Real Natures: Basic, Consequent, Resultant and Emergent
I. Introduction 271
II. Sharpening the Issues 279
1. Tunes -- Forms and structures. 282
2. What about indeterminacy and the borders of natural and synthetic kinds 287
3. Same constitution and replicability. 291
4. Realism again. 293
5. Consequent natures. 295
6. The status of the laws. 297
7. Real natures: Basic, consequent, resultant and emergent. 299
III. Conclusion 300
Chapter 7
Real Natures: Basic, Consequent, Resultant and Emergent
I. Introduction
We have to discuss these things: (1) That there are real natures that are constant
dispositions, whether active or not, (like fluidity of water), solid with things.
"Things" for this purpose analogously include the elements, compounds,
animals, forces, fields, galaxies, galactic space and anything else that exerts
physical causation upon anything else. (2) That because natures involve matter
behaving according to forms (mathematizable structures of constant, and sometimes
instantaneous [time-irrelevant], causation), it is as if there were software
everywhere. (3) That there are consequent, resultant and emergent natures, relatively
to what appears physically fundamental, though all may be embedded recursively
in further structures without ever touching bottom for all we know so far. (4)
That such a recursive structure, if that should be the universal structure of
the cosmos, is not an equivalent of the "prime matter" attributed
to Aristotle by Aquinas and others before him, nor is it a universal substratum
of some kind, but the negation of such a bottom layer. (5) Thus, on that supposition,
top-down explanation of origin, by creation, necessary emanation or pantheistic
identity, might be the only option because "bottom up" explanations
of the necessities of nature would have no final basis. To borrow a phrase of
Quine's: They would not wind down. (6) Lastly, it is the forms in nature that
are intelligible and, as explained in Chapter 5, originate our conceptions.
But first we need to sharpen the edges of the claim that there are real natures
wherever there are physical realities with regularity of behavior. For instance,
wherever there are physical realities whose spatio-temporal approach or other
"presence" to other physical realities is enough for a measurable
(in principle) physical change in one of them we have behavior from a real nature.
That's true even for what I called "friendship among the quanta."
So, for example, a force-field considered as a spatio-temporally distributed
mathematizable physical function, amounts to a real nature if some level of
entities exhibit regularities of behavior differentially when within its spatio-temporal
boundaries. An electro-magnetic field can be displayed by the lined-up iron
filings we throw on it. Whether or not we sprinkle the filings, the causation
of the magnetic field is constant. Such constant causation is a force.
Real natures typically involve an analogue of Aristotle's matter-form composition.
If we want to talk of the nature of electric current, we conveniently distinguish
the electrons and the structure of their behavior, their script, as it were:
flow, direction, force, volume, inductive and magnetic properties, etc. Form
as "intrinsic explanatory programs for observable behavior" applies
analogously across the entire cosmos, from the level of a grand unified theory,
to light, sound, explosions, tides, all the elements and compounds, to all species
of plants and animals and to every real thing that humans make, whether automobiles,
pesticides, dams or lasers. It is as if there is software everywhere.
Some of the simplest real forms are the distributive forms used in building
-- arches, buttresses, bracing, timbering -- arrangements of the material that
distribute gross physical forces, like gravity, mass, surface resistance, friction,
compression of matter by volume, so as to constitute the particular stability,
endurance, shock-resistance, wind-resistance (and all the other properties that
result from the arrangement of the materials) of that sort of building: aqueduct,
bridge, barn roof, bays of stone, cathedrals and skyscrapers. When you arrange
a pile of stones so that they hold one another in place to make a New England
stone wall (of which there are indefinitely many designs, discernible after
one learns how to look at them), you make an active distributive structure with
the component stones. It is the structure that explains the stability, frost
resistance, slope, curvature, cornering and leveling of the wall. The structure,
though far too complex to be described except in very general terms and sketches,
is constant causation, in this case, distribution and alignment of more basic
physical forces, to achieve characteristic behavior; the structure is as real
as are the component stones and as far beyond the capacity of the component
stones to attain on their own as is speech.
When we come to the level of crystals, for instance in metals and gems, we find
distributive forms of higher complexity: for they distribute not only the forces
like gravity, but various electromagnetic and atomic forces, even light reflective
and absorbent forces, to produce the characteristic behavior, from conductivity
to sheen to elasticity, heat-expansion, light reflection and absorption, even
light focussing on a brilliant center. As crystalline structures display, the
explanatory arrangement of atoms can be repeated over and over, with numberless
variations and deviations, while the common structure can be understood by abstraction
and is seen to be realized in each case.
So there is no point in disputing the reality of forms (mathematizable explanatory
structures that are modes of constant causation) whose components are only passively
capable of such behavior. You can find them in table settings, and sea walls;
actively in trusses and ties in a roof, and in the utility of arches and buttresses;
even more actively in a radio or a computer, where satisfying the design is
essential to performance and impossible for the parts by themselves.
There may be a point in disputing whether all intrinsic explanatory physical
and biological structures are reducible (perhaps, eliminatively) to a few fundamental
structures, or even to some basic components and universal forces, the same
throughout the cosmos, that in fact produce all the more complex forms over
time. But that inquiry, however it comes out, is peripheral to the present one,
which concerns the complexity and reality of various forms (intrinsic explanatory
structures that are modes of constant causation), as the foundation of the intelligibility
of the material world, and as the explanatory origin of the observable regularities
of behavior: sub-atomic, molecular, cellular, organ, plant, animal, ecosystem,
planet, star, galaxy and the whole universe. It is by conceptualization of real
structures that we make the realities into components of judgment. So, when
we say "mass determines space" we are thinking of, and talking about,
real mass and real space.
It is the particular that is perceptually present to an animal, but it is its
intelligible form (of which most are accidental and incidental and seldom "the
essence") by which the real thing becomes a component of judgment. So the
red buttocks of the baboon is apparent to other baboons, but color is present
only to humans, and by conceptualization red becomes a component not only of
animal perception but of human perceptual judgment.
The forms as principles of constant causation cannot be eliminated as unnecessary,
the way 17th century mechanists hoped. Forms are the intelligible features,
which, realized materially, constitute the real natures of particular things,
from light waves to ocean waves to spiders, cats and people. The forms are not
the natures. The material components are not the natures. The components-formed
into constant causal dispositions are the natures. Thus, real natures are not
generalities, they are to particulars as capacities are to realizations. The
individual thing is a realization of capacity for that sort of material organization
exhibiting that sort of behavior. Such real active ability is the nature, and
the intrinsic organizing constant causation is the form or structure.
