The men who run the global corporations are the first in history
with the organization, technology, money, and ideology to make
a credible try at managing the world as an integrated economic
unit .... What they are demanding is in essence the right to
transcend the nation-state, and in the process, to transform
it.
-- Richard Barnet and Ronald Muller (1974: 13,15-16)
Full integration will be reached only when there is free movement
of goods, services, capital, and labour and when governments
treat firms equally, regardless of their nationality.
-- The Economist (March 27, 1993: 7)
Corporations have emerged as the dominant governance institutions
on the planet, with the largest among them reaching into virtually
every country in the world and exceeding most governments in
size and power.... The past two decades have seen ... a conscious
and international transformation in search of a new economic
order in which business has no nationality and knows no borders....
It has become a matter of pride and principle for corporate executives
to proclaim that their firms have grown beyond any national interest
....
-- David C. Korten (1995: 54, 121, 124)
We need to think ourselves beyond the nation. This is not
to suggest that thought alone will carry us beyond the nation
.... it is to suggest that the role of intellectual practices
is to identify the current crisis of the nation and in identifying
it to provide part of the apparatus of recognition for post-national
social forms.
--- Arjun Appadurai (1993: 158)
The coherence of effects that development discourse achieved
is the key to its success as a hegemonic form of representation:
the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal,
preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers
....
-- Arturo Escobar (1995, in Rahnema: 92-3)
Like modernity and development, globalization is a long term historical
process, but it is also a project and a paradigm whose contours
have changed dramatically over time. As a process, it can be defined
as an on-going increase in the number of effective interactions
among sites around the globe, a deepening and expansion of the
power of those influential elements that circulate widely among
people and places to effect change in local conditions and experience.
Empirically, we can see long-term growth in the number and significance
of sites in which circulatory movements intersect and from
which they emanate; and historically, data from ancient times
to the present depict circles of rippling influence being broadcast
outward along networks of movement, representation, and communication
to influence the character of locality.
The term "globalization" refers to a global coverage
which has been achieved by human networks of influential interaction,
and its onset can be measured and explained by many factors, including
migration, trade, empire, technology, and the spread of languages
and disparate cultural elements. Its history is best documented
since the days of Genghis Khan. The known world of Eurasia had
been woven together by mobility over land and sea in the fourteenth
century when Asian disease decimated Europe. In the sixteenth
century, more literally global networks came into being
with European seaborne empires, when European diseases decimated
the Americas. Global connectivity has deepened and spread ever
since, with big bursts coming with waves of new technology from
moveable sail riggings and guns to the printing press, steamship
and railway, to the airplane, jumbo jet, radio, TV, computer,
and the internet. By 1550, the Pope could speak for Catholics
on all continents. By 1744, French and English wars sped simultaneously
by horse and sailing ship into the Americas and Asia. In 1820,
African workers produced sugar in the Caribbean to sweeten tea
brewed from Chinese leaves purchased with profits from the sale
of Indian opium and consumed by English workers who made cloth
for export to India, Africa, China, and the Americas from cotton
grown by slaves in the American south. In 1829, indigo stocks
crashed in London, throwing tenants off their land in India. In
1929, a single depression hit every corner of the world economy.
Globalization today therefore a recent phase in a very long history
of networks and structures which have increasingly connected far-flung
sites of human action and experience.
A Project Orientation
We can measure globalization empirically without reference to
the ideas and interests which have propelled it, and impersonal
factors like new transport and communication technology do indeed
help to explain its momentum; but expansive, world-embracing theories
have also guided conscious human efforts to expand the influence
of peoples and places over distant sites around the world. The
expansion of networks that integrate global space has not proceeded
randomly: it has attained an orderly form -- a sense of direction
and purpose -- from the activity of its many project managers.
Waves of connective power have rippled out most influentially
from some particularly important sites, which have had more influence
than others in the overall process of globalization. Over the
centuries, universal theories of human progress and destiny have
imbued the people who are most consciously engaged in the project
of globalization with the idea that their influence and ambition
have limitless horizons.
