The Perils of Financial Globalization without Financial Development
(International Macroeconomics with Heterogeneous Agents and Incomplete Markets)

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Layout of the presentation

1. Financial globalization and global imbalances: facts & questions
2. Explaining the facts: financial underdevelopment
3. Normative analysis
4. Policy implications and conclusions
Financial Globalization and Global Imbalances: Facts and Questions
Ages of financial globalization

Obstfeld & Taylor’s “introspection” capital mobility index (updated)
Twenty-five years of financial globalization
(Chinn-Ito index)
The promises

• Improved risk sharing
• Enhanced financial intermediation
• Efficient world allocation of capital
• Increased growth, reduced volatility
• Increased social welfare
The record so far

• Weak evidence of improved risk sharing
• No evidence of permanent growth effects
• No change in long-run volatility
• Limited evidence of financial development
• A decade of financial debacles in EMs, 2008 global crash, plus now Eurozone crisis
• Large global imbalances
The global imbalances phenomenon

1. Large secular decline in NFA of the U.S.
2. U.S. portfolio: risky assets leveraged on debt
3. Build up of foreign reserves in EMs (less financially developed)
4. Low interest rates in the U.S., high financing costs in EMs
5. Growing credit and leverage ratios of U.S. households and government
NFA positions as a share of world GDP

-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

US, Emerging Asia, Oil exporters, Japan
Portfolio structure of NFA positions

A – NFA in debt and international reserves

B – NFA in portfolio equity and FDI
Gross stocks of foreign assets & liabilities
U.S. current account & net factor payments
Global Imbalances facts

Fact 1: The Wealth Fact
*U.S. NFA* falling since 1983 to -8% of *world* GDP in 2006 (*CA* hit historical low of -2% *WGDP*)

Fact 2: The Portfolio Fact
*Net equity+FDI* position at 4% of *U.S. GDP* on average since 1983

Fact 3: The Interest Rate Fact
52% of long-term *Tbills* owned by foreign residents by 2005, lowering 10-year yield by up to 120 b. pts.
The key questions and our answers

• What caused the global imbalances?
  – *Financial globalization without financial development*

• Are they sustainable?
  – *Yes, but can be a bumpy ride (Sudden Stops)*

• Should we care?
  – *Definitely. Risk of financial crises, but also*
  – *…financial globalization without financial development has negative welfare effects!*
Financial development or the lack thereof


Note: Aggregate financial index is an average of indexes that measure traditional bank intermediation, new financial intermediation, and financial markets characteristics (see Appendix 4.1 of IMF (2006) for details).
Financial liberalization index
(Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2007).)
Explaining the Global Imbalances Facts
“Financial Integration, Financial Development & Global Imbalances”
(Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull JPE, 2009)
Analytical framework

• Countries 1 & 2 inhabited by a continuum of agents, each maximizing:

\[
E_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1 - \sigma} \right]
\]

• Stochastic, idiosyncratic endowment \( w_t \)

• Fixed agg. supply of productive asset traded at price \( P_t \), used for individual production:

\[
y_{t+1} = z_{t+1} k_t^{\nu}
\]

\[
R_t(k_t, z_{t+1}) = \frac{P_{t+1} + \nu z_{t+1} k_t^{\nu-1}}{P_t}
\]

- \( z_{t+1} \equiv \) Idiosyncratic investment shock
- \( k_t \equiv \) Asset used in production
- \( \nu < 1 \): dec. returns in home production (fixed supply of managerial capital, indivisible but mobile across countries)
Financial structure

• Contingent claims deliver \( b(s_{t+1}) \) units of goods, so an individual’s wealth is:

\[
a(s_{t+1}) = w_{t+1} + k_{t}P_{t+1} + z_{t+1}k_{t}^{\psi} + b(s_{t+1})
\]

• Individual budget constraint

\[
a_{t} = c_{t} + k_{t}P_{t} + \sum_{s_{t+1}} q(s_{t}, s_{t+1})b(s_{t+1})
\]

• No aggregate uncertainty implies:

\[
q(s_{t}, s_{t+1}) = g(s_{t}, s_{t+1}) / (1 + r_{t})
\]

– \( r \) is the eq. Risk-free interest rate and \( g(.) \) the joint Markov trans. prob matrix of the shocks
Financial development

- Limited liability: \[ a(s_j) \geq 0 \]