The real nature of rubies and sapphires, originating the hardness, translucency,
reflectively and the like, is complete (though perhaps not perfect or pure)
in each and every stone. Real natures are repeatable but are not universals
because the disposition of one ruby is not numerically that of another. How
then -- to speak as classical philosophers did -- can there be a multitude of
things "of the same nature," glaciers, rubies, snow flakes, fruit
flies or stars? What is the ontological status of common natures, whether it
be the drying properties of an evaporating paint or those of a heat-interacting
epoxy paint?
For a first step, multitude and regularity exist apart from conception, whereas
universals, abstractions, do not. Multitude and regularity are the foundations
for our conceptions, but conceptions are products of the understanding and make
real things components of judgments. Conceptions are not components of material
things, but acts of the understanding whose content is the forms of things.
The multitude and regularity all reduce to the behavior of single things whose
behavior exhibits the real nature, which in turn is material components (atoms,
molecules, cells, etc.), organized formally and, in certain cases, there may
be forms that are what-they-do, requiring no material components but having
only physical effects, perhaps like energy, or maybe gravity (if there are no
gravitons).
But if constant causation, like electromagnetic fields, exists everywhere in
the cosmos, then constant causation must be a reality on its own? No. Causation
is not subsistent; it does not exist on its own, but only through forms and
components by their interactions. One stone leans on another; one brick presses
another down; one sun attracts the moving earth; a tree crushes a car. Gravity
is the constant mathematizable causation by which mass (de)forms space and space
determines motion. In a sense gravity is everywhere because it is the field
of masses, the shape of space. But gravity can also be regarded as a form co-present
with mass. We need not decide on one or the other at this point.
Consider a superstring type hypothesis that, in effect, postulates that all
matter consists in the spatio-temporal distribution of what are mathematically
and theoretically energy waves, perhaps originally and ultimately a single wave
without a medium, that fragmented (why?) into the multiplicity of waves that
may be regarded either as having space-time as their medium through which they
pass as wave forms pass through water or as having space-time among their characteristic
effects. If anything like that hypothesis were true, then form -- as spatio-temporally
distributed mathematizable structures of constant causation -- would not only
be everywhere and real in the cosmos, it would be ultimate physically. As I
said we don't have to decide anything so general. But notice, the physics of
wave theory relies on the notion of form as italicized above. It is that sort
of form that I say is present everywhere and at every "level" or dimension
of matter, from the galaxies to the diameter of the atom 10-19 cm and beyond
at least to 10-21 cm.
As with each of the analytic nodes in this metaphysical inquiry, there is both
analogy of meaning among the words and analogy of reality among the things.
The words, like "form," "behavior," "observable,"
"essence," "nature," and "cause" adapt to the
discourse, both to the meanings of words in the statements and to their conditions
of applicability (to the overflow conditions, not contained in the meaning but
incorporated by referential practice). Similarly, the things we talk about and
find in the material world are really analogous, the way the "dielectric
polarization, that occurs also in all electrical insulators is a reversible
electrical property analogous to their mechanical elasticity" [Holden,
1965, p. 4]. There is analogia entis among the realities under discussion. For
instance the basic structure of solids that makes elastic distortion, heat capacity
and dielectric polarization to be reversible properties, which is analogous
among the features mentioned, is certainly not a form, a program or software,
in the same sense as is the unifying structure in a mouse, a water beetle or
a dog. But the function of constant causation that, through the passive dispositions
of matter, explains the regularity of observable behavior is again "the
same" in all. The fact that a notion is analogous and that the realities
encompassed are really analogous, and not further similar, is not a reason to
separate the study of the one from that of the other. On the contrary, the ability
to recognize that the dielectric polarization in electrical insulators is a
reversible electrical property analogous to their mechanical elasticity, is
a scientific insight leading to the further insight that mechanical changes
cause thermal changes and electrical changes cause thermal and mechanical changes
and vice versa. So there is physical causation among analogous realities.
In the physics of solids, as I explained, there are features recognized to be
analogous to one another and to stand in mathematizable relationships as well.
So for a philosopher to say "Well, if the phenomena are only analogous
there is nothing important in common" is entirely to miss the point: wherever
there is analogy of the realities, there are very important intelligible commonalities,
not reducible to identities, even when, as with wave theory, there is a common
mathematization. Nature goes together not so much in unisons -- which would
make dull music -- but in proportionalities, which Pythagoras took to be the
foundation of analogy and order. A-440, C, E and F, A, C have the same intervals
but distinct frequencies. They are proportionally the same (analogous) but not
identical or even the same by doubling as octaves are.
After some further remarks about the variety of real forms and why they are
the intelligible features of things, I will explain why the indeterminacy of
the physical as to pure functions that is central to the argument of Chapter
6, does not apply to real forms, as constant causation wholly physically present
in every one of their material realizations: e.g., the support features of a
properly constructed arch. For this, it is useful to keep in mind that the real
nature of a thing is the constant active cause of the characteristic behavior
of the thing, and that the form is metaphorically, at least, the program according
to which the material components act (and react) to exercise that constant causation.
Thus form is an intrinsic constant organizing cause, while the nature, which
includes the particular sort of matter involved, is an intrinsic cause of external
behavior, of actual and potential changes in other things (even where there
is no effect to be detected, as in the empty magnetic field). Thus, the nature
is the essence as principle of the operations of a thing, to use an ancient
phrase, and the form organizes the material into the essence, thereby causing
the form-matter complex to exist. Although the terminology is old, the ideas,
understood in light of what we know now, have vitality, new mathematizable content
and new explanatory utility.
Now there is no doubt that in attempting to articulate a physical form with
mathematical and ideal precision, problems of indeterminacy as to which, if
any, pure function is realized may arise. I apply the solution of Chapter 6,
that where it is physically indeterminate which among incompatible pure functions
is realized, then none of them are. There is no reason at all why real forms
cannot both fail to realize any pure function perfectly and yet can be intelligible,
with the help of such abstractions, and, furthermore, that the real forms should
be the principle of intelligibility of the material world; in fact many are
intelligible because they can be approximated by competing pure functions which
are accessible to understanding alone.
I apply the principles, "no names, no cases" and "no cases, no
kinds" to real natures. The result is that there are no merely possible
real natures, no real natures without cases and no reality to natures apart
from their realization in cases. Of course "cases" is also analogous,
ranging from individual animals, cells, molecules, to waves, fields and forces.
Once we recognize that real natures are the objects of the articulate, stable
comprehension that amounts to scientific understanding, as well as of the pre-scientific
comprehension of farmers, hunters, fishermen, sailors, and craftsmen of all
sorts, we provide modern content to the ancient generality that "the proper
object of human understanding is the natures of material things."
And, lastly for this chapter, what ontic status do the laws of nature have?
In what sense is the behavior of lead solder governed by a law that relates
rising temperature to fluidity of lead and dropping temperature to solidity?