Globalization has acquired its current aura of inevitability and
abstract perfection from many centuries of theoretical work to
unify the destiny of the world with the dreams of powerful men,
most prominently, the rulers of empires and nations and their
allied intellectuals. Twentieth century theories of modernization
and development represent a recent phase in the historical projection
of moral futures out into the world of possibilities; and for
centuries, people who have worked hard to increase the connectivity
of human sites around the globe have viewed technology and knowledge
as means to their higher moral purpose. They have seen the boundaries
of their present as temporary limitations inherited from the past.
To overcome limits in the present, new technologies and imagination
open the door to a better future; and by these means, many rulers,
entrepreneurs, scholars, and engineers have projected their own
powers across old frontiers to create new connections among peoples
and places on the earth.
Globalization is thus a complex social and cultural project that
cannot be understood simply as the result of one dominant force.
The investments in technologies and in visionary possibilities
which have propelled globalization have required sustained institutional
support and renewed commitment over generations. Roads and ports
crumble without repair and renovation; communication across difficult
terrain breaks down without maintenance. Over the centuries, monasteries,
missionaries, businesses, and scientific associations have invested
in the progress of global connectivity and their efforts along
with many others' have been organized and supplemented substantially
by imperial states. The economic and military requirements of
dynasties, empires, and nations provide compelling motives for
official funding to expand connections among sites over the globe,
and any government of substance will invest in transportation
and communication and in gathering data to facilitate trade, communication,
espionage, defense, or expansion. The military and commercial
meanings of "intelligence" became more global from the
sixteenth century onward, as a connected set of early-modern empires
covered the globe for the first time. By 1750, no major political
territory in the world lacked knowledge about most (if not all)
others; and London, Paris, Amsterdam, Lisbon, and Rome were central
points for accumulations of data. European powers over knowledge
became the "enlightenment," and enlightenment universalism
became fundamental for European expansion. In the eighteenth century,
many early-modern empires were expanding world connectivities
across the Muslim world and Central, South, and East Asia; and
European empires merely connected these imperial territories with
the Americas, forming a global system of states and accelerating
social investment in globalization. Dominant Europeans interpreted
this globalization as a realization of their own universalism,
and they have never looked back.
Technologies that lower transportation and communications costs
do facilitate globalization, which we can measure as a process
by physical movements from place to place, but the globalization
project is neither explained nor mandated by technology. Moral
theories, scientific paradigms, religious passion, cultural mythology,
and legitimate authorities sustain the institutional investments
that expand the scope of influential interactions, as people strive
to organize human territory across the old boundaries of the past,
moving outward into the new world of future possibilities. Concretely,
then, the globe in globalization is a type of human
territory, a space that is marked with human aspirations, meanings,
and power. It is a domain of human control and social order, like
any other kind of territory. Historically, globalization has emerged
from the expansion of territorial powers over the globe, which
imparts to the process not only a sense of direction but also
a historical geography that we can map by locating routes of travel,
centers of institutional order, and symbols of legitimacy and
leadership. Universal theories of divinity have played a conspicuous
role down to the present day; and the global reach of Christianity
(and to a lesser extent, Islam) has been supported generously
by expansive imperial states, since later the days of the Roman
empire. The Catholic Church and British Empire established their
languages, religions, and institutions globally. Chinese, Ottoman,
Mughal, Safavid, and other landed empires did the same in smaller
territories during the early modern period. The history of this
kind of activity -- combining empire, religion, culture, trade,
and intellectual expansion -- can be documented over many centuries
through records preserved in media ranging from stone inscriptions
to monumental buildings to songs, drama, literature, art, and
clothing. Broadcasting the charisma and influence of central authorities
over vast territories is an ancient imperial project, and its
proponents have long promoted theories of human destiny that sustain
their own global vision. Imperial ideologies have given globalization
a cultural coherence and they have organized technology, belief,
and passion for the projection of power and knowledge.
Globalizing activities attained modernity in the late nineteenth
century. Indeed, their technologies, institutions, ideologies,
and passions form the substance of modernity. The idea of the
modern is by its nature universal, transcendant; it crosses all
boundaries of territory even as it forms its own territory of
progress and faces opposition in territories of particularism
and tradition. Modernity is global. Tradition is local. These
are basic tenets in the global expansion of imperial nations from
the nineteenth century. To realize the global ambitions of modernity,
states have made huge investments to lower transportation and
communication costs, from the building of the railway down to
launching satellites and building all the infrastructure for the
internet. States have also produced institutions of territorial
control to support globalization by missionaries, marketeers,
engineers, scholars, scientists and many others. Most prominent
among all the non-governmental interests in globalilzation are
businesses, particularly incorporated firms whose investors have
special state protection against loss and liability. Since the
first granting of charters by English monarchs for trade and settlement
in the Americas and the East Indies, in the seventeenth century,
state-protected corporate capital has provided much of the transactional
substance for the expansion of global connectivity. Competitive
business investments in procurement, processing, financing, and
marketing have also provided wealth and motivation for state expansion.
