the loss of both maternal satisfaction and paternal prohibition. Whereas Freud identifies this aggressivity as one directed at the father through its substitute, the phobic animal; Kristeva sees a preobjectual aggression that comes from bodily drive force and latches onto the animal as a symbol for everything threatening and scary in the child’s young life: “Fear and the aggressivity intended to protect me from some not yet localizable cause are projected and come back to me from the outside: ‘I am threatened’”
The biting and devouring mouth of the child is projected onto the biting and devouring mouth of the animal; the child becomes passive, no longer the agent of aggression, while the animal (mother) becomes active, now the agent of aggression.

For Kristeva, phobia represents the failure of introjection of what is incorporated through the mouth, both maternal breast and paternal words (1982, 40). The precocious child does not yet have the linguistic or symbolic competence to properly displace the thing by substituting words, so it displaces it by inventing its own impulses onto a telegraphic symbol like the phobic animal. This child may have a facility with, and fascination for, words, but its logorrhea does not effectively stop-up the empty mouth deprived of the maternal breast. Unlike Freud who understands both the totem animal and the phobic animal as substitutes that represent the father, Kristeva believes that the phobic animal does not represent but merely stands in for. She maintains that lurking behind the relation between the father and the animal is the maternal body and all the sensations associated with the separation from it, that is, all the sensations associated with becoming a subject over and against the world and others as objects. For Freud, totem and phobic animals are the harbinger of language and the psychic process of displacement that allows words to compensate for, if not completely replace, things. For Kristeva, however, not yet counterphobic, language or words are not up to the task of countervailing the object mother; words are not adequate substitutes for things, particularly what she calls "the maternal thing" (1989).

Therefore, the child finds another thing (the horse or wolf) to stand in for the many things that it cannot represent in words; its wants, the desires of its parents, and the sounds, sights, smells, and textures of its world. In this sense, for Kristeva, phobia is not so much a displacement as a condensation. Since we all ultimately are in the position of the phobic unable to find the right words to adequately capture our experience or compensate for the nostalgic longing for (imagined) unity with the world and others, we continue to speak, write, and search for words with which to describe what remains unnameable. In this context, Kristeva says, "phobia literally stages the instability of object relation" (1982, 43). Phobia shows us how and why the subject/object split is a precarious fantasy, necessary and yet illusory. As much as we try, the thing cannot be completely incorporated and thereby possessed through language. At the same time, as much as we try, the thing cannot be completely expelled or rejected because it always returns. But words can act as go-betweens or messengers between fragile, always precarious, porous not-yet or not-quite subjects and fragile, always precarious, porous not-yet or not-quite objects.
Shit Babies

Krisneva’s theory of abjection sheds new light on Freud’s cases of phobic boys. As we saw in the last chapter, Little Hans, the Wolf-Man, and the Rat-Man all imagine giving birth to themselves and taking the place of their mother. In their fantasies, this maternal position is associated with excrement, filth, and abjection. They become members of what Krisneva calls the “erotic cult of the object,” which, approaching perversion, does not manage to “dodge” castration because the sense of wanting or longing is not yet identified with an object like that precious bodily member. Rather, the phobic lives by finding a symbol for all frustration, deprivation, and want—an object symbol like rats gnawing at an attic—to stand in for but still not represent “his whole life” and the flows of his experience (Krisneva 1982, 55). It is as if object bodily fluids associated with phobic fantasies are leaking out of a hole in the psyche itself. “To preserve himself from severance, he is ready for more—flow, discharge, hemorrhage, . . . . The eroticization of abjection, and perhaps any abjection to the extent that it is already eroticized, is an attempt at stopping the hemorrhage” (Krisneva 1982, 55). The fledgling subject’s erotic life becomes tinged with abjection and represented by the hieroglyphic logic of phobia characterized by frightening yet fascinating animal symbols.

Krisneva reinterprets phobia as a form of abjection. The phobic “subject” incorporates a devouring object mother with whom he cannot quite identify and yet carries around as so much psychic baggage. This phobic subject’s sense of self becomes constituted by abjection so that he identifies with the object rather than with the mother herself. In other words, the phobic identifies with the preobjectual maternal object rather than with the mother as object. Through this incorporation of abjection, the phobic “subject” tries to give birth to his abject self by shitting (or splitting) himself, among other forms of expulsion (cf. Krisneva 1982, 54). In a sense, the abject phobic is leaking himself from his various bodily orifices, much as he imagines he was leaked from parental orifices. He is especially fascinated with where babies come from, and as we have seen, this question is inspired by births of siblings, particularly sisters. The role of the father in this process seems suspect to the young phobic, for whom the paternal function is firmy protection from the power of maternal abjection (cf. 1982, 72).

For Krisneva, phobia and abjection are firmly anchored to the maternal body. In Powers of Horror, she describes maternal authority as earlier than, and a prerequisite for, paternal authority, especially in terms of individual development but also in social development. She identifies two main polluting or abject objects that fall from the body, which she contends are related to the maternal and/or the feminine: excrement and menstrual blood. As we have seen, Freud’s phobic boys all are fascinated with excrement. And Freud himself repeatedly returns us to blood in Totem and Taboo, where he explicitly connects blood in general to menstrual blood in particular. Krisneva maintains that excrement represents danger from the outside and menstrual blood represents danger from the inside, either the borders of the “clean and proper” self or within the borders of the group:

Excrement and its equivalents (decent, infection, disease, corpse, etc.) stand for danger to identity that comes from without: the ego threatened by the non-ego, society threatened by its outside, life by death. Menstrual blood, on the contrary, stands for the danger issuing from within the identity (social or sexual); it threatens the relationship between the sexes within a social aggregate and, through internalization, the identity of each sex in face of sexual difference. (1982, 71)

Krisneva maintains that the association between menstrual blood and the maternal or feminine is obviously connected to sexual difference. As for excrement, first, she claims that the child imagines that the mother has an “anal penis,” perhaps like the excrement penis imagined by the Rat-Man; and second, she claims that the mother and maternal authority became associated with sibincular training, which is a frustration that follows the maternal deprivation of the breast. Through these bodily frustrations, deprivations, and disciplinary actions, the maternal authority appears “chronologically and logically immediate” in early childhood experience (1982, 71). These unspoken regulations—not quite prohibitions—set up proper social (maternal) prohibitions.