In what sense is the behavior of a wave governed by the law "A wave travels
one wavelength during one period" or even a less definitional law that
a wave's crest is related to its trough by a certain mathematical function?
If at a conjectured moment of maximum compactness, the big bang, there are no
physical natures, then where do they come from and what status do they have
afterward? I conclude that laws of nature have no causal efficacy and have no
ontological status except as products of human understanding, and that the real
natures of things which we can comprehend and then articulately express in mathematized
laws, could be differently conceptualized and expressed in different laws, without
loss of the intelligibility of nature or of the success of science, and that,
sometimes at least, we have to revise and refine the laws to make the systems
neater or more comprehensive (as we did to Newton's physics), without losing
what we previously comprehended (though comprehension can in part be lost for
a while too, as we advance on another front). So, in brief, the laws of nature
epitomize real explanations (causation and constitution) as far as we have grasped
them, but have so many made-up features that they are not even just "obtuse
abstractions" as that idea was explained earlier, but are products of our
"intellectual composition of nature," more closely analogous to landscape
art, architectural and mechanical drawing and map making than to wall-building.
II. Sharpening the Issues
No one is likely to deny that there are natural laws, even natural necessities,
e.g., as the velocity of an object with mass approaches that of light, the mass
approaches infinity, or F=MA applied to automobile crashes. Few would deny that
the necessity mentioned is an abstraction and extrapolation by theory from the
regularity of physical behavior. That is especially obvious in the relation
of velocity, mass and the speed of light, since we do not have any observed
cases at large fractions of the speed of light, or at the least had none when
the generality was accepted on theoretical grounds. And some might insist that
the law has ideal status, like a platonic archetype, or holds because of the
divine immutability (Descartes), or is only a human instrument for the prediction
of regularity in experience (Berkeley), or even, is an a priori mental structure
of experience (Kant). Those are all too extravagant. The real natures of things
are the basis for the laws we abstract, however much mathematics and theorizing
we do to formulate them. Some people, of course, are satisfied to say there
is no further basis than the observable regularity of behavior, and perhaps,
artifacts of our thinking. But that just leaves the question "whence the
regularity of behavior?" unaddressed, but not suppressed. And it is the
regularity of behavior we want to recognize, predict and explain. If the laws
are the abstractive/judgmental outcomes of regular material behavior, then the
explanation of the regularity does not lie in the laws but has to lie in real
principles of constant causation (some, with immediate effects). So real causation
has to include something more than event-causation as Hume and many other philosophers
describe it; in fact, event-causation is, probably, entirely reducible to constant
causation of immediate effects.
An active dispositive nature is an intrinsic explanatory principle (a causal
origin) of observable regularity of behavior that is the basis for law-like
generalization. For instance it is the nature of liquids that if contained,
pressure applied at any point through the surface of the container is distributed
equally all over the inner surface of the container: the principle of hydraulic
brakes and airplane hydraulics. Very probably we can now provide a reductive
account of that element of the nature of fluids; but that does not impugn the
claim that the hydraulic properties are features of fluids by nature, that is,
from the intrinsic molecular/atomic constitution that causes observable fluid
behavior, like moving a piston, that we rely upon to produce further effects
(braking, flap positioning).
For a long time philosophers dismissed the idea of intrinsic explanatory structures
as unnecessary and unintelligible. For if there is one universal cosmic physics,
then all physical behavior is in principle at least, reducible under the universal
physical principles and nothing additional is required. So what is the point
of forms, essences and natures? What explanatory content could they add, and
how could we avoid the appearance of causation by magic? Within the 17th century
idea of res extensa with only geometric properties, acting under a universal
divine deposit of motion, like a giant clock wound up by the divine will and
never to run down (but with no part actually pushing its ghostly three-dimensional
geometric nearest neighbor to a new relative position), the old Aristotelian
notion of multitudes of innate forms (like "little souls in things"
to use a very apt phrase of Descartes') was arbitrary and unneeded.
The internal defects of a notion of continuous matter with only Euclidean geometrical
properties that could still be discrete and able to transmit motion, apparently
by getting out of the way all together (without any explanation of transmission,
resistance, friction, etc.), did not become obvious right away, and there was
such rapid supplementation within 45 years by Newton that the incoherence of
the Cartesian system was not as much of interest to physicists as Newton's explanatory
successes by the offensive ideas of action at a distance. Nevertheless, both
systems lack coherent accounts of physical causation. After all, besides the
mysterious force of gravity that was supposed to propagate without a medium
(and at what rate? instantaneously?), there is also the mysterious attachment
of the close particles of solids that weakens with distance; but why? (Now we
can explain it.) And gradually electro-magnetic force was recognized, as was
the strong nuclear force and the weak force (since reduced, I think, to the
electro-magnetic force). All the phenomena of observable matter were to be explained
through these basic forces, supplemented by quantum theory, without the need
of any additional forms, natures or other software.
As things turned out with the development of physics, chemistry, biology (and
hundreds of other subdisciplines), the cosmic physics, as far as we have it
worked out, very little resembles 17th century mechanism, or even Newtonian
mechanics, and much more resembles an almost innumerable variety of scripts
composed within a framework of universal physical principles (the universal
constants and forces) from which one cannot usually deduce the scripts, though
there are indeed notable exceptions, some having to do with star and galaxy-formation
and some with the behavior of metals, glass, glaciers, ocean waves, light waves,
sound waves, hydraulics, aerodynamics, electronics and the like.
The script for concrete hardening is probably reducible to chemical and physical
subscripts. So also, electrical induction is probably reducible to atomic and
electromagnetic principles. But there is no known similar reduction of crabs,
worms, birds, insects, spiders, or mammals of any species to the components,
even to cells, much less to molecules or atoms. In other words, there are principles
of organization, especially obvious in living things, that produce a unified
existent, explain its characteristic behavior, that are destroyed by its death,
and cannot, as far as we know so far, be produced by mere sequencing and arranging
of the universal physical principles.
The universal reductionist dream seems further from reality than ever, while
the reality of intrinsic dynamic structures that script the observable phenomena,
sometimes rigidly and sometimes probably, is harder and harder to deny. Who
can doubt that when critical mass of fissionable uranium is reached, the resulting
phenomena follow exactly as if they were written into the atoms in the first
place? Who can doubt that when a baby red squirrel matures in a hospitable environment,
it will feed and play and seek to reproduce as do the others of its kind? The
squirrel, unlike the critical mass of uranium, has an active, overall organizing
principle that makes it one living thing, a principle of constant causation
that is active in a way a radio's design is not?
