Movements in relative prices play a large role in economic fluctuations, particularly in emerging economies. Sudden stops in capital movements, for instance, are typically associated with sharp depreciations of the real exchange rate, which in turn can wreak havoc with private sector balance sheets. This raises the question of what is behind these real exchange rate fluctuations—whether it is the relative prices of traded goods that move, or the price of nontradables in terms of tradables. Answering this empirical question is crucial both for building relevant models and for designing policies to moderate the dramatic macroeconomic fluctuations that seem to plague emerging economies.

The dominant view in the empirical literature on real exchange rates is that exchange-rate-adjusted relative prices of tradable goods account for most of the observed high variability of consumer-price-index-based real exchange rates. Based on an application of his earlier variance analysis to Mexican data, Engel concludes that this dominant view applies to Mexico. Using a sample of monthly data from 1991 to 1999, he finds that the fraction of the variance of the peso-dollar real exchange rate accounted for by the variance

Mendoza is with the International Monetary Fund and the University of Maryland. Comments and suggestions by Marcelo Oviedo, Raphael Bergoeing, Nouriel Roubini, and Andrés Velasco are gratefully acknowledged. An earlier version of the empirical section of this paper circulated as a working paper under the title “On the Instability of Variance Decompositions of the Real Exchange Rate across Exchange Rate Regimes: Evidence from Mexico and the United States,” which benefited from comments by Charles Engel, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe, and Martín Uribe.

1. See the classic article by Engel (1999) and earlier work by Rogers and Jenkins (1995).
of the Mexico-U.S. ratio of prices of tradable goods adjusted by the nominal exchange rate exceeds 90 percent, regardless of the time horizon over which the data are differenced.

Engel’s finding raises serious questions about the empirical relevance of a large literature that emphasizes the price of nontradables as a key factor for explaining real exchange rates and economic fluctuations in emerging economies. Many papers on noncredible exchange-rate-based stabilizations model the real exchange rate as a positive, monotonic function of the relative price of nontradables (with the latter determined at equilibrium by the optimality conditions for sectoral allocation of consumption and production).³ Lack of credibility in a currency peg leads to a temporary increase in tradables consumption and a rise in the relative price of nontradables, which causes a temporary real appreciation of the currency. The literature on sudden stops in emerging economies emphasizes the phenomenon of liability dollarization: debts in emerging economies are generally denominated in units of tradable goods or in hard currencies, but they are partially leveraged on the incomes and assets of the large nontradables sector typical of these economies. With liability dollarization, the real exchange rate may collapse in the face of a sharp decline in the price of nontradables, thereby triggering a financial crash and deep recession. For example, Calvo shows how a sudden loss of access to the world credit market can trigger a real depreciation of the currency and systemic bankruptcies in the nontradables sector.⁴ The real depreciation occurs because the market price of nontradables collapses when the lack of credit forces a reduction of tradables consumption, while the supply of nontradables remains unaltered.

Engel’s finding that nontradables prices account for only a negligible fraction of real exchange rate variability in emerging economies like Mexico undermines the empirical foundation of these theories on sudden stops and the real effects of exchange-rate-based stabilizations. Moreover, it renders irrelevant the key policy lessons derived from these theories on how to cope with the adverse effects of noncredible stabilization policies or to prevent sudden stops. An example of such policies is the push to reduce liability dollarization by developing new foreign debt instruments—either by indexing debt to output or commodity prices or by issuing debt at longer maturities or in domestic currencies. In short: determining the main sources of the observed fluctuations of real exchange rates in emerging economies is a central issue for theory and policy.

A closer look at the empirical evidence suggests, however, that the relative price of nontradables may not be as irrelevant as Engel’s work suggests. Mendoza and Uribe report large variations in Mexico’s relative price of nontradables during the country’s exchange-rate-based stabilization of 1988–94. They do not conduct Engel’s variance analysis, so while they show that the price of nontradables rose sharply, their findings cannot establish whether the movement in the nontradables price was important for the large real appreciation of the Mexican peso. Nevertheless, their results point to a potential problem with Engel’s analysis of Mexican data—namely, that it does not separate periods of managed exchange rates from periods of floating exchange rates.

A related point is that liability dollarization does seem to matter for emerging market crises. Panel data evidence shows that the relative nontradables price is, in fact, closely linked to the real exchange rate, and it is also systematically related to the occurrence of sudden stops.

This paper has two objectives. The first is to conduct a variance analysis to determine the contribution of fluctuations in domestic prices of nontradable goods relative to tradable goods, vis-à-vis fluctuations in exchange-rate-adjusted relative prices of tradable goods, for explaining the variability of the real exchange rate of the Mexican peso against the U.S. dollar. The results show that Mexico’s nontradables prices display high variability and account for a significant fraction of real exchange rate variability in periods of managed exchange rates. In light of these results, the second objective of the paper is to show that a financial accelerator mechanism at work in economies with liability dollarization and credit constraints produces amplification and asymmetry in the responses of the price of nontradables, the real exchange rate, consumption, and the current account to exogenous shocks. In particular, the model predicts that sudden policy-induced changes in relative prices, analogous to those induced by the collapse of managed exchange rate regimes, can set in motion this financial accelerator mechanism. Economies with managed exchange rates can thus display high real exchange rate volatility driven by the relative price of nontradables, because of the effects of liability dollarization in credit-constrained economies.

The variance analysis is based on a sample of monthly data for the 1969–2000 period. The results replicate Engel’s findings for a subsample that

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matches his sample. The same holds for the full sample and for all subsample periods in which Mexico did not follow an explicit policy of exchange rate management. The results are markedly different in periods in which Mexico managed its exchange rate, including episodes with a fixed exchange rate or crawling pegs. In these episodes, the fraction of real exchange rate variability accounted for by movements of tradable goods prices and the nominal exchange rate falls sharply and varies widely with the time horizon of the variance ratios.

Movements in Mexico’s relative nontradables prices can account for up to 70 percent of the variance of the real exchange rate. In short, whenever Mexico managed its exchange rate, the country experienced high real exchange rate variability, but movements in the price of nontradable goods contributed significantly to explaining it.

The Mexican data also fail to reproduce two other key findings of Engel’s work. In addition to the overwhelming role of tradable goods prices in explaining real exchange rates, Engel finds, first, that covariances across domestic relative nontradables prices and cross-country relative tradables prices tend to be generally positive or negligible and, second, that variance ratios corrected to take these covariances into account generally do not change results derived using approximate variance ratios that ignore them. Contrary to these findings, the correlation between domestic relative nontradables prices and international relative tradables prices is sharply negative in periods in which Mexico had a managed exchange rate. The standard deviation of Mexico’s domestic relative prices is also markedly higher during these periods. As a result, measures of the contribution of tradable goods prices to real exchange rate variability that are corrected to take these features of the data into account are significantly lower than those that do not.

Recent cross-country empirical studies provide further time-series and cross-sectional evidence indicating that the relative price of nontradables explains a significantly higher fraction of real exchange rate variability under managed exchange rates than under more flexible arrangements. Naknoi constructs a large data set covering thirty-five countries and nearly 600 pairs of bilateral real exchange rates. She finds that Engel’s result holds for many of these pairs, but she also finds many cases for which it does not, including some in which the relative price of nontradables accounts for about 50 percent of real exchange rate variability. She also reports that the variability of

the relative price of nontradables rises as that of the nominal exchange rate falls; in some cases, it exceeds the variability of exchange-rate-adjusted relative prices of tradable goods. Parsley examines the cross-paired and U.S.-dollar-based real exchange rates of six countries of Southeast Asia using monthly data.\(^9\) He finds that in subsamples with managed exchange rates for Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand, the relative price of nontradables could explain up to 50 percent of the real exchange rate variability. All these findings are related to the works of Mussa and of Baxter and Stockman, which show that the variability of the real exchange rate is higher under flexible exchange rate regimes than under managed exchange rate regimes, although they do not decompose this variability in terms of the contributions of the relative prices of tradables versus nontradables.\(^10\)

A common approach followed in the international macroeconomics literature is to take the above empirical evidence as an indication of the existence of nominal rigidities affecting price or wage setting. This approach is the focus of extensive research examining the interaction of nominal rigidities with alternative pricing arrangements (such as pricing to market and local versus foreign currency invoicing) and with different industrial organization arrangements (such as endogenous tradability). Unfortunately, the ability of these models to explain the variability of real exchange rates, even among country pairs for which the dominant view holds, is limited. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan find that models with nominal rigidities cannot explain the variability of real exchange rates in industrial countries unless the models adopt separable preferences in leisure and values that are at odds with empirical evidence for the coefficients of relative risk aversion and capital adjustment costs and for the periodicity of staggered price adjustments.\(^11\) Moreover, the conclusion that nominal rigidities must be at work does not follow from the observation that under managed exchange rates the behavior of the real exchange rate is more closely linked to that of the price of nontradables. Theoretical analysis shows that the equilibria obtained for monetary economies under alternative exchange rate regimes, with or without nominal rigidities, can be reproduced in monetary economies with flexible prices with appropriate combinations of tax-equivalent distortions on consumption and factor incomes.\(^12\)

\(^9\) Parsley (2003).
\(^10\) Mussa (1986); Baxter and Stockman (1989).
\(^12\) See Adão, Correia, and Teles (2005); Coleman (1996); Mendoza (2001); Mendoza and Uribe (2000).
Instead of emphasizing the role of nominal rigidities, this paper uses a simple nonmonetary model of endogenous credit constraints with liability dollarization to illustrate how a strong amplification mechanism driven by a variant of Fisher’s debt-deflation process can induce high variability in the nontradables price and the real exchange rate in response to exogenous shocks. In particular, policy-induced shocks to relative prices akin to those triggered by a currency devaluation can set in motion this amplification mechanism. The financial accelerator that amplifies the responses of consumption, the current account, and the price of nontradables to shocks of usual magnitudes combines a standard balance sheet effect (because of the mismatch between the units in which debt is denominated and the units in which some of this debt is leveraged) with Fisher’s debt-deflation process: an initial fall in the price of nontradables triggered by an exogenous shock tightens further credit constraints, leading to a downward spiral in access to debt and the price of nontradables.