Through its first interactions with the body of the infant, the maternal body maps out the boundaries of the “clean and proper” self for the child. According to Krisneva,

Maternal authority is the trustee of that mapping of the self’s clean and proper body; it is distinguished from paternal laws within which, with the phallic phase and acquisition of language, the destiny of man will take shape. If language, like culture, sets up a separation and, starting with discrete elements, concatenates an order, it does so precisely by repressing maternal authority and the corporeal mapping that abuts against them. (1982, 72)

Note that she says the “destiny of man,” suggesting that the notion of man and humanity take shape in relation to repression of maternal authority. Throughout Powers of Horror, Krisneva repeatedly says, “Abjection is coextensive with social and symbolic order, on the individual as well as on the collective level” (1982, 68).
Both the individual and the collectivity of man or human acquire their identities as such through separation from both maternal and animal, which, in Kristeva's account, are intimately connected.

Mother Phobia

For Kristeva, the fear of animals correlates with the fear of maternity. She sees the totem animal or the phobic animal as symbols of the fear of the maternal body. Behind what Freud identifies as fear of the father or fear of castration are more primal and abyssal fears connected to bodily animal drives in relation to the maternal body. Kristeva diagnoses the cultural link between the maternal body and animality that gives maternity its "magical" and "fearsome" power (as Freud might say). On the level of the social, this power is the mother's generative power (1982, 77), and on the level of the individual, this power is the mother's authority over the infant's body and its satisfaction. Both collectively and individually, we depend on the maternal body (and animals and our own animality) for continued life, and this dependence is repressed through a process of abjection in order for the group or individual to assert its independence and fortify the boundaries of its identity. Kristeva interprets the prohibitions against incest and contact with mothers or women, particularly during menstruation—symbol of women's fertility and generative powers—as attempts to regulate their power, what she calls "a loathing of defilement as protection against the poorly controlled power of mothers" (1982, 77).

Reminiscent of Freud's Totem and Taboo, the association between women and blood (particularly menstrual blood and the afterbirth or ejection of the placenta after birth) is seen as a sign of the contaminating power of the maternal body. Women's blood is considered polluting in a way that threatens to spread like disease or infection if not kept in check (see Kristeva 1982, 77-78). Kristeva argues that prohibitions against contact with maternal bodies are more prevalent in areas where overpopulation is a danger. This suggests that as in the Freudian account in which contagion spreads via temptation and imitation, here too the female body and the signs of its fertility are temptations that must be controlled. Kristeva discusses various rituals surrounding defilement, all of which, she says, revolve around the mother: "Defilement is the translinguistic spor of the most archaic boundaries of the self's clean and proper body. In that sense, if it is a jettisoned object, it is so from the mother" (1982, 73). She argues that purification rituals use symbols and language to reach back to this archaic boundary associated with the mother (and the animal) in order to inscribe this abject preobject "spoor" within a signifying system. She maintains that the inscription at stake here is one of "limits, an emphasis placed not on the (paternal) Law but on (maternal) Authority through the very signifying order" (1982, 73). In this regard, she describes these rituals as acts rather than symbols. Again, as with the phobic animal, the inscription does not so much represent as stand in for the abject maternal body. Because the totem animal is involved in a ritual of purification of this type, it also is a stand-in rather than a representation or symbol proper. Like the phobic animal, it operates as a sort of hieroglyph that condenses an amorphous group of experiences and fears into one location. Again, Kristeva emphasizes the unnamable out of reach of the paternal symbolic that motivates these rituals. In her account, unlike Freud's, they are not motivated by fear of the father and castration but by fear of the mother and the loss of her body or by fear of the loss of the body itself. Because all bodies become reminders of the abject maternal body, their animality must be repressed in favor of an abstract untouchable body, a sacred body excluded from the realm of flesh and blood. Whether it is fear of the mother or the father, the animals in animal phobias are either representatives of or stand-ins for, parental threats.

French psychoanalyst Anne Biriaux, one of the few scholars to discuss the animals in animal phobias, concludes that children's fear of animals is a result of their similarity to humans and the easy imaginary displacement of human attributes onto animals, and vice versa, especially the child's images of its parents (2007). Biriaux argues that a fear of animals is natural and is produced, or at least used, in cultural depictions of animals in children's literature, fairy tales, television, and films. For my purposes, what is interesting about her assessment of the role of animals in animal phobias is that she links them to what she calls "parental pedagogy of fear" (pédagogie parentale de la peur) (2007, 15). Biriaux maintains that this parental pedagogy can be found in children's literature that uses animals to construct moral tales and is a means of helping children negotiate anxiety and fear in general. Taking a more Freudian (or even Foucaultian) turn, we could view this parental pedagogy of fear as a way of using animals to discipline their children by instilling fear into them. Through tales involving animals, they learn how to behave as humans in socially acceptable ways. Like Kristeva, Biriaux suggests that the fear of animals signals general anxiety and fear. Kristeva's theory of abjection, however, complicates the notion that the fear of animals is natural and that in children's fantasies they are like us. Although in Kristeva's theory, abjection is the process through which we assure ourselves that we are not like them precisely because at some level we know, or fear, that we are indeed like them. Also, for Kristeva, as we have seen, this general fear or anxiety always takes us back to the maternal body.
Returning to anthropological literature, Kristeva maintains that in cultures needing population growth for survival, prohibitions against contact with the maternal body, namely, incest and cannibalism, are relaxed (1982, 78). These anthropological accounts lead her to ask:

Is that parallel (to concerns for overpopulation and prohibitions) sufficient to suggest that delimitation reveals, at the same time as an attempt to throttle matrilineality, an attempt at separating the speaking being from his body in order that the latter accede to the status of clean and proper body, that is to say, non-assimilable, unclean, abject? (1982, 78)

She goes on to propose that fear of the mother’s generative power makes her body abject and unclean and also all bodies abject and unclean: “I give up cannibalism because abjection (of the mother) leads me toward respect for the body of the other, my fellow man, my brother” (1982, 79, parentheses in original). The body becomes inedible, not literal flesh and blood that, like animals, can be consumed, but metaphorical flesh and blood, which is to say, kin—fellow man, brother. In other words, giving up the literal consumption of flesh and blood produces and is produced by the metaphorical notion of flesh and blood as kinship. We don’t eat our kin. In regard to animals, the circular logic runs as follows: if we eat animals, they are not our kin; animals are not our kin, so we eat them. Because we literally consume their flesh and blood, they are not our metaphorical flesh and blood, and vice versa. Because they are not our metaphorical flesh and blood, they can be our literal flesh and blood in terms of what we eat.

Kinship by Marriage or Meals?