Chartered companies, corporations, and other businesses have typically
expanded their operations beyond the boundaries of state authority;
and moving into new frontiers, they have mobilized political influence
to bring state power in behind them to back them up and sustain
their further expansion. Business protected by the state has also
moved quickly into new territories of state expansion, filling
out regional economies and form investment connections of trade
and finance with old state territories. From the seventeenth century
onward, interactions of this kind among states and businesses
built the British and other European empires; and they have defined
an expansive zone of power and influence around national states
since 1945, in a post-imperial world in which corporations can
move more freely among state territories.
State and business interactions create overlapping frontiers of
expansion and conflict, which have generated serious territorial
conflict; and indeed, one critical marker of globalization is
an expanse of warfare from the seventeenth century which in 1945
produced the nightmare of global holocaust. Behind this trend
lay the commitment of states to open territory for national economic
interests. The modern state has a dual responsibility: to facilitate
the expansion of its own native business interests and to protect
its own territorial sovereignty. These are twin pillars of international
law, which obviously entail conflict at the borderlands of economic
sovereignty where states seek control over the material conditions
of their own reproduction in the world economy. Determining where
the effective influence of one expansive state ends and that of
another begins has been the subject of deliberation which has
formed international protocol. Since the nineteenth century, the
US has been officially protecting the sovereignty of Latin American
states as it has opened their borders to US business; and in much
of the world, off-shore investments by US companies are prominent.
Numerous nineteenth century wars were justified in the name of
"free trade" -- that is, the opening of state boundaries
to foreign businesses -- including the Opium Wars, in which English
guns enforced the rights of international drug cartels. Modern
international law actually had origins in the treaties of Berlin
that were forged among expansive industrial states to reconcile
their competing interests during the partition of Africa in the
1880s.
National states and international institutions have formed the
organizational basis for modern globalization and also for the
global expansion of business during the twentieth century. In
this context, the extent of the influence over territory wielded
by the citizens of each national state has never coincided strictly
with national boundaries. Until 1945, European national states
ruled vast empires that covered most of Africa and Asia; and from
the 1920s, Japanese and American businesses were increasingly
influential inside European imperial economies, where Indian and
Chinese businesses had also formed substantial zones of economic
and political influence. Empires created special connections between
each European metropolis and its colonies, so that least-cost
transportation and communication ran, for instance, from Dakar
to Paris, from Lagos to London, from Singapore to London, and
from Saigon to Paris, rather than running among the cities of
Africa and Asia. Imperial competition also produced barriers among
national and imperial markets. Empires integrated the world economy
but also partitioned the world's monetary and legal systems. The
separation of economic territories produced opportunities for
profit in exchanges between them -- not only in world money markets
but in the world division of labor -- so that integrating world
markets and creating sharp divisions among world territories went
hand in hand. National states became the institutions for administering
this integrated world of partitions and difference.
When European empires were dismantled after 1945, the old institutions
of connectivity remained, so that former colonial territories
remain typically better connected to their old metropolitan capitals
than to contiguous national territories even today. The routes
of connectivity for people in the old territories of British India
still favor the Anglophone world; and the world of former French
and Iberian territories in Africa and the Americas have a similar
linguistic bias. Other patterns of globalization produced by European
national competition before 1945 also continued thereafter, despite
the globalization of the national state, as both the US and the
USSR pushed their influence into areas already marked as old imperial
territory. The new aspirants for world leadership in the process
of globalization erased empire from the discourse of progress,
relegating it to the past. Woodrow Wilson and V.I.Lenin theorized
a world beyond imperialism, a world of global order among nations.
Both championed universal independence for national states and
the liberation of all peoples from empire. After 1945, Americans
and Soviets sought to expand their global influence in a world
of national state and the United Nations became the global institution
for resolving all the contradictory projects of national expansion
and sovereignty that raged among the old and new imperial powers
and all the new entrants to world competition.