1. Tunes -- Forms and structures.
To clarify both the intelligibility and the constant causation, including the
causation of being, by forms, let's begin with the idea of a tune. The page
here displays several tunes, spread out in space in printing and spread out
in time in performance, but with no relation between the two extensions. Each
has an internal structure. How the internal structure of the sung tune is to
be described depends of course on one's made up musical theory, of intervals,
notes (pitches) and, perhaps voice leading, and one's principles about how to
divide up the sound rhythmically and metrically. If you describe some of these
tunes in terms of classical diatonic structures you get progressions made out
of such intervals as major thirds, consecutive whole tones, minor thirds, perfect
fifths, and so forth. But if you describe them according to a 23 tone scale
(still between A-440 to A-880), the intervals will be quite different, and unless
we are careful about what tunes we pick, there may even be no equivalent in
that scale. Similarly, Gregorian Chants, in the chant modes, can be notated
as diatonic melodies. But not all diatonic melodies can be notated or sung within
the chant modes.
[Insert half-page of illustrations]
Melodies have personality and energy that cannot be explained by the general musical theory alone. J. S. Bach melodies have peculiar energy qualities (intelligibility, striving and driving toward the resolution) not shared by the Brahms, though sometimes something analogous appears in Bartok melodies. [See the illustrations.]
Singing or playing or writing out the song is a materialization of the form,
the tune: you can show that by transposing the tune up a third or down a tone.
The material, the tones, entirely changes but the structure remains the same.
In fact, skipping the abstraction by which we render a melody without the particular
sounds by marks in a score, the melody has no reality apart from the singing
or playing, or the image in someone's memory or recording, or digital program,
or the composer's making. The relation of the melody to the song is the relation
of form to matter. Structure determines what the thing is, in this case, which
song it is, and that it is a song, and that it exists, and is not a random sequence
of squeaks, say. The fact that the melody can be repeated in different media
for materialization, say, in magnetic impulses in radio waves (which are actually
light waves, not sound at all), on violins, pianos, organs (with different systems
of tuning and different temperaments), is merely a modern illustration of Aristotle's
observation that a material form can be received in many kinds of matter, that
is, matter capable of the differentiations and stability and unity the form
requires. The melody has no existence apart from a materialization as I said:
it is a form. Yet the melody is not the same as any of its materializations
and is an internal, intrinsic, constant organizing cause of the melodic features
of any of its soundings and also an intrinsic constant cause of the existence
(being) of the song.
The melody that makes a particular song to be "A Mighty Fortress is Our
God," is not detectable to the senses as a melody, even if it is found
to be pleasurable; that is, melody has to be grasped, understood, and in the
understanding made present as a cross-temporal unit. The same holds for a spoken
sentence too (as Augustine noted in De Magistro). A judgment under a conception
is required to turn the perceptual multiplicity into a perceived unity, that,
as understood, like a sentence, is understood all-at-once (in a time different
from the time of performance). It is only the unity perceived that can be repeated
in other performances. A child less than a year old can perceive simple tunes
that even a herder sheep-dog cannot. Do not confuse the material repeatability
of music and all other messages by copying or reproduction of the signal; even
random sounds with no message and no form can be physically replicated. Multiple
realization requires the same form. We have to be able to say there is no relevant
difference as to what is sung, whether a man sings a phrase or a woman does,
though a woman's voice is an octave higher than a man's.
That kind of experience by which you grasp the song, even if you don't have
a name for it or a conception for it, is abstractive judgment. So is the situation
in which someone says something in an unknown language; and you, without any
idea of its content, judge that something was said (asserted, exclaimed, asked,
ordered, etc.). Thus judgment can have very little content while still being
genuinely abstract. Notice, any tune has the same indeterminacy, compared to
pure functions, as any other physical form. But that does not cause "no
fact of the matter" as to whether a song is "Three Blind Mice"
or "Frere Jacques."
There is no physical relation that constitutes sameness of form. So a tune can
be played beginning on any note (or any pitch or even any frequency). The intervals
do not have to be preserved in any physical way; they can all be out of tune.
Identity is a matter of recognizability and some of that requires expertise
or habitual appreciation, for instance, to recognize a melody under the transformations
of jazz improvisation. There is no merely physical isomorphism that has to be
preserved for replication of a tune (or any other material form); that's illustrated
by the fact that you can play a tune on some old twangy piano with no intervals
in tune, and thus none of the intervals is even proportionally the same as on
a well-tuned piano. The tune can be the same, even if some of the keys won't
sound.
Now that is not a suggestion that distributive and organizing forms are not
material realities. Rather, although no such form can exist unmaterialized,
the form cannot be identified with any materialization even though, in each,
the form explains both the organization of the components and the existence
of the material thing. The tune explains the organization of sound into the
song, that (sort of) song, and the existence (internally) of the song. Recognizing
a song is not like a sheep-dog's recognition of the master's whistled directions
from a mile away in New Zealand. The understanding has to organize into a present
unified identification, what is presented successively as a transtemporal unit,
temporally organized (e.g., with some parts longer than others).
No, I don't want the reader to conclude that every time there is a common formula
among things there is a common form in nature, except perhaps in the sense of
an accidental form. Accidental patterns can occur in traffic, in investments,
even in literature and music; some novelist may use "th" sounds more
often than another, and not because of a character's accent. Whenever there
is a tune-like structure to things that are causally interacting, there will
be patterns in the interaction that will also have a formula-like structure
but for the most part those will be resultants, that is, causally accounted
for by the material transformations in which the constitutive formula is realized.
So I leave the question of what are the fundamental structures in nature apart
for the moment, merely pointing out that no adequate science could account for
the behavior of things without regarding, for instance, the element-structures
by which each has its own identifying light signature, and every particle of
each element has the same light signature, as real. The explanation is in the
organization of the atoms (the elemental form), the nature of light and their
interactions. The atomic constitution and the crystalline organization explain
the features of steel by which it gets its contrasted laminating qualities,
tensile qualities, strength, stability, elasticity, and its other features in
contrast say to glass. Nature is full of tunes -- continuous causation according
to a program, whose dynamic features explain the exhibited behavior of things.
Whether those natural tunes are themselves somehow fundamental and not themselves
the resultants of other forms is a separate matter. For the most part, we're
inclined to think that such natural structures as we find in, say, water molecules,
are in fact causally resultant from structures we can find in the components,
the atoms. So, for instance, the fact that water has three states, liquid, gas
and solid, and as gas has several distinct states, is a resultant of the atomic
features of the molecules yet conditional upon there being environments in which
those three states might occur. Sometimes latent capacities can be discovered
theoretically, by comparisons, even though not practically producible. Azimov
reports that hydrogen under a pressure equalling that at earth's center would
form a dense black solid.