Kristeva’s analysis of the structural relation between the mother and the animal in the process of abjection and identity formation prompts us to ask why the taboo against eating the abject maternal body does not also apply to eating the abject animal body. To Kristeva, the social struggle against the abject is a battle of the sexes over whether paternal or maternal power will triumph; it is a battle between patriarchal and matrilineal social formations. Behind these struggles are the animals. Even while discussing the power struggle between masculine and feminine or paternal and maternal, Kristeva takes us back to the animal. She asks whether food loathing or prohibitions against certain foods, particularly animal flesh and animal products, is a matter of marriage or of meals.11 Following this line of thought (from the anthropologist Célestin Bouglé, now combined with theories of Louis Dumont and Mary Douglas), Kristeva argues that loathing or revulsion must be explained in terms of an opposition between pure and impure, which is imposed on or displaces sexual difference. The opposition between pure and impure allows for the substitution of rituals of purification for sacrifice. Both rituals of sacrifice and rituals of purification, however, revolve around killing and eating animals. Using recent anthropological research in Powers of Horror, Kristeva updates Freud’s Totem and Taboo. There she traces the origins of religion, particularly religious taboos, but unlike Freud, she finds the mother and maternal body rather than the father behind all such taboos.14 In the transition from rituals of sacrifice to rituals of purification, one thing remains the same, the abjection of the maternal body or of animal. Whereas for Kristeva the maternal body is essentially linked to animality and animal bodies, her analysis tracts on that animality and animal bodies in order to give the abject mother her power. We could say that despite her departure from Freud in regard to the priority of the mother over the father, it is still the animal that puts the teeth into her notion of the abject-devouring mother.

The role of the maternal body in relation to the animal is particularly poignant in Kristeva’s analysis of what she calls the “semiotics of biblical abomination,” or the food prohibitions of the Old Testament (see 1982, chap. 4).15 There, she argues that fear of the maternal body, its generative power, and its authority over the bodily functions of children give rise to food taboos involving mixing her body (or its symbolic equivalents) with the bodies of her children (or their symbolic equivalents). On the symbolic and imaginary levels, she interprets these food prohibitions as again revolving around the abjection of the maternal body. Literally, however, this abjection is played out on the bodies of animals and regulations concerning what parts of these creatures can and cannot be eaten and how. In this regard, all animal bodies become symbols for the maternal body and its relation to the bodies of children (i.e., all of us, since we are all born from a maternal body). Animal bodies become symbols for human bodies, and both our rituals of animal sacrifice and of purification involving eating only certain animals or animal parts take us back to our relationships with our mothers. Insofar as they become symbols for human bodies and human relations, we could argue that animals themselves do not exist in Kristeva’s text.

Although Kristeva identifies food prohibitions with the border between human and animals, she continually fastens that border to the maternal body: When food appears as a polluting object, it does so as oral object only in the extent that orality signifies a boundary of the self’s clean and proper body. Food becomes abject only if it is a border between two distinct entities or territories. A boundary between nature and culture, between the human and the non-human. (1982, 73)
This passage suggests that the boundary with nonhuman animals “pollutes” the clean and proper borders of the human. To Kristeva, however, this pollution turns out to be just another form of maternal contaminant. Her thesis is that biblical impurity is a threat to the sacred, not a form of defilement, in that sense, it points to but does not signify an autonomous force that can threaten the sacred. I shall suggest that such a force is rooted historically in the history of religious experience and subjectively in the disturbance of the subject’s identity, in the cathexis of maternal function—mother, woman, reproduction. (1982, 99–101, italics in original)

She argues that dietary prohibitions are aimed at the mother as the first source of nourishment and milk. These taboos are attempts to fortify precarious boundaries between the maternal body and the social and individual subject because they are directed toward “intermixture, erasing of differences, threat to identity” (1982, 201). Biblical food prohibitions are aimed at separation and distinction that avoid the ambiguity and mixing threatened by the maternal body. All food prohibitions, then, according to Kristeva, are symbolic regulations of the power of the maternal.

For example, she maintains that the biblical command “Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother’s milk” is a metaphorical prohibition against incest between mother and child symbolized by mixing its flesh with her milk (1982, 203). She concludes that biblical dietary prohibitions are “based upon the prohibition of incest” (1982, 105, italics in original). On the symbolic level, all food taboos involving animals are really prohibitions against contact with the maternal body. Kristeva even interprets the Eucharist in terms of the maternal body. Unlike Freud, who describes the Eucharist as another ritualistic repetition of the totemic celebration of eating the father, Kristeva sees it as both a repetition and a disavowal of the moral, the primal “object” of the urge to devour. She regards cannibalistic urges to eat the body of another as always disguised (or not so disguised) wishes to eat the mother. According to her, every body recalls the maternal body, the first body encountered by the infant. The Eucharist brings together food and body in a ritualistic way that laments the loss to cannibalism, symbolically repeating it as a way of preventing actual eating of bodies—except, as we have seen, the bodies of animals. Kristeva maintains that by bringing together body and bread, the Eucharist makes cannibalism: “By surreptitiously mingling the theme of ‘devouring’ with that of ‘satiating,’ that narrative [the Eucharist] is a way of taming cannibalism. It invites a removal of guilt, instead of the archaic relation to the first pre-object (abject) of need: the mother” (1982, 128). In this passage Kristeva speaks of “taming” cannibalism as if it is an animal instinct that must be domesticated. Furthermore, she identifies both the urge to devour and satiation with the maternal body by insisting that the Eucharist is a purification ritual aimed at curbing and regulating incestuous and cannibalistic desires for the mother and the maternal body.

While opening psychoanalysis to its maternal and feminine other—which should not be underestimated or undervalued—Kristeva ultimately forecloses the possibility of animal others. In her analysis of biblical dietary restrictions, she discusses at length taboos on various animals and animal parts but continually insists that these animals are stand-ins for the mother, much as Freud insists that the animals in animal phobias are representatives for the father. The process that Kristeva describes, however, is the metonymic slippage from milk and blood to maternal body rather than the metaphorical substitution of horse or wolf for paternal threats. Kristeva is concerned about distinguishing the process of substitution or sacrifice identified by Freud in Totem and Taboo from the process of ritual purification involving dietary restrictions rather than killing and eating per se. In other words, dietary restrictions prevent the kind of murderous sacrifice of the primal horde in which the animal becomes the father, and vice versa. What Kristeva does not acknowledge is that animals are still killed and eaten even when purification rituals regulate that activity. The difference is one of emphasis. In purification rituals, killing animals is no longer a necessary part of the ritual (with some exceptions, e.g., Jewish kosher regulations for the bleeding of animals, which Kristeva interprets as again signaling the threat of blood, a metonym for menstrual blood). In all cases, however, animals are killed; only now their killing is not part of a ritual sacrifice but a regular part of domestic culinary practices, which involve various restrictions on how the animal flesh is prepared. In other words, killing animals has become domesticated.