A set of basic numerical experiments suggests that the quantitative implications of this financial accelerator are significant. Fisher’s debt-deflation process is a powerful vehicle for inducing amplification and asymmetry in the economy’s responses to exogenous shocks (particularly to changes in taxes that approximate the relative price effects of changes in the rate of currency devaluation). The magnitude of the effects that Fisher’s deflation has on the nontradables price, the real exchange rate, and the current account dwarf those that result from the standard balance sheet effect that is widely studied in the sudden stop literature. In this way, the model can simultaneously account for high variability of the real exchange rate and key features of the sudden stop phenomenon as the result of (endogenous) high variability of the relative price of nontradables.

The model is analogous to the models with liquidity-constrained consumers of the closed-economy macroeconomic literature and to the dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium models reviewed by Arellano and Mendoza. The setup provided in this paper is simpler in order to focus the analysis on the amplification mechanism linking sudden stops and real exchange rate movements driven by the relative price of nontradables.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section conducts the variance analysis of the Mexico-U.S. real exchange rate. The paper then develops the model of liability dollarization with financial frictions in which “excess volatility” of the real exchange rate is caused by fluctuations in the relative prices of nontradables.

price of nontradables. The closing section presents conclusions and policy implications.

**Variance Analysis of the Peso-Dollar Real Exchange Rate**

This section presents the results of a variance analysis that closely follows the methodology applied by Engel. The analysis uses non-seasonally-adjusted monthly observations of the consumer price index (CPI) and some of its components for Mexico (MX) and the United States (US) over the period January 1969 to February 2000. Mexican data are from the Bank of Mexico’s website; those for the United States are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data for three price indexes were collected for each country: the aggregate CPI ($P_i$ for $i = MX, US$), the consumer price indexes for durable goods ($PD_i$ for $i = MX, US$), and the one for services ($PS_i$ for $i = MX, US$). The data set also includes the nominal exchange rate series for the monthly average exchange rate of Mexican pesos per U.S. dollar ($E$), as reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its *International Financial Statistics*. The real exchange rate was generated following the IMF convention: $RER = P_{MX} / (EP_{US})$. The data were transformed into logs, with logged variables written in lowercase letters.

Durable goods are treated as tradable goods, and services are treated as nontradable goods. This definition is in line with standard treatment in empirical studies of real exchange rates. It is also roughly consistent with a sectoral classification of Mexican data based on a definition of tradable goods as pertaining to sectors in which the ratio of total trade to gross output exceeds 5 percent.

Simple algebraic manipulation of the definition of the real exchange rate yields this expression: $rer_t = x_t + y_t$. The variable $x_t$ is the log of the exchange-rate-adjusted price ratio of tradables across Mexico and the United States: $x_t = pd_{t, MX} - e_t - pd_{t, US}$. (This is the negative of Engel’s measure because the real exchange rate is defined here using the IMF’s definition.) If the strong assumptions needed for the law of one price to hold in this context were satisfied, $x_t$ should be a constant that does not contribute to explaining variations in $rer_t$. The variable $y_t$ includes the terms that reflect domestic prices of non-

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tradables relative to tradables in each country: 

\[ y_t = b_t^{MX}(p_s^{MX} - p_d^{MX}) - b_t^{US}(p_s^{US} - p_d^{US}) \]

where \( b_t^{MX} \) and \( b_t^{US} \) are the (potentially time-varying) weights of nontradables in each country’s CPI. The logs of the relative prices of nontradables are therefore \( \ln(p_{nt}^{MX}) / \ln(p_{st}^{MX} - p_{dt}^{MX}) \) and \( \ln(p_{nt}^{US}) / \ln(p_{st}^{US} - p_{dt}^{US}) \).

Figure 1 summarizes the results of the variance analysis of the peso-dollar real exchange rate. The figure is based on an earlier paper, which reports detailed results not only for the variance ratios for the real exchange rate, but also for the standard deviations and correlations of \( rer, y, x, pn^MX, \) and \( pn^US \). As argued below, changes in these moments are useful for explaining the changes in the results of the variance analysis across fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. The discussion of the results below refers to the changes in the relevant moments, although the earlier paper provides the complete set of moments.

Each panel in figure 1 shows curves for five different sample periods: the full sample; the sample studied by Engel, which he retrieved from Datastream for the period September 1991 to August 1999; a sample that includes only data for the post-1994 floating exchange rate; a fixed exchange rate sample covering January 1969 to July 1976; and a sample covering the managed exchange rate regime that anchored the stabilization plan known as El Pacto (March 1988 to November 1994). This last sample includes an initial one-year period with a fixed exchange rate followed by a crawling peg within a narrow band (the boundaries of which were revised occasionally).

Each of the four panels shows results for an alternative measure of the variance ratio that quantifies the fraction of real exchange rate variability explained by \( x_t \) (that is, the relative price of tradables). The ratios are plotted as functions of the time frequency over which the data were differenced (one month, six months, twelve months, twenty-four months, and, for samples with sufficient observations, seventy-two months). The plots show results for four variance ratios. The first is Engel’s basic ratio, \( \sigma^2(x_t) / \sigma^2(rer_t) \). In general, \( \sigma^2(rer_t) = \sigma^2(x_t) + \sigma^2(y_t) + 2 \text{cov}(x_t, y_t) \), where \( \text{cov}(x_t, y_t) \) is the covariance between \( x_t \) and \( y_t \), so this basic ratio is accurate only when \( x_t \) and \( y_t \) are independent random variables—that is, when \( \text{cov}(x_t, y_t) = 0 \). Engel therefore computes the following second and third ratios as alternatives that adjust for covariance terms.

The second ratio, then, is referred to as the independent variables ratio, \( \sigma^2(x) / [\sigma^2(rer) - \text{cov}(x, y)] \), which deducts from the variance of \( rer \) in the denominator of the variance ratio the effect of \( \text{cov}(x, y) \). The third is labeled the half covariance ratio, \( [\sigma^2(x) + \text{cov}(x, y)] / \sigma^2(rer) \), which measures the contribution of \( x \) to the variability of \( rer \) by assigning to \( x \) half of the effect of \( \text{cov}(x, y) \) on the variance of \( rer \). This half covariance ratio can be written as the product of the basic ratio multiplied by \( 1 + \rho(x, y) [\sigma(y) / \sigma(x)] \), where \( \rho(x, y) \) is the correlation between \( x \) and \( y \). Consequently, the basic ratio approximates well the half covariance ratio if \( \rho(x, y) \) is low or the standard
deviation of $x$ is large relative to that of $y$ (or both). Finally, a fourth ratio is the nontradables weighted covariance ratio, which controls only for the covariance between $x$ and the domestic relative price of nontradables in Mexico by rewriting the variance ratio as $[\sigma^2(x) / \sigma^2(rer)] \{1 + \rho(x, pn^{MX}) [b^{MX} \sigma(pn^{MX}) / \sigma(x)]\}$. The basic ratio accurately approximates this fourth variance ratio when the correlation between $x$ and $pn^{MX}$ is low or the standard deviation of $x$ is large relative to that of $pn^{MX}$ (or both).

The motivation for the fourth ratio follows from the fact that while the half covariance ratio aims to correct for the variance of $rer$ that is due to the covariance of $x$ and $y$, it is silent about the contributions of the various elements that make up $y$ itself. The latter can be important because $y$ captures the combined changes in domestic relative prices of nontradables in Mexico and the United States, as well as the recurrent revisions to the weights used in each country’s CPI (which take place at different intervals in each country). Moreover, since the aggregate CPIs include nondurables, in addition to durables and services, $y$ also captures the effects of cross-country differences in the prices of non-durables relative to durables. Computing an exact variance ratio that decomposes all of these effects requires controlling for the full variance-covariance matrix of $y$, $x$, $pn^{MX}$, $pn^{US}$, $b^{MX}$ and $b^N$. Since data to calculate this matrix are not available, the nontradables weighted covariance ratio is used as a proxy that isolates the effect of the covariance between $pn^{MX}$ and $rer$. The complement (that is, 1 minus the fourth variance ratio) is a good measure of the contribution of Mexico’s relative price of nontradables to the variance of the real exchange rate to the extent that movements in the CPI weights play a minor role and the correlation between $pn^{MX}$ and $pn^{US}$ is low or the variance of $pn^{MX}$ largely exceeds that of $pn^{US}$.

The potential importance of covariance terms in the calculation of a variance ratio, and hence the need to consider alternative definitions of this ratio, is a classic problem in variance analysis. Engel considers this issue carefully in his work on industrial country real exchange rates and on the peso-dollar real exchange rate, and he concludes that it could be set aside safely. As shown below, however, the features of the data that support this conclusion are not present in the data for Mexico’s managed exchange rates. The variance ratios that control for covariance effects therefore play a crucial role in this case. Engel argues that in the case of the components of the real exchange rate of

22. Computing this variance ratio requires an estimate for a constant value of $b^{MX}$, which was determined using 1994 weights from the Mexican CPI, extracted from a methodological note provided by the Bank of Mexico ($b^{MX} = 0.6$).
the United States vis-à-vis industrial countries, "comovements between \( x \) and \( y \) are insignificant in all cases, except when we use the aggregate PPI [producer price index] as the traded goods price index."\(^{23}\) Engel later notes that the basic ratio "tends to underestimate the importance of \( x \) as long as the covariance term (between \( x \) and \( y \)) is positive (which it is at most short horizons), but any alternative treatment of the covariance has very little effect on the measured relative importance of the \( x \) component."\(^{24}\) Under these conditions, the basic ratio either is very accurate—if \( \rho(x, y) \) is low—or, in the worst-case scenario, represents a lower bound for the true variance ratio—if \( \rho(x, y) \) is positive. In either case, a high ratio \( \sigma^2(x) / \sigma^2(rer) \) indicates correctly that real exchange rate fluctuations are mostly explained by movements in tradable goods prices and in the nominal exchange rate.