- Limited enforcement of financial contracts:
  \[
  a(s_j) \geq a(s_{\text{worst}}) + (1 - \phi)[(w_j + z_jk^v) - (w_{\text{worst}} + z_{\text{worst}}k^v)]
  \]
  - For all \( j \) in the Markov realization matrix
  - \( \phi^i \) applies to residents, wherever they own assets (verification of diversion requires verification of \( c \))
  - \( \phi^i = \Phi \geq 1 \) implies complete markets, \( \phi^i = 0 \) allows only non-state-contingent bonds
Contracts with limited enforcement

• Enforceability constraint derived from an optimal contract in an environment in which:
  1. Incomes are observable but not verifiable
  2. Agents can divert $1 - \phi^i$ of endowment and output
  3. There is limited liability

• Incentive compatibility constraint:

$$V_t(s_j, a(s_j)) \geq V_t(s_j, a(s_{\text{worst}}) + (1 - \phi)[(w_j + z_jk_v) - (w_{\text{worst}} + z_{\text{worst}}k_v)])$$

so strict monotonicity of $V$ implies:

$$a(s_j) \geq a(s_{\text{worst}}) + (1 - \phi)[(w_j + z_jk_v) - (w_{\text{worst}} + z_{\text{worst}}k_v)]$$
Individual optimization problem

\[ V_t^i(s, a) = \max_{c, k, b(s')} \left\{ U(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} V_{t+1}^i(s', a(s')) g(s, s') \right\} \]

subject to

\[ a_t = c_t + k_t P_t^i + \sum_{s_{t+1}} b(s_{t+1}) q_t^i(s_t, s_{t+1}), \]

\[ a(s_{t+1}) = w_{t+1} + k_{t+1} P_{t+1}^i + z_{t+1} k_t^\nu + b(s_{t+1}) \]

\[ a(s_j) - a(s_1) \geq (1 - \phi^i) \cdot \left[ (w_j + z_j k_t^\nu) - (w_1 + z_1 k_t^\nu) \right] \]

\[ a(s_j) \geq 0 \]
Equilibrium

- Given $\phi^i$ and an initial wealth distribution $M^i_t(s,k,b)$ for each country $i \in \{1,2\}$, a recursive equilibrium is defined by sequences of policy functions $\{c^i_\tau(s,a), k^i_\tau(s,a), b^i_\tau(s,a,s')\}$, value functions $\{V^i_\tau(s,a)\}$, prices $\{P^i_\tau, r^i_\tau, q^i_\tau(s,s')\}$, and distributions $\{M^i_\tau(s,k,b)\}$, for $\tau=t,\ldots,\infty$, such that:

  (i) $\{c^i_\tau(s,a), k^i_\tau(s,a), b^i_\tau(s,a,s')\}$ solve opt. problems with $\{V^i_\tau(s,a)\}$ as associated value functions

  (ii) Prices satisfy: $q^i_\tau = g(s,s')/(1+r^i_\tau)$

  (iii) $\{M^i_\tau(s,k,b)\}$ is consistent w. $M^i_t(s,k,b)$, $\{c^i_\tau(s,a), k^i_\tau(s,a), b^i_\tau(s,a,s')\}$

  (iv) Asset markets clear for all $\tau \geq t$ under one of two conditions:

    AU: Autarky: each $i \in \{1,2\}$ satisfies

    $$\int_{s,k,b} k^i_\tau(s,a) M^i_\tau(s,k,b) = 1, \int_{s,k,b,s'} b^i_\tau(s,a,s') M^i_\tau(s,k,b) g(s,s') = 0$$

    FI: Financial integration:

    $$\sum_{i=1}^2 \int_{s,k,b} k^i_\tau(s,a) M^i_\tau(s,k,b) = 2, \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_{s,k,b,s'} b^i_\tau(s,a,s') M^i_\tau(s,k,b) g(s,s') = 0.$$
Theoretical analysis

• **Case 1**: Endowment shocks only
  – Can explain Facts 1 and 3, but not 2

• **Case 2**: Production shocks only
  – Can explain Fact 2 (may not explain Facts 1 and 3)

• **Case 3**: Endowment and production shocks
  – Can explain both facts
Case 1: Endowment shocks only

**Autarky with $\phi=0$**

\[ b(w_1) = ... = b(w_N) = b, \]

\[ U'(c) = \beta(1 + r_t) EU'(c(w')) + (1 + r_t) E\lambda(w') \]

\[ U'(c) = \beta R_t(k, \bar{z}) EU'(c(w')) + R_t(k, \bar{z}) E\lambda(w') \]

\[ R_t(k, \bar{z}) = 1 + r_t \quad P_t = P_{t+1} = \nu \bar{z} / r. \quad \beta(1+r_t) < 1 \]