Many new national states could not create effective sovereignty
in the face of what Kwame Nkrumah called neo-colonialism; and
dependency theory expressed the fact that many states depended
on outside resources to maintain their internal coherence; but
at the same time, some new states -- including China, India, Egypt,
Israel, and Egypt -- inherited powers that potentially exceeded
their borders. The Cold War and its attendant hot conflicts took
center stage from 1945 until 1989, but these decades also witnessed
a much broader competition among many actors to expand national
influence and formulate national sovereignty. Expansive combinations
of state and corporate power constantly crossed national borders
in an increasingly complex pattern which never appears on the
maps of states that comprise the international system. Political
maps depicting state territory on the earth's surface do not effectively
express national territoriality, because expansive economies and
states -- like the US, Japan, and Germany -- extend their influence
into weaker states, while weaker states feel the old power of
the imperial metropolis and the new power of new expansive states,
corporations, and international organizations like the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund deep inside their borders. Maps
of states remain static even as their territorial powers expand,
fracture, dissipate, and solidify, internally and externally.
In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, joyous celebrations of national
independence are not like the triumphal expressions of national
power that mark the Fourth of July; they are instead tempered
by the realization that the national state needs international
finance, assistance, and protection from powerful countries, private
banks, and international institutions to thrive. Most of the world's
national states came into existence after 1945; most continue
to be at the receiving end of European, American, Japanese, and
Soviet expansion. Their territory of influence in the process
of globalization thus being substantially smaller than political
maps indicate. Corporate and state activities emanating from Europe,
Japan, the US, and USSR have integrated most countries into world
transactional systems that are geared to special connections with
one set of powerful countries or another; and the Cold War comprised
a complex, shifting set of struggles to tilt the balance of connective
advantage toward the US and USSR.
International legal institutions define the world as a patchwork
of national states that cover the global comprehensively, but
territoriality in the world of nations is not so simple. By 1970,
for the first time, every inch of the earth fell within the legal
territory of a national state with its own clear border on the
world map. This represents an unprecedented globalization of institutional
rules, norms, regulations, and political participation, which
has speeded the expansion of global connectivity substantially.
The world of national states is very new -- however old the world
of the national imagination might be -- so its artifiality is
quite transparent: despite the eternal identity of every nation
for itself, every boundary line on a world map is in
itself a mere scratch across a historical zone of interactive
economic life, migration, communication, and other territorial
markers which that indicate maps of many kinds. The nation and
the national state are not fixed or natural features of modern
life, but rather historical projects of territoriality, which
operate in the context of many other projects and possibilities.
Practically speaking, moreover, the globalization of national
order in the world today has occurred under the sponsorship of
richer, more powerful countries, which also have the strongest
interest, impetus, and capacity for national expansion and thus
for the dissolution of the territorial integrity of smaller, weaker
states.
Connectivity among sites in the contemporary world is thus expanding
today inside structures of global inequality and national community.
Globalization might be represented graphically as a gaggle of
octopuses. Until 1989, the most prominent of these were the US
and the USSR, which fought to wangle less powerful countries into
their grip; but smaller beasts were also at work, ranging from
Germany and Japan, to India and China, down to the likes of Singapore
and Israel. Despite their formal equality and enclosed sovereignty,
each octopus consists of disparate interests and expansive powers,
including bureaucracies, armies, and corporations; and the bigger
ones have more power in the process of globalization. The broad
contours of world situation were captured at Bandung in 1954 when
the Non-Aligned Movement defined the First, Second, and Third
World; and a stark division of rich and poor peoples and countries
remains a structural feature of globalization after the Cold War.