The results shown in the four panels of figure 1 for the full sample period are firmly in line with Engel’s findings, except in the very long horizon of seventy-two months. At frequencies of twenty-four months or less, the basic ratio always exceeds 0.94, and using any of the other ratios to correct for covariances across \( x \) and \( y \), or across \( x \) and \( pn^{MX} \), makes no difference. These results reflect the facts that for the full sample, the correlations between \( x \) and \( y \) and between \( x \) and \( pn^{MX} \) are always close to zero, and the standard deviation of \( x \) is 3.5 to 3.7 times larger than that of \( y \) and 2.9 to 3.7 times larger than that of \( pn^{MX} \).\(^{25}\) Covariances of \( x \) with \( pn^{US} \) are also irrelevant because the correlations between these variables are generally negligible and the standard deviations of \( pn^{US} \) are all small. The correlations between \( pn^{MX} \) and \( pn^{US} \) are also negligible.

A very similar picture emerges for Engel’s sample and for the post-1994 floating period.\(^{26}\) The one notable difference is that frequencies higher than one month display marked negative correlations between \( x \) and \( pn^{US} \) and between \( pn^{MX} \) and \( pn^{US} \). These correlations could, in principle, add to the contribution of domestic relative price variations in explaining the variance of \( rer \). They can be safely ignored, however, because the standard deviation of \( x \) dwarfs those of \( pn^{US} \) and \( pn^{MX} \) at all time horizons, and the latter still have to be reduced by the fractions \( b^{MX} \) and \( b^{US} \), respectively. In summary, in periods in which the Mexican peso is floating, the variability of exchange-rate-adjusted tradable goods prices is so much larger than that of relative non-tradables prices that covariance adjustments cannot alter the result that the

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25. See Mendoza (2000, table 1) for details.
relative price of nontradables is of little consequence for movements in the real exchange rate.

The picture that emerges from Mexico’s managed exchange rate regimes is very different. For both the fixed rate sample and the sample for El Pacto, the basic ratio is very high and often exceeds 1, indicating the presence of large covariance terms. The other three variance ratios show dramatic reductions in the share of real exchange rate variability attributable to $x$ compared with the results for periods without exchange rate management. For instance, the half covariance ratio for the fixed exchange rate sample shows that the contribution of $x$ to the variability of the real exchange rate reaches a minimum of 0.29 at the six-month frequency and remains low at around 0.36 at the twelve- and twenty-four-month frequencies. The nontradables weighted ratio, which corrects for the covariance between $x$ and $pn^{MX}$, is below 0.61 at frequencies higher than one month. In the sample for El Pacto, the independent variables and half covariance ratios indicate that the contribution of $x$ to the variability of the real exchange rate is below 0.60 at all frequencies (except for the half covariance ratio at the twelve-month frequency, in which case it increases to 0.70). Using the nontradables weighted ratio and considering only the covariance between $x$ and $pn^{MX}$, the variance of $rer$ attributable to $x$ reaches a lower bound of 0.55 at the one-month frequency (although it increases sharply at the twenty-four-month frequency before declining again at the seventy-two-month frequency).

These striking differences in the outcome of the variance analysis for periods of exchange rate management reflect two critical changes. First, the standard deviations of the Mexican relative price of nontradables and the composite variable $y$ increase significantly relative to the standard deviations of $x$; the ratios of the standard deviation of $x$ to that of $y$ now range between 0.7 and 1.2. Second, the correlations between $x$ and $y$ and between $x$ and $pn^{MX}$ fall sharply and become markedly negative (approaching $-0.6$ in most cases).

Comparing periods of managed and floating exchange rates reveals two additional features. First, the correlation between $x$ and $rer$ is much lower in the former than in the latter: the correlation between $x$ and $rer$ is almost 1.00 at all time horizons in periods of floating exchange rates, while it ranges between 0.29 and 0.70 in the samples of managed exchange rates. Second, some of the managed exchange rate scenarios, particularly the twelve- and twenty-four-month horizons of the El Pacto sample, yield a positive correlation between the relative prices of nontradable goods in Mexico and the United States, which can be as high as 0.32. This second result actually reduces the share of fluctuations in $rer$ that can be accounted for by $y$. Because
the U.S. and Mexican relative prices of nontradable goods are likely to increase together, differences in these domestic relative prices across countries tend to offset each other, and hence they are not highly important for real exchange rate fluctuations.

The only feature of the statistical moments of the data examined here that is robust to changes in the exchange rate regime is the fact that the variability of relative nontradables prices in Mexico always exceeds that of the United States by a large margin. For the full (El Pacto) sample, the ratio of the standard deviation of $p_{t}^{MX}$ to that of $p_{t}^{US}$ ranges from 3.7 (3.4) at the one-month frequency to 4.9 (7.1) at the twenty-four-month frequency. However, Mexico’s relative nontradables prices tend to be more volatile under a currency peg than a float. The ratio of the standard deviation of $p_{t}^{MX}$ for the El Pacto sample to that for the post-1994 floating period doubles from 1 at the one-month frequency to about 2 at the twenty-four-month frequency. The higher volatility of the relative price of nontradables in Mexico than in the United States, and under a managed versus a floating exchange rate regime, is a significant feature of the data that helps explain why the nontradables price accounts for a nontrivial fraction of the variability of Mexico’s real exchange rate in periods of exchange rate management.

**Sudden Stops and Nontradables-Driven Real Exchange Rate Volatility**

The previous section showed that in periods in which Mexico managed its exchange rate, the relative nontradables price accounted for a significant fraction of the high variability of the real exchange rate. This evidence raises the question of whether analysts should be concerned about volatility of the real exchange rate driven by nontradable goods prices. This section argues that this issue is, in fact, a concern. The main argument is that in economies that suffer from liability dollarization, the sudden stop phenomenon and the high variability of the real exchange rate may both be the result of high volatility in nontradables prices. To support this argument, the section examines a simple model in which endogenous credit constraints and liability dollarization produce a financial accelerator mechanism that amplifies the responses of consumption, the current account, the price of nontradables, and the real exchange rate to exogenous shocks.

Credit frictions and liability dollarization are widely studied in the sudden stop literature. The goal here is to provide a basic framework that highlights how balance sheet effects and Fisher’s deflation process interact to trigger
high volatility of the real exchange rate and sudden stops. The mechanism is similar to those explored by Arellano and Mendoza.\textsuperscript{27}

Consider a conventional nonstochastic intertemporal equilibrium setup of a two-sector, representative-agent, small open economy with endowments of tradables ($y_t^T$) and nontradables ($y_t^N$). The households in this economy solve the following problem:

\begin{equation}
\max_{[c_t^T, c_t^N, b_{i+1}^T]} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^i u \left( c_t^T, c_t^N \right),
\end{equation}

subject to:

\begin{align}
&c_t^T + \left( 1 + \tau_t \right) p_t^N c_t^N = y_t^T + p_t^N y_t^N - b_{i+1} + b_t R + T_t \quad \text{and} \\
&b_{i+1} \geq -\kappa \left( y_t^T + p_t^N y_t^N \right) \geq -\Omega.
\end{align}

Utility is defined in terms of a composite good, $c$, that depends on consumption of tradables ($c_t^T$) and nontradables ($c_t^N$). This composite good takes the form of a standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, and the utility function, $u(\cdot)$, is a standard increasing, twice continuously differentiable, and concave utility function. Since $c$ is a CES aggregator, the marginal rate of substitution between nontradables and tradables satisfies

$$
\frac{c_2 \left( c_t^T, c_t^N \right)}{c_1 \left( c_t^T, c_t^N \right)} = \Phi \left( \frac{c_t^T}{c_t^N} \right),
$$

where $\Phi$ is an increasing, strictly convex function of the ratio $c_t^T/c_t^N$. The price of tradables is determined in competitive world markets and normalized to unity without loss of generality; $p_t^N$ denotes the price of nontradable goods relative to tradables.

As is evident from the budget constraint in equation 2, international debt contracts are denominated in units of tradable goods, so this economy features liability dollarization. The only asset traded with the rest of the world is a one-period bond that pays a constant gross real interest rate of $R$, in units of tradables.

\textsuperscript{27} Arellano and Mendoza (2003); Mendoza (2002).
World credit markets are imperfect. In particular, constraint 3 states that foreign creditors limit their lending to the small open economy so as to satisfy a liquidity constraint up to a debt ceiling. The liquidity constraint limits debt to a fraction, $\kappa$, of the value of the economy’s current income in units of tradables. The debt ceiling requires that the debt allowed by the liquidity constraint not exceed a maximum level, $\Omega$. This maximum debt helps rule out perverse equilibria in which agents could satisfy the liquidity constraint by running very large debts to finance high levels of tradables consumption and prop up the price of nontradables.

The above credit constraints can result from informational frictions or institutional weaknesses affecting credit relationships (such as monitoring costs, limited enforcement, and costly information). For simplicity, the contracting environment that yields the constraints is not part of the model, but rather the credit constraints are taken as given to focus on their implications for equilibrium allocations and prices. Setting credit limits in terms of the debt-income ratio, as in equation 3, is common practice in actual credit markets, particularly in household mortgage and consumer loans.