A truly physicalist account of matter, which is surely the ideal of empirical
science, has to say that the entire reality of physical laws is in material
things without requiring any abstract object or any thinking being at all. So
if the wind chimes happen to make the sound of "Three Blind Mice,"
although what tune it is depends on human invention, that such a progression
of intervals is of the form A, A, B, B, B, A has to be entirely accounted for
by the physical features of the particular sounds. That structure has to be
entirely in the material thing or else it does not organize the material thing.
But if the structure is entirely in the sounds, then it begins and ends with
the sounds and is as particular as they are. That's why the discussion of abstraction
and its normal outcome, conception, is so important for explaining understanding
and truth [see Chapter 5]. What I called "dematerialization of the singular"
is actually a real change in the intelligent perceiver by which the form that
is particular in the thing and to the senses is also present, as structure,
to the understanding. The sounds are not really changed, but the person is who
hears the tune.
The notion of a formula is too static to explain the notion of natural structures
that I have in mind. If the natural structure is real, in the thing, a formula,
mathematical or chemical, or the like, may be an expression or description of
it. So the formula, say, given in a scientific description of a crystal structure
like corundum, is related to the particular emerald somewhat the way a concept
or a conception is related to a perceived thing. It is the same in content.
The formulas and other mathematized generalizations with which we describe the
physical phenomena are like a score transcribed by a skillful musician upon
hearing a work. He can so transcribe the work that you can recover the work
from the score by making a sounding of it according to the pattern laid down
by the score, interpreting the marks according to the prevailing conventions
for reading scores. The score is related to the composition the way a sentence
in use is related to what is said. And the composition, what is said, is far
more definite than any expression of it, and a performance, like other real
situations, is transcendently determinate, as that notion was explained in Chapter
1 and again in Chapter 6.
Similarly, it is as if there has to be a certain kind of tune running through
all the matter in the human body and continuing for quite a long time, as long
as the matter is capable of the tune, in order for there to be a human being
at all. When the matter, like the sounds, can't maintain the continuation of
the tune, the whole thing (song, human) ceases to be. I end the discussion of
structures or forms of things that operate dynamically like software to explain
the unified being of things, for now. The main point to be made out of this
is that what a thing is, determined by the melody or form, is itself something
realized entirely in the materialization and spread out in time, presented to
us by the senses and recognizable by the understanding alone (cf. Descartes'
similar point in his wax example, Meditation 2).
2. What about indeterminacy and the borders of natural and synthetic kinds?
With many natural kinds we can find or make cases that fall on the borders or
outside the borders of things that bear the name, either because of a similar
constitution with a difference of behavior or because of the same behavior but
from a different constitution (emeralds: beryl v. corundum). There are three
different automatic focussing systems for a still camera (not entirely equivalent
because some results differ). And apparently some of the same software can run
on Mac and DOS and even Unix-based systems. But, the argument goes, if natural
and synthetic kinds are indefinite at the edges, and if the structures or forms
of things, measured precisely enough are not the same as the ideal forms, then
we don't really know the forms or natures of the individual cases and have to
get along with conventions about them. Granted that, we are told, then we might
as well conclude that there are not real forms or natures or natural kinds,
because, granting that we cannot know them, we have no reason in experience
for saying there are such things. No real difference in aspirin and arsenic?
But we do have reasons in experience for saying there are such things: pythons,
of certain species, kill by fangs and poison, boa constrictors kill by crushing,
congestive heart disease kills by failure to pump blood, coronary occlusion
kills by blockage of the blood passage. If some burning paper falls on your
hand, you can plunge it into water and extinguish the fire (even lessen the
burning of the hand). If some ignited napalm falls on your hand you cannot extinguish
it with water, and the burn is far worse in the same time. The fact that napalm
is gasoline thickened to flow jellied, either by soap thickeners or by polystyrene
or by similar polymers, and can, therefore, have varying chemical constitution,
does not cancel its being a really different kind of stuff from ignitable paper,
and that, regardless of the differences of constitution, certain gross properties
(not only of weight, viscosity and electron behavior) but being non-extinguishable
by water, causing searing burning, and burning what cannot be ignited, are distinctive.
We should acknowledge that there are real (even if synthetic) equivalence kinds,
the same in certain behavior and with distinct equivalent constitutions for
producing the behavior.
So we proceed to abstract a chemical formula for some stuff, say, gasoline.
Someone points out that a particular gasoline may not be ideally pure, having
admixtures of other chemicals; someone else points out that gasoline often has
deliberate additives, as did leaded gasoline. The conclusion is supposed to
be that we do not know "what" gasoline is. But the conclusion does
not follow at all. We can know what something is, when there is not a single
perfect case available. And, of course, in a pre-scientific way we can know
for certain that an average caucasian, a seven-foot Zulu, a pygmy, a dwarf and
a midget are all humans without being able to say more precisely than "rational
animal" what the common nature is. But it is real and equally present in
everyone. Scientifically we can say what nitroglycerin is and how it differs
from semtex, and can predict the explosive behavior of each precisely.
So, even though the under-determination of hypotheses by data, the inscrutability
of reference, the grue problems of Goodman and "quus/plus" plus problems
of Kripke can be replicated over the question, "what is the identity of
the tune or the melody in any given sounding?" since there is nothing about
the sounding that tells us whether it has ended, nothing that tells us what
would have occurred, had a half-step been added or a note divided in two, or
had the pitch of the instrument flattened a quarter-tone and so, when you take
an entirely enumerative inductive approach, there is no particular reason to
project one predicate (call it "Moon River," rather than "Spoon
River," a contrasting and incompatible predicate), on any given pattern
of sound. The fact is that those conjectural differences are irrelevant, both
cognitively and entitatively. We discover the real natures of things, even of
our own inventions, by comprehension based on abstraction and not by generalization
based on counting cases. The Humean induction problem and Goodman's new riddle
of induction and even meaning -- skepticism, apply to processes we do not usually
use in understanding the natures of things.
The fact that any description of constitution we offer might be replaced by
a better or more comprehensive one, or may even need to be replaced as we fit
chemistry more securely into the lap of physics, has nothing to do with whether
the earlier description is sufficient for us to comprehend the active principle
of characteristic behavior. We can even comprehend that some inner constitution
is the constant cause of observable behavior, say of a fiber "with memory,"
so that even if stretched out into a line, when dropped into warm water, it
returns to its spring-shape with all the spring properties intact, when we have
no idea (as non-specialists) of what the inner constitution is or how it achieves
the "memory" effect. We know that the inner constitution has to have
a part or feature that acts like a program, a command structure, that causes
the components to do what they do, in contrast to arrangements where the same
components (qualitatively) do not have the active abilities we observe, but
have others of the same complexity or others of a lower complexity, instead.