Kristeva sees the progression from ritual sacrifice to rituals of purification as a move away from violence and toward more symbolic and therefore more humane forms of regulation. Her analysis sees ritual sacrifice as glorifying the violence of killing, whereas the rituals of purification sublimate it. Yet in contrast to Kristeva, we could argue that rituals of purification merely domesticate the killing of animals and allow for a radical disavowal of their slaughter to the point that we end up with factory farming and mass killing hidden away from view rather than the ritualized but extremely limited killing celebrated as animal sacrifice. Animals are no longer sacrificed because neither their lives nor their deaths have the symbolic value they did before factory farming. In psychoanalytic theory, their only symbolic value is either as a substitute for the father à la Freud or as a stand-in for the mother à la Kristeva. Moreover, the psychoanalytic domestication of animals itself forecloses the possibilities of either their wilderness or their kinship.
with humans. They cannot be our mother or father or sisters or brothers, but they must represent them or stand in for them. They must be sacrificed instead of them—that is, killed in their stead. Or they must be regulated as a means of regulating ourselves. In either case, their value is defined entirely in terms of human relations and human exchange. Whether sacrificed or regulated, animals are killed or exchanged so that human society and human kinship is possible, and all these accounts are based on, or presuppose, killing and eating animals. In this case, we are not what we eat, and eating animals proves that we are not like them. Rather, we become fathers, mothers, sisters, and brothers on the basis of killing and eating animals. Symbolically, they bind us together as kin through the flesh and blood of their bodies. At the same time, animals reassure us that if we can eat them, we are human and not animals. That is, they die like animals so that we can live as humans.

Kristeva also describes the distinction between man and God as a dietary distinction. Man is not God because unlike God, he is prohibited from eating certain foods. For example, in Genesis, God expels Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden for eating from the tree of knowledge, but he does so before they can eat from the tree of life, which would make them immortal (cf. Kristeva 1982, 95). Kristeva points out that Adam’s temptation is both a feminine and an animal temptation: Eve is tempted by the serpent and Adam is tempted by Eve to eat forbidden fruit. Following J. Soler, Kristeva interprets Genesis as reserving dominion over living beings for God and giving man the right to eat animals only after the Flood; and only then as an acknowledgment of his essential evil (1982, 96). At this point, temptations of the flesh become associated with both women and food, particularly meat eating. Temptations of the flesh can be interpreted as temptations arising from the flesh, from our so-called animal nature, or as temptations for flesh, as in the temptation to get “a piece of tail,” in the sense of either women’s flesh or a lump roast. Kristeva reads this urge to kill and eat flesh as recognition of the death drive in its most primordial form, as the urge to devour (1982, 96). The prohibition against murder is no longer extended to killing and eating animals but becomes displaced onto dietary prohibitions that prohibit eating carnivorous animals. Man can eat only herbivorous animals and cannot eat or assimilate rapacious animals or predatory animals that kill. Our own murderous nature is displaced onto those animals that we are not allowed to consume (cf. Kristeva 1982, 96).

Although her analysis of the death drive and the urge to devour in relation to killing and eating animals is an explicit acknowledgement of the violence done to animals in order to reinforce the boundaries of the notion of the human and ourselves as nonanimals, again Kristeva presents it as more evidence that animals are stand-ins for the maternal body. Immediately following her discussion of the death drive in relation to devouring animals, she claims that biblical dietary prohibitions are paralleled and founded in “the abomination provoked by the fertilizable or fertile feminine body (menses, childbirth)” (1982, 100). Kristeva’s analysis not only makes explicit that abjection of the feminine and maternal body on which the Western imaginary thrives and on which man defines himself as clean and proper but also points to the inherent connection in this imaginary of animals and women, especially mothers. What animals and mothers supposedly share is their connection to nature, and as Kristeva says, “The body must bear no trace of its debt to nature: it must be clean and proper in order to be fully symbolic” (1982, 102). Acknowledging this debt is not only breaking the incest taboo by speaking of connectedness to the maternal (animal) body but also staging the return of the repressed maternal, animal, body.

As many feminists have pointed out, in the Western imaginary, man constitutes himself as properly man against both the feminine and the animal. Kristeva’s analysis makes a crucial contribution to psychoanalysis by revealing man’s indebtedness and subsequent disavowal of both. She does so in part by complicating the maternal function, which she imbues with speech, law, and authority, attributes traditionally reserved for the paternal function and required for autonomy from the maternal body. What Kristeva’s theory of abjection itself disavows, even while describing it, is our indebtedness to animals, who metaphorically and literally nourish our sense of ourselves as human and as kin. The very notions of maternity or paternity, mother or father, that drive psychoanalytic theory are based on the displacement or condensation of these figures and animals. Whether it is Freud’s father totem phobia or Kristeva’s mother meal abject, the slippage between animals—specifically dead ones—and our closest and most influential kin contributes to both our social identity and individual identity.

Feasting on the Maternal Body (Again)

As we have seen, in Powers of Horror, Kristeva, unlike Freud, emphasizes the prohibition against incest with the mother rather than the prohibition against murder of the father in her account of the origin of civilization. More than a decade later, in The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt (2000b), Kristeva returns to Freud’s Totem and Taboo and again emphasizes regulations aimed at relations with the maternal body, through both the incest taboo and the totemic feast. There she reads Freud’s story of the primal horde of brothers who overthrow, kill, and eat their father as a tale of revolt and feast (2000b, 12). The celebration that
follows the murder cements the social bond through shared food (even if in this case, it is the body of the murdered father). Kristeva dwells on both the negativity and creativity in revolt, which produce the subject as "I" (2006b, 14). In her analysis, subjective agency is produced through a revolt against traditional order that allows the assimilation of that order, thereby authorizing the self. In other words, revolt is necessary for both social order and individual subjectivity. At the same time, it undermines all order, whether social or individual. As she describes it, revolt or rebellion is a necessary part of the process of becoming a subject, a process that is always precarious and never finished. Kristeva argues that revolt (which is a negative moment) and the celebration that follows (which is a positive moment) are moments of jouissance or pleasure, including pleasure in violence and destruction. Again, she sees Freud's account as repressing the feminine, both the feminine of women as objects of desire and the feminine position or passive position of the brothers in relation to the overpowering father (2006b, 13). The revolt is a way of reactivating that passivity, but as a result, it is also a guilty act—even uncanny act—that requires recompense and atonement. Conversely, the celebration of the feast is a ritual that can be repeated, even now without the murder of the father, in order to regulate and contain murderous impulses. This is the way that Freud describes the totemic meal, as a repetition of, and ritualistic celebration that replaces, the murder. Kristeva emphasizes the sense of renewal and joy that comes through both revolt and feast. She also points to what Freud calls "the cherished fruit of the crime" as the appropriation of authority that is ritualistically reproduced in the assimilation of his body by eating and then subsequently the assimilation of his substitute in the form of the animal. As we have seen, even while describing the substitution of animals for human bodies, neither Kristeva nor Freud diagnoses the disavowal of animal killing, assimilation, and kinship in the formation of human society. This is even more apparent in The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt than it was in Powers of Horror, as animals have almost entirely disappeared from the story of the primal feast.