The government imposes a tax, $\tau$, on private consumption of nontradable goods. This approximates some of the effects that a change in the currency’s depreciation rate would have in a monetary model in which money economizes transaction costs or enters in the utility function. The government also maintains time-invariant levels of unproductive government expenditures in tradables and nontradables ($g_T$ and $g_N$, respectively), and it is assumed to run a balanced budget policy for simplicity. Hence, any movements in the primary fiscal balance stemming from either exogenous policy changes in the tax rate or endogenous movements in the price of nontradables are offset via lump-sum rebates or taxes, $T_t$. The government’s budget constraint is therefore

$$\tau_c^T p_N^c = \bar{g}_T + p_N^c \bar{g}_N + T_t.$$  

A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of allocations $[c_t^T, c_t^N, T_t, b_{t+1}]$ and prices $[p_N^c]$ such that (a) the allocations represent a solution to the households’ problem, taking the price of nontradables, the tax rate, 

28. See Mendoza (2001). Adão, Correia, and Teles (2005), Coleman (1996), and Mendoza and Uribe (2000) provide other examples in which the equilibria of monetary economies with alternative exchange rate regimes, and with or without nominal rigidities, can be reproduced in nonmonetary economies with appropriate combinations of tax-equivalent distortions.
and government transfers as given; (b) the sequence of transfers satisfies the
government budget constraint given the tax policy, government expenditures, private consumption of nontradables, and the relative price of nontradables; and (c) the following market-clearing condition in the nontradables sector holds:

\[(5) \quad c^N_t + \bar{g}^N_t = y^N_t.\]

Given equations 2, 4, and 5, the resource constraint in the tradables sector is

\[(6) \quad c^T_t + \bar{g}_t = y^T_t - b_{t+1} + Rb_t.\]

In the economy described by equations 1 through 6, the responses of consumption, the current account, the real exchange rate, and the price of nontradables to exogenous shocks exhibit endogenous amplification via a financial accelerator mechanism when the credit constraints bind. This mechanism operates via a balance sheet effect and Fisher’s deflation, which are triggered by movements in the relative price of nontradables. Other studies examine the quantitative implications of more sophisticated variants of this model, incorporating uncertainty, incomplete financial markets, and labor demand and supply decisions in the nontradables sector. This paper focuses only on the key aspects of the economic intuition behind the model’s financial accelerator.

**Equilibrium When the Credit Constraints Never Bind: Perfectly Smooth Consumption**

Consider first a scenario in which the credit constraints never bind. In this case, the model yields an equilibrium identical to what would be obtained with perfect credit markets. The economy borrows or lends at the world-determined interest rate with no other limitation than the standard no-Ponzi-game condition, which requires that the present value of tradable goods absorption equals the tradables sector’s wealth. The latter is composed of nonfinancial wealth \((W_0)\) and financial wealth \((Rb_0)\), so that the economy faces this intertemporal budget constraint:

\[(7) \quad \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} R^{-t} c^T_t = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} R^{-t} \left( y^T_t - \bar{g}^T_t \right) + Rb_0 = W_0 - \left( \frac{R}{R-1} \right) \bar{g}^T + Rb_0.\]

29. See Mendoza (2002).
Next the model adopts a set of assumptions that imply that when the credit frictions never bind, the equilibrium reduces to a textbook case of perfectly smooth consumption. In particular, assume that the economy satisfies the traditional stationarity condition, $\beta R = 1$, and that the nontradables output is time invariant ($y^N_t = \bar{y}^N$ for all $t$). It follows from equation 5 and the standard Euler equation for tradables consumption that $c^T_t = \bar{c}^T$ for all $t$. The intertemporal constraint in equation 7 then implies that the equilibrium sequence of tradables consumption is perfectly smooth at this level:

$$c^r_t = (1 - \beta)(W_0 + Rh_0) - \bar{g}^r.$$ 

The optimality condition that equates the marginal rate of substitution in tradables and nontradables consumption with the after-tax relative price of nontradables further implies that the equilibrium price of nontradables is

$$p^N_t = \bar{p}^N_t = \frac{c_2(\bar{c}^T, \bar{y}^N - \bar{g}^N)}{c_1(\bar{c}^T, \bar{y}^N - \bar{g}^N)}(1 + \tau_t)^{-1} = \Phi\left(\frac{\bar{c}^T}{\bar{y}^N - \bar{g}^N}\right)(1 + \tau_t)^{-1}.$$ 

Since tradables consumption is perfectly smooth and both the endowment and government consumption of nontradables are time-invariant by assumption, equation 9 states that any variations in the relative price of nontradables result only from government-induced variations in the tax on nontradables consumption. Tax policy is neutral in the sense that variations in the tax alter the price of nontradables but not consumption allocations or the current account. Thus, if credit constraints never bind, tax-induced real devaluations are neutral (that is, changes in the exchange rate regime make no difference for the behavior of the real exchange rate).

As long as the credit constraints do not bind, the results in equations 8 and 9 hold for any time-varying, deterministic, nonnegative stream of tradables endowments. To compare this perfectly smooth equilibrium with the equilibrium of the economy with binding credit constraints, consider a particular stream of tradables income that provides an incentive for the economy to borrow at date 0. Using standard concepts from the permanent income theory of consumption, define an arbitrary time-varying sequence of tradables endowments as an equivalent sequence with a time-invariant endowment (or permanent income). Hence, the level of nonfinancial wealth in equation 7 satisfies $\bar{y}^T = (1 - \beta)W_0$, where $\bar{y}^T$ is the time-invariant tradables endowment that yields the same present value of tradables income (that is, the same wealth) as a
given time-varying sequence paid to households. Then define a wealth-neutral shock to tradables income at date 0 as a change in the endowment at date 0 offset by a change in the endowment at date 1, which keeps the present value of the two constant (leaving the rest of the sequence of tradables income in $W_0$ unchanged). Thus, wealth-neutral shocks to income at date 0 satisfy the following:

\[ y^*_T - \bar{y}^* = \beta \cdot (\bar{y}^* - y^*_0). \]  

(10)

Condition 10 states that, if the endowment at date 0 falls below permanent income, the endowment at date 1 increases above permanent income by enough to keep the present value constant. For any $0 < y^*_0 < \bar{y}^* < y^*_1$ that satisfies condition 10 and for which the credit constraints do not bind, the economy maintains the perfectly smooth equilibrium with these results:

\[ \bar{c}^T = (1 - \beta)(W_0 + Rb_0) - \bar{g}^T; \]

(11)

\[ \bar{p}^N_t = \Phi \left( \frac{\bar{c}^T}{\bar{y}^N - \bar{g}^N} \right) \left( 1 + \tau_t \right)^{-1}; \]

\[ b_1 - b_0 = y^*_0 - \bar{y}, \quad b_2 - b_1 = -(b_1 - b_0), \quad b_1 = b_0 \text{ for } t \geq 2. \]

Hence, consumption allocations and the price of nontradables remain at their first-best levels, and the current account deficit at date 0 equals the current account surplus at date 1. The economy thus reduces asset holdings below $b_0$ at date 0 (that is, the economy borrows) and returns to its initial asset position at date 1. Policy-induced real devaluations of the currency are still neutral with respect to all of these outcomes.

**The Economy with Binding Credit Constraints**

Now consider unanticipated, wealth-neutral shocks to $y^*_0$ that satisfy condition 10. If the shock to $y^*_0$ is not large enough to trigger the credit constraints, the solutions obtained in equation 11 still hold. The liquidity constraint binds, however, if the shock lowers $y^*_0$ to a point at or below a critical level. This critical level is given by the following:

\[ \hat{y}^* = \frac{\bar{y}^* - b_0 - \kappa \bar{p}^N_t \bar{y}^N}{1 + \kappa}. \]

(12)
Since only positive endowments are possible, condition 12 also implies an upper bound for $\kappa$:

$$\kappa < \kappa^k = \frac{1 - \left(\frac{b_0}{\bar{y}T} \right)}{\left(\bar{p}_0^N \bar{y}^N \right)/\bar{y}T}.$$ 

If $\kappa$ exceeds this critical value, the model allows for enough debt so that the liquidity constraint never binds for any positive value of $y_0^T$. There is also a lower bound for $\kappa$, and this is the level at which satisfying the liquidity constraint would make tradables consumption and the nontradables price fall to zero:

$$\kappa < \kappa' = \frac{\bar{g}T - \bar{y}_0^T - Rb_0}{y_0^T}.$$ 

A critical observation about the result in equation 12 is that for a given wealth-neutral pair $(y_0^T, y_1^T)$, a sufficiently large and unanticipated tax increase at date 0 (that is, a policy-induced real depreciation) can also move the economy below the critical level of tradables income. This triggers the credit constraints, because it lowers the price of nontradables and the value of the nontradables endowment. Since this affects the equilibrium outcomes of consumption, the current account, the price of nontradables, and the real exchange rate, a policy-induced real depreciation of the currency is no longer neutral once the credit constraints bind. Now alternative policy regimes yield very different outcomes for real exchange rate behavior.

For simplicity, assume a debt ceiling set at $\Omega = -\bar{b}_1$. Shocks that put $y_0^T$ below its critical level trigger the liquidity constraint, and equilibrium allocations and prices for date 0 are then

$$c_0^T = y_0^T - \bar{g}T + \kappa(y_0^T + p_0^N \bar{y}^N) + Rb_0;$$

$$p_0^T = \Phi\left(-\frac{c_0^T}{\bar{y}^N - \bar{g}N}\right)\left(1 + \tau_0\right)^{-1};$$

$$b_1 - b_0 = -\kappa(y_0^T + p_0^N \bar{y}^N) - b_0 > \Omega - b_0.$$ 

Since $b_1 = -\kappa(y_0^T + p_0^N \bar{y}^N) > \bar{b}_1$, it is clearly the case that $c_0^T < \bar{c}T$, $p_0^N < \bar{p}N$, and $b_1 - b_0 > \bar{b}_1 - b_0$. Thus, when the credit constraint binds, tradables consumption and the price of nontradables are lower than in the perfectly smooth
case, whereas the current account is higher. In other words, the economy’s response to a shock that puts the tradables endowment below the critical level involves a sudden stop—a drop in tradables consumption, a real depreciation, and a current account reversal.

The above argument is similar to Calvo’s: if the country cannot borrow, tradables consumption falls; this lowers the price of nontradables, which validates the country’s reduced borrowing ability via a balance sheet effect and the liability dollarization feature of the credit constraint.30 The difference with Calvo’s setup is that the equilibrium characterized by conditions 13 through 15 also features Fisher’s debt-deflation mechanism.

Fisher’s deflation amplifies the responses of quantities and prices. In particular, tradables consumption and the nontradables price at date 0 are determined by solving the two-equation system formed by equations 13 and 14. Equation 13 shows that tradables consumption depends on the nontradables price when the credit constraint binds because of liability dollarization: changes in the value of the nontradables endowment affect agents’ ability to borrow in tradables-denominated debt. Equation 14 shows that the price of nontradables depends on the consumption of tradables via the standard optimality condition for sectoral consumption allocations. Fisher’s deflation then occurs because the price of nontradables falls with tradables consumption; this drop in price tightens the credit constraint, which makes tradables consumption fall further, which in turn makes the price of nontradables fall further.