Modernity has therefore entailed the simultaneous formation of
national and global territoriality, which support and contradict
one another, in a true dialectic. Imagined in universal theories
of human perfectibility and institutionalized -- first as competing
national empires and then as an international system -- global
territoriality is like other kinds, being composed of a complex
mix of symbolism, institutions, activities, and power relations;
actors, centers, networks, and entitlements, nested within clusters
that form its constituent sub-territories. Even small territories
contain clusters of nested components. Even a small urban neighborhood
or farming village has nested bundles of powers and identities
within it. Territories typically include multiple internal, even
contradictory histories of self-representation which are contained
by and made sensible within larger units with broader powers and
wider reach. Households fit into neighborhoods, which fit into
towns, suburbs, cities, regions, and states. Territoriality of
this nested sort organizes much of what we call politics, because
people in the institutions that form units of territory at various
levels of scale compete with one another for resources even as
each level of territoriality depends upon the others for its identity
and integrity. Globalization is territoriality at a world scale,
consisting of institutions, activities, and knowledge that constitute
projects of resource control at a global scale, including many
nested bundles of territoriality within it; and though it is possible
to imagine many forms of order which might constitute global institutions,
historically, one particular set of possibilities has crowded
out others. Global institution-building has been led by economically
and militarily dominant states that wield universal theories to
underwrite their own legitimacy, so that globalization as a theoretical
project has always had a heavy load of moral and scientific absolutism,
as it represents the possibility that universal theories can be
validated beyond refutation in real human history on the planet
earth. In the discourse of globalism, we find many apocalyptic
nightmares, many millenarian, futuristic scenarios; and world
history has an air of inescapable inevitability: these are cultural
dimensions of territoriality at the global scale, whose management
and intelligentsia seek to represent the fate and wisdom of all
humanity.
As at other levels of scale, ideologies with global ambition articulate
the powers and entitlements that form community. Global community
has a territorial sensibility which covers the planet, but like
all communities, it is imagined and formed in the context of serious
inequality, which it buries under the rhetoric of unity. Communities
are not born, they are made, and a global village is no less artificial
than a neighborhood or a nation. Natural, ethnic, local, indigenous,
and other primordial communities became building blocks for modern
nationality in the course of globalization, as modern imperial
authorities classified and ordered the diversity of the world
population; and today, identity politics continues to be central
in the process of global community formation; because community
identity is being used to naturalize various claims to entitlements
and status by territorial actors who work inside and across national
boundaries. Community sentiment and membership is critical in
the definition of territory, because territoriality is a marking
of social space by its occupants and observers. Each territory
needs to be recognized as such internally and externally, by people
who have the recognized power to call a territory by its name,
to represent its qualities. Communities are formed inside, outside,
and across the boundaries of territory, which define their location
and the home space of their identity. Global institutions sustain
the credibility and viability if their constituent national territories,
which in turn provide home space for the interests that expand
to increase the reach of global enterprise and the scale of global
community. These expansive activities form territorial units that
integrate the world economy and feed the wealth of national states
by moving among territories, connecting them, and forming communities
of global interest. Despite the fixity of world political maps,
territoriality, like community, is a contingent formation.
Territory need not consist of contiguous bundles of community
or continuous patches of space on the earth's surface. (Sack 1989)
A household is a territory from which members are often absent;
some members may be migrant laborers, working far from the hearth
for long periods of time. The Catholic Church and British Empire
represent vast, discontinuous territories with many styles of
order, nesting, and political interaction at work among their
constituent territorial units. The United Nations, World Bank,
Islam, US foreign policy, the English language, multi-national
corporations, communism, and feminism each define their own communities
and territories; and the contemporary substance of globalization
emerges more clearly when we appreciate that a rapidly increasing
number of communities are now extending their sense of their own
territory to a global scale. Global territory includes a huge
number of constituent territorialities: some are defined by the
official enclosure and physical borders of a state, city, shopping
mall, or household; others are defined instead by networks of
interaction, as among major cities, along rail lines, across the
counters of a stock exchange, and through the internet; and still
others are disbursed communities of sentiment and institutional
identification, such as ethnic, religious, and political movements,
each with their own marked space of identity and belonging.