In The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt Kristeva acknowledges that in Freud's account the totemic feast signals the onset of religion, along with substitution, representation, and displacement. She nonetheless is concerned with what happens when religion loses its value and asks whether revolt (and therefore the authorization of subjectivity) is still possible. She maintains that revolt is connected to a time before time or the timelessness of the unconscious, which is associated with both the maternal body and animality. Whereas Freud is interested in the operations of representation foundational to religion, Kristeva is interested in what makes these very operations possible. As usual, Kristeva looks for the law before the law, the authority before authority, the time before time, and so on; and as usual, she finds the maternal body and maternal function behind symbolic systems (which Freud and Lacan associated with the paternal function). In her retelling of Freud's Totem and Taboo, she focuses on the return of an archaic timelessness, of "pure embodied time," that enabled Freud's Oedipal revolt (2006b, 16). She proposes that access to this timelessness is regenerating and gives rise to all forms of creativity, which authorize the subject. As she describes it, creativity requires revolt and rebellion, and the meaning of life depends on creativity. Life has meaning only in that we can creatively authorize ourselves by revolting against and then assimilating the power of our symbolic systems, especially language. Kristeva describes this process as one of making the clichés of language one's own: "I will express my specificity by distorting the nevertheless necessary clichés of the codes of communication and by constantly deconstructing ideas/concepts/ideologies/philosophies that 'I have inherited'" (2006b, 19).

Kristeva's appeal to timelessness presents another facet of the assimilation of the primal father's authority. The feast celebrating the death of the father is not just a repetition of the crime or a reminder of the guilt that binds the brothers, or even of the mobility of power as it now moves from the father to the brothers. Rather, Kristeva's account suggests that the ritual feast puts us in touch with a "lost time," a time of want and satisfaction, an archaic time associated with the maternal body as the first "object" of want and satisfaction and with animality as the primal state of human existence. In a sense, with the feast we are repeating and recalling the timelessness of the infantile state, which may very well be an imaginary time. For that reason, it becomes associated in Kristeva's thought with the imaginary father as the figure through whom the timelessness of the maternal body moves into the sequential time of paternal language. We imagine that before language, we existed in a purely embodied state, as animals did. We long for this timelessness, for pure bodily experience, for the absolute unity of being and meaning, what Freud might call the "death drive." Sublimation, for Kristeva, becomes a process of articulating this death drive rather than acting on it. It is the process of assimilating the timelessness of the drives or unconscious (of the animal) into time (the temporality of the human), what Kristeva calls "timeless temporality" (2006b, 16). We come in contact with our own animality only by sublimating timelessness and unconscious drives into time, by bringing them into temporality. (Elsewhere I discuss the promise of this proposal for social theory; see Oliver 2004.)

Kristeva proposes renewed humanism that comes through rediscovery of the timelessness of revolt figured as a return of our own repressed and abjected maternal and animal bodies. In criticizing what she calls "our culture of distraction" for "flattening psychic space," she insists that creative revolt is still possible.
Psychoanalysis and the Science of Kinship

Revolts have taken place, but they are not been erased; they can be read, and they offer itself to a ruthless humanity now governed by the relativism of images as well as monetary and humanitarian indifference. Nonetheless, the richness for enthusiasm, doubt, and the pleasure of inquiry has perhaps not been entirely lost. This is the heart of the ultimate defense of human life; the meaning of language and the architecture of the idea in the human mind. (2000b, 19)

Kristeva's work itself can be read as a defense of human life and human meaning. My question here is whether or not that life and meaning are bought at the expense of animal life and animal meaning. On this question, Kristeva's work, like Freud's and Lacan's before her, is ambivalent.

Considering the status of animals in Kristeva's texts, it is noteworthy that in The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt, immediately following her engagement with Freud's Totem and Taboo, she introduces the figures of horse-man and horse-boy. Following anthropologist Georges Dumézil, Kristeva discusses what he calls "turbulent boys" as those "who represent the jouissance, rupture, displacement, and revolt underlying puri, repentance, and the renewal of the pact" (2000b, 25–26). In particular, she examines the Mithraic religious priest figured as Gandharva, half-horse and half-man (2000b, 26). She argues that this
dual human and animal nature... seems to indicate, as though by metaphor, ardor and violence, as forces difficult for anthropology to contemplate, a "going to the limit," the metaphor of the horse suggesting the vigor of the drive and a psychical and extraspsychical setting into motion that we have difficulty symbolizing. (2000b, 26)

What exceeds symbolization—or, at least, is difficult to symbolize—is the animal or animality, especially because it is part of human nature. This human/animal figure represents for Kristeva the possibility of renewal and jouissance that motivates ritual of society and the joyous aspect or feast before the disciplinary aspects of such rituals. Following Dumézil, she says that "the turbulent boys" are destructive but that they also promote fertility and joy during feasts (2000b, 26). In this reading, rituals of purity become spaces where "man brushes up against his animality" (2000b, 27). The pleasure in revolt, then, is figured by these horse-boys, whose horning around may be destructive as well as creative.

Returning to the question of whether or not Kristeva disavows the central role of animals and animality in the constitution of the human and humanity in her texts, my analysis suggests that the answer is an ambivalent yes and no. On the one hand, Kristeva talks of a lost time and a time before time that suggests something like Freud's problematic notion of animal ancestors, the idea that we
were once animals but have progressed beyond them, that humanity is the telos of animality, that animal timelessness gives birth to human temporality. She goes so far as to suggest that the time before time is the time between birth and the acquisition of language, the time when the infant is an animal who does not speak. To illustrate, she gives the example of the feral child raised by wolves who never speaks (2000b, 37, cf. 38). On the other hand, Kristeva insists that this so-called lost time returns, that we have access to it through the semiotic dimension of language, and that our own animality is the return of the repressed. She repeatedly refers to humans as "speaking animals" to emphasize that we, too, are animals no matter how much we "progress" or, more accurately, how much we protest (cf. 1962, 15). At the same time, however, she maintains that the abjection of both the maternal body and our own animality is necessary to identifying as individuals. So even though we can never rid ourselves completely of our connection to the maternal body, our connection to our own animality or to animals, our ability to enter human culture demands that we try. Kristeva proposes a dynamic and fluid movement between repressions and the return of the repressed, between what she calls the symbolic and the semiotic elements of signification, between meaning and being or human and animal, that gives rise to the "speaking animal." In this regard, ambivalence is part and parcel of the human condition and of Kristeva's theory. Indeed, her theory of abjection is a theory of ambivalence: we abject ambivalence and ambiguity in favor of fixed identities; yet those fixed identities are always constituted and supported by abjection, which also threatens to undo them.