Figure 2 illustrates the determination of the equilibrium at date 0 when Fisher’s deflation process is at work. The vertical line, TT, represents the perfectly smooth tradables consumption allocation, which is independent of the price of nontradables. The PP curve represents the optimality condition for sectoral consumption allocations; this condition equates the marginal rate of substitution between tradables and nontradables with the corresponding after-tax relative price (that is, equation 14). Since the consumption aggregator is CES and nontradables consumption is constant at $\frac{N}{N} - \frac{g}{N}$, PP is an increasing, convex function of tradables consumption. TT and PP intersect at the equilibrium price of the perfectly smooth consumption case (point A).

The SS line represents equation 13, which is the tradables resource constraint when the liquidity constraint binds. SS is an upward-sloping, linear function of tradables consumption, with a slope of $1/\kappa \tilde{y}^N$. Since the horizontal intercept of SS is $Rb_0 - \tilde{g}^T + (1 + \kappa)y_T^T$, SS shifts to the left as $y_T^T$ falls. In

Consider a wealth-neutral shock to the tradables endowment at date 0 such that \( y^T_0 < \hat{y}^T \). The SS curve shifts to SS’, and the new equilibrium is determined at point D. If prices did not respond to the drop in consumption, or if the borrowing constraint were set as a fixed amount independent of income and prices, the new equilibrium would be at point B. At B, however, tradables consumption is lower than in the perfectly smooth case, so equilibrium requires the price of nontradables to fall. If the credit constraint were independent of the nontradables price (as, for example, in Calvo’s setup), the new equilibrium would be at point C, with a lower nontradables price and lower tradables consumption.\(^{31}\) This outcome reflects the balance sheet effect induced by liability

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dollarization, but Fisher’s deflation has not yet been taken into account. The lower price at C on the PP line reduces the value of the nontradables endowment, which tightens the liquidity constraint and forces tradables consumption to fall so as to satisfy the constraint at a point on SS’. At that point, the nontradables price must fall again to regain a point along PP, but at that point, tradables consumption also falls again because the credit constraint tightens further. Fisher’s debt-deflation process continues until it converges to point D, where the liquidity constraint is satisfied for a nontradables price and a level of tradables consumption that are consistent with the equilibrium condition for sectoral consumption allocations. In short, the response to the tradables endowment shock, which would be at point A for any shock that satisfies $y^T_0 \geq \hat{y}^T$, is amplified to point D because of the combined effects of the balance sheet effect and Fisher’s deflation.

The above results also apply to the case in which there is no shock to the tradables endowment, but the government increases $\tau_0$ by enough to generate a drop in $p^N_0$ that puts $\hat{y}^T$ above $y^T_0$. In this case, a policy change that may be intended to yield a small real depreciation of the currency can trigger the credit constraint, resulting in a large current account reversal and a collapse in tradables consumption, the price of nontradables, and the real exchange rate. The policy neutrality of the perfectly smooth case no longer holds.

One caveat of this analysis is that for a low enough $y^T_0$, the economy would not be able to borrow at the competitive equilibrium. This occurs when $y^T_0$ is so low that the level of debt that satisfies the liquidity constraint exceeds $\Omega$ (or, in this case, the debt that would be contracted in the perfectly smooth equilibrium). Setting debt at this debt ceiling would imply a nontradables price at which the liquidity constraint is violated, while the debt level that satisfies equations 13 and 14, so that the liquidity constraint holds, would violate the debt ceiling. At corners like these, debt is set to zero and the economy is in financial autarky. The remainder of this paper concentrates on situations in which shocks result in values of $y^T_0 \leq \hat{y}^T$, such that there are internal solutions with debt (that is, solutions for which $\Omega$ is not binding).

Further analysis of figure 2 raises questions about the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium with Fisher’s deflation, depending on assumptions about the position and slope of the SS line and the curvature of the PP curve. The model produces results that shed light on this issue, but they are highly dependent on the simplicity of the setup, which is aimed at deriving tractable analytical results to illustrate the effects of Fisher’s deflation. The following results regarding the conditions that can produce or rule out multiple equilibria should be considered with caution, as they may not be robust to important
extensions of the model (such as including uncertainty, capital accumulation, or a labor market).

Figure 2 suggests that a sufficiency condition to ensure a unique equilibrium with Fisher’s deflation (for cases with \( y_T^0 \leq \bar{y}^T \) that yield internal solutions with debt) is that the PP curve be flatter than the SS line around point A. Since SS is an upward-sloping, linear function and PP is increasing and strictly convex, this assumption ensures that the two curves intersect only once in the interval between 0 and \( \bar{c}^T \).

Given equations 13 and 14, the assumption that PP is flatter than SS around point A implies that

\[
\kappa < \frac{1}{1 + \mu} z \quad \text{with} \quad z = \frac{\left( \bar{c}^T / \bar{y}^T \right)}{\left( \bar{p}_0^N \bar{y}^N / \bar{y}^T \right)},
\]

where \( 1/(1 + \mu) \) is the elasticity of substitution in the consumption of tradable and nontradable goods.

Condition 16 sets an upper bound for the liquidity coefficient, \( \kappa \); this is different from the upper bound identified earlier, which determined a value of \( \kappa \) that is high enough to make the liquidity constraint irrelevant. Since in most countries the nontradables sector is at least as large as the tradables sector, and consumption of tradables is lower than tradables output, it follows that \( z < 1 \). Equation 16 thus states that the sufficiency condition for a unique equilibrium with Fisher’s deflation requires the liquidity coefficient to be lower than the fraction, \( z \), of the elasticity of substitution.

Existing empirical studies for developing countries show that the elasticity of substitution is less than unitary, ranging between 0.4 and 0.83. In an early paper, I report sectoral data for Mexico indicating that, on average over the 1988–98 period, \( \left( \bar{p}_0^N \bar{y}^N / \bar{y}^T \right) = 1.543 \) and \( \left( \bar{c}^T / \bar{y}^T \right) = 0.665 \), so that in Mexico \( z = 0.43 \). Given this value of \( z \), supporting a debt-output ratio of about 36 percent requires using the upper bound of the estimates of the elasticity

32. Unless PP and SS are tangent at point A, the curves also intersect once in the region with \( c_T^0 > \bar{c}^T \), because equations 13 and 14 can be satisfied by setting \( c_T^0 \) high enough to yield a \( p_0^N \) at which the credit constraint supports the high debt needed to finance this high consumption. This outcome is not an equilibrium, however, because the resulting debt level violates the debt ceiling (which is the debt of the perfectly smooth case implicit at point A).


34. Mendoza (2002).
of substitution—that is, \(1/(1 + \mu) = 0.83\). With this elasticity and \(z = 0.43\), condition 16 implies that \(\kappa < 0.357\). This result also meets the condition required for the credit constraint to bind at positive values of the tradables endowment,

\[
\kappa < \kappa^h = \frac{1 - (b_0/\bar{y}^T)}{\left(\frac{\bar{p}_0^N \bar{y}^N}{\bar{y}^T}\right)},
\]

for any \(b_0 \leq 0\). This rough review of empirical facts thus suggests that the sufficiency condition for which the model yields a unique equilibrium with Fisher’s deflation is in line with the data.

**Quantitative Implications: Balance Sheet Effect versus Fisher’s Deflation**

What are the relative magnitudes of the balance sheet effect and Fisher’s deflation that move the economy from point A to point D in figure 2? The figure suggests that for a given value of the tradables endowment shock, the magnitude of the two effects depends on the curvature of SS and PP, which in turn depends on the relative magnitudes of the liquidity coefficient and the sectoral elasticity of substitution in consumption.

A lower liquidity coefficient increases the slope of the SS curve. This strengthens the balance sheet effect, but its effect on Fisher’s deflation is not monotonic. Starting from a high \(\kappa\) at which the credit constraint was just marginally binding (so Fisher’s deflation was irrelevant), lowering \(\kappa\) strengthens Fisher’s deflation. As \(\kappa\) falls further, Fisher’s deflation weakens because the feedback between the nontradables price and the ability to borrow weakens. (In the limit, for \(\kappa = 0\), there is no Fisher’s deflation, as is also the case when \(\kappa\) is too high for the credit constraint to ever bind.) A higher elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables makes the PP curve flatter, which strengthens both the balance sheet effect and Fisher’s deflation.

The following numerical experiments illustrate the potential magnitudes of the balance sheet effect and Fisher’s deflation, using a set of parameter values and calibration assumptions that match some empirical evidence from Mexico. These experiments use a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) period utility function, \(u(c) = (c^{1-\sigma})/(1 - \sigma)\), and a CES aggregator for sectoral consumption.

35. The 36 percent debt ratio is the lowest ratio of net foreign assets to output estimated for Mexico by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001).
The subjective discount factor and the coefficient of relative risk aversion are set to standard values of \( \beta = 0.960 \) and \( \sigma = 2.000 \). I use an earlier estimate of the share parameter of the CES aggregator for Mexico, \( a = 0.342 \).\(^36\) The elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables is set to the upper bound of the range of estimates cited earlier (0.830), which implies that \( \mu = 0.204 \).

The model is calibrated to match earlier estimates of Mexico’s ratio of nontradables GDP to tradables GDP at current prices (1.543), as well as the sectoral shares of tradables (nontradables) consumption in tradables (nontradables) GDP, which are 66 percent and 71 percent, respectively.\(^37\) Total permanent output is normalized to 1, so that the results of the quantitative experiments can be interpreted as shares of permanent GDP. I also allow for permanent absorption of tradables and nontradables including government purchases and private investment, to match the model with observed consumption-output ratios. The tax rate is set to zero, which implies a baseline scenario in which government expenditures are financed with lump-sum taxation. Initial external debt is set to one-third of permanent GDP, in the range of the time series of the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP produced for Mexico by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti.\(^38\) With these calibrated parameter values, the perfectly smooth equilibrium yields consumption allocations of \( -c_T = 0.26 \) and \( -c_N = 0.56 \), with an equilibrium price of nontradables of \( -p_N = 0.77 \).