**Autarky with $\phi=\Phi$**

\[ U'(c) = \beta(1 + r_t) U'(c(w')) + (1 + r_t) \lambda(w'), \quad \forall w' \]

\[ U'(c) = \beta R_t(k, \bar{z}) EU'(c(w')) + R_t(k, \bar{z}) E\lambda(w') \]

\[ R_t(k, \bar{z}) = 1 + r_t \quad P_t = P_{t+1} = \nu \bar{z} / r. \quad \beta(1+r_t) = 1 \]
Prop. 1: Financial integration with $\phi^1 = \Phi$ and $\phi^2 = 0$ implies that at steady state C. 1 features:
1. Negative NFA, due to precautionary savings incentive in C. 2
2. Zero foreign prod. asset holdings, due to arbitrage against riskless return
3. Interest rate lower than $1/\beta$, otherwise C. 2’s NFA goes to $\infty$

Generalizes to any $(\phi^1, \phi^2)$ such that $0 \leq \phi^2 < \phi^1 \leq \Phi$
- $\phi^2 < \phi^1$ (weaker enforcement in C. 2) lowers NFA in C. 1 and yields equilibrium interest rate below C. 1’ autarky rate
Financial autarky v. financial globalization
Case 2: Production shocks only

$\phi = 0$

\[ b(z_1) = ... = b(z_N) = b \]

\[ U'(c) = \beta (1 + r_t) EU'(c(z')) + (1 + r_t) E\lambda(z') \]

\[ U'(c) = \beta E U'(c(z')) R_t(k, z') + E\lambda(z') R_t(k, z') \]

\[ \beta (1 + r_t) < 1 \quad \text{ER}_t(k, z') > 1 + r_t \]

\[ \text{ER}_{t+1}(k, z') - (1 + r_t) = - \frac{\text{Cov}(R_{t+1}(k, z'), U'(c(z'))}{EU'(c(z'))} \]

$\phi = \Phi$

\[ U'(c) = \beta (1 + r_t) U'(c(z')) + (1 + r_t) \lambda(z') \quad \forall w' \]

\[ U'(c) = \beta \text{ER}_t(k, z') U'(c(z')) + E\lambda(z') R_t(k, z') \]

\[ \beta (1 + r_t) = 1 \quad \text{ER}_t(k, z') = 1 + r_t \]
Case 2: Equilibrium with Financial Integration

• Prop. 2: If $\phi^1 = \Phi$ and $\phi^2 = 0$, C. 1 holds negative NFA position in the steady state with financial integration, has positive NPA, and faces an interest rate lower than (a) $1/\beta$ and (b) mean return on foreign prod. assets
  – C. 2 agents demand higher premium on asset returns because of imperfect insurance, C. 1 agents buy assets in C. 2
  – Equity premium implies interest rate lower than risky returns

• Leverage buildup: Country with deeper financial markets invests in foreign high-return assets and finance this with debt.

• Results do not generalize to any $0 \leq \phi^2 < \phi^1 \leq \Phi$
  – If $\phi^2 < \phi^1 < \Phi$, C. 1 still buys some of C. 2’s risky asset, but by taking more risk it can stimulate enough precautionary savings to yield positive NFA.
Modifications for quantitative analysis

- \( N \) countries, heterogeneous in \( a(s_j) \geq a^i \)

- Divisible managerial capital \( A \), so GNI is:

\[
y_{t+1} = \sum_{\ell=1}^{N} z_{\ell,t+1} A_{\ell,t+1}^{1-\nu} k_{\ell,t}^\nu \quad \text{with} \quad \sum_{\ell=1}^{N} A_{\ell,t+1} = 1
\]

  - Financial integration now allows risk diversification
  - We can now determine gross and net FA positions
  - Markov states: \( s_t = [w_t, z_{1,t}, \ldots, z_{N,t}] \)

- Net worth:

\[
a_t = c_t + \sum_{\ell=1}^{N} k_{\ell,t} P_{j,t} + \sum_{s_{t+1}} b(s_{t+1}) q^i_t(s_t, s_{t+1})
\]