In regard to animals and animality, Kristeva moves back and forth between suggesting, on the one hand, that they are linked to a lost time and lost experience associated with "pure embodiment," and that they are part of the metonymy animal/matriarchal-body-food on which patriarchal symbolic systems are based, on the other hand. In other words, according to her theory, animals and animality stand in for the materiality of the body itself before signification and for the metonymical slip between maternal bodies and animal bodies. Yet Kristeva constantly risks causing animals by making them into nothing more than stand-ins for the maternal body (cf. 2000b, 20–21). Even in her discussions of the violence of sacrifice and her implication that rituals of purification are more civilized or humane, she neglects to consider that in both, animals are killed and eaten. In sum, even while she opens psychoanalysis onto its feminine and maternal others, she forecloses its animal others. Moreover, the force of her theory of abjection and maternity comes from animals and animality in ways that point to her movements toward the feminine and the maternal as based on movements away from consideration for the role of animals and animal pedagogy. Like Freud's theories
of paternity and castration, Kristeva constructs theories of maternity and abjection by disavowing or ignoring the animals and animality at their heart. Even as she attempts to bring the dynamic, living, speaking animal body back into the human sciences, she does so by sacrificing—or, at least, purifying—animals and animality for the sake of the human and humanity. In this regard, like that of so many thinkers before her, Kristeva’s humanism is built on the metaphorical and literal backs of animals. Her theory of human speech and signification disavows the animal pedagogy lurking in the shadows. Her notion of sublimation comes at the cost of not only replacing real animals with symbolic or metaphorical animals but also reducing animals to mere stand-ins for human kinship relations. For Kristeva, as for so many thinkers before her, human kinship is bought at the expense of animal kinship.

This project started as a work of mourning for my beloved companion of eighteen years, Kaos. Friends sometimes warned me that I should stop thanking Kaos and Wizard in the acknowledgments of my books, that scholars would not take my writing seriously if I continued to thank my cats. Now they are probably convinced that I have gone to the dogs (except for those who know that I am a car person). Recently, at a small symposium where I presented some ideas for the first chapter, friends and strangers alike challenged my turn to animals. Some of them even said that although they had followed my work up to this point, they could not follow the animals. Certainly, in the face of domestic violence, endless war, genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, sexism, and all the other forms of violence that humans inflict on one another, the ethical treatment of animals seems secondary. Indeed, focusing on animals in this context may seem unethical, a way of displacing the injustices inflicted on human beings and distracting us from the history of oppression, slavery, and torture whose bloody reach continues to mar what we call humanity. It is legitimate to ask why I would turn to animals at a time when our “inhumanity to man” continues unabated. But following animals through the history of philosophy, particularly recent philosophies of alterity, has shown me that the practices of oppression, slavery, and torture are historically inseparable from the question of the animal. Tracking the animals through the writings of more than three centuries of philosophers has taught me that our concepts of man, humanity, and inhumanity are inherently bound up with the concepts of the animal, animality, and animals. The man/animal binary is not just any op-
4. For a discussion of Agamben’s distinction between man and human, see Wadlew 2004.
5. See, e.g., J. M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals (1999), in which Elizabeth Costello, the main character, argues that slaughterhouses are a form of animal Holocaust that rivals the Nazis’ attempts to exterminate Jews. See also Charles Patterson’s Eternal Treblinka (2002), in which he says that in relation to animals, all of us are Nazis; see also Wadlew’s commentary on Patterson (2004).
6. Doina Wadlew also worries that sometimes Agamben sounds as if he is arguing for a more absolute separation between man and animal (Wadlew 2004). But he finds reassurance in Agamben’s concluding remarks on Titaia’s lovers, which, he believes, indicates that Agamben is proposing a philosophy of love as a way out of bipower and a way to stop the anthropological machine (see Wadlew 2004).
7. Matthew Calarco gives an excellent analysis (2002) of Agamben’s earlier work, before The Open, in relation to Heidegger, particularly on the question of the animal. It is almost as if Agamben’s The Open is a response to Calarco’s earlier challenge. See also Calarco 2008.
8. Following Derrida, we might also ask what kind of power the passive “letting be” is that is definitive of Dasein. Is it that animals cannot be passive enough? That they lack the “ability” or “power” of passivity, the ability or power to “let it be”? Derrida takes this task in relation to the possibility of animal suffering. If humans are distinct from animals in their capacity to suffer pain—or, in Heidegger’s discourse, melancholy—then what kind of strange power is this power to suffer? (see Derrida 2008).
9. Here I am applying Kalpava Seshadri-Crooks’s analysis (2000) of whiteness as a transcendental signifier to the notion of humaneness.
10. Wadlew (2002) develops a persuasive account of how we might apply Agamben’s notion of base life to animals and concludes that for Agamben it is not a matter of reinstituting a gap between humans and nonhuman animals but of eliminating the gap. Only by eliminating the gap will the zone of indetermination and the risks of the in-between category be eliminated. I am more sympathetic to Wadlew’s interpretation of Agamben than to Agamben’s explicit discussions of animals and the risks of treating humans like them.
12. For a helpful discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology as a philosophy of life, see Vallier 2001, in which Vallier says that

the focus on behavior allows us to say that the motif in the name of which Merleau-Ponty engages this critique is that of life or the living; it is life that escapes from biological discourse when it views the organism as a collection of parts, and no catalogue of parts will disclose the life of the whole. (2001, 190, italics in original)

13. I recently heard a report on National Public Radio that even plants recognize their kin. When neighboring plants are related to them, they are not as aggressive in taking

water and nutrients from the soil as they are when their neighbors are not relatives. See “Researchers Find Discriminating Plants,” June 30, 2008.