The aggregate consumption-output ratio thus matches the ratio from Mexican data: 
\[
(\bar{c}_T + \bar{p}_N \bar{c}_N) / (\bar{y}_T + \bar{p}_N \bar{y}_N) = 0.69.
\]

Figure 3 illustrates the quantitative predictions of the model for a range of values of the liquidity coefficient \( 0.21 < \kappa < 35 \), assuming a shock that lowers \( y_0^T \) to 3 percent below its permanent level. The lower bound of the liquidity coefficient is the lowest value of \( \kappa \) that can support positive tradables consumption with a binding liquidity constraint. The upper bound is the highest value of \( \kappa \) at which the constraint still binds; higher values would imply that the credit constraint does not bind for the 3 percent shock to tradables income, and the perfectly smooth equilibrium would be maintained.

\(^{36}\) Mendoza (2002).
\(^{37}\) Mendoza (2002).
\(^{38}\) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001).
Panel A of the figure shows the economy’s bond position at date 0 in three situations: with a binding credit constraint, with perfect credit markets (that is, a perfectly smooth equilibrium), and with a credit constraint evaluated at the prices of the perfectly smooth equilibrium (that is, the value of the fraction $\kappa$ of income valued at tradable goods prices in this same economy). The credit constraint binds whenever the third curve (credit constraint evaluated at perfectly smooth prices) is above the second (perfect credit markets). The
vertical distance between the curve for the credit constraint evaluated at the prices of the perfectly smooth equilibrium and the binding constraint curve represents the effect of the endogenous collapse in the price of nontradables on the ability to contract debt. This effect grows very rapidly as $\kappa$ falls, and it can imply a correction in the debt position (and in the current account) of over 10 percentage points of permanent GDP.

Panels B and C illustrate the effects of the credit constraints on tradables consumption, the relative price of nontradables, and the real exchange rate (with each measured as a percent deviation from their values in the perfectly smooth equilibrium). The plots decompose the total effect of the constraints on tradables consumption and the nontradables price into two components: namely, the balance sheet effect and Fisher’s deflation. The total effect corresponds to a comparison of points A and D in figure 2. The balance sheet effect compares points A and C, and Fisher’s deflation compares points C and D.

The negative effects of the liquidity constraint on tradables consumption and the relative price of nontradables are large and grow rapidly as $\kappa$ falls. With $\kappa$ set at 33 percent, tradables consumption and the nontradables price fall by nearly 50 percent, and the CPI-based measure of the real exchange rate (that is, the CES price index associated with the CES aggregator of sectoral consumption) falls nearly 37 percent. These declines are driven mainly by Fisher’s deflation, as the contribution of the pure balance sheet effect is less than 7 percent for both tradables consumption and the nontradables price.

The effect of Fisher’s deflation is strongest with $\kappa$ around 30 percent, and it becomes weaker for lower values of $\kappa$. In the worst-case scenario, with $\kappa$ at 20 percent, tradables consumption and the nontradables price approach zero. Even for these low values of the liquidity coefficient, however, the contribution to the collapse in consumption and prices is split fairly evenly between the balance sheet effect and Fisher’s deflation. Hence, the contribution of Fisher’s deflation process is at least as large as that of the balance sheet effect.

Panel D shows the welfare cost of the sudden stops shown in panels A through C. Welfare costs are computed as compensating variations in a time-invariant consumption level that equates lifetime utility in the credit-constrained economy with that of the economy with perfect credit markets (in which the perfectly smooth equilibrium prevails at all times). With $\kappa$ at 33 percent, the welfare loss measures 1.1 percent, and the loss increases rapidly as $\kappa$ falls.

Figure 4 illustrates the results for variations in the magnitude of the adverse shocks to the tradables endowment at date 0, while fixing $\kappa$ at 34 percent. The shocks range between 0.0 and 12.4 percent of the permanent tradables
endowment \((1.000 - 0.124 = 0.876\) and \(1.000\) in the horizontal axes of the plots). In this experiment, the smallest shock for which the liquidity constraint begins to bind is 1.9 percent, so shocks between 0.0 and 1.9 percent do not trigger the constraint and yield the perfectly smooth equilibrium. The upper bound of the shocks (12.4 percent) is the largest shock that satisfies the maximum debt constraint (that is, the constraint stating that debt must not exceed the level corresponding to the perfectly smooth equilibrium).
The adjustment in the debt position is severe and increases rapidly with the size of the shock. A 5 percent shock to the tradables endowment implies a reduction in debt of about 15 percentage points of permanent income. Tradables consumption and the nontradables price fall about 60 percent below the levels of the perfectly smooth equilibrium, with most of the decline accounted for by Fisher’s deflation. The CPI-based measure of the real exchange rate drops by about 47 percent. The welfare loss measures 1.7 percent in terms of a compensating variation in a lifetime-utility-equivalent level of consumption. All these effects—except the contribution of Fisher’s deflation—grow rapidly as the size of the shock increases.

Finally, consider a policy experiment that switches from the tax rate consistent with a fixed exchange rate (that is, \( \tau = 0 \)) to a floating exchange rate for which the currency’s depreciation rate settles at levels consistent with a fixed, positive value of \( \tau \) (alternatively, this experiment can be viewed as a case in which the government aims to induce a real depreciation by increasing \( \tau \)). This experiment sets \( y_T^t = \hat{y}_T \), which by construction implies that the credit constraint is marginally binding at a zero tax rate (that is, when \( \tau = 0 \), the economy is at point A in figure 2). Figure 5 shows the results of tax increases varying from 0 to 5 percent. Since the credit constraint is marginally binding at a zero tax rate and \( y_T^t = \hat{y}_T \), and since with a nonbinding credit constraint the tax hike would induce at most a 3 percent real depreciation (if the tax were raised to the 5 percent maximum), the government could have good reason to expect the tax hike to induce a small real depreciation. As the panels in figure 5 show, however, the actual outcome would deviate sharply from this expectation because increasing the tax triggers the credit constraint. Increasing the tax rate by 5 percentage points induces a correction of 8 percentage points of permanent tradables income in the net foreign asset position of the economy. Consumption falls by 30 percent relative to the perfectly smooth equilibrium, the relative price of nontradables drops by 35 percent, and the real exchange rate depreciates by about 23 percent. As in the other two experiments, the amplification in the declines of consumption, the nontradables price, and the real exchange rate is largely due to Fisher’s debt-deflation effect, with a negligible contribution from the balance sheet effect. This policy-induced real depreciation results in a welfare loss of nearly 0.4 percent in terms of a stationary tradables consumption path.

In summary, the results of these numerical experiments suggest that in the presence of liability dollarization and credit-market frictions, Fisher’s deflation mechanism can be an important source of amplification and asymmetry in emerging economies’ response to negative shocks. Fisher’s deflation causes
large declines in consumption and the nontradables price, as well as large real depreciations and large reversals in the current account. In this environment, policy-induced real depreciations can trigger the credit constraints and Fisher’s deflation mechanism, resulting in a collapse in the nontradables price and large real depreciations of the currency. Fisher’s deflation mechanism may thus help account for the empirical observation that the relative
nontradables price accounts for a significant fraction of the variability of the real exchange rate in economies with managed exchange rate regimes.

Conclusions

This paper has reported evidence based on Mexican and U.S. monthly data for the 1969–2000 period showing that—when Mexico was under a managed exchange rate regime—fluctuations in Mexico’s relative price of nontradable goods account for 50 to 70 percent of the variability in the Mexico-U.S. real exchange rate. The main lesson drawn from this evidence, and from cross-country studies by Naknoi and Parsley, is that the behavior of the determinants of the real exchange rate differs sharply between countries with features similar to Mexico’s and the industrial countries to which variance analysis of real exchange rates is normally applied.39 In particular, the overwhelming role of movements in tradable goods prices and nominal exchange rates found in industrial countries and in developing countries with floating exchange rates falls sharply in developing countries with managed exchange rates.

This finding suggests that liability dollarization is rightly emphasized in the sudden stops literature. This paper proposed a basic model to illustrate how liability dollarization introduces amplification and asymmetry in the responses of the economy to adverse shocks via a financial accelerator that combines a balance sheet effect with Fisher’s debt-deflation mechanism. The balance sheet effect and Fisher’s deflation result in a collapse in the real exchange rate, driven by a collapse in the relative price of nontradables. A set of basic numerical experiments suggests that the quantitative implications of these frictions, particularly Fisher’s deflation, can be significant. In the case of a policy-induced real depreciation (or a shift from a fixed exchange rate regime to a constant, positive depreciation rate), this paper’s financial accelerator produces large collapses in the relative nontradables price, the real exchange rate, and consumption, together with a large current account reversal (starting from a situation in which credit constraints were marginally binding).

The results indicate that roughly half of the variability of the real exchange rate can be attributed to movements in nontradables prices. This is in line with the quantitative findings of the recent literature on the business cycle

39. Naknoi (2005) and Parsley (2003) demonstrate that this result is robust across developing countries.
implications of exchange rate management.\textsuperscript{40} Further empirical research should focus on comparing the experiences of industrial and developing countries so as to shed more light on whether variance analysis of other real exchange rates pairing emerging markets and industrial countries displays a similar sensitivity to the exchange rate regime as the real peso-dollar exchange rate.\textsuperscript{41} Another important issue is whether the role of the nontradables price in accounting for real exchange rate variability depends on the degree of liability dollarization in the economy.