- Budget const.:

\[
a(s_{t+1}) = w_{t+1} + \sum_{\ell=1}^{N} [k_{\ell,t} P_{\ell,t+1} + z_{\ell,t+1} A_{\ell,t}^{1-\nu} k_{\ell,t}^\nu] + b(s_{t+1})
\]
Individual optimization problem

\[ V_t^i(s, a) = \max_{A_\ell, k_\ell, b(s')} \left\{ U(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} V_{t+1}^i(s', a(s')) g(s, s') \right\} \]

subject to

\[ A_\ell \in [0, 1], \quad \sum_{\ell=1}^N A_\ell = 1 \]

\[ a(s_j) \geq a^i \]

\[ a(s_j) - a(s_1) \geq (1 - \phi^i) \cdot \left[ w^j - w^1 + \sum_{j=1}^N (z_{\ell, t+1}^j - z_{\ell, t+1}^1) A_{\ell, t}^{1-\nu} k_{\ell, t}^\nu \right] \]

\[ a_t = c_t + \sum_{\ell=1}^N k_{\ell, t} P_{j, t} + \sum_{s_{t+1}} b(s_{t+1}) q_t^i(s_t, s_{t+1}) \]

\[ a(s_{t+1}) = w_{t+1} + \sum_{\ell=1}^N \left[ k_{\ell, t} P_{\ell, t+1} + z_{\ell, t+1} A_{\ell, t}^{1-\nu} k_{\ell, t}^\nu \right] + b(s_{t+1}) \]
Global market clearing conditions

• Global market for each country’s prod. asset:

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \int_{s,A,k,b} k_{\ell,\tau}^i(s, a) M^i_\tau(s, A, k, b) = \mu^\ell \]

  – Asset prices not equalized unless shocks are perfectly correlated

• Global market of state contingent claims:

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \int_{s,A,k,b,s'} b^i_\tau(s, a, s') M^i_\tau(s, A, k, b) g(s, s') = 0 \]
Equivalent economy for numerical solution

• Transform agent’s problem into equivalent problem with a single riskless bond and “residual income processes”

• Define conditional expected value of s.c. claims:

\[ b_t = \sum_{s_{t+1}} b(s_{t+1})g(s_t, s_{t+1}) \]

• Rewrite contingent claims in terms of a synthetic n.s.c. bond and the “pure insurance” component of s.c. claims:

\[ b(s_{t+1}) = \bar{b}_t + x(s_{t+1}) \quad \sum_{s_{t+1}} x(s_{t+1})g(s_t, s_{t+1}) = 0 \]

• Rewrite law of motion of wealth:

\[ a(s_{t+1}) = w_{t+1} + \sum_{j=1}^{I} \left[ k_{j,t} P_{t+1}^{j} + z_{j,t+1} A_{j,t}^{1-\nu} k_{j,t}^{\nu} \right] + \bar{b}_t + x(s_{t+1}) \]
• Agents desire maximum insurance, so enforcement constraint holds with equality:

\[ a(s_n) = a(s_1) + (1 - \phi) \cdot \left[ w_n - w_1 + \sum_{j=1}^{I} (z_{j,n} - z_{j,1}) A_{j,t}^{1-\nu} k_{j,t}^{\nu} \right] \]

• Rewrite the enforcement constraint as:

\[ x(s_n) - x(s_1) = -\phi \cdot \left[ w_n - w_1 + \sum_{j=1}^{I} (z_{j,n} - z_{j,1}) A_{j,t}^{1-\nu} k_{j,t}^{\nu} \right] \]

for all \( n \in \{2, \ldots, N\} \)

• Using the above and \( \sum_{n} x(s_n) g(s_t, s_n) = 0 \) we obtain:

\[ x(s_n) = -\phi \cdot W_n(s_t) - \phi \cdot \sum_{j=1}^{I} Z_{j,n}(s_t) \cdot A_{j,t}^{1-\nu} k_{j,t}^{\nu} \]
where

\[ W_n(s_t) = w_n - \sum_{\ell} g(s_t, s_\ell) w_\ell \]
\[ Z_{j,n}(s_t) = z_{j,n} - \sum_{\ell} g(s_t, s_\ell) z_{j,\ell} \]

So we can define residual incomes as follows:

\[ \tilde{w}_n(s_t) = w_n - \phi \cdot W_n(s_t) \]
\[ \tilde{z}_{j,n}(s_t) = z_{j,n} - \phi \cdot Z_{j,n}(s_t) \]