Territoriality is moveable and malleable, but its institutions
also tend to inertia as they strive for permanence and stability,
to maintain their identity; and their opposition and fracture
tend to suffuse community sensibilities for rather long periods
of time. The legacy of the British Empire is still powerful in
the metropolis and former colonies; and the Catholic Church remains
a shadow empire, composed not only of belief and ritual but also
of vast material wealth. The endless repetition of stories about
Hong Kong being aired today on the BBC World Service indicates
the symbolic significance of that old imperial territory for British
sensibilities; and obsessions with colonialism in Indian historiography
are fragments of its mirror image. The sense of community that
forms the cultural substance of a national states arises within
the everyday human experience of the permanence and omnipresence
of national territory. Carved from old imperial territories, national
boundaries were defined by international treaties that marked
a community of nations which staked a claim to represent all of
humankind. Each nation has its place in the global community of
nations and the United Nations provides a legitimate framework
for global governance. After the founding of the UN charter, a
host of scholarly, philosophical, and policy texts formed a global
discourse of nationality and global community, and an old world
of empires became a new world of nations. Universal theories of
human progress adopted the nation as their vehicle. Universal
truths became global in the binding agreements of global community,
as for instance in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The universality of the human condition and the singularity of
the human species became the theoretical basis for world community,
which could find its full realization in a world of nations. World
history now became a story of the progress of one humanity in
all its many nationalities, as each separate national state pursued
its own eternal quest for sovereignty. A global chorus sounded
the praise of a single humanity in the collective voice of eternal
nations.
This kind of triumphal vision of human community had long been
standard fare in Christianity, but it became typical of global
discourse after 1945, and in this context, the Cold War could
be represented as a struggle for the future of humanity. and its
end could be taken literally to be the end of history (Fukayama
1992) -- the end of barriers to the unity of humanity. Yet the
framework of the United Nations constitutes global community in
the sovereignty of states. Universal humanity and global community
suffuse the world of nationalities and national states.
New Paradigm, New Globalism
World elites have global vision. Circulating among capitals of
governance, among urban sites of erudition, and now communicating
by internet; they can imagine themselves free of all territoriality.
Today, some among them appear to be producing a new kind of global
knowledge. In accounts of globalization that project the power
to redefine global community, visionary scenarios for the future
erase the territory of the nation state and replace it with the
infinite fluidity of a univeral market economy.
Such cosmopolitan mobility and far-reaching intellectual deterritorialization
is not new. One critical marker of elite identity from ancient
times has been its claim to freedom from the site-specific limitation
of a parochial mind. Universal religions theorized and promulgated
infinitely mobile elite erudition, and the Buddha brought cosmic
truth down to the ground by educating a world intellentsia. Chandragupta
Maurya's cosmic empire was a big step in the ancient history of
globalization, as the first major effort to infuse conquest with
universal idealism and to envision governance as a benevolent
expansion of cosmic goodness. Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity,
and Islam make universal claims for sites of purity, divinity,
righteousness, justice, and salvation; and they produce coteries
of learned people of refined erudition -- armed with magical words,
logic, texts, and communicative skills -- who control universal
truth and travel anywhere. In this world of knowledge, charismatic
elites are distinguished from lesser practioners, stuck in lower
echelons, trapped in localities by the gross substance of dialect,
custom, and superstition. Language and technical knowledge constitute
a global territory of the mind and distinguish a community of
erudition which in its own audience represents the world. Such
specialists in communication and cosmopolitanism articulate a
community of the most culturally mobile, the most global of cultural
producers, by virtue of their power to participate in the widest
networks of cultural production. Exotic items in the drawing room,
exotic words sprinkled in conversation, clothing to indicate travel
and experience abroad, and other makers of the riches of the world
on their person and in their personal territory indicate members
of the world community of elite erudition.
Money can buy such markers today, and a larger number of people
than ever before participate today in global communities. Institutions
create and sustain the knowledge that constitutes global territory.
Cities are of course prominent; they virtually define cosmopolitanism.
Strung along routes of transportation, migration, accumulation,
exchange, communication, and distribution, cities big are home
space for global territoriality. Airports, highways, traffic jams,
hotels, conference rooms, board rooms, clubs, restaurants, seminar
rooms, libraries, boats and trains are homey domains for they
people who move from place to place and think about the global
territory they live in. But in the nested territories of globalization,
instititions also produce many varieties of territorial enclosure;
and at each level of scale -- the global, regional, and local
-- people are always learning to live inside their own territory
by learning its language and by imbibing its technical and intellectual
substance, by absording its the disiplining of their sentiments
and imagination. Globalization defines its own distinctive institutional
space for global community, in a territorial formation of global
language and discourse, an accumulation of powers to translate
and move among languages, and a profusion of technical tools for
the effective habitation of global networks by people who can
penetrate, mediate, and influence all the constituent social spaces
nested within.