The paper intentionally avoided taking a position on the best modeling strategy to account for the nontrivial fraction of real exchange rate variability explained by movements in tradable goods prices and the nominal exchange rate. In particular, the evidence reported here for periods without exchange rate management, in which a large fraction of real exchange rate variability is due to changes in relative tradables prices and the nominal exchange rate, does not suggest per se that one should view fluctuations in the variable $x$ as deviations from the law of one price or evidence of price or wage stickiness. It simply shows how much $x$ (that is, the ratio of exchange-rate-adjusted CPI prices of durable goods across Mexico and the United States) contributes to explaining the variance of the ratio of exchange-rate-adjusted aggregate CPIs. This is far from the ideal scenario needed to interpret changes in $x$ as deviations from the law of one price. The law of one price applies to single, homogeneous goods sold in a freely accessible market and in the absence of frictions like transportation costs and tax or tariff distortions. Clearly, aggregate data for the Mexican and U.S. CPIs violate these conditions. The indexes include different goods, the goods carry different weights, and the weights change at different intervals. Access to a common market varied widely over the sample period and across goods, and similar caveats apply to transportation costs and tariffs.\textsuperscript{42}

The treatment of the data here abstracts from medium- to low-frequency considerations, including those related to mean-reverting properties of real exchange rates and to the long-run determination of real exchange rates.

\textsuperscript{40} See Mendoza and Uribe (2000).
\textsuperscript{41} Naknoi (2005) and Parsley (2003) are good examples of this approach.
\textsuperscript{42} A number of detailed studies on purchasing power parity (PPP) and the law of one price take the above issues into account and still find evidence of large price differentials for highly disaggregated consumer goods. Some researchers are concerned with the impossibility of defining a pure concept of tradable goods as required by the law of one price, and they thus study the “degree of tradability of goods” or distribution costs. See Betts and Kehoe (2000); Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003).
Research in this direction is inconclusive, as the survey by Froot and Rogoff shows.\textsuperscript{43} In this paper, variance ratios based on seventy-two-month differences of the data, which correspond to the six-year periodicity of recent Mexican business cycles, show that the contribution of $x$ to the variance of the real exchange rate is about 65 percent, both for the full sample and for the period of the managed exchange rate that ended in 1994.

This paper provides an argument in favor of policies that seek to stabilize the real value of the currency. Traditional exchange rate management is not useful because currency collapses trigger large movements in relative prices, together with sudden stops in consumption and the current account. Instead, the model favors policies that can successfully prevent large fluctuations in the real exchange rate. The setup of the model highlights, in particular, the use of sectoral tax policy to contain the deflationary pressure on the relative price of nontradables as this pressure builds up. Policies that point in the same direction include the removal of the liability dollarization problem (for example, the full adoption of a hard currency as the domestic currency) or the prevention of large swings in the real value of the currency under a de jure floating exchange rate (as may be occurring in practice in many emerging countries that claim to stick to inflation targeting rules).

An alternative to policies that prevent large fluctuations in the relative price of nontradables is to make emerging economies’ debt instruments less susceptible to adverse balance sheet effects and Fisher’s deflation. This is in line with recent proposals to issue bonds only in domestic currencies or indexed to the evolution of output or key commodity prices (as was done by Argentina in its recent debt conversion, using bonds partially indexed to output). But whether emerging economies can successfully establish liquid markets for these instruments unilaterally, or whether there is enough interest in them in world financial markets, remains an open question. Clearly, if creating markets for the state-contingent claims that can neutralize financial accelerator mechanisms driving sudden stops is feasible, this is the most preferable policy. If not, domestic policies aimed at stabilizing the relative price of nontradables are an appealing alternative.

\textsuperscript{43} Froot and Rogoff (1995). For example, Asea and Mendoza (1994) find that while the data support predictions of long-run neoclassical models in which cross-country differences in the relative nontradables price reflect differences in productivity across sectors that produce tradables and nontradables, measures of the long-run relative nontradables price do poorly in explaining cross-country differences in CPI-based measures of the real exchange rate.
Comments

Raphael Bergoeing: Enrique Mendoza has written an excellent paper. His goal is twofold: first, to quantify the contribution of movements in exchange-rate-adjusted prices of tradable goods and in the price of non-tradable goods relative to tradables as a source of real exchange rate variability, using a thirty-year sample of monthly Mexican data; second, to study whether the observed evidence on exchange rate fluctuations in Mexico is consistent with recently developed theories on sudden stops and the real effects of exchange-rate-based stabilizations in emerging economies. To analyze these issues, he builds a general equilibrium model of endogenous credit constraints with liability dollarization, and he then simulates the model to stress balance sheet effects under large changes in the relative price of non-tradable goods. In particular, he shows that Fisher’s deflation mechanism can be an important source of amplification and asymmetry in the response of economies to shocks. The paper also provides key insights into the benefits of inflation targeting rules, a widespread monetary tool in the last decade. This monetary policy, which commits to de jure floating exchange rates, can prove effective in preventing large swings in the real value of the currency.

Traditional models of real exchange rate determination attribute all movements in the real exchange rate to changes in the relative price of nontradable to tradable goods across countries. For instance, Stockman and Tesar, as well as Fernández de Córdoba and Kehoe, develop models in which the real exchange rate is exactly the relative price of nontradables to tradables across countries.1 This setting contains no role whatsoever for movements in the international relative prices of tradable goods. Several recent papers, however, report large and persistent deviations from the law of one price. Most notably, Engel claims that at almost every horizon and for almost every measure and every country relative to the United States, the failure of the law of one price

accounts for over 90 percent (and up to 99 percent) of real exchange rate variations.\(^2\) Figures 6 and 7 provide alternative support for these mutually inconsistent facts. Figure 6 illustrates the relation between the bilateral real exchange rate for Germany and the United States with a bilateral relative price of nontradable goods. In this figure, \(rer\) is the logarithm of the real exchange rate between Germany and the United States, and \(rerN\) is the logarithm of the relative price measure. These variables have been constructed so that if the law of one price holds (that is, if the traditional theory works well and if I use appropriated data to measure relative prices), then the two variables should be the same. This figure shows no perceptible relation between the two series, thus supporting the view that the traditional theory is dead. Figure 7, however, provides evidence to the contrary. This figure illustrates the same relation between bilateral variables as in figure 6, but in this case for Canada and the United States. These additional data suggest that the traditional theory is still valid.\(^3\)

Mendoza’s paper demonstrates that figures such as these do not need to be inconsistent. Mexican data support both depending on the exchange rate regime in place. Engel himself claims that a figure such as figure 6 would fairly represent Mexican data. Using a sample of monthly data from 1991 to 1999, he finds that the fraction of the variance of the peso-dollar real exchange rate accounted for by the variance of the Mexico-U.S. ratio for tradables prices adjusted by the nominal exchange rate is over 90 percent, regardless of the time horizon over which the data are differenced. Mendoza shows, however, that Engel may be drawing on too little evidence, as the period he analyzes was characterized mainly by a floating exchange rate regime. Mendoza includes the 1970s and 1980s, when Mexico followed a managed exchange rate regime; he finds that the contribution of the relative price of nontradable to tradable goods becomes much more relevant, accounting for up to 70 percent of the high variability of Mexico’s real exchange rate.

This improved characterization of the evidence is relevant for understanding several issues related to the current discussion on financial crises, sudden stops, liability dollarization, and real exchange rate stabilization. In particular, the coexistence of liability dollarization and credit constraints provides a channel for aggregate shocks to produce large real exchange rate variability and sudden stops, through movements in the relative price of nontradable goods. Both theoretical and policy issues emerged.

\(^2\) Engel (1999).

\(^3\) See Betts and Kehoe (2005) for a detailed description of these data.
FIGURE 6. Germany-U.S. Real Exchange Rate

FIGURE 7. Canada-U.S. Real Exchange Rate
Mendoza claims that the channels stressed in his theory are relevant. Measuring their importance, however, requires a good characterization of the facts and a robust quantification of the model’s implications. The paper provides insightful analysis of both issues, although I would raise several caveats. Particularly, and as already presented in figures 6 and 7, I expect the variations in the real exchange rates and in a ratio of nontradables prices between two economies to be the same if, and only if, the traditional theory works well and appropriate data are used to measure relative prices. In what follows, I comment on the theory and the data.

The literature provides alternative theories to address the expected role of movements in the relative price of tradables across countries versus movements in the relative price of nontradables to tradables as drivers of real exchange rate movements. For instance, two recent papers consider endogenous tradability. Naknoi develops a framework in which productive heterogeneity drives firm-specific pricing strategies and international trade. With a managed exchange rate, changes in the prices of tradable goods are delayed, and the prices of nontradable goods adjust more sharply. Betts and Kehoe present a model in which home bias is endogenously determined. They determine tradability both by the degree of substitutability in consumption between units of the same good produced in different countries and by the transaction costs that must be incurred to consume goods outside their country of origin. In both cases, the implication is that the relative tradables price makes a much greater contribution to overall real exchange rate volatility under a fixed exchange rate regime than under a flexible regime, as in the data reported by Mendoza. Other theoretical issues involve incorporating political economy aspects to model actual experiences. The strategic forces behind the actual policy implementation process in Latin America are certainly relevant to understanding financial crises in the region. Sensitivity analysis could provide further evidence on the importance of these aspects from a quantitative perspective, in particular, to illustrate the potential magnitude of the balance sheet effect and Fisher’s deflation.

With regard to the quality of the data, the key question is whether relative prices are correctly measured. Betts and Kehoe provide insight into the problems of measuring relative prices. They investigate measures of relative prices of nontradables to tradables across a sample of fifty-two countries, as

well as the bilateral real exchange rates between the United States and five of its most important trade partners. They find that the observed relations depend crucially on the choice of price series used to measure relative prices and on the choice of trade partners. The relation is stronger when they measure relative prices using producer prices rather than consumer prices, and when the trade relationship between the analyzed trade partners is more important. However, even in cases of a strong relationship between the real exchange rate and the relative nontradables price, a large fraction of real exchange rate fluctuations is due to deviations from the law of one price for tradable goods.

This again raises the question of whether Mendoza’s results are robust, as well as their relevance for better understanding other emerging market experiences and their implications for inflation targeting regimes. The paper could do more to address these questions. For instance, given that most countries are moving toward more flexible exchange rate regimes, tradables prices could explain a large fraction of real exchange rates movements in the future.