12. Psychoanalysis as Animal By-product

1. In an essay on Freud’s preference for single-celled organisms, Judith Roof claims that there are “sparse” references to animals in Freud’s work. I disagree. Animals are everywhere in Freud’s work, although they may not be the stuff of biological science preferred by Roof. Roof’s analysis of the role of single-celled organisms in what she calls Freud’s “Cellular Romance” is provocative and insightful.

Occupying a large share of Freud’s sparse references to animals, the single-celled organism both is and is not “human”; its difference from humanity both is and is not a positive feature. This ambivalent status makes the example of the protist valuable as a link between the human and the animal, as well as between the animate and the inanimate, the simple and the complex, the mortal and the immortal, its dual position guaranteeing the commonality of fundamental processes throughout a range of species. At the same time, the protist is the anthropomorphized subject of a psychoanalysis as Freud interprets its impulses, demonstrating how even the microbiological is ultimately a mirror for the human. (2009, 102)

2. Although she did not have time to elaborate her claim in the context of her conference presentation at the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy in 2007, Elissa Marder argued, “As it happens, throughout Freud’s work, animals do the lion’s share of the theoretical work in the metaphysics of the conceptual foundation of the idea of death, castration, and consequently the difference between the sexes” (see 2009). Her formation of the role of animals in Freud’s work helped me clarify my thesis as I was revising this chapter. Marder draws these conclusions in the context of thinking about the relation between maternity and death in Freud’s writings.

3. My thanks to Elaine Miller for articulating the problematic in these terms and for discussing this chapter with me. Her comments, along with those of a group of faculty and graduate students at Miami University of Ohio, were helpful in revising this chapter.

4. For an interesting discussion of how Freud develops the theory of displacement in Totem and Taboo, see DiCenzo 1999, esp. chap. 4.

5. Kalpava Seshadri-Crooks (2003) discusses the distinction between killing and murder insituted by the primal murder.


7. Edwin Wallace’s (Wallace 1983) among others, has shown how Freud’s theories and the anthropological theories on which his theories are based have been discredited, see also Barnes 1993; DiCenzo 1999; and Lewis 1988.
8. For a discussion and criticism of the notion of contemporary ancestors, see Oliver 2000.

9. Elisa Marder describes the circular reasoning of Freud’s theory of castration in relation to animals and animal phobia:

Sometimes he seems to prove the theory of castration anxiety based on his analysis of the clinical example, and sometimes he postulates castration and then explains the phobia on the basis of the theory. But the argument that the animal phobia is both a function of pre-historic knowledge of castration and a specific response to childhood events depends, once again, on the presumption of an ambiguous “special proximity” between boy children and large animals, and the specific psychic malleability of the figure of the animal itself. (2009a, forthcoming; italics in original)

10. For general discussions of Freud’s theory of phobia, see Compton 1992; Lewis 1988 (she discusses the evolution of phobias and revises and updates Freud’s theories using current research in both psychology and anthropology); Strachey 1968 (he relates Freud’s theory to contemporary theories of phobia); and Spira 1991 (he traces the evolution of the concept of phobia in Freud’s work). For a discussion of anthropology since Freud, see Barnes 1995.

11. Elisa Marder has written an extensive essay analyzing the role of animals and the animal in Freud’s presentation of the Wolf-Man case. She argues,

Animal figures operate at every level of the case and intervene in complicated ways in its conceptual framework. Indeed, I hope to demonstrate that animals occupy a critical, albeit somewhat obscure, role in many if not most of the major theoretical issues raised by the case. . . . I hope to argue that paradoxically, the animals in the text serve as strange indices to the very specificity of the human psyche. . . . Interestingly, in what follows, it will emerge that one of the defining traits of being human is the incorporation of animal figures within the psyche; these internal animal figures are uncanny traces of our radical alterity and separation from animals. (Marder 2009a, forthcoming)

12. For an insightful discussion of the psychoanalytic import of Freud’s comparison of animals and children, particularly in the case of the Wolf-Man, see Marder 2009a, in which she identifies a “faked recognition” of species difference in children and Freud’s asser tions that is a prerequisite for representation and thereby humanity. “In general, we do not suspect that wolves commonly dream of little boys even if little boys commonly dream of wolves” (Marder 2009a, forthcoming).

13. In her essay “The Bestiary and the Primal Scene,” Elisa Marder develops a provocative and insightful interpretation of Freud’s concern with the reality status of the primal scene witnessed by the Wolf-Man. There, she discusses the substitutability of humans for animals necessary for the production of sexual difference as Freud describes it. She argues that “the observation of sexual difference in the primal scene is predicated upon” confusion between humans and animals and that “the only way human sexual difference can be perceived or represented in the scene is through the mediation and substitution of animal figures for human figures” (2009a, forthcoming).

In his essay “Freud’s Bestiary,” Gary Genosko also observes that Freud says that children are like animals in order to criticize Deleuze and Guattari’s suggestion that Freud does not consider “becoming animal” only a mere resemblance (1999, 609). Genosko also responds to Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of Freud’s replacement of the Wolf-Man’s wolves with domesticated dogs by claiming that they miss what is crucial through their insistence on the wolf as a pack animal, namely, the real wolves in the young Russian life (1999, 63).

14. Elisa Marder (2009a) provides a stunning interpretation of the Wolf dream in relation to the role of animals as constitutive of humanity.

15. Kalpana Sehhati-Crooke discusses the connection between food and sex in her reading of the Lacanian supplement to Freuds’s LACAN.

Lacan seems to suggest that the Freudian myth of the primal horde is also the myth of the constitution of the cannibal and the bestialist—the transgressors of the law before the law. This submerged matrix of prohibitions comes more sharply into view when we consider that one of the functions of the moral law is to establish a mutually exclusive opposition between those we use for food and those we use for sex (that is, we may not have sex with the food object or turn our sexual object into food). In The Savage Mind, Claude Lévi-Strauss, through not on the track of species difference, acknowledges the “profound analogy which people throughout the world seem to find between copulation and eating.” He provides several examples of language, including French, which use the same word to denote both activities. . . . It is not so much that food prohibitions are prior in some way, but that the simultaneity of the prohibitions against anthropomorphism and bestiality effectively dissociates sex from food, leaving us with little but the messy metaphor of ingestion and union. The extraordinary depth of the interrelation of these prohibitions is perhaps most evident in our relations with the family pet, which, like one’s kin, may not be regarded as food or sex object. (2003, 103–4)

16. In the context of discussing the link between maternity and death in Freud’s writing, Elisa Marder made a similar point in her presentation at the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy conference in Chicago, 2007:

As feminist readers of Totem and Taboo have long observed, in this story about the founding of religion and politics, women have no active role to play. . . . But my inference in this text is somewhat different. Moving all too quickly I would like to suggest that the “erosure” of the maternal and the feminine with which Totem and Taboo famously ends is both derived from and challenged by the complicated inscription of animals, maternity, eating and death throughout its earlier sections. (2009b)
Marder also discusses (2009a) the link between the figure of mother in relation to the figure of animal, arguing that in Freud's interpretation of the Wolf-Man's encounter with the primordial scene, that the woman is more of an animal than the man.