- \( \phi = 0 \): no insurance, residual incomes same as original incomes
- \( \phi = 1 \) and i.i.d shocks: expected income is time & state invariant (full insurance)
- Use residual incomes to rewrite law of motion of wealth in terms of risky assets and a n.s.c. bond
Equivalent optimization problem

\[ V_t^i(s, a) = \max_{A, k, b(s')} \left\{ U(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} V_{t+1}^i(s', a(s')) g(s, s') \right\} \]

subject to

\[ A_j \in [0, 1], \sum_{j=1}^I A_j = 1 \]

\[ a(s_j) \geq a^i \]

\[ a_t = c_t + \sum_{j=1}^I k_{j,t} P_t^j + \frac{\bar{b}_t}{1 + r} \]

\[ a(s_n) = \tilde{w}_n(s_t) + \sum_{j} \left[ k_{j,t} P_{t+1}^j + \tilde{z}_{j,n}(s_t) \cdot A_{j,t}^{1-\nu} k_{j,t}^\nu \right] + \bar{b}_t \]
Calibration for two-country baseline

- $\beta = 0.925$ to yield 3.3 world wealth-income ratio
- CRRA coefficient: $\sigma = 2$
- C1 is U.S., 30% of world GDP, $\mu_1 = 0.3$
- Financial structure:
  \[ \phi^1 = 0.35, \quad \phi^2 = 0, \quad a^1 = a^2 = 0 \]
- Individual earnings process set to U.S. estimates:
  \[ w = \bar{w}(1 \pm \Delta_w), \quad \bar{w} = 0.85, \quad \Delta_w = 0.6, \quad g(w, w') = 0.95 \]
- Production:
  \[ y = \bar{z}k^\nu, \quad \nu = 0.75, \quad y = \bar{z}k^\nu = 0.15 \]

$z$ is i.i.d. with $\pm 2.5$ deviations from mean (returns vary -6% to 14%)
Decision rules under financial integration
(gross asset positions & net claims position)
Long-run wealth distributions under financial integration

Country 1 – Distribution

Country 2 – Distribution
Comparing long-run positions: both shocks

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<th>Autarky</th>
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<th>Capital mobility</th>
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<td>Capital</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C1</td>
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<td>C2</td>
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<td>Gross holdings of productive assets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.91</td>
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Transitional dynamics: NFA & Current Account

NFA - Total

Current account balance
Transitional dynamics: NFA portfolios
Transitional dynamics: asset prices
## Correlated investment shocks

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<td>-107.98</td>
<td>46.50</td>
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### A) Shocks are partially correlated (correlation=0.5)

### B) Shocks are perfectly correlated (correlation=1)
Residence v. source-based enforcement

1. C.1 residence, C.2 source (on foreign holdings)

\[ a(s_j) - a(s_1) \geq (1 - \phi^2) \cdot \left[ w^j - w^1 + (z^j_2 - z^1_2)A_{2,t}^{1-\nu} k^\nu_{2,t} \right] + (1 - \phi^1)(z^j_1 - z^1_1)A_{1,t}^{1-\nu} k^\nu_{1,t} \]

2. C.1 source (on foreign holdings), C.2 residence

\[ a(s_j) - a(s_1) \geq (1 - \phi^1) \cdot \left[ w^j - w^1 + (z^j_1 - z^1_1)A_{1,t}^{1-\nu} k^\nu_{1,t} \right] + (1 - \phi^2)(z^j_2 - z^1_2)A_{2,t}^{1-\nu} k^\nu_{2,t} \]

3. C.1 & C.2 foreign holdings enforced at \( \tilde{\phi} = (\phi^1 + \phi^2)/2 \)

\[ a(s_j) - a(s_1) \geq (1 - \phi^1) \cdot \left[ w^j - w^1 + (z^j_1 - z^1_1)A_{1,t}^{1-\nu} k^\nu_{1,t} \right] + (1 - \tilde{\phi})(z^j_2 - z^1_2)A_{2,t}^{1-\nu} k^\nu_{2,t} \]