In short, this paper addresses not only old issues, such as how well the law of one price holds, but also more recent ones, such as what accounts for emerging market financial crises. The implications within an inflation targeting setting are particularly interesting, given that several emerging countries implemented this monetary regime in the last decade and advanced economies such as the United States will probably adopt it in the near future. As countries have moved to flexible exchange rates, they have been forced to search for new monetary anchors. Inflation targeting has been the regime of choice. On the same matter, a relevant discussion deals with the benefits and disadvantages of maintaining a national currency for a small economy versus moving toward a regional currency. A lot must still be learned, however, before these issues are resolved. Mendoza’s paper is an important contribution toward that goal.

**Nouriel Roubini:** Enrique Mendoza has written a very interesting and well researched paper on an important topic. Specifically, he explores the determinants of real exchange rate movements and volatility in emerging market economies, asking whether they stem from movements in the relative price of tradable goods across countries or movements in the relative price of nontradable versus tradable goods. After establishing that movements in the latter are important in episodes of a managed exchange rate, he goes on to consider how they affect the dynamics of financial crises that are triggered by the collapse of fixed pegs and that lead to severe balance sheet effects in the presence of liability dollarization. The paper is divided in two
parts, an empirical section that identifies the determinants of real exchange rate volatility in a typical emerging market economy (Mexico) and a theoretical section that presents some calibrated simulations to show the importance of the balance sheet channel when shocks lead to sharp movements of the relative price of nontradable goods.

Since Mendoza is convinced of the importance of balance sheet effects for explaining crises in dollarized economies characterized by sharp movements of nontradables prices, he needs to show that a significant part of the movements of the real exchange rate—especially under managed exchange rate regimes—is due to movements in the relative price of nontradable goods. The classic empirical studies on the determinants of the real exchange rate conclude that, at least for advanced economies, 90 percent of the volatility of the real exchange rate can be explained by the relative price of tradable goods. Mendoza argues that for the case of Mexico in periods of a managed exchange rate, the contribution of the relative price of nontradable goods is much more significant than the relative tradables price. The author’s statistical analysis is very careful, and I find his conclusions sensible and convincing: movements in the relative prices of nontradable to tradable goods are indeed an important factor in explaining movements in Mexico’s real exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar in periods when Mexico implemented semi-fixed exchange rates. Mendoza then makes some broad inferences on what these results may imply for ongoing debates on what drives real exchange rate movements. He argues that if movements of the relative tradables price matter less than is currently believed, then traditional explanations of the volatility of the real exchange rate—based on deviations from PPP or from the law of one price, pricing to market, or stickiness of the price- or wage-setting mechanism—may be incorrect. Mendoza is arguing that optimizing models that are not based on such frictions can adequately explain movements of the real exchange rate.

These broad conclusions are not convincing for a number of reasons. First, the traditional Engel results hold for the full sample period. Second, even in periods when the exchange rate was managed, the relative price of tradable goods explains a significant part of the real exchange rate volatility. Third, optimizing models without nominal frictions have a hard time explaining why the determinants of the real exchange rate should be so different under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. The fact that he finds such differences is prima facie evidence that nominal factors—such as irrelevance of the

1. See, for example, Engel (1999).
exchange rate regime in a frictionless world—are very important. Thus while the author finds valid evidence that movements of nontradables prices are important for emerging market economies, his broader inferences on what this implies for larger debates on monetary economics are somewhat unwarranted.

Next, the author builds a model in which the interaction of shocks, financial frictions, and liability dollarization can explain financial crises in emerging market economies where sharp movements in the relative nontradables price (triggered by a currency crisis) lead to balance sheet effects that explain the real and financial consequences of such crises. However, while the relative price of nontradable goods moves a lot in emerging market economies, this is not clearly the basis of most financial crises in such countries or even in Mexico in the last thirty years. Since the 1970s, Mexico has almost always faced a currency crisis around the time of its six-year presidential elections, as regular attempts to repeg the exchange rate after the collapse of a peg consistently ended in a new currency crisis. The fixed-rate peg that Mexico maintained in the 1960s (which led to the famous “peso problem” in the forward exchange rate) became unsustainable during the 1976 presidential election and ultimately collapsed. An attempt to restore a managed exchange rate after this crisis led to the foreign debt accumulation of the late 1970s, resulting in the currency and debt crisis of 1982—another election year. After 1982, policymakers avoided formal attempts to repeg while the country dealt with its debt and economic crisis, yet another currency crisis emerged during the 1988 presidential year. The response to this crisis was another attempt to implement a managed exchange rate: the exchange-rate-based stabilization program known as El Pacto again produced an overvalued currency, a large and growing current account deficit, and the eventual collapse of the peg in the next election year, 1994. The only presidential election year in which a currency crisis did not occur was 2000. Mexico finally learned the lesson that managed exchange rates and pegs are unstable and floating exchange rates are superior. Thus, both sound economic reforms and the choice of a floating rate regime explain the lack of a currency crisis in 2000.

A simple optimizing model (even one with financial frictions) cannot fully capture the political economy of pegged exchange rates that lead to overvalued currencies and unsustainable current accounts, which in turn cause a currency crash and produce another exchange-rate-based stabilization program. It took over twenty years for Mexico to realize that such peg regimes become unsustainable and that a full float is thus preferable. The model presented in
the paper cannot capture these political economy nuances of the cycle of currency pegs followed by crises. Another limitation of a real model without money is that modeling currency crises becomes cumbersome. A full explanation of fixed and flexible exchange rates and the dynamics of crises requires a monetary model in which monetary factors may play a role in the crises. Modeling a real depreciation in a model without money is also awkward: Mendoza models this real depreciation as a tax on private nontradables consumption that serves to “approximate the relative price effects of changes in the rate of currency devaluation.”

The model in the paper is a stripped-down version of the models with liability dollarization and financial frictions that Mendoza and other authors have developed over the last few years. Cavallo and others present a similar model with two goods, in which exogenous shocks can lead to overshooting of real exchange rates and trigger strong balance sheet effects that cause financial distress, current account adjustments, and a sharp output contraction. The channels presented in the current paper are thus quite well known in the literature on the balance sheet effects of crises. Compared with these earlier models, however, the analytical framework is kept to a minimum: the model does not include capital or a labor supply reaction; the margin constraint is modeled as a simple maximum ratio between debt and the income level (rather than as a limit on debt relative to the capital stock in the economy); and the slow portfolio adjustment, which other models use to trigger sharp asset price movements, is absent.

Even in this simplified framework, Mendoza shows how the interaction between liability dollarization and the financing constraints can lead to interesting crisis dynamics when shocks hit the economy. The mechanism that delivers the results in the paper is as follows: if a shock occurs that makes the financing constraint binding (for example, a fall in the tradables endowment), then the country cannot borrow; this causes tradables consumption to fall, which lowers the price of nontradables; and, finally, this reinforces the country’s reduced borrowing ability via the balance sheet effect and the liability dollarization of the economy. This adjustment mechanism features as Fisher’s debt deflation: “The price of nontradables falls with tradables consumption; this drop in price tightens the credit constraint, which makes tradables consumption fall further, which in turn makes the price of nontradables fall further.”

2. See, for example, the survey of this literature in Mendoza and Smith (2002).
Mendoza shows that Fisher’s debt deflation mechanism is similarly triggered when the exogenous shock is an increase in the tax rate on private nontradables consumption (a proxy for real depreciation) rather than a tradables endowment shock. While this is an interesting exercise, the analysis finesse the point of why a government would choose a real depreciation if the policy were to lead to such balance sheet effects. In the model, the currency crisis is not an endogenous phenomenon triggered by a shock, but an exogenous—and unexplained—policy choice of the government. The author’s calibration exercises suggest that the quantitative effects of the credit constraints and Fisher’s deflation captured by the model can be significant and similar to the actual pattern followed by major macroeconomic variables during a currency crisis: a steep fall in consumption, a significant drop in the relative price of nontradables, strong real depreciation, and a sharp adjustment of the current account. Mendoza concludes that “Fisher’s deflation mechanism may thus help account for the empirical observation that the relative nontradables price accounts for a significant fraction of the variability of the real exchange rate in economies with managed exchange rate regimes.”

This inference is not clearly warranted, however. The basic model could be interpreted, interchangeably, as a model with fixed or flexible exchange rates. Consequently, the effects of the output shocks described in the model do not necessarily apply only to fixed rate regimes. Moreover, the shock that is proxying for a real depreciation does not show the dynamics of an economy with real exchange rates, but rather the dynamics of an economy in which the real exchange rate collapses during a depreciation. Given that Mendoza’s empirical results focus on the determinants of real exchange rates during a fixed rate period rather than during the time in which the fixed rate collapses, the calibration results of the paper do not necessarily explain the variability of the real exchange rate during a managed exchange rate period. The author seems to be confusing the behavior of the real exchange rate during a currency crisis with the dynamics of the real exchange rate during a fixed rate period when the currency has not yet collapsed.

The paper ends with policy implications for the choice of the appropriate or optimal exchange rate regime for a liability-dollarized economy. Mendoza appears to support policies of hard pegs that stabilize the real exchange rate or even outright dollarization that, in his view, would remove the problem of liability dollarization. Such policy implications are not warranted. First, fixed rate regimes—even hard pegs such as currency boards—
can collapse in the face of large shocks. Second, exchange rate flexibility may help reduce currency mismatches if it leads to more currency hedging; it also creates a valve for releasing pressures on the currency from shocks, which might otherwise result in a collapse of the peg. Third, dollarization does not resolve the problem of balance sheet effects: if a shock triggers a change in the relative price of nontradable goods, the shock will have balance sheet effects with or without formal dollarization. Indeed, in the paper’s real model without money, such balance sheet effects occur regardless of the currency regime. The literature contains a meaningful analytical debate on whether flexible rate regimes dominate temporarily fixed ones when balance sheet effects are at work. This study, however, does not systematically consider the relative performance and welfare of an alternative exchange rate regime.

In conclusion, this is a good, well-researched paper on an important topic. Some of the arguments in the paper are convincing, but I am left with the impression that the emphasized mechanisms—while important—do not explain most of the phenomena of currency and financial crises that have afflicted emerging market economies for the last decade. In particular, the political economy dynamics that lead countries to choose fixed pegs and then let them collapse need to be fleshed out in a framework in which policies are not optimally chosen and thus can fail.
References