Global territory today owes a lot to old empires that produced
earlier forms of global discourse, knowledge, and territory. Globalization
is in many respects an accumulation and further expansion of imperial
territoriality. Chinese dynasties ruled a linguistic world of
discourse and erudition of massive proportions -- a world of its
own. Arabic, Persian, and Turkish empires did the same, but they
were subsequently more thoroughly integrated in European empires
that produced modern a world of global language, literature, and
education; a world of expansive horizons for elites in its nested
territories who learned to travel roads of global erudition across
a metropolitan landscape of cosmopolitanism, from city to city,
from one institution of global discourse to another.
By the 1940s, a subtantial set of world leaders in the Americas,
Africa, and Eurasia spoke a handful of European languages. The
UN became an institutional environment for comprehensive translation
and world communication; and from the 1950s, national educational
systems in most countries included institutions for training specialists
in global communication who collectively controlled all the languages
of the world. The preponderance of power in this linguistic process
of globalization tilted toward English, because of the combined
influence of the old British Empire and the new American global
expansion; and though the USSR engaged in a massive global language
program and communicated widely through translation and by the
training of intellectual leaders from all over the world; the
US accumulated much more influence along these lines. Senator
Fulbright was far-sighted enough to craft a program that would
send Americans all over the world to study and would bring students
from every country to America for education and training. Today,
the Fulbright student program can boast many alumni who are world
leaders in Africa and Eurasia. The Ford Foundation and other foundations
also endeavored to train world leaders, technical specialists,
professionals, intellectuals, and people of cultural prominence,
with considerable success. The PL480 progam brought such a massive
collection of foreign language books to the US that many American
libraries today have better book collections in foreign languages
than their native countries. The experience of the OSS in World
War Two led the US government to believe that knowing foreign
languages was essential for military security in the global world
of its national interests; and with this in mind, funds were set
aside for training American scholars in foreign languages and
cultures.
As the US became a prominent world consumer -- consuming resources
and generating waste in accelerating excess proportion to its
share of world population -- it became an extravangant, cosmopolitan
collector of world knowledge. Migrations to the US brought many
world ethnicities into American cities; and American exhibitions,
museums, malls, and media collected cultural elements to represent
the world in an American way. Its collections of culture took
on the appearance of ultimate global sophistication. At the same
time, American corporations became prominent internationally,
not only in the ownership of capital, but in the propagation of
cultural products like TV shows, movies, advertising, and the
Worldwide Web; which has formed an expanding institutional basis
for an American discourse about the world. In the institutions
of international community, moreover, American influence became
formidable -- in NATO, Security Council, IMF and World Bank.
Most of the leadership of the national states that emerged from
the old world of empire came from an educated stratum that knew
French or English, and many had been educated in one European
capital or another. The relative size of the Anglophone intelligentsia
increased steadily in the subsequent decades, when national (and
subnational) languages were at the same time becoming the basis
for massive national education programs. A multi-tiered institutional
structure developed in the nested territories of globalization.
The largest number of people and the vast preponderance of everyday
intellectual activity occurs in linguistic idioms using technical
vocabulary and knowledge that is only comprehensible within small
territories, which we can call, for simplicity, local. The identity
and character of this local level of territorial knowledge derives
promarily from national and regional territories in which they
are situated. National states have formed territories of linguistic
homogenization that in some regions effectively collapse the distinctiion
between the local and national, as in most of Europe, the US,
and Japan. Old imperial languages -- Spanish, Arabic, French,
Chinese, and Turkish -- and to an increasing extent, migratory
languages like Hindi, Tamil, Gujarati, Bengal and Japanese --
also form an influential web of communication among dispersed
localities and within national territories. English is the global
language and though it does not penetrate local discourse directly
in most of the world, its influence is pervasive through the mediation
of other languages and translation. Today, when a community or
an institution has global ambition, it operates on the WorldWide
Web in English.