17. Marshy Garrison points out that Hans is especially afraid of horses with ears, which both he and Freud associate with a "stock box" or his mother's pregnant belly (see Garrison 1978, 53).

18. Marshy Garrison noted Freud's case of Little Hans and concluded that "Hans's death wish against Hanna is, then, the most plausible roots of this fear of horses" (Garrison 1978, 53). As we will see in the next chapter, Julia Kristeva reinterprets Little Hans's fear in relation to the maternal body which, like Freud's interpretation, ignores the significant role of Hans's sister.

19. In terms of Julia Kristeva's theory of abjection, which I will discuss in the next chapter, we could say that the Wolf-Man's sister is his own abject self. See also Genette's discussion of the relation between wolves and sisters in the case of the Wolf-Man (1993, esp. 616).

20. Freud takes this notion of the primal ooze from Darwin. For a discussion of the tension in Freud's theories of sexuality and instinct that result from the influence of Darwin, see Rivco 1990 and Roof 2005.

21. For an insightful discussion of cannibalism and bestiality as the two prohibitions hidden behind the taboos against incest and murder instituted by the murder of the father, see Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks 2003.

12. Animal Abjcts, Maternal Abjcts

1. Freud says:

"The strangest fact seems to be that anyone who has transgressed one of these prohibitions himself acquires the characteristic of being prohibited—as though the whole of the dangerous had been transferred over to him. This power is attached to all special individuals, such as kings, priests or newborn babies, to all exceptional states, such as the physical state of menstruation, puberty or birth, and to all uncanny things, such as sickness and death and what is associated with them through their power of infection or contagion." (Freud 1975, 22)

It is noteworthy that Deleuze and Guattari also discuss sex and reproduction in terms of contagion (1987, 241).

2. For introductions to Kristeva's notion of abjection, see MacAfe 2004 and Oliver 1999.

3. For insightful and provocative discussions of Freud's mythology, see Paul Ricoeur's *Freud and Philosophy* (1970) and James D'Arcy's *The Other Freud* (1990).


5. Elisa Marder makes this argument in her analysis of Freud's Wolf-Man case and concludes:

The child comes into contact with human sexuality and confrontation sexual difference only when the humans involved do not appear to act like humans, but like animals. Once again, human sexuality becomes visible only when humans behave like animals. In the dream of wolves, therefore, the animal figures are distorted substitutes for human figures that are themselves imitating animal postures. (2009a, forthcoming)

Deleuze and Guattari's insistence that "becoming-animal" is neither mimicry nor imitation is relevant here (1987).

6. For discussions of Kristeva's reinterpretation of Freud's case of Little Hans, see Beardsworth 2004, esp. 84-90; and DiCenso 1999, 69-70.

Deleuze and Guattari also interpret Little Hans's fear of horses as a network of affective relations. They say, "So just what is the becoming-horse of Little Hans? Hans is also taken up in: an assemblage: his mother's bed, the paternal element: the horse, the café across the street, the nearby warehouse, the street, the right to go out onto the street" (1987, 257).

7. For an insightful analysis of Kristeva's reinterpretation of Freud's theory of phobia, particularly in the case of Little Hans, see Beardsworth 2004, esp. 84-90. Beardsworth concludes: "Kristeva acknowledges Freud's indications of the presence of the ocular problematic in phobia, but equally shows the phobic object to be a hallucinatory metaphor tied to unsexualized drives. She calls the hallucinatory metaphor a 'proto-writing', and little Hans—deprived of others—is sage director of his own drama" (2004, 90). Beardsworth takes up Kristeva's analysis of the relation between writing and phobia.

8. Marshy Garrison makes a similar argument in her reinterpretation of Little Hans's phobia, maintaining that Hans is afraid of his mother, represented by the horse, and seeks protection from her from his father (1978, 53-57).

9. This maternal anguish is the infant's relation to the non-yet or pre- or semi-objects of food, air, and movement that it needs. The infant experiences the deprivation of the breast, hunger, and other needs that are not satisfied "on time." As a result, the anguish or fear it feels in connection with these bodily needs or wants are associated with the maternal body and, if we follow Freud and Lacan, eventually with the fear of castration (interpreted narrowly as the fear of losing the penis or broadly as the fear of losing the object—or agent—of satisfaction). Marshy Garrison reinterprets (1978) Little Hans's phobia as a result of a fear of castration from his mother and not his father. Garrison argues that the case history demonstrates that the horse represents the maternal and not paternal threat. She concludes that ultimately, Little Hans's forbidden desire for the death of his sister prompts his fear of punishment from the horse/mother.

10. For a discussion of the relation between Kristeva and Klein, see Domic and Hodges 1993.

11. Kristeva challenges some of Lacan's suggestions that language is always already there. She argues that this position discounts the drives and the primary processes that existed before the secondary processes (1980, 42-43). Her analysis of the unnameable and the
presymbolic "symbol" of the phobic animal also imply her divergence from Lacan’s position on Freud’s discussion of totemism in which Lacan insists that the names of the father (and mother, etc.) must exist before the totemic substitution.

12. Even while continually reminding us of the warning or longing or negativity at the heart of language, Kristeva holds out hope that words can be connected to effects in ways that enable sublimation, love, and joy. She does point out, however, that the fetishism involved in language acquisition may be the only unanalyzable fetishism (1982, 37).

13. Here she follows anthropologist Célestin Bouglé (see Kristeva 1982, 81).

14. For a helpful discussion of Kristeva’s theory of religion and the sacred in relation to Freud’s, see Beardsworth 2004.

15. Sara Beardsworth discusses Kristeva’s analysis of biblical abomination, saying that for Kristeva, “biblical abomination therefore iterates parental repression, carrying it into the very constitution of symbolic Law and, at the same time, revealing that the latter produces abjection without end” (2004, 133).

16. For discussions of Kristeva’s contributions to psychoanalysis pertaining to the role of the mother and the maternal function, see, e.g., Beardsworth 2004; McAfee 2004; Oliver 1993; Reiner 1997; Weit 1993; Wiseman 1993.

17. For an extended examination of, and engagement with, Kristeva’s notion of creativity, genius, and revolt, see Oliver 2004.


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