In a word, the argument that from indeterminacy of various sorts we can conclude
that if there is a definite structure we cannot know it, and because we lack
such knowledge in principle we are in no position to insist that there are inner
explanatory structures in things, has everything backwards. Our experiential
knowledge that what things are and what they do is explained by their constitution,
and that same components are not enough for same constitution, but that there
also has to be a story, a program, or form, and that that generality holds throughout
all the dimensions of matter from 2x1040 cm to 2x10-23 cm is certain and something
scientific theory and philosophy of science have to suppose and to explain,
not deny. It is the intelligible in nature that we strive to understand, and
to use in explanations. Philosophy that denies intelligible reality is really
there and really everywhere, has torn out its eyes.
The wrong conclusion was drawn from saying our knowledge of the material world
based on the examination of cases is always indeterminate among conflicting
generalities. Oftentimes any one of the relevant generalities will do to articulate
our comprehension, just as distinct scores taken by dictation form a symphony
may do equally well for later performances. Knowledge runs ahead of the data,
and does so rather quickly, using it like snow to ski on. So while it is true
that an inexperienced person has great difficulty in identifying what the melody
is in a passage from Strauss's Electra, and would be even more baffled at differentiating
cells microscopically or at reading a sonogram, that's really no different from
an ordinary person's being baffled to figure out what the formula for formica
is, or an outsider's not knowing when the windup begins and ends for a baseball
pitch and, thus being unable to see a balk. Most of our discriminations as to
what things really are have to be learned and are modified by teaching. The
fact that there is a theoretical haze around many such judgments is no basis
for uncertainty, usually, and is merely a byproduct of the fact that thought
can be, with respect to ideal objects and pure functions, more definite and
precise than matter can be. And so, in principle we can always ask a question,
"It is A, or incompatible B?", that nature cannot answer because it
cannot actually be either. Yet nature can and is still definite in its own way:
intrinsic form and structure explains observable regularity of behavior. And
any physical thing has overflow features we do not know of, and, as to individuation,
we cannot in principle understand.
3. Same constitution and replicability.
One cannot multiply things of the same sort of constitution without numerically
differing components or relative locations (two electromagnetic fields, say),
but the same form. Now as was known from ancient times, "same form"
cannot mean numerically the same form because one case can be destroyed without
affecting the other. You would only have numerically the same form in all the
letters "A" in this manuscript if by erasing one you could make them
all disappear. So there has to be real repeatability materially, just as there
can be real repetition of a statement or a tune, where each is the same but
the materialization is different and distinct.
Human nature is repeated and multiplied analogously to Sinatra's and Ella Fitzerald's
singing "Time Goes By." One could retrace the mountain roads of the
traditional problem of universals at this point; but that is unnecessary. We
don't need to explain where forms come from and how they organize matter (as
if there were inner mechanisms by which forms work). We can settle for the notion
that by forms matter is organized into unified active dispositions that characterize
one sort of thing as against another, from dinosaurs right down to cells, proteins,
molecules, atoms, electrons, neutrons, protons, mesons, and perhaps quarks and
further. We can allow that matter may, for all we know, be "forms all the
way down," a recursive structuring, and, unless we are primarily investigating
the origination of the whole universe, we can leave all the questions about
universals behind with the simple observations that universals (as the conceptions
by which we apprehend first level general forms above individuating differences)
exist as such only in thought, that they are the abstractive presence of the
particularized forms of things and not causes of them (as Plato had it). Forms
are particular in things and not separable (except in the case of humans, perhaps).
Any organizing principle of material components can be repeated in suitable
other components, whether naturally or synthetically, but the repetition yields
at most a plurality of the same sort, not repetition of the actual thing, as
can happen with an abstract particular; e.g., the very thing, Mozart's Symphony
No. 40 can be repeated; this book can be repeated, even in different type, and
in different media. Individuals cannot in that sense be repeated and neither
can forms.
Now some people have said this sort of a theory spills over on the one side
into conceptualism because it seems to suggest that the regularity of things
is somehow accounted for by our concepts, or on the other side into nominalism,
because it says in fact that there isn't any generality in things, there is
only multiplicity in equiform names for things. But this sort of theory is neither
nominalist not conceptualist. For one thing, it requires what other philosophers
call abstract ideas; it requires that we abstract the things we perceive just
as if each were a chain of pitches in which we hear a tune. For that you don't
need to name the tune, you don't need to be able to reproduce the tune, sing
it or anything of that kind; it simply presents itself with that kind of generality,
coincident with the particular sounds, by which one can say, in addition to
hearing the sounds, we hear the song, usually learning how to do that for all
sorts of things, by comparison. It doesn't make any sense at all to say that
the similarity between renditions of "A Mighty Fortress" is accounted
for by our conception of something like a formula for "A Mighty Fortress
is Our God," that could be a kind of tone-neutral score. We can abstract
and recognize the tune because it is in each playing, not the other way around.
Nominalism will do no better at explaining how there can be abstraction in which a physical object perceptually present is coincident with the conception and judgment (say, as to what tune it is). That cannot be explained as the mere application of one label to many objects. In fact, a nominalist cannot explain what applying "the same name to many things" is, in a way that accords with our linguistic practice, except for the cases where we really do that: count things the same because we call them the same: e.g., accidents.
The general shape of this account is moderate realism: we have real forms (software,
scripts, dynamic natures) to explain (a) the similarity of distinct things,
(b) the internal organization of matter into unities whose diverse regularities
of behavior are observable, (c) the intelligibility, by conception, of material
things, and (d) what the basic components of judgments are and how conception
can build upon conception into very abstract thought, even highly formal thinking
like advanced mathematics.
When in the normal course of making sounds, say whistling or humming for example,
we produce sounds that satisfy some formula, and then repeat the melody with
another set of sounds, their sameness is not to be explained extrinsically either
by a causal or a similarity relation to an archetype or even to what we abstract
from one of them, or even less by our happening to call them "I did it
my way." For the organization that makes a melody is internal to the sounds
and coincident with them and as particular as they are. The organization is
repeated with each suitable succession of sounds. It is real and intrinsic to
the material world.
There is a tension between saying the repeated singing repeats the organizing form numerically but otherwise without any difference in it, but only in the particular sounds that embody it, and saying that the organizing form understood, through abstraction, is numerically the same as the form in the singing. For that would seem to imply that A = B, yet A = C and B = C. The answer is that numerical identity is a merely logical relation of particulars to themselves, and numerical difference is a logical (mind dependent) relation dependent on real differences. So the form (tune) in two cases of singing can be numerically different because its embodiment in sounds is different. But the form in each embodiment can be completely the same as the form conceived because by conception it acquires another manner of being but not a difference of content. The form, particular in the tune is also abstract in the thinker.