Forming knowledge about the world to inform the operation and
discourse within global are critical in the project in globalization;
as they are in local, regional, and national territory, where
leadership depends on the ability to constitute community in routines
of representation. Reading the literature on what we would now
call "global issues," it is apparent that the nation
and national state were understood to be foundational features
of world community for most of the twentieth century, specifically
from 1911 to 1989, from the days of Woodrow Wilson to the end
of the USSR. This period is roughly bifurcated by the founding
of the UN and the rise of a world discourse based on the institutions
of the community of nations. By the 1970s, a host of world convocations
had considered issues from hunger to the status of women around
the world. But in the 1980s, a shift begins to be noticeable in
the production of world knowledge; it begins to become global
in a new sense; and its production begins to include more prominently
a different mix of global actors and discursive elements. That
shift is well advanced today. Historical turns of this kind are
difficult to describe, let alone to explain, and though their
influence cannot be assessed clearly at such proximity, a great
many articulate people in global circles take this change to be
a sharp break in the modern paradigm. For some, it appears to
be a shift of the magnitude that characterized the Enlightenment
or the great revolutions: they see a totally new, revolutionary
reality at hand, which had always been unfolding before, perhaps,
but is now upon us. For its proponents, this paradigm shift feels
like a new dawn, an impending millennium, or a revelation; and
there is no shortage of examples of pronouncements of the radical
newness and disjuncture of our present condition.
The end of the Cold War seems to mark the definitive start of
a new era. Thomas Haskell captures this idea nicely by saying,
"The bloody contest between capitalism and socialism unexpectedly
came to an end in 1989 after a struggle that gripped the world
for a century and a half."1
Eric Hobsbawm called 1989 the end of "the age of extremes,"
saying about the nineties (in the past tense) that "citizens
of the fin de siecle tapped their way through the global
fog that surrounded them, into the third millennium ... certain
... that an era of history had ended." "They knew very
little else," he added.2
But the shift that is now well underway in global discourse began
before 1989; it can be seen as early as the 1970s at the start
of the age of structural adjustment, as the World Bank and IMF
forced national governments, one by one, to serve the interests
of global invesors in return for development loans and debt service.
The role of the Bank and IMF in overthrowing the governments of
Salvador Allende and Michael Manley mark a shift in the conduct
of international governance, for which Ronald Reagan and Margaret
Thatcher became leaders. A a sharp decline in American respect
for the UN accompanied a more aggressive effort to reconceptual
the world in terms of global markets. Immanuel Wallterstein's
world systems theory was the first to explain the history of national
states through the functional requirements of world markets. In
December, 1997, the financial policies of the government of Korea
were said to be the cause for a massive crash in the Korean economy
produced by the flight of global investors; and the IMF-Bank bail
out scheme included a massive overhaul of Korea to bring it more
in line with the needs and operations of world markets. The logic
of such activity goes back to the eighteenth century, when the
British East India Company took over the financial administration
of state after state in India, to prevent a loss on its commercial
investments; and in 1885, an Anglo-French consortiium took over
Egypt's treasury for the same reason. But the shift that occurred
after 1975 occurred in an age in which national sovereignty was
firmly built into international law; and justified, for instance,
the US bombing of Iraq to reinstate the government of Kuwait.
National soveriegnty is not being denied, it is being redefined
to include external, international control over national political
economies.
The fall of the USSR is a particularly symbolic event in a long
sequence of events in a paradigm shift concerning the status of
the national state in the process of globalization; and rather
than seeing 1989 as a sharp break in the history of modernity,
we might better imagine the last decades of this century as being
yet another startling concatenation of molecular processes of
a kind which characterize bourgeoise revolutions. (Callinicos
1988: 75) As in the eighteenth century, the trend of change is
being described as progress for the cause of freedom from constraints
imposed upon enterprise by the state. The fall of the USSR and
of the Korean economy alike are taken to illustate the inevitability
and superiority of market solutions. Prominently in this paradigm
shift, therefore, we can see a precipitous decline in the moral
stature of both the nation and the state, and therefore of images
of global community as a community of nations. This decline is
most noticeable in the representation of Latin America, Africa,
and Asia by Anglophone intellectuals and by the institutions which
are most aggressively engaged in globalization. Among the intellectuals,
those based in the US are most prominent; and among institutions,
we find corporations, banks, economic analysts, and global development
organizations like the World Bank being most active. There is
no one agent or organization that is responsible for this shift,
but clearly a new paradigm of globalism has emerged recently that
we can see operating with increasing confidence and clarity in
most if not all major global institutions, from the privately
owned media, to nonprofit NGOS, to the UN, and embracing most
of the globalizing efforts of other institutions, like unversities
and foundations. Broadly speaking, the shift is from a model of
world community as a collection of national cultures and states
to one of globally connected localities. This new globalism ordains
that we "think globally and act locally."