4. C.1 & C.2 source-based on foreign holdings (1. and 2.)
Country 1 or Country 2 source based

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<td>$C1$</td>
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<td>A) Source based only for residents of $C2$</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) Source based only for residents of $C1$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prices of productive assets</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns on productive assets</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest rate</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net foreign asset positions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### D) Partially source based for residents of both countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autarky</th>
<th>Capital mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$C_1$</td>
<td>$C_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prices of productive assets</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns on productive assets</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net foreign asset positions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive assets</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonds</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### C) Source based for residents of both countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autarky</th>
<th>Capital mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$C_1$</td>
<td>$C_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prices of productive assets</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net foreign asset positions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive assets</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonds</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Heterogeneity in $\phi$ and $\alpha$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A) Differences in $\alpha$ only: $\alpha^1 = -1$, $\alpha^2 = 0$, $\phi^1 = \phi^2 = 0.35$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prices of productive assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns on productive assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net foreign asset positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B) Differences in both: $\alpha^1 = -1$, $\alpha^2 = 0$, $\phi^1 = 0.35$, $\phi^2 = 0$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prices of productive assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns on productive assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net foreign asset positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Three-country case with differences in growth and volatility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autarky</th>
<th>Capital mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C1</td>
<td>C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prices of productive assets</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns on productive assets</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>5.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest rate</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net foreign asset positions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive assets</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonds</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross holdings of productive assets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country 1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country 2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country 3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The heterogeneous parameters are $\phi = (0.5, 0.5, 0), \sigma = (-1, 0, 0)$, $\beta = (0.925, 0.925, 0.863)$, $\Delta w = (0.6, 0.6, 0.9)$, $\Delta z = (2.5, 2.5, 3.75)$, $\mu = (0.3, 0.5, 0.2)$. See also Table 1.
Welfare effects: individual v. aggregate

• Individual welfare effect on agent “j”:

\[ E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u \left( c_t^{FA}(1 + g^j) \right) = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u \left( c_t^{FI} \right) \]

\[ (1 + g^j)^{1-\sigma} V^{FA}(\varepsilon, a) = V_0^{FI}(\varepsilon, a) \]

  – There is a distribution of individual welfare effects associated with each country’s wealth distribution
  – Calculations include transitional dynamics

• Aggregate welfare effect on country “i”: social welfare function weights each individual equally

\[ (1 + G_i)^{1-\sigma} \int_{\varepsilon,a} V^{FA}(\varepsilon, a) M^i(\varepsilon, a) = \int_{\varepsilon,a} V_0^{FI}(\varepsilon, a) M^i(\varepsilon, a) \]
Welfare results in the first *MQRR* model (mean welfare effects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model version</th>
<th>Country 1</th>
<th>Country 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline model</td>
<td>2.63%</td>
<td>-0.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlated inv. Shocks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.18%</td>
<td>-0.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.77%</td>
<td>-0.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source-based enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source for C. 2</td>
<td>2.67%</td>
<td>-0.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source for C. 1</td>
<td>2.87%</td>
<td>-0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially for both</td>
<td>2.71%</td>
<td>-0.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full for both</td>
<td>2.80%</td>
<td>-0.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity in $\phi$ and $\alpha$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$ only</td>
<td>2.99%</td>
<td>-0.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>both</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>-0.89%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Welfare effects across individuals

Country 1 - Welfare gains

Country 2 - Welfare gains
Unilateral redistributive policy

- Unanticipated uniform tax on net worth at $t = 0$ in C. 2 to finance uniform lump-sum transfers (in model with K. accumulation and simple borrowing constraint)

$$T^i = \int_{\varepsilon, a} \tau^i a M^i(\varepsilon, a)$$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax Rate</th>
<th>Initial wealth gini after redistribution in country 2</th>
<th>Welfare gains country 1</th>
<th>Welfare gains country 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Globalization of financial crises

“Financial Globalization, Financial Crises & Contagion”

(E. Mendoza and V. Quadrini, JME, 2010)
Stock markets crashed globally
(indexes re-based at Dow Jones maximum)
Bank spreads surged globally
Strategy and findings

• Propose a model in which FG without domestic FD causes surge in U.S. credit (MQRR, JPE 09)

• Introduce financial intermediation with MtoM capital requirements and “securitization”

• Study implications of a “small shock” to FI’s capital in one country
  1. Fisherian deflation with large amplification
  2. Global spillovers
  3. Financial heterogeneity matters for amplification
  4. Relaxing MtoM weakens the crash
Introduce financial intermediation

• Split agents into “savers,” (S) “producers” (P) and financial intermediaries” (FI)

• S: similar to MQRR agents with same frictions

• P: representative firm facing Kiyotaki-Moore collateral constraint (Fisherian deflation)

• FIs: take deposits from S, extend loans to P facing MtoM capital requirements constraint or can circumvent them at a cost (akin to “SIVs”)

• Each country has mass $\mu$ of agents, $1/2$ are S, $1/2$ are P, both with CRRA utility
Country i’s individual saver’s problem

\[ V_t^i(w, b) = \max_{c, b(w')} \left\{ U(c) + \beta \sum_{w'} V_{t+1}^i(w', b(w')) g(w, w') \right\} \]

subject to:

(a) Budget constraint:

\[ d_t + w_t + b(w_t) = c_t + \sum_{w_{t+1}} b(w_{t+1}) q_t^i(w_t, w_{t+1}) \]

(b) Limited enforcement constraint

\[ b(w_1) - b(w_j) \leq \phi^i \cdot (w_j - w_1) \]

(c) Limited liability constraint

\[ w_j + b(w_j) \geq 0 \]

Since shocks are purely idiosyncratic, contingent claims prices still satisfy:

\[ q_t^i(w_t, w_{t+1}) = g(w_t, w_{t+1})/(1 + r_t^i) \]
Country i’s representative producer’s problem

\[ W_t^i(k, l) = \max_{c, k', l'} \left\{ U(c) + \beta W_{t+1}^i(k', l') \right\} \]

Subject to:

(a) Budget constraint

\[ w^P + k P_t^i + F(k) + \frac{l' - \varphi_t^i(l')}{1 + r_t^i} = c + l + k' \]

\[ F(k_{t+1}) = A k_{t+1}^\nu \]

(b) Limited enforcement constraint

\[ l' \leq \psi^i \left[ k' P_{t+1}^i + F(k') \right] \]
Optimality conditions of savers and producers

Savers:

\[ U'(c_t) \geq \beta (1 + r_t) EU'(c_{t+1}) \]

Producers:

\[
U'(c_t) = \left[ \beta U'(c_{t+1}) + \mu_t \right] \left( \frac{1 + r_t}{1 - \varphi'(l')} \right)
\]

\[
U'(c_t) = \left[ \beta U(c_{t+1}) + \mu_t \psi^2 \right] \left( \frac{P_{t+1} + F_k(k_{t+1})}{P_t} \right)
\]
Financial intermediaries

• Deposit liabilities

\[ B_t = \int_{w_{-1}, b_{-1}, w} \sum_w b_{t-1}^i(w_{-1}, b_{-1}, w) g(w_{-1}, w) M_t(w_{-1}, b_{-1}) \]

• Beginning-of-period equity:

\[ e_t = \overline{k}^f P_t^i + L_t - B_t \]

• Budget constraint:

\[ e_t + \frac{B_{t+1}}{1 + r_t^i} = \overline{k}^f P_t^i + \frac{L_{t+1}}{1 + r_t^i} + d_t \]

• Non-negativity constraint on dividends: \[ d_t \geq 0. \]
Capital requirements

- Subset of loans $\overline{L}_{t+1}$ subject to MtoM capital req.
  \[ \overline{L}_{t+1} \leq \alpha(e_t - d_t) \]

- Individual bank incurs cost for loans larger than a "threshold "price:"
  \[ \varphi_t(l_{t+1}) = \begin{cases} 
  \kappa(l_{t+1} - \chi_t^i)^2 & \text{if } l_{t+1} \geq \chi_t^i \\
  0 & \text{otherwise} 
\end{cases} \]

- Competitive banks minimize costs by choosing highest threshold that keeps dividends non-negative.
  \[ \chi_t = \alpha(\overline{k}^f P_t + L_t - B_t) = \alpha e_t \]

- Loans at/below this threshold are offered at $r$ and subject to MtoM constraint, and above they have increasing cost
Financial intermediaries’ problem

\[
\gamma^i_t (B, L) = \max_{d \geq 0, B', L'} \left\{ d + \left( \frac{1}{1 + r^i_t} \right) \gamma^i_{t+1} (B', L') \right\}
\]

Subject to

\[
L - B = \frac{L'}{1 + r_t} - \frac{B'}{1 + r_t} + d
\]

- This determines total loans, the subset \( \overline{L}_{t+1} \) of which is subject to the capital requirement, and the complement offered at the increasing cost.
Asset market clearing conditions

- Under financial autarky, for each \( i \in \{1,2\} \):
  \[
  k^i_t(K, L)/2 = \bar{k} - \bar{k}^f
  \]
  \[
  \int_{w,b,w'} b^i_T(w,b,w') M^i_T(w,b) g(w,w') = B^i_T(B,L)
  \]

- Under financial integration, across all \( i=1,2 \)
  \[
  \sum_{i=1}^{2} k^i_t \mu^i = \bar{k} - \bar{k}^f
  \]
  \[
  \sum_{i=1}^{2} \int_{w,b,w'} b^i_T(w,b,w') M^i_t \mu^i(w,b) g(w,w') = \sum_{i=1}^{2} B^i_t(B,L) \mu^i
  \]

  \[
  q^1_t = g(w,w')/(1 + r^1_t) = g(w,w')/(1 + r^2_t) = q^2_t
  \]

  \[
  P^1_t = P^2_t, \quad \chi^1_t = \chi^2_t
  \]
Credit shocks in the loan market