4. Realism again.
The object of science is a stable comprehension of things, ever more particular
and also more encompassing. Not mere information, or conjecture, or confirmed
hypotheses, but a genuine grasp of the "WHY" of what things do, that
we can display in successful prediction and technology (or other doing and making).
Ideally we'd attain cosmic comprehension, becoming streetwise in the universe
if we could; not to make a map of nature, but no more to need a map than I need
a map of my hand.
In science, item by item truth lets us know "how it goes," what to
expect from things and why; from that we grasp their natures. But the lying
laws of physics that do not predict the observed values, and the imaginable,
competing sciences may be useful parts of what we want, not because "Yin"
and "Yang" are just as good as "positive charge" and "negative
charge" for physics, but because enough truth is what triggers comprehension,
at a threshold that varies with our prior knowledge, our scope, our emotional
refinement and our intelligence. For the most part, we know only the causally
consequent natures of things, and have barely a glimmer as yet of the basic
cosmic physics. The people who think the end of science is in sight, have not
even seen the beginning yet or appreciated the "great problem" to
explain life and perception, not to mention intelligence. That does not mean
our knowledge is trivial, or "only of effects," as if we knew that
acidity turns pink litmus paper light blue, but not why. Our knowing why is
knowledge of the real nature of acids. Realism that acknowledges our ignorance
is not like Locke's agnosticism about the natures of things. We have that knowledge
at mid-dimensions to an amazing degree; and we know enough to see that the micro-micro-components
of matter have none of the "primary" qualities, of size, shape, hardness,
and the like, that were thought definitive of matter from the 17th to 19th centuries.
Even the notions of extension, of "occupying places" and "intelligible
extension" have given way to ideas like "mathematizable propensities
to detectable effects." How, indeed, can one photon, through a slit, be
in two places on a screen in defiance of the light constant? How, indeed, can
the place of an electron be indeterminate apart from observation? We have current
anomalies and mysteries, but they all suppose extensive certainties about the
natures of things.
5. Consequent natures.
Consequent natures, say, milk, meat, sunlight, and oak, and most basic chemical
and atomic natures, are just as real as the most basic ones we do not know.
They are not mere shadows, mere deceptions made by us, the way Paul Churchland
[1979, pp. 25-36] seems to think music is related to frequencies. Because they
have causal tendencies of their own, mid-size things have conditional routines,
things they will do under triggering circumstances and sustaining conditions,
in virtue of what they are, but which do not amount to what they are; e.g.,
hydrogen's turning into a black rockhard solid at earth-center pressures, and
boiling at a few degrees above absolute zero; meat's being freezable once and
edible, but not re-freezable and edible; water's expanding when frozen while
metals contract.
Whether the consequent behavioral tendencies of things are resultant, emergent,
or constructed, they are all real -- all caused by the materialized forms of
things. The pink glare of a polka-dot wall, from a certain distance is just
as real as the polka-dots at a lesser distance, though the pink results from
the polka-dots and not vice versa. So too, my dog looks small off in the distance
(not, "looks like a small dog" or "as if he got small" or
the like, just "looks small," relatively, as do automobiles and houses
from an airplane, and people on a vast staircase like the Philadelphia Museum
of Art). Those are consequent visual appearances, the way things should look,
given our optical abilities, and are within our general comprehension of vision,
optics and light.
The poisonous gas from heating ammonia may be a mere resultant, yet it has real
tendencies, e.g., to replace the oxygen in certain blood cells. It does things,
consequential though they may be, yet neither accidental, nor incidental, just
latent, and not the same as what-it-is, but explained by what-it-is along with
some other general regularities.
We already have profound comprehension, highly systematized (though improvable),
of whole areas of the world, like parts of chemistry (e.g., paint chemistry,
molecular biology), the physical theory of frequencies and harmonics, and optics,
cell biology, metallurgy (metal bonding), geology (core dating and tectonic
plate theory), and various technologies, ranging from general surgery to how
to destroy all humans and make wastes that will outlast the English language.
The fact that with nearly perfect understanding of optics, we can make a near-sighted
space-telescope (Hubble II) and then correct it by virtually making glasses
for it, is testimony not to subjectivity and relativity, but to objectivity
and truth about the natures of things.
Philosophers have drawn irrealist conclusions from the made up, arbitrary elements
of science, just as they draw relativist conclusions from sensory illusions.
But the optical illusions indicate conditions of verticality, not the untrustworthiness,
of perception. The reason perceptions distinguishing "inner" and "outer"
corners are reliable is that there is a systematic difference optically that
is indicated by the "two arrows" illusion. So too, making homemade
simplicities, inventions, conventions and arbitrary units and measures (e.g.,
foot, inch, joule, watt, coulomb), we probe metals, gasses, and light, to "figure
out what it will do and why," making up experimental conditions [Hacking,
1983, pp. 224-229] to reach a comprehension that we can explicate in true, though
idealized and restricted descriptions, not a telephone directory of mere items.
Ian Hacking [1983, p. 163] uses the example of an arbitrary object, the "duty"
of an engine, a measure of work done for energy consumed, a measure "fully
grounded" in the natures of the things (though how was unknown), by which
to compare efficiency. Hacking's story [1983, pp. 176-178] of Herschel's discovery
of radiant heat indicates that a false encompassing theory -- a corpuscular
theory of light -- need not block the comprehension that is scientific understanding.
The "reality" aspect of this "realism" is that there are
real natures with active dispositions (as real as the flowing and heating of
molten lava, the searing of skin by hot iron). The notion of real dispositions,
active tendencies, many of them conditional, that are mathematically describable
and traceable to a stable structure (form), is at bottom in the realism I advocate,
and at bottom again in the account of impossibility.
There is no getting around it: either we explain something's doing something
on account of what it is (so that in order to be, it has to do that, at least
conditionally or latently, like an electron) or we have no scientific starting
point as to why anything that exists temporally, does anything. Among the things
whose doings are explained by what they are, there are two sorts: those whose
doings are what they are (without any latencies), like force fields, and those
things whose doings are on account of what they are but not the same as what
they are because, in other circumstances, they would behave differently.
The overall picture is exactly the opposite of Descartes'. For him everything
in the physical world does what it does because it moves on tracks of universal
laws which are as much products of God's immutable nature as the initial deposit
of motion is a product of God's will. On my view, whatever the role of God may
be, what things do is on account of what they are, and all matter converts,
in principle, to energy, and all matter is structured energy, where the mass,
not the structure, converts, via the light constant, into energy.
6. The status of the laws.
Philosophers just assume that if we find "the laws" we'll have the
explanations. That is not true. Laws of nature are thought-dependent; they are
creations of human understanding. Unless we explain what things do, eventually,
on account of what they are, their doings will either require an outside explainer,
like a deity to move particles that have no "insides" to move them,
like a director to command the actors' every move on the stage, or there will
be no explanation at all, just the appearance of one in the talk of "laws."
There is another option: structure (materialized) explains behavior. Yet structure
has to be materially realized or understood, otherwise it does not exist. There
are many structures that exist only as things understood and have no materialization
(formal structures); but there are also uncountable materialized structures
that we have not conceptualized or at least not at the level by which we would
have a scientifically articulate grasp of "what" they are, yet; and
there are libraries of structures, consequent, resultant, emergent and fairly
fundamental, too, that we have conceptually and systematically articulated.
We cannot end up explaining nature from abstract entities, the laws, supposed
to exist apart from matter and independently of it and of thought [see Chapter
3, Section 5]. We cannot explain what things do from nothing, as we might explain
falling water, "because nothing was there." Nor will it do to say
"there was nothing to stop it," because it is not true that "everything
does just anything, unless something else stops it." Not at all. What things
do is a display, relatively to a physical environment, of what they are. As
Averroes/Avicenna said [cf. Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia], "the nature
of a thing is the what-it-is displayed in what it does" ("nature is
essence exhibited in operation"). Why things do not do something else,
to use Aquinas' example, why shapes do not cause colors, or, to use a Hacking
example [1983, p. 175], why the air does not distort the shapes of words I read
(the way water does), always ends with a story of what does what and why on
account of its structure or material it does it. And "components,"
like quarks, are thought of as unities which in formalizable combinations (e.g.,
two "up" quarks and a "down" quark are a proton), contrastively,
provide the structures (formally) for diverse particles: protons, neutrons,
electrons, etc. Of course, why they do that will either turn out to be a conceptual
inclusion, or a case of another generality, or another fact in need of an explanation.
Looked at one way, "mass is resistance to acceleration" and "as
velocity increases mass increases so that as velocity approaches C, mass approaches
infinity." Looked at another way, one wants to know why? Why is the velocity
of light finite when light has no mass? And in particular, why is its velocity
186,000 mps+ and constant everywhere (if it is)? If there is to be a genuine
answer, it will have to issue from a comprehension of what light is, etc.
7. Real natures: Basic, consequent, resultant and emergent.
First let me recall that nature is not the same as form. A real nature, say
of iron, involves both the elemental form and the material components, in this
case iron atoms each of which is organized by an intrinsic form and made of
interchangeable protons, neutrons, electrons and sub-nuclear parts. So to use
old terminology, a real nature is formed matter as principle of the operations
of a thing. Thus, we will explain why a pile of iron ore will become fluid only
above 2400 degrees Fahrenheit by a general account of molecular bonding and
of the changes caused by raising the average kinetic energy of the atoms high
enough, and we will similarly explain why it can be moulded, cooled, and why
it has its characteristic strength and weaknesses.
Now what sorts of real natures are there? Candidates seem to be: basic, consequent,
resultant and emergent, because such distinctions seems to be clear enough.
Whether there are any basic real natures, as I said, I do not know, though I
doubt it in one sense: that there are any physical behaviors involving components
that do not involve forms for the components; that is, there seems to be no
bottom layer in that sense. Structured material seems to be recursive. However,
in another sense, there do seem to be physical realities that are what they
do, that are not made out-of anything, and do the same thing no matter what,
that is, have no latencies toward other behavior; examples seem to be electro-magnetic
fields and light. Whether the examples turn out to be apt or not is incidental.
There may even turn out to be no natures basic in that sense at all, though
I doubt that. For physical causation, productive causation as distinct from
formal causation (the constant causation of existence and what-kind), seems
to be, at bottom, the resultant of basic natures: thus light, on account of
what it is, propagates and is subject to gravity (though, how can it be subject
to gravity if it has no mass?), and gravity (supposing it to be a universal
force field for now, or even to be "clumps" of mass (where [e=mc2])
determines space by determining the relative paths of motions of things. Now
this is all imaginary: to illustrate that if there are enough sorts of things
that are what they do, related systematically to one another, that nothing further
is required for physical causation -- the universal regularities are resultant
from the basic natures.
Consequent natures are best illustrated by the human synthesis of resultant
natures: into paints, metals, buildings, etc. But it happens as well in nature
untouched by humans: rivers in certain kinds of soils bend snakewise in direct
proportion to depth and volume. And, of course, humans can now make synthetic
rubies, sapphires, diamonds, etc., because we understand the natural materials
(aluminum oxide, say) and understand both the crystal structures and how to
simulate the natural production.
Emergent natures involve emergent forms. I have mentioned such things several
times, speculating as to what that feature might consist in and how it may be
part of our explanation of life and of sensation, analogously to the way, with
seed crystals in a proper bath, a whole crystal structure will form, following
its own script, as it were. The fact that a hydrofoil skims the water is a resultant
of all the shapes, materials and forces involved; similarly, the fact that a
superconductor can be made to "float" is a resultant of the electromagnetic
properties when the atoms all line up the right way. But the fact that an animal
can see cannot be explained that way: so we have to consider that there are
real active abilities latent within the basic structures of nature that are
not predictable or reducible or even deducible from the true description of
the universal physical forces and basic natures.
III. Conclusion
Although I have argued, mostly by illustration, that there are real explanatory
structures, forms, throughout the physical world that are the basis of the intelligibility
of the world and the basis of our concepts, I want to reiterate that both the
notion "form" and the reality, forms, are respectively linguistically
and really analogous. The common umbrella notion of "the intrinsic principle
of constant causation of characteristic observable behavior and readiness to
behave" is captured by the discourse sector: melodies as explanations of
songs, buttresses as explanations of the counterthrust by which walls are stabilized,
software that makes a computer into a wordprocessor, electro-magnetic fields
-- all fit the general notion but in detail are both very much alike and very
different. That's why I used the metaphor "scripts": material things,
no matter what they do, follow scripts; intrinsic scripts are forms; they are
what we understand prescientifically (and sometimes with elegant expectations,
as hunters know what their game will do and south-sea islanders know the curls
and slopes of the waves) and come to understand articulately and mathematically
as science progresses. Sometimes we can reduce what were previously thought
to be a plurality of forms to one, sometimes not. Whether it is the way butter
melts, or an overheated spoon curls and shrivels, or a spring pulls, or a molecule
assembles, or a crystal forms, or an atom splits, it is as if matter is following
one or another script; and since there are no outside scripts, no archetypes,
there must be an intrinsic structure, like a program or software, that is the
constant cause of both behavior and existence. So what was unneeded for the
ghostly solid geometry of matter three centuries ago is indispensable to explain
material change and causation now. It is, as well, the foundation of the presence
of particular things, substances and events, abstractly to human understanding.