Marginal cost of borrowing

Supply of loans after the shock

Supply of loans before the shock $r_t^s + \phi_t^s(L')$

Demand of loans

$r_t^s$

Before

$r_t^s$

After

$L_{After}$

$L_{Before}$

$L'$
Quantitative experiments

• Compare FA v. FG steady-state equilibria
  – Show how much FG contributed to credit surge

• Hit with unanticipated, once-and-for-all “credit shock” (one-time drop in FI’s equity—e.g. unexpected loss in a small fraction of loans)
  – Show Fisherian amplification and contagion
  – Examine differential effects under FA v. FG
  – Examine importance of financial heterogeneity
Calibration

- $\beta = 0.94, \sigma = 1$
- C1 is U.S., 30% of world GDP, $\mu^1 = 0.3$
- Financial structure parameters:
  - $\phi^1 = 0.21, \phi^2 = 0, \psi^1 = 0.62, \psi^2 = 0.45, \kappa = 0.1, \alpha = 10$
- Individual earnings process set to U.S. estimates:
  - $w = \bar{w}(1 \pm \Delta_w), \bar{w} = w^p = 0.4, \Delta_w = 0.6, g(w, w') = 0.95$
- Production:
  - $y = Ak^\nu, \nu = 0.75, A = 0.2, k = 1$
- Capital stocks:
  - $k = 1, \bar{k} = 1.05, k^f = 0.05$
Credit ratios in steady states before and after FG (shares of output)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before FG</th>
<th>After FG 1/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country 1</td>
<td>169%</td>
<td>195%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country 2</td>
<td>126%</td>
<td>119%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Calibrated to match 2005 observed shares of credit to GDP from World Bank World Development Indicators.

Foreign asset positions in steady state after FG (shares of output)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country 1</th>
<th>Country 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net foreign assets 1/</td>
<td>-30%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net prod. assets</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign borrowing</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>-27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Calibrated to match 2006 NFA positions in Lane-Milesi database.
Unexpected credit shock

- “Small shock” to C1’s banks (1.5% of loans)
Macro dynamics

Interest rate

Effective int. rate: \((1+r)/(1-\varphi)\)

- **Country 1**
- **Country 2**
Macro dynamics

Loans backed by bank capital

Total loans

Percent deviation from SS

Country 1
Country 2

Percent deviation from SS
Sensitivity experiments

- Baseline
- Stricter capital requirement ($\alpha=9$)
- Homogeneous countries ($\phi_1=\phi_2$, $\psi_1=\psi_2$)
Marking to steady-state price

![Graph showing the deviation of book value and mark-to-market value from steady state over time.](image-url)
Conclusions & Policy Implications
Financial globalization: reality check

- **Expectations**: Improved risk sharing, enhanced financial intermediation, efficient allocation of capital, increased growth, reduced volatility ... increased social welfare

- **Realities**: Weak evidence of improved risk sharing, convergence in FD, or faster growth, reduced long-run volatility. Risk of financial crises, global imbalances

- **Realizing the gains of FG requires development of domestic institutions & financial markets!** (Frankel, Mishkin, Rajan & Zingales, Obstfeld & Taylor)
  - …but how do we get there? (sequencing v. Rajan-Zingales)
  - …in the meantime redistributive policy is worth considering
Additional conclusions

• Growing leverage creates vulnerability to shocks that can trigger debt-deflation dynamics (Mendoza & Quadrini JME 2010)

• Fiscal policy may help alleviate welfare effects

• New mercantilism is only partially right
  – Fin. Globalization can explain surge in reserves
  – Persistent surpluses and undervaluation even without central bank intervention

• Precautionary savings are suboptimal, but can we design better arrangements?
  – Private capital markets ahead of IFOs
Financial instability risks

• FG without FD is very risky
  – Induces large buildup of debt
  – Large, global amplification effects of credit shocks
  – Larger effects with more financial heterogeneity

• MtoM accounting induces significant amplification in response to credit shocks, but MtoM aims to address other distortions (e.g. moral hazard)

• Consider Shiller’s cyclical capital requirements, or temporary relief from MtoM?

• Pecuniary externality favors macroprudential